Chapter XX. Of The Competition Of Different Countries In The Same Market.

§ 1. Causes which enable one Country to undersell another.

In the phraseology of the Mercantile System, there is no word of more

frequent recurrence or more perilous import than the word _underselling_.

To undersell other countries—not to be undersold by other countries—were

spoken of, and are still very often spoken of, almost as if they were the

sole purposes for which production and commodities exist.

Nations may, like individual dealers, be competitors, with

opposite interests, in the markets of some commodities, while in

others they are in the more fortunate relation of reciprocal

customers. The benefit of commerce does not consist, as it was

once thought to do, in the commodities sold; but, since the

commodities sold are the means of obtaining those which are

bought, a nation would be cut off from the real advantage of

commerce, the imports, if it could not induce other nations to

take any of its commodities in exchange; and in proportion as the

competition of other countries compels it to offer its commodities

on cheaper terms, on pain of not selling them at all, the imports

which it obtains by its foreign trade are procured at greater

cost.

One country (A) can only undersell another (B) in a given market, to the

extent of entirely expelling her from it, on two conditions: (1) In the

first place, she (A) must have a greater advantage than the second country

(B) in the production of the article exported by both; meaning by a

greater advantage (as has been already so fully explained) not absolutely,

but in comparison with other commodities; and (2) in the second place,

such must be her (A’s) relation with the customer-country in respect to

the demand for each other’s products, and such the consequent state of

international values, as to give away to the customer-country more than

the whole advantage possessed by the rival country (B); otherwise the

rival will still be able to hold her ground in the market.

Let us suppose a trade between England and the United States, in

iron and wheat. England being capable of producing ten cwts. of

iron at the same cost as fifteen bushels of wheat, the United

States at the same cost as twenty bushels, and the two commodities

being exchanged between the two countries (cost of carriage apart)

at some intermediate rate, say ten for seventeen. The United

States could not be permanently undersold in the English market,

and expelled from it, unless by a country (such as India) which

offered not merely more than seventeen, but more than twenty

bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron. Short of that, the

competition would only oblige the United States to pay dearer for

iron, but would not disable her from exporting wheat. The country,

therefore, which could undersell the United States, must, in the

first place, be able to produce wheat at less cost, compared with

iron, than the United States herself; and, in the next place, must

have such a demand for iron, or other English commodities, as

would compel her, even when she became sole occupant of the

market, to give a greater advantage to England than the United

States could give by resigning the whole of hers; to give, for

example, twenty-one bushels for ten cwts. For if not—if, for

example, the equation of international demand, after the United

States was excluded, gave a ratio of eighteen for ten—the United

States would be now the underselling nation; and there would be a

point, perhaps nineteen for ten, at which both countries would be

able to maintain their ground, and to sell in England enough wheat

to pay for the iron, or other English commodities, for which, on

these newly adjusted terms of interchange, they had a demand. In

like manner, England, as an exporter of iron, could only be driven

from the American market by some rival whose superior advantages

in the production of iron enabled her, and the intensity of whose

demand for American produce compelled her, to offer ten cwts. of

iron, not merely for less than seventeen bushels of wheat, but for

less than fifteen. In that case, England could no longer carry on

the trade without loss; but, in any case short of this, she would

merely be obliged to give to the United States more iron for less

wheat than she had previously given.(288)

It thus appears that the alarm of being permanently undersold may be taken

much too easily; may be taken when the thing really to be anticipated is

not the loss of the trade, but the minor inconvenience of carrying it on

at a diminished advantage; an inconvenience chiefly falling on the

consumers of foreign commodities, and not on the producers or sellers of

the exported article. It is no sufficient ground of apprehension to the

[American] producers, to find that some other country can sell [wheat] in

foreign markets, at some particular time, a trifle cheaper than they can

themselves afford to do in the existing state of prices in [the United

States]. Suppose them to be temporarily unsold, and their exports

diminished; the imports will exceed the exports, there will be a new

distribution of the precious metals, prices will fall, and, as all the

money expenses of the [American] producers will be diminished, they will

be able (if the case falls short of that stated in the preceding

paragraph) again to compete with their rivals.

The loss which [the United States] will incur will not fall upon the

exporters, but upon those who consume imported commodities; who, with

money incomes reduced in amount, will have to pay the same or even an

increased price for all things produced in foreign countries.

But the business world would regard what was going on under

economic laws as a great and dreaded disaster, if it meant that

prices were to fall, and gold leave the country. Those holding

large stocks of goods would for that time suffer; and so, at

first, it might really happen that “exporters,” in the sense of

exporting agents (not the producers, perhaps, of the exportable

article), would incur a loss. In the end, of course, the consumers

of imports suffer. But, temporarily, and on the face of it,

exporters do lose.

§ 2. High wages do not prevent one Country from underselling another.

According to the preceding doctrine, a country can not be undersold in any

commodity, unless the rival country has a stronger inducement than itself

for devoting its labor and capital to the production of the commodity;

arising from the fact that by doing so it occasions a greater saving of

labor and capital, to be shared between itself and its customers—a greater

increase of the aggregate produce of the world. The underselling,

therefore, though a loss to the undersold country, is an advantage to the

world at large; the substituted commerce being one which economizes more

of the labor and capital of mankind, and adds more to their collective

wealth, than the commerce superseded by it. The advantage, of course,

consists in being able to produce the commodity of better quality, or with

less labor (compared with other things); or perhaps not with less labor,

but in less time; with a less prolonged detention of the capital employed.

This may arise from greater natural advantages (such as soil, climate,

richness of mines); superior capability, either natural or acquired, in

the laborers; better division of labor, and better tools, or machinery.

But there is no place left in this theory for the case of lower wages.

This, however, in the theories commonly current, is a favorite cause of

underselling. We continually hear of the disadvantage under which the

[American] producer labors, both in foreign markets and even in his own,

through the lower wages paid by his foreign rivals. These lower wages, we

are told, enable, or are always on the point of enabling, them to sell at

lower prices, and to dislodge the [American] manufacturer from all markets

in which he is not artificially protected.

It will be remembered that, as we have before seen, international

trade, in actual practice, depends on comparative prices within

the same country (even though the exporter may not consciously

make a comparison). We send wheat abroad, because it is low in

price relatively to certain manufactured goods; that is, we send

the wheat, but we do not send the manufactured goods. But, so far,

this is considering only the comparative prices in the same

country. Yet we shall fail to realize in actual practice the

application of the above principles, when we use the terms prices

and money, if we do not admit that there is in the matter of

underselling a comparison, also, between the absolute price of the

goods in one country and the absolute price of the same goods in

the competing country. For example, wheat is not shipped to

England unless the price is lower here than there. If India or

Morocco were to send wheat into the English market in close

competition with the United States, and the price were to fall in

London, it would mean that, if we continued our shipments of wheat

to England, we must part with our wheat at a less advantage in the

international exchange. In the illustration already used, we must,

for example, offer more than seventeen bushels of wheat for ten

cwts. of iron. The fall in the price of wheat, without any change

in that of iron, implies the necessity of offering a greater

quantity of wheat for the same quantity of iron, perhaps nineteen

or twenty bushels for ten cwts. of iron. If the price went so low

as to require twenty-one bushels to pay for ten cwts. of iron,

then we should be entirely undersold; and the price here as

compared with the price in London would be an indication of the

fact. So that the comparison of prices here with prices abroad is

merely a register of the terms at which our international

exchanges are performed; but not the cause of the existence of the

international trade. If the price falls so low in a foreign market

that we can not sell wheat there, it simply means that we have

reached in the exchange ratios the limit of our comparative

advantages in wheat and iron; so that we are obliged to offer

twenty or more bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron.

But in all this it must be noted that this price must include the

return to capital also, and that it must be equal to the usual

reward for capital in other competing industries, that is, the

ordinary rate of profit. In exporting wheat from the United States

the capital engaged will insist on getting the rate of profit to

be found in other occupations to which the capital can go, in the

United States. Now, the price, if it stands for the value (which

is supposed to be governed by cost of production in this case), is

the sum out of which wages and profits are paid. If the price were

to fall in the foreign market, then there might not be the means

with which to pay the usual rate of wages and the usual rate of

profit also. Then we should probably hear of complaints by the

shippers that there is no profit in the exportation of wheat, and

of a falling off in the trade. In other words, as the capitalist

is the one who manages the operation, and is the one first

affected, the diminution of advantage in foreign trade arising

from competition, generally shows itself first in lessened

profits. The price, then, is the means by which we determine

whether a certain article gives us that comparative advantage

which will insure a gain from international trade.

An exportable article whose price in this country is low—since it

is for this reason selected as an export—is one whose cost is low.

If the cost be low, it means that the industry is very productive;

that the same capital and labor produce more for their exertion in

this than in other industries. And yet it is precisely in the most

productive industries that higher wages and profits can be, and

are, paid. Although each article is sold at a low price, the great

quantity produced makes the total sum, or value, out of which the

industrial rewards, profits, and wages, are paid, large. That is,

the price may be very low (lower, also, in direct comparison with

prices abroad) and yet pay the rate of wages and profits current

in this country. Consequently, although wages and profits may be

very high (relatively to older countries) in those industries of

the United States whose productiveness is great, yet the very fact

of this low cost, and consequently this low price (where

competition is effective), is that which fits the commodity for

exportation. We are, therefore, inevitably led to a position in

which we see that high wages and low prices naturally go together

in an exportable commodity. In practice, certainly, the high wages

do not, by raising the price, prevent us, by comparing our price

with English prices, from sending goods abroad—because we send

goods abroad from our most productive employments. As an

illustration of this principle, it is found that the leading

exports of the United States, in 1883, were cotton, breadstuffs,

provisions, tobacco, mineral oils, and wood.

But, since a direct comparison is in practice made between prices

here and prices in England (for example), in order to determine

whether the trade can be a profitable one, we constantly hear it

said that we can not send goods abroad because our labor is so

dear. It need scarcely be observed that we do not hear this from

those engaged in any of the extractive industries just mentioned

as furnishing large exports, which are admittedly very productive;

it is generally heard in regard to certain kinds of manufactured

goods. The difficulty arises not with regard to articles in which

we have the greatest advantage in productiveness, but those in

which we have a less advantage. If the majority of occupations are

so productive as to assure a generally high reward to labor and

capital throughout the country, these less advantageously situated

industries—not being so productive as others (either from lack of

skill or good management, or high cost of machinery and materials,

or peculiarities of climate, or heavy taxation)—can not pay the

usual high reward to labor, and at the same time get for the

capitalist the same high reward he can everywhere else receive at

home. For, at a price low enough to warrant an exportation, the

quantity made by a given amount of labor and capital does not

yield a total value so great as is given in the majority of other

occupations to the same amount of labor and capital, and out of

which the usual high wages and profits can be paid. The less

productiveness of an industry, compared with other industries in

the same country, then, is the real cause which prevents it from

competing with foreign countries consistently with receiving the

ordinary rate of profit. It is the high rate of profits as well as

the high rate of wages common in the country which prevents

selling abroad. It is absurd to say that it is only high wages: it

is just as much high profits. Of course, if the less productive

industries wish to compete with England, and if they pay—as we

know they must—the high rate of wages due to the general

productiveness of our country’s industries, they must submit to

less profits for the pleasure of having that particular desire. It

is not possible that we should produce everything equally well

here; nor is it possible that England should produce everything

equally well. If we wish to send any goods at all to England, we

must receive some goods from her. In order to get the gain arising

from our productiveness, we must earnestly wish that England

should have some commodity also in which she has a comparative

advantage, in order that any trade whatever may exist. It is not,

however, worth while, in my opinion, to go on in this discussion

to consider the position of those who would shut us off from any

and all foreign trade.

Our present high wages should be a cause for congratulation,

because they are due to the generally high productiveness of our

resources, or, in other words, due to low cost; and it is to be

hoped that they may long continue high. We do not seem to be in

imminent danger of not having goods which we can export in

quantities which will buy for us all we may wish to import from

abroad. (See Chart No. XIII, and note the vast increase of exports

at the same time that wages are known to be higher in this country

than abroad.) So long as wages continue high, we may possibly be

unwilling to see gratified that false and ignorant desire which

leads some people to think that we ought to produce, equally well

with any competitor in the world, everything that is made. If, as

was pointed out under the discussion on cost of labor,(289) we

must necessarily connect with efficiency of labor all natural

advantages under which labor works, it is easy to see that high

wages are entirely consistent with low prices; and that high wages

do not prevent us to-day from having an hitherto unequaled export

trade. Even if all wages and all profits were lower, it would,

however, affect all industries alike, and some would still be more

productive relatively to others, and the same inequality would

remain. If, however, we learn to use our materials better, use

machinery with more effect on the quantity produced, adapt our

industries to our climate, get the raw products more cheaply, free

ourselves from excessive and unreasonable taxation, it would be

difficult to say what commodities we might not be able eventually

to manufacture in competition with the rest of the world. For we

have scarcely ever, as a country, had the advantage of such

conditions to aid us in our foreign trade.

Mr. Mill now goes on to consider the suggestive fact that wages

are higher in England than on the Continent, and yet that the

English have no difficulty in underselling their Continental

rivals.

Before examining this opinion on grounds of principle, it is worth while

to bestow a moment’s consideration upon it as a question of fact. Is it

true that the wages of manufacturing labor are lower in foreign countries

than in England, in any sense in which low wages are an advantage to the

capitalist? The artisan of Ghent or Lyons may earn less wages in a day,

but does he not do less work? Degrees of efficiency considered, does his

labor cost less to his employer? Though wages may be lower on the

Continent, is not the Cost of Labor, which is the real element in the

competition, very nearly the same? That it is so seems the opinion of

competent judges, and is confirmed by the very little difference in the

rate of profit between England and the Continental countries. But, if so,

the opinion is absurd that English producers can be undersold by their

Continental rivals from this cause. It is only in America that the

supposition is _prima facie_ admissible. In America wages are much higher

than in England, if we mean by wages the daily earnings of a laborer; but

the productive power of American labor is so great—its efficiency,

combined with the favorable circumstances in which it is exerted, makes it

worth so much to the purchaser—that the Cost of Labor is lower in America

than in England; as is proved by the fact that the general rate of profits

and of interest is very much higher.

§ 3. Low wages enable a Country to undersell another, when Peculiar to

certain branches of Industry.

But is it true that low wages, even in the sense of low Cost of Labor,

enable a country to sell cheaper in the foreign market? I mean, of course,

low wages which are common to the whole productive industry of the

country.

If wages, in any of the departments of industry which supply exports, are

kept, artificially or by some accidental cause, below the general rate of

wages in the country, this is a real advantage in the foreign market. It

lessens the _comparative_ cost of production of those articles in relation

to others, and has the same effect as if their production required so much

less labor. Take, for instance, the case of the United States in respect

to certain commodities. In that country tobacco and cotton, two great

articles of export, are produced by slave-labor, while food and

manufactures generally are produced by free laborers, who either work on

their own account or are paid by wages. In spite of the inferior

efficiency of slave-labor, there can be no reasonable doubt that, in a

country where the wages of free labor are so high, the work executed by

slaves is a better bargain to the capitalist. To whatever extent it is so,

this smaller cost of labor, being not general, but limited to those

employments, is just as much a cause of cheapness in the products, both in

the home and in the foreign market, as if they had been made by a less

quantity of labor. If the slaves in the Southern States were emancipated,

and their wages rose to the general level of the earnings of free labor in

America, that country might be obliged to erase some of the slave-grown

articles from the catalogue of its exports, and would certainly be unable

to sell any of them in the foreign market at the present price. Their

cheapness is partly an artificial cheapness, which may be compared to that

produced by a bounty on production or on exportation; or, considering the

means by which it is obtained, an apter comparison would be with the

cheapness of stolen goods.

[Illustration: Chart XV.]

Chart XV.

How far Mr. Mill was in error may be seen by Chart No. XV, which

shows the enormous increase of cotton production under the

_régime_ of free labor as compared with that of slave-labor in the

United States. The abolition of slavery has been an economic gain

to the South. Moreover, the exports of raw cotton have increased

from 644,327,921 pounds in 1869, to 2,288,075,062 pounds in 1883;

while for corresponding years the exports of tobacco increased

from 181,527,630 to 235,628,360 pounds. In other words, exports of

tobacco were increased by 30 per cent, and those of raw cotton by

no less than 255 per cent. Besides, the prices of cotton and

tobacco are no higher now than before 1850.

An advantage of a similar economical, though of a very different moral

character, is that possessed by domestic manufactures; fabrics produced in

the leisure hours of families partially occupied in other pursuits, who,

not depending for subsistence on the produce of the manufacture, can

afford to sell it at any price, however low, for which they think it worth

while to take the trouble of producing. The workman of Zürich is to-day a

manufacturer, to-morrow again an agriculturist, and changes his

occupations with the seasons in a continual round. Manufacturing industry

and tillage advance hand in hand, in inseparable alliance, and in this

union of the two occupations the secret may be found why the simple and

unlearned Swiss manufacturer can always go on competing and increasing in

prosperity in the face of those extensive establishments fitted out with

great economic and (what is still more important) intellectual resources.

In the case of these domestic manufactures, the comparative cost of

production, on which the interchange between countries depends, is much

lower than in proportion to the quantity of labor employed. The

work-people, looking to the earnings of their loom for a part only, if for

any part, of their actual maintenance, can afford to work for a less

remuneration than the lowest rate of wages which can permanently exist in

the employments by which the laborer has to support the whole expense of a

family. Working, as they do, not for an employer but for themselves, they

may be said to carry on the manufacture at no cost at all, except the

small expense of a loom and of the material; and the limit of possible

cheapness is not the necessity of living by their trade, but that of

earning enough by the work to make that social employment of their leisure

hours not disagreeable.

§ 4. —But not when common to All.

These two cases, of slave-labor and of domestic manufactures, exemplify

the conditions under which low wages enable a country to sell its

commodities cheaper in foreign markets, and consequently to undersell its

rivals, or to avoid being undersold by them. But no such advantage is

conferred by low wages when common to all branches of industry. General

low wages never caused any country to undersell its rivals, nor did

general high wages ever hinder it from doing so.

To demonstrate this, we must turn to an elementary principle which was

discussed in a former chapter.(290) General low wages do not cause low

prices, nor high wages high prices, within the country itself. General

prices are not raised by a rise of wages, any more than they would be

raised by an increase of the quantity of labor required in all production.

Expenses which affect all commodities equally have no influence on prices.

If the maker of broadcloth or cutlery, and nobody else, had to pay higher

wages, the price of his commodity would rise, just as it would if he had

to employ more labor; because otherwise he would gain less profit than

other producers, and nobody would engage in the employment. But if

everybody has to pay higher wages, or everybody to employ more labor, the

loss must be submitted to; as it affects everybody alike, no one can hope

to get rid of it by a change of employment; each, therefore, resigns

himself to a diminution of profits, and prices remain as they were. In

like manner, general low wages, or a general increase in the

productiveness of labor, does not make prices low, but profits high. If

wages fall (meaning here by wages the cost of labor), why, on that

account, should the producer lower his price? He will be forced, it may be

said, by the competition of other capitalists who will crowd into his

employment. But other capitalists are also paying lower wages, and by

entering into competition with him they would gain nothing but what they

are gaining already. The rate, then, at which labor is paid, as well as

the quantity of it which is employed, affects neither the value nor the

price of the commodity produced, except in so far as it is peculiar to

that commodity, and not common to commodities generally.

However, without there being any change in the productiveness of

any industry, if the price of the article should rise, for

instance, from an increased demand, that would make the total

value arising from the products of the industry larger in its

purchasing power, and so there would be a larger sum to be divided

among labor and capital. If there be free competition, more

capital would move into this one industry under the hope of larger

profits, and so wages would rise. Therefore, it is possible that

high wages and high prices may go together, but not as cause and

effect. In fact, the change in price generally precedes the change

in wages. On the other hand, while low wages are not the cause of

low prices nor high wages of high prices, yet the two may be found

together, as both due to a common cause, viz., the small or great

value of the total product.(291)

Since low wages are not a cause of low prices in the country itself, so

neither do they cause it to offer its commodities in foreign markets at a

lower price. It is quite true that, if the cost of labor is lower in

America than in England, America could sell her cottons to Cuba at a lower

price than England, and still gain as high a profit as the English

manufacturer. But it is not with the profit of the English manufacturer

that the American cotton-spinner will make his comparison; it is with the

profits of other American capitalists. These enjoy, in common with

himself, the benefit of a low cost of labor, and have accordingly a high

rate of profit. This high profit the cotton-spinner must also have: he

will not content himself with the English profit. It is true he may go on

for a time at that lower rate, rather than change his employment; and a

trade may be carried on, sometimes for a long period, at a much lower

profit than that for which it would have been originally engaged in.

Countries which have a low cost of labor and high profits do not for that

reason undersell others, but they do oppose a more obstinate resistance to

being undersold, because the producers can often submit to a diminution of

profit without being unable to live, and even to thrive, by their

business. But this is all which their advantage does for them; and in this

resistance they will not long persevere when a change of times which may

give them equal profits with the rest of their countrymen has become

manifestly hopeless.

§ 5. Low profits as affecting the carrying Trade.

It is worth while also to notice a third class of small, but in this case

mostly independent communities, which have supported and enriched

themselves almost without any productions of their own (except ships and

marine equipments), by a mere carrying-trade, and commerce of entrepot; by

buying the produce of one country, to sell it at a profit in another. Such

were Venice and the Hanse Towns.

When the Venetians became the agents of the general commerce of Southern

Europe, they had scarcely any competitors: the thing would not have been

done at all without them, and there was really no limit to their profits

except the limit to what the ignorant feudal nobility could and would give

for the unknown luxuries then first presented to their sight. At a later

period competition arose, and the profit of this operation, like that of

others, became amenable to natural laws. The carrying-trade was taken up

by Holland, a country with productions of its own and a large accumulated

capital. The other nations of Europe also had now capital to spare, and

were capable of conducting their foreign trade for themselves: but

Holland, having, from the variety of circumstances, a lower rate of profit

at home, could afford to carry for other countries at a smaller advance on

the original cost of the goods than would have been required by their own

capitalists; and Holland, therefore, engrossed the greatest part of the

carrying-trade of all those countries which did not keep it to themselves

by navigation laws,(292) constructed, like those of England, for the

express purpose.

In the United States, early in the century, a retaliatory policy

against England gave us a body of navigation laws copied after the

mediæval statutes of England and the Continent, which still remain

on the statute-book. They do not permit an American to buy a

vessel abroad and sail it under our flag without paying enormous

duties; a provision which is intended to foster ship-building in

the United States. Even with this legislation, ships, as a fact,

are not built here for the foreign trade; and our ship-builders

practically supply the coasting-trade only (which is not open to

foreigners). The ability to buy ships anywhere, and enter them to

registry under our flag free of duty, is what is meant by the

demand for “free ships.” This, however, has to do with

ship-building. But ship-owning or ship-sailing, is quite distinct

from it. The ability to get as great a return from capital and

labor invested in a ship as from other occupations open to

Americans is another thing. Even if we had “free ships,” the

higher returns in other industries in our country, particularly as

regards profits, might cause capitalists naturally to neglect a

less for a more productive business. In 1884 Congress has very

properly taken away many vexatious restrictions upon ships, which

diminished the returns from ship-sailing, and it remains to be

seen whether we can thereby regain any of our foreign

carrying-trade. At present we have a very small tonnage even in

that part of the shipping engaged in carrying our own goods.

Principles of Political Economy Abridged with Critical, Bibliographical, and Explanatory Notes, and a Sketch of the History of Political Economy · 第 20 / 25 章