these,--is unfortunately, so very figurative, when he speaks of the
intellectual phenomena,(though I have no doubt that he would have
avoided these figures, if he could have foreseen the possibility of
their being interpreted literally,) that it is not easy to show, by
any single quotation, how very different his opinions as to perception
were, from those which Dr Reid has represented them to be. The great
question is, whether he believed the existence of ideas, as things
in the mind, separate from perception, and intermediate between, the
organic affection, whatever it might be, and the mental affection;
or whether the _idea_ and the _perception_ were considered by him as
the same. “In the perception of external objects,” says Dr Reid, “all
languages distinguish three things,--the mind that perceives,--the
operation of that mind, which is called perception,--and the object
perceived. Philosophers have introduced a fourth thing, in this
process, which they call the idea of the object.”[93] It is the merit
of shewing the nullity of this supposed fourth thing, which Dr Reid
claims, and which has been granted to him, without examination. The
perception itself, as a state of the mind, or, as he chooses to call
it, an operation of the mind, he admits, and he admits also the organic
change which precedes it. Did Mr Locke then contend for any thing more,
for that fourth thing, the idea, distinct from the perception,--over
which Dr Reid supposes himself to have triumphed? That he did not
contend for any thing more, nor conceive the idea to be any thing
different from the perception itself, is sufficiently apparent from
innumerable passages both of his Essay itself, and of his admirable
defence of the great doctrines of his Essay, in his controversy with
Bishop Stillingfleet. He repeatedly states, that he uses the word
_idea_, as synonymous with _conception_ or _notion_, in the common use
of those terms; his only reason for preferring it to notion, (which
assuredly Dr Reid could not suppose to mean any thing, distinct from
the mind) being, that the term notion seems to him better limited to
a particular class of ideas, those which he technically terms _mixed
modes_. That ideas are not different from perceptions is clearly
expressed by him. “To ask at what time a man has first any _ideas_,”
he says, “is to ask when he begins to _perceive_; having ideas and
perception being the same thing.”[94] If he speaks of our senses, as
the _inlets_ to our ideas, the metaphor is surely a very obvious one;
or, if any one will still contend, that what is said metaphorically
must have been intended really, it must be remembered, that he uses
precisely the same metaphor, in cases in which the _real_ application
of it is absolutely impossible, as, for example, with respect to our
perceptions or sensations, and that, if we are to understand, from his
use of such metaphors, that he believed the ideas, thus introduced, to
be distinct from the mind, we must understand, in like manner, that he
believed our sensations and perceptions, introduced, in like manner, to
be also things self-existing, and capable of being admitted, at certain
inlets, into the mind as their recipient. “Our senses, conversant about
particular sensible objects, do convey,” he says, “into the mind,
several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways
wherein those objects do affect them.”[95] “The senses are avenues
provided by nature for the reception of sensations.”[96] I cannot but
think, that these, and the similar passages that occur in the Essay,
ought, of themselves, to have convinced Dr Reid, that he who thus spoke
of PERCEPTIONS, conveyed into the mind, and of avenues provided for the
reception of SENSATIONS, might also, when he spoke of the conveyance of
ideas into the mind, and of avenues for the reception of ideas, have
meant nothing more than the simple external origin of those notions,
or conceptions, or feelings, or affections of mind, to which he gave
the name of _ideas_; especially when there is not a single argument in
his Essay, or in any of his works, that is founded on the substantial
reality of our ideas, as separate and distinct things in the mind. I
shall refer only to one additional passage, which I purposely select,
because it is, at the same time, very full of the particular figures,
that have misled Dr Reid, and shews, therefore, what the true meaning
of the author was at the time at which he used these figures.
“The other way of retention, is the power to revive again in our minds
those ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as
it were laid aside out of sight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat
or light, yellow or sweet, the object being removed. This is memory,
which is, as it were the storehouse of our ideas. For the narrow
mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and
consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository to lay up
those ideas, which at another time it might have use of. But our ideas
being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be any
thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas
in the repository of the memory, signifies no more but this, that the
mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions, which it has once
had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had
them before. And in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in
our memories, when indeed they are actually no where, but only there
is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again, and as it
were paint them a-new on itself, though some with more, some with less
difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely.”[97]
The doctrine of this truly eminent philosopher, therefore, is, that the
presence of the external object, and the consequent organic change,
are followed by an idea, “which is nothing but the actual perception;”
and that the laying up of these ideas in the memory, signifies nothing
more, than that the mind has, in many cases, a power to revive
perceptions which it has once had. All this, I conceive, is the very
doctrine of Dr Reid on the subject; and to have confuted Mr Locke,
therefore, if it had been possible for him, must have been a very
unfortunate confutation, as it would have been also to have confuted
as completely the very opinions on the subject, which he was disposed
himself to maintain.
I may now proceed further back, to another philosopher of great
eminence, whose name, unfortunately for its reputation, is associated
more with his political and religious errors, than with his analytical
investigations of the nature of the phenomena of thought. The author
to whom I allude is Hobbes, without all question one of the most acute
intellectual inquirers of the country and age in which he lived. As
the physiology of the mind, in Britain at least seemed at that time
to be almost a new science, he was very generally complimented by
his contemporary poets, as the discoverer of a _new land_. Some very
beautiful Latin verses, addressed to him, I quoted to you, in a former
Lecture, in which it was said, on occasion of his work on Human Nature,
that the mind, which had before known all things, was now for the first
time made known to itself.
“Omnia hactenus
Quæ nosse potuit, nota jam primum est sibi.”
And in which he was said, _in revealing_ the mind, to have performed a
work, next in divinity to that of creating it.
“Divinum est opus
Animum creare, proximum huic ostendere.”
By Cowley, who styles him “the discoverer of the golden lands of new
philosophy,” he is compared to Columbus, with this difference, that
the world, which that great navigator found, was left by him, rude and
neglected, to the culture of future industry; while that which Hobbes
discovered might be said to have been at once explored by him and
civilized. The eloquence of his strong and perspicuous style, I may
remark by the way, seems to have met with equal commendation, from his
poetical panegyrists, with whom, certainly not from the excellence of
his own verses, he appears to have been in singular favour. His style
is thus described, in some verses of Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham:
“Clear as a beautiful transparent skin,
Which never hides the blood, yet holds it in;
Like a delicious stream it ever ran
As smooth as woman, and as strong as man.”[98]
The opinions of Hobbes, on the subject which we are considering, are
stated at length, in that part of his Elements of Philosophy, which he
has entitled _Physica_; and, far from justifying Dr Reid's assertion,
with respect to the general ideal system of philosophers, may be
considered, in this important respect, as far, at least, as relates to
the unity of the idea, and the perception itself, as similar to his
own. _Sensation_ or _perception_, he traces to the impulse of external
objects, producing a motion along the nerves towards the brain, and a
consequent reaction outwards, which he seems to think, very falsely
indeed, may account for the reference to the object as external. This
hypothesis, however, is of no consequence. The only important point
in reference to the supposed universality of the system of ideas, is
whether this philosopher of another age, asserted the existence of
ideas, as intermediate things, distinct from the mere perception;
and, on this subject, he is as explicit as Dr Reid himself could be.
The idea or _phantasma_, as he terms it, is the very perception or
_actus sentiendi_. “Phantasma enim est sentiendi actus; neque differt
a sensione, aliter quam _fieri_ differt a _factum esse_.”[99] The same
doctrine, and I may add also, the same expression of the unity of the
actus sentiendi and the phantasma, are to be found in various other
parts of his works.
I may, however, proceed still further back, to an author of yet wider
and more varied genius, one of those extraordinary men whom nature
gives to the world, for her mightiest purposes, when she wishes to
change the aspect, not of a single science merely, but of all that
can be known by man; that illustrious _rebel_, who, in overthrowing
the authority of Aristotle, seemed to have acquired, as it were by
right of conquest, a sway in philosophy, as absolute, though not so
lasting, as that of the Grecian despot. “Time,” says one of the most
eloquent of his countrymen, “has destroyed the opinions of Des Cartes.
But his glory subsists still. He appears like one of those dethroned
monarchs, who, on the very ruins of their empire, still seem born for
the sovereignty of mankind.”
On the opinions of Des Cartes, with respect to perception, Dr Reid has
dwelt at great length, and has not merely represented him as joining
in that belief of ideas, distinct from perception, which he represents
as the universal belief of philosophers, but has even expressed
astonishment, that Des Cartes, whose general opinions might have led
him to a different conclusion, should yet have joined in the common
one. “The system of Des Cartes,” he says, “is with great perspicuity
and acuteness explained by himself, in his writings, which ought to be
consulted by those who would understand it.”[100] He probably was not
aware, when he wrote these few lines, how important was the reference
which he made, especially to those whom he was addressing; since, the
more they studied the view which he has given of the opinions of Des
Cartes, the more necessary would it become for them to consult the
original author.
“It is to be observed,” he says, “that Des Cartes rejected a part only
of the ancient theory, concerning the perception of external objects
by the senses, and that he adopted the other part. That theory may be
divided into two parts,--the _first_, that images, species, or forms
of external objects, come from the object, and enter by the avenues
of the senses to the mind; the _second_ part is, that the external
object itself is not perceived, but only the species or image of it in
the mind. The first part Des Cartes and his followers rejected, and
refuted by solid arguments; but the second part, neither he nor his
followers have thought of calling in question; being persuaded that it
is only a representative image, in the mind, of the external object
that we perceive, and not the object itself. And this image, which
the Peripatetics called a _species_, he calls an _idea_, changing the
name only, while he admits the thing.”[101]--“Des Cartes, according
to the spirit of his own philosophy, ought to have doubted of both
parts of the Peripatetic hypothesis, or to have given his reasons,
why he adopted one part, as well as why he rejected the other part;
especially since the unlearned, who have the faculty of perceiving
objects by their senses, in no less perfection than philosophers, and
should therefore know, as well as they, what it is they perceive, have
been unanimous in this, that the objects they perceive are not ideas in
their own minds, but things external. It might have been expected, that
a philosopher, who was so cautious as not to take his own existence for
granted, without proof, would not have taken it for granted, without
proof, that every thing he perceived was only _ideas_ in his own
mind.”[102]
All this might certainly have been expected, as Dr Reid says, if the
truth had not been, that the opinions of Des Cartes are precisely
opposite to the representation which he has given of them,--that,
far from believing in the existence of images of external objects,
as the immediate causes or antecedents of perception, he strenuously
contends against them. The presence of the external body,--the organic
change, which he conceives to be a sort of motion of the small febrils
of the nerves and brain,--and the affection of the mind, which he
expressly asserts to have no resemblance whatever to the motion that
gave occasion to it,--these are all which he conceives to constitute
the process of perception, without any _idea_, as a thing distinct,--a
fourth thing intervening between the organic and the mental change. And
this process is exactly the process which Dr Reid himself supposes,
with this only difference,--an unimportant one for the present
argument,--that Dr Reid, though he admits some intervening organic
change, does not state, positively, what he conceives to be its nature,
while the French philosopher supposes it to consist in a motion of the
nervous fibrils. The doctrine of Des Cartes is to be found, very fully
stated, in his _Principia Philosophiæ_, in his _Dioptrics_, and in
many passages of his small controversial works. He not merely rejects
the Peripatetic notion, of images or shadowy films, the resemblance of
external things, received by the senses,--contending, that the mere
organic affection--the motion of the nervous fibril--is sufficient,
without any such images, “diversos motus tenuium uniuscujusque nervi
capillamentorum sufficere ad diversos sensus producendum;” and proving
this by a very apposite case, to which he frequently recurs, of a
blind man determining the dimensions of bodies by comprehending them
within two crossed sticks,--in which case, he says, it cannot be
supposed, that the sticks _transmit_, through themselves, any _images_
of the body; but he even proceeds to account for the common prejudice,
with respect to the use of images of perception, ascribing it to the
well-known effect of pictures in exciting notions of the objects
pictured. “Such is the nature of the mind,” he says, “that, by its very
constitution, when certain bodily motions take place, certain thoughts
immediately arise, that have no resemblance whatever, as images, to the
motions in consequence of which they arise. The thoughts which words,
written or spoken, excite, have surely no resemblance to the words
themselves. A slight change in the motion of a pen may produce, in the
reader, affections of mind the most opposite; nor is it any reply to
this to say, that the characters traced by the pen are only occasions,
that excite the mind itself to form opposite images,--for the case is
equally striking, when no such image can be formed, and the feeling
is the immediate result of the application of the external body. When
a sword has pierced any part, is not the feeling excited as different
altogether from the mere motion of the sword, as colour, or sound, or
smell, or taste; and since we are sure, in the case of the mere pain
from the sword, that no image of the sword is necessary, ought we not
to extend the same inference, by analogy, to all the other affections
of our senses, and to believe these also to depend, not on any images,
or things transmitted to the brain, but on the mere constitution of our
nature, by which certain thoughts are made to arise, in consequence
of certain corporeal motions?” The passage is long, indeed, but it is
so clear, and so decisive, as to the misrepresentation by Dr Reid of
the opinion which he strangely considered himself as confuting, that
I cannot refrain from quoting the original, that you may judge for
yourselves, of the real meaning, which a translation might be supposed
to have erred in conveying.
“Probatur deinde, talem esse nostræ mentis naturam, ut ex eo solo quod
quidam motus in corpore fiant ad quaslibet cogitationes, nullam istorum
motuum imaginem referentes, possit impelli; et speciatim ad illas
confusas, quæ sensus, sive sensationes dicuntur. Nam videmus, verba,
sive ore prolata, sive tantum scripta, quaslibet in animis nostris
cogitationes et commotiones excitare. In eadem charta, cum eodem calamo
et atramento, si tantum calami extremitas certo modo supra chartam
ducatur, literas exarabit, quæ cogitationes præliorum, tempestatum,
furiarum, affectusque indignationis et tristitiæ in lectorum animis
concitabunt; si vero alio modo fere simili calamus moveatur,
cogitationes valde diversas, tranquillitatis, pacis, amœnitatis,
affectusque plane contrarios amoris et lætitiæ efficiet. Respondebitur
fortasse, scripturam vel loquelam nullos affectus, nullasque rerum a se
diversarum imaginationes immediate in mente excitare, sed tantummodo,
diversas intellectiones; quarum deinde occasione anima ipsa variarum
rerum imagines in se efformat. Quid autem dicetur de sensu doloris et
titillationis? Gladius corpori nostro admovetur; illud scindit; ex
hoc solo sequitur dolor; qui sane non minus diversus est a gladii,
vel corporis quod scinditur locali motu, quam color, vel sonus,
vel odor, vel sapor. Atque ideo cum clare videamus, doloris sensum
in nobis excitari ab eo solo, quod aliquae corporis nostri partes
contactu alicujus alterius corporis localiter moveantur, concludere
licet, mentem nostram esse talis naturæ, ut ab aliquibus etiam motibus
localibus omnium aliorum sensuum affectiones pati possit.
“Præterea non deprehendimus ullam differentiam inter nervos, ex qua
liceat judicare, aliud quid per unos, quam alios, ab organis sensuum
externorum ad cerebrum pervenire, vel omnino quidquam eo pervenire
præter ipsorum nervorum motum localem.”[103]
It is scarcely possible to express more strongly, or illustrate
more clearly, an opinion so exactly the reverse of that doctrine of
perception, by the medium of representative ideas or images, ascribed
by Dr Reid to its illustrious author. It would not be more unjust, even
after all his laborious writings on the subject, to rank the supposed
confuter of the ideal system, as himself one of its most strenuous
champions, than to make this charge against Des Cartes, and to say of
him, in Dr Reid's words, that “the image which the Peripatetics called
a species, he calls an idea, changing the name only, while he admits
the thing.”[104]
To these authors, whose opinions, on the subject of perception, Dr
Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom even he himself allows, to
have shaken off the ideal system, and to have considered the idea and
the perception, as not distinct, but the same, a modification of the
mind, and nothing more. I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer,
Arnauld, who maintains this doctrine as expressly as Dr Reid himself,
and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with
Malebranche. But, if I were to quote to you every less important
writer, who disbelieved the reality of ideas or images, as things
existing separately and independently, I might quote to you almost
every writer, British and foreign, who, for the last century, and for
many years preceding it, has treated of the mind. The narrow limits of
a Lecture have forced me to confine my notice to the most illustrious.
Of all evidence, however, with respect to the prevalence of opinions,
the most decisive is that which is found, not in treatises read only
by a few, but in the popular elementary works of science of the time,
the general text-books of schools and colleges. I shall conclude this
long discussion, therefore, with short quotations from two of the most
distinguished and popular authors, of this very useful class.
The first is from the logic or rather the pneumatology, of Le Clerc,
the Friend of Locke. In his chapter, on the nature of ideas, he gives
the history of the opinions of philosophers on this subject, and states
among them the very doctrine which is most forcibly and accurately
opposed to the ideal system of perception. “Others,” he says, “held
that ideas and the perception of ideas are absolutely the same in
themselves, and differ merely in our relative application of them; that
same feeling of the mind, which is termed an idea, in reference to
the object which the mind considers, is termed a perception, when we
speak of it relatively to the percipient mind; but it is only of one
modification of the mind that we speak in both cases.” According to
these philosophers, therefore, there are, in strictness of language, no
ideas distinct from the mind itself. “Alii putant ideas et perceptiones
idearum easdem esse, licet relationibus differant. Idea, uti censent,
proprie ad objectum refertur, quod mens considerat;--perceptio,
vero, ad mentem ipsam quæ percipit; sed duplex illa relatio ad unam
modificationem mentis pertinet. Itaque secundum hosce philosophos,
nullæ sunt proprie loquendo ideæ a mente nostra distinctæ.”[105] What
is it, I may ask, which Dr Reid considers himself as having added to
this very philosophic view of perception? and, if he added nothing, it
is surely too much to ascribe to him the merit of detecting errors, the
counter statement to which had long formed a part of the elementary
works of the schools.
In addition to these quotations,--the number of which may perhaps
already have produced at least as much weariness as conviction,--I
shall content myself with a single paragraph, from a work of De
Crousaz, the author, not of _one_ merely, but of many very popular
elementary works of logic, and unquestionably one of the most acute
thinkers of his time. His works abound with many sagacious remarks,
on the sources of the prejudice involved in that ideal system, which
Dr Reid conceived himself the first to have overthrown; and he states,
in the strongest language, that our ideas are nothing more than states
or affections of our mind itself. “Cogitandi modi--quibus cogitatio
nostra modificatur, quos induit alios post alios, sufficiunt, ut per
eos ad rerum cognitionem veniat; nec sunt fingendæ ideæ, ab illis
modificationibus diversæ.”[106] I may remark by the way, that precisely
the same distinction of sensations and perceptions, on which Dr Reid
founds so much, is stated and enforced in the different works of this
ingenious writer. Indeed so very similar are his opinions, that if he
had lived after Dr Reid, and had intended to give a view of that very
system of perception which we have been examining, I do not think that
he could have varied in the slightest respect, from that view of the
process which he has given in his own original writings.