FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI
I
It required no great gift of prophecy to foretell the failure of the
Provisional Government established by the revolutionary coalition headed by
Prince Lvov. From the very first day it was evident that the Cabinet could
never satisfy the Russian people. It was an anomaly in that the Revolution
had been a popular revolution, while the Provisional Government was
overwhelmingly representative of the landowners, manufacturers, bankers,
and merchants--the despised and distrusted bourgeoisie. The very meager
representation given to the working class, through Kerensky, was, in the
circumstances, remarkable for its stupid effrontery and its disregard of
the most obvious realities. Much has been said and written of the
doctrinaire attitude which has characterized the Bolsheviki in the later
phases of the struggle, but if by doctrinairism is meant subservience to
preconceived theories and disregard of realities, it must be said that the
statesmen of the bourgeoisie were as completely its victims as the
Bolsheviki later proved to be. They were subservient to dogma and
indifferent to fact.
The bourgeois leaders of Russia--and those Socialists who co-operated with
them--attempted to ignore the biggest and most vital fact in the whole
situation, namely, the fact that the Revolution was essentially a
Socialist Revolution in the sense that the overwhelming mass of the people
were bent upon the realization of a very comprehensive, though somewhat
crudely conceived, program of socialization. It was not a mere political
Revolution, and political changes which left the essential social structure
unchanged, which did not tend to bring about equality of democratic
opportunity, and which left the control of the nation in the hands of
landowners and capitalists, could never satisfy the masses nor fail to
invite their savage attack. Only the most hopeless and futile of
doctrinaires could have argued themselves into believing anything else. It
was quite idle to argue from the experience of other countries that Russia
must follow the universal rule and establish and maintain bourgeois rule
for a period more or less prolonged. True, that had been the experience of
most nations, but it was foolish in the extreme to suppose that it must be
the experience of Russia, whose conditions were so utterly unlike those
which had obtained in any nation which had by revolution established
constitutional government upon a democratic basis.
To begin with, in every other country revolution by the bourgeoisie itself
had been the main factor in the overthrow of autocracy. Feudalism and
monarchical autocracy fell in western Europe before the might of a powerful
rising class. That this class in every case drew to its side the masses and
benefited by their co-operation must not be allowed to obscure the fact
that in these other countries of all the classes in society the bourgeoisie
was the most powerful. It was that fact which established its right to rule
in place of the deposed rulers. The Russian middle class, however, lacked
that historic right to rule. In consequence of the backwardness of the
nation from the point of view of industrial development, the bourgeoisie
was correspondingly backward and weak. Never in any country had a class so
weak and uninfluential essayed the rôle of the ruling class. To believe
that a class which at the most did not exceed six per cent. of the
population could assert and maintain its rule over a nation of one hundred
and eighty millions of people, when these had been stirred by years of
revolutionary agitation, was at once pedantic and absurd.
The industrial proletariat was as backward and as relatively weak as the
bourgeoisie. Except by armed force and tyranny of the worst kind, this
class could not rule Russia. Its fitness and right to rule are not
appreciably greater than the fitness and right of the bourgeoisie. It
cannot even be said on its behalf that it had waged the revolutionary
struggle of the working class, for in truth its share in the Russian
revolutionary movement had been relatively small, far less than that of the
peasant organizations. With more than one hundred and thirty-five millions
of peasants, from whose discontent and struggle the revolutionary movement
had drawn its main strength, neither the bourgeoisie nor the
class-conscious section of the industrial proletariat could set up its rule
without angry protest and attacks which, soon or late, must overturn it.
Every essential fact in the Russian situation, which was so unique, pointed
to the need for a genuine and sincere co-operation by the intelligent
leaders of all the opposition elements until stability was attained,
together with freedom from the abnormal difficulties due to the war. In any
event, the domination of the Provisional Government by a class so weak and
so narrow in its outlook and aims was a disaster. As soon as time for
reflection had been afforded the masses discontent and distrust were
inevitable.
II
From the first days there were ominous murmurings. Yet it must be confessed
that the Provisional Government manifested much greater enlightenment than
might have been expected of it and hastened to enact a program--quite
remarkable for its liberality and vision; a program which, had it come from
a government more truly representative in its personnel of revolutionary
Russia, might, with one important addition, have served as the foundation
of an enduring structure. On March 18th the Provisional Government issued a
statement of its program and an appeal to the citizens for support. This
document, which is said to have been the joint work of P.I. Novgorodtzev,
N.V. Nekrasov, and P.N. Miliukov, read as follows:
CITIZENS: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the
aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its
inhabitants, has succeeded in triumphing over the obnoxious forces
of the old régime so that we can proceed to a more stable
organization of the executive power, with men whose past political
activity assures them the country's confidence.
The new Cabinet will base its policy upon the following
principles: _First_.--An immediate and general amnesty for all
political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and
military and agrarian offenses.
_Second_.--Liberty of speech and of the press; freedom for
alliances, unions, and strikes, with the extension of these
liberties to military officials, within the limits admitted by
military requirements.
_Third_.--Abolition of all social, religious, and national
restrictions.
_Fourth_.--To proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation
of a Constituent Assembly, based on universal suffrage. This
Assembly will establish a stable universal régime.
_Fifth_.--The substitution of the police by a national militia,
with chiefs to be elected and responsible to the municipalities.
_Sixth_.--Communal elections to be based on universal, direct,
equal, and secret suffrage.
_Seventh_.--The troops which participated in the revolutionary
movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd.
_Eighth_.--While maintaining strict military discipline for troops
in active service, it is desirable to abrogate for soldiers all
restrictions in the enjoyment of civil rights accorded other
citizens.
The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention
of taking advantage of war conditions to delay the realization of
the measures of reform above mentioned.
This address is worthy of especial attention. The generous liberalism of
the program it outlines cannot be denied, but it is political liberalism
only. It is not directly and definitely concerned with the great
fundamental economic issues which so profoundly affect the life and
well-being of the working class, peasants, and factory-workers alike. It is
the program of men who saw in the Revolution only a great epochal political
advance. In this it reflects its bourgeois origin. With the exception of
the right to organize unions and strikes--which is a political measure--not
one of the important economic demands peculiar to the working class is met
in the program. The land question, which was the economic basis of the
Revolution, and without which there could have been no Revolution, was not
even mentioned. And the Manifesto which the Provisional Government
addressed to the nation on March 20th was equally silent with regard to the
land question and the socialization of industry.
Evidently the Provisional Government desired to confine itself as closely
as possible to political democracy, and to leave fundamental economic
reform to be attended to by the Constituent Assembly. If that were its
purpose, it would have helped matters to have had the purpose clearly
stated and not merely left to inference. But whatever the shortcomings of
its first official statements, the actual program of the Provisional
Government during the first weeks was far more satisfactory and afforded
room for great hope. On March 21st the constitution of Finland was
restored. On the following day amnesty was granted to all political and
religious offenders. Within a few days freedom and self-government were
granted to Poland, subject to the ratification of the Constituent Assembly.
At the same time all laws discriminating against the Jews were repealed by
the following decree:
All existing legal restrictions upon the rights of Russian citizens, based
upon faith, religious teaching, or nationality, are revoked. In accordance
with this, we hereby repeal all laws existing in Russia as a whole, as well
as for separate localities, concerning:
1. Selection of place of residence and change of residence.
2. Acquiring rights of ownership and other material rights in all
kinds of movable property and real estate, and likewise in the
possession of, the use and managing of all property, or receiving
such for security.
3. Engaging in all kinds of trades, commerce, and industry, not
excepting mining; also equal participation in the bidding for
government contracts, deliveries, and in public auctions.
4. Participation in joint-stock and other commercial or industrial
companies and partnerships, and also employment in these companies
and partnerships in all kinds of positions, either by elections or
by employment.
5. Employment of servants, salesmen, foremen, laborers, and trade
apprentices.
6. Entering the government service, civil as well as military, and
the grade or condition of such service; participation in the
elections for the institutions for local self-government, and all
kinds of public institutions; serving in all kinds of positions of
government and public establishments, as well as the prosecution
of the duties connected with such positions.
7. Admission to all kinds of educational institutions, whether
private, government, or public, and the pursuing of the courses of
instruction of these institutions, and receiving scholarships.
Also the pursuance of teaching and other educational professions.
8. Performing the duties of guardians, trustees, or jurors.
9. The use of language and dialects, other than Russian, in the
proceedings of private societies, or in teaching in all kinds of
private educational institutions, and in commercial bookkeeping.
Thus all the humiliating restrictions which had been imposed upon the
Jewish people were swept away. Had the Provisional Government done nothing
else than this, it would have justified itself at the bar of history. But
it accomplished much more than this: before it had been in office a month,
in addition to its liberation of Finns, Poles, and Jews, the Provisional
Government abolished the death penalty; removed all the provincial
governors and substituted for them the elected heads of the provincial
county councils; _confiscated the large land holdings of the Imperial
family and of the monasteries_; levied an excess war-profits tax on all war
industries; and fixed the price of food at rates greatly lower than had
prevailed before. The Provisional Government had gone farther, and, while
declaring that these matters must be left to the Constituent Assembly for
settlement, had declared itself in favor of woman suffrage and of _the
distribution of all land among the peasants, the terms and conditions of
expropriation and distribution to be determined by the Constituent
Assembly_.
The Provisional Government also established a War Cabinet which introduced
various reforms into the army. All the old oppressive regulations were
repealed and an attempt made to democratize the military system. Some of
these reforms were of the utmost value; others were rather dangerous
experiments. Much criticism has been leveled against the rules providing
for the election of officers by the men in the ranks, for a conciliation
board to act in disputes between men and officers over questions of
discipline, and the abolition of the regulations requiring private soldiers
to address officers by the title "Sir." It must be borne in mind, however,
in discussing these things, that these rules represented a great, honest
effort to restore the morale of an army that had been demoralized, and to
infuse it with democratic faith and zeal in order that it might "carry on."
It is not just to judge the rules without considering the conditions which
called them forth.
Certainly the Provisional Government--which the government of the United
States formally recognized on March 22d, being followed in this by the
other Allied governments next day--could not be accused fairly of being
either slothful or unfaithful. Its accomplishments during those first weeks
were most remarkable. Nevertheless, as the days went by it became evident
that it could not hope to satisfy the masses and that, therefore, it could
not last very long.
III
The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates was pursuing its
independent existence, under the leadership of Tchcheidze, Skobelev,
Tseretelli, and other moderate Social Democrats. As yet the Bolsheviki were
a very small and uninfluential faction, lacking capable leadership. There
can be very little doubt that the Council represented the feelings of the
great mass of the organized wage-earners far more satisfactorily than the
Provisional Government did, or that it was trusted to a far greater degree,
alike by the wage-earners of the cities and the peasants. A great
psychological fact existed, a fact which the Provisional Government and the
governments of the Allied nations might well have reckoned with: the
Russian working-people, artisans and peasants alike, were aggressively
class conscious and could trust fully only the leaders of their own class.
The majority of the Social Democratic party was, at the beginning, so far
from anything like Bolshevism, so thoroughly constructive and opportunistic
in its policies, that its official organ, _Pravda_--not yet captured by the
Bolsheviki--put forward a program which might easily have been made the
basis for an effective coalition. It was in some respects disappointingly
moderate: like the program of the Provisional Government, it left the land
question untouched, except in so far as the clause demanding the
confiscation of the property of the royal family and the Church bore upon
it. The Social Democratic party, reflecting the interests of the city
proletariat, had never been enthusiastic about the peasants' claim for
distribution of the land, and there had been much controversy between its
leaders and the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the party of
the peasants. The program as printed in Pravda read:
1. A biennial one-house parliament.
2. Wide extension of the principle of self-government.
3. Inviolability of person and dwelling.
4. Unlimited freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.
5. Freedom of movement in business.
6. Equal rights for all irrespective of sex, religion, and
nationality.
7. Abolition of class distinction.
8. Education in native language; native languages everywhere to
have equal rights with official language.
9. Every nationality in the state to have the right of
self-definition.
10. The right of all persons to prosecute officials before a jury.
11. Election of magistrates.
12. A citizen army instead of ordinary troops.
13. Separation of Church from state and school from Church.
14. Free compulsory education for both sexes to the age of
sixteen.
15. State feeding of poor children.
16. Confiscation of Church property, also that of the royal
family.
17. Progressive income tax.
18. An eight-hour day, with six hours for all under eighteen.
19. Prohibition of female labor where such is harmful to women.
20. A clear holiday once a week to consist of forty-two hours on
end.
It would be a mistake to suppose that this very moderate program embraced
all that the majority of the Social Democratic party aimed at. It was not
intended to be more than an ameliorative program for immediate adoption by
the Constituent Assembly, for the convocation of which the Social Democrats
were most eager, and which they confidently believed would have a majority
of Socialists of different factions.
In a brilliant and caustic criticism of conditions as they existed in the
pre-Bolshevist period, Trotzky denounced what he called "the farce of dual
authority." In a characteristically clever and biting phrase, he described
it as "The epoch of Dual Impotence, the government not able, and the Soviet
not daring," and predicted its culmination in a "crisis of unheard-of
severity."[5] There was more than a little truth in the scornful phrase. On
the one hand, there was the Provisional Government, to which the Soviet had
given its consent and its allegiance, trying to discharge the functions of
government. On the other hand, there was the Soviet itself, claiming the
right to control the course of the Provisional Government and indulging in
systematic criticism of the latter's actions. It was inevitable that the
Soviet should have been driven irresistibly to the point where it must
either renounce its own existence or oppose the Provisional Government.
The dominating spirit and thought of the Soviet was that of international
social democracy. While most of the delegates believed that it was
necessary to prosecute the war and to defeat the aggressions of the Central
Empires, they were still Socialists, internationalists, fundamental
democrats, and anti-imperialists. Not without good and sufficient reason,
they mistrusted the bourgeois statesmen and believed that some of the most
influential among them were imperialists, actuated by a desire for
territorial expansion, especially the annexation of Constantinople, and
that they were committed to various secret treaties entered into by the old
régime with England, France, and Italy. In the meetings of the Soviet, and
in other assemblages of workers, the ugly suspicion grew that the war was
not simply a war for national defense, for which there was democratic
sanction and justification, but a war of imperialism, and that the
Provisional Government was pursuing the old ways of secret diplomacy.
Strength was given to this feeling when Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, in
an interview championed the annexation of Constantinople as a necessary
safeguard for the outlet to the Mediterranean which Russian economic
development needed. Immediately there was an outcry of protest from the
Soviet, in which, it should be observed, the Bolsheviki were already
gaining strength and confidence, thanks to the leadership of Kamenev,
Lenine's colleague, who had returned from Siberian exile. It was not only
the Bolsheviki, however, who protested against imperialistic tendencies.
Practically the whole body of Socialists, Mensheviki and Bolsheviki alike,
agreed in opposing imperialism and secret diplomacy. Socialists loyal to
the national defense and Socialists who repudiated that policy and deemed
it treason to the cause of Socialism were united in this one thing.
The storm of protest which Miliukov's interview provoked was stilled
temporarily when the Premier, Lvov, announced that the Foreign Minister's
views concerning the annexation of Constantinople were purely personal and
did not represent the policy of the Provisional Government. Assurances were
given that the Provisional Government was in accord with the policy of the
Soviet. On April 16th a national congress of the Councils of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates adopted a series of resolutions in which there was a
distinct menace to the Provisional Government. An earlier proclamation by
the Petrograd Soviet had taken the form of a letter addressed to
"Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries," but being in fact an
appeal to the German working class to rise and refuse to fight against
democratic and free Russia.[6] It declared that the peoples must take the
matter of deciding questions of war and peace into their own hands. The new
declaration was addressed to the Russian people:
_First_.--The Provisional Government, which constituted itself
during the Revolution, in agreement with the Council of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd, published a proclamation
announcing its program. This Congress records that this program
contains in principle political demands for Russian democracy, and
_recognizes that so far the Provisional Government has faithfully
carried out its promises_.
_Second_.--This Congress appeals to the whole revolutionary
democracy of Russia to rally to the support of the Council of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which is the center of the
organized democratic forces that are capable, in unison with
other progressive forces, of counteracting any counter
revolutionary attempt and of consolidating the conquests of the
revolution.
_Third_.--The Congress recognizes the necessity of permanent
political control, the necessity of exercising an influence over
the Provisional Government which will keep it up to a more
energetic struggle against anti-revolutionary forces, and the
necessity of exercising an influence which will insure its
democratizing the whole Russian life and paving the way for a
common _peace without annexations or contributions_, but on a
basis of free national development of all peoples.
_Fourth_.--The Congress appeals to the democracy, while declining
responsibility for any of its acts, to support the Provisional
Government as long as it continues to consolidate and develop the
conquest of the Revolution, _and as long as the basis of its
foreign policy does not rest upon aspirations for territorial
expansion_.
_Fifth_.--The Congress calls upon the revolutionary democracy of
Russia, rallying around the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Delegates, to be ready to _vigorously suppress any attempt by the
government to elude the control of democracy or to renounce the
carrying out of its pledges_.[7]
On April 27th, acting under pressure from the Soviet, the Provisional
Government published a Manifesto to the Russian people in which it
announced a foreign policy which conformed to that which the Congress of
Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates had adopted. On May 1st
Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, transmitted this Manifesto to the Allied
governments as a preliminary to an invitation to those governments to
restate their war aims. Accompanying the Manifesto was a Note of
explanation, which was interpreted by a great many of the Socialists as an
intimation to the Allies that the Manifesto was intended merely for home
consumption, and that the Provisional Government would be glad to have the
Allies disregard it. It is difficult for any one outside of Russia, whose
sympathies were with the Entente Allies, to gather such an impression from
the text of the Note, which simply set forth that enemy attempts to spread
the belief that Russia was about to make a separate peace with Germany made
it necessary for the Provisional Government to state its "entire agreement"
with the aims of the Allies as set forth by their statesmen, including
President Wilson, and to affirm that "the Provisional Government, in
safeguarding the right acquired for our country, will maintain a strict
regard for its agreement with the allies of Russia."
Although it was explained that the Note had been sent with the knowledge
and approval of the Provisional Government, the storm of fury it produced
was directed against Miliukov and, in less degree, Guchkov. Tremendous
demonstrations of protest against "imperialism" were held. In the Soviet a
vigorous demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government was made by
the steadily growing Bolshevik faction and by many anti-Bolsheviki
Socialists. To avert the disaster of a vote of the Soviet against it, the
Provisional Government made the following explanation of the so-called
Miliukov Note:
The Note was subjected to long and detailed examination by the
Provisional Government, and was unanimously approved. This Note,
in speaking of a "decisive victory," had in view a solution of the
problems mentioned in the communication of April 9th, and which
was thus specified:
"The government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now
that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations,
or at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying
by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish
a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide
their own destiny.
"The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its
power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to
subjugate or humiliate any one. In the name of the higher
principles of equity, the Russian people have broken the chains
which fettered the Polish nation, but it will not suffer that its
own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or
weakened in its vital forces.
"In referring to the 'penalties and guarantees' essential to a
durable peace, the Provisional Government had in view the
reduction of armaments, the establishment of international
tribunals, etc.
"This explanation will be communicated by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers."
This assurance satisfied a majority of the delegates to the Soviet meeting
held on the evening of May 4th, and a resolution of confidence in the
Provisional Government was carried, after a very stormy debate. The
majority, however, was a very small one, thirty-five in a total vote of
about twenty-five hundred. It was clearly evident that the political
government and the Soviet, which was increasingly inclined to assume the
functions of government, were nearing a serious breach. With each day the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, as the organized expression
of the great mass of wage-workers in Petrograd, grew in power over the
Provisional Government and its influence throughout the whole of Russia. On
May 13th Guchkov resigned, and three days later Miliukov followed his
example. The party of the Constitutional Democrats had come to be
identified in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat with imperialism
and secret diplomacy, and was utterly discredited. The crisis developed an
intensification of the distrust of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat.
IV
The crisis was not due solely to the diplomacy of the Provisional
Government. Indeed, that was a minor cause. Behind all the discussions and
disputes over Miliukov's conduct of the affairs of the Foreign Office there
was the far more serious issue created by the agitation of the Bolsheviki.
Under the leadership of Kamenev, Lenine, and others less well known, who
skillfully exploited the friction with the Provisional Government, the idea
of overthrowing that bourgeois body and of asserting that the Councils of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates would rule Russia in the interests of the
working class made steady if not rapid progress.
Late in April Lenine and several other active Bolshevik leaders returned to
Petrograd from Switzerland, together with Martov and other Menshevik
leaders, who, while differing from the Bolsheviki upon practically all
other matters, agreed with them in their bitter and uncompromising
opposition to the war and in demanding an immediate peace.[8] As is well
known, they were granted special facilities by the German Government in
order that they might reach Russia safely. Certain Swiss Socialist leaders,
regarded as strongly pro-German, arranged with the German Government that
the Russian revolutionists should be permitted to travel across Germany by
rail, in closed carriages. Unusual courtesies were extended to the
travelers by the German authorities, and it was quite natural that Lenine
and his associates should have been suspected of being sympathizers with,
if not the paid agents and tools of, the German Government. The manner in
which their actions, when they arrived in Russia, served the ends sought
by the German military authorities naturally strengthened the suspicion so
that it became a strong conviction.
Suspicious as the circumstances undoubtedly were, there is a very simple
explanation of the conduct of Lenine and his companions. It is not at all
necessary to conclude that they were German agents. Let us look at the
facts with full candor: Lenine had long openly advocated the view that the
defeat of Russia, even by Germany, would be good for the Russian
revolutionary movement. But that was in the days before the overthrow of
the Czar. Since that time his position had naturally shifted somewhat; he
had opposed the continuation of the war and urged the Russian workers to
withhold support from it. He had influenced the Soviets to demand a
restatement of war aims by the Allies, and to incessantly agitate for
immediate negotiations looking toward a general and democratic peace. Of
course, the preaching of such a policy in Russia at that time by a leader
so powerful and influential as Lenine, bound as it was to divide Russia and
sow dissension among the Allies, fitted admirably into the German plans.
That Germany would have been glad to pay for the performance of service so
valuable can hardly be doubted.
On his side, Lenine is far too astute a thinker to have failed to
understand that the German Government had its own selfish interests in view
when it arranged for his passage across Germany. But the fact that the
Allies would suffer, and that the Central Empires would gain some
advantage, was of no consequence to him. That was an unavoidable accident
and was purely incidental. His own purpose, to lead the revolutionary
movement into a new phase, in which he believed with fanatical
thoroughness, was the only thing that mattered in the least. If the
conditions had been reversed, and he could only have reached Russia by the
co-operation of the Allies, whose cause would be served, however
unintentionally, by his work, he would have felt exactly the same. On the
other hand, it was of the essence of his faith that his policy would lead
to the overthrow of all capitalist-imperialist governments, those of
Germany and her allies no less than those ranged on the other side. Germany
might reason that a revolutionary uprising led by Lenine would rid her of
one of her enemies and enable her to hurl larger forces against the foe on
the western front. At that reasoning Lenine would smile in derision,
thoroughly believing that any uprising he might bring about in Russia would
sweep westward and destroy the whole fabric of Austro-German
capitalist-imperialism. Lenine knew that he was being used by Germany, but
he believed that he, in turn, was using Germany. He was supremely confident
that he could outplay the German statesmen and military leaders.
It was a dangerous game that Lenine was playing, and he knew it, but the
stakes were high and worth the great risk involved. It was not necessary
for Germany to buy the service he could render to her; that service would
be an unavoidable accompaniment of his mission. He argued that his work
could, at the worst, give only temporary advantage to Germany. So far as
there is any evidence to show, Lenine has been personally incorruptible.
Holding lightly what he scornfully derides as "bourgeois morality," unmoral
rather than immoral, willing to use any and all means to achieve ends which
he sincerely believes to be the very highest and noblest that ever inspired
mankind, he would, doubtless, take German money if he saw that it would
help him to achieve his purposes. He would do so, however, without any
thought of self-aggrandizement. It is probably safe and just to believe
that if Lenine ever took money from the Germans, either at that time or
subsequently, he did so in this spirit, believing that the net result of
his efforts would be equally disastrous to all the capitalist governments
concerned in the war. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
distinctions drawn by most thoughtful men between autocratic governments
like those which ruled Germany and Austria and the more democratic
governments of France, England, and America, have very little meaning or
value to men like Lenine. They regard the political form as relatively
unimportant; what matters is the fundamental economic class interest
represented by the governments. Capitalist governments are all equally
undesirable.
What Lenine's program was when he left Switzerland is easily learned. A few
days before he left Switzerland he delivered a lecture on "The Russian
Revolution," in which he made a careful statement of his position. It gives
a very good idea of Lenine's mental processes. It shows him as a Marxist of
the most dogmatic type--the type which caused Marx himself to rejoice that
he was not a "Marxist":
As to the revolutionary organization and its task, the conquest of
the power of the state and militarism: From the praxis of the
French Commune of 1871, Marx shows that "the working class cannot
simply take over the governmental machinery as built by the
bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes." The
proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been
either concealed or denied by the opportunists.[9] But it is the
most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the
Revolution in Russia in 1905. The difference between us and the
Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the
development of our Revolution. The difference with the
opportunists and the Kautsky[10] disciples is that we claim that
we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the
"democratic" bourgeois republics, but _the direct power of armed
and organized workers_. Such was the character of the Commune of
1871 and of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers of 1905 and 1917.
On this basis we build.[11]
Lenine went on to outline his program of action, which was to begin a new
phase of the Revolution; to carry the revolt against Czarism onward against
the bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding his scorn for democracy, he declared at
that time that his policy included the establishment of a "democratic
republic," confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor of
the peasants, and the opening up of immediate peace negotiations. But the
latter he would take out of the hands of the government entirely. "Peace
negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments,
but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries." In his
criticism of Kerensky and Tchcheidze the Bolshevik leader was especially
scornful and bitter.
In a letter which he addressed to the Socialists of Switzerland immediately
after his departure for Russia, Lenine gave a careful statement of his own
position and that of his friends. It shows an opportunistic attitude of
mind which differs from the opportunistic attitude of the moderate
Socialists _in direction only_, not in the _quality of being
opportunistic_:
Historic conditions have made the Russians, _perhaps for a short
period_, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, _but
Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia_. We can expect only an
agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable
conditions for further development of the proletarian forces and
_may result in measures for the control of production and
distribution_.
The main results of the present Revolution will have to be _the
creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary
development_, and to influence the more highly developed European
countries into action.[12]
The Bolsheviki at this period had as their program the following:
(1) The Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants to constitute themselves
into the actual revolutionary government and establish the dictatorship of
the proletariat; (2) immediate confiscation of landed estates without
compensation, the seizure to be done by the peasants themselves, without
waiting for legal forms or processes, the peasants to organize into
Soviets; (3) measures for the control of production and distribution by the
revolutionary government, nationalization of monopolies, repudiation of the
national debt; (4) the workers to take possession of factories and operate
them in co-operation with the technical staffs; (5) refusal by the Soviets
to recognize any treaties made by the governments either of the Czar or the
bourgeoisie, and the immediate publication of all such treaties; (6) the
workers to propose at once and publicly an immediate truce and negotiations
of peace, these to be carried on by the proletariat and not by and with the
bourgeoisie; (7) bourgeois war debts to be paid exclusively by the
capitalists.
According to Litvinov, who is certainly not an unfriendly authority, as
soon as Lenine arrived in Russia he submitted a new program to his party
which was so novel, and so far a departure from accepted Socialist
principles, that "Lenine's own closest friends shrank from it and refused
to accept it."[13]
This program involved the abandonment of the plans made for holding the
Constituent Assembly, or, at any rate, such a radical change as to amount
to the abandonment of the accepted plans. _He proposed that universal,
equal, direct, and secret suffrage be frankly abandoned, and that only the
industrial proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry be
permitted to vote at all!_ Against the traditional Socialist view that
class distinctions must be wiped out and the class war ended by the
victorious proletariat, Lenine proposed to make the class division more
rigid and enduring. He proposed to give the sole control of Russia into the
hands of not more than two hundred thousand workers in a land of one
hundred and eighty millions of people, more than one hundred and
thirty-five millions of whom were peasants!
Of course, there could be no reconciliation between such views as these and
the universally accepted Socialist principle of democratic government.
Lenine did not hesitate to declare that democracy itself was a "bourgeois
conception" which the revolutionary proletariat must overthrow, a
declaration hard to reconcile with his demand for a "democratic republic."
Russia must not become a democratic republic, he argued, for a democratic
republic is a bourgeois republic. Again and again, during the time we are
discussing and later, Lenine assailed the principle of democratic
government. "Since March, 1917, the word 'democracy' is simply a shackle
fastened upon the revolutionary nation," he declared in an article written
after the Bolsheviki had overthrown Kerensky.[14]
When democracy is abolished, parliamentary government goes with it. From
the first days after his return to Russia Lenine advocated, instead of a
parliamentary republic similar to that of France or the United States, what
he called a Soviet republic, which would be formed upon these lines: local
government would be carried on by local Soviets composed of delegates
elected by "the working class and the poorest peasantry," to use a common
Bolshevik phrase which bothers a great many people whose minds insist upon
classifying peasants as "working-people" and part of the working class.
What Lenine means when he uses the phrase, and what Litvinov means[15] is
that the industrial wage-workers--to whom is applied the term "working
class"--must be sharply distinguished from peasants and small farmers,
though the very poorest peasants, not being conservative, as more
prosperous peasants are, can be united with the wage-workers.
These local Soviets functioning in local government would, in Lenine's
Soviet republic, elect delegates to a central committee of all the Soviets
in the country, and that central committee would be the state. Except in
details of organization, this is not materially different from the
fundamental idea of the I.W.W. with which we are familiar.[16] According to
the latter, the labor-unions, organized on industrial lines and federated
through a central council, will take the place of parliamentary government
elected on territorial lines. According to the Bolshevik plan, Soviets
would take the place held by the unions in the plan of the I.W.W. It is not
to be wondered at that, in the words of Litvinov, Lenine's own closest
friends shrank from his scheme and Lenine "was compelled to drop it for a
time."
V
Bolshevism was greatly strengthened in its leadership by the return of Leon
Trotzky, who arrived in Petrograd on May 17th. Trotzky was born in Moscow
about forty-five years ago. Like Lenine, he is of bourgeois origin, his
father being a wealthy Moscow merchant. He is a Jew and his real name is
Bronstein. To live under an assumed name has always been a common practice
among Russian revolutionists, for very good and cogent reasons. Certainly
all who knew anything at all of the personnel of the Russian revolutionary
movement during the past twenty years knew that Trotzky was Bronstein, and
that he was a Jew. The idea, assiduously disseminated by a section of the
American press, that there must be something discreditable or mysterious
connected with his adoption of an alias is extremely absurd, and can only
be explained by monumental ignorance of Russian revolutionary history.
Trotzky has been a fighter in the ranks of the revolutionary army of Russia
for twenty years. As early as 1900 his activities as a Socialist
propagandist among students had landed him in prison in solitary
confinement. In 1902 he was exiled to eastern Siberia, whence he managed to
escape. During the next three years he lived abroad, except for brief
intervals spent in Russia, devoting himself to Socialist journalism. His
first pamphlet, published in Geneva in 1903, was an attempt to reconcile
the two factions in the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki and the
Mensheviki. He was an orthodox Marxist of the most extreme doctrinaire
type, and naturally inclined to the Bolshevik view. Yet he never joined the
Bolsheviki, preferring to remain aloof from both factions and steadfastly
and earnestly striving to unite them.
When the Revolution of 1905 broke out Trotzky had already attained
considerable influence among the Socialists. He was regarded as one of the
ablest of the younger Marxians, and men spoke of him as destined to occupy
the place of Plechanov. He became one of the most influential leaders of
the St. Petersburg Soviet, and was elected its president. In that capacity
he labored with titanic energy and manifested great versatility, as
organizer, writer, speaker, and arbiter of disputes among warring
individuals and groups. When the end came he was arrested and thrown into
prison, where he remained for twelve months. After that he was tried and
sentenced to life-exile in northern Siberia. From this he managed to
escape, however, and from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1914 he
lived in Vienna.
The first two years of the war he lived in France, doing editorial work for
a radical Russian Socialist daily paper, the _Nashe Slovo_. His writing,
together with his activity in the Zimmerwald movement of anti-war
Socialists, caused his expulsion from France. The Swiss government having
refused to permit him to enter Switzerland, he sought refuge in Spain,
where he was once more arrested and imprisoned for a short time. Released
through the intervention of Spanish Socialists, he set sail with his family
for New York, where he arrived early in January, 1917. Soon after the news
of the Russian Revolution thrilled the world Trotzky, like many other
Russian exiles, made hasty preparations to return, sailing on March 27th
on a Norwegian steamer. At Halifax he and his family, together with a
number of other Russian revolutionists, were taken from the ship and
interned in a camp for war prisoners, Trotzky resisting violently and
having to be carried off the ship. The British authorities kept them
interned for a month, but finally released them at the urgent demand of the
Foreign Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, Miliukov.
Such, in brief outline, is the history of the man Trotzky. It is a typical
Russian history: the story of a persistent, courageous, and exceedingly
able fighter for an ideal believed in with fanatical devotion. Lenine, in
one of his many disputes with Trotzky, called him "a man who blinds himself
with revolutionary phrases,"[17] and the description is very apt. He
possesses all the usual characteristics of the revolutionary Jewish
Socialists of Russia. To a high-strung, passionate, nervous temperament and
an exceedingly active imagination he unites a keen intellect which finds
its highest satisfaction in theoretical abstractions and subtleties, and
which accepts, phrases as though they were realities.
Understanding of Trotzky's attitude during the recent revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary struggles is made easier by understanding the
development of his thought in the First Revolution, 1905-06. He began as an
extremely orthodox Marxist, and believed that any attempt to establish a
Socialist order in Russia until a more or less protracted intensive
economic development, exhausting the possibilities of capitalism, made
change inevitable, must fail. He accepted the view that a powerful
capitalist class must be developed and perform its indispensable historical
rôle, to be challenged and overthrown in its turn by the proletariat. That
was the essence of his pure and unadulterated faith. To it he clung with
all the tenacity of his nature, deriding as "Utopians" and "dreamers" the
peasant Socialists who refused to accept the Marxian theory of Socialism as
the product of historic necessity as applicable to Russia.
The great upheaval of 1905 changed his viewpoint. The manner in which
revolutionary ideas spread among the masses created in Trotzky, as in many
others, almost unbounded confidence and enthusiasm. In an essay written
soon after the outbreak of the Revolution he wrote: "The Revolution has
come. _One move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up
which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships
and fatigue_." The idea that the Revolution had "lifted the people over
scores of steps" possessed him and changed his whole conception of the
manner in which Socialism was to come. Still calling himself a Marxist, and
believing as strongly as ever in the fundamental Marxian doctrines, as he
understood them, he naturally devoted his keen mind with its peculiar
aptitude for Talmudic hair-splitting to a new interpretation of Marxism. He
declared his belief that in Russia it was possible to change from
Absolutism to Socialism immediately, without the necessity of a prolonged
period of capitalist development. At the same time, he maintained a
scornful attitude toward the "Utopianism" of the peasant Socialists, who
had always made the same contention, because he believed they based their
hopes and their policy upon a wrong conception of Socialism. He had small
patience for their agrarian Socialism with its economic basis in
peasant-proprietorship and voluntary co-operation.
He argued that the Russian bourgeoisie was so thoroughly infected with the
ills of the bureaucratic system that it was itself decadent; not virile
and progressive as a class aiming to possess the future must be. Since it
was thus corrupted and weakened, and therefore incapable of fulfilling any
revolutionary historical rôle, that became the _immediate_ task of the
proletariat. Here was an example of the manner in which lifting over
revolutionary steps was accomplished. Of course, the peasantry was in a
backward and even primitive state which unfitted it for the proletarian
rôle. Nevertheless, it had a class consciousness of its own, and an
irresistible hunger for land. Without this class supporting it, or, at
least, acquiescing in its rule, the proletariat could never hope to seize
and hold the power of government. It would be possible to solve the
difficulty here presented, Trotzky contended, if the enactment of the
peasant program were permitted during the Revolution and accepted by the
proletariat as a _fait accompli_. This would satisfy the peasants and make
them content to acquiesce in a proletarian dictatorship. Once firmly
established in power, it would be possible for the proletariat to gradually
apply the true Socialist solution to the agrarian problem and to convert
the peasants. "Once in power, the proletariat will appear before the
peasantry as its liberator," he wrote.
His imagination fired by the manner in which the Soviet of which he was
president held the loyalty of the masses during the revolutionary uprising,
and the representative character it developed, Trotzky conceived the idea
that it lent itself admirably to the scheme of proletarian dictatorship.
Parliamentary government cannot be used to impose and maintain a
dictatorship, whether of autocracy or oligarchy, bourgeoisie or
proletariat. In the Soviet, as a result of six weeks' experience in
abnormal times, during which it was never for a moment subjected to the
test of maintaining the economic life of the nation, Trotzky saw the ideal
proletarian government. He once described the Soviet as "a true,
unadulterated democracy," but, unless we are to dismiss the description as
idle and vain rhetoric, we must assume that the word "democracy" was used
in an entirely new sense, utterly incompatible with its etymological and
historical meaning. Democracy has always meant absence of class rule;
proletarian dictatorship is class rule.
In the foregoing analysis of the theoretical and tactical views which
Trotzky held during and immediately after the First Revolution, it is easy
to see the genesis of the policies of the Bolshevik government which came
twelve years later. The intervening years served only to deepen his
convictions. At the center of all his thinking during that period was his
belief in the sufficiency of the Soviet, and in the need of proletarian
dictatorship. Throwing aside the first cautious thought that these things
arose from the peculiar conditions existing in Russia as a result of her
retarded economic development, he had come to regard them as applicable to
all nations and to all peoples, except, perhaps, the peoples still living
in barbarism or savagery.
VI
After the crisis which resulted in the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov,
it was evident that the Lvov government could not long endure. The
situation in the army, as well as in the country, was so bad that the
complete reorganization of the Provisional Government, upon much more
radical lines, was imperative. The question arose among the revolutionary
working-class organizations whether they should consent to co-operation
with the liberal bourgeoisie in a new coalition Cabinet or whether they
should refuse such co-operation and fight exclusively on class lines. This,
of course, opened the entire controversy between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki.
In the mean time the war-weary nation was clamoring for peace. The army was
demoralized and saturated with the defeatism preached by the Porazhentsi.
To deal with this grave situation two important conventions were arranged
for, as follows: the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front,
which opened on May 10th and lasted for about a week, and the First
All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, which opened on May 17th and
lasted for about twelve days. Between the two gatherings there was also an
important meeting of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies, which dealt with the same grave situation. The dates here are of
the greatest significance: the first convention was opened three days
before Miliukov's resignation and was in session when that event occurred;
the second convention was opened four days after the resignation of
Miliukov and one day after that of Guchkov. It was Guchkov's unique
experience to address the convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front
as Minister of War and Marine, explaining and defending his policy with
great ability, and then, some days later, to address the same assembly as a
private citizen.
Guchkov drew a terrible picture of the seriousness of the military
situation. With truly amazing candor he described conditions and explained
how they had been brought about. He begged the soldiers not to lay down
their arms, but to fight with new courage. Kerensky followed with a long
speech, noble and full of pathos. In some respects, it was the most
powerful of all the appeals it fell to his lot to make to his people, who
were staggering in the too strong sunlight of an unfamiliar freedom. He
did not lack courage to speak plainly: "My heart and soul are uneasy. I am
greatly worried and I must say so openly, no matter what ... the
consequences will be. The process of resurrecting the country's creative
forces for the purpose of establishing the new régime rests on the basis of
liberty and personal responsibility.... A century of slavery has not only
demoralized the government and transformed the old officials into a band of
traitors, _but it has also destroyed in the people themselves the
consciousness of their responsibility for their fate, their country's
destiny_." It was in this address that he cried out in his anguish: "I
regret that I did not die two months ago. I would have died happy with the
dream that the flame of a new life has been kindled in Russia, hopeful of a
time when we could respect one another's right without resorting to the
knout."
To the soldiers Kerensky brought this challenge: "You fired on the people
when the government demanded. But now, when it comes to obeying your own
revolutionary government, you can no longer endure further sacrifice! Does
this mean that free Russia is a nation of rebellious slaves?" He closed
with an eloquent peroration: "I came here because I believe in my right to
tell the truth as I understand it. People who even under the old régime
went about their work openly and without fear of death, those people, I
say, will not be terrorized. The fate of our country is in our hands and
the country is in great danger. We have sipped of the cup of liberty and we
are somewhat intoxicated; we are in need of the greatest possible sobriety
and discipline. We must go down in history meriting the epitaph on our
tombstones, 'They died, but they were never slaves.'"
From the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies came I.G.
Tseretelli, who had just returned from ten years' Siberian exile. A native
of Georgia, a prince, nearly half of his forty-two years had been spent
either in Socialist service or in exile brought about by such service. A
man of education, wise in leadership and a brilliant orator, his leadership
of the Socialist Group in the Second Duma had marked him as one of the
truly great men of Russia. To the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from
the Front Tseretelli brought the decisions of the Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Deputies, in shaping which he had taken an important part with
Tchcheidze, Skobelev, and others. The Council had decided "to send an
appeal to the soldiers at the front, and to explain to them that _in order
to bring about universal peace it is necessary to defend the Revolution and
Russia by defending the front_." This action had been taken despite the
opposition of the Bolsheviki, and showed that the moderate Socialists were
still in control of the Soviet. An Appeal to the Army, drawn up by
Tseretelli, was adopted by the vote of every member except the Bolsheviki,
who refrained from voting. This Appeal to the Army Tseretelli presented to
the Soldiers' Delegates from the Front:
Comrades, soldiers at the front, in the name of the Revolutionary
Democracy, we make a fervent appeal to you.
A hard task has fallen to your lot. You have paid a dear price,
you have paid with your blood, a dear price indeed, for the crimes
of the Czar who sent you to fight and left you without arms,
without ammunition, without bread!
Why, the privation you now suffer is the work of the Czar and his
coterie of self-seeking associates who brought the country to
ruin. And the Revolution will need the efforts of many to overcome
the disorganization left her as a heritage by these robbers and
executioners.
The working class did not need the war. The workers did not begin
it. It was started by the Czars and capitalists of all countries.
Each day of war is for the people only a day of unnecessary
suffering and misfortune. Having dethroned the Czar, the Russian
people have selected for their first problem the ending of the war
in the quickest possible manner.
The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to
all nations to end the butchery. We have appealed to the French
and the English, to the Germans and the Austrians.[18] Russia
wants an answer to this appeal. Remember, however, comrades and
soldiers, that our appeal will be of no value if the regiments of
Wilhelm overpower Revolutionary Russia before our brothers, the
workers and peasants of other countries, will be able to respond.
Our appeal will become "a scrap of paper" if the whole strength of
the revolutionary people does not stand behind it, if the triumph
of Wilhelm Hohenzollern will be established on the ruins of
Russian freedom. The ruin of free Russia will be a tremendous,
irreparable misfortune, not only for us, but for the toilers of
the whole world.
Comrades, soldiers, defend Revolutionary Russia with all your
might!
The workers and peasants of Russia desire peace with all their
soul. But this peace must be universal, a peace for all nations
based on the agreement of all.
What would happen if we should agree to a separate peace--a peace
for ourselves alone! What would happen if the Russian soldiers
were to stick their bayonets into the ground to-day and say that
they do not care to fight any longer, that it makes no difference
to them what happens to the whole world!
Here is what would happen. Having destroyed our allies in the
west, German Imperialism would rush in upon us with all the force
of its arms. Germany's imperialists, her landowners and
capitalists, would put an iron heel on our necks, would occupy our
cities, our villages, and our land, and would force us to pay
tribute to her. Was it to bow down at the feet of Wilhelm that we
overthrew Nicholas?
Comrades--soldiers! The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies leads you to peace by another route. We lead you to peace
by calling upon the workers and peasants of Serbia and Austria to
rise and revolt; we lead you to peace by calling an international
conference of Socialists for a universal and determined revolt
against war. There is a great necessity, comrades--soldiers, for
the peoples of the world to awaken. Time is needed in order that
they should rebel and with an iron hand force their Czars and
capitalists to peace. Time is needed so that the toilers of all
lands should join with us for a merciless war upon violators and
robbers.
_But remember, comrades--soldiers, this time will never come if
you do not stop the advance of the enemy at the front, if your
ranks are crushed and under the feet of Wilhelm falls the
breathless corpse of the Russian Revolution_.
Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are
now standing in defense of Russia's freedom. You defend the
Revolution, you defend your brothers, the workers and peasants.
Let this defense be worthy of the great cause and the great
sacrifices already made by you. _It is impossible to defend the
front if, as has been decided, the soldiers are not to leave the
trenches under any circumstances_.[19] At times only an attack can
repulse and prevent the advance of the enemy. At times awaiting an
attack means patiently waiting for death. Again, only the change
to an advance may save you or your brothers, on other sections of
the front, from destruction.
Remember this, comrades--soldiers! Having sworn to defend Russian
freedom, do not refuse to start the offensive the military
situation may require. The freedom and happiness of Russia are in
your hands.
In defending this freedom be on the lookout for betrayal and
trickery. The fraternization which is developing on the front can
easily turn into such a trap.
Revolutionary armies may fraternize, but with whom? With an army
also revolutionary, which has decided to die for peace and
freedom. At present, however, not only in the German army, but
even in the Austro-Hungarian army, in spite of the number of
individuals politically conscious and honest, there is no
revolution. In those countries the armies are still blindly
following Wilhelm and Charles, the landowners and capitalists, and
agree to annexation of foreign soil, to robberies and violence.
There the General Staff will make use not only of your credulity,
but also of the blind obedience of their soldiers. You go out to
fraternize with open hearts. And to meet you an officer of the
General Staff leaves the enemies' trenches, disguised as a common
soldier. You speak with the enemy without any trickery. At that
very time he photographs the surrounding territory. You stop the
shooting to fraternize, but behind the enemies' trenches artillery
is being moved, new positions built and troops transferred.
Comrades--soldiers, not by fraternization will you get peace, not
by separate agreements made at the front by single companies,
battalions, or regiments. Not in separate peace or in a separate
truce lies the salvation of the Russian Revolution, the triumph of
peace for the whole world.
The people who assure you that fraternizing is the road to peace
lead you to destruction. Do not believe them. The road to peace is
a different one. It has been pointed out to you already by the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies: tread it. Sweep aside
everything that weakens your fighting power, that brings into the
army disorganization and loss of spirit.
Your fighting power serves the cause of peace. The Council of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is able to continue its
revolutionary work with all its might, to develop its struggle for
peace, only by depending on you, knowing that you will not allow
the military destruction of Russia.
Comrades--soldiers, the workers and peasants, not only of Russia,
but of the whole world, look to you with confidence and hope.
Soldiers of the Revolution, you will prove worthy of this faith,
for you know that your military tasks serve the cause of peace.
In the name of the happiness and freedom of Revolutionary Russia,
in the name of the coming brotherhood of nations, you will fulfil
your military duties with unconquerable strength.
Again and again Tseretelli was interrupted with cheers as he read this
Appeal to the Army. He was cheered, too, when he explained that the Soviet
had decided to support the reconstructed Provisional Government and called
upon the soldiers to do likewise. There was a storm of applause when he
said: "We well realize the necessity of having a strong power in Russia;
however, the strength of this power must rely upon its progressive and
revolutionary policy. Our government must adopt the revolutionary slogans
of democracy. It must grant the demands of the revolutionary people. It
must turn over all land to the laboring peasantry. It must safeguard the
interests of the working class, enacting improved social legislation for
the protection of labor. It must lead Russia to a speedy and lasting peace
worthy of a great people."