CHAPTER IV.

WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; ELECTION OF GUSTAVUS TO THE THRONE. 1521-1523.

Causes of the War.--Character of the Dalesmen.--Growth of the Patriot

Army.--Didrik Slagheck.--Battle of Koeping.--Capture of Vesteras; of

Upsala.--Skirmish with Trolle.--Skirmishes near Stockholm.--Siege of

Stegeborg.--Norby.--Rensel.--Brask.--Progress of the War.--Coinage

of Gustavus.--Christiern's Troubles in Denmark.--Siege of

Stockholm.--Fall of Kalmar.--Diet of Strengnaes.--Fall of

Stockholm.--Retrospect of the War.

There are periods in the history of most nations when all that has been

hallowed by time and custom seems of a sudden to lose its sanctity and

bow down before the commanding influence of some new force. These

periods are of rare occurrence and generally of short duration. They

remind one of those thunderstorms which burst upon us at the close of a

sultry August day, unheralded but by the stifling heat of a burning sky,

and in a few moments leaving the atmosphere behind them pure and clear

and cool. Sudden and unheralded as they appear, they are yet the direct

result of a long series of forces, whose ultimate issue might have been

accurately predicted did we but thoroughly understand the forces

themselves. So, too, it is with great political upheavals. The

revolution which drenched the whole of France with blood in 1789 is no

more difficult to explain than the thunderstorm which drenches the

parched earth with rain on a hot midsummer night. It was simply the

reaction after a century of oppression, extravagance and vice. In like

manner the great revolution whose development we are about to trace was

merely the natural result of long years of tyranny culminating in the

fearful carnage of the autumn of 1520. The Revolution in Sweden is,

however, in one respect pre-eminent among the great crises known to

history. Never was a revolution so thoroughly the work of a single man

as that in Sweden. From beginning to end there was one figure whose

presence alone infused life into a lukewarm people, and who, working

upon the forces which had been forged by years of tyranny, shaped them

gradually to his own commanding will. The Revolution in Sweden is the

history of Gustavus Vasa. He it was who set the torch, and he, too,

pointed out the direction in which the flame should burn.

Early in January, 1521, the war of independence already had begun. By

this time news of the revolt in Dalarne had spread throughout the land,

and the Danish officers were wild with irritation that the young

Gustavus had escaped their clutches. The charge of affairs, at the

withdrawal of Christiern, had been placed in the hands of a wretch

scarce less contemptible than his master. This was one Didrik Slagheck,

a Westphalian surgeon who, we are told, had "ingratiated himself with

Christiern and ravished the wives and daughters of the Swedish

magnates." Gad, for a time the councillor of the Danish king, was now no

more. Christiern, shrewdly divining that one who had deserted his

former master might desert again, had used him to mediate for the

surrender of Stockholm and had then removed his head. In place of the

old burgomaster and Council of Stockholm, the city was now held by

satellites of Christiern, and any whose hearts revolted against his

sickening cruelties were discreet enough to hold their tongues. Dalarne

had become the only spot in Sweden where liberty still lived, and

thither all liberty-loving Swedes whose hands were not yet tied

repaired. Whenever these recruits appeared, Gustavus placed them in the

midst of his little army, and called upon them to declare what they had

seen of Christiern's deeds. It makes a striking picture, this little

band of patriots, in a far-off mountain region in the dead of winter,

with no arms but their picks and axes, strong only in their high

resolve, and yet breathing defiance against the whole army of the Danish

king. Gustavus knew the Swedish people well. He knew them slow to move,

dull of intellect, and averse from reason. But he knew also that they

were ardent in their emotions, permeated with a love of liberty,

courageous in defence of their ancestral rights; and he foresaw that if

he could once but rouse their passions by a vivid picture of Danish

tyranny, he could make of them the finest soldiers in all Christendom.

By Lent the little army was four hundred strong. With this force

Gustavus marched to the great copper-mine at Falun, where he seized the

Danish steward and took possession of the royal rents, as well as of a

quantity of clothing and some silk which he at once turned to a good use

as banners for his army. He then retired to his camp, but shortly after

returned, this time fifteen hundred strong. This rapid increase in his

forces produced an instantaneous effect. No sooner did he appear than

the miners joined his ranks, and further than that they wrote to their

friends in all the neighboring provinces to join him too. Gustavus then

fixed the headquarters of his army near the southern boundary of

Dalarne, and started, April 3, on a journey in person through several of

the northern provinces to enlist recruits.[56]

Meantime Slagheck had concentrated the Danish forces in and near the

Castle of Vesteras, deeming this the best point at which to hold the

patriots at bay. One detachment, indeed, proceeded north as far as the

Dalelf, on the southern frontier of Dalarne, and encamped there,

thinking to prevent the enemy from crossing. While waiting, the Danish

leader is said to have inquired the population of Dalarne, and on being

told that it was about twenty thousand, to have asked how the province

could support so many. The answer was that the people were not used to

dainties, that their only drink was water, and in hard times their only

food a bread made from the bark of trees. "Even the Devil," ejaculated

the officer, "could not vanquish men who live on wood and water;" and

with that he ordered a retreat. Before they got off, however, the Swedes

fell upon them and drove them home in flight. About the same time the

burgomaster and Council of Stockholm despatched a letter to the

northern provinces, urging them to pay no heed to the lies of Gustavus;

and Archbishop Trolle, after several epistles of a like nature, set sail

along the coast of the Baltic to the north to use his influence in

quelling the insurrection. But wherever he tried to land he was met by

the peasantry with threats and imprecations; and he soon beat a hasty

and ignominious retreat.[57]

On returning from his recruiting-tour to the headquarters of his army,

Gustavus put his men through a regular course of training. Most of them

were farmers, with scarce enough knowledge of military affairs to

distinguish a javelin from a flagstaff. Their weapons were of the rudest

sort,--axes and bows and arrows. He therefore taught them first of all

to forge javelin and arrow heads. He also introduced a pike with spiral

point which could be driven into a man's armor so as to hold him fast.

To meet the necessities of a soldier, who was prevented by his

occupation from paying for his goods with wheat or rye, Gustavus issued

a copper coin which was at once received as money. These preparations

seem all to have been made with the prospect of a long-continued war.

While they were in progress, a letter came from the burgomaster and

Council of Stockholm, dated April 10, and addressed to the people of

Dalarne, informing them that a number of vessels had just arrived from

the Hanse Towns, laden by order of Christiern with clothing and food,

which were to be distributed among the people. After administering this

mealy morsel the letter of the burgomaster and Council went on to urge

the Dalesmen to have nothing to do with the lies and treachery of

Gustavus, but to consider their own and their children's welfare and bow

humbly before their gracious king. This letter seems not to have

produced the effect that was intended. Another that came about the same

time was more effective. It was from some German soldiers who declared,

with more or less exaggeration, that they were four thousand strong,

that they had come to lend their succor to Gustavus, had already seized

nine of Christiern's best men-of-war, and expected within a few days to

get possession of Stockholm. The news of this marvellous achievement

seems never to have been confirmed, but at all events it fanned the

enthusiasm of the infant army.[58]

Discontent had by this time spread throughout the land. On the 18th of

April we find the Danish authorities in Stockholm writing that tumult

and confusion reign in all parts of the kingdom, and on the 23d of April

they write of an insurrection that has broken out in Stegeholm. This

rapid spread of the conflagration made it necessary for the Danish

officers to increase their vigilance, and on the 26th of April they

found an opportunity to win their spurs. It occurred in this wise. One

of the recruiting-officers of Gustavus, in his eagerness to advance the

patriot cause, had pushed south into the very heart of the enemy's

country, and finally burst into the town of Koeping. Here, with all the

rashness of a new-made officer, he let loose his soldiers on the town.

The result was just what might have been expected. Ere nightfall the

whole army, officers and men, were drunk. They retired to their camp,

built blazing fires, and lay down to sleep without watch or guard. News

of the situation was carried at once to Vesteras, where a force of three

thousand men was got together and sent post-haste to Koeping. It reached

the patriot camp soon after midnight on April 26. The scene of

debauchery was not yet past. The Danes fell upon them as they lay there

in their drunken stupor, and slew them.[59]

Three days before this catastrophe Gustavus divided his entire forces

into two parts, placing one under the command of an officer named Olsson

and the other under one Eriksson. He then reviewed his troops, and

prepared to march against the Castle of Vesteras. He had planned an

attack on the east side of the castle, and the force sent down to Koeping

had been given orders to attack it simultaneously on the west. On

learning of the disaster at Koeping he seems to have made no change in

his own manoeuvres. He waited till the 29th, and then advanced to the

walls of Vesteras. His design was not to attack the town that day. But

the Danish soldiers, chafing for the fight and already glorying in

success, gave him no choice. They came boldly forth to meet him, led by

a line of cavalry, who dashed upon the patriots, so runs the chronicle,

"like raging lions." The patriots received the charge like men. In

their front rank were the halberdiers, armed with sharp weapons some

fifteen or twenty feet in length. With these they kept the cavalry at

bay, and worried the horses till at length confusion began to spread

along the line. No sooner did the patriots see this than they discharged

a volley of arrows, hitherto reserved. Under this double discomfiture,

from their own horses and their opponents' arrows, the cavalry yielded,

then finally turned and fled, leaving four hundred dead upon the field.

Nor was this all. As the cavalry, frenzied with terror, dashed through

the town-gate, they found the narrow streets blocked with the infantry,

on whom their ungovernable steeds rushed with all the fury lent by fear.

A large number were thus trampled to death, while the rest were

precipitated into flight. Eriksson followed them a short distance, and

then retired; but meantime Olsson entered the city from another quarter,

and got possession of the enemy's cannon, ball, and powder. This he

carried to Gustavus, who had taken up his position on a ridge to the

north of the town. When now the garrison saw that they were worsted,

they set fire to the town and then retired to the castle. At this many

patriots rushed back into the burning town, burst open the shops and

wine-vaults, and parted their booty among them. As soon as the Danes saw

what was going on, their courage once more rose, and they fell upon the

plundering patriots, already half drunk with wine. Gustavus therefore

sent a detachment under Olsson into the town to drive the Danish

soldiers back. They met in the public square, and a long and bloody

battle followed; but at last the remnant of the Danish soldiers fled

and took refuge in the monastery. Here they remained three weeks, and

then escaped by boat to Stockholm. Gustavus, after the fight was over,

entered the town and destroyed every wine-cask in the place. Though the

town had fallen, the Castle of Vesteras still held out. Experience,

however, had made clear that it could not be reduced except by siege. He

therefore pitched his camp on the west side of the castle, and

despatched the main body of his forces to other parts.[60]

First of all, he ordered Eriksson and Olsson to attack Upsala. They

therefore proceeded with a body of infantry to a forest some twelve

miles from the city, and pitched their camp. As soon as the canons, with

the burgomaster and Council, heard that the city was to be attacked,

they sent a letter to the patriots urging them to postpone the onset

till after the 18th of May, Saint Erik's day, that they might celebrate

the festival. But their messenger brought back answer that as Saint

Erik's day was a Swedish festival, the patriots would enter the town

before that day and attend to the festival themselves. However, the

archbishop's steward, who held command of the town, felt no anxiety; and

out of bravado gave a sumptuous feast one evening on the esplanade. The

festivities were protracted with song and dance till after midnight; and

scarce had the sound of revelry died away, when the patriots, warned of

the midnight orgies, burst upon the town, beat down the guard, and held

possession of the streets before any of the carousers knew they were at

hand. So soon as they did come to their senses they poured a volley

from their arquebuses into the spot where they thought the enemy were

collected. But they were aiming in the dark, and not a finger of the

Swedes was hurt. The archbishop's steward then planned a strategic

movement on the rear, and endeavored to move his troops through a long

wooden passageway running from the palace to the cathedral; but the

Swedes, perceiving it, set fire to the passageway, and at the same time

shot blazing arrows up into the palace roof. The Danes retaliated by

setting fire to the buildings all about the palace; but the patriots in

each case extinguished the fire before it got fully under way. The

palace, however, was soon a mass of flames; and the archbishop's forces,

seeing all was lost, mounted their steeds, burst open the palace-gate,

and galloped in all haste over the fields to the south. The Swedes

pursued, but, finding the enemy's steeds too fleet for them, showered a

volley of arrows after the flying horsemen, and returned.[61]

Early in June Gustavus came from Vesteras, and opened negotiations with

the canons of Upsala, with a view to win them over to his side. As they

refused, however, to take action without consulting the archbishop, he

begged them to consult him at once, and he himself wrote a pacific

letter urging the archbishop to champion his country's cause. Trolle,

then in Stockholm, scorned the message and seized the messenger who

brought it. Then he placed himself at the head of a troop of three

thousand foot and five hundred horse, in glittering armor, and marched

to Upsala, declaring that his answer to the message he would convey in

person. Gustavus, expecting daily the return of his messenger, was taken

wholly unawares. The great body of his soldiers had gone back to their

farms, and he had but six hundred of them left. With these it would be

madness to withstand the archbishop's force. He therefore evacuated the

city, and hurried over the meadows to the west. As soon as he was out of

danger, he despatched officers to call back the farmers to his ranks,

and meantime drew up an ambuscade on the road between Stockholm and

Upsala, thinking to spring upon the archbishop as he returned. The plot

was discovered, and when the troops returned they took another path.

Gustavus, however, did not give up the chase. With his ranks once more

replenished, he pursued the enemy, and a battle followed so hot that

when the archbishop arrived at Stockholm, he entered the town with only

an eighth part of the glittering troop with which he had started

out.[62]

The patriot army now proceeded to the capital, and pitched their camp on

the hill north of the town. There they found four gallows from which

were hanging the bodies of four Swedes, murdered to glut the rapacity of

their Danish masters. One day, while encamped on this spot, the Danes

came out against them, and dividing their forces into two bodies stormed

the Swedish redoubt simultaneously on both sides. The charge was fierce,

and lasted half a day, when the Swedes were driven from their

stronghold with heavy loss, and forced to take up a new position about

twelve miles farther north. There they remained three weeks, battling

daily with the enemy with varying success. At last the commandant of

Stockholm had recourse to strategy. Advancing with a powerful army till

near the vicinity of the Swedish camp, he halted and placed his force in

ambuscade. He then pushed forward with some forty horse and a few weak

infantry to the enemy's earthworks, as if to storm them. After a slight

skirmish, in which some eight or ten of the horse were captured, the

Danish leader shouted that all was lost, and took to flight. The

patriots, all unsuspecting, dashed after them, and followed blindly into

the very midst of the Danish army, into the jaws of death. Thus ended

the first attempt of Gustavus Vasa to capture Stockholm.[63]

Better fared it with him in other parts. One of the most valiant

officers of Gustavus was Arvid Vestgoete. This man was despatched, about

the middle of May, to the provinces south of Stockholm, to enlist the

peasantry in the Swedish cause. Collecting his forces along the way, he

advanced from one town to another, plundering the estates of all who

would not join him, and before the end of June reached Stegeborg, a

strongly fortified castle on the Baltic coast. This he proceeded to

besiege. In July, Norby, the most famous naval officer of Christiern,

came to the rescue of the beleaguered castle with sixteen men-of-war.

Landing his forces on the shore, he drew them up in battle-array, three

hundred strong. The Swedes, however, rushed furiously upon them, and

drove them to the sea. A few days later, after provisioning the castle,

Norby sailed away to Denmark.[64]

[Illustration]

All through this spring and summer Gustavus was busy passing from camp

to camp, giving orders as to the disposition of his forces, and

receiving the allegiance of the people. His practice, as far as

possible, seems to have been to use persuasion, and only when that

failed did he resort to force. This method proved successful in a

marvellous degree. One after another the provinces recognized him as

their leader; and on the 14th of July we find him issuing a proclamation

as commander of five provinces, named in the order of their declaration

of allegiance. His greatest difficulty at this time was in finding the

means with which to pay his men. Possessing no authority to levy taxes,

he was often forced to close the mouths of his clamoring soldiers by

allowing them to plunder. The great body of his army was of course made

up of Swedes. These were fighting for the welfare of their wives and

children, and were content if he provided them only with the necessities

of life. The mercenaries whom he employed were few. One of them, a tough

old warrior named Rensel, has left us a chronicle of his life. He tells

us he came over from Livonia in the winter of 1521, and was among the

four thousand German veterans that counted on entering Stockholm in the

spring. Gustavus sent him back to the Continent for more men and

ammunition; and when he returned in July of that year, he brought back

sixty mercenaries with him. In August Gustavus made an inspection of

the camp at Stegeborg. While there, he learned that the Bishop of

Linkoeping was more than half minded to join the patriot cause. This

bishop, Hans Brask, was a man of rare shrewdness, excellent

common-sense, and as time-serving as any man in Europe. He had strong

convictions, but he always looked to see how the wind was blowing before

he spoke them out. He had, among others, signed the decree for the

demolition of Staeket, but had taken the precaution to place under his

seal a slip of paper declaring that he affixed his signature perforce,

and when his fellows were brought out to be beheaded, he removed the

seal; by this little bit of Romanism he saved his head and the

emoluments of his priestly office. To this man Gustavus wrote in August,

asking for a conference. The aspect of the heavens was not such as to

justify the wily bishop in refusing. The continued brutality of Didrik

Slagheck had raised such a storm of indignation in the country, that his

own followers had found it necessary, on June 16, to hurry him out of

Sweden, and announce that they had thrown him into jail. Nearly all of

Sweden, except the fortified castles, was in the patriots' hands. The

forces of Gustavus were growing stronger day by day, and in the

continued absence of Christiern the fortresses that still held out were

likely soon to yield for want of food and ammunition. In this state of

affairs Hans Brask made up his mind without delay. He granted the

interview with Gustavus, and was very easily persuaded to join the

Swedish cause. It now seemed best that the vague authority conferred

upon Gustavus by the different provinces should be defined, so that he

might as representative of the Swedish nation treat with foreign powers.

He therefore announced that a general diet would be held at Vadstena on

August 24, and all the chief men of different classes in the kingdom

were summoned to attend. By whom the delegates were selected we are not

told. Certainly they were not selected by Gustavus. At all events, they

came together in vast numbers, and, if we are to believe the chronicle,

urged Gustavus to accept the crown. This, however, he refused, but

accepted the title of Commander of the Swedish Army, at the same time

adding that after they had wholly freed themselves from Christiern, a

general diet might then be held to discuss the propriety of choosing

some man of their own nation king.[65]

While the patriots were occupied with their diet, the Danes in Stockholm

sent a force by water to the relief of Vesteras. The patriots, still in

possession of the town, sought by aid of their falconets to prevent a

landing, but without avail. The relief-party made its way into the

castle, replenished it with men and ammunition, and withdrew. Gustavus,

knowing that the Danes on their return to Stockholm must pass through a

narrow inlet some thirty yards in width, sent thither a force to throw

up earthworks on both sides of the passage and await the coming of the

enemy. The battle which ensued was fierce, and lasted two whole days;

but finally, having inflicted as well as suffered heavy loss, the Danish

fleet escaped. Shortly after, in September, Gustavus sent a force to

Finland. This force received large reinforcements from the people in

that province, and on the 24th of November, being furnished ammunition

by the bishop of Abo, laid siege to Abo Castle. On December 18 the

Castle of Stegeborg still besieged by Arvid Vestgoete, fell; and the

commandant, Berent von Mehlen, after two months in prison swore fealty

to Gustavus. Six days after the castle yielded, Norby, not having heard

of the disaster, came sailing boldly into the harbor with food and men.

The patriots soon informed him of his error by firing upon him from the

castle walls, and in the conflict which took place it is reported that

six hundred of his men were lost. Most of Vestgoete's forces, after the

fall of Stegeborg, were transferred to the vicinity of Stockholm, to

which Gustavus early in the autumn had again laid siege. The summer's

experience had made manifest that it would be useless to assault the

capital. Gustavus therefore held his forces several miles away from the

city, and with a view to cut off supplies divided them into three

camps,--one on the north, another on the south, and the third on an

island to the west. On Christmas eve the garrison, finding that no

assault was likely to be made, embarked some fifteen hundred men on

yawls and coasting-vessels, and proceeded against the island-camp. The

Swedish leader watched the preparations from a hill; and when he saw

that the enemy were coming against himself, divided his men into squads

of fourteen and sixteen, and placed these squads at intervals through

the woods with orders to sound their horns as soon as the neighboring

squad had sounded theirs. He then waited till the enemy were all on

shore, when he gave the signal, and in a moment it was re-echoed all

along the line. The effect was marvellous. The enemy, horrified by the

apparent number of the Swedes, turned and fled. The Swedes, who had but

about four hundred and fifty men in all, pursued them to their boats and

cut down two hundred of them on the shore. After this the garrison from

time to time made raids upon the northern and southern camps, and

generally got the better of the Swedes, though nothing of marked

importance was accomplished by either side. On the 30th of January the

Castle of Vesteras, hard pressed for food and cut off from supplies,

surrendered. Later in the winter, seemingly in March, Norby came from

Denmark with a large force to Stockholm, and replenished the garrison

with fresh men. About the same time the Swedish camp on the north was

moved nearer; and the Danes, thus reinforced by Norby, came out against

them April 17, and routed them with heavy loss. The day following, a

like sally was made on the southern camp with like result. Having thus

raised the siege of Stockholm, Norby set sail for Finland, and routed

the Swedish forces still besieging Abo. The bishop of Abo, finding his

own land too hot for him, embarked for Sweden; but his vessel foundered,

and all on board were drowned. In April Gustavus recruited a strong

force in Dalarne and the other northern provinces, and pitched his camps

once more to the north and south of Stockholm.[66]

[Illustration]

The war had now been raging over a year, and Gustavus had experienced

the utmost difficulty in obtaining money with which to pay his men. In

the absence of any authority to levy taxes, he had resorted to the

practice of coining money, and had established mints in several places

through the realm. His coins, which were known as "klippings," consisted

of copper with a very slight admixture of silver, and twenty-four of

them were issued for a mark. As a matter of fact their actual value fell

far below what they purported to be worth. For such a practice it is

difficult to find excuse, except that it was a practice universal at the

time. Why a monarch should be justified any more than an individual in

giving a penny where he owed a pound, is difficult to comprehend. Yet

this had been for centuries the custom, and each successive monarch had

pared a little from the standard, so that in the eight hundred years

preceding Gustavus Vasa the various monetary units all over Europe had

declined to little more than an eighteenth part of their original value.

In Denmark the debasement of the currency had been more rapid than in

almost any other land, and the "klippings" of Christiern II. fell

farther below their nominal value than any coin in Europe--till the

"klippings" were issued by Gustavus, which were a trifle worse than

those of Christiern. Of course, as the standard of currency is lowered,

its buying-power gradually declines, so that ultimately, under whatever

name a particular coin may go, it will buy no more than could be had for

the actual bullion which it contains. A mark in the sixteenth century

would have bought, provided the relative supply of bullion and

merchandise remained the same, only an eighteenth part of what it bought

originally. The aim of monarchs was, therefore, to get rid of their

debased coins at more than the real value, and after they had

depreciated, to get them back at the depreciated value, melt them down,

and lower the standard further. Precisely how much Gustavus made by

tampering with the currency is impossible to say, for there is no means

of determining how many of his "klippings" he threw upon the market. It

is clear, however, that the scheme was from a financial point of view

successful, and that a vast number of the "klippings" were absorbed

before the public detected their inferiority.[67]

Unquestionably the marvellous progress made by Gustavus in this first

year of the revolution was owing in great measure to the critical state

of things in Denmark. Christiern had by this time made enemies all over

Europe. Lubeck, always a latent enemy, was particularly imbittered by

Christiern's favoritism of the market towns of the Netherlands and his

avowed intention of making Copenhagen the staple market for his kingdom;

France hated him because he was the brother-in-law of her enemy, Charles

V.; Fredrik, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, opposed him because he had laid

claim to those dominions; and his own clergy opposed him because of his

rumored leaning towards Lutheranism and his efforts to check their

power. All these things prevented his return to Sweden, and conspired

against his credit so that he was unable to raise an army of any

strength. Didrik Slagheck, too, whom he had placed at the head of

affairs in Sweden, had fallen into disgrace, and, to appease the public

clamor, had been beheaded. Even Gustavus Trolle, after several attempts

to exert his papal authority in Sweden, had found the land too hot for

him, and for the present had withdrawn to Denmark.[68]

Norby was at this time the most valuable officer that Christiern had. He

infested the shores of the Baltic with his fleet, making frequent

incursions on the land to plunder; and at length became so obnoxious

that Gustavus sent to Lubeck for a fleet. On the 7th of June it came,

ten ships of war, laden with all sorts of merchandise, and fully

equipped with powder, shot, and men. For this aid Gustavus is said to

have paid an enormous figure, giving his promissory note for the amount.

Picking out a battalion of five hundred men, he sent them down to

Kalmar, to which castle Vestgoete had just laid siege. The rest of the

reinforcements he despatched to Stockholm, quartering them in his

different camps, and then discharged all of the Swedish peasants except

the young unmarried men. Shortly after this change the commandant of Abo

Castle crossed the Baltic with a powerful fleet, and sought to break the

siege of Stockholm. But the Swedish fleet met him outside the harbor,

captured or burnt his vessels, and took him prisoner. In October, seeing

that the garrison was losing strength, Gustavus advanced his camps

nearer to the town. His southern camp he moved to Soedermalm, from which

he built a pontoon bridge to connect it with the west camp now on an

island some three or four hundred yards from Stockholm. Another bridge

he threw across the channel east of the city, and built upon it a turret

which he armed with heavy guns. The city was thus hemmed in on every

side, and a contemporary writes, "We cannot find in any of the old

chronicles that Stockholm ever was so hard besieged before." Unless

relief came it was merely a question of time when the garrison would

have to yield. Once, in November, Norby came sailing into the harbor

with five ships-of-war; but the Swedish fleet, consisting of fifteen

vessels, drove him off, and, were it not for the half-heartedness of the

German mercenaries, would very likely have destroyed his fleet.[69]

The high spirit of the garrison had fallen. Wasted in numbers, with

hunger and dissension spreading fast among them, and with scarce enough

ammunition to resist an assault upon their walls, they waited

impatiently for the army of Christiern, and marvelled that it did not

come. All servants, old men, monks, burghers, and prostitutes they sent

away, that there might be fewer mouths to feed. Each day, too, their

numbers were diminished through the desertion of able-bodied men who

escaped through the gates or over the walls and made their way by one

means or another to the Swedish camp. There being no longer possibility

of driving off the enemy by force, they felt that their only hope was

fraud. They therefore one day sent a Swedish magnate to the enemy, with

instructions to pretend that he had fled, and after finding out how

matters stood, set fire to the camp and either return to the garrison,

or, that being impossible, make his way to Denmark and induce the

monarch to send immediate relief. This piece of stratagem, however,

proved abortive; for two refugees from the garrison came forward and

denounced the magnate as a spy.[70]

When winter came, Gustavus sent a large part of his army, chiefly the

cavalry, to take up winter-quarters in Upsala. Others were sent to other

towns. Some, too, were sent, in February, 1523, to the Norwegian

frontier to gain the allegiance of the people. Towards the close of

winter Gustavus ordered his German troops to the south of Sweden on a

similar errand, but within six weeks they came back and reported that

the spring freshets had carried away the bridges and they could not

proceed. Norby meantime lay with a strong force in the town and castle

of Kalmar, and was making preparations to attack Vestgoete, who was still

carrying on the siege, as soon as spring should open. But just as he was

getting ready, he received word from the Danish Cabinet that Christiern

had been deposed in Denmark, and Fredrik, duke of Schleswig-Holstein,

summoned to the throne. At this news he set sail with all his force for

Denmark, leaving only sixty men to hold the castle and town of Kalmar.

Their orders were to form two garrisons of thirty each, one to guard the

castle and the other to guard the town; and if through assault or

failure of provisions they could not maintain the stronghold, they were

to slaughter all the Swedes in Kalmar, set fire to the town, and sail to

Gotland. As soon as the burghers of Kalmar learned of these

instructions, they sent a messenger to the Swedish camp to tell the

Swedes to enter the town by the north gate on the 27th of May, when the

burghers would take care that the gate should be opened for them. On the

day appointed Vestgoete advanced with all his cavalry, and drew them up

in battle-array along the west and south side of the town as if to storm

the southern gate. The garrison, all unsuspecting, flocked to that point

in order to receive the charge. But meantime the Swedish infantry had

massed themselves outside the northern gate, which at a concerted signal

was thrown open on its hinges, and the infantry pressed in. It was but

the work of a moment to put the little garrison to the sword. For a few

weeks more the castle refused to yield, and it was not till the 7th of

July that, reduced to the last extremity, it fell.[71]

Kalmar had not yet fallen when it became clear that the war of

independence was drawing to its close, and it was felt on every hand

that the country had been too long without a king. The powers which

Gustavus possessed as regent were too vague to meet the necessities of a

time of peace. While the army was in the field, he had authority, as

commander of the forces, to levy the taxes necessary to sustain his men;

but, so soon as the war was over, there would be no means for raising

the money needed to pay the nation's debts. He therefore, shortly before

the fall of Kalmar, summoned a general diet to be held at Strengnaes on

the 27th of May. Whether or not all the magnates of Sweden were summoned

to the diet is not known, but at any rate the peasantry were

represented. The wily Brask, who had once saved his head by a bit of

strategy, dared not put it in jeopardy again, and fearing that matters

of weight might be brought before the diet, was suddenly taken ill and

rendered unable to attend. The Cabinet, hitherto the sum and substance

of a general diet, was practically dead, having been carried off in the

fearful slaughter of 1520. One of the first things to be done,

therefore, after the opening of the diet, was to fill these vacant

seats. This was accomplished on the 2d of June, but whether the members

were chosen by Gustavus or by vote of the general diet we are not told.

Noteworthy it is, that the persons selected, nine in number, were all

of them laymen and warriors in the service of Gustavus. Four days later,

on the 6th of June, the question of electing a king of Sweden was

brought before the house. The proposal was received with shouts of

acclamation, and with one accord the delegates raised their voices in

favor of Gustavus. But the regent, so the reporter tells us, rose to his

feet, and, mid the deafening shouts of those about him, declared that he

had no wish for further honor, that he was weary of leadership, that he

had found more gall than honey in the post, and that there were others

more worthy than himself on whom to lay the crown. So importunate,

however, were the delegates, that at last he yielded, accepted their

allegiance, and took the royal oath. This done, the diet voted to levy a

tax to defray the expenses of the war. Among the very first Acts to

which the newly chosen monarch attached his seal was one which granted

the cities of Lubeck and Dantzic, with their allies, the perpetual

monopoly of all foreign trade with Sweden. At the same time it was

provided that Stockholm, Kalmar, Soederkoeping, and Abo should be the only

ports of entry for foreign merchants in the realm. This Act was the

result of an application made by Lubeck the year before, and was carried

by the importunities of Lubeck's ambassadors to the diet. It was a sop

to stay the flood of their demands for immediate payment of the debt

incurred to Lubeck by the war. As it granted these Hanse Towns entry for

all goods free of duty, it must be deemed a marked concession. One

favorable clause, however, was incorporated in the Act, providing that

no alien should thereafter be a burgher either of Stockholm or of

Kalmar. Another measure of weight which the diet passed provided that a

tax payable in silver should be levied to defray the expenses of the

war, though apparently nothing was fixed by the diet as to the amount to

be raised or as to the mode of levy. With this meagre record our

information regarding this celebrated diet ends; but the new Cabinet,

before it parted, drew up a long-winded account of the cruelties of

Christiern, which it sent abroad among the people for a lasting memorial

of their tyrant king.[72]

No sooner had the diet closed its doors than the monarch sped with all

the haste he could command to Stockholm. That city had been for several

days in the last stages of despair. The garrison was miserably wasted in

numbers, and its food was gone. Longer to look for aid from Denmark was

to hope against all hope. Indeed, the wretched soldiers now thought only

of the terms on which they should capitulate. During a month or more

they had parleyed with their besiegers, but the terms which they had

offered had thus far been refused. As soon as Gustavus reached the spot,

negotiations were once more opened. The new monarch, fresh from the

honors of Strengnaes, seems to have shown them mercy. Apparently he

granted their requests; for on the 20th of June the castle yielded, and

the garrison, supplied with food and ships, set sail for Denmark. Three

days later, June 23, the monarch entered the capital in triumph, amid

the hosannas of his people. With this glorious issue the Swedish war of

independence closed.[73]

[Illustration]

In contemplating this struggle as a whole, the reader will doubtless be

impressed by the extraordinary ease with which the victory was won. In

less than two years and a half after the first blow was struck, the

Danish tyrants had been driven from every stronghold, and the patriots

had placed their leader on the throne. Indeed, eighteen months had

scarcely passed when the issue was practically decided. The remaining

year consisted mainly in the reduction of Sweden's strongholds, and was

marked by little bloodshed. It furnished small opportunity either for

brilliant strategy or for acts of startling courage. The enforced

absence of the Danish monarch prevented his army from entering the

field, and the patriots had neither arms nor ammunition with which to

storm the forts. Both parties, therefore, waited; and the last year was

little more than a test to determine the endurance of the contending

armies. While, however, this period wants many of the features that make

war grand, it is yet instructive if not interesting in its results. The

struggle at the beginning was against overwhelming odds. The patriots

had neither ammunition nor resources, and their leader was without

prestige. On the other hand the Danes were well supplied with men and

arms, and were led by one of the powerful monarchs of Europe backed by

all the authority and influence of Rome. In spite of all this, the

patriots grew in numbers day by day, while the Danish forces steadily

declined. The patriots succeeded in obtaining rich supplies of men and

arms from abroad, while Christiern was scarce able to keep his army from

starvation. One by one the strongholds which he had seized surrendered,

till finally his entire army was forced to yield, and Sweden, from her

place as a weak and down-trodden Danish province, attained an enviable

position among the great monarchies of Europe. The key to this

marvellous transformation in the two parties can be found only in the

characters of their respective leaders. The people were horrified by the

brutal cruelties of Christiern, while allured by the evident sincerity

and enthusiasm of Gustavus. In all history there is no more striking

example of the far-reaching influence which individual characters

sometimes exert upon a nation's growth.

FOOTNOTES:

[56] Svaning, _Christ. II._, pp. 432-433; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp.

17-18 and 20-21; Ludvigsson, _Collect._, pp. 86-87; and _Sver. trakt._,

vol. iv. pp. 1-5.

[57] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 18-19 and 21-23; _Christ. II.'s

arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1340-1348; and _Dipl. Dal._, vol. i. pp. 237-238.

[58] Rensel, _Beraettelse_, p. 19; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, p. 26;

_Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1338-1339 and 1353-1356; and _Dipl.

Dal._, vol. i. pp. 240-241.

[59] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 25-26; and _Christ. II.'s arkiv_,

vol. iv. pp. 1349-1350 and 1352-1353.

[60] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 24 and 26-30.

[61] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 31-34.

[62] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 35-37; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv.

pp. 7-15.

[63] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 37-39.

[64] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 30 and 42-43.

[65] Rensel, _Beraettelse_, pp. 22-23; _Diar. Vazsten._, p. 217; Svart,

_Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 39-41 and 43-46; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv.

pp. 1356-1369 and 1374-1375; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. i. pp. 240-241, and

Suppl. p. 30; _Nya Kaellor till Finl. Medeltidshist._, pp. 708-709; and

_Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 5-6 and 27-35.

[66] _Diar. Vazsten._, p. 217; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 43 and

46-55; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. i. pp. 197-211 and 214-220; and _Nya

Kaellor till Finl. Medeltidshist._, pp. 712-714.

[67] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 23 and 53; and _Christ. II.'s

arkiv_, vol. i. p. 214. See on this subject a most valuable discussion

by Hans Forssell in his _Anteckningar om mynt, vigt, matt, och varupris

i Sverige_, pp. 19-43, printed at the end of his _Sver. inre hist._,

vol. ii.

[68] Eliesen, _Chron. Skib._, p. 570; Rensel, _Beraettelse_, p. 24;

Svaning, _Christ. II._, pp. 389-392 and 432-437; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_,

vol. i. pp. 159-196 and vol. iv. pp. 1369-1379; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. i.

pp. 242-244; _Nya Kaellor till Finl. Medeltidshist._, pp. 718-726; and

_Skrift. och handl._, vol. iv. pp. 351-357.

[69] Rensel, _Beraettelse_, pp. 24-30; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 51,

55-56 and 61-64; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 15-27.

[70] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 65-66.

[71] Rensel, _Beraettelse_, pp. 30-33; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp.

67-69; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. p. 106.

[72] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 70-73; _Alla riksdag. och moet.

besluth_, vol i. pp. 1-17; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1457-1458

and 1677-1682; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 63-86;

_Svenska riksdagsakt._, vol. i. pp. 8-9; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv.

pp. 55-60.

[73] Rensel, _Beraettelse_, p. 34; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 69-72;

_Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1452-1454, 1463 and 1474-1482; _Kon.

Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. i. pp. 90-95; and _Sver. trakt._,

vol. iv. pp. 61-65.

The Swedish Revolution Under Gustavus Vasa · 第 4 / 9 章