The beginning of the end--Reports in London that submarines were
withdrawing to their bases to head a battle movement on the part of the
German Fleet--How the plan was foiled--The surrender of the German Fleet
to the combined British and American Squadrons--Departure of the
American Squadron--What might have happened had the German vessels come
out to fight
In the early fall of 1913 an American naval officer, who enjoyed to a
peculiar degree the confidence of certain officers of the British
Admiralty, was attending to duties of an extremely confidential nature
in London when one morning he was accosted by a friend, an officer high
in the councils of His Majesty's Navy.
"M----," he said, "I have rather an important bit of news. Within a few
weeks--in fact, we cannot quite tell how soon--there is going to be the
greatest naval engagement the world has ever seen. We are ready for
them, though, and we shall win."
The American was naturally curious, and in reply to his questions the
Briton went on to say that from certain intelligence quarters word had
come that the trend of German U-boats back to their bases--which had
been noted for a week or so--contained a grim meaning. It meant, in
fine, the emergence of the German fleet, headed by the submarines,
prepared for a final battle to establish the question of sea power.
One may imagine the tenseness that reigned at the Admiralty, and the
code messages that flew back and forth between London and the flag-ship
of the British and American battle fleet. As it happened, the German sea
fighters never sallied forth in battle array, their final appearance
being less warlike.
But they would have come, it transpired later, had not the sailors of
the fleet intercepted messages from German officers to their families,
bidding a last good-by. They never expected to return from this last
fight. But the seamen were of a different mind from their officers. They
declined to go forth to a losing battle, and they struck. This, then,
appears to be the reason why the German battleships and armored cruisers
and the like did not come forth to battle--at least this is one of the
stories told in navy circles.
With the events that followed the cessation of hostilities on November
11 almost every American is familiar. The armistice of that date
demanded that Germany give her entire fleet to the keeping of England.
For a discussion of the surrender the German light cruiser _Koenigsberg_
brought representatives from the Soldiers' and Sailors' Council, which
was then in nominal control of the German fleet, into the Firth of
Forth. Admiral Beatty refused to deal with these representatives, and
insisted that all arrangements be made through some flag-officer of the
imperial fleet.
Thereupon Admiral von Reuter, the commanding German officer, went aboard
the _Queen Elizabeth_, and there arranged with Admiral Beatty and his
flag-officers for the surrender. At dinner the German officers dined at
one table, the British at another. After more discussion the
_Koenigsberg_ departed for Kiel about ten that night. The
commander-in-chief then issued an order to all his ships, prescribing
the entire details of the surrender. The American battle squadron got
under way about 4 A.M. November 21, 1918, and steamed from the Forth
bridge out of the Firth into the North Sea.
The entire Grand Fleet was here concentrated, formed in two long
parallel lines steaming due east six miles apart, our American squadron
being the second one in the northern line. By that time the Sixth Battle
Squadron was composed of the _New York_, _Texas_, _Wyoming_, _Arkansas_,
and _Florida_, the _Delaware_ having returned home. Our ships were led
by the _New York_. About 9 A.M. the men crowding the decks sighted some
smoke coming dead ahead out of the mist, and in a short time the German
battle-cruisers were plainly seen leading the other German ships in
their last trip at sea under their own flag. They were not flying
battle-flags. At this time every one of the Anglo-American ships was at
her battle station, turrets were fully manned, and all preparations made
for treachery at the last minute.
The German line, led by the _Seydlitz_, steamed slowly between the
Allied lines, keeping perfect station, and when their flag-ship came
abreast of the _Queen Elizabeth_ the signal was given for the whole
Grand Fleet to make a turn of 180 degrees, and return into port with the
humiliated enemy. The appearance of the enemy ships was very good. There
is no doubt they were magnificent fighting ships, and that in action
they would have acquitted themselves gallantly.
Lieutenant W. A. Kirk, U.S.N., who witnessed the surrender from a point
of vantage on the bridge of the battleship _New York_, standing just
behind Admiral Rodman and Admiral Sims, said that it was exceedingly
difficult at the time to grasp the significance of their surrender and
feel duly impressed, as there was a lack of show or emotion of any kind.
"The whole affair," he added, "was run exactly according to prearranged
schedule, and was only another proof of the quiet, businesslike,
efficient way the Royal Navy does things."
Continuing, he said:
"We proceeded into port in this formation, our lines gradually
converging as we approached the entrance of the Firth of Forth. After
reaching a point a short distance in the Firth the German ships dropped
anchor, and Admiral Beatty on his flag-ship stood by to inspect them. As
we passed within 500 yards of the enemy ships on our way to anchorage,
we gave the British Admiral three rousing cheers. He returned them by
waving his hat to Admiral Rodman. About three that afternoon Admiral
Beatty sent his famous message, 'The German flag will be hauled down at
sunset to-day, and will not be flown again until further orders.' The
German ships a few days later, and after more inspection, were convoyed
to their port of internment, Scapa Flow."
The American battleships remained with the Grand Fleet for about two
weeks after the surrender, and then departed, amid many felicitations
and interchange of compliments, to Portland, where they joined the
vessels assembled to escort President Wilson into Brest. This done, the
American sea-fighters lay for a day in Brest, and then, spreading
600-foot homeward-bound pennants to the breezes, the armada headed for
the United States, where at the port of New York the men of the fleet
paraded down Fifth Avenue, to the appreciative acclaim of tens upon tens
of thousands of enthusiastic patriots who lined Fifth Avenue.
Had the German fleet come out for battle a large percentage of it would
unquestionably have been destroyed, and yet it is the theory of naval
officers that some units, perhaps the swift cruisers, would in the very
nature of the fighting (sea battles are fought upon the lines of two
great arcs) have succeeded in shaking themselves loose, to the
consequent detriment of our freight and transport traffic. Cruisers
speeding free upon the face of the broad ocean are difficult to corner,
and a great amount of damage might have been inflicted on the Allies
before all were finally hunted down.
As it was, the enemy fleet remained at its base, and in the end came
forth peacefully, as has been described. Had the war gone on, had the
German craft not appeared for battle, a plan to smother their base
through the medium of clouds of bombing airplanes would unquestionably
have been put into effect at a good and proper time. And at the same
juncture, no doubt, our Sixth Squadron would have joined with the Grand
Fleet in an attack upon Heligoland, plans for which are still in
existence.
In the waning months of the war it had become increasingly clear that
the submarine as a weapon to decide the war was ineffective. Not only
were the Allied destroyers and chasers, armed with their depth-bombs,
waging a successful fight against the undersea boats, but other methods
were beginning to have their effect. Chief among these were our
mine-laying exploits, by which, in October of 1918, was established a
mine-barrage across the North Sea, which proved a tremendous handicap to
the German U-boats.
Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U.S.N., commanding Mine Squadron I of the
Atlantic Fleet, which operated in European waters, has compiled an
interesting account of the important part played by the United States
mine-laying squadron in planting mines in the North Sea. From the time
the United States joined in the war, he says, our Navy Department urged
strong measures, essentially offensive, to hem in the enemy bases, so
that fewer submarines might get out, or, if already out, get back. A new
American invention came to the notice of the Bureau of Ordnance, where
its possibilities were quickly perceived. A few quiet but searching
experiments developed it into a mine of more promising effectiveness
than any ever used before, especially against submarines. This gave the
United States Navy the definite means to offer an anti-submarine
barrage, on the German coast or elsewhere, and the result was the
northern mine-barrage in the North Sea, stretching from the Orkneys 280
miles to Norway, which the Secretary of the Navy's annual report
characterizes as "the outstanding anti-submarine offensive product of of
the year."
Manufacture of the mines in this country--they were of the non-sweepable
variety--had been going on since December, 1917. The many parts were
constructed by the thousands by numerous different contractors, who
delivered them at Norfolk, where the mine spheres were charged with 300
pounds of TNT, and loaded into steamers, managed by the Naval Overseas
Transport Service. It required twenty-four steamers, running constantly,
to keep the ten mine-planters supplied with mines. Only one fell a
victim to a submarine.
Our mine squadron arrived at Inverness May 26, 1918, and twelve days
later started on its first mine-planting "excursion." On this excursion,
June 7, the squadron planted a mine field 47 miles long, containing
3,400 mines, in three hours and thirty-six minutes. One ship emptied
herself of 675 mines without a single break, 1 mine every eleven and
one-half seconds through more than two hours, the longest series ever
planted anywhere.
On the seventh excursion, August 26, the commander of the mine force,
Rear-Admiral Strauss, U.S.N., went out, and on the next, by the American
and British squadrons together, he was in command of them both, on the
_San Francisco_. The mine field on this occasion closed the western end
of the barrier off the Orkneys, making it complete across. Of the ninth
excursion Rear-Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N., was in command. Altogether
the American squadron made fifteen excursions, the British squadron
eleven, and when the barrage was finished, at the end of October, 70,100
mines in all had been planted in it, of which 56,570 were American. The
barrier stretched from off the northern Orkney Islands, 230 miles, to
the coast of Norway, near Bergen. Its width averaged 25 miles, nowhere
less than 15 miles--more than an hour's run for a submarine.
The barrage began to yield results early in July, and from time to time
reports would come of submarines damaged or disappearing. It may never
be known definitely how many actually did come to grief there, but the
best information gives a probable ten before the middle of October, with
a final total of seventeen or more. In addition the squadron should be
credited with two submarines lost in the field of British mines laid by
the U.S.S. _Baltimore_, off the Irish coast.
In summing up the work of the navy throughout the war one month after
the armistice had been signed, Secretary Daniels paid the highest
tribute to the widely recognized efficiency of Vice-Admiral Sims; he had
also superlative praise for Rear-Admiral Rodman, who commanded our
battleships attached to the Grand Fleet; for Vice-Admiral Wilson,
commanding our forces in French waters; for Rear-Admiral Niblack, our
Mediterranean commander, Rear-Admiral Dunn in the Azores, and
Rear-Admiral Strauss in charge of mining operations.
When the fighting ended our force in European waters comprised 338
vessels, with 75,000 men and officers, a force larger than the entire
navy before the war. The navy, in its operations, covered the widest
scope in its history; naval men served on nearly 2,000 craft that plied
the waters, on submarines, and in aviation, while on land, marines and
sailors helped to hold strategic points. The regiments of marines shared
with the magnificent army their part of the hard-won victory;
wonderfully trained gun-crews of sailors manned the monster 14-inch
guns--which marked a new departure in land warfare--while naval officers
and men in all parts of the world did their full part in the operations
which mark the heroic year of accomplishment.
While the destroyers led in the anti-submarine warfare, the 406
submarine chasers, of which 335 were despatched abroad, should have
credit for efficient aid, also the American submarines sent to foreign
waters.
The transportation of 2,000,000 American troops 3,000 miles overseas,
with the loss of only a few hundred lives, and without the loss of a
single American troopship on the way to France, was an unparalleled
achievement. From a small beginning this fleet expanded to 24 cruisers
and 42 transports, manned by 3,000 officers and 41,000 men, these being
augmented by 4 French men-of-war and 13 foreign merchant vessels, a
grand total of 83 ships. In spite of the constant menace of submarines,
only 3 of these troopships were lost--the _Antilles_, _Lincoln_, and
_Covington_. All were sunk on the homeward voyage.
Four naval vessels were lost as a result of submarine activity--the
destroyer _Jacob Jones_, the converted yacht _Alcedo_, the coast-guard
cutter _Tampa_, sunk with all on board, and the cruiser _San Diego_,
sunk in home waters by striking an enemy mine. The loss of the collier
_Cyclops_, bound for South America, whose disappearance is one of the
unsolved mysteries of the seas, will probably never be explained.
The notable achievements in naval ordnance, especially the work of the
14-inch naval guns on railway mounts on the western front, which hurled
shells far behind the German lines, have received adequate recognition
from Allied authorities. These mounts were designed and completed in
four months. The land battery of these naval guns was manned exclusively
by bluejackets, under command of Rear-Admiral C. P. Plunkett, and work
of the Bureau of Ordnance was conducted by Admiral Early, the chief of
the bureau, one of our "ablest and fittest" officers.