CONSTANTINOPLE
(1865-1867)
Although temporarily retired, it was scarcely probable that the
Government would fail to utilize a man who had proved himself to be so
valuable a public servant, and as early as February Lord Russell had
already intimated that he proposed to offer to Lord Lyons the Lisbon
Legation, although to transfer a minister from Washington to Lisbon
seems a somewhat dubious compliment.
In June he was sufficiently recovered to receive the degree of D.C.L.,
and in the following month there arrived from Lord Russell the offer of
the Embassy at Constantinople, Lord Russell being careful to state in
his letter that the Queen highly approved of the appointment and that
Lord Palmerston heartily concurred. The offer was of course gratefully
accepted, and an urgent request that Malet and Sheffield should be
permitted to accompany him was granted, although both had been already
named to other posts. The appointment, when it became known, was
received with general approval, and congratulations came from all
quarters, but the signal compliment which had been paid him, far from
turning his head, only elicited the expression that he knew rather less
of the East than most people and that he entered upon his duties with
many misgivings.
Accompanied by Malet and Sheffield, Lord Lyons arrived at Constantinople
in October, 1865, under somewhat peculiar circumstances. It is unusual
for two ambassadors to be present at the same post at the same time, but
Sir Henry Bulwer, in spite of many protestations that he wished to be
relieved of his duties, was still residing at the Embassy, having
possibly imbibed the spirit of procrastination from the locality, and it
is conceivable that the Foreign Office considered that the best means of
accelerating his departure was to send out his successor with orders to
present his credentials as soon as possible.
The two ambassadors were lodged under the same roof. At first Lord Lyons
was the guest of Sir Henry Bulwer, then the conditions were reversed,
Sir Henry becoming the guest of his successor, and the comedy concluded
with the simultaneous presentation at the palace of the letters of
recall and letters of credence of the outgoing and incoming ambassadors.
After rather more than a fortnight, Sir Henry Bulwer was induced to take
his departure to some unknown destination, but, much to the
embarrassment of his successor, announced his intention of returning
before long. Those who are acquainted with the history of British
diplomacy must remember a very similar episode which also occurred at
Constantinople about twenty-six years ago, when a special envoy was
residing there in addition to the ambassador.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Constantinople, Oct. 25, 1865.
Sir Henry Bulwer received me very kindly and cordially, and has told
me very fully what his views are, both as to Turkish politics in
general, and as to the particular questions now uppermost. He had a
private audience of the Sultan the day before yesterday, and after
it, went on board the _Caradoc_, intending to sail the same evening.
This, however, he did not do, and I went on board to see him
yesterday afternoon. He meant then to sail at daylight this morning.
I hear that he has now put off his departure till to-morrow. As to
his destination, he seems to waver between Malta, Naples and
Palermo. Lady Bulwer stays a little longer. Sir Henry talks vaguely
of coming back here as a traveller in the spring, and the Sultan has
offered to place a house at his disposal if he does so. I could not
tell him that I thought it advisable either for the public service
or for himself that he should come back so soon, especially as he
thinks the place particularly disagrees with him. He has been so
friendly and agreeable that I half blame myself for not being more
willing to see him again here.
I can write little that can be depended upon about public matters
here. Everybody represents everybody else as being engaged in a
series of intrigues so complicated as to be utterly beyond my
comprehension. Fuad and Ali appear very easy to get on with, and I
think that I shall have little difficulty in transacting all
important business directly with them, as long as they remain in
office. My idea is not to give an opportunity for starting
difficulties by announcing a great change which I should not be able
to carry out, but actually to do the business myself, as much as
possible without dragomans. My colleagues seeing this will no doubt
follow my example. The dragoman system will then languish, and the
opportunity may then be taken of giving it the _coup de grace_ if
that should seem advisable.
The impression made upon my mind by Fuad Pasha's conversation on the
finances was that he will make every effort to pay the interest on
the Foreign Loans regularly, but that the Government will frequently
be very hard up for money and will then raise it by any expedient
and on any terms for the moment. In this way a new irregular
internal or quasi-internal debt will arise, which, when it reaches a
certain point, will have to be converted, or funded, or provided for
in some way; and then the country becomes more and more involved.
Whether the undeveloped resources of the country, which must be very
great, can be brought into play soon enough to balance the growing
debt, I cannot of course pretend to say. The great measure in
contemplation is to secularize the Vacoufs. The tenures on which
this property is held and transmitted are so peculiar and
complicated that it will require some study to enable me to
understand the subject. I confess one cannot help feeling that most
of the property will be interrupted by dishonest agents on its way
to the Treasury.
My colleagues seem very well disposed to be cordial and easy to deal
with, but M. de Monstier, whom they all seem to regard as the great
difficulty, is not yet here.
The Constantinople Embassy, justly regarded as one of the big prizes in
the British Diplomatic Service, is, under ordinary circumstances, the
most onerous post of all; and, as past occupants know to their cost, the
distinguished position occupied by the British ambassador, the almost
princely state in which he lives, the magnificence of his residences,
the charm of the Bosphorus and the pleasure derived from living in what
is at once one of the most beautiful and one of the most interesting
cities in the universe, are somewhat dearly bought by the constant,
thankless, and fruitless labour in which they are habitually engaged.
Their time is ceaselessly occupied in combating the intrigues of other
Powers, in ineffectual attempts to redress the real or fictitious
grievances of British subjects, in the urging of nebulous schemes
vaguely described as reforms, and in hopeless efforts to avert the
inevitable doom awaiting a people, who, in spite of some admirable
qualities, are constitutionally incapacitated from realizing what are
their true interests. After the stress and turmoil of the last five
years at Washington, however, Constantinople must have appeared to the
new ambassador almost in the agreeable light of a rest cure.
For once in a way, things were fairly quiet: there were no signs of any
immediate crisis, and although the Turkish Government was involved in
its habitual financial difficulties, in the autumn of 1865 the only
questions which appeared likely to give rise to trouble were those
relating to the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, to Crete, and to a
Firman for the Bey of Tunis. But whatever may be the internal condition
of the Turkish Empire at any given period, or whatever may be its
external relations, there is invariably one representative of the Great
Powers at Constantinople whose _rôle_ it is to threaten, browbeat, and
coerce. At the period in question this duty was discharged with zest by
the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Moustier, whose mission it was to
'_porter haut le drapeau de la France_'--in other words, to bully and
bluster whenever opportunity permitted, and of whom the Turks and his
foreign colleagues stood in deadly fear. The Russian Minister at that
time was the celebrated General Ignatieff, of whom Lord Lyons
subsequently expressed the opinion that 'General Ignatieff would be an
admirable diplomatist if he were only a little more veracious.' And it
seems odd nowadays to read that on nearly every matter the French and
the Russians were in opposition to each other. In fact, General
Ignatieff used to declare that his French colleague was so insupportably
arrogant that it was impossible to do business with him. Each
endeavoured to enlist the new British Ambassador upon his side;
naturally, without success, as intrigue was essentially foreign to his
nature, and he had no intention of allowing himself to become embroiled
in their quarrels. Writing in November to Mr. Erskine, the British
Minister at Athens, he was able to say that 'Here we are as quiet as
possible; the disease with which the Turk is threatened appears to be
atrophy; want of money and want of men. There are no questions of
interest at this moment, nor even any particular matter for the
diplomatists to quarrel about.'
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._[5]
Constantinople, Dec. 6, 1865.
I don't know what to say of the Turkish finances. Notwithstanding
the drought, the cholera, etc., etc., it is alarming that in a year
of profound tranquillity at home and abroad, the Government should
find itself absolutely without money. As this was the case, I
suppose a new foreign loan was better than scraping together, at
enormous sacrifices, enough money here to provide for the interest
of the old loans next month. They promise that they will pay over to
the Bank, as it comes in, the revenue from the sources which are
most certain, so as to provide in ample time for the interest on the
foreign loans. But what will they have left to live upon? I am
trying to get something like an accurate notion of what their
prospects are for next year.
The only probability of trouble for the present seems to be in the
Principalities. If Mr. Green[6] is right, the overthrow of Couza by
an internal revolution is imminent. As he is unable to suggest
any means of saving Couza or of making any improvement in the
administration of the Principalities, I don't know that he is wrong
in thinking it best to leave things for the present to the chapter
of accidents. At any rate I think I shall do well to try and keep
the question as quiet as possible here until I have instructions
from you about it.
As you will see by my despatches I do all the important business
myself with Aali Pasha. Of course, I do not take a Dragoman with me
when I go to him. I shall do away with the Dragoman system, as far
as it is possible and compatible with the public service to do so.
By degrees it may be done away with altogether--but it will be some
time before it will be possible to get ordinary matters done at the
Turkish office without having some one perpetually nagging at them
who can speak to them in their own language.
A letter from the veteran Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Lyons is
not without interest as showing the views he held towards the close of
his life with regard to the Turkish Empire.
* * * * *
Dec. 13, 1865.
It gave me much pleasure to hear from you. I hope, and indeed I
doubt not, that as time moves on you will be more and more pleased
with the situation. You are lucky I think, to have no great
questions to begin with. Sooner or later some will arise, and
meanwhile you have time to sound the depths and shallows around you
and to lay a good foundation for future action. Be assured that my
good wishes will go with you, and if you surpass me in my own line,
so much the better. I am now too old to be jealous.
It does not surprise me that the Principalities continue to give
trouble. They stand in a false position towards Turkey. The allies
have not been happy in their manner of dealing with them. Prince
Couza's government is an anomaly. Austria would be a safer neighbour
to the Porte, even the whole length of the Danube, than either
Russia or an independent Union.
The finances of Turkey are, no doubt, a great and growing difficulty.
They _need not_ be so with Russia in abeyance, the Empire
guaranteed, an increasing trade, a Sultan who professes economy and
no interruption of peace. But they _are naturally_ so in right of
ministerial ignorance, of an inveterate habit of abuses, of too much
facility for borrowing, and of the little personal prudence at the
Porte. I tremble at hearing of another large loan from France. It
might be better if, acting in concert with our neighbour, we made
the Turkish Ministers feel more deeply the responsibility of their
extravagance and unwillingness to reform. I was glad to learn some
little time ago that our Government presses the Porte for statements
of its financial condition which may be relied on, and that the
Ottoman Bank maintains its independence, as opposed to the rash
requirements launched from Constantinople.
I sincerely hope that you will be able by and by to see your way to
some progress in other matters of essential reform.
The financial outlook became so alarming that at the beginning of 1866
the Turks contemplated engaging a British Controller; but--and this
throws an instructive light upon the intrigues which prevail at
Constantinople--they were afraid to apply for one because they knew that
if they did so, the French would insist upon a Frenchman being engaged
as well. Aali and Fuad Pasha used to appear and make long speeches which
'would have done credit to a Chancellor of the Exchequer,' but their
eloquence produced no practical result, and Sultan Abdul Aziz, who,
according to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was pledged to economy,
possessed singularly extravagant tastes, foremost amongst his
extravagances being a mania for buying ironclads and endeavouring to
create an imposing Turkish fleet. As there was no necessity to build up
a big navy and little probability of the Turks ever being able to make
any effective use of it if ever created, the only thing to be said in
favour of Abdul Aziz's hobby was that the ironclads were always ordered
in England.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._
Constantinople, February 14, 1866.
There is rather a delicate matter for us which bears materially upon
the Ottoman finances. The Sultan has a passion for ironclad frigates
and insists upon ordering them. His Ministers (except, I believe,
the Capitan Pasha) make some feeble opposition. We have, I believe,
rather encouraged the thing than otherwise. The orders are executed
in England to the advantage of our shipbuilders, and I think Sir
Henry Bulwer had an idea that though they would not be much use in
the hands of the Turks, they might be manned and used to advantage
by allies of the Turks in case of war.
I think it would be undesirable, on many accounts, that we should
now take the initiative in remonstrating against this particular
expense. If however the question of Turkish finance comes up in
Europe we shall hear a great deal of these ironclads and we may be
asked to join France in a representation against them. We may
possibly have to propose to France to join us. If we do anything it
would be well to consult Musurus confidentially, as he has a great
deal to do with ordering them in England.
There are, I think, three mailed frigates here, one nearly ready in
England and one laid down there. It is also said that the Sultan
insists upon one still larger and more powerful being ordered, but I
do not know whether the order is actually given. The expense is of
course immense in proportion to the revenue of the country and
considering the rate at which the Porte borrows money.
What the result of consulting Musurus Pasha was, does not appear; but,
in view of the determined obstinacy of Sultan Abdul Aziz, it is not
likely that remonstrances from any quarter would have had much effect.
In February, the difficulties with regard to the Principalities came to
a head. Prince Couza, who had been elected Hospodar in 1859 (and who
incidentally had given a great deal of trouble) was deposed by
successful conspirators and expelled from the country, Mr. Green, the
British Minister at Bucharest, having thus proved himself a true
prophet. The inhabitants of the Principalities appeared to be unanimous
in desiring the continuation of the Union, and, at the same time, a
foreign prince as their ruler, to the consternation of the Porte, which
had a well-grounded foreboding that a similar phenomenon would shortly
manifest itself in other outlying provinces of the Empire, and that
disintegration would follow. As for the other Powers concerned, the
Russians were strongly in favour of a separation of Moldavia and
Wallachia. The Austrians were credited with the same views, while it was
feared by the Turks that the French would put forward a candidate of
their own in the shape of a foreign prince. Eventually it was agreed to
refer the whole question to a conference at Paris, into which the
British Government entered unshackled by any pledges or previous
announcement of its views.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._
Constantinople, March 14, 1866.
The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha seem to be in very low spirits about
the Paris Conference. M. de Moustier seems to be constantly
frightening them. I am willing to comfort them, but I am determined
not to say anything which may be interpreted by them as a pledge,
either from my Government or myself. They are horribly afraid of
France and they would like to lean upon us, but they think that we
care more for France than for them, and believe that we are apt to
blame them for weakness without being willing to protect them
against the consequences of their resistance. I think they are wrong
in thinking that it would have been better for them to have had the
Conference here. The French Government itself seems to me to be
always more reasonable than its agents abroad.
I have not been able to get any fresh information about the
Finances. The Syndicate to receive the revenues set apart for the
payment of the Foreign Loans is not yet established, though it is a
month since Fuad Pasha assured me that the decree was 'all but
printed.' The Commission which is examining the actual state of the
Finances seems to have great difficulty in getting at the truth.
None of its proceedings have yet been made public. I preach economy
and retrenchment, but I have not mentioned the ironclads
particularly to the Ottoman authorities as General Ignatieff appears
to suppose. I have certainly not attempted to defend the expenditure
incurred for these vessels when I have heard it attacked by my
colleagues and other people.
I have certainly got on very well with my colleagues hitherto, but
then we have had no serious questions to discuss.
The unhappy Turks, bullied by Moustier, at their wit's ends to find
money, and distracted at the threat of internal troubles, seem about
this period to have once more recurred to the old proposal of a Russian
Protectorate, and to have hit upon the brilliant idea of making money,
at the same time, out of the Principalities.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Earl Cowley._
April 18, 1866.
The Turks are very low, and I hear that a good deal of discussion
goes on about the hopelessness of obtaining any efficient protection
from the Western Powers, and the consequent necessity of making the
best terms they can with Russia. France they look upon as an enemy;
England as a lukewarm and indifferent friend. They hope that they
might get a good sum out of Russia for the Principalities; that they
might satisfy her appetite for territory by giving them to her, and
that then by letting her exercise great influence for the protection
of the Eastern Church in the rest of the Empire, they might satisfy
her, and persuade her to abstain from coming to Constantinople
herself, and to keep other Powers off. Of course nothing so absurd
as this, or at all like it, has been said to me by Aali or Fuad, but
I hear that this sort of language is held by a great many Turks
amongst themselves, and it may be a symptom worth noting.
We are all anxiety to hear something from Paris about the Plébiscite
and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern. Till I know what our Government
think, I can give no advice to the Turks.
The result of the Paris Conference was that Prince Charles of
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was chosen as Hereditary Prince of Roumania,
much to the consternation of the Turks, who saw in this practical
abandonment of their suzerainty, the approaching disintegration of their
Empire, and therefore began to threaten an occupation of the
Principalities. This they were dissuaded from attempting, and the
efforts of British diplomacy were directed towards obtaining a
recognition of Prince Charles on reasonable terms, a task which was not
facilitated by the Sultan's sudden dismissal of the capable Grand
Vizier, Fuad Pasha, or by the refusal of the Roumanians to behave with
even decent courtesy towards the Porte. A prodigious amount of
negotiation and correspondence passed with reference to the Investiture
of the Prince by the Sultan, and that the fault lay with the Roumanians
is shown by the following extract from a letter[7] written in August:
'The Turks have been wonderfully yielding and moderate about the
Principalities, and if there had been anything of the same spirit at
Bucharest, Prince Charles would have been invested long ago. There is a
hitch now, and there will be at least more delay.' In this troublesome
matter the English and the French Governments worked together in order
to arrive at a satisfactory solution, and the much-denounced M. de
Moustier seems to have done something to help his colleague.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._[8]
Constantinople, Sept. 12, 1866.
M. de Moustier sets out for Paris this day week. He and I have been
very good colleagues. Since Lord Clarendon decided to advise the
Porte to recognize Prince Charles, M. de Moustier and I have worked
cordially together to settle the Principalities question in that
sense, and I hope the thing may be done before he goes. A stable
honest government in the Principalities is the best thing for all
parties, and the recognition of Prince Charles is the obvious means
of arriving at this. Whether he will prove a success or a failure
will depend upon his character and his ability to govern through the
constitutional forms, for the Hospodar must in fact for some time be
a Cæsar or he will soon be nothing.
M. de Moustier is not at all liked by his other colleagues here, and
he has inspired the Turks with more fear than love. As he and I have
not differed on any serious matter (except just at first about the
Suez Canal), I cannot very well say how I should have liked him as
an opponent.
The Turks seem horribly afraid of Benedetti as his successor. I wish
the mantle had fallen upon Mercier, with whom I got on so well at
Washington.
It is strange to learn that Prince Charles, who has since developed into
a model constitutional monarch, produced at first the impression of
being a perfect firebrand, full of ambitious schemes, and actually
credited with the design of eventually establishing himself as 'The
Charlemagne of the East.' Mr. Green, the British Minister at Bucharest,
thought it desirable to give him some paternal advice, upon his own
responsibility, telling him that the Roumanians had no intention of
putting up with a mere show Prince; that he would have to work hard;
that great mistakes had been made since his arrival in the country, that
these would eventually be visited upon his head, and that he should take
warning from the fate of Couza. 'He was very polite,' added Mr. Green,
innocently, 'but I don't think he half liked what I said, or that he
quite understood it. It was probably the first time he had heard the
truth since he has been in the country.'
Foreign princes who undertake to govern Balkan States, however, often
have to put up with worse things than unpalatable truths, and the
conduct of Prince Charles and his advisers with reference to the
question of investiture was of a nature which not only justified strong
language, but necessitated strong pressure from France and England.
After bargaining and haggling for several months, and obtaining all
sorts of concessions from the Porte, the Roumanians actually proposed
that 'in order to meet existing difficulties' the Prince should be
invested at Constantinople without any conditions at all. The chief
stumbling block appears to have the phrase '_partie intégrante_,' in the
Declaration, and it was not until it had been made clear that neither
France nor England would recognize the Prince unless this condition
was complied with that the sacramental words were agreed to. Eventually
more reasonable views prevailed at Bucharest, and Prince Charles at last
proceeded to Constantinople for the ceremony of Investiture. The Turks,
as is their wont, received him with great courtesy, and the impression
he created was of the most favourable kind, the only person who
exhibited dissatisfaction being the Russian Minister.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Mr. Green._
Therapia, Nov. 1, 1866.
The Prince will, I suppose, arrive at Bucharest two or three days
before this reaches you. I hope he is satisfied with his visit to
Constantinople. There was some hitch about the interchange of
civilities with the Russian Minister and one or two other chiefs of
missions, I believe. I suppose however all was set right before His
Highness went away. The Prince himself showed, I thought, great good
sense in these matters of etiquette as well as in more important
matters. I should be glad if you would take an opportunity of
letting him understand discreetly that I personally was thoroughly
satisfied, not that he can doubt it.
The Principalities Question having been satisfactorily settled, M. de
Moustier, who, in the meanwhile, had become Minister for Foreign
affairs, lost no time in claiming all the credit for himself. With his
usual good sense, Lord Lyons showed complete indifference to the egotism
of his former colleague.
'It is the way of French diplomatists everywhere, and of almost all
diplomatists at Pera, to take to themselves the credit of every good
thing that has been done,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, 'so far as the
Turks are concerned. I have borne in mind what you told me in Paris
of your own system of dealing with them, and have endeavoured to let
them have the credit of their good deeds, whatever part I may have
had in bringing them about. M. de Moustier has certainly not
followed the same plan. His article in the _Moniteur_ gives no
credit either to the Turks or to me. Whatever may be our relative
shares in settling the questions, it cannot be doubted that if I had
chosen from jealousy, or any other motive, to thwart him, I could
easily have done so. However, if good is done, I am willing to
forego my share of the boasting.'
It is hardly necessary to state that the semi-comic question of the
Principalities was but one of many difficulties threatening in every
part of the Turkish Empire, from the Fortress of Belgrade to the
Lebanon. The long letter to Lord Stanley of December 19 is one which,
with slight variations, might have been written by every British
Ambassador at Constantinople at any time during the last fifty years,
but is quoted in full because it seems to constitute a comprehensive
review of the condition of Turkey at the close of 1866; and it is
perhaps worthy of note, as showing how completely the politics of Europe
have changed, that the gigantic struggle between Prussia and Austria
passed unnoticed and without producing the slightest apparent effect in
the Near East.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._
Constantinople, Dec. 19, 1866.
I am afraid that it is only too true that a storm is brewing in the
East. There is a very apparent change in the policy of Russia, or at
least, in that of her agents in Turkey. When I arrived a year ago
there was every appearance of a desire on the part of Russia to keep
things quiet in Turkey. Now her agents make no secret of their
sympathy with the Cretan insurrection and with Christian malcontents
throughout the Empire and appear to be determined to recover their
old position as the special friends and protectors of all the
Orthodox Christians, and to be willing enough to see troubles and
disturbances break out in all directions. Greece is bent upon
mischief, and the question whether we are or are not to have an
Eastern Question forced upon us in the spring depends upon whether
or no Greece can be kept in order. All this suits the Russian game.
If we interfere to bring the Hellenes to their senses, she hopes to
recover her lost popularity at our expense. If we do not, she will
claim the merit of having hindered us.
I cannot make up my mind to recommend the Turks to take a bold
course. Discouraging as is the spectacle afforded by the Turkish
army and navy in Crete, I think it probable that the Turks would in
the end get the better of the Hellenes if they were allowed to deal
with them without any interference from Europe. But Europe
undoubtedly would interfere. I very much dread the effects of
allowing the Greeks to get up disturbances in this country in the
spring. If the disturbances are very serious they will probably lead
to the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. What will take its
place it is impossible to foresee, but I think it is pretty clear
that the Turks will not go without a desperate struggle, and that in
mixed districts we shall have massacres and every kind of horror.
Great calamities may possibly be avoided if we can keep the Turks
going and make them go on tolerably well for some years longer. If
they are really capable of radical improvement, if they can live
upon equal terms with the Christians, and establish a good
government, so much the better. If things go on as they have done
lately, the Turks will be gradually squeezed out, as the Americans
say, by the increase in numbers, wealth and intelligence of the
Christians. I am not one of those who look upon the Turkish Empire
as good _per se_--to be upheld at all hazards--but in the interest
of all parties, I should like to let it down gently; but in order to
make this possible, the Turks must be prudent and behave well to all
their subjects.
The arguments against giving up the Fortress of Belgrade are
strongly put in Mr. Longworth's despatch to me of which he has sent
you a copy. For my own part I doubt whether the _Levée en masse_ of
the Mussulman population of Turkey to defend it, would not shake the
Empire to pieces. In the face of the extreme unpopularity of the
Sultan personally and of the Government with the Mussulmans, I doubt
whether the Ministers would be willing to risk an appeal to them.
The same state of things however makes the Ministers very fearful of
the effect of giving up the Fortress. It seems that Europe will
advise the Porte to abandon it, and this, I am inclined to think, is
the proper advice for Europe to give. I do not think that it is
advice which it would be fair to press very strongly unless (as is
by no means impossible) the Porte may wish to be able to say to the
Sultan and the people that they were obliged to yield to all Europe
united against them on the point. I don't think that England, or any
other power, should encourage the Porte to hold out, unless of
course it were deemed to be a matter of such importance that
material aid would be given to help the Porte out of any scrape into
which its holding out might bring it. On the other hand, unless we
were prepared to do this and to do it effectually, we should make
ourselves unnecessarily odious to the Christian races, and neither
obtain nor deserve any gratitude from the Turks, if we alone advised
them to keep the Fortress. Aali Pasha does not talk as if he had any
idea of yielding. His plan will probably be to say neither yes nor
no, unless circumstances compel him to give a categorical answer to
the Servians.
Lord Stanley, who at this period ruled at the Foreign Office, was not an
optimist by nature, had no illusions about the future of Turkey, and his
letters contain references to many other questions which appeared likely
to create trouble in Europe; besides Crete and the Fortress of Belgrade.
With regard to the latter he observed that the 'Turks have the same right
to stay there that every one has to do foolish things where only his own
interest is concerned.' 'The Austrians,' he wrote in October, 'have made
their greatest mistake of this year (which is saying a good deal) in the
choice of Beust as Minister.
'The general impression is that Bismark[9] (_sic_) will not be able to
hold power, from the state of his health. I do not envy the King of
Prussia left alone to carry out plans which he probably has never
understood and to face a German Parliament which he only consented to
call in reliance on his adviser's capacity to manage it.'
Another letter refers to a contemplated visit of the Prince of Wales to
St. Petersburg, and, in view of 'his strong anti-Turkish opinions of
which he makes no secret,' points out that care should be taken to
explain to the Russian Government that H.R.H. did not represent the
opinions of the Cabinet.
Other communications from the same Minister mention that the Americans
had revived the _Alabama_ claims 'in a friendly and temperate manner,'
and there are many allusions to the disquieting symptoms in France. 'I
hear,' he wrote in November, 'that the one idea of everybody, high and
low, in France is that the country is defenceless (with 600,000
soldiers), and that the lowest estimate of the necessary force laid
before the commission now sitting involves an addition of 400,000 more.
They have so long been used in that country to be surrounded by weak
states that the mere neighbourhood of an equal is regarded by them as a
threat.'
In the beginning of 1867 one difficulty was cleared out of the way, for
Lord Stanley having formally tendered his advice, the Turkish Government
consented to evacuate the Fortress of Belgrade. This unusual display of
good sense was all the more creditable on account of the terror which
Sultan Abdul Aziz inspired in his ministers; but the protracted
insurrection in Crete constituted not only a danger, but also a fertile
source of intrigues amongst Foreign Powers.
Lord Stanley took the matter-of-fact view that Greece had estranged
British sympathy through financial immorality; and he was probably
correct, for in the case of Turkey, it was not until the repudiation of
her debts, that there was much fulmination against the iniquities of
Ottoman rule.
'Opinion here is undecided about the Cretan quarrel,' wrote this prosaic
nobleman, who is credited with having himself refused the throne of
Greece. 'Nobody much believes in the Turks, but the old Phil-Hellenism
is dead, and cannot be revived. Greece is too much associated in the
English mind with unpaid debts and commercial sharp practice to command
the sympathy that was felt thirty years ago. And now that questions of
more interest and nearer home are being discussed, Crete will drop out
of men's minds.'
A little later, the French Government suddenly and quite unexpectedly
proposed the cession of Crete to Greece; and this violent change in the
policy hitherto pursued, rendered difficult joint action on the part of
England and France with regard to Turkey. The original idea underlying
French policy had been that the two Governments should force certain
reforms upon the Porte, more particularly with regard to encouraging
public works to be undertaken by foreign capitalists, and that the Turks
should be made prosperous in spite of themselves. The difficulty in
carrying out this beneficent programme consisted in the fact that there
were no means of influencing the daily details of administration upon
which its execution and success depended, and it seemed highly probable
that the joint guardianship of England and France might degenerate into
a struggle between the two Embassies for personal influences in making
and unmaking governors and ministers, to say nothing of the danger of
the perpetration of gigantic jobs under the guise of giving public works
to foreign capitalists. Nor, of course, was the Turkish Government in
possession of funds to carry out any programme whatever.
Lord Stanley refused to entertain the French proposal with regard to
Crete, and advanced much the same reasons as those probably brought
forward more than forty years later.
* * * * *
_Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 21, 1867.
The Eastern Question remains where it was. France has certainly not
dropped her idea of urging the cession of Crete. I have distinctly
refused to join in this advice, as you will see by my despatch. The
Russians seem jealous of French interference, though they cannot
object, as it is in the sense of their often expressed opinions. The
Italian Government shows an inclination to take part in the
discussion, but rather, as I conceive, for the purpose of asserting
its position as a first-rate power than with any definite idea of
what it wants. Indeed, I think I trace in Italy a feeling of
jealousy of the increase of the Greek power, lest Greece should
become a troublesome neighbour and rival.
The chief event which is interesting the diplomatic world at the
present moment is a report--not wholly unfounded as I believe--of
the cession of Luxemburg by Holland to France. Prussia will resent
it (if it comes to pass) and Belgium will not be the happier for
being thus partly surrounded by French territory.
The Emperor (who had probably abandoned the control of his Eastern
policy to M. de Moustier) received a warning from Lord Cowley.
* * * * *
_Lord Cowley to Lord Lyons._
Paris, March 22, 1867.
I found Moustier on my return a very different man from what I had
left him, in respect to Turkey, but I had, a few days after my
arrival, a conversation with the Emperor in which I warned him of
the dangerous game he was playing in hastening the dissolution of
the Turkish Empire, which could only turn to the profit of Russia,
and I think that H.M. sees the matter in this light now and that he
has desired Moustier to hold his hand and not forestall events. I
fear however that things cannot go on much longer in Turkey as they
are. The great matter now should be to educate the Christians for
the emancipation which awaits them, by giving the outlying provinces
as much autonomy as possible, but it 'will be a bitter pill for the
Turks to swallow.'
There is no particular news here--fresh irritation against Prussia,
which will become dangerous if it does not die out before next year.
The vagary on the part of the French Government produced much confusion
amongst the diplomatists at Constantinople, who all came to the British
Ambassador with such different stories of what one had done, of what
another was going to do, and of what a third would not do, that he
eventually became as much puzzled as any one else, and adopted an
attitude of strict neutrality.
The following letter to Lord Stanley is of interest for various reasons.
It expresses the deliberate opinion of an exceptionally impartial man
upon Russian policy towards Turkey, and there are references in it for
the first time to two new factors in the Eastern Question, viz. the
Bulgarians and the Young Turks.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._
Constantinople, April 10, 1867.
The Turks stand at bay for the moment. They have sent Omar Pasha to
Crete and are confident that he will reduce the island to
submission. If he fails to do so in a reasonable time, they must
confess that the task is too hard for them and leave the settlement
of the question to the European Powers. France has played the game
of Russia and apparently has not succeeded after all in satisfying
her. She has brought Turkey nearer to ruin than it has yet been. It
all forwards the policy of Russia, which is to keep Turkey unquiet,
to prevent any approach to conciliation between Turks and
Christians, to keep up a constant drain on the finances--in short,
to have the country entirely at its mercy whenever circumstances
render it convenient to seize it. Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha both
assure me that the dividends due in July on the foreign loans will
be punctually paid; but, with the best intentions, the Porte will
not be able to pay its foreign dividends much longer, if it is
obliged to keep a large force on a war footing on the frontier of
Greece; and to provide against insurrections excited from abroad in
other quarters. The Bulgarians appear to oppose a strong _vis
inertiæ_ to the Russian and Hellenic attempts to induce them to use
and demand autonomy. Their principal quarrel is with the Greek
clergy foisted upon them by the Patriarchate here. I have not been
able to form a positive opinion on their demands for a separate
Patriarch of their own, but I incline to think that the Porte would
do well to grant it. Russia now urges that the Bulgarians should
have a civil representative instead, but this would come very near
to autonomy.
The discontent among the Mussulmans is very great. It is
particularly so at Constantinople, where the employees of the
Government form an important class, and where in consequence of the
non-payment of salaries, they, and all who live by them, are reduced
to the greatest distress. The 'Jeune Turquie' party is produced
partly by this and partly by the desire of Mustapha Fazyl Pasha and
others to oust Fuad and Aali and to take their places.
Reports from the Consuls on the treatment of the Christians will
have been pouring in upon you. The greater part of the grievances of
the Christians are the results of bad government and bad
administration of justice, and affect Mussulmans and Christians
alike. Their peculiar grievances are their practical exclusion from
the high offices of the State, the rejection in many cases of their
evidence in the Law Courts, and what is most intolerable, the
position in which they stand socially and politically with regard to
the Turks. The Turks will not look upon them as equals and cannot
trust them. In fact the Christians cannot feel loyalty to the
Government because they are not trusted and employed; and they
cannot be trusted and employed because they are not loyal to the
Government. It is a perfect example of a vicious circle. It is
useless to deny that the position of a Christian subject of the
Porte is a humiliating position, and it is vain to expect that
within any reasonable time the Christians will look upon the
existing Government as anything but an evil to be endured or
possibly even upheld as a less evil than revolution, but nothing
more.
It will be realized from this instructive letter that however bad the
Turkish Government, it had to contend with obstacles which are not
encountered by other countries, and that in reality it never had a fair
chance, although it is only just to add that when a real chance did
occur, upon the overthrow of Abdul Hamid, in 1908, the opportunity was
deliberately thrown away.
The Turks, however, had sufficient sense to concede the Bulgarian demand
for a separate church, and by thus affecting a schism between the latter
and the Greeks, succeeded in prolonging their hold over Macedonia for a
longer period than would otherwise have been the case.
Meanwhile Lord Stanley had been thinking of other matters, and the
allusions to Alaska and to Canada in the letter of April 4, afford a
delightful instance of the light in which British statesmen viewed
Colonial questions at that period.
* * * * *
_Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, April 4, 1867.
The Eastern Question has left us quiet during the last ten days. I
hear nothing more of the proposed cession of Crete, and I suspect
the French have found out that they had been going a little too fast
and too far.
The Luxemburg business has monopolized attention. Holland was
willing to sell the Grand Duchy if the consent of Prussia could be
secured, and France wished and wishes to buy, but Prussia steadily
refuses. Holland dares not act without Bismarck's permission, and
for the moment the plan seems to have fallen through. But the
Emperor cannot afford a fresh defeat, and I fear we have not seen
the end of the transaction. There is an almost universal expectation
of war.
The Americans, as you will see, have bought a large amount of
worthless[10] territory from Russia at a nominal price. Their motive
is probably twofold: to establish a sort of claim in the future to
British North America, lying as it does between their old and their
new possessions; and to gain a victory over us by doing without our
knowledge an act which they probably think will annoy England. In
that expectation they will be disappointed, for I cannot find any
one who cares about the matter, and the press in general treats it
with indifference. It is true that in Canada the feeling may be
different.
The Luxemburg difficulty (which had the effect of producing a temporary
rapprochement between France and Russia with regard to the Eastern
Question) was settled by a conference in London, and letters from Lord
Stanley and others show that war was narrowly averted, and that the
French were not ungrateful for the action of the British Government.
'We have been too busy at home to have much leisure for Eastern
affairs,' wrote Lord Stanley. 'The success of the Conference in
keeping the peace was not, I think, expected by the general public
and has given proportionate satisfaction, more perhaps here than
elsewhere, and more in France than in Russia. The Emperor dreaded
the idea of war and would have accepted almost any terms. The
Prussians, being prepared and knowing that the French were not so,
professed great indifference as to the result of the negotiations.
Many still say that the inevitable quarrel is only postponed. It may
be so, but I am inclined to think that in such matters to gain time
is to gain everything. Irritation subsides, new questions arise to
divert attention, and the opinion of the country has time to declare
itself. I am told that at Paris the feeling of gratitude to England
is general and strong.'
In May, in spite of Crete, it was arranged that Sultan Abdul Aziz should
pay a visit to France, and both the French and Turks, unlike Lord
Russell, whose opinion on the value of such visits has been already
quoted, thought that it would be productive of great results. The Turks
were especially delighted, because they thought the invitation a proof
that France would not persist in the alliance with Russia which had been
so perilous to the Ottoman Empire. It was hoped that if France could be
brought back to her old attitude of co-operation with England in
deprecating foreign aggression, things might be kept quiet, and that the
internal situation might improve. The recent pro-Russian proclivities of
Napoleon III. had drawn upon him some very sharp remonstrances from Her
Majesty's Government, and a despatch from Lord Cowley shows that the
Emperor had to put up with some remarkably plain speaking. He was told
by the British Ambassador that if he would devote a little more
attention to Eastern affairs he would probably refrain from constant
intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, unless indeed he wished
to see that Empire collapse; and when he attempted feebly to explain
that Russia deserved some satisfaction for her pride wounded by the
result of the Crimean War, and that the best method of restraining her
aggressive proceedings was to act in conjunction with her, he was
informed that the best way of meeting insidious Russian policy was by
honest and open opposition. It must doubtless have been extremely
irritating to the British Government to see this disposition to fritter
away the effects of the policy which led to the Crimean War, and the
probability is that the Emperor had no definite idea as to what he
wanted and was merely drifting along, in his usual manner, without
realizing the possible results.
'I fancy,' said Lord Lyons, 'that great efforts will be made to
please and astonish the Sultan in France and to impress him with the
power of the country. He is not stupid or bigoted, but he has had
very little education. He is more amiable than he looks. He speaks
only Turkish. His hobby is the Navy and the way for us to impress
him would be to show him as many ships, and particularly ironclads,
as we can--that is to say if we can show as many or more than the
French. He is Oriental enough to expect hospitality, as he practises
it here, and I suppose he would be much hurt by any etiquette which
he thought a slight. Politically, I think a visit from him to
England would be a good thing if we received him personally as well
as the French did. As he has taken up the idea of going to England,
he would of course be very much mortified at not being cordially
received, and advantage would be taken of anything of the kind by
the enemies of Turkey here to weaken his and our position. I
suggested to Fuad Pasha to let the question of his visit to England
be still, until I could communicate with you about it, but I
understand he has telegraphed to Musurus to speak to you. I suppose
the Sultan, of whom they all seem as much afraid as if he still cut
off heads, ordered him to do so and he dared not object. I believe
the Sultan will not leave Constantinople till he has made quite sure
of not finding the Emperor of Russia at Paris. Fuad says he will
take a very small suite, but I suppose it will be a larger suite
than a European Sovereign would have. I believe he will take a sort
of noble guard he has, who wear very picturesque costumes of
different parts of the Empire: there used to be fifty of them, but I
hardly suppose all will go.'
It very soon became evident that the Sultan was quite determined to go
to England, and it was clearly desirable that he should be received with
no less distinction and ceremony than in France. In a courtly manner he
conveyed to the Ambassador that he would be deeply mortified if he were
not given the opportunity of paying his respects personally to Queen
Victoria, and his ministers laid great stress upon the desirability of
His Majesty being received by the Lord Mayor, the importance of that
magnate standing apparently as high in the estimation of the Oriental as
of the Frenchman. The mingled pleasure, alarm, and agitation evoked by
the Sultan's intended visit are well illustrated by the following letter
to Lord Lyons from a man who seemed marked out to add to the gaiety of
nations, Mr. Hammond.
* * * * *
Foreign Office, May 30, 1867.
We should like to know as soon as possible at what time we may
calculate on seeing the Sultan and what members of his family or of
his Government he brings with him, and the rank and description of
his suite and their numbers. It is to be hoped they will not be too
numerous, and that as he is to be lodged in the Palace, the usual
habits of Orientalism will for the time be laid aside and the
services of his Harem be dispensed with during his visit. It would
shock the people in this country to hear of the Sultan being
attended by persons not proper to be mentioned in civilized society,
and no small inconvenience might result if he was known to have
slaves in his suite, for it would be impossible to answer for the
enthusiasts of Exeter Hall with so fair an opportunity before them
for displaying their zeal and doing mischief.
Aali Pasha has, I think, been in England, and you might have means
of bringing these little matters before him in such a delicate way
as not to shock the Sultan's ideas of propriety or mastery. The
French probably would not be so particular in these respects, but
they have not Writs of Habeas Corpus dangling before their eyes, nor
unrestricted liberty of speech and print to provide against.
Whatever information you can give us of the Sultan's habits of
living and of the sort of accommodation he will require will be very
acceptable to the Lord Chamberlain's office, and any hints as to
what it would most interest him to see would be valuable.
In London, you know, we have no manufactories, but there are the
Arsenal at Woolwich; the large private shipbuilding yards in the
Thames, if he did not care to go to Portsmouth for a day; the
Museum, Bank, Post Office and some few things of that sort which are
probably peculiar in their extent to this country. It might also
interest him, if he is a reformer, to see our prisons, from which he
might take useful hints. Does he keep reasonable hours, and would he
be shocked at balls, or restrain himself from throwing a
handkerchief at any beauty that might cross his path?
Sultan Abdul Aziz's visit to England passed off without administering
any of those shocks to public feeling which Mr. Hammond contemplated
with so much alarm. There are no means of ascertaining what precise
effects were produced upon the Sultan's mind, but it is to be presumed
that the object lesson afforded by an English prison was wasted upon
him, for anything more unlike an English prison than a Turkish gaol it
would be difficult to imagine. The ill-fated Abdul Aziz was accompanied
on this journey by his young nephew, destined to become famous
subsequently as Abdul Hamid II., but he, too, has kept his impressions
to himself, and the only topic upon which he has been known to
expatiate, is the excellence of English servants, who 'always treated
him in a fatherly manner.'
In the meanwhile Lord Lyons's stay at Constantinople was drawing to a
close, for at the end of April, Lord Stanley had offered him the Embassy
at Paris. The offer was made in highly flattering terms, the Foreign
Secretary expressing his regret at withdrawing the Ambassador from an
important post, the duties of which he so thoroughly understood, but
adding that Paris was the first place in the diplomatic service, and
that the Eastern Question seemed likely to be superseded by even more
serious difficulties nearer home. It is probable that the honour was all
the more appreciated because it was unsolicited and unexpected, as shown
by the following letter from him to Lord Cowley.
* * * * *
Constantinople, May 8, 1867.
When I first heard that you were likely to give up Paris, I felt, as
I think I said in my letter to you, alarmed at the prospect of the
Embassy's falling into other hands. I should have been indeed
alarmed had I then known into what hands it was likely to fall. I
received on the 3rd a letter from Lord Stanley offering it to me. I
have accepted in deference to my father's often repeated injunction
never to refuse promotion, but I confess I am full of misgivings and
anxieties. I had heard nothing whatever from the Foreign Office till
I received Lord Stanley's letter last week.
The appointment, when it became known publicly, was generally approved,
and no one wrote in warmer terms of congratulation than Lord Clarendon,
who had been Lord Stanley's predecessor at the Foreign Office, and who
stated that he had himself suggested Lord Lyons to his successor as the
most suitable man for the post.
Thus, at the comparatively early age of fifty he had attained the
highest place in the British diplomatic service.
As regards Lord Lyons's two years occupation of the Constantinople
Embassy, it has already been pointed out that the period was one of
comparative calm, and that there were no sensational questions to be
dealt with. Unlike some of his predecessors and successors, he had not
been instructed to make any change in the policy pursued by the British
Government towards Turkey, and it had not fallen to his lot to be forced
to adopt a threatening and aggressive attitude. Consequently, his
experiences of Constantinople were agreeable and unexciting; his
relations with the Turkish Ministers and with his colleagues had been
singularly amicable, and he left the place with regret. It would be
affectation to claim that his stay there left any permanent mark upon
our policy in the East, but there were two minor matters in which his
influence made itself felt. Entertaining a profound dislike to intrigue
and tortuous methods, he made it his business to diminish as much as
possible the so-called Dragoman system and to substitute for it a
different and more open method of transacting the business of the
Embassy. The other matter related to the practice of extorting favours
and concessions from the Porte. It has always been the tradition of
British diplomacy in the East, and it may perhaps be said to be unique
in this respect, that the influence of the Ambassador should not be used
to procure concessions, honours, or favours on behalf of British
subjects. Upon this point he carried the principle of abstention to
almost extravagant lengths, as the following incident shows. The
daughter of a gentleman connected with the Embassy was about to be
married, and the newspaper _La Turquie_ announced that the Sultan had
sent a magnificent present. The announcement caught the eye of the
vigilant ambassador, who immediately wrote to the father:
I think you will do well to take steps to remove the unfavourable
impression which this paragraph cannot but make. There can be little
if any difference between such a present and one made directly to
yourself; and the most friendly course I can take is to advise you
to prevent the acceptance of it, and to have a paragraph inserted in
the _Turquie_ explaining that it has not been retained.
This must have been singularly unpleasant for all parties, and it is
quite likely that the Ambassador found himself morally bound to
compensate the lady by making an equally magnificent present as a
substitute for the Sultan's rejected gift.
An application to support a concession to Mr. Brassey for the
construction of a railway from Constantinople to Adrianople met with no
favour at all. He explained that he was constantly applied to in order
to support all sorts of concessions for railways and similar
undertakings, and that his practice was to reply that it was not his
business to meddle in such matters unless instructed to do so by the
Foreign Office, and that concessionaires should therefore in the first
place address themselves to the Home Government. 'The fact is that there
is often much dirty work connected with the management of such matters
at the Porte, and I wish to be clear of them.' Over and over again there
appears in his letters the emphatic statement that he 'refuses to take
part in the dirty work by which European speculators are apt to get
concessions out of the Turks.'
It would not be difficult to find arguments against this attitude, which
in these days of increased international competition it would be
impossible rigidly to maintain, but the views which prevailed fifty
years ago with regard to the abstention of British diplomacy from every
species of concession mongering probably did more than anything else to
inspire Orientals with a belief in our integrity as a nation.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] Lord Clarendon, upon the death of Lord Palmerston, became Foreign
Secretary in place of Lord Russell.
[6] British minister at Bucharest.
[7] Lord Lyons to Mr. Stuart.
[8] In consequence of the change of Government, Lord Stanley
(subsequently Earl of Derby) had now become Foreign Secretary.
[9] It used to be said that it took a Franco-German war to secure the
correct spelling of this name. It is certainly a curious fact that
another Foreign Secretary also used to spell it incorrectly.
[10] Alaska.