Russian Revolution" he received an ovation such as few men have ever been
accorded. The great Socialist theorist plunged into a keen and forceful
attack upon the theories of the Bolsheviki. He was frequently interrupted
by angry cries and by impatient questionings, which he answered with
rapier-like sentences. He was asked what a "democratic" government should
be, and replied:
"I am asked, 'What should a democratic government be? My answer is: It
should be a government enjoying the people's full confidence and
sufficiently strong to prevent any possibility of anarchy. Under what
condition, then, can such a strong, democratic government be established?
In my opinion it is necessary, for this purpose, _that the government be
composed of representatives of all those parts of the population that are
not interested in the restoration of the old order. What is called a
coalition Ministry is necessary_. Our comrades, the Socialists,
acknowledging the necessity of entering the government, can and should set
forth definite conditions, definite demands. _But there should be no
demands that would be unacceptable to the representatives of other classes,
to the spokesmen of other parts of the population_."
"Would you have us Russian proletarians fight in this war for England's
colonial interests?" was one of the questions hurled at Plechanov, and
greeted by the jubilant applause of the Bolsheviki. Plechanov replied with
great spirit, his reply evoking a storm of cheers: "The answer is clear to
every one who accepts the principle of self-determination of nations," he
said. "The colonies are not deserts, but populated localities, and their
populations should also be given the right to determine freely their own
destinies. It is clear that Russia cannot fight for the sake of any one's
predatory aspirations. _But I am surprised that the question of annexations
is raised in Russia, whose sixteen provinces are under the Prussian heel!_
I do not understand this exclusive solicitude for Germany's interests."
To those who advocated fraternization, who were engaged in spreading the
idea that the German working class would refuse to fight against the
Russian revolutionists, the great Socialist teacher, possessing one of the
ripest minds in the whole international Socialist movement, and an intimate
knowledge of the history of that movement, made vigorous reply and recited
a significant page of Socialist history:
"In the fall of 1906, when Wilhelm was planning to move his troops on the
then revolutionary Russia, I asked my comrades, the German Social
Democrats, 'What will you do in case Wilhelm declares war on Russia?' At
the party convention in Mannheim, Bebel gave me an answer to this question.
Bebel introduced a resolution in favor of the declaration of a general
strike in the event of war being declared on Russia. But this resolution
was not adopted; _members of the trade-unions voted against it_. This is a
fact which you should not forget. Bebel had to beat a retreat and introduce
another resolution. Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg were dissatisfied with
Bebel's conduct. I asked Kautsky whether there is a way to bring about a
general strike against the workers' will. As there is no such way, there
was nothing else that Bebel could do. _And if Wilhelm had sent his hordes
to Russia in 1906, the German workers would not have done an earthly thing
to prevent the butchery_. In September, 1914, the situation was still
worse."
The opposition to Plechanov on the part of some of the delegates was an
evidence of the extent to which disaffection, defeatism, and the readiness
to make peace at any price almost--a general peace preferably, but, if not,
then a separate peace--had permeated even the most intelligent part of the
Russian army. Bolshevism and its ally, defeatism, were far more influential
in the ranks of the soldiers than in those of the workers in the factories.
Yet the majority was with Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Plechanov, as the
following resolutions adopted by the convention prove:
The first convention of the Delegates from the Front, having heard
reports on current problems from the representatives of the
Provisional Government, members of the Executive Committee of the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and from
representatives of the Socialist parties, and having considered
the situation, hereby resolves:
(1) That the disorganization of the food-supply system and the
weakening of the army's fighting capacity, due to a distrust of a
majority of the military authorities, to lack of inner
organization, and to other temporary causes, have reached such a
degree that the freedom won by the Revolution is seriously
endangered.
(2) That the sole salvation lies in establishing a government
enjoying the full confidence of the toiling masses, in the
awakening of a creative revolutionary enthusiasm, and in concerted
self-sacrificing work on the part of all the elements of the
population.
The convention extends to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter's
self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new
order in Russia, in the interests of the Russian Democracy and at
the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the
above Council transformed into an All-Russian Council of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Delegates.
_The convention is of the opinion that the war is at present
conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of
the masses_, and it, therefore, urges the Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates to take the most energetic and effective
measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of
free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all
belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. Not a drop
of Russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us.
Considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose
is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would
defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the
organized Revolutionary Democracy, that is, by the Council of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, responsible for its acts to the
whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of
the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to take part in
the new Provisional Government.
The convention demands that the representatives of the Church give
up for the country's benefit the treasures and funds now in the
possession of churches and monasteries. The convention makes an
urgent appeal to all parts of the population.
1. To the comrade-soldiers in the rear: Comrades! Come to fill up
our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder
with us for the country's defense!
2. Comrade-workers! Work energetically and unite your efforts, and
in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for
nations! By strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom!
3. Fellow-citizens of the capitalist class! Follow the historic
example of Minin! Even as he, open your treasuries and quickly
bring your money to the aid of Russia!
4. To the peasants: Fathers and Brothers! Bring your last mite to
help the weakening front! Give us bread, and oats and hay to our
horses. Remember that the future Russia will be yours!
5. Comrades-Intellectuals! Come to us and bring the light of
knowledge into our dark trenches! Share with us the difficult work
of advancing Russia's freedom and prepare us for the citizenship
of new Russia!
6. To the Russian women: Support your husbands and sons in the
performing of their civil duty to the country! Replace them where
this is not beyond your strength! Let your scorn drive away all
those who are slackers in these difficult times!
No one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty and
sincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression.
The fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, their
spokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. Pardonably weary of a war in
which they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any other
army in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments which
had made covenants with the hated Romanov dynasty, they were still far from
being ready to follow the leadership of Bolsheviki. They had, instead,
adopted the sanely constructive policy of Tchcheidze, Tseretelli, Skobelev,
Plechanov, and other Socialists who from the first had seen the great
struggle in its true perspective. That they did not succeed in averting
disaster is due in part to the fact that the Revolution itself had come too
late to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of the
governments allied with Russia to render intelligent aid.
VII
The Provisional Government was reorganized. Before we consider the actions
of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, one of the most
important gatherings of representatives of Russian workers ever held, the
reorganization of the Provisional Government merits attention. On the 17th,
at a special sitting of the Duma, Guchkov and Miliukov explained why they
had resigned. Guchkov made it a matter of conscience. Anarchy had entered
into the administration of the army and navy, he said: "In the way of
reforms the new government has gone very far. Not even in the most
democratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, and
equality been so extensively applied in military life. We have gone
somewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives us
farther still.... I could not consent to this dangerous work; I could not
sign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapid
deterioration of our military forces. A country, and especially an army,
cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences."
Miliukov told his colleagues of the Duma that he had not resigned of his
own free will, but under pressure: "I had to resign, yielding not to force,
but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. With a clear
conscience I can say that I did not leave on my own account, but was
compelled to leave." Nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he had
pursued was the correct one. "You could see for yourselves that my activity
in foreign politics was in accord with your ideas," he declared amid
applause which eloquently testified to the approval with which the
bourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariat
condemned. He pointed out that the pacifist policies of Zimmerwald and
Keinthal had permeated a large part of the Socialist movement, and that the
Soviet, the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, claiming to
exercise control over the Provisional Government, were divided. He feared
that the proposal to establish a Coalition Government would not lead to
success, because of "discord in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Delegates itself." Not all the members of the latter body were agreed upon
entering into a Coalition Government, and "it is evident that those who do
not enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered,
and it is possible that the Socialists who enter the Cabinet will find
themselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the government
did before." Still, because it meant the creation of a stronger government
at once, which was the most vital need, he, like Guchkov, favored a
coalition which would ally the Constitutional Democratic party with the
majority of the Socialists.
The Soviet had decided at its meeting on May 14th to participate in a
Coalition Ministry. The struggle upon that question between Bolsheviki and
Mensheviki was long and bitter. The vote, which was forty-one in favor of
participation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the full
strength of Bolshevism in its stronghold. After various conferences between
Premier Lvov and the other Ministers, on the one side, and representatives
of the Soviet, on the other side, a new Provisional Government was
announced, with Prince Lvov again Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet there
were seven Constitutional Democrats, six Socialists, and two Octobrists. As
Minister of War and head of the army and navy Alexander Kerensky took the
place of Guchkov, while P.N. Pereverzev, a clever member of the
Socialist-Revolutionary party, succeeded Kerensky as Minister of Justice.
In Miliukov's position at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
placed M.I. Terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of the
Constitutional-Democratic party, who had held the post of Minister of
Finance, which was now given to A.I. Shingariev, a brilliant member of the
same party, who had proved his worth and capacity as Minister of
Agriculture. To the latter post was appointed V.M. Chernov, the leader of
the Socialist-Revolutionists, one of the most capable Socialists in Russia,
or, for that matter, the world. Other Socialists of distinction in the new
Provisional Government were I.G. Tseretelli, as Minister of Posts and
Telegraphs, and M.I. Skobelev, as Minister of Labor. As Minister of Supply
an independent Socialist, A.V. Peshekhonov, was chosen.
It was a remarkable Cabinet. So far as the Socialists were concerned, it
would have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. As
in the formation of the First Provisional Government, attempts had been
made to induce Tchcheidze to accept a position in the Cabinet, but without
success. He could not be induced to enter a Coalition Ministry, though he
strongly and even enthusiastically supported in the Soviet the motion to
participate in such a Ministry. Apart from the regret caused by
Tchcheidze's decision, it was felt on every hand that the Socialists had
sent into the Second Provisional Government their strongest and most
capable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen and
who would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. On
the side of the Constitutional Democrats and the Octobrists, too, there
were men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberal
minds. The selection of Terestchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs was by
many Socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, the
Coalition Ministry met with warm approbation. If any coalition of the sort
could succeed, the Cabinet headed by Prince Lvov might be expected to do
so.
On the 18th, the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates
adopted a resolution, introduced by Tchcheidze, president of the Council,
warmly approving the entrance of the Socialist Ministers into the Cabinet
and accepting the declaration of the new Provisional Government as
satisfactory. This resolution was bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviki, who
were led in the fight by Trotzky. This was Trotzky's first speech in
Petrograd since his arrival the previous day from America. His speech was a
demagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements.
Participation in the Coalition Ministry by the Socialists was a dangerous
policy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of class
struggle. Elaborating his views further, he said: "I never believed that
the emancipation of the working class will come from above. Division of
power will not cease with the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministry.
A strong revolutionary power is necessary. The Russian Revolution will not
perish. But I believe only in a miracle from below. There are three
commandments for the proletariat. They are: First, transmission of power to
the revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; and
third, confidence in their own revolutionary powers."
This was the beginning of Trotzky's warfare upon the Coalition Government,
a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might.
Tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the Bolshevik leader's
criticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of the
Executive Committee presented by Tchcheidze was carried by a large
majority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. The resolution read as
follows:
Acknowledging that the declaration of the Provisional Government,
which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of
representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, conforms to the
idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements of the
Revolution and its further development, the Council of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Delegates has determined:
I. Representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Delegates must enter into the Provisional Government.
II. Those representatives of the Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates who join the government must, until the
creation of an All-Russian organ of the Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates, consider themselves responsible to the
Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and must
pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that
Council.
III. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates expresses
its full confidence in the new Provisional Government, and urges
all friends of democracy to give this government active
assistance, which will insure it the full measure of power
necessary for the safety of the Revolution's gains and for its
further development.
If there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning the
state of working-class opinion in Russia at that time, two months after the
overthrow of the old régime, it is that the overwhelming majority of the
working-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of the
Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists--the policy of co-operating
with liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stable
government--as against the policy of the Bolsheviki. The two votes of the
Petrograd Soviet told where the city workers stood. That very section of
the proletariat upon which the Bolsheviki leaders based their hopes had
repudiated them in the most emphatic manner. The Delegates of the Soldiers
at the Front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leaders
of the Bolsheviki. And at the first opportunity which presented itself the
peasants placed themselves in definite opposition to Bolshevism.
On the afternoon preceding the action of the Soviet in giving its
indorsement to the new Provisional Government and instructing its
representatives to enter the Coalition Cabinet, there assembled in the
People's House, Petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to the
first All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Never before had so many peasant
delegates been gathered together in Russia to consider their special
problems. There were present delegates from every part of Russia, even from
the extreme border provinces, and many from the front. On the platform were
the members of the Organizing Committee, the Executive Committee of the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the Socialist-Revolutionary
party, the Social Democratic party, and a number of prominent Socialist
leaders. As might be expected in a peasants' Congress, members of the
Socialist-Revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering 537. The next
largest group was the Social Democratic party, including Bolsheviki and
Mensheviki, numbering 103. There were 136 delegates described as
non-partizan; 4 belonged to the group called the "People's Socialists" and
6 to the Labor Group. It was the most representative body of peasant
workers ever brought together.
Among the first speakers to address the Congress was the venerable
"Grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Catherine Breshkovskaya, who spoke
with the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "Tell me," she demanded,
"is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and in
allowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to die
from fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? If our army had a
real desire to help the Allies, the war would be finished in one or two
months, _but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded_." V.M.
Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the new Minister of
Agriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skill
and courage the arguments of the Bolsheviki, making a superb defense of the
policy of participation in the government.
Kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as Minister of
War and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, for
self-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new Provisional
Government. He did not mince matters: "I intend to establish an iron
discipline in the army. I am certain that I shall succeed in my
undertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward the
country, the duty of honor.... By all means, we must see that the country
becomes free and strong enough to elect the Constituent Assembly, the
Assembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to the
toiling Russian peasants that for which they have been yearning for
centuries, the land.... We are afraid of no demagogues, whether they come
from the right or from the left. We shall attend to our business, quietly
and firmly." Kerensky begged the peasants to assert their will that there
should be "no repetition of the sad events of 1905-06, when the entire
country seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it became
involved in anarchy." The speech created a profound impression and it was
voted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of the
Congress, and have them distributed throughout the army.
A similar honor was accorded the speech of I.I. Bunakov, one of the best
known and most popular of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party.
With remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the Bolsheviki and the
Porazhentsi. Taking the cry that there must be "no annexations," for
example, he declared that the peasants of Russia could only accept that in
the sense that Poland be reunited and her independence be restored; that
the people of Alsace and Lorraine be permitted to be reunited to France;
that Armenia be taken from Turkey and made independent. The peasants could
not accept the _status quo ante_ as a basis for peace. He assailed the
treacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "But such
peace is unacceptable to us peasants. A separate peace would kill not only
our Revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. A
separate peace is dishonor for Russia and treason toward the Allies.... We
must start an offensive. To remain in the trenches without moving is a
separate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. A separate truce
demoralizes the army and ruins the people. This spring, according to our
agreement with the Allies, we should have begun a general offensive, but
instead of that we have concluded a separate truce. _The Allies saved the
Russian Revolution, but they are becoming exhausted_.... When our Minister
of War, Kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the Russian army must
support him with all its strength, with all the means available.... From
here we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage an
offensive. Let the army know that it must fight and die for Russia's
freedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming Socialist
commonwealth."
In the resolutions which were adopted the Congress confined itself to
outlining a program for the Constituent Assembly, urging the abolition of
private property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineral
resources. It urged the Provisional Government to "issue an absolutely
clear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question the
Provisional Government will allow nobody to oppose the people's will." It
also issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earning
population of Russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for the
Constituent Assembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves to
advocate the nationalization of the land without reimbursement on
principles of equality." In the election for an Executive Committee to
carry on the work of the Congress and maintain the organization the
delegates with Bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under." Those who were
elected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of the
policy of participation in and responsibility for the Provisional
Government, and known to be ardent believers in the Constituent Assembly.
Chernov, with 810 votes, led the poll; Breshkovskaya came next with 809;
Kerensky came third with 804; Avksentiev had 799; Bunakov 790; Vera Finger
776, and so on. Nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerable
Nicholas Tchaykovsky, well known in America. Once more a great
representative body of Russian working-people had spoken and rejected the
teachings and the advice of the Bolsheviki.
VIII
As we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelming
majority of the organized workers that the Socialists entered the Coalition
Ministry. It was with that mandate that Kerensky undertook the Herculean
task of restoring the discipline and morale of the Russian army. In that
work he was the agent and representative of the organized working class.
For this reason, if for no other, Kerensky and his associates were entitled
to expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty to
the working class. Instead of giving that support, however, the Bolsheviki
devoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the Provisional
Government to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, had
been approved by the great mass of the organized workers. They availed
themselves of every means in their power to hamper Kerensky in his work and
to hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation to
sustain the military forces.
Kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensive
against the Austro-German forces. That such offensive was needed was
obvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and the
Bolsheviki. The Congress of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front and the
Petrograd Soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, as
had most of the well-known peasants' leaders. It was a working-class
policy. But that fact did not prevent the Bolsheviki from throwing
obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. They carried on an active
propaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination,
fraternization, and refusal to fight. They encouraged sabotage as a means
of insuring the failure of the efforts of the Provisional Government. So
thoroughly did they play into the hands of the German military authorities,
whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay of
Germany was made against them--not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians and
journalists, but by the most responsible Socialists in Russia.
The epic story of Kerensky's magnificently heroic fight to recreate the
Russian army is too well known to need retelling here. Though it was vain
and ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever be
remembered with gratitude and admiration by all friends of freedom. The
audacity and the courage with which Kerensky and a few loyal associates
strove to maintain Russia in the struggle made the Allied nations, and all
the civilized world, their debtors. Many mistakes were made, it is true,
yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more or
succeeded where they failed. It must be confessed, furthermore, that the
governments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievous
mistakes on their part.
Perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge to
Kerensky's account was the signing of the famous Declaration of Soldiers'
Rights. This document, which was signed on May 27th, can only be regarded
in the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. In his address to the
All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, on May 18th, speaking for the
first time in his capacity as Minister of War, Kerensky had declared, "I
intend to establish an iron discipline in the army," yet the Declaration of
Soldiers' Rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make any
real discipline impossible. Was it because he was inconsistent,
vacillating, and weak that Kerensky attached his name to such a document?
Such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. The fact is that
Kerensky's responsibility was very small indeed. He and his Socialist
associates in the Cabinet held their positions by authority of the Council
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and they had agreed to be subject to
its guidance and instruction. The Soviet was responsible for the
Declaration of Soldiers' Rights. Kerensky was acting under its orders. The
Soviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famous
Order Number One, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders of
their officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionary
authorities--that is, by the Soviet or its accredited agents. That the
order was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that it
was justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered among
the officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the fact
remains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. The fact that
Kerensky's predecessor, Guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers'
delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was at
a low ebb. It brought the army into the arena of politics and made
questions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering.
The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights was a further step along a road which
inevitably led to disaster. That remarkable document provided that soldiers
and officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights;
that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that their
correspondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be free
to receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which they
desired. It provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute to
officers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform when
not actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty"
hours. Finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in the
hands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were to
have four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth.
Of course, the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights represented a violent
reaction. Under the old régime the army was a monstrously cruel machine;
the soldiers were slaves. At the first opportunity they had revolted and,
as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. On May 28th the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued a declaration in which
it was said: "From now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery of
saluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses....
Discipline in the Revolutionary Army will exist, prompted by popular
enthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by a
slavish salute." If we are tempted to laugh at this naïve idealism, we
Americans will do well to remember that it was an American
statesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a million
men overnight, and that a shrewd American capitalist-idealist sent forth a
"peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end the
greatest war in history.
IX
Throughout the first half of June, while arrangements for a big military
offensive were being made, and were causing Kerensky and the other
Socialist Ministers to strain every nerve, Lenine, Trotzky, Kamenev,
Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Bolsheviki were as strenuously engaged
in denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. Whatever gift
or genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction and
obstruction. The student will search in vain among the multitude of records
of meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a single
instance of participation in any constructive act, one positive service to
the soldiers at the front or the workers' families in need, by any
Bolshevik leader. But they never missed an opportunity to embarrass those
who were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that was
already too heavy.
Lenine denounced the offensive against Germany as "an act of treason
against the Socialist International" and poured out the vials of his wrath
against Kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions of
the Soviet and other working-class organizations. Thus we had the
astonishing and tragic spectacle of one Socialist leader working with
titanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized by
the old régime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatest
militarist system in the world, while another Socialist leader worked with
might and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation of
the demoralized army. And all the while the German General Staff gloated at
every success of the Bolsheviki. There was a regular system of
communications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the German
General Staff. In proof of this statement only one illustration need be
offered, though many such could be cited: At the All-Russian Congress of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on June 22d, Kerensky read, in the
presence of Lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of the
German eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration of
certain delegates of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
At this session Lenine bitterly assailed the proposed offensive. He said
that it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revamping
all the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. He
minimized the loss which Russia had suffered at Germany's hands, and the
gains Germany had made in Belgium and northern France, pointing out that
she had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which England would be very
unlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. Taunted
with being in favor of a separate peace with Germany, Lenine indignantly
denied the accusation. "It is a lie," he cried. "Down with a separate
peace! _We Russian revolutionists will never consent to it._" He argued
that there could be only one policy for Socialists in any country--namely,
to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-class rule in that
country. No war entered into by a capitalist ruling class, regardless what
its motives, should be supported by Socialists. He argued that the adoption
of his policy by the Russian working class would stand ten times the chance
of succeeding that the military policy would have. The German working class
would compel their government and the General Staff to follow the example
of Russia and make peace.
Kerensky was called upon to reply to Lenine. At the time when the
restoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, it
was necessary for Kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminable
debates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the Bolshevik
offensive always being waged in the rear. That, of course, was part of the
Bolshevist plan of campaign. So Kerensky, wearied by his tremendous efforts
to perform the task assigned him by the workers, answered Lenine. His reply
was a forensic masterpiece. He took the message of the commander-in-chief
of the German eastern front and hurled it at Lenine's head, figuratively
speaking, showing how Lenine's reasoning was paralleled in the German
propaganda. With merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how the
Bolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination of
nationalities," as the basis of a propaganda to bring about the
dismemberment of Russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small,
helpless states. To Lenine's statements about the readiness of the German
working class to rebel, Kerensky made retort that Lenine should have
remained in Germany while on his way to Russia and preached his ideas
there.
A few days earlier, at a session of the same Congress, Trotzky and Kamenev
had made vigorous assault upon the Coalition Government and upon the
Socialist policy with reference thereto. In view of what subsequently
transpired, it is important to note that Trotzky made much of the delay in
calling together the Constituent Assembly: "The policy of continual
postponement _and the detailed preparations_ for calling the Constituent
Assembly is a false policy. It may destroy even the very realization of the
Constituent Assembly." This profession of concern for the Constituent
Assembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere. He did not in the
least care about or believe in the Constituent Assembly, and had not done
so at any time since the First Revolution of 1905-06. His whole thought
rejected such a democratic instrument. However, he and his associates knew
that the demand for a Constituent Assembly was almost universal, and that
to resist that demand was impossible. Their very obvious policy in the
circumstances was to try and force the holding of the Assembly prematurely,
without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for a
nation-wide electoral campaign. A hastily gathered, badly organized
Constituent Assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easily
stampeded or controlled by a determined minority.
Trotzky assailed the Coalition Government with vitriolic passion. At the
moment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the only
possible condition for the survival of the Revolution, and that any
division in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it might
be based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his Bolshevik
colleagues deliberately stirred up dissension. Even if their opposition to
political union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of a
sound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was either
treachery or madness. When a house is already on fire the only thing in
order, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is to
work to extinguish the fire. It is obviously not the time to debate whether
the house was properly built or whether mistakes were made. Russia was a
house on fire; the Bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating.
Kamenev followed Trotzky's lead in attacking the Coalition Government. In a
subtle speech he supported the idea of splitting Russia up into a large
number of petty states, insisting that the formula, "self-determination of
peoples," applied to the separatist movement in the Ukraine. He insisted
that for the Russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whether
the Central Empires or the Entente nations won in the war. He argued that
the only hope for the Russian Revolution must be the support of the
revolutionary proletariat in the other European countries, particularly
those adjacent to Russia: "If the revolutionary proletariat of Europe fails
to support the Russian Revolution the latter will be ruined. As that
support is the only guaranty of the safety of the Revolution, we cannot
change our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing will
stimulate the awakening of the proletariat of Europe." In other words,
Kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life and
his all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel.
It was in this manner that the Bolshevist leaders conspired to Russia's
destruction. They were absorbing the time and energies of the men who were
really trying to do something, compelling them to engage in numerous
futile debates, to the neglect of their vitally important work, debates,
moreover, which could have no other effect than to weaken the nation.
Further, they were actively obstructing the work of the government. Thus
Tseretelli, Kerensky, Skobelev, and many others whose efforts might have
saved the Revolution, were thwarted by men wholly without a sense of
responsibility. Lenine was shrieking for the arrest of capitalists because
they were capitalists, when it was obvious that the services of those same
capitalists were needed if the nation was to live. Later on, when
confronted by the realities and responsibilities of government, he availed
himself of the special powers and training of the despised capitalists. At
this earlier period he was, as Tseretelli repeatedly reminded the workers,
without any sense of responsibility for the practical results of his
propaganda. And that was equally true of the Bolsheviki as a whole. They
talked about sending "ultimatums" to the Allies, while the whole system of
national defense was falling to pieces. Tseretelli made the only reply it
was possible for a sane man to make:
"It is proposed that we speak to the Allies with ultimatums, but did those
who made this silly proposal think that this road might lead to the
breaking of diplomatic relations with the Allies, and to that very separate
peace which is condemned by all factions among us? Did Lenine think of the
actual consequences of his proposal to arrest several dozen capitalists at
this time? Can the Bolsheviki guarantee that their road will lead us to the
correct solution of the crisis? No. If they guarantee this they do not know
what they are doing and their guaranty is worthless. The Bolshevik road can
lead us only to one end, civil war."
Once more the good sense of the working class prevailed. By an
overwhelming majority of votes the Congress decided to uphold the Coalition
Government and rejected the Bolshevik proposals. The resolution adopted
declared that "the passing over of all power to the bourgeoisie elements
would deal a blow at the revolutionary cause," but that equally the
transfer of all power to the Soviets would be disastrous to the Revolution,
and "would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from her
elements which are still capable of serving her, and would threaten the
ruin of the Revolution." Therefore, having heard the explanations of the
Socialist Ministers and having full confidence in them, the Congress
insisted that the Socialist Ministers be solely responsible to the
"plenipotentiary and representative organ of the whole organized
Revolutionary Democracy of Russia, which organ must be composed of the
representatives of the All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates, as well as of representatives of the All-Russian
Congress of Peasants' Delegates."
But in spite of the fact that the workers upon every opportunity repudiated
their policies, the Bolsheviki continued their tactics. Lenine, Trotzky,
Tshitsherin, Zinoviev, and others called upon the workers to stop working
and to go out into the streets to demonstrate for peace. The All-Russian
Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued an appeal to the
workers warning them not to heed the call of the Bolsheviki, which had been
made at the "moment of supreme danger." The appeal said:
Comrades, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and
soldiers, we tell you, "Do not do that which you are called upon
to do." At this dangerous moment you are called out into the
streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, to
whom the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give
its support. And those who are calling you cannot but know that
out of your peaceful demonstrations bloodshed and chaos may
result.... You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the
Revolution, _but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take
advantage of your demonstration ... the counter-revolutionists are
eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks
of the Revolutionary Democracy and enable them to crush the
Revolution_.
X
Not only in this way were the Bolsheviki recklessly attempting to thwart
the efforts of the Socialist Ministers to carry out the mandates of the
majority of the working class of Russia, but they were equally active in
trying to secure the failure of the attempt to restore the army. All
through June the Bolshevik papers denounced the military offensive. In the
ranks of the army itself a persistent campaign against further fighting was
carried on. The Duma had voted, on June 17th, for an immediate offensive,
and it was approved by the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government on
that date published a Note to the Allied governments, requesting a
conference with a view to making a restatement of their war aims. These
actions were approved by the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates, as was also the expulsion from Russia of the Swiss
Socialist, Robert Grimm, who was a notorious agent of the German
Government. Grimm, as is now well known, was acting under the orders of
Hoffman, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was trying to bring
about a separate peace between Russia and Germany. He was also intimately
connected with the infamous "Parvus," the trusted Social Democrat who was a
spy and tool of the German Government. As always, the great majority of the
representatives of the actual working class of Russia took the sane
course.
But the Bolsheviki were meanwhile holding mass meetings among the troops,
preaching defeatism and surrender and urging the soldiers not to obey the
orders of "bourgeois" officers. The Provisional Government was not blind to
the peril of this propaganda, but it dared not attempt to end it by force,
conscious that any attempt to do so would provoke revolt which could not be
stayed. The Bolsheviki, unable to control the Workmen's and Soldiers'
Council, sought in every possible manner to weaken its influence and to
discredit it. They conspired to overthrow the Provisional Government. Their
plot was to bring about an armed revolt on the 24th of June, when the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets would be in session. They planned to arrest
the members of the Provisional Government and assume full power. _At the
same time, all the soldiers at the front were to be called on to leave the
trenches_. On the eve of the date when it was to be executed this plot was
divulged. There was treachery within their own ranks. The Bolshevik leaders
humbly apologized and promised to abandon their plans. Under other
conditions the Provisional Government might have refused to be satisfied
with apologies, might have adopted far sterner measures, but it was face to
face with the bitter fact that the nation was drunk with the strong wine of
freedom. The time had not yet arrived when the masses could be expected to
recognize the distinction between liberty within the law and the license
that leads always to tyranny. It takes time and experience of freedom to
teach the stern lesson that, as Rousseau has it, freedom comes by way of
self-imposed compulsions to be free.
The offensive which Kerensky had urged and planned began on July 1st and
its initial success was encouraging. It seemed as though the miracle of the
restoration of the Russian army had been achieved, despite everything. Here
was an army whose killed and dead already amounted to more than three
million men,[20] an army which had suffered incredible hardships, again
going into battle with songs. On the 1st of July more than thirty-six
thousand prisoners were taken by the Russians on the southwestern front.
Then came the tragic harvest of the Bolshevist propaganda. In northeastern
Galicia the 607th Russian Regiment left the trenches and forced other units
to do the same thing, opening a clear way for the German advance. Regiment
after regiment refused to obey orders. Officers were brutally murdered by
their men. Along a front of more than one hundred and fifty miles the
Russians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without attempting to
fight, while the enemy steadily advanced. This was made possible by the
agitation of the Bolsheviki, especially by the mutiny which they provoked
among the troops in the garrison at Petrograd. On the 17th of July, at the
very time when the separatist movement in the Ukraine, the resignation of
the Constitutional Democrats from the government, and the revolt and
treachery among the troops had produced a grave crisis, seizing the
opportunity afforded by the general chaos, the Bolsheviki attempted to
realize their aim of establishing what they called a "dictatorship of the
proletariat," but which was in reality the dictatorship of a small part of
the proletariat. There was no pretense that they represented a majority of
the proletariat, even. It was a desperate effort to impose the dictatorship
of a small minority of the proletariat upon the whole nation. For two days
the revolt lasted, more than five hundred men, women, and children being
killed in the streets of Petrograd.
On the 20th Prince Lvov resigned as Premier. In the mean time the
Bolshevist uprising had been put down by Cossack troops and the leaders
were in hiding. Kerensky stepped into Lvov's position as Premier and
continued to address himself to the task of bringing order out of the
chaos. There could not have been any selfish ambition in this; no
place-hunter would have attempted to bear the heavy burden Kerensky then
assumed, especially with his knowledge of the seriousness of the situation.
He knew that the undertaking was practically hopeless, yet he determined
never to give up the struggle so long as there was a single thing to be
done and his comrades desired him to do it.[21]
There had been created a revolutionary body representing all the organized
workers, called the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian Councils
of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, a body of more than three
hundred elected representatives of the various Soviets. They represented
the views of many millions. This body vigorously denounced the Bolsheviki
and rallied to the support of Kerensky and his colleagues. In a Manifesto
to the people the Bolsheviki were charged with responsibility for the blood
of all who had been slain in the uprising. On July 21st a second Manifesto
was issued by the Committee calling upon the workers to uphold the
government so long as the authorized representatives of the working class
determined that to be the proper course to follow. The charge that Lenine,
Zinoviev, Trotzky, and others were acting under German instructions and
receiving German money spread until it was upon almost every tongue in
Petrograd. On July 24th Gregory Alexinsky, a well-known Socialist, in his
paper, _Bez Lisnih Slov_, published a circumstantial story of German
intrigue in the Ukraine, revealed by one Yermolenko, an ensign in the 16th
Siberian Regiment, who had been sent to Russia by the German Government.
This Yermolenko charged that Lenine had been instructed by the authorities
in Berlin, just as he himself had been, and that Lenine had been furnished
with almost unlimited funds by the German Government, the arrangement being
that it was to be forwarded through one Svendson, at Stockholm.[22] By a
vote of 300 to 11 the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian
Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates adopted the
following resolution:
The whole Revolutionary Democracy desires that the Bolsheviki
group accused of having organized disorders, or inciting revolt,
or of having received money from German sources be tried publicly.
In consequence, the Executive Committee considers it absolutely
inadmissible that Lenine and Zinoviev should escape justice, and
demands that the Bolsheviki faction immediately and categorically
express its censure of the conduct of its leaders.
Later on, under the "terror," there was some pretense of an "investigation"
of the charge that Lenine and others had received German money, but there
has never been a genuine investigation so far as is known. Groups of
Russian Socialists belonging to various parties and groups have asked that
a commission of well-known Socialists from the leading countries of Europe
and from the United States, furnished with reliable interpreters, be sent
to Russia to make a thorough investigation of the charge.
The United Executive Committee of the workers' organizations adopted a
resolution demanding that all members and all factions, and the members of
all affiliated bodies, obey the mandate of the majority, and that all
majority decisions be absolutely obeyed. They took the position--too late,
alas!--that the will of the majority must be observed, since the only
alternative was the rule of the majority by the aggressive minority.
Repressive measures against the Bolsheviki were adopted by the Kerensky
Cabinet with the full approval of the Committee. Some of the Bolshevik
papers were suppressed and the death penalty, which had been abolished at
the very beginning of the Revolution, was partially restored in that it was
ordered that it should be applied to traitors and deserters at the front.
Lenine and Zinoviev were in hiding, but Trotzky, Kamenev, Alexandra
Kollontay, and many other noted Bolsheviki were imprisoned for a few days.
It was Kerensky's hope that by arranging for an early conference by the
Allies, at which the war aims would be restated in terms similar to those
which President Wilson had employed, and by definitely fixing the date for
the Constituent Assembly elections, September 30th, while sternly
repressing the Bolsheviki, it might be possible to save Russia. But it was
too late. Despite his almost superhuman efforts, and the loyal support of
the great majority of the Soviets, he was defeated. Day after day
conditions at the front grew worse. By the beginning of August practically
the whole of Galicia was in the hands of the Germans. Russian soldiers in
large numbers retreated before inferior numbers of Germans, refusing to
strike a blow. Germans furnished them with immense quantities of spirits,
and an orgy of drunkenness took place. The red flag was borne by debauched
and drunken mobs. What a fate for the symbol of universal freedom and
human brotherhood!
It was a time of terrible strain and upheaval. Crisis followed upon crisis.
Chernov resigned his position as Minister of Agriculture. Kerensky resigned
as Premier, but the members of the Provisional Government by unanimous vote
declined to accept the resignation. They called a joint meeting of all the
Cabinet, of leaders of all political parties, of the Duma, of the Soviets
of workers, peasants, and soldiers. At this meeting the whole critical
situation was discussed and all present joined in demanding that Kerensky
continue in office. The political parties represented were the Social
Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, the Democratic Radicals, the Labor
Union party, the Popular Socialists, and the Constitutional Democrats. From
these groups came an appeal which Kerensky could not deny. He said:
"In view of the evident impossibility of establishing, by means of a
compromise between the various political groups, Socialist as well as
non-Socialist, a strong revolutionary government ... I was obliged to
resign. Friday's conference, ... after a prolonged discussion, resulted in
the parties represented at the conference deciding to intrust me with the
task of reconstructing the government. Considering it impossible for me in
the present circumstances, when defeat without and disintegration within
are threatening the country, to withdraw from the heavy task which is now
intrusted to me, I regard this task as an express order of the country to
construct a strong revolutionary government in the shortest possible time
and in spite of all the obstacles which might arise."
For the second time Kerensky was Premier at the head of a Coalition
Ministry. No other government was possible for Russia except a strong
despotism. Theorists might debate the advisability of such coalition, but
the stern reality was that nothing else was possible. The leader of the
peasants, Chernov, returned to his old post as Minister of Agriculture and
the Constitutional Democrats took their share of the burden. There were six
parties and groups in the new Cabinet, four of them of various shades of
Socialism and two of them liberal bourgeoisie. Never before, perhaps, and
certainly only rarely, if ever, have men essayed a heavier or more
difficult task than that which this new Provisional Government undertook.
Heroically Kerensky sought to make successful the efforts of General
Kornilov, as commander-in-chief, to restore order and discipline in the
army, but it was too late. The disintegration had gone too far. The
measures which the Revolutionary Democracy had introduced into the army, in
the hope of realizing freedom, had reduced it to a wild mob. Officers were
butchered by their men; regiment after regiment deserted its post and, in
some instances, attempted to make a separate peace with the enemy, even
offering to pay indemnities. Moreover, the industrial organization of the
country had been utterly demoralized. The manufacture of army supplies had
fallen off more than 60 per cent., with the result that the state of
affairs was worse than in the most corrupt period of the old régime.
XI
It became evident to the Provisional Government that something big and
dramatic must be done, without waiting for the results of the Constituent
Assembly elections. Accordingly, it was decided to call together a great
extraordinary council, representing all classes and all parties, to
consider the situation and the best means of meeting it. The Extraordinary
National Conference, as it was called, was opened in Moscow, on August
26th, with more than fourteen hundred members in attendance. Some of these
members--principally those from the Soviets--had been elected as delegates,
but the others had been invited by the government and could not be said to
speak as authorized representatives. There were about one hundred and
ninety men who had been members of one or other of the Dumas; one hundred
representatives of the peasants' Soviets and other peasant organizations;
about two hundred and thirty representatives of the Soviets of industrial
workers and of soldiers; more than three hundred from co-operatives; about
one hundred and eighty from the trade-unions; about one hundred and fifty
from municipalities; one hundred and fifty representatives of banks and
industrial concerns, and about one hundred and twenty from the Union of
Zemstvos and Towns. It was a Conference more thoroughly representative of
Russia than any that had ever been held. There were, indeed, no
representatives of the old régime, and there were few representatives of
the Bolsheviki. The former had no place in the new Russia that was
struggling for its existence; the repressive measures that had been found
necessary accounted for the scant representation of the latter.
It was to this Conference that President Wilson sent his famous message
giving the assurance of "every material and moral assistance" to the people
and government of Russia. For three days the great assembly debated and
listened to speeches from men representing every section of the country,
every class, and every party. Kerensky, Tseretelli, Tchcheidze, Boublikov,
Plechanov, Kropotkin, Breshkovskaya, and others, spoke for the workers;
General Kornilov and General Kaledine spoke for the military command;
Miliukov, Nekrasov, Guchkov, Maklakov, and others spoke for the
bourgeoisie. At times feeling ran high, as might have been expected, but
throughout the great gathering there was displayed a remarkable unanimity
of feeling and immediate purpose; a common resolve to support the
Provisional Government, to re-establish discipline in the army and navy, to
remain loyal to the Allies, and reject with scorn all offers of a separate
peace, and to work for the success of the Constituent Assembly.
But, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, the
Moscow Conference showed that there was still a great gulf between the
classes, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcome
the peril that hung over the nation like the sword of Damocles, there could
be no unity in working out the great economic and social program which must
be the basis for the Social Democratic commonwealth which the workers
sought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as much
as they feared the triumph of Germany. In some respects the Conference
intensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civil
strife. The Bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact. They pointed to
the Conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the Socialist
Ministers, and of the officials of the Soviets, to compromise with the
bourgeoisie. This propaganda had its effect and Bolshevism grew in
consequence, especially in Petrograd.
Then followed the disastrous military and political events which made it
practically impossible for the Kerensky government to stand. At the front
the soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating. Kornilov was
quite helpless. Germany began a new offensive, and on September 2d German
armies crossed the Dvina near Riga. On September 3d Riga was surrendered to
the Germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in Petrograd.
Then on the 9th came the revolt of Kornilov against the Provisional
Government and the vulgar quarrel between him and Kerensky. Kornilov
charged that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the
Bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the German General Staff.
Kerensky, backed by the rest of the Cabinet, ordered Kornilov's removal,
while Kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front,
against Petrograd.
It was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can be
found except in the strained mental condition of all the principal parties
concerned. In less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the two
leaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removing
misunderstandings. As things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two men
suffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, provided
all the elements of a disaster. Kornilov's revolt was crushed without great
trouble and with very little bloodshed, Kornilov himself being arrested.
The Soviets stood by the Provisional Government, for they saw in the revolt
the attempt to set up a personal dictatorship. Even the Bolsheviki were
temporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the "man on horseback."
Kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of the
Russian armies. Always, it seemed, through every calamity, all parties
except the Bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough to
undertake the heaviest and hardest tasks.
Toward the end of September what may be termed the Kerensky régime entered
upon its last phase. For reasons which have been already set forth, the
Bolsheviki kept up a bitter attack upon the Provisional Government, and
upon the official leaders of the Soviets, on account of the Moscow
Conference. They demanded that the United Executive Committee of the
Soviets convoke a new Conference. They contended that the Moscow Conference
had been convoked by the government, not by the Soviets, and that the
United Executive Committee must act for the latter. The United Executive
Committee complied and summoned a new National Democratic Conference, which
assembled on September 27th. By this time, as a result of the exhaustion of
the patience of many workers, many of the Soviets had ceased to exist,
while others existed on paper only. According to the _Izvestya Soveta_,
there had been more than eight hundred region organizations at one time,
many scores of which had disappeared. According to the same authority, the
peasants were drawing away from the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. The
United Executive Committee, which had been elected in June, was, of course,
dominated by anti-Bolsheviki--that is, by Menshevik Social Democrats and by
Socialist-Revolutionists.
The Democratic Conference was not confined to the Soviets. It embraced
delegates from Soviets of peasants, soldiers, and industrial workers; from
municipalities, from zemstvos, co-operatives, and other organizations. It
differed from the Moscow Conference principally in that the delegates were
elected and that it did not include so many representatives of the
capitalist class. The petty bourgeoisie was represented, but not the great
capitalists. There were more than a thousand members in attendance at this
Democratic Conference, which was dominated by the most moderate section of
the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionists were not very numerous.
This Conference created another Coalition Cabinet, the last of the Kerensky
régime. Kerensky continued as Premier and as commander-in-chief of the
army. There were in the Cabinet five Social Democrats, two
Socialist-Revolutionists, eight Constitutional Democrats, and two
non-partisans. It was therefore as far as its predecessors from meeting the
standards insisted upon by many radical Socialists, who, while not
Bolsheviki, still believed that there should be at least an absolute
Socialist predominance in the Provisional Government. Of course, the new
Coalition Ministry infuriated the Bolsheviki. From his hiding-place Lenine
issued a series of "Letters to the Comrades," which were published in the
_Rabochiy Put_, in which he urged the necessity of an armed uprising like
that of July, only upon a larger scale. In these letters he scoffed at the
Constituent Assembly as a poor thing to satisfy hungry men. Meanwhile,
Trotzky, out of prison again, and other Bolshevik leaders were agitating by
speeches, proclamations, and newspaper articles for an uprising. The
Provisional Government dared not try to suppress them. Its hold upon the
people was now too weak.
The Democratic Conference introduced one innovation. It created a
Preliminary Parliament, as the new body came to be known, though its first
official title was the Provisional Council of the Republic. This new body
was to function as a parliament until the Constituent Assembly convened,
when it would give place to whatever form of parliamentary body the
Constituent Assembly might create. This Preliminary Parliament and its
functions were thus described:
This Council, in which all classes of the population will be
represented, and in which the delegates elected to the Democratic
Conference will also participate, will be given the right of
addressing questions to the government and of securing replies to
them in a definite period of time, of working out legislative acts
and discussing all those questions which will be presented for
consideration by the Provisional Government, as well as those
which will arise on its own initiative. Resting on the
co-operation of such a Council, the government, preserving, in
accordance with its pledge, the unity of the governmental power
created by the Revolution, will regard it its duty to consider the
great public significance of such a Council in all its acts up to
the time when the Constituent Assembly gives full and complete
representation to all classes of the population of Russia.
This Preliminary Parliament was really another Duma--that is, it was a very
limited parliamentary body. Its life was short and quite uneventful. It
assembled for the first time on October 8th and was dispersed by the
Bolsheviki on November 7th. When it assembled there were 555 members--the
number fixed by the decree of the Provisional Government. Of these, 53 were
Bolsheviki, but these withdrew almost at the opening with three others,
thus reducing the actual membership of the body to less than five hundred.
Even with the Bolsheviki withdrawn, when Kerensky appeared before the
Preliminary Parliament on November 6th and made his last appeal, a
resolution expressing confidence in his government was carried only by a
small majority. Only about three hundred members were in attendance on this
occasion, and of these 123 voted the expression of confidence, while 102
voted against it, and 26 declined to vote at all.
The Bolsheviki had forced the United Executive Committee to convene a new
All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the date of its meeting had been fixed
at November 7th. While the elections and arrangements for this Congress
were proceeding, the Bolsheviki were actively and openly organizing an
uprising. In their papers and at their meetings they announced that on
November 7th there would be an armed uprising against the government. Their
intentions were, therefore, thoroughly well known, and it was believed that
the government had taken every necessary step to repress any attempt to
carry those intentions into practice. It was said that of the delegates to
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets-numbering 676 as against more than one
thousand at the former Congress of peasant Soviets alone--a majority were
Bolsheviki. It was charged that the Bolsheviki had intimidated many workers
into voting for their candidates; that they had, in some instances, put
forward their men as anti-Bolsheviki and secured their election by false
pretenses; that they had practised fraud in many instances. It was quite
certain that a great many Soviets had refused to send delegates, and that
many thousands of workers, and these all anti-Bolsheviki, had simply grown
weary and disgusted with the whole struggle. Whatever the explanation might
be, the fact remained that of the 676 delegates 390 were generally rated as
Bolsheviki, while 230 were Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki. Not all
of the Socialist-Revolutionists could be counted as anti-Bolsheviki,
moreover. There were fifty-six delegates whose position was not quite
clearly defined, but who were regarded as being, if not Bolsheviki, at
least anti-government. For the first time in the whole struggle the
Bolsheviki apparently had a majority of delegates in a working-class
convention.
On the night of the 6th, a few hours before the opening of the Congress of
Soviets, the Bolsheviki struck the blow they had been so carefully
planning. They were not met with the resistance they had expected--for
reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. Kerensky recognized
that it was useless for him to attempt to carry on the fight. The
Bolsheviki had organized their Red Guards, and these, directed by military
leaders, occupied the principal government buildings, such as the central
telephone and telegraph offices, the military-staff barracks, and so on.
Part of the Petrograd garrison joined with the Bolsheviki, the other part
simply refusing to do anything. On the morning of November 7th the members
of the Provisional Government were arrested in the Winter Palace, but
Kerensky managed to escape. The Bolshevik _coup d'état_ was thus
accomplished practically without bloodshed. A new government was formed,
called the Council of People's Commissaries, of which Nikolai Lenine was
President and Leon Trotzky Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The
"dictatorship of the proletariat" was thus begun. Kerensky's attempt to
rally forces enough to put an end to this dictatorship was a pathetic
failure, as it was bound to be. It was like the last fitful flicker with
which a great flame dies. The masses wanted peace--for that they would
tolerate even a dictatorship.