COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR
(1862-1865)
Although the immediate danger of war between England and America had at
all events temporarily vanished, and the United States Government had
put a good face upon the matter, it was only natural that a soreness
should remain; nor did the slowness of military operations tend to
restore that government to a more equable frame of mind. Much of the
enthusiasm which marked the outbreak of hostilities had already
evaporated, but the hatred of the South had continued to grow in
intensity, and although the latter was undoubtedly suffering great
hardships and privations, there was no sign of failing courage, and
every prospect of a long and bitter contest. The difficulty of finding
men for the Northern army continued to increase; the prospect of having
to raise twenty or thirty millions sterling in taxes from a people
unaccustomed to pay any apparent taxes at all for Federal purposes was
particularly unpleasant, more especially as there appeared to be no
immediate probability of a striking military success; and it was not
surprising that the country showed signs of great depression. Under
these circumstances, a marked division of parties in the North began to
show itself. One, which may be termed the Revolutionary Party, was in
favour of prosecuting the war at all hazards and by all means; of
proclaiming the immediate abolition of slavery in the South; promoting a
servile insurrection there; turning out the Cabinet, and even deposing
the President if he proved to be an obstacle; keeping Congress
permanently in session to spur on the Government, and the Generals,
maintaining a paper currency by inflicting heavy penalties for
depreciating it, and so on. The Foreign Policy of this party consisted
in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general,
and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England.
On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward,
and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a
kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a
foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only
fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was
genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party
of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the
moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an
excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular
irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless.
Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much
that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing.
Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to
something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under
orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising
offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port
in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant
the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept
it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these
troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might
be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England
and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were
eventually used against the United States, there would have been a
violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The
danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or
during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to
deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too
much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than
hatred.
Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to
England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of
his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been
the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of
Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to
surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward
appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England,
but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence,
and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were
contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these
was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers
would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other
was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking
up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were
increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the
Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or
not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could
not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with
favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he
was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a
striking _coup_, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect
him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely
declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting
into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally
gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following
letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from
the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced
that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter
confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, April 23, 1862.
M. Mercier came back from Richmond yesterday. He went soon after his
arrival to see Mr. Seward and came afterwards to me. He is persuaded
that the confidence and the resolution of the Confederates are
increased rather than diminished by recent events. If they are
worsted anywhere they will still not surrender. They will destroy
their stores of cotton and tobacco, and all other property which
they cannot remove. They will retire into the interior of their
country and defy the North to follow them. They will endure any
privations and sufferings rather than be again united to the North.
Their unanimity and devotion to the cause are wonderful. They are
not carrying on a war in the usual manner for dominion as the North
is: they consider themselves to be fighting for their homes and
their liberty, and are making and are ready to make any sacrifices.
Such is the impression which M. Mercier says was made upon him by
what he saw and heard.
I asked him whether he had obtained any specific information as to
the extent of the naval and military resources of the Confederates.
He said that they admitted that they were in want of arms and
ammunition, and said that but for this they could keep a very much
larger army in the field. They had no difficulty about men. On the
contrary, they had more than they could arm. They had another
'Merrimac' nearly ready at Norfolk: they had an iron-plated vessel
on the James River: they had iron-plated vessels nearly ready at New
Orleans. If they lost New Orleans and all the seaboard, they would
be as far from being subdued as ever.
I inquired of M. Mercier whether he had entered upon any particular
matter of business with the members of the Confederate Government.
He said he had avoided the appearance of having come to transact
business: that the French tobacco would be spared if the rest was
burnt, provided it could be distinguished and separated from that
belonging to private persons.
I asked M. Mercier if anything had passed on the subject of the
position of the Consuls. He said that if the idea of calling upon
them to take out exequaturs from the Confederate Government had ever
been entertained, it was now abandoned; there appeared to be a very
good disposition towards foreigners in general; less good perhaps
towards the English as a nation than others, perhaps because more
had been expected from that country than from any other, and the
disappointment had consequently been greater. On the other hand, the
Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all expectation of
succour from Europe: indeed, they declared that all they desired was
such an interruption of the blockade as would enable them to get
arms.
M. Mercier said that he was more than ever convinced that the
restoration of the old Union was impossible; that he believed the
war would, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence upon it,
last for years; that he thought that in the end the independence of
the South must be recognized, and that the governments of Europe
should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in
such a manner as to end the war. The present opportunity would,
however, he thought, be peculiarly unfavourable.
I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually
pursued by France or England, but I entirely agreed with M. Mercier
that there was nothing to do at the present moment but watch events.
This morning Mr. Seward spoke to me about M. Mercier's journey. He
said that M. Mercier had, probably without being altogether aware of
it himself, obtained very valuable information for the U.S.
Government. He himself was quite convinced from M. Mercier's account
of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last
effort: that they had their last armies in the field; and that their
last resources were brought into action. Their talking of retiring
into the interior was idle. If the U.S. were undisputed masters of
the border states, including Tennessee, and of the sea coast, there
would be no occasion for any further fighting. Anybody who liked to
retire into the interior was welcome to do so and stay there till he
was tired. Mr. Seward went on to say that he had had some difficulty
in preventing M. Mercier's journey making an unfavourable impression
upon the public. With this view he had caused it to be mentioned in
the papers that M. Mercier had had a long interview with him on his
return from Richmond; he had in the evening taken M. Mercier to the
President, which also he should put in the newspapers: to-night he
was to dine with M. Mercier to meet the captain of the French ship
of war which had brought M. Mercier back: to-morrow the President
would pay a visit to that ship.
I suppose the truth lies somewhere between M. Mercier's views of the
prospects of the South and Mr. Seward's. Mr. Seward was of course
anxious to weaken any impression M. Mercier's language may have made
upon me.
The Slave Trade Treaty has met with much more general approval than
I expected. It has excited quite an enthusiasm among the
Anti-Slavery party. I have never seen Mr. Seward apparently so much
pleased. Mr. Sumner, who has had the management of it in the Senate,
was moved to tears when he came to tell me that it had passed
unanimously.
As had been foreseen and pointed out to M. Mercier, the most
unsatisfactory result of his visit was the impression it produced that
France was disposed to act independently of England, but there is no
evidence to show that such were the intentions of the French Government
at the time, and M. Mercier himself always showed himself to be a most
frank and honest colleague.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, May 16, 1862.
The Government here is very much disquieted by the rumoured
intentions of England and France with regard to intervention. This
is not altogether without advantage, as they are more disposed to be
considerate, or, at all events, civil, when they have doubts about
us, than when they feel sure of us. They are more civil to France
than to England partly because they are more doubtful about her, and
partly because they never will have, do what she will, the same
bitterness against her as they have against England. Mr. Seward is
encouraged by some of his English correspondents to believe that the
Mexican affair will produce a serious disagreement between England
and France.
M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility that the
South may be victorious both in the battles in Virginia and in
Tennessee. He is at all events quite confident that whether
victorious or defeated they will not give in, and he is certainly
disposed to advise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the
war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is however very much
puzzled to devise any mode of intervention which would have the
effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I shall
suppose he would think it desirable to go to great lengths to stop
the war, because he believes that the South will not give in until
the whole country is made desolate, and that the North will very
soon be led to proclaim immediate emancipation, which would stop the
cultivation of cotton for an indefinite time.
I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears to
me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal
of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not see my
way to doing any good.
* * * * *
The credit of the Government has been wonderfully kept up, but it
would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible
under such circumstances that a peace party might arise, and perhaps
just _possible_ that England and France might give weight to such a
party. However, all this is a mere speculation. We are (as usual) on
the eve of a crisis which is to clear up everything.
A threatened breakdown in health, due chiefly to overwork, forced Lord
Lyons reluctantly to apply for leave to return to England before the
severe heat of a Washington summer had set in, and in making the
application he pointed out that during the three years which had elapsed
since his arrival in the United States he had only been absent for four
nights from Washington, with the exception of the two months during
which he was officially in attendance on the Prince of Wales. The work
in fact was incessant, the staff of the Legation scanty, and things were
not made easier by the autocratic Hammond, who suddenly recalled one of
the attachés to London, that enlightened bureaucrat being apparently
quite incapable of realizing that a young man's time might be more
profitably employed at Washington during the Civil War than in preparing
for some perfunctory and trumpery examination which could perfectly well
have been undertaken at any subsequent period. The appeals to the
autocrat of the Foreign Office for assistance are as pathetic as they
are moderate. 'I conjure you to send me out two or at least one good
working attaché as soon as possible. Brodie is completely out of health;
Warre is always prostrated by the abominable heat of this place; Monson
can do a great deal, but his constitution is not of iron; and as for
myself I cannot do much Chancery work in addition to my proper duties.
Indeed, I shall soon break down. What you see of our work gives a very
small idea of the amount of it. It seems to me that everybody North and
South who gets into trouble discovers that he or she is a
non-naturalized British subject.'
Nor were any high qualifications demanded. Geniuses were not in request.
'What we want is a good steady industrious copier, _well conducted in
private life_. I have no objection to quite a young one; such a man as
Jenner would suit me perfectly. Anderson, Monson, and I are all
sufficiently well up in ordinary Chancery management to make it
unnecessary to have more genius or more experience than is required for
copying.'
Writing to his old chief Lord Normanby, the confession is made that
Washington 'is a terrible place for young men; nothing whatever in the
shape of amusement for them, little or no society of any kind now; no
theatre, no club. I have no time to think whether I am amused or not.'
Being constitutionally incapable of exaggeration, this last statement
may be accepted as literally accurate.
Leave for three months having been granted, the sanguine Mr. Seward did
not fail to draw hopeful conclusions from the circumstance, and there
appeared to be no sign of immediate trouble in the near future.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, June 9, 1862.
I was so unwell yesterday that I was unable to do anything, which
has prevented my sending you by this mail some general information
on the prospects of the war and some other matters.
I did not think that Mr. Seward would object to my going. He has, in
fact, taken up the idea with so much enthusiasm that I have been
obliged to endeavour to check his anticipation of the wonders I am
to effect, or rather to make him understand that my own views, not
his, are those which I must express to you.
I take his willingness that I should go as a sign that he does not
expect serious trouble, for I think that he would rather be in my
hands than those of a man new to him if he did.
I am afraid that there are three things to which we must not blind
ourselves:
1. That we have a very small chance of getting cotton from this
country for a long time to come.
2. That there is no Union feeling in the South.
3. That the war has become one of separation or subjugation.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, June 13, 1862.
I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning.
He told, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous,
but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I
suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more
of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em that I mean 'em no harm.' He
does not pay much attention to foreign affairs, and I suppose did
not like to talk about them without Mr. Seward. I am to hear Mr.
Seward's last words at New York on Tuesday evening. I embark the
following morning, and hope to pay my respects to you in person a
few days after this letter reaches you.
It is quite time for me to get away from this place. The heat to-day
is overpowering.
Lord Lyons arrived in London about the end of June, and a letter to Mr.
Stuart who had been left in charge of the Legation at Washington shows
that he was considerably alarmed at the hostile feeling prevailing
throughout the country against the North, largely due to the inability
to obtain cotton, but also embittered by the tone of the American press.
As an instance of this feeling, alluding to the rumour that McClellan
had suffered a serious defeat, he adds: 'I am afraid no one but me is
sorry for it.' McClellan's misfortunes certainly provoked demonstrations
of pleasure in the House of Commons during an ill-timed debate which
took place in July, and a celebrated speech by Gladstone in which he
asserted that 'Jefferson Davies and the leaders of the South have made
an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what
is more than either--they have made a nation,' certainly tended to show
that however impartial the Cabinet intended to be, the sympathies of
England were to a great extent with the South.
During his stay in England he was in constant communication with the
Cabinet, and the general belief of ministers was that whilst extremely
reluctant to interfere in any way in the American contest, interference
might be forced upon them. Mediation was again in the air, and M.
Mercier and the French Government thought that an opportunity had
arrived for proposing it.
Lord Lyons, after having been detained by Lord Russell for the purpose
of additional consultations, set out again for Washington in October
accompanied by the late Sir Edward Malet, who remained for a
considerable period on his staff, and became one of his closest friends.
In fact, with the exception of the late Mr. George Sheffield, who was
already acting as his private secretary, and of the late Sir Michael
Hubert, who subsequently acted in the same capacity, it is doubtful
whether any other person of his acquaintance ever reached the same
degree of intimacy or shared his confidence to an equal extent.
The visit to England had in no sense changed the policy of the British
Government towards the United States, and there were no fresh
instructions with regard to mediation, intervention, recognition of the
South, and the numerous other matters which occupied attention. Nor had
any essential change taken place in the situation in America, and Lord
Lyons, immediately after his return expressed the opinion that foreign
intervention, short of the use of force, would only make matters worse.
The indefatigable M. Mercier, however, in whose thoughts intervention
was always uppermost, was full of a new plan, although, with the violent
party predominant in the Cabinet, the moment did not appear propitious.
M. Mercier's idea was that France, with the consent and support of
England, should offer mediation alone. He thought that the difficulty
which the irritation against England threw in the way of mediation might
thus be avoided, while the fact of England supporting France would give
to France the weight of both Powers. According to his information,
Russia, probably from a desire to separate France and England, was
disposed to join France in offering good offices, but, independently of
other considerations, the presence of Russia might be an obstacle to the
success of his plan. It would take away from the offer of mediation the
element of intimidation, which, though kept in the background, must be
felt by the United States to exist. The mediation of all the European
Powers (France, England, Russia, and perhaps Prussia) would be a
different matter. It might have the effect of reconciling the pride of
the United States to negotiation with the South, and might, in certain
conjunctions, be usefully employed. But it would be more easy for the
Government of the United States to reject an offer from the four Powers
than from England and France, or from France only. England and France
had an obvious and pressing interest in putting an end to hostilities
and the means of supporting their counsels by their navies.
Such was M. Mercier's plan, but he received little encouragement from
his British colleague, who had anticipated something of the kind, and
with habitual caution declined to pronounce any opinion until he had
received instructions from home. As a matter of fact, he had foreseen
this proposal when in England, and had obtained an assurance from Lord
Russell that it should be discussed by the Cabinet.
The two following letters from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons show that
M. Mercier was really in accordance with his own Government.
* * * * *
Woburn Abbey, Nov. 1, 1862.
The Emperor of the French wishes to offer peace to both parties, and
he says both parties will agree to peace, the one on the ground of
Union and the other on the ground of Separation! I fear we are no
nearer to peace, if so near, as we were a year ago.
Seward's avowal to Mr. Stuart that he looks to mutual extermination
and the superior numbers of the North, in order to restore the
Union!!! is the most horrible thing I ever heard.
Cobden, I fear, is right when he says that to preach peace to them
is like speaking to mad dogs. I am much less sanguine than I was,
but I shall be glad to hear your views on your return. Russia must
be a party to any thing done by us and France--if we do anything.
* * * * *
Woburn Abbey, Nov. 8, 1862.
Flahault has been instructed to propose to us in conjunction with
Russia to ask North and South to suspend their war for six months. I
have not seen the despatch.
We shall consider our answer on Tuesday next.
The Emperor's proposal was declined by the British Government, and at
first peremptorily declined also by the Russian Government, but as soon
as the latter perceived, by a speech made by Lord Palmerston at the
Guildhall, that there was no chance of an acceptance of the proposal by
England a circular was issued, stating that if France persisted in her
intention, the Russian Minister at Washington would be instructed to
give it moral if not official support. Thus, as on many other occasions,
did Louis Napoleon's elaborate scheme vanish into space.
One fresh difficulty which had arisen in the meantime was the diminished
influence of Mr. Seward with the President and his ministers. He
had become much more conciliatory in his dealings with foreign
representatives, but was apparently unable to carry his points with
other departments, and had fallen in public estimation by signing the
Abolition Proclamation which had been imposed upon him, in opposition to
all his views by the Radical party in the Cabinet. Towards the end of
the year it seemed quite probable that he would have to resign, and the
contingency was viewed with consternation, for although Mr. Seward had
very pronounced faults, he now represented the Moderate party, and his
departure would signify the surrender of President Lincoln to the Ultra
Radical party, prepared to risk everything, even to a foreign war, in
order to maintain itself in power.
Upon the whole, there was every excuse for dissatisfaction with their
Government on the part of the Northern public. After about two years'
fighting the two main armies of the North and South remained in much the
same position, but, if anything, the balance of gain appeared to rest
with the South. New Orleans, it is true, had been captured, but the
invasion of Virginia had failed, and Richmond was as unapproachable as
ever. The North were the attacking party, and if they failed to advance
it was equivalent to a defeat. Disappointment and discouragement had
succeeded to confidence and enthusiasm, and if the contest imposed much
severer hardships upon the Confederates than upon their opponents, there
was no sign of faltering, and their spirit remained as high as ever.
Before the end of 1862 the prices of ordinary articles in the
Confederate States had already greatly increased. As early as October,
according to the consular reports, the price of tea at Savannah was
sixteen dollars a pound; brown sugar sixty cents; loaf sugar
unobtainable, and the commonest brown soap seventy-five cents. At
Charleston, coal was unprocurable; black cloth fetched fifty-three
dollars a yard; shoes cost thirty-four dollars a pair; beer thirty
dollars a dozen; sugar a dollar a pound; butter a dollar and a half, and
the pound sterling was worth fourteen dollars. In view of these figures
it would be interesting to learn the cost of a banquet given by General
Ripley in December 1862, to some French officers at Charleston, at which
Consul Bunch, of revoked exequatur fame, was present, and which must
surely have been the most sumptuous meal ever partaken of in a besieged
town since the days of Belshazzar.
* * * * *
BILL OF FARE.
Oysters on Shell.
FISH.
Salmon, Anchovy sauce.
SOUP.
Green Turtle. Oyster.
RELEVÉES.
Fillet of Beef, braisé with Mushrooms,
Capon, with Truffes à la Regence.
BOILED.
Leg of Mutton, Caper sauce,
Turkey, Celery sauce.
COLD.
Boned Turkey, garnished with Jelly,
Chicken Salad, à la Française,
Game Pattie, with truffles, decorated with Jelly.
ENTRÉES.
Sweet Breads, larded en croustade, sauce petits pois,
Fillets of Teal Duck, bigare, sauce Italienne,
Quails, braisés, sauce Champignons,
Snipe, broiled on Toast,
Fillets of Venison, sautés, sauce Poivrade,
Fried Oysters.
RELISHES.
Sardines, Olives, Celery, Assorted Pickles,
Horseradish, Pickled Onions, Cranberry Jelly,
Worcestershire sauce.
VEGETABLES.
Baked Sweet Potatoes, New Irish Potatoes, Mashed Potatoes,
Spinach, Cauliflowers, Turnips, Rice.
ROAST.
Turkey, stuffed with truffles, Saddle of Mutton,
Baked Ham, Madeira sauce.
GAME.
Wild Duck, Wild Turkey, Venison, with Jelly.
PASTRY.
Plum Pudding, Brandy sauce.
Apple and Mince pies, Omelette Soufflée, Lady Fingers,
Vanilla Kisses, Sponge Cake, Cup Custard, Madeira Jelly.
DESSERT.
Apples, Nuts, Coffee, etc.
If, however, the South was feeling the effects of privation, the North
had no cause to rejoice. In September, 1862, Lincoln had issued the
preliminary proclamation of Emancipation, but the hope that it would
consolidate the North had not been realized. The second proclamation
appeared on January 1, 1863, and had no greater success, serving only to
exasperate the South still further and increasing the divisions in the
North. The Democratic party was afraid to declare openly for peace, but
disguised efforts in favour of it were now made, and it was sought to
induce some of the State Legislatures to pass resolutions in favour of
an armistice and a convention. Men of all shades of politics had lost
heart, but the most probable cause of peace seemed to be the
impossibility of raising or keeping together a great army unless the
national spirit could be raised by some striking military successes,
meanwhile the division of feeling in the North had reached such a
pitch that the patriots who had formerly clamoured for a foreign war to
reunite North and South were now calling for a foreign war to reunite
the North itself.
The general demoralization induced M. Mercier to make yet another
attempt at mediation. Upon this occasion he was approached by the
well-known journalist, Mr. Horace Greeley, whose object it was to
ascertain whether the Emperor Napoleon could be relied upon as a real
friend to the United States in case of his being accepted as a mediator,
a 'real friend,' meaning, of course, one who would insist upon the
restoration of the Union. M. Mercier's fresh attempt met with no greater
success than before, nor was it surprising, for his action was based
upon an entire misconception.
Being firmly convinced that the restoration of the Union was impossible,
he failed to realize that this must be the basis of all negotiations,
and although most people were heartily sick of the war and were not
prepared to refuse to the South all terms short of unconditional
surrender, they had not been brought to the point of acquiescing in a
cession of territory.
The French proposal, with which we had been careful not to associate
ourselves, was, of course, declined by the American Government. Mr.
Seward re-established some of his popularity by the character of his
answer; distrust of the Emperor Napoleon increased, and the only party
which benefited in any way was England, for the increase in ill-feeling
towards France had the result of diminishing to some extent the
animosity against us, and M. Mercier himself was now almost as much
attacked in the press as the British Minister had been in the past.
Early in the year, an incident occurred which might have had unpleasant
consequences had it not been promptly dealt with. In spite of the
endless embarrassments created by the blockade, the British Government
was sincerely anxious not to give the United States Government any
ground for complaint, and the Consuls had been continually enjoined by
Lord Lyons to adhere closely to the recognized rules of International
Law where a state of blockade existed. To his consternation he now
learnt that the Consul at Mobile proposed to send away from that port a
quantity of specie in a British man-of-war. 'I should be very much
alarmed,' he wrote, 'if I thought it likely that he would find a captain
of man-of-war as foolish as himself. I really could not answer for peace
if, in addition to the irritation about the _Alabama_, should come the
fury which would be excited, if it were shown that our men-of-war had
carried Confederate gold through the blockade. No proof that the money
was intended for, or even that it had been actually paid to, British
bondholders would ever convince people here that it had not been used to
purchase munitions of war.' Unfortunately a simple-minded captain had
been discovered by the Consul, and before it was possible to communicate
with him the specie had been shipped. This action, which was due solely
to stupidity, was impossible to defend, and would have provided the
American Government with a first-class grievance; clearly the best thing
to do was to anticipate any complaints, and consequently the Consul was
wisely dismissed before the matter became really public. The promptitude
with which this regrettable incident was dealt with contrasts favourably
with the difficulty which was experienced in persuading the American
Government to deal adequately with grievances arising out of the
proceedings of their own officials.
At this period of the war innumerable complaints were received from
British Governors, Naval officers and Consuls with regard to the
arbitrary proceedings of United States cruisers, and it was plain that
these proceedings were largely due to the exasperation caused by the
exploits of the _Alabama_, and by the rumours that similar vessels were
being built in England for the Confederates. This exasperation was
perfectly natural, but not altogether reasonable, for it never seems to
have occurred to the Americans that the fault lay partly with their own
Navy. Great pressure was put upon President Lincoln to issue letters of
marque, and had privateers made their appearance and exercised
belligerent rights against neutral merchantmen, the difficulty of
preserving peace would have been increased tenfold. Mr. Seward was known
to be strongly in favour of the policy of issuing letters of marque, and
the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Adams by Lord Russell,
who always appeared somewhat unnecessarily disposed to suspect Mr.
Seward of hostile intentions.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Chesham Place, March 14, 1863.
I don't think Mr. Seward means to quarrel with us, but perhaps he
will bluster rather more when he has lost the support of Congress.
Adams told me that the privateers, if sanctioned at all, were not
intended to interfere with nice questions of International Law, but
only to encounter the _Alabama_ and other vessels of that sort.
If this be so I doubt if they will be fitted out at all, but if
they are fitted out I think they will not keep their hands off
English merchant ships.
We have no thoughts of recognizing at present. If you are asked our
intentions by Seward, say that our opinion is that the Republican
Party ought not to leave the glorious work of peace to the
Democrats, but as a Neutral Power, our intention and wish is to let
the war work itself out, as it is sure to do by the moral exhaustion
of the war spirit.
Our procession and wedding went off splendidly. The Princess of
Wales is charming and would make New York stand on tiptoe to behold
her.
In a further conversation with Mr. Adams he made the significant remarks
that if the contemplated privateers sought for Confederate merchant
ships they would not find any, and that if they interfered with neutral
vessels and the law of blockade they would probably involve their own
and the British Government in 'very awkward questions.'
Lord Russell, in spite of his sincere and often proclaimed desire to
remain absolutely impartial, hardly seems at this time to have realized
the disastrous consequences of not having prevented the departure of the
_Alabama_ and similar vessels.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 28, 1863.
The outcry in America about the _Oreto_ and the _Alabama_ is much
exaggerated, but I must feel that her roaming the ocean with English
guns and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the ships of a
friendly nation, is a scandal and a reproach. I don't know very well
what we can do, but I should like myself to refer the question of
indemnity to an impartial arbiter.
When things are more advanced towards a termination, I think this
might be done. It would be dangerous to do it at present, or even
to hold out hopes of it. I will think further of it, and if I remain
in the same mind, will submit the question to the Cabinet.
The _Peterhoff_ and the _Magicienne_ are now before the Law
Officers. I will send you instructions about them next week. The
seizures by Admiral Wilkes seem like a plan to embroil our two
countries. He always protests that such is not his object, but his
acts do not agree with his words.
I should like anything better than being obliged to take the part of
the Confederates. But then President Lincoln must not be getting up
war cries to help his declining popularity.
The two vessels alluded to had been captured on their way to Matamoros,
in Mexican territory, and the British Government contended that the
traffic to that place was legitimate, while the United States Government
maintained, probably with justice, that the goods were intended for
Texas. Matamoros, which was situated on the Rio Grande, separating
Mexico from the United States, sprang into prominence in 1862 in
consequence of the war, became the seat of a brisk trade, and provided
one of the numerous difficulties arising out of the blockade, which had
now been greatly extended owing to the rapid development of the Federal
Navy.
As for Admiral Wilkes, the hero of the _Trent_, his arbitrary conduct
was the subject of continual complaints; he showed marked discourtesy in
connection with H.M.S. _Barracouta_, and upon one occasion a cruiser
under his command went so far as to fire a shot across the bows of
H.M.S. _Cygnet_, and as the long-suffering British Admiral Sir A. Milne
observed, to fire a shot across the bows of a neutral ship of war when
hove to, was going a step further in the already uncourteous proceedings
of the American cruisers. Admiral Wilkes always disclaimed any
intention of unfriendliness, but his proceedings were a fruitful source
of irritation, and Lord Russell certainly conceived the impression that
he and his official chief, Mr. Welles, were bent upon picking a quarrel
with us.
Feeling between the two countries was not improved by the inopportune
publication of a Blue Book. The Democrats, who had been faring badly, by
some mysterious process of reasoning, came to the conclusion that the
object was to destroy them and denounced Lord Russell for having lost
them an election in Connecticut by his Machiavellian proceedings. They
vented their indignation upon the Legation at Washington, and the
position of the minister became more and more unpleasant, added to which
his health again showed signs of giving way.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, April 13, 1863.
I have written as much as I have time and strength for officially. I
have been unwell all the last week, but not seriously so. I think
the state of things here, as far as peace with us is concerned, more
alarming than it has been since the Trent affair. They are not a
people who can be soothed by concessions, and they are a people who
after any amount of bluster will give in if they think that their
opponents are in earnest and are stronger than they. I would rather
the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some better ground for us
than the question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The
great point to be gained, in my opinion, would be to prevent the
ships sailing, without leading the people here to think that they
had gained their point by threats. I am in trouble altogether, for
the good will to me personally, which had miraculously survived so
long, seems at last to have sunk altogether under the stroke of the
last Blue Book.
It must have been peculiarly irritating, after all the efforts he had
made, to find them neutralized by the clumsy action of the Home
Government, but in his private correspondence there occur no expressions
of resentment against those who had thus weakened his position, probably
because his sense of discipline and loyalty to his official chiefs was
so strong as to preclude anything in the nature of criticism. It is
customary, before publishing Blue Books on Foreign Affairs, to consult
both the Foreign Government concerned and the British representative
accredited to it, but presumably in this case the usual practice was not
observed.
In one direction, however, there was an improvement. The British
Government tardily realizing the danger arising from the building of
Confederate cruisers in England took steps to prevent it, and the
situation was eased for the time being.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, April 24, 1863.
So far as I can judge in this short time the Americans have eagerly
grasped at the intelligence of the endeavours to stop the
Confederate vessels building in England, as a relief from their
dread that they were really drifting into a war with us. I cannot
yet say whether the exasperation is subsiding. I have not much fear
that they will ever put a _casus belli_ to us, but I do fear that
they may force us to make demands upon them to which, however
plainly just, party considerations may render it difficult for the
administration to yield. I seem to be getting on pretty well again
with Mr. Seward, but not with others since the Blue Book, and Mr.
Seward cannot control the feelings or the actions of the other
members of the administration either as regards England or her
Representative here personally. However, for the moment, things
certainly look more peaceful than they did a week ago. I mean
peaceful towards us, for there are no symptoms of an approaching end
of the civil war.
One danger at any rate was removed, at all events temporarily, for the
American Government determined not to proceed with the issuing of the
letters of marque. The chief danger, however, lay not so much in the
exasperation caused by the Confederate ships as in the proceedings of
the United States cruisers, and it was feared that a repetition of such
seizures as those of the _Peterhoff_ and _Magicienne_ might rouse such a
feeling of indignation in England that it might become necessary to put
forward demands for redress which the Americans would be too angry to
comply with. For some reason, too, the relations between the British
Legation and the Navy Department (perhaps owing to Mr. Welles's
anti-English proclivities), were much less satisfactory than was the
case with the other Government offices, and whenever an American naval
officer had been admittedly in the wrong, explanation, regret, or
redress were generally postponed so long (as in the case of the _Trent_)
that the United States Government found itself in the position of having
either to make a marked concession to England, or to run the risk of
refusing just demands. Lord Lyons's usual practice was to leave the door
open for spontaneous action on their part up to the last moment, and to
abstain from making anything like a demand or even an embarrassing
observation for as long as possible; but his difficulties in dealing
with such questions were increased by a quarrel between Mr. Seward and
Mr. Welles. Mr. Seward, to do him justice, generally seems to have
exercised a pacific influence, but party spirit ran so high, and the
Democrats detested him so cordially, that even those who were known
to be friendly towards England could not resist the temptation of
denouncing his 'humiliating concessions to British arrogance' when
they got the opportunity.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Admiral Sir A. Milne._
Washington, May 11, 1863.
I have given Mr. Seward verbally a warning from H.M. Government that
the impression which prevails in England that the United States are
systematically endeavouring by fair means and by foul to stop our
trade with Matamoros is producing very dangerous effects. Mr. Seward
said that he should be able to give very satisfactory assurances on
this head. I observed to him that I thought some decided practical
steps were necessary to do away with this impression. I reminded him
of his previous assurances and of his instructions to the Navy
Department, and pointed out those instructions were apparently set
at nought by the U.S. officers. I said that the great point was to
make the subordinate officers feel the effects of the displeasure of
the Government, when they violated neutral rights; that it was not
likely the naval officers would pay much attention to the assurances
given by the Government to Foreign Powers, and that it was not to be
expected that they would pay much attention to formal instructions
to themselves, if they found that they could practically violate
them with impunity. The Government ought, I said, to remove its
subordinates from situations in which they were peculiarly exposed
to temptations to make an unlawful use of belligerent powers. I told
Mr. Seward that I should regard another questionable seizure of a
British merchant vessel in the neighbourhood of St. Thomas, or
another questionable seizure anywhere of a British vessel bound to
Matamoros, as little less than a calamity.
I trust that I made so much impression as to render it probable that
these matters will be arranged for the present, as far as _words_
go, and that something will be done to check the vexatious
proceedings of the cruisers. What this Government ought to do is to
remove their ships from St. Thomas altogether and recall Admiral
Wilkes. I have not however much confidence in their doing anything
really effectual. Many of the naval officers would like a war with
England. They know well enough that it would not be a naval war, but
they are envious of Captain Semmes and the _Alabama_, and would
rather roam about picking up prizes, than go on with the dull and
harassing work of blockading. Then the universal exasperation in the
country against England makes the Government unwilling and afraid to
do anything which looks like a concession to us. Thus things are in
a dangerous state, and it will be a great comfort to me to be within
reach of you by telegraph.
If any more privateers get out of our ports, the Government here may
be forced by public clamour to issue letters of marque somewhat
suddenly. Mr. Seward has verbally promised to give us notice, but
this is a very vague assurance: of course it will not do for me to
discuss beforehand any particular arrangements about them, because
this would imply acquiescence in their being issued, which we are
far from wishing to signify beforehand.
I have been unwell for more than a month, and am beset by a quantity
of small vexatious business concerning the wrongs of British
subjects who have suddenly proclaimed their unswerving loyalty to
the British Crown and demanded my protection.
Many thanks for your private letter. You will think that I am trying
to make up for the quality of my information by quantity of writing.
The fact is I am too much knocked up to be able to write shortly.
The representations made with regard to Admiral Wilkes, partly owing to
the good offices of Mr. Seward, at length produced a satisfactory
result, and that enterprising officer was promoted to a command in the
Pacific, much doubtless to the relief of all concerned. Lord Lyons was
extremely careful to conceal the fact that he had been in any way
instrumental in obtaining this transfer, and congratulated himself upon
the advent of a temporary lull in the storm against England: a lull,
however, which the escape of another _Alabama_ from Liverpool, of a
considerable Federal success or even a mere accident, might convert into
an even more furious tempest.
Two years previously Mr. Seward had announced that the policy of the
United States, unlike that of other countries, was 'based on high and
eternal consideration of principle and the good of the human race,' but
aliens resident in America, and more especially Englishmen, might have
been excused for complaining that this lofty and inspiring ideal was
accompanied by a vast amount of inconvenience and hardship.
Foreigners who have taken up their abode in a country where a state of
war prevails are naturally subjected to much that is objectionable to
them, in the natural course of things, and as a general rule find it
extremely difficult to obtain redress, for whilst they remain in a
country which is not their own they must submit to any exceptional
legislation which the force of circumstances may require. Foreign
Governments are not in a position to decide whether this exceptional
legislation is justifiable or not, and the utmost that the alien can
expect is, either that he should be allowed time to depart, or that his
Government should protect him by remonstrance or otherwise when he is
dealt with illegally; and the general principle which is usually adopted
is that foreign interference should be as sparing as possible and that
the foreigner should take his chance with the native citizen.
It was not long before foreigners in the United States were made to
realize the disadvantages of living in a country where civil war
prevailed. When hostilities began, the Government, reasonably enough,
took steps to suspend when necessary the ordinary law, that being a
practice almost invariably adopted by civilized countries under similar
circumstances. Persons suspected of disaffection or treason were
arbitrarily arrested, kept in prison under the authority of the
military, and detained there without trial; and amongst these were
occasionally _bonâ fide_ British subjects and others who claimed to
be such. Where martial law exists, it is only natural that occasional
cases of injustice or harshness should arise, and it is clear that a
certain number of British subjects suffered without due cause, but upon
the whole it does not appear the United States Government exercised its
powers with undue severity, or that it acted in a more arbitrary manner
than would have been the case with a European Power in a similar
position.
In February, 1862, nearly all political prisoners, other than spies,
were ordered to be released on parole, and in April Lord Lyons was able
to report that although the Executive Government retained the power to
make political arrests it was rarely exercised. He stated that he was
not aware of any British subject being detained arbitrarily as a
political prisoner, and that although arrests without form of law were
still being made by the military authorities in places occupied by the
forces of the United States, they appeared to be confined in general to
persons accused of offences affecting, more or less, the discipline or
safety of the army.
As was only to be expected, there were an enormous number of
applications made to the Legation by persons who were aggrieved by the
operation of martial law, but what gave far more trouble was the attempt
of the United States Government to exact military service from resident
British subjects.
The established principle is that resident aliens, in return for the
enjoyment of ordinary civil rights, should be liable to discharge
certain duties in connection with the administration of justice and the
maintenance of order, and that in certain cases they may reasonably be
called upon to take part in the defence of the country against invasion.
On the other hand, the incorporation of aliens in the regular army or
navy is manifestly unjust, for it prevents departure from the country
and might conceivably incur the obligation of having to fight against
their own countrymen. This, it is true, is not applicable to a civil
war, but an alien might well argue that a civil war, waged between
citizens for an object in which he, as an alien, had no concern, was a
totally insufficient reason for dragging him into the contest. It is
difficult to believe, for instance, that the United States Government
would tolerate the compulsory service of American citizens in the army
of a South American Republic in the event of an attempt being made to
impress them during a civil war. Consequently, when hostilities began,
the Washington Legation was besieged by persons who desired to be
exempted from service by getting registered as British subjects, many of
whom had announced their intention of becoming American citizens at the
earliest opportunity. _Prima facie_ it seems only reasonable that
persons who deliberately exchange one nationality for another, more
especially if like many of the Irish emigrants they have professed
undying hostility to England, and everything English, should accept any
liability imposed upon them, but the question was complicated by the
fact that they had not acquired full rights of citizenship, the
naturalization of a foreigner in America, necessitating a residence of
five years in the United States, and a declaration of intention three
years in advance.
Instructions upon this question were requested from Her Majesty's
Government before the war broke out, and in reply it was stated that
there was nothing in International Law which prohibited a Government
from requiring resident aliens to serve in the police or militia; if,
however, the militia were to be embodied for active service, and
substitutes were prohibited, then 'the position of British subjects
would appear to deserve very favourable consideration, and to call for
every exertion being made in their favour.' A similar opinion was
expressed in July, 1861.
The difficulty really arose out of the defective military organization
of the United States, which was based upon the voluntary system. The
so-called voluntary system, which is in reality only a high-sounding
device to impose upon an impecunious minority what ought to be a general
obligation, may be an admirable institution in time of peace, but it
invariably breaks down in a really serious emergency, and it was the
totally inadequate nature of that system which forced both combatants in
the American Civil War to have recourse to all sorts of discreditable
expedients.
It has already been stated that at the beginning of the war the American
regular army consisted of only 16,000 officers and men all told.
Immediately after the seizure of Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, President
Lincoln called out 75,000 militia, and in May he called for 42,000
volunteers for three years, half of whom were to serve in the regular
army, and half in the navy. At first these appeals were responded to
with the greatest enthusiasm, but it was not long-lived, for, as has
been related, even as early as the battle of Bull's Run in July, militia
regiments insisted upon leaving at the completion of their period of
service, and from that date the difficulty in finding recruits continued
to increase.
The pay of the privates was in May, 1861, raised to thirteen dollars a
month, which, however, may be considered low when compared with the five
shillings a day we paid to untrained men during the Boer War, and it
became clear that not only was it difficult to attract volunteers, but
also to keep them when obtained. In view of the methods employed in
recruiting them it was not surprising that the results were frequently
unsatisfactory.
The usual method employed was to inform the Governor of a State of the
number of men required. The Governor having made the necessary
announcement, private persons came forward offering to raise regiments.
Each set forth his claims, his influence in the State or among a certain
portion of the population, and his devotion to the party in power.
From the persons thus presenting themselves the Governor made his
choice. Generally the person upon whom the choice fell laid it down as
a condition that he should have the command of the regiment. The next
thing was to find soldiers. Friends seized with the same martial ardour
promised to bring so many recruits if they were made--the one a
Captain--another a Lieutenant--another a Sergeant, and so forth. The
framework was thus formed and partially filled up, and the regiment
being thus organized, the lists were carried to the Governor for his
approval.
The inconveniences of such a system were obvious, and experience showed
that it was much less adapted, than had been supposed, for the purpose
of raising an efficient army. It was considered, however, to possess
certain political advantages, one of which was that there was little
fear of the officers ultimately forming anything like a separate
military or aristocratic caste.
The real inconvenience of the system, however, was that sufficient men
were not forthcoming in spite of the inducements offered by means of
high pay, and the Government was forced to have recourse to all sorts of
iniquitous devices in order to get hold of so-called volunteers, many of
whom were foreigners. The most objectionable practice was that of giving
bounties to agents for bringing in recruits. The effect of this at the
beginning of the war was that great numbers of men deserted from the
British navy, and the Admiral at Halifax reported that at one time there
were a hundred deserters from one ship alone, the _St. Vincent_, but as
the contest progressed the bounty system was responsible for innumerable
cases of kidnapping in which British subjects were the sufferers.
Kidnapping especially flourished in New York where the emigrants were an
easy prey, and to such a point had corruption been carried that the
Governor admitted to the British Consul that out of every million of
dollars expended in bounties, fully four-fifths of the amount were
secured by bounty and substitute brokers and crimps.
* * * * *
'The fraud and violence combined,' wrote Consul Archibald from New
York, 'which are now used in procuring recruits for both army and
navy are disgraceful, and it is idle for the authorities to think of
putting down the malpractices of the villains who carry on the
business of kidnapping recruits, or of making the world believe they
are sincere, while they hold out such inducements to these vagabonds
for carrying on their White Slave Trade and Black Slave Trade too. I
have numerous complaints, but, as in a great majority of cases the
victims, at last, succumb and take a portion of the bounty, for they
rarely get more than a portion, it would be unavailing to ask for
their release.'
In the autumn of 1862, Fire Island was filled with unfortunates
cheated and deluded, or forced thither by the police who received
ten dollars a head for each man. Now in addition to the enormous
bounties offered, there is placarded in conspicuous places on the
walls of the New Park barracks at the City Hall the following very
suggestive notice: 'Fifteen dollars Hand Money given to any man
bringing a volunteer.'
The following report from a Federal General shows that the strictures of
Consul Archibald were thoroughly justified.
* * * * *
_Important Letter from General Wistar._
VICTIMS OF THE BOUNTY SWINDLERS DESERTING IN LARGE NUMBERS,--EVILS
OF THE PLUNDERING SYSTEM ON OUR ARMIES IN THE FIELD, ETC.
* * * * *
Headquarters United States Forces,
Yorktown, Va., April 15, 1854.
General--An extended spirit of desertion prevailing among the
recruits recently received from the North, in some of the regiments
of my command, has led me to make some inquiries resulting in
apparently well-authenticated information, which I beg respectfully
to communicate to you in this unofficial manner, deeming it required
by humanity, no less than by our common desire to benefit the
service.
There seems to be little doubt that many, in fact I think I am
justified in saying the most, of these unfortunate men were either
deceived or kidnapped, or both, in the most scandalous and inhuman
manner, in New York city, where they were drugged and carried off to
New Hampshire and Connecticut, mustered in and uniformed before
their consciousness was fully restored.
Even their bounty was obtained by the parties who were instrumental
in these nefarious transactions, and the poor wretches find
themselves on returning to their senses, mustered soldiers, without
any pecuniary benefit. Nearly all are foreigners, mostly sailors,
both ignorant of and indifferent to the objects of the war in which
they thus suddenly find themselves involved.
Two men were shot here this morning for desertion, and over thirty
more are now awaiting trial or execution.
These examples are essential, as we all understand; but it occurred
to me, General, that you would pardon me for thus calling your
attention to the greater crime committed in New York, in kidnapping
these men into positions where, to their ignorance, desertion must
seem like a vindication of their own rights and liberty.
Believe me to be, General, with the highest esteem, your obedient
servant,
* * * * *
J. J. WISTAR.
To Major-General John A. Dix, New York City.
These outrages committed in the name of the Voluntary System, and many
of the victims of which were Englishmen, constantly took place even
after the Act of July, 1862, which provided for the enrolment in the
militia of all able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five, and it may be presumed therefore either that the United
States Government was afraid to enforce its laws or that the so-called
'volunteers' were chiefly foreign subjects. In any case, amongst
these unhappy victims were numerous British youths under twenty-one
years of age, and the efforts made to obtain their discharge on the
ground of their being minors were rarely successful and eventually
abandoned altogether.
In the South, apparently, the state of things was equally bad, if not
worse; British subjects were imprisoned on all sorts of pretexts in
spite of Consular protection papers, and enlistment was frequently the
price of liberty. The Southern press was particularly scathing on the
subject of aliens, especially Irishmen who endeavoured to evade military
service.
* * * * *
We can conceive nothing more disgraceful than the conduct of
Irishmen, for example--but we trust they are few--who have been
cursing the British Government ever since they could talk, who have
emigrated to this country to escape the British Yoke, but who now
run to an English Consul and profess themselves subjects of Queen
Victoria in order to evade their duties in the land of their
adoption. We say that we fervently trust there are but few Irishmen
of whom this can be said, for such are a disgrace to their old
island, and bring the blush of shame to the cheek of their
compatriots who fight in our foremost ranks upon every field. Nobody
will be more pleased than our good Irish citizens if these fellows
are sent under guard to the camp.
The attention of conscript officers is therefore called to the
foreign Consul's offices, to the railroad cars and the roads.
The question of the liability to conscription of British subjects
naturally produced a voluminous correspondence.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, July 24, 1863.
Military events, or at all events military news, have been scarce
during the last few days. The really important question seems to be
the enforcement of the Conscription Act. On the one hand we hear of
wide-spread plans of resistance to it, organized among the Germans,
as well as the Irish population in all parts of the Country; on the
other hand it is represented that the Government is determined to
enforce it at the point of the bayonet, and to begin at New York, as
soon as it can get things ready. We have as yet had no proof that
any serious resistance to the Government will be provoked by any
measures it may take. The Democrats at New York are, as might be
expected, frightened by the mob--they dare not encourage resistance
to the Conscription, lest they should let loose an uncontrollable
gang of plunderers. On the other hand, if the Government succeeds in
getting military command of New York there is very little chance of
any but the Government candidate's coming in as President when Mr.
Lincoln's term expires.
British subjects are not the least violent in language about the
Draft, and are far from being pleased either with H.M. Government or
with H.M. Minister here. I have given myself a world of trouble to
make the burthen of proving their claim to exemption as light as
possible. If I have not succeeded as well as I ought, I have done
more than most people, who knew anything about the difficulties,
expected. I have written you a very long despatch about it--much
longer than I intended, but I thought it well to put something on
record to show that the matter had been properly attended to. I have
taken more pains myself about it, and given Mr. Seward more trouble
about it, than about any matter which I have had to treat with him.
M. Mercier's absence has made it difficult to concert measures
speedily about the Cotton question, but his Secretary of Legation
and I intend to speak to Mr. Seward about it to-morrow. We do not
mean to go to Mr. Seward together. I have so little hope of
effecting anything practical, that I should hardly feel in earnest
about it, if it were a matter of less importance. As it is, I shall
of course do my best. As soon as this affair is in train, I hope to
set out for Canada. My present notion is to wait here for the
despatches from London of the 18th--which ought to arrive the middle
of next week--and to wait at New York for the despatches from London
of the 25th, and then, if they bring nothing to hinder it, to go on
to Quebec. I shall present Mr. Stuart as _Chargé d'affaires_ before
I leave Washington. It would be impossible to carry on the immense
amount of protection to British subjects' business here, without
some one on the spot who could write officially to the Government.
Mr. Stuart is both perfectly capable of managing difficult questions
himself, and perfectly willing to refer them to men higher in office
when it is proper to do so--a rare combination of merits.
The question was finally decided to the satisfaction of His Majesty's
Government by a Proclamation of the President which allowed aliens a
period of sixty-five days, during which their departure was permitted,
and interference on behalf of persons who had failed to take advantage
of the opportunity was subsequently refused. As for the difficulties
experienced by the United States Government, they seem to have been met
by enforcing conscription where it was possible, and delaying it where
serious opposition was feared.
In August, 1863, a somewhat surprising proposal came from Mr. Seward. In
a confidential conversation with Lord Lyons he expatiated upon the
necessity of reviving a better feeling between Great Britain and the
United States, and of making some demonstration calculated to produce
the desired effect. England, he said, had made such a demonstration
before the war by the visit of the Prince of Wales, which had been
productive of the happiest results. Now it was the turn of the United
States to make a corresponding display of goodwill, but it was difficult
to devise the means of doing so, as the President could not travel, and
America possessed no Princes. Would Lord Lyons think the matter over?
The latter, having duly reflected, expressed the opinion that there was
no real hostility to the United States in England, although there was
undoubtedly a certain amount of sympathy with the South, and that
consequently there was no necessity to take any extraordinary step. Mr.
Seward, however, having returned to his suggestion of making some
counter demonstration in the nature of the visit of the Prince of Wales.
* * * * *
'The only conjecture I can make,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'is that he
thinks of going to England himself. He may possibly want to be
absent for some reasons connected with the Presidential contest. If
he thinks that he has himself any chance of being taken as a
candidate by either party he is the only man who thinks so at this
moment. It is however generally considered to be an advantage to a
candidate to be out of the country during the canvass. I cannot see
any good which his going to England could effect with regard to
public opinion. If he considered himself as returning the Prince of
Wales's visit, the absurdity of the notion would alone prevent its
being offensive. The majority of the Americans would probably be by
no means pleased if he met with a brilliant reception. He has,
besides, so much more vanity, personal and national, than tact, that
he seldom makes a favourable impression at first. When one comes
really to know him, one is surprised to find much to esteem and even
to like in him. It is however hardly worth while to say more on the
subject, for it is a mere conjecture of mine that he was thinking
of going to England when he spoke to me. It might however be of
advantage for me to know whether you would wish to encourage the
idea of some public demonstration or other, if he should return to
the subject when I get back to Washington. I told him that so far as
public opinion in England was concerned, the one thing to do was
to let us really have a supply of cotton; that without this
demonstrations and professions would be unsuccessful: that with it
they would not be required.'
Whether Lord Lyons's conjecture was well founded or not, the prospect of
a visit from Mr. Seward possessed no charms for Lord Russell, whose
antipathy to the American Secretary of State has been already noted. The
following letter appears to be full of good sense and instructive as
regards the real value of those visits of exalted personages which
produce such illimitable enthusiasm in the press.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Oct. 2, 1863.
Upon considering Mr. Seward's hints to you of doing something here
as an equivalent or a return for the Prince of Wales's visit to the
United States, I do not see my way to anything satisfactory. These
visits of Great Personages seldom have more than a transient effect;
they form no real and solid relation of friendship between nations,
though if undertaken at a fortunate moment, they serve to bring out
and demonstrate a friendship already existing.
The visit of the Prince of Wales was thus fortunately well timed;
but if Mr. Seward or any conspicuous statesman of the United States
were to visit this country now he would find us all divided. The
Government would show him every attention and civility: the
Anti-Slavery party would probably make great show of sympathy by
addresses and public receptions. But the party who press for
recognition of the South would hold aloof, and in some unmistakable
manner, prove that there is a great deal of sympathy with the South
in this country.
In these circumstances I do not think that any such mark of
friendship as Mr. Seward suggests would be likely to produce the
good effect of which he is desirous. Mr. Sumner's conduct is very
bad; he has taken infinite pains to misrepresent me in every
particular. I have done my best to counteract his efforts by my
speech at Blairgowrie. I don't know how far I may be successful, but
I rely on your constant watchfulness to prevent any rupture between
the two countries, which of all things I should most lament.
The question of the ironclads is still under investigation. The
Cabinet must consider it very soon, and I have no doubt we shall do
all that is right to preserve our neutrality free from just
reproach--unjust reproach we shall not yield to.
I hope you are now quite well, and as the heats must be over I trust
you will not suffer for the next six months from the climate of
Washington.
Owing to continual ill-health, Lord Lyons was compelled to pay a visit
to Canada in the autumn, and upon his return to Washington in October,
accompanied by Admiral Milne, he found Mr. Seward in a more conciliatory
frame of mind than ever, chiefly owing to the detention of Confederate
ironclads in England. Mr. Welles and the lawyers at the Navy Department,
however, still 'appeared to be thoroughly wrongheaded and unable to see
that municipal law is one thing and International Law and the relations
between Governments another.' The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase,
engaged on an electioneering tour, distinguished himself by spirited
speeches, talking of 'taking Old Mother England by the hair and giving
her a good shaking,' and was himself outdone in rancour against England
by another distinguished politician, Mr. Sumner. There was in fact no
sign of change in the feeling of the people at large towards us, and the
visit of a Russian squadron to New York was made the occasion of an
anti-British and anti-French demonstration.
Considering that the war had now lasted for several years, it seems
rather remarkable that the British Government had not thought it worth
while to send military or naval officers to watch the operations, but
judging from the following letter, the idea never seems to have occurred
that there was anything to learn.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Nov. 3, 1863.
I have no news of importance--political or military to write to-day.
The crisis at Chattanooga has not yet taken place, so far as we
know.
I doubt whether people in Europe are aware of the extent of the
progress of this Country in military strength or of the preparations
which have been made for the contingency of a War with an European
Power. It is impossible for me to undertake to give anything like
detailed information on the subject; but it may be worth while for
Her Majesty's Government to consider whether it is important for
them to know what is really being done, and if so, what measures
will be best with a view to their obtaining regularly information
practically useful. I have no fancy for having a military or Naval
Attaché--and I am not certain how the appointment of one might be
taken here. It _might_ create suspicion--on the other hand it
_might_ be taken as a compliment. I am inclined to think that
Officers unconnected with the Legation sent quietly, but by no means
secretly, would learn most. But if the Legation is to be depended
upon for the information, it is absolutely necessary that there
should be in it some one having a professional knowledge both of
naval and military matters. I myself know as little of such matters
as any man--and were it otherwise, I have as much proper Diplomatic
business to do as I can manage. The correspondence with Mr. Seward,
which requires minute care in many cases, grows more and more
burdensome. New cases arise daily, and the old ones never seem to
come to an end. I have had considerably more than nine hundred notes
from Mr. Seward already this year.
I don't think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel
with us or with any European power, but the better prepared it is,
the less manageable it will be.
This suggestion was eventually acted upon as appears later.
About this time, the mission to Europe of Messrs. Mason and Slidell
having failed in its object, the Confederate Government resolved upon
the expulsion of the British Consuls resident in the South, who were
informed that they could no longer be permitted to exercise their
functions, or even to reside within the limits of the Confederacy.
Doubtless the active part the Consuls had taken in endeavouring to
prevent the compulsory enlistment of British subjects contributed
towards this action, but the ostensible reasons were, firstly, that they
received their instructions from the British Minister residing in
Washington, and secondly, that Mr. McGee, the Consul at Mobile, had been
dismissed from his post because he had allowed specie intended for the
payment of interest on a State debt to be shipped from that blockaded
port to London on board of a British warship. In Lord Lyons's opinion
the action of Mr. Jefferson Davis's Government appeared reasonable.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Nov. 17, 1863.
Mr. Walker has sent me a copy of his despatch to you enclosing Mr.
Benjamin's letter to Mr. Slidell explaining the reasons to be given
for the expulsion. The objection to the Consuls being under the
orders of the Minister at Washington appears reasonable enough. As
you know, I have all along been of opinion that the connexion
between the Southern Consulates and the Legation was full of
inconvenience. The objection to Mr. Cridland's appointment, that it
was made by me, has, in fact, no other foundation than that your
orders to Mr. Moore on the subject were sent through me; in
transmitting them I took the precaution expressly to desire Mr.
Moore to word the appointment as one coming from H.M. Government
and not to mention me.
Mr. Benjamin's lecture on the duty of Belligerents to pay their
debts is totally beside the purpose. Of course no one could have
wished more than I did that the British creditors should receive
their money. I wished that all British subjects should be able to
remove their property from the Confederate States, and most of all I
wished that an unlimited amount of cotton should be exported. What I
objected to was that a British Consul should engage himself in
committing a breach of blockade, and that a British man of war,
which had been admitted on the faith that she should carry away
nothing but despatches, should carry through the Blockade the very
article to the exportation of which the United States most objected.
It is rather cool of Mr. Benjamin to say that the United States
could not but have been glad that specie should be exported, when he
knew that at the time the great anxiety of the Confederates was to
get specie through the blockade to pay for their purchasers of
warlike stores in Europe, and that the great anxiety of the United
States was to prevent this.
At the close of 1863 it became evident that the cause of the South was
failing, but the reverses of the Confederates seemed only to stimulate
them to fresh exertions, while President Davis's eloquent message in
December proclaimed that the patriotism of the people was equal to every
sacrifice demanded by their country's needs.
In the preceding autumn, Mr. Seward, in pursuance of his laudable policy
of conciliation, had suggested that the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada,
which would expire shortly, might afford an opportunity of making a
friendly demonstration. His suggestion was that the British Government
should make inquiries from him on the subject of its renewal, but Lord
Russell, who was prone to regard him with suspicion, had not responded
to this advance with any favour. In the early part of 1864 it became
evident that the treaty was in considerable danger, and the Canadian
Government began to show signs of natural anxiety, especially in view of
the fact that a hostile motion was pending in Congress. The following
letters disclose the objections of the professional diplomatist to being
saddled with amateur assistants.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Viscount Monck._
Washington, Jan. 28, 1864.
The Canadians appear to me to be acting unwisely about the
Reciprocity Treaty at this moment. Their true policy is to keep as
quiet about it as possible. The more they agitate, the more they
convince people here that the Treaty is a good bargain for Canada
and a bad bargain for the United States. The utmost we can ever
dream of doing now is to stave off a successful motion in Congress
calling upon the President to give the notice for abrogating the
Treaty. I doubt whether we shall be able to do this, but our only
chance lies in keeping quiet and endeavouring to induce the Executive
Government to exert its influence unostentatiously against the
motion. If the Executive Government can be induced to do so, it will
be by considerations connected with its relations with the Imperial
Government. The moment the question is treated as one between the
United States and the Provinces, all hope of maintaining the Treaty
vanishes.
I cannot have a Canadian here supposed to be peculiarly in
my confidence on the subject. This would impose upon me a
responsibility which I cannot undertake. Directly there was the
least appearance of a Canadian being here in any such position, I
should feel bound to take decisive steps to show that the appearance
was false. My own opinion is that the Canadians will only do
themselves harm by coming lobbying here; but if they choose to do
so, they must do it entirely independently of me, and I would
suggest that any who came for this purpose should not be furnished
with letters of introduction to me, and should be advised not to
call upon me.
At the same time, I think it right to say that I do not believe that
we shall find it possible to maintain the Treaty long after the U.S.
can abrogate it. The impression is very strong that it is a bad
bargain for them, and they will probably give the notice very soon
after the terms of the Treaty allow of their doing so, with a view
perhaps to negotiating another. If matters reach this point, it will
no doubt be very desirable that whoever negotiates the new Treaty
should be thoroughly informed on all the details of Canadian
commerce, and then will be the time for a Canadian Cobden to be sent
here. At present there are no questions of detail to be considered:
the only practical thing is to stave off the notice of the
abrogation as long as possible, and the only chance of doing this,
is, in my opinion, the exertion of the _Imperial_ influence.
I very well understand the difficulty of keeping quiet when one is
very anxious on a subject, and the immense relief it is to be doing
something. I can also well understand that if there were a
discussion on the details of the Treaty, the Canadians would wish to
have an advocate better informed on the details than the British
Minister at Washington is ever likely to be, but the object now is
to _avoid_ discussion.
It became necessary, however, to modify these views, for Mr. Seward
changed his mind, and whereas he had at first discountenanced the
presence of official and semi-official Canadian representatives he now
expressed himself in favour of their coming over privately and lobbying
Members of Congress, that being, in his opinion, an effective method of
promoting good relations between the two countries.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Feb. 9, 1864.
I am very sorry to say that the agitation against the Reciprocity
Treaty has gone on increasing, and that it now appears probable that
a Resolution calling upon the President to give as soon as possible
notice for abrogating it, will be passed by Congress. The Canadian
Ministers are very anxious to be doing something in the matter, in
order to cover their responsibility as regards their constituents
hereafter. They had a desire to send an agent here to advise with me
and to speak to the American Cabinet and to members of Congress.
This I have told Lord Monck privately, I will not hear of. I could
not undertake to keep the peace for a month if I had a man here by
my side, over whom I could have no practical control, and who would
be really guided only by Canadian party politics, but who would yet
be supposed to be more or less in my confidence, and therefore to be
entitled to speak for me and H.M. Government. My troubles are great
enough without adding Canadian electioneering views to the
difficulties I have to contend with.
Mr. Seward's opinion was that the quieter the Canadians kept the
better, and so was mine, and so it would be still, if Mr. Seward had
not changed his. He now thinks that discussion on the subject cannot
be avoided, and a good effect would be produced by visits to
Washington of influential Canadians coming 'on their own hook' and
talking in a friendly manner to Senators and Deputies. He does not
recommend that they should appear to have any special connexion with
me, nor any semblance of an official or quasi-official character of
any kind, nor does he consider it to be desirable that any one
individual should stay long.
I am corresponding privately with Lord Monck about this action of
Mr. Seward's, and I defer writing about the Treaty officially until
I come to some understanding with him about it. Mr. Seward's opinion
is so much more likely to be correct than mine, that I do not like
to discourage Canadians coming in the way he suggests. Beside which
I have very little hope of staving off the Resolution for the
abrogation of the Treaty in any way, and therefore do not feel
justified in preventing efforts being made by the Canadians
themselves, provided I am clear of all connexion with them, and
that they do not compromise me or the Imperial Government.
The attack on the Treaty is now caused much more by ill will to
England and her Colonies than by any commercial or financial
considerations. The same spirit has caused the introduction of a
Bill into Congress to repeal the Act allowing goods to pass through
the United States without paying duty in transit to and from Canada.
In fact the absence of any serious opposition in Congress renders
both Houses very unmanageable.
The views expressed in these two letters may appear unsympathetic as
regards Canada, but apart from his rooted and well-founded distrust of
amateur diplomatists, Lord Lyons's main task was to keep the peace if
possible between England and the United States, and he was therefore
justified in refusing to be associated with any persons who might
conceivably add to the difficulty of a very critical situation. In
addition to this he was always inclined to resent the tendency of
Canadian Ministers to do a little diplomacy of their own, and held
strongly that it would be time enough for them to think of diplomacy
when they had provided themselves with an army and a navy.
The extreme caution which he constantly displayed in avoiding anything
which might disturb American susceptibility in the smallest degree is
well illustrated by a letter to Mr. Hammond respecting the appointment
of a new secretary to the Washington Legation.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._
Washington, April 5, 1864.
I have been terribly frightened by hearing that there has been a
notion of sending Mr. Horace Johnstone to this Legation. To have the
brother of a man married to the sister of Slidell's Secretary of
Legation in Paris would expose the whole of this mission to all
kinds of suspicion and ill will. It is impossible for any one not
here to conceive the captiousness of the Federals, in and out of
office, on these points. It is almost beyond my power to keep
matters straight with them, do what I can, and if I had a man in the
Legation who was personally suspicious to them I should have no hope
of keeping out of scrapes. If Mr. Johnstone were here, I think the
only way I could employ him for the advantage of H.M.'s service
would be in carrying the next despatches home.
So much alarmed was he at the prospect of Mr. Johnstone's appearance
that he also communicated his objections to the Private Secretary at the
Foreign Office, and even wrote to Lord Russell saying that if Mr.
Johnstone arrived he should feel it his duty to order him to remain at
the port of disembarkation until further instructions were received.
Most men would probably have considered that the family connexions of a
junior member of the Legation were of no importance, but Lord Lyons
was one of those who never took any risks.
In accordance with the suggestion made in the previous autumn, some
officers were at last despatched from England in order to follow the
operations of the Federal Army.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, April 19, 1864.
The two military officers, Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson,
sent by the War Office to report on military matters here, are about
to set out for the Army of the Potomac. Some great attempt will
probably be made by that army within a very short time. Everything
is supposed to depend on the success of the operations. The
Presidential Election and the Finances in particular hang in the
balance. Captain Goodenough, the officer sent here by the Admiralty,
confirms my impression that the Americans are very seriously
preparing for a Foreign War. I think we should never be for long
without naval and military officers here to watch and to report on
these matters. The men employed should be made to understand that
their principal duty is to keep H.M. Government so well informed of
the state of preparation and of the position of the naval and
military forces of the United States that if a war were to break out
at a moment's notice, our Admiralty and War Office would know
exactly what to do. It is quite impossible that a Diplomatic Mission
can do this without the assistance of professional men; and the more
completely the responsibility is thrown on the professional men, the
more effectually will the work be performed. With the present
feeling of the United States Government I think the officers had
better come with a decidedly official character, either as naval or
military attachés to the Legation, or under any other name: but I do
not think that the most effective mode of obtaining the requisite
information would be to let them subside into permanent attachés
residing here, and making mere routine reports by each mail.
It would, of course, be well before publishing any appointment of a
definite official character, to let me ascertain that it would be
acceptable to this Government to have officers here in that
particular character.
There can unhappily be no doubt that three-fourths of the American
people are eagerly longing for a safe opportunity of making war with
England, and to what extent this feeling may be played upon, and
with what results, during the Presidential Elections, no one can
say.
The ill will shows itself in many ways--principally in vexatious
proceedings in regard to the neighbouring Colonies. The last attempt
in Congress is to repeal an Act of 1831 in virtue of which there are
no higher duties levied on British rafts, boats, and Colonial
vessels in the American ports on the Lakes, than are levied on
similar American craft in the British ports. I have spoken to Mr.
Seward about it, and I hope, if it is a matter of importance to
Canada, that we shall be able to stop it.
The ill will alluded to above showed itself in an unpleasant and
undignified manner in connection with the visit of the British officers.
Application had been made on behalf of Major-General Lindsay, M.P.,
commanding the Brigade of Guards in Canada to be allowed to visit the
Army of the Potomac, and, much to the surprise of the Legation, a pass
was refused by the Secretary of War, although the point was pressed as
far as was prudent; but worse was to follow, for the Secretary of War
actually refused passes also to Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson,
the two officers specially sent out by the British Government. 'I do not
trust myself,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'to say all I think about this
discourtesy, but I have let the people here know that this is not the
way to maintain friendly feelings, and have reminded them of the very
different manner in which we treated the officers sent by the United
States to the Crimea.'
Of more importance than this act of discourtesy was the apparent
preparation for a foreign war on the part of the United States
Government. There could, unfortunately, be little doubt as to the
country against which these preparations were being made, and the danger
was that, in the existing temper of the American people, advantage might
be eagerly taken of any conjunction of circumstances which would enable
a declaration of war against England to be made with tolerable safety.
The letters of Lord Russell do not display a realization of the enormous
increase of the military and naval power of the United States, and it
does not appear that he appreciated the vast change which had taken
place in the relative power of England and the United States. In the
past, the latter had been restrained from provoking hostilities by fear
of the advantages which the greatly superior military and naval forces,
then habitually maintained by England, would confer on their enemy at
the outset. Now, however, they considered the reverse to be the case.
They believed, and probably they were right, that they could throw an
overwhelming force into Canada, and that sudden attacks on some of the
British colonies, such as Bermuda and the Bahamas, would in all
probability be successful. They believed that they could inflict
enormous injury to British commerce, and it was plain that an immense
booty could be obtained by sending out their swift cruisers with as
little notice as possible.
It was difficult to discover an adequate explanation of the bitter
feeling which, at that time, actuated the majority of the American
people against England; and it was still more difficult to combat it,
because it was largely unreasonable and quite regardless of facts
and arguments. In reality it resulted from the exasperation caused by
the civil commotion which constituted the first check to a previously
uninterrupted course of progress and prosperity, and the Americans,
mortified and angry, found it a relief to vent their ill-humour upon
England, against whom they had an old grudge. Under these adverse
circumstances, it is easy to realize how difficult must have been the
position of the British Minister at Washington, and it is not surprising
that his letters and despatches of the period were couched in a more
pessimistic tone than had been the case for some time. 'I am out of
heart altogether,' he wrote to Lord Russell, in consequence of the
manner in which his representations to the American Government, with
regard to the grievances of British subjects, were treated. These
grievances related chiefly, at this period, to the hardships inflicted
upon the crews of blockade runners and to the iniquities of the United
States recruiting agencies, iniquities which were fully admitted in an
official report of General Dix, the Military Commandant at New York, and
in neither case was it found possible to obtain adequate redress. The
following note will serve as a sample of the communications which
passed:--
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward._
Washington, July 3, 1864.
This day week you came to my door with the President to tell me that
I might write to England to say that Mr. James McHugh would be
released immediately. He was still in Fort Lafayette yesterday. What
to say in writing to England to-morrow I know not. Could not orders
be sent by telegraph to the military authorities at New York to
release McHugh at once and to report by telegraph that they have
actually done so?
I am very much pained by what has happened about Eneas and Rahming,
as well as about McHugh, and am utterly unable to devise any
satisfactory explanation to send home.
To add to his troubles the health of Lord Lyons again began to give way
under the strain, and as the following letter shows, his staff was
insufficient for the work.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._
Washington, June 14, 1864.
We cannot get on without more hands in the Chancery here. I could
not refuse to let Heneage go, on the death of his father, but he was
ill to be spared.
One really first-rate second secretary and two ordinary working
second or third secretaries should come out at once if the work is
to be done. It has doubled since last year. We ordered an immense
register which we calculated would last through the year, having
made ample allowance as we thought for the usual progressive
increase of correspondence. We are already obliged to order another
of the same size.
For my own part I am worn out altogether.
Although never prone to spare himself or to exaggerate, such phrases as:
'I am worked to death here,' and 'I am worn out by the heat and the
work,' occur in letters to other correspondents, and in order to prevent
a complete breakdown he was directed by Lord Russell to proceed to
Canada to confer with Lord Monck as to the defence of the Dominion.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
July 23, 1864.
I think it will be useful that you should go to Canada soon. If, as
you think, the Americans may take a sudden resolution to attack us,
it will be important to consider how and when we can best defend
ourselves. I should be very glad that with this view you should
consult Lord Monck, and also that you should, if possible, see Sir
James Hope, who might come up the St. Lawrence to meet you at
Quebec. The defence of Quebec both by land and sea is one of the
most important points for the consideration of the Cabinet. It is
also of great importance to ascertain what the Canadian Government
are prepared to do for themselves.
If, as is probable, Grant will not succeed in reaching Richmond and
is obliged to retire, the American Government may not be willing to
add to the number of their enemies, especially as the Emperor of
Mexico may have the assistance of French troops, and may hold an
unfriendly position to the Northern, and a friendly attitude to the
Southern States. I shall be glad to send a civil or military agent
or commissioner to the Confederate States, and think of sending him
by Mexico and Texas. It would be by no means a recognition, but
would be useful as regards our interests in the Southern States.
Lord Russell never seems to have thoroughly believed in the ultimate
success of the North, and frequently expressed the opinion that, as the
re-establishment of the Union was impossible, it would be well to come
to terms with the South, but he could scarcely have been expected to
foresee that the day would come when the United States Government would
order the Emperor Napoleon out of Mexico.
As regards the mission to Canada, Lord Lyons pointed out that whereas it
was very desirable that he should confer with the Governor-General on
many questions, amongst others, the 'wholesale system of seducing,
entrapping and kidnapping recruits for the United States Army from
Canada,' yet that his own opinion on the naval and military questions
concerning the defence of that country was worth nothing at all. His
general impression, however, was that the Dominion was altogether
indefensible, unless the Canadians were prepared to make such a stand
and such sacrifices as the Southerners had done. Whether he ever made
any recommendations, as the result of his visit, or whether, if they
were ever made, any attention was paid to them does not appear, but
there is reason to believe that the British Government eventually nerved
itself to spend the stupendous sum of £50,000 on Canadian defence.
The Canadian visit was undertaken very reluctantly, in spite of
weariness and ill health, partly on account of the press of work, and
partly because it would be necessary to leave as Chargé d'Affaires a
Secretary of Legation (Mr. Burnley), who had only just arrived in the
country, and of whose abilities and judgment he was completely ignorant.
Consequently he took the precaution of asking the Foreign Office to
intimate clearly that, whether outside American territory or not, he
should still be considered the superior authority in the Legation, and
that if he deemed it necessary to give an instruction, it must be
obeyed. This stipulation was not intended as a reflection upon Mr.
Burnley, who indeed showed himself perfectly competent, but was merely
an instance of that extreme caution which never left anything to chance.
At the end of August he was suffering so much from the excessive heat of
Washington and from nervous prostration that he no longer felt able to
discharge his duties satisfactorily, and set out for Canada much against
his will, remaining there until October. The change of air, however,
effected little improvement, and letters to friends announcing his
return complain of ill health and low spirits. While on the journey
back, he met at dinner, at New York, by a singular coincidence, General
Dix, on the night when the news of the St. Albans raid arrived. During
the dinner the latter received a telegram stating that a band of
Confederate desperadoes had made a raid from Canada upon a place called
St. Albans, raided some banks and committed some murders. General
Dix said that he had sent orders to the military officers in the
neighbourhood to take measures for apprehending the raiders, and that he
had directed these officers to use their best endeavours to seize them
on American territory, but that rather than allow them to escape, they
were to be pursued beyond the frontier, such action being, in his
opinion, justifiable under International Law. Upon being asked whether
he had given this order on his own authority or under instructions
from Washington, the General admitted that he had acted on his own
responsibility. This was clearly one of the most alarming incidents that
had yet occurred, and had General Dix's orders been carried out, there
must inevitably have been war between England and the United States.
Fortunately, however, the American Government disavowed General Dix's
ill-advised orders, and the prompt action of the Canadian authorities
contributed towards a peaceful solution. The raiders were seized and
made to give up their booty; police were stationed along the frontier,
the volunteers were called out, and effective steps taken to prevent
similar occurrences in the future.
The settlement of this affair must have been one of Lord Lyons's last
transactions with the American Government, for upon his return to
Washington his health rapidly grew worse, and as scarcely any letters
from him are to be found between the end of October and the middle of
December it is to be presumed that he was so incapacitated that the work
devolved upon Mr. Burnley. Early in November he was forced to apply for
leave, which was granted in December.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Dec. 5, 1864.
I am truly obliged to you for so promptly sending me leave to come
home. When I wrote to you on the 1st of last month to ask for it, I
hardly expected to have such urgent need of it as I have now, but a
few days afterwards I became so ill as to be utterly unable to do
any work. I have not made any satisfactory progress towards a
recovery, and am scarcely in a state to travel. There seems however
to be no prospect of my getting any better while I stay here, and I
shall therefore, if possible, set out for New York to-morrow, in the
hope of being able to embark there for England on the 14th.
I am told that the American papers have stated that I have been
dangerously ill with typhoid fever. I have had no fever at all. My
principal malady is a nervous headache.
In letters to other correspondents he explained that being quite unable
to work he considered himself simply an impediment to the transaction of
public business, and was going away simply on leave of absence. During
the last few days of his stay in America he was too unwell to write, or
even, as he explained to Mr. Seward, equal to a conversation, and it was
doubtful whether he would be well enough to travel. Accompanied,
however, by Mr. Sheffield, he embarked at New York and arrived in London
during the closing days of December.
The fact was that he had completely broken down under the continuous
strain of the last four years, and in view of the circumstances it was
not surprising. Some idea of the work at Washington may be gathered from
the following official figures.
* * * * *
_Despatches and Letters sent to and from Her Majesty's Legation at
Washington during the year 1864._
Foreign Office to Lord Lyons 966 From Lord Lyons 653
United States Government " " 1816 " " 2782
Consuls " " 1155 " " 1390
Naval and Colonial
Departments " " 311 " " 360
Miscellaneous " " 2242 " " 3141
---- ----
6490 8326
To these figures must be added a number of lithographs and other answers
for which forms had been devised and which therefore were not
registered, nor does it seem probable that Lord Lyons's numerous private
letters to the Secretary of State and other correspondents are included;
whilst there is no mention of telegrams.
It would really not be much of an exaggeration to assert that, unless
absent or incapacitated by illness, nearly every one of these thousands
of documents was either originated by or submitted to the British
Minister. The late Sir Edward Malet in his book 'Shifting Scenes,' has
borne witness to the indefatigable industry of his chief. 'At Washington
any quantity of letters arrived daily asking every imaginable question,
and often making untenable complaints. They were all opened by Lord
Lyons, who made a pencil note upon them indicating the tenor of the
answer to be sent, and returned them to the Chancery. Draft answers were
then written, which were again sent up to Lord Lyons with the letters.
He would nearly always alter the wording. Then he put an "L" at the
bottom, and returned them to be written out for signature. In this way
not a letter issued from the Legation which had not been approved by the
chief. It was a most valuable safeguard, for you can never be sure what
a young man may say when he gets a pen into his hand. It is the moment
when the evil spirit of the Jack-in-office, unless he be entirely exempt
from it, which is very rare, gets the better of him, and prompts him to
make some epigrammatic or cutting reply. I learned no more valuable
lesson while working under Lord Lyons than that every letter received
must be answered, and that the answer must be staid in form and well
considered in substance, whatever might be the ignorance, the petulance,
or the extravagance of the writer to whose letter you were replying.' It
may be added that he rigidly adhered to this practice throughout his
official career, and that there must be many members of the Diplomatic
Service now living who would corroborate the opinion expressed by Sir
Edward Malet.
From the same source we learn the usual routine of the Chancery during
the Civil War. The secretaries and attachés had to be at their desks at
9 a.m. They worked continuously without a luncheon interval until past 7
p.m., then adjourned to Willard's Hotel to indulge in the pernicious
local habit of swallowing cocktails, dined at 8, and were frequently
obliged to return to the Chancery afterwards and work till midnight or
even later. There is no reason whatever to suppose that Sir Edward Malet
indulged in any exaggeration, and it is therefore not surprising either
that the junior members of the Legation occasionally broke down or that
many of them were desirous of being appointed to some less exacting post
than Washington. In spite, however, of the disadvantageous circumstances
under which Sir Edward Malet passed his time at Washington, it is worthy
of note that he considered that every one in the British Diplomatic
Service should rejoice if he had the chance of going there, and he bore
emphatic testimony that, according to his experience, English people
were treated with extraordinary courtesy and hospitality however high
political feeling may have run.
Lord Lyons, upon arriving in England, found a home provided for him at
Arundel by his sister, the widowed Duchess of Norfolk, to whom he was
deeply attached, and it was hoped that the rest and retired life would
restore him sufficiently to enable him to resume his post at Washington.
He made, however, little progress towards recovery, and for some time
was almost incapable of either physical or mental exertion; in fact, so
unsatisfactory was his condition, and so remote appeared the probability
of his being able to resume his duties, that, in the spring of 1865, it
became necessary for him to resign his post and to retire temporarily if
not permanently from the service. A letter to Mr. Stuart, a former
member of his staff, explains the circumstances of his retirement.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Mr. Stuart._
Norfolk House, March 16, 1865.
I am very much obliged by your kind letter inquiring for me. You
will have seen that I have gone out of the service altogether and
have become a gentleman at large without pay or pension. My health
did not admit of my fixing a time for going back, and the Cabinet
became nervous about leaving Washington without a Minister in these
critical times. I confess I do not feel so much relief or even
pleasure as might have been expected, and I seriously thought of
offering to go back immediately when I heard of the decision of the
Cabinet. But my own feelings as to health and still more the
opinions of the doctors deterred me. I have certainly got a great
deal better, but I seem to stick at a certain point. I can go about
without inconvenience, but still a small thing brings on a headache.
The old Legation at Washington is completely broken up. Malet goes
to Lisbon, Sheffield to Frankfort and Kennedy and Seymour to Vienna.
I to a certain extent enjoy being in England, but I am not well
enough nor quite sufficiently satisfied with the wind up of my
Washington Mission, to enjoy myself thoroughly. Lord Russell has
been extremely kind to me, and so indeed has every one here, but
neither I nor they can do much for my benefit while my health is in
its present state.
You seem to be doing well as usual in your present post, and you
are, I trust, flourishing in all respects.
In a letter to Mr. Seward expressing his regret at being prevented from
thanking President Lincoln in person for the unvarying kindness and
consideration shown to him during the last four eventful years the
following passage occurs:--
You will find Sir Frederick Bruce (his successor at Washington) as
anxious as I was to act in concert with you for the maintenance of
peace and good will, and you will, I am sure, be glad to form with
him the confidential and intimate relations which did so much, in my
case, to make my task easy and agreeable. The friendly and
unconstrained terms on which we were produced so much good, that I
am most anxious that my successor's intercourse with you should be
placed at once on the same footing.
* * * * *
_Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons._
Washington, March 20, 1865.
I accept your farewell with sincere sorrow. But I reconcile myself
to it because it is a condition of restoration of your health. All
of my family commend me to tender you assurances of sympathy.
I have never desponded of my country, of emancipation of her slaves
and of her resumption of her position as an agent of peace, progress
and civilization--interests which I never fail to believe are common
with all branches of the British family. So I have had no doubt that
when this dreadful war shall be ended, the United States and Great
Britain would be reconciled and become better friends than ever.
I have thought that you are entitled to share in these great
successes, as you have taken so great a part of the trials of the
war. But God disposes. I feel sure that if I never find time to go
abroad again, you with recovered health will come here to see the
reign of peace and order. So I shall not dwell upon our parting as a
final one.
It is satisfactory to realize that these two men, between whom so many
encounters had taken place, parted on terms of friendship and mutual
esteem. Each, in fact, had been able to appreciate the good qualities of
the other, and in subsequent communications with his own Government,
Lord Lyons frequently expressed the hope that Mr. Seward would continue
to be responsible for the foreign policy of the American Government.
The official acknowledgment of Lord Lyons's services at Washington was
couched in warmer terms than is usually the case.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 25, 1865.
As your successor, Sir Frederick Bruce, is to take his departure
this day from the shores of England, I take this opportunity to
testify to your Lordship the sense which Her Majesty's Government
entertain of your invaluable services as Her Majesty's
Representative at Washington.
The return which I enclose of the number of despatches and letters
received by Her Majesty's Mission to the United States during the
years 1864 gives some notion of the amount of labour which has been
undergone by Your Lordship, the Secretary of Legation and other
members of the Mission.
But the prudence, the moderation, the good temper, the
discrimination and the just regard to a friendly Government shown by
Your Lordship during the trying period which has elapsed while Your
Lordship was charged with the most honourable, but at the same time,
the most difficult duties with which any diplomatic agent can be
entrusted, these are incapable of any remuneration and cannot be
estimated by any measurement.
It is to be hoped that the previous pages have, to some extent,
demonstrated that Lord Russell's language was not that of hyperbole,
and that the value of Lord Lyons's unobtrusive services was not
over-estimated. It was the good fortune of this country to be
represented during a protracted and dangerous crisis by a man who,
distinguished by exceptional prudence, tact, judgment, and sincerity,
added to these qualities a most minute knowledge of his own duties
accompanied with indefatigable industry. It is not too much to say that
any one wanting in these qualities would have found it impossible to
prevent the calamity of war between England and the United States, and
the diplomatist who successfully avoids a catastrophe of this nature and
at the same time protects the interests of his country is as deserving
of gratitude as the successful commander who appears upon the scene when
diplomacy had failed.
One little detail characteristic of the man is worth noting. He used to
state, in after life, with much apparent satisfaction, that during his
five years' residence in the United States, he had never 'taken a drink,
or made a speech.'