BEGINNINGS OF THE REFORMATION. 1523-1524.
Nature of the Reformation in Europe.--Cause of the Reformation in
Sweden.--The Debt to Lubeck.--Riches of the Church.--Relations of
Gustavus to the Pope.--Johannes Magni.--New Taxation--Dissension
among the People.--Opposition of Gustavus to the Pope.--Trial of
Peder Sunnanvaeder.--Expedition against Gotland.--Repudiation of the
"Klippings."--Berent von Mehlen.--Negotiations between Fredrik and
Norby.--Congress of Malmoe.--Efforts to appease the
People.--Lutheranism.--Olaus Petri.--Laurentius Andreae.--Brask's
Efforts to repress Heresy.--Religious Tendencies of
Gustavus.--Character of Brask.
We have now reached that point in our narrative where the history of
modern Sweden takes its start. With the close of the war of independence
those features which mark the face of mediaeval Sweden disappear, and a
wholly new countenance gradually settles upon the land. Nor is this
transformation peculiar in any way to Sweden. Early in the sixteenth
century all Europe was passing from mediaeval into modern history. In the
Middle Ages there was but one criterion for every question that arose,
and that criterion was the past. Whatever had been, should continue. All
Church dogmas were settled by an appeal to the ancient Fathers; all
political aspirations were fought out on the basis of descent. Tradition
was the god of mediaeval Europe. At last, however, questions arose for
which tradition had no answer. On the Renaissance in Italy, on the
invention of printing and of gunpowder, on the discovery of America, the
ancient Fathers had not spoken. On these things, therefore, which raised
the greatest questions of the age, men had nothing for it but to do
their thinking for themselves. The practice thus evoked soon spread to
other questions, and gradually men grew bold enough to venture opinions
on certain stereotyped matters of religion. As all the world knows, the
Reformation followed, and from an age of blind acceptance Europe passed
to an age of eager controversy. Instead of searching to find out what
had been, men argued to determine what it was desirable should be. If
tradition was the characteristic of mediaeval, policy is the
characteristic of modern, history. Some old dogmas, like the divine
right of kings, still linger; but since the fifteenth century kings have
had little chance whose claims conflict with the balance of European
power.
The beginnings of modern history are inextricably bound up with the
beginnings of the Reformation. It is a common belief that the
Reformation in Europe worked a radical change in the doctrines of
religious men, raising up two parties with diametrically opposing
creeds. Such a conception, however, is misleading. The Reformation was
not so much a religious as a political revolt. It was the natural
outcome of a growth in the power of northern Germany at a moment when
Rome was losing her political prestige. The alliance between the German
Empire and the popes of Rome had its origin in a need of mutual
assistance. Western Europe consisted, at the accession of Charlemagne,
of many independent principalities at war among themselves, and what
they needed was a powerful protector to adjust their various disputes.
Later this need of a protector became still more urgent, when Germany
and France fell under different rulers, and the German Empire began to
be threatened by the monarchy across the Rhine. Rome, by reason of her
spiritual supremacy, was the arbiter to whom the northern nations
naturally turned, and she found ready recompense for her services in the
treasures poured generously into her lap. Such was the basis of the Holy
Roman Empire. But by the beginning of the sixteenth century all this had
changed. Germany was no longer weak. Her little principalities had
become cemented together under an emperor well able to repel every
invasion of the French. Society had made vast progress, not only in its
comforts, but in its demands. Rome, on the other hand, had lost her
prestige. In Italy, where the brutality and licentiousness of the popes
were open to every eye, people had long since lost all reverence for the
Church. This feeling did not spread readily across the Alps; but it came
at last, and at a moment when Germany no longer needed aid. A nation
guarded by the strong arm of Maximilian could ill brook new levies to
feed the extravagance of its decrepit ally, and the infamous practices
of Tetzel served as a timely pretext to shake off the burdensome
alliance of the papal see. The abuses of popery were little more than a
war-cry, while the real struggle of the Reformation was against the
political supremacy of Rome.
In Sweden, more than in almost any other land, the Reformation was a
political revolt. Indeed, it may well be called a political necessity.
At the moment when Gustavus Vasa was elected king, Sweden was on the
verge of bankruptcy. The war just passed had drained the resources of
the country, and left her heavily involved in debt. The principal
creditor was Lubeck. Precisely how much had been borrowed from that town
it is impossible to determine, though it is certain the total amount
fell not far short of 300,000 Swedish marks.[74] One payment of about
17,000 Swedish marks Gustavus had made in 1522.[75] This of course was a
mere drop in the bucket, and other devices were necessary to relieve the
general distress. One favorite device, to which allusion has been
already made, consisted in a debasement of the currency. That device,
however, had soon lost its savor, and the coin which in 1522 Gustavus
had issued for an oere and a half, he was forced in 1523 to place upon
the market as an oere.[76] So that when the new monarch ascended the
throne it was manifest that the treasury must be replenished in other
modes. The natural direction was that in which the greatest wealth of
Sweden lay,--in other words, the Church. We have already seen how
completely, in the centuries preceding the Reformation, the Church in
Sweden had freed herself from all authority of the people, and had
gradually accumulated for herself a vast amount of wealth. Some
conception of this treasure may be had by comparing the edifices
belonging to the Church with those owned by individuals. Such a
comparison reveals at once an enormous disparity in favor of the Church.
At a time when well-to-do citizens dwelt in what would at this day be
known as hovels, they worshipped in churches that must have seemed to
them palatial. The six cathedrals that existed in the time of Gustavus
still remain, and even at this day compare favorably with the finest
structures in the land. In addition to a magnificent palace, the
archbishop and the five Swedish bishops each possessed a fortified
castle in his diocese. In each diocese, too, there were an enormous
number of estates belonging to the bishopric; those in the diocese of
Linkoeping, for example, numbering over six hundred. The rents and
profits from these estates went directly to the bishopric, and were
wholly exempt from taxation, as were also the untold treasures of gold
and silver belonging to the various churches. Beside all this tithes of
every species of farm produce raised in any part of Sweden were due the
Church, also tithes of all other personal property acquired. Further, a
small annual tax was due the Church for every building in the land from
a palace to a pig-sty; also a fee for every wedding, death, or
childbirth. No one could inherit property, or even take the sacrament,
without a contribution to the Church. And every peasant was bound one
day each year to labor for his pastor without reward.[77] How all this
money was disbursed, seems difficult to comprehend. Some clew, however,
may be gained when we consider what a vast horde of clergy the Swedish
people had to feed. Take, for example, the cathedrals. Most of them
formed a little hierarchy in themselves. First of all was the archbishop
or the bishop, who lived in regal splendor. Around him was his chapter,
comprising in one instance as many as thirty canons. Then there was the
archdeacon, the cantor, the scholasticus, and some thirty or forty
prebends. This little army of Church officers required to be fed, and
fed well--and the people of Sweden had to pay the bill. It was but
natural, therefore, that, Sweden being heavily involved in debt, the
monarch should seek to stay this wasteful extravagance and divert a
portion of the Church incomes to the crown.
By the war of independence the way had been already paved for a war
against the Church. Christiern had declared himself the champion of the
pope; and the higher clergy, as vicegerents of the pope in Sweden, had
generally allied themselves with the foreign party. So that the
rebellion had been in large measure directed against the authorities of
the Church itself, and the victory of Gustavus was felt distinctly as a
victory over the powers of the Church. The Chapter of Upsala had
therefore deemed it policy to please Gustavus, and were talking of
electing his chancellor archbishop in place of Trolle, who had fled the
realm. For a like reason the Chapter of Vesteras had chosen a former
secretary of Sture to their vacant bishopric. The bishoprics of
Strengnaes and Skara, made vacant by the expulsion of the Danes, had also
been filled by persons favorable to the general policy of Gustavus. So
that when the new monarch assumed control, the dignitaries of the Church
seemed likely to listen to his demands.[78]
It is not for a moment to be supposed that Gustavus at this time
contemplated an opposition to the pope. Such an idea had been spread
abroad by Christiern with a view to win sympathy in Europe; but Gustavus
had written to all the potentates of Europe to deny the charge, and had
sent a messenger to the pope to raise a counter charge against
Christiern as the murderer of two Swedish bishops in the slaughter of
1520. The pope, already distrustful of his Danish ally, had listened
favorably to the message, and in the following summer, 1523, had sent a
legate to Sweden to inform him further on the subject.[79]
This papal legate, Johannes Magni, was the son of a pious burgher of
Linkoeping, and along with his two brothers had been educated from
childhood for the Church. At the age of eighteen so marvellous was his
precocity that he was made a canon both of Linkoeping and of Skara.
Later, as was the practice with scholars of that period, he continued
his studies at several of the leading universities in Europe. But in
spite of a sojourn of some seventeen years away from Sweden, he never
ceased to keep up a fervid interest in the affairs of his native land.
As soon as the atrocities of Christiern reached his ears, he made a
personal visit to Pope Leo X. and denounced the practices of the Danish
king. The suggestions which he offered seem to have been scorned by Leo;
but in 1521 that pontiff died, and his successor, Adrian VI., listened
more readily to the Swedish canon. Adrian himself was from the north of
Europe, and had earlier been an instructor of Johannes in the University
of Louvain. The characters of the two were not unlike. Both held strong
theological opinions, and looked with dread upon all opposition to the
papal power. But they were both keenly alive to the abuses that had
gathered about the Church, and were eager to repress them. Johannes was
peculiarly suited by nature for a work of compromise. With no ordinary
talents, of untiring energy, sympathetic, generous, and conciliating,
but withal imbued with an ardent love of the Church, Adrian at once
discerned in him a valuable mediator. When, therefore, Gustavus wrote to
Rome to defend himself against the charge of heresy, the pope selected
Johannes as his legate, with instructions to proceed to Sweden and
investigate the charges made against each other by Christiern and
Gustavus. The legate, complying with these orders, arrived in Sweden
while the diet of Strengnaes was in session. He therefore made his way
directly to that town. While on the road the tidings reached him that
Gustavus Vasa had been elected king. As soon as the new monarch learned
of his approach, he sent for him to come before the house. There he was
overwhelmed with expressions of gratitude for his past interest in the
Swedish cause. In return the legate addressed the house at great length
in favor of Gustavus. The impression left upon his hearers was so
pleasing that the Cabinet drew up a letter to the pope requesting that
Johannes be given full authority, with the bishops of Sweden, to reform
the Swedish Church. In the same letter opportunity was taken to denounce
the vices of Archbishop Trolle, and to beg that, he having already
resigned and fled the kingdom, the pope should use his authority to
have a new archbishop chosen in his stead.[80]
This document bears strong evidence of the influence of the king. Its
allusion to the resignation of Archbishop Trolle was of course untrue.
That prelate had fled the realm to escape the fury of his opponents, but
he still looked for the restoration of Danish power and a return of his
own prerogatives in the Swedish Church. The king's desire, as reflected
in the letter of his Cabinet, was to secure from the pope a recognition
that the archbishopric was vacant, and then to use this recognition to
force the unwilling Chapter of Upsala to nominate as archbishop one who
was in the interests of the king. The scheme, however, failed; for Pope
Adrian died before he had had time to act, and was succeeded by a
pontiff who hated everything which savored of reform.
During the first months of his reign Gustavus was made wretched by the
importunate demands of Lubeck. Her ambassadors continually dogged his
steps, and declared they would not leave him till every cent that Sweden
owed was paid. After the fall of Kalmar the monarch needed his foreign
mercenaries no longer, and would gladly have cashiered them and sent
them off. But the "klippings" struck the year before had so far lost the
confidence of his subjects that the soldiers refused to take them at any
price at all, and Gustavus was compelled to keep his men on foot till he
could obtain the silver requisite to issue better coins. The diet just
dissolved had passed an act providing for the levy of new taxes to be
paid in silver, and the king apparently had been given power to fix the
mode in which the levy should be made. This was a matter which required
skilful handling; and it is fair to say that the policy which the king
pursued, if not perfectly straightforward, showed, at any rate, rare
skill. Fearing lest another direct call upon the peasantry would raise
an outcry, he resolved to make his application to the Church, and give
her the option of surrendering a portion of her riches or of losing her
prestige by laying new burdens on her devotees. With this in view he
wrote first of all to Brask, and after demanding some five thousand
guilders which he understood that prelate had stored away in Lubeck, he
called upon him to collect four hundred marks in silver from the clergy
of his diocese. He then issued a proclamation to the churches and
monasteries throughout the land to send him all the chalices, patens,
and ornaments that could be spared from the altars, as well as all the
silver coin that could be found; and along with this he published a
statement of the total amount which each diocese and monastery must
provide. Two things are noticeable in this proclamation: first, it does
not specify the amount which each particular church must furnish; and,
secondly, it distinctly states that the sums handed over are to be
deemed as loans, which he will duly acknowledge and ultimately pay in
full. In his letter to Brask, on the contrary, the exact amount for
which the bishop must be responsible is named, and no definite promise
is given to repay it. The document seems part of a deliberate plan to
crush the power of the crafty bishop. This Brask noticed, and in his
reply adverted to a suspicion lest for some reason he had incurred the
king's displeasure, which he would willingly avert. The simplest mode of
averting the king's displeasure would have been a speedy compliance with
the king's demand. For this, however, Brask had little relish. So
Gustavus, two weeks later, wrote again. "We are much surprised," he
said, "that you show no more concern while a weight like this rests upon
the kingdom. The amount which we must raise without a moment's delay is
two hundred thousand guilders, and the Lubeck ambassadors refuse
point-blank to depart unless they take that sum with them. If they don't
get it we fear open war, which God forbid! Therefore, by the allegiance
which you owe us and the realm, we exhort you, send the four hundred
marks' weight without delay." Even this appeal had no immediate effect,
and after two weeks more he sent Brask another despatch. "The Lubeck
ambassadors," wrote the king, "will not leave us till they get the money
which we owe in Lubeck,--a vast sum. It is, therefore, of necessity that
we lay this tax upon the churches and monasteries. Strain every nerve to
obtain some relief for us in your diocese, especially from your churches
and monasteries; the clergy we shall spare for the present." The bishop
finally complied, though with an ill grace; and on the 10th of August we
find Gustavus writing that he has so far satisfied the demands of Lubeck
that her ambassadors have parted from him on good terms.[81]
The tax had been collected, though not without much friction. It had
found the people in an irritable temper, and it had left them more
irritable still. The ruin which the war had caused was visible on every
hand, and the blessings that were expected to follow were not so easily
discerned. During two years the fields had been lying fallow, commerce
had steadily declined, and the people were actually suffering for food.
Stockholm had been rendered desolate. Its population had fallen to about
one quarter. "Every other house," wrote Gustavus, "is now empty;" and
there appeared so little chance of a revival that the king issued a
proclamation calling on the burghers of other towns as far as possible
to sell their houses and settle down in Stockholm. Another cause of
dissatisfaction was that, though the war was over in Sweden, the Swedish
possessions in Finland were still in the hands of the enemy, and a
considerable army was needed to reduce them. Fredrik, king of Denmark,
had resigned his claim to Sweden; but certain islands off the coast, as
well as some districts along the frontier of Norway, were still matters
of dispute. All these circumstances tended to raise a spirit of
discontent, which, though for the nonce restrained, was ready to break
out into violence at any moment. To prevent evil, Gustavus resolved to
issue a proclamation to the people.[82]
On the 8th of September the annual fair at Vesteras was opened, and
Gustavus seized this opportunity to make a public statement of his
doings. This statement was in the nature of an apology for the recent
tax. It declared in the first place that the expenses of the war had
reached a higher figure than had ever been incurred by Swedish king
before, amounting to a total of over nine hundred thousand marks. A
large part of this sum was for foreign troops, hired that the Swedish
peasantry might "stay at home in peace, tending their fields and
pastures, and caring for their wives and children." When the war was
over and the mercenaries were ready to depart, they had demanded with
threats of violence immediate payment for all the arms and vessels they
had furnished. Having no means to satisfy them, Gustavus had consulted
with his Cabinet, and by their advice had called upon the churches and
monasteries for a loan, "which with God's help shall be paid, if all
goes well." "Nor," continued the monarch, "was this tax in any way a
departure from the practice of former rulers, as may be seen by
referring to the ancient records.... Some there are among you who assert
openly or in private that we have fleeced the churches and monasteries.
This we assert distinctly we have not done, but have merely called upon
them for a loan, which shall be paid.... We trust you will give no heed
to such conspirators and traitors, but will aid us in bringing them to
punishment." The document closes with some remarks upon the coinage. "It
must be clear to all," it runs, "that with the enormous expenses which
have been rolling up against us we could not issue coins of the quality
which you are accustomed to of old. From sheer necessity we have issued
'klippings' after the pattern of King Christiern, though his coins are
now, thank God! departed from the realm.... These 'klippings' are at
present not accepted for more than half their worth; and while this has
been strenuously forbidden, the only result thus far has been that
traders have refused to trade at all, and have carried their salt and
hops and clothing back to Germany. We therefore intend at the first
opportunity to instruct our Cabinet with the most learned men of the
various classes to determine whether the 'klippings' shall be accepted
for their present value or for less; and whatever their decision, we
promise faithfully we shall obey."[83]
After administering this soothing drug, the monarch turned his thoughts
once more to the appointment of a new archbishop. The letter despatched
by the Cabinet to Pope Adrian immediately after the diet of Strengnaes
had proved of little service, for Brask on the 18th of July had secretly
sent a messenger to the pope with word that Church property was being
confiscated. Gustavus, ignorant of the bishop's perfidy and wondering at
the pope's delay, now wrote again. "For a long time, Holy Father," began
the courteous monarch, "our cathedral chapters have urged us to solicit
you in behalf of the persons elected by them to fill their vacant posts.
Trolle having resigned the archbishopric, the prelates and canons of
Upsala have chosen your legate Johannes Magni in his stead; the canons
of Skara have chosen their archdeacon Magnus Haraldsson to the bishopric
vacated by his predecessor's death; and the canons of Strengnaes have
chosen their provost Magnus Sommar. The prelates and canons of
Vesteras, their bishop having died, present the name of Petrus Magni for
the post. In Abo, though the bishop died a year ago, no successor has as
yet been chosen, that church having only recently been captured from our
enemies. As the persons above named are satisfactory to us and to our
people, we beg you to confirm them as soon as possible, and thus avert
the danger to which vacancies in the episcopal office would expose the
Church." Whether or not the Chapters had actually elected all the
persons named, may well be doubted, and is, indeed, of little moment;
for their spirit was by this time broken, and if they cherished any
preferences they dared not speak them. The letter was intrusted to
Johannes Magni with orders to obtain confirmation from the pope and then
return to Sweden. But just as he was making ready to depart, the
long-awaited letter came from Adrian, though it differed much in tenor
from what had been expected. Instead of urging the Upsala Chapter to
choose a new archbishop, it commanded Gustavus to restore Archbishop
Trolle to his post, threatening him with punishment if he refused.[84]
This change of colors on the part of Adrian has been accounted for in
many ways. Johannes Magni himself suggested that it was the work of
evil-minded counsellors in Rome. The more probable supposition is that
Adrian had been influenced by Brask. If Church property was being
confiscated, as Brask declared, Archbishop Trolle could be relied on to
offer much more strenuous resistance than the prelate talked of as his
successor. But the very reason which induced the pope to favor Trolle
seemed to the king sufficient ground for supporting his opponent. It was
precisely because of Johannes Magni's pliable and compromising temper
that Gustavus would have rejoiced to see the mitre on his head. He was
determined that Trolle, at any rate, should not wear it. So he sat down,
as soon as Adrian's letter came, and wrote a warm reply to the College
of Cardinals in Rome. "If our Most Holy Father," he said, "has any care
for the peace of our country, we shall be pleased to have him confirm
the election of his legate Johannes to the archbishopric, and we shall
comply with the pope's wishes as to a reformation of the Christian
Church and religion. But if his Holiness, against our honor and the
peace of our subjects, sides with the crime-stained partisans of
Archbishop Trolle, we shall allow his legate to return to Rome, and
shall govern the Church in this country with the authority which we have
as king, and in a manner which we believe will please God as well as all
the princes of Christendom. We beg you, however, to use your authority
in the Apostolic See in such way as not to harm our state, nor give the
appearance of championing the crimes of Trolle against the tranquillity
of a Christian people." Three days after writing this vehement despatch,
the monarch sent off another, couched in language even more determined,
to the pope. "We shall never," he declared, "allow that man to return as
our archbishop. He not only is unworthy of the priesthood, he is
unworthy even to live. We respect the Roman Church, and if need be
would die in her behalf. But if she endeavors thus to ruin our country,
we shall resist her till the last drop of blood is shed." This document
was placed in the hands of Olaus Magni, brother of the proposed
archbishop, with orders to inform the pope of the evils to which the
Church in Sweden was exposed, and to use his utmost endeavor to secure
the confirmation of the bishops. The missive, however, never reached the
pontiff to whom it was addressed. Adrian was already dead and buried ere
the document was penned; and when the messenger arrived in Rome, he
found another pontiff, Clement VII., seated in the papal chair.[85]
The breach between the king and popery was now open. Gustavus had
actually flung down the gauntlet at the feet of Rome, asserting that if
officers satisfactory to him were not appointed by the pope, he would
take the duty of appointing them upon himself. Still he did not
relinquish hope that the breach might yet be healed; and on the 2d of
November he wrote again, this time requesting the pope to confirm the
election of Erik Svensson, a former secretary of Gustavus, to the vacant
bishopric of Abo. "And if your Holiness," wrote the king, "shall delay
in confirming the bishops-elect, we shall ourselves undertake the
restoration of our ruined churches, and shall have the bishops confirmed
by Him who is our High Pontifex, that His Church and religion may not be
injured through the negligence of the Apostolic See. Moreover, Most Holy
Father, we hear from certain men of Lubeck that one Francisco of
Potentia has returned from Rome to Denmark with arguments in
justification of that tyrant Christiern's massacre of our bishops, and
that your Holiness has rewarded him with the bishopric of Skara. If this
be true, the Apostolic See has done us and the Church a wrong equal in
enormity to that of the Danish king, and we shall by God's aid avert it
if necessary with our blood. Let not your Holiness fancy that we shall
permit foreigners to rule the Church in Sweden." At about the same time
with this letter the monarch, in writing to Johannes Magni, uses even
stronger language. After suggesting that Christiern has so impoverished
the Church that it is unable to send its bishops elect to Rome for
confirmation, he asserts that it is rumored the real cause of the delay
is that the Church has not been able to furnish the pope the customary
fees for confirmation. "Some assert, too," he adds, "that there is no
authority in Scripture for all the dues that belong by custom to the
pope.... So soon as we find that our patience and moderation are of no
avail, we shall proceed to rigorous measures. We shall not suffer our
people to bend beneath a cruel foreign yoke, for we are confident that
Christ, who is our High Priest, will not let his people die to suit the
pope's caprice."[86]
These were bold words to use of the potentate whose command all
Christendom obeyed. The youthful monarch, it was already clear, intended
to rule his country with an iron hand. When only three months on the
throne, he chanced upon some letters in which the bishop of Vesteras
alluded to him in arrogant and contumelious terms. This bishop, who
gloried in the name of Peder Sunnanvaeder, had been at one time
chancellor of the young Sten Sture, and though elected in 1522 to the
bishopric of Vesteras, had suffered the same fate as the other bishops
and never been confirmed. Gustavus did not hesitate a moment. As soon as
the abusive letters reached him, he proceeded with the entire Cabinet to
Vesteras, and summoned the bishop with all his canons to the
chapter-house. There he laid before them the evidences of the bishop's
guilt. Unable to furnish satisfactory explanation, the bishop was
removed; and the Chapter, at the instance of Gustavus, elected Petrus
Magni in his stead. Even with this, however, the monarch's vengeance did
not end. Knut, the dean of Vesteras and a former chancellor of
Gustavus,--the man, indeed, who had been talked of for the archbishopric
of Upsala,--was indiscreet enough to come forward at the trial with an
apology for his bishop. The monarch wanted no other proof of his
complicity, and discharged him along with Sunnanvaeder from his post.[87]
Gustavus was spurred on in his campaign against the Church by a
continued need of money to keep his army in the field. Even after the
subjection of Sweden he had to carry on the war in Finland; and it was
not till nearly Christmas, and after he had sent a strong force of
mercenaries across the Baltic, that Finland was subdued.[88] After this
the great bone of contention was the isle of Gotland. This island, or
rather its capital, the town of Visby, had been in ages past the leader
of the Hanseatic League. Its situation in the Baltic, not far from the
east coast of southern Sweden, made it still of great value to
merchant-vessels passing between Sweden and the Hanseatic Towns. When
Christiern fled from Denmark, Gotland was under the control of Norby,
who continued after his master's fall to make depredations along the
coast of Sweden and seize all merchantmen that came within his grasp.
Danish, Swedish, and Hanse vessels were alike his prey, till Gotland
came to be known by all as a "nest of robbers." Fredrik and Lubeck,
unwilling though they were that Gotland should fall to Sweden, welcomed
any movement intended to root out this impediment to the Baltic trade,
and raised no opposition when Gustavus offered, in the winter of 1524,
to attack the island in the coming spring. The attitude of Fredrik to
Gustavus recalls the fable of the monkey and the cat. The Danish king
hoped ultimately to secure the chestnuts for himself, but in the mean
time was not sorry to see an army gathering in Sweden to bear the brunt
of the assault. Which party first proposed an expedition against Gotland
is not clear.[89] At the general diet held in Vadstena in January,
representatives from Fredrik were present, and it was agreed that the
expedition should be made as soon as the harbors opened. The quotas to
be furnished by the different parts of Sweden by the first week after
Easter were also fixed. The Danish envoys, it appears, made no promises
except that a congress of the two realms should be held on the 14th of
February to settle all matters of dispute. The passports for the Danish
envoys to this convention were issued by Gustavus on the spot. They were
never used, however; for just before the appointed day he received
notice from the Danish Cabinet that they wished the congress to be
postponed. This action caused Brask to suspect that Fredrik's sole
object was to use up time. Whatever Fredrik's object, the congress could
not be held without him. Gustavus therefore postponed it till the end of
April, and set about raising an army for himself.[90]
The first person to whom the monarch turned was Bishop Brask. It appears
that there had been some dispute between the bishop and one of the
hospitals in his diocese as to the tithes from certain lands. The shrewd
monarch conceived the notion that the simplest mode of settling the
dispute was to hand the disputed property over to the crown. He wrote,
therefore, to both parties to send him at once the original documents on
which they based their claims. "And meantime," he said, "we forbid you
positively to collect the disputed tithes. Should you touch them, we
shall be forced to take further steps. We have, indeed, been told that
in the times of our fathers the crown received from the canons
throughout the realm one fourth of their tithes under the name of 'the
poor man's portion,' with the understanding that the money should be
used to found hospitals, and over these hospitals the crown has ever
since held _jus patronatus_." To this demand Brask answered that he
would send the documents desired, but that the crown had never taken the
tithes from the canons except by force. A few weeks later, on the 18th
of February, the king wrote Brask that the expedition would start as
soon as the harbors opened, and that, as Brask had been one of the
promoters of the scheme, he must expect to contribute generously toward
it, especially since he and his diocese, being nearest to the isle of
Gotland, would be the ones most benefited by the overthrow of Norby.
Brask, in his answer of March 8, repudiated the idea that the expedition
was the fruit of his brain, and expressed the hope that the matter might
be settled without bloodshed. "'T is never wise," he said, "to break
down doors already open." Brask asserted, further, that he had never
received a penny of rent from Gotland, but promised to do all he could
to obtain aid from the churches of his diocese.[91]
By this time it had become rumored that the king was about to levy a new
tax upon the people, and a murmur of discontent had risen through the
land. To allay this, Gustavus issued several letters, declaring that
the contribution was to be wholly voluntary. One of the convents he
begged to send him all the silver collected for a certain shrine, and
offered to give the crown's note for the amount, secured, if the convent
wished it, by a mortgage of certain crown fiefs. In writing to the
people of Oestergoetland he pointed out that the expedition was
necessitated by the piracies of Norby, who had caused a dreadful
scarcity of food by checking imports; and he called upon the people to
have a detachment of armed men ready by the first week after Easter at
the latest, promising at the same time that as soon as the fleet should
put to sea the men would be provided for at the crown's expense. To the
people of Brask's diocese he wrote that he had heard a rumor to the
effect that he was imposing a new tax upon the people. This rumor the
king characterized as "a palpable lie." He declared further that he had
applied the crown rents to pay for the expedition, and had asked their
bishop to make a loan from his rents for the same purpose, to which
Brask had replied that he would lend the money, but would raise it by
imposing a tax upon his churches. This Gustavus declared was not his
desire; all he wished was a free-will offering. From this letter it is
clear the monarch sought to cast upon Brask the odium which this new
levy had brought upon himself, and it is equally clear that in doing so
he exceeded the bounds of truth. In calling upon Brask for a
contribution he had in no way specified the mode in which the money
should be raised; and Brask, so far from refusing to apply his own rents
for the purpose, had distinctly stated, in every letter which he wrote,
that he would do his utmost to furnish the desired sum.[92]
A further cause of disaffection lay in the general impression that the
monarch was tampering with the coinage. This impression had its origin
naturally enough in the fact that the general diet held in January had
repudiated the Swedish "klippings." The reason given for that act was
that, the Danish "klippings" having been repudiated in Denmark the year
before, merchants were bringing barrelfuls of them into Sweden; so that
the Swedish "klipping," being scarcely discernible from its Danish
namesake, fell constantly in value, its fluctuations depending upon the
importations of the repudiated coin from Denmark. In the Act repudiating
the Swedish "klipping" that coin was declared to be worth four "hvitar;"
that is, about one half of the amount which the crown had received in
issuing it. The outcry which this Act called forth was universal, and
the king was forced to issue a letter to the people in which he
endeavored to allay their wrath. "We have never," he declared with
brazen falsehood,--"we have never altered the coinage either by raising
or by lowering its value, but have permitted each coin to pass for the
same value as it had before;" and he added with bland simplicity, "the
coin has fallen by its own weight." The striking feature in this matter
is the audacity of the king. He trusted that the people generally would
not have access to the documents which we now possess to contradict him.
After issuing this mendacious letter, he approached the Stockholm
merchants, and, by certain persuasive arguments whose nature it is easy
to conceive, prevailed upon them to deposit all their "klippings" in the
treasury, to be weighed and bought by the Government at their actual
bullion value. He then began the issue of a new series of coins
approximating though still below their face value, and published another
letter, this time acknowledging that he had repudiated the "klippings,"
but asserting that the step was taken to comply with a suggestion made
him by the people.[93]
Late in March Gustavus received a note from Fredrik requesting a further
postponement of the congress till May 15. As the Vend Cities were to be
present, Gustavus answered that he would communicate with Lubeck, and so
soon as he had word from her would give a definite reply. He then
despatched the Danish monarch's letter to Bishop Brask. The answer of
that prelate was full of wisdom. "I marvel much," wrote Brask, "that his
Grace should call a congress of these three realms without first
consulting you.... He must be well aware that you cannot be present on
so short notice, especially since he knows that you are about to make an
expedition against Gotland. His real purpose, I suspect, is to induce
you to postpone your expedition." In this surmise the shrewd bishop
doubtless was correct. Fredrik, though satisfied that Sweden should go
to great expense in preparing for an expedition against Gotland, was
reluctant to see her armies actually land upon the isle, lest his own
claims to Gotland might thereby be lost. It seemed to him that Norby,
terrified by the armaments of Sweden, might be induced to go to Denmark
and yield the isle to him. He therefore wrote to Sweden, requesting that
the pirate be given a safe-conduct through the land. But the army was
already in the field, and Gustavus answered firmly that he would not
comply with the request. To this answer he was induced partly by a
suspicion that Denmark was already furnishing supplies to Norby.[94]
On the 8th of May Gustavus despatched his fleet, eight thousand strong,
to Gotland. The command he gave to a German adventurer who has already
figured in this story as Berent von Mehlen. This person, after breaking
faith with his former master, Christiern, had married a cousin of
Gustavus, and had become a trusted counsellor of the king. By what
traits he became attractive in his monarch's eyes it is at this day
difficult to conceive. Certainly as a general he knew as little as any
general possibly could know. Again and again he had been given
opportunity to display his warlike power, but thus far in every instance
he had failed. He now set forth, as admiral of the Swedish fleet, to
besiege the town of Visby. The siege began on the 19th of May, and was
enlivened during a few weeks by several skirmishes. Nothing of
importance, however, was accomplished. The siege was protracted through
the summer, and at last the besiegers showed so little life that their
leader, the favorite of Gustavus, was reported to have turned his coat
once more and joined the enemy.[95]
Not yet had the siege begun when evidence was furnished that Fredrik was
in league with Norby. So early as the 9th of May Gustavus wrote to Brask
that the Danes were rumored to be supplying Norby with stores and
ammunition. A few days later word arrived from Fredrik that he wished
once more to put off the congress, this time till the 24th of June.
Gustavus was now fairly mad with indignation, and declared to Brask that
he would neither be present nor allow his envoys to be present at the
proposed congress. He was discreet enough, however, to conceal his wrath
from Fredrik; and, without refusing the offer of the Danish king, he
called a meeting of his Cabinet, to which he urged Lubeck to send her
envoys. Fredrik in the mean time had been negotiating on his own
account with Norby, and had wrung promises from him which led to the
impression that Norby had thrown up his allegiance to Christiern II. and
was ready to accept the authority of Fredrik. Elated by this false hope,
the Danish monarch felt in a position to ignore the slight that had been
put upon him by Gustavus, and sent delegates, apparently unbidden, to
the Swedish king and Cabinet, proposing that a congress be held in
Denmark to settle all matters of dispute, the Swedish army in the mean
time to withdraw from Gotland, and Norby to be given safe-conduct from
the isle. These terms Gustavus rejected with disdain, declaring that he
had striven for the good of all to scatter Norby with his "nest of
robbers," and would consent to a meeting with Fredrik only on condition
that in the interval Norby should receive no aid of any shape or kind.
Fredrik, finding that Gustavus was determined, and that Norby's feigned
alliance was somewhat airy, yielded reluctantly to this condition. The
Swedish army continued in its camp at Visby; and the two monarchs,
attended by their Cabinets, proceeded to the town of Malmoe in hope of
settling their disputes. The congress opened on the first day of
September. The two monarchs with their retinues were present, together
with envoys from the Hanseatic Towns. The meeting opened, as was usual,
with an interchange of courtesies and with mutual promises to resist
their common enemy, King Christiern. It was agreed, too, that all
renegades from either country should be returned, and that citizens of
one country should be entitled to any property belonging to them in the
other. As soon, however, as the question of disputed territory arose,
it became clear that no conclusion could be reached. It was therefore
resolved, after long debate, that this question be postponed, to be
decided by a congress of certain Hanse Towns, to be held in Lubeck in
June of the following year. Till then a provisional frontier agreed upon
by Norway, Denmark, and Sweden was to be observed; and Gotland was to
remain during the interval in the hands of that party which held it on
September 1. If it should be found that Norby held it on that day, he
should be called upon to surrender it to Fredrik, to be placed by him
under the temporary control of some person satisfactory to Sweden,
Denmark, and Lubeck. If Sweden should continue the war in Gotland, she
was to pay for all damage she might do. Either party by violating these
terms was to become indebted to the other to the amount of one hundred
thousand guilders. This conclusion reached, the congress was dissolved,
envoys being first sent to Gotland to carry out the terms. Finding that
Norby was still in possession, they entered into negotiations, and soon
obtained a contract, signed by Norby as well as Mehlen, that each should
withdraw his forces from the land. In conformity with this contract
Mehlen at once broke camp and sailed with all the Swedish fleet to
Kalmar; but Norby, laughing at the credulity of his opponent, continued
to dominate the island, and began his piracies afresh.[96]
This disastrous expedition caused a heavy drain upon the Swedish
treasury, an evil which the monarch sought to meet by new demands upon
the Church. On the 9th of May he wrote to Brask that he must have more
money, and that the bishopric of Linkoeping, being benefited more than
others by the expedition, must expect to bear the chief part of the
cost. To this Brask answered humbly that he had already furnished more
than his proper share, but would do his utmost to obtain the needed sum.
This promise, however, did not satisfy the king; and a few days later he
sent a letter to Brask's chapter, declaring that they had collected
certain rents belonging to the crown which must be yielded up without
delay. Brask appears to have been a special object of the monarch's
greed. On one occasion Gustavus seized some tithes belonging to that
prelate, and then had face enough to write him that he had done so, his
only excuse being that the army was in need of food. This high-handed
mode of dealing with the Church is in marked contrast to the monarch's
complaisance when dealing with the people. Before the common people
Gustavus grovelled in the dust. Every day nearly he despatched some
document granting new privileges to this town or to that; and when the
people of Kalmar refused to contribute on the ground that their trade
had been ruined by foreign merchants, Gustavus sent back answer that he
would remedy this wrong. The notion getting abroad in Brask's diocese
that new taxes were being levied, Gustavus insisted that the bishop
should counteract this view, thus practically forcing him to make the
contribution from his private means.[97]
In spite of every effort to appease the people, discontent was fast
spreading through the land. To attribute this entirely to the actions of
Gustavus is unfair. His expedition against Gotland, it is true, had
proved a failure, and had cost his country dear. The monarch should have
seen that, in the impoverished state of his finances, the duty of
destroying Norby belonged to Denmark or Lubeck. But, granted that the
expedition was ill-judged, its failure certainly did not justify revolt.
The truth is, the Swedish people were so used to insurrection that the
slightest disappointment sufficed to set the whole country by the ears,
and no sooner was the expedition brought to its humiliating end than the
people began to look about for pretexts for revolt. One of the first
cries raised against Gustavus was that he had transgressed the law by
admitting foreign citizens into the Cabinet of Sweden. To this charge
the monarch was unable to make a rational reply. At the very outset of
his reign, he had displayed his first infatuation for foreign men by
raising Mehlen to the highest honors of the state. Later another
adventurer, one Count Johan von Hoya, had appeared upon the scene. The
king had forthwith showered royal favors upon his head. Scarcely two
months after landing Hoya had betrothed himself to the king's sister,
and had been received by the infatuated monarch into the Swedish
Cabinet. Such a course appeared to the people in direct opposition to
the promise made by Gustavus that he would drive out foreign power.
This evil, however, was but slight, in comparison with others that the
people had to bear. In plain English, they were starving. The
long-protracted war with Denmark, followed by the brutal piracies of
Norby, had so reduced the supply of necessaries, particularly salt, that
few except the rich were able to get enough to stay their hunger. Hoping
to allay the people's indignation in these matters, Gustavus called a
meeting of his Cabinet in October, summoning at the same time two
Linkoeping burghers to advise the Cabinet as to the best methods of
improving trade. It is worthy of note, however, that though the meeting
was expressly announced to be called for the purpose of improving trade,
the documents describing the debate are devoted almost wholly to a
consideration of methods to augment the royal funds. The king, it seems,
came forward with a suggestion that, since he was likely soon to marry,
some, provision should be made for adding to his income, and some steps
be taken to reimburse him for the sums advanced by him to carry on the
war. What he particularly wanted was the right to fix, according to his
own judgment, the amount of rents to be paid by crown estates. He
suggested, further, that, since the pope would not confirm the bishops
till they paid their fees, his coronation should be delayed no longer,
but the bishops should perform the ceremony without the papal sanction.
He recommended also that, there being no satisfactory place in which to
keep the Swedish cavalry, they be quartered in the various monasteries,
"where," he added, "we find plenty of money, but very few monks." As to
Hoya, he requested the Cabinet's sanction of the proposed marriage,
shrewdly intimating that while he favored citizens of Germany, he
believed no marriage between a Swede and Dane should be allowed. The
answer which the Cabinet made to these proposals shows traces of a
feeble opposition along with a manifest endeavor to accommodate the
king. First of all, the Cabinet advised the king to appoint a few of the
most intelligent and able debaters in the realm to represent the cause
of Sweden at the congress to be held next year in Lubeck; and in
accordance with this suggestion the king named Hoya, and the new
archbishop, Johannes Magni. Regarding the matter of conferring fiefs on
Hoya, the Cabinet yielded to the king's desire. "Though the law
declares," they said, "that no foreigner shall enter the Cabinet or
govern land or castle, yet we shall gladly see you grant him both castle
and land as you deem best, doubting not that you will so watch over his
and all other grants that your subjects suffer not." In accordance with
this concession Hoya was given Stegeborg in fee, and his marriage with
Margareta was arranged to take place in January next. As to quartering
in the monasteries, the conservative element prevailed, the Cabinet
decreeing that it was not advisable to fill the monasteries with horse
and men. That the coronation take place at once, the Cabinet strongly
urged, though they refrained from expressing opinion as to the
confirmation of the bishops. The proposition that the king be given
power to regulate the royal rents was not rejected, but a hint was
thrown out that the proper step was rather to prepare an accurate list
of all crown property and collect the rents as due thereon of old.[98]
Clearly enough this meeting would not satisfy a hungry people. In fact
apparently it added to their rage, and we find the people of Dalarne at
this time drawing up a long list of grievances to be laid before the
king. Their first and weightiest complaint was that certain rich men,
stewards of the king, had bought up all the grain in their district, and
had made a corner in it so that the poor man could not get enough to
eat. Further than this, they protested against the king's practice of
admitting into the kingdom all sorts of foreigners, "who have put their
heads together to ruin the common people." This vehement lament aroused
Gustavus to the gravity of his position, particularly as he learned that
Sunnanvaeder was inciting the people to rebel. Hoping to quiet matters,
he despatched his messengers to all parts of the kingdom with soothing
words. He endeavored in every way to impress upon the people that the
high price of food was due entirely to the war between the emperor and
the King of France; and as to the repudiation of the "klippings," of
which some people had complained, he asserted that he had thereby
suffered far greater injury than his people. Sunnanvaeder's conspiracy
was the thing that caused him most anxiety, and on the 9th of December
he addressed the Dalesmen on that theme. "Dear friends," he suavely
wrote, "report has reached our ears that Sunnanvaeder has gone among you
with plots to throw the kingdom into strife once more. We beg you in the
name of God give him no heed. He has made statements about us, we are
told, which are absolutely false; among others, that we are about to
restore Trolle to his archbishopric,--the man who deprived us of father
and mother and threw our kingdom into ruin. As we have called a diet to
be held in January, to investigate these charges among other things, we
request you at that time or earlier to send representatives from every
parish to judge between us; and we hereby promise the said Sunnanvaeder
safe-conduct to and from Stockholm for this investigation. You may make
this proclamation to him; and if he will not come, you may know that he
is false.... Further, since we are informed that you are suffering from
great lack of salt, we have just despatched to you between ten and
twenty cargoes of salt to relieve your want."[99]
While Gustavus was thus dickering with the Dalesmen, a far more weighty
matter kept him continually on an anxious seat at home. This was the
Reformation of the Romish Church. It has been already noted that the
Swedish Reformation was a political revolt, and at its outset had but
little connection with theological dispute. The conflagration that had
raged in Germany since 1519 produced no immediate effect in Sweden, and
it was not till the spring of 1523 that the Swedish prelates felt real
dread of Martin Luther. The father of the Swedish Reformation was Olaus
Petri, a blacksmith's son, of Oerebro. From his earliest years this
champion of Luther had been educated by a pious father for the Romish
Church. His childhood had been passed amid the religious influence of a
monastery in his native town. There, with his younger brother
Laurentius, he had shared the daily routine of a monk. When a mere boy
his father, little knowing the temptation to which his son would be
exposed, had placed him in the University of Wittenberg, where he sat
for some years at the feet of Luther. On his return to Sweden in 1519,
he was appointed to give instructions in the Bible to the youth of
Strengnaes. Though only twenty-two, he already showed such promise that
within a year he was chosen deacon of Strengnaes, and placed at the head
of the school belonging to the Chapter. The opportunity thus given him
was great. The bishopric being vacant, the charge of things in Strengnaes
fell upon Laurentius Andreae, at the time archdeacon. Andreae, though
fifteen years his senior, was of a kindred spirit, and by a contemporary
is described as a willing pupil of the young reformer. There can be no
question that even at this period Petri was regarded as a man of
strength. A portrait of him painted when still a youth shows in a marked
degree the traits by which he was distinguished later. The face is full
and round, with large, warm eyes twinkling with merriment, and a high,
clear forehead, from which is thrown back a heavy mass of waving hair.
The mouth is firm as adamant, and the sharp-cut lips and chin are
eloquent of strength. Altogether, it is the picture of just the man that
Petri afterward became,--a brilliant orator, daring, good-natured, and
gifted with a generous supply of common-sense. Precisely how much Petri
owed to Martin Luther we cannot know. It is not, however, likely that at
first his teaching in Strengnaes differed materially from that inculcated
by the Romish Church. At any rate, he taught four years before any
serious complaint was made. The first to charge him with heresy was
Bishop Brask. On the 7th of May, 1523, that much-enduring prelate wrote
to a member of the Upsala Chapter that a certain person in Strengnaes had
inflamed the people by preaching heresies; "and God knows," he added,
"we are grieved enough to learn that he is not silenced." What these
heresies preached by Petri were, appears from a polemic hurled at the
young reformer by Brask's deacon. They include, among other things, a
denial of the priest's authority to solicit alms, with assertions that
men should place no faith in the Virgin or in other saints, but in God
alone; that the priest's first duty is to preach, not pray, and that
confession should be made to none but God. Surely we have here the very
essence of the Reformation. Brask was already trembling with
apprehension, and despatched a letter to a brother bishop to say that
the heresies of Petri had begun to break out in Upsala. "We must use our
utmost vehemence," he gasped, "to persuade Johannes Magni to apply the
inquisition to this Petri; otherwise the flame will spread throughout
the land." Magni, it is clear, was deemed a little lukewarm by such
ardent men as Brask, and on the 12th of July we find Brask pouring out a
flood of Latin eloquence to excite the tranquil legate. In nothing is
Brask's sagacity more manifest than in the enthusiasm which he here
displayed. He discerned with perfect clearness that the battle must be
fought at once. If Petri should once gain the people's ear, all hope was
lost. Romanism was no match for Lutheranism in an open war. He therefore
sought to stamp out the new teachings without allowing them to be fairly
known; and had his superiors shown equal zeal, the Reformation might
have been delayed.[100]
A few days after his earnest appeal to Magni, Brask despatched to the
Vadstena Chapter a tract in refutation of the Lutheran doctrines, and
along with it a sermon preached by Petri, "in which," so wrote the
bishop, "you will observe his blasphemy of the Holy Virgin." Brask,
despite his spiritual duties, was no ascetic, and, though suffering at
the time from illness, added a postscript begging the Chapter to let him
have a box of nuts. Apparently these delicacies came; for the bishop's
next letter, written to the pope, was in a happier vein. "I have just
had from Johannes Magni a letter on exterminating heresy which fills my
soul with joy.... I grieve, however, to tell you that the heresy which
had its birth in Germany has spread its branches across this kingdom....
I have sought to the utmost of my power to stay the pestilence, but
through lack of authority outside my diocese, could not accomplish what
I would.... Give me your orders to act outside my diocese, and I will
crush the heresy with my utmost zeal." About this time the bishop
received a letter from Johannes Magni that must have soothed his
temper. "God knows," the legate wrote, "how eagerly I burn to effect the
hoped-for freedom of the Christian Church, had not circumstances been
adverse. I have at any rate pleaded with the king, and he has promised
to maintain our rights. He says that if any of his soldiers wrong our
tenants, they do so at their peril. When I spoke to him of the burdens
that had been put upon us, he exclaimed with tears in his eyes that no
one felt it more than he, that it had been necessary and contrary to his
will, and that it was his full intention so soon as peace was restored
to refund the money we had furnished. He promised also to repress the
Lutheran heresy, though he urged me to use persuasion rather than force,
lest by conflict of opinions the whole Church be overturned." The
impression left on Magni by his monarch's tears is probably the
impression that the monarch had designed. We have no reason to suppose
Gustavus cherished any affection yet for Luther, but neither is there
reason to suppose he hated him. What he hoped for above all else was to
keep the bishops under his control, and the surest way to do so was to
keep the Church at enmity with Luther.[101]
That Gustavus played his cards with skill is manifest from a letter
written by Magni to the Linkoeping Chapter. "I understand," he wrote,
"that you feel little anxiety at my proposed return to Rome, thinking
that I have not shown enough energy in restoring the disabled Church. I
may say, however, that I have pleaded and now plead for her before the
king, who protests that his whole heart is in her preservation, and that
any harm done by his officers to our tenants has been done against his
will. He says too, and with tears in his eyes regrets, that the
importunity of his soldiers has forced him to lay burdens on the Church.
Nor is it his Majesty's intention to compel our weary priests to give up
the care of souls. His excuse for exacting tribute from the churches to
aid the kingdom is that he undertook the war as much for the freedom of
the Church as for the safety of the kingdom. I give you this excuse for
whatever it is worth. His Majesty promises that when he has paid the
enormous debt contracted to Lubeck, and has wholly freed the kingdom,
both clergy and people shall rejoice as never they have rejoiced before.
In the extirpation of Lutheranism I am aided as much by the efforts of
his Majesty as by the authority of the pope. It seems to me that the
strife going on by letters among the clergy should be put to an end, and
more toleration shown. I know it will, if continued, spread
conflagration in other lands. The clergy of Strengnaes have promised me
firmly that they will abstain from all new doctrines, and will send out
no more letters unless they are harassed." This warning from the legate
proves that the Swedish prelates were already cutting one another's
throats. Apparently, too, it worked like magic in quieting their
disputes, for six months now elapsed before the charge of heresy was
raised again.[102]
On the 21st of February, 1524, Laurentius Andreae returned to the assault
with a long epistle to the Vadstena Chapter. This epistle is moderate in
tone, and contains this sound advice: "His Majesty desires that when you
discover strange doctrines in the books of Luther or of any other, you
should not reject them without a fair examination. If then you find
anything contrary to the truth, write a refutation of it based on Holy
Writ. As soon as scholars have seen your answer and have determined what
to accept and what reject, you can preach according to their judgment
and not according to your individual caprice. I suspect, however, there
will hardly be many among you able to refute these doctrines; for,
though but little of the so-called Lutheran teaching has come to my
knowledge, I am convinced that Luther is too great a man to be refuted
by simple men like us, for the Scriptures get their strength from no
man, but from God. Even if we have the truth on our side, 'tis folly for
us who have no arms to attack those who are well equipped, since we
should thus do nothing but expose our own simplicity.... Prove all
things; hold fast that which is good. Search the spirit to see whether
it be of God. I would urge every one to read the new doctrines. Those
who persuade or command you otherwise, appear to me to act contrary to
the Scriptures, and I suspect they do not wish the truth to come to
light.... If there be any among you whom this letter offends, let him
write to me, pointing out where I am wrong, and I will withdraw my
statements." Brask, though offended deeply, scorned the challenge.
Instead of answering Andreae, he wrote to the bishop of Skara, saying:
"Certain persons are beginning to urge that we should not banish
Luther's writings, but should study them carefully to the end that we
may write against them, as if, forsooth, we were simple enough to
trouble ourselves about the effrontery of Luther. He flatters himself
that he possesses greater wisdom than all the saints. But we shall bow
the knee to God, not man, and shall do our utmost that the kingdom be
not corrupted by this new heresy." Brask was now boiling with
indignation, and a few days later wrote a friend: "I have no fear of
Luther or any other heretic. Were an angel from heaven to predict his
victory, I should not waver."[103]
This feigned assurance on the part of Brask was not deep-set. In the
secrecy of his own cloisters he contemplated the issue with fear and
trembling. This is clear from a letter penned at this period to the
monarch. "By the allegiance which I owe you," wrote the bishop, "I deem
it my duty to urge you not to allow the sale of Luther's books within
the realm, nor give his pupils shelter or encouragement of any kind,
till the coming council of the Church shall pass its judgment.... I know
not how your Grace can better win the love of God, as well as of all
Christian kings and princes, than by restoring the Church of Christ to
the state of harmony that it has enjoyed in ages past." The same day
that this letter was despatched, Brask wrote to a friend in terms which
show that his anxiety was great. After intimating that the king's
constant demands on him for money were probably inspired by the friends
of Luther, he exclaimed: "This party is growing all too fast among us,
and I greatly fear lest some new heresy, which God forbid! may break out
soon." As the king appeared not likely to take very stringent measures
to repress the heresy, the bishop hastened to exert his own authority,
and issued a mandate, to be read from all the pulpits in his diocese,
forbidding the sale of Luther's books and teachings. A few days later
the monarch's answer came. It was couched in temperate language, but
offered little solace to the bishop. "Regarding your request," so wrote
Gustavus, "that we forbid the sale of Luther's writings, we know not by
what right it could be done, for we are told his teachings have not yet
been found by impartial judges to be false. Moreover, since writings
opposed to Luther have been circulated through the land, it seems but
right that his, too, should be kept public, that you and other scholars
may detect their fallacies and show them to the people. Then the books
of Luther may be condemned. As to your charge that Luther's pupils are
given shelter at our court, we answer that they have not sought it. If
indeed they should, you are aware it is our duty to protect them as well
as you. If there be any in our protection whom you wish to charge, bring
your accusation and give their names." The method of trial suggested in
this letter was not in harmony with the bishop's views. What he wanted
was an inquisition, and in writing to a fellow-bishop he did not
hesitate to say so. "I maintain that every diocese should have an
inquisition for this heresy, and I think our Most Holy Father ought to
write his Majesty to that effect." The mere prohibition of Luther's
writings was of no avail. As Brask declared to Johannes Magni, "The
number of foreign abettors of Lutheranism is growing daily, despite our
mandate, through the sale of Luther's books. I fear the remedy will be
too late unless it is applied at once."[104]
This letter was written on the 20th of June, 1524. About the same time
Petri was called to Stockholm to fill the post of city clerk, and
Andreae, already secretary to the king, was made archdeacon of Upsala.
This double advancement of the Lutheran leaders left no room longer to
doubt the king's designs. From this time forth he was felt on every hand
to be an enemy to the Romish Church. The striking fact in all this
history is the utter absence of conscientious motives in the king.
Though the whole of Christendom was ablaze with theological dispute, he
went on steadily reducing the bishops' power with never a word of
invective against their teaching or their faith. His conduct was guided
solely by a desire to aggrandize the crown, and he seized without a
scruple the tools best fitted to his hand. Had Brask been more
compliant, or the Church less rich, the king would not unlikely have
continued in the faith. The moral of all this is to hide your riches
from those that may become your foes.
The part that Brask played in this drama calls forth a feeling of
respect. Artful and man[oe]uvring though he was, there were certain deep
principles within his breast that only great adversity could touch. Of
these the most exalted was his affection for the Church. Apart from all
her splendor and the temporal advantages to which her service led, Brask
loved her for herself. She was the mother at whose breast he had been
reared, and the feelings that had warmed his soul in childhood could not
easily be extinguished now that he was old. Every dart that struck her
pierced deep into his own flesh, and a premonition of the coming ruin
overwhelmed him with bitter grief. It was this very grief, however, that
raised him to rebel. The old vacillating temper that he had shown in
days gone by was his no longer. Drear and dismal though the prospect
was, he did not hesitate, but threw himself into the encounter heart and
soul. From this time forth, with all his cunning and sagacity, he was
the steadfast leader of the papal cause.
FOOTNOTES:
[74] July 13, 1523, a payment of about 17,000 marks having been already
made, Gustavus wrote to Brask that Lubeck still demanded 200,000
guilders, which was equivalent to about 300,000 Swedish marks. This
probably was an exaggeration for the purpose of getting a generous
contribution from Brask. Another source states it as more than 120,000
Swedish marks. Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, p. 72. This clearly was too
low an estimate; for we know that Gustavus paid at least 42,945 Lubeck
marks (or 83,000 Swedish marks) in the course of 1523, and that in the
following spring the amount claimed by Lubeck was about 240,000 Swedish
marks. See _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 109-110, and
the documents in the Archives at Lubeck cited in Handelmann's _Die
letzten Zeiten der hanseatischen Uebermacht im Norden_, pp. 165-170. The
matter is ably discussed by Forssell in his _Sver. inre hist._, vol. i.
pp. 134-138. Much confusion is caused by the fact that the debtor and
creditor reckoned the sum each according to his own monetary standard,
and there can be no question, too, that between the parties there was
some dispute as to the exact sum due.
[75] See a document in the Archives at Lubeck cited in Handelmann's _Die
letzten Zeiten der hanseatischen Uebermacht im Norden_, p. 165.
[76] [Illustration]
Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 64-65. Svart, whose chronicle was written
with a view to flatter Gustavus, informs us of the reduction in the
value at which the coin was issued, and appears to attribute this
reduction to the generosity of his master. It was "a good fat coin," he
adds, which merchants carried out of the country as an excellent piece
of merchandise. The zeal with which the chronicler defends the coin is
enough to raise suspicion as to its true value. If it was really worth
an oere and a half, it is incredible that Gustavus in the strait in which
he then was should have ultimately given it for an oere. Forssell, in his
_Anteckn. om mynt, vigt, matt och varupris i Sverige_, pp. 44-51,
suggests that probably the coin was first issued for an oere and a half,
and then with the same size and weight but containing more alloy, was
issued for an oere. I think the true explanation is more simple. Gustavus
had been found out. The "klippings" which he had issued a year before
were such a palpable fraud that the Danish commandant of Stockholm had
actually forbidden their use, lest the Danish "klippings" (which were
about as bad as anything could be) might through association with the
others fall into ill repute. _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. i. pp. 214 and
218. So that when he issued a new coin and called it an oere and a half,
people were suspicious and refused to take it till he reduced it to
something like its value. This view is strengthened by the fact that of
the few extant coins of Gustavus, dated 1522, not one contains enough
silver to have been worth an oere and a half, and most of them fall
considerably below the value of an oere. It is noticeable also that those
stamped 1523, which were presumably issued for an oere, contain a trifle
more in value than those stamped 1522, and called an oere and a half. As
none of them have any value stamped upon their face, it was a simple
matter to start the figure high, and then reduce it to what the coin
would bring.
[Illustration]
[77] As to Church fees and incomes see a letter of Brask, dated Dec. 21,
1514, in _Hist. handl._, vol. viii. pp. 65-67.
[78] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, p. 58.
[79] _Von der grauesamen tyrannischen myssehandelung_; Svart, _Gust. I.'s
kroen._, pp. 56-58; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 35-44.
[80] Johannes Magni, _Hist. pont._, pp. 74-75; Svart, _Gust. I.'s
kroen._, p. 70; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp.
88-89.
[81] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, p. 73; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. pp. 97, 99-101, 108-111, 114-115, 119, and 298-300;
and Linkoeping, _Bibliotheks handl._, vol. ii. pp. 204-205.
[82] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 107-108 and
121-129; Forssell, _Sver. inre hist._, vol. ii. p. 72; and _Sver.
trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 44-55, 65-67, and 69-74.
[83] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 121-129.
[84] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 129-134 and
139-140; and Theiner, _Schwed. u. seine Stell. z. heil. Stuhl_, vol. ii.
pp. 6-11.
[85] Johannes Magni, _Hist. pont._, p. 75; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. pp. 143-150; and _Nya Kaellor till Finl.
Medeltidshist._, pp. 737-740.
[86] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 172-174 and
178-181.
[87] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 74-75.
[88] _Ibid._, pp. 73-74; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 67-69.
[89] No one apparently wished to father the expedition. Svart, who
presents the king's side of the case, says, in his _Gust. I.'s kroen._,
pp. 78-81, that Gustavus undertook the campaign at the urgent
solicitation of Lubeck, who promised to defer payment of her loan for
several years without interest, provided Gustavus would undertake the
war. This proposition appears generous, but there is no trace of it in
the contemporary letters of the king. Those letters assert that Brask
was the prime mover of the scheme; but as Brask repudiated it at once,
the responsibility for it cannot be fairly laid on him. See _Kon. Gust.
den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 190 and 301.
[90] Rensel, _Beraettelse_, pp. 34-35; _Acta hist. Reg. Christ. II._, pp.
4-9; _Alla riksdag. och moet. besluth_, vol. i. pp. 29-30; _Handl. roer.
Skand. hist._, vol. xvii. p. 172; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. pp. 182, 184-185, 187-189, and 301-302.
[91] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 185-186, 189-191,
and 300-302; and Linkoeping, _Bibliotheks handl._, vol. i. pp. 153-155.
[92] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 191-192 and
193-197.
[93] The documents relating to the repudiation of the "klippings" vary
somewhat in phraseology. In the Royal Archives at Stockholm is an
official contemporary statement of the business transacted by the
general diet in January, 1524, which declares: "The 'klippings' were in
so far repudiated as to be valued at only four 'hvitar,' though any
person may accept them for what he will." _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. p. 182; and _Svenska riksdagsakt._, vol. i. pp.
17-20. Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, p. 76, asserts that the diet
"repudiated the 'klippings.'" Tegel, _Then stoormecht._, p. 81, says,
"the 'klippings' were utterly repudiated." In a letter issued by
Gustavus to the people of Dalarne immediately after the passage of the
Act he says the diet advised "that the 'klippings' fall so that they
pass for only five 'hvitar,' to which we and our Cabinet consented."
_Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 182-183. In a letter
issued at about the same time to the people of Vadstena, Gustavus made
the same statement, except that he used the word "four" instead of
"five." _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. p. 184. The later
letters of Gustavus, in which he declares that he has not repudiated his
coinage, are printed in _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp.
196-197 and 202-207.
[94] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 198-201, 211-212
and 303-306.
[95] _Diar. Minor. Visbyens._, p. 39; Rensel, _Beraettelse_, pp. 36-38;
Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 81-82; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. pp. 218-219.
[96] Eliesen, _Chron. Skib._, p. 577; Rensel, _Beraettelse_, pp. 38-40;
Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 82-83 and 93-96; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_,
vol. ii. pp. 688-765; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp.
223-224, 229-230, 236-241, 245-250 and 309-327; and _Sver. trakt._, vol.
iv. pp. 94-103.
[97] _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 223-225, 227-236
and 306-309.
[98] _Alla riksdag. och moet. besluth_, vol. i. pp. 31-35; _Kon. Gust.
den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 251-265; and _Svenska
riksdagsakt._, vol. i. pp. 22-29.
[99] _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp. 31-39; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. pp. 271-281 and 327-328.
[100] Johannes Magni, _Hist. pont._, p. 75; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._,
p. 92; and _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xvii. pp. 117-119 and
135-148.
[101] _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xvii. pp. 151-155 and 157-159.
There is preserved among Brask's documents of this period a
proclamation, purporting to be issued by Gustavus, forbidding the sale
of Lutheran tracts within the realm. _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol.
xvii. pp. 159-160. No reference, however, is made to it in other
writings; and as it is clearly contrary to all the monarch's later
views, it is certain that it did not emanate from him. Probably it was a
mere concept drawn by Brask in the hope that it would meet with royal
favor.
[102] _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xvii. pp. 162-164.
[103] _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xvii. pp. 205-216 and 220-223.
[104] _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xiii. pp. 48-50 and 52-54, and
vol. xviii. pp. 234-236 and 237-239; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. i. pp. 231-233 and 306-309.