Chapter XIX. Of The Rate Of Interest.

§ 1. The Rate of Interest depends on the Demand and Supply of Loans.

The two topics of Currency and Loans, though in themselves distinct, are

so intimately blended in the phenomena of what is called the money market,

that it is impossible to understand the one without the other, and in many

minds the two subjects are mixed up in the most inextricable confusion.

In the preceding book(285) we defined the relation in which interest

stands to profit. We found that the gross profit of capital might be

distinguished into three parts, which are respectively the remuneration

for risk, for trouble, and for the capital itself, and may be termed

insurance, wages of superintendence, and interest. After making

compensation for risk, that is, after covering the average losses to which

capital is exposed either by the general circumstances of society or by

the hazards of the particular employment, there remains a surplus, which

partly goes to repay the owner of the capital for his abstinence, and

partly the employer of it for his time and trouble. How much goes to the

one and how much to the other is shown by the amount of the remuneration

which, when the two functions are separated, the owner of capital can

obtain from the employer for its use. This is evidently a question of

demand and supply. Nor have demand and supply any different meaning or

effect in this case from what they have in all others. The rate of

interest will be such as to equalize the demand for loans with the supply

of them. It will be such that, exactly as much as some people are desirous

to borrow at that rate, others shall be willing to lend. If there is more

offered than demanded, interest will fall; if more is demanded than

offered, it will rise; and in both cases, to the point at which the

equation of supply and demand is re-established.

The desire to borrow and the willingness to lend are more or less

influenced by every circumstance which affects the state or prospects of

industry or commerce, either generally or in any of their branches. The

rate of interest, therefore, on good security, which alone we have here to

consider (for interest in which considerations of risk bear a part may

swell to any amount), is seldom, in the great centers of money

transactions, precisely the same for two days together; as is shown by the

never-ceasing variations in the quoted prices of the funds and other

negotiable securities. Nevertheless, there must be, as in other cases of

value, some rate which (in the language of Adam Smith and Ricardo) may be

called the natural rate; some rate about which the market rate oscillates,

and to which it always tends to return. This rate partly depends on the

amount of accumulation going on in the hands of persons who can not

themselves attend to the employment of their savings, and partly on the

comparative taste existing in the community for the active pursuits of

industry, or for the leisure, ease, and independence of an annuitant.

§ 2. Circumstances which Determine the Permanent Demand and Supply of

Loans.

In [ordinary] circumstances, the more thriving producers and traders have

their capital fully employed, and many are able to transact business to a

considerably greater extent than they have capital for. These are

naturally borrowers: and the amount which they desire to borrow, and can

give security for, constitutes the demand for loans on account of

productive employment. To these must be added the loans required by

Government, and by land-owners, or other unproductive consumers who have

good security to give. This constitutes the mass of loans for which there

is an habitual demand.

Now, it is conceivable that there might exist, in the hands of persons

disinclined or disqualified for engaging personally in business, (1) a

mass of capital equal to, and even exceeding, this demand. In that case

there would be an habitual excess of competition on the part of lenders,

and the rate of interest would bear a low proportion to the rate of

profit. Interest would be forced down to the point which would either

tempt borrowers to take a greater amount of loans than they had a

reasonable expectation of being able to employ in their business, or would

so discourage a portion of the lenders as to make them either forbear to

accumulate or endeavor to increase their income by engaging in business on

their own account, and incurring the risks, if not the labors, of

industrial employment.

The low rates of interest, rather, tempt people to take some

additional risk, and enter into investments which offer a higher

rate of dividends; so that a period of low interest is a time when

speculative enterprises find victims, and then by bad and

worthless investments much of the loanable funds is actually lost;

thereby reducing the total quantity of loans more nearly to that

demand which will give an ordinary rate of interest.

(2.) On the other hand, the capital owned by persons who prefer lending it

at interest, or whose avocations prevent them from personally

superintending its employment, may be short of the habitual demand for

loans. It may be in great part absorbed by the investments afforded by the

public debt and by mortgages, and the remainder may not be sufficient to

supply the wants of commerce. If so, the rate of interest will be raised

so high as in some way to re-establish the equilibrium. When there is only

a small difference between interest and profit, many borrowers may no

longer be willing to increase their responsibilities and involve their

credit for so small a remuneration: or some, who would otherwise have

engaged in business, may prefer leisure, and become lenders instead of

borrowers: or others, under the inducement of high interest and easy

investment for their capital, may retire from business earlier, and with

smaller fortunes, than they otherwise would have done.

Or, lastly, instead of [capital] being afforded by persons not in

business, the affording it may itself become a business. A portion of the

capital employed in trade may be supplied by a class of professional

money-lenders. These money-lenders, however, must have more than a mere

interest; they must have the ordinary rate of profit on their capital,

risk and all other circumstances being allowed for. [For] it can never

answer, to any one who borrows for the purposes of his business, to pay a

full profit for capital from which he will only derive a full profit: and

money-lending, as an employment, for the regular supply of trade, can not,

therefore, be carried on except by persons who, in addition to their own

capital, can lend their credit, or, in other words, the capital of other

people. A bank which lends its notes lends capital which it borrows from

the community, and for which it pays no interest.

Of late years, however, banks are generally not permitted to issue

notes on their simple credit. That privilege has been so often

abused in this country that now, in the national banking system, a

separate part of the resources are set aside for the security of

the circulating notes (as is also true of the Bank of England

since 1844). It is not generally true, then, that banks now create

the means to make loans by issuing notes by which they borrow

capital from the community without paying interest. They do,

however, depend almost entirely on deposits.

A bank of deposit lends capital which it collects from the community in

small parcels, sometimes without paying any interest, and, if it does pay

interest, it still pays much less than it receives; for the depositors,

who in any other way could mostly obtain for such small balances no

interest worth taking any trouble for, are glad to receive even a little.

Having this subsidiary resource, bankers are enabled to obtain, by lending

at interest, the ordinary rate of profit on their own capital. The

disposable capital deposited in banks, together with the funds belonging

to those who, either from necessity or preference, live upon the interest

of their property, constitute the general loan fund of the country; and

the amount of this aggregate fund, when set against the habitual demands

of producers and dealers, and those of the Government and of unproductive

consumers, determines the permanent or average rate of interest, which

must always be such as to adjust these two amounts to one another.(286)

But, while the whole of this mass of lent capital takes effect upon the

_permanent_ rate of interest, the _fluctuations_ depend almost entirely

upon the portion which is in the hands of bankers; for it is that portion

almost exclusively which, being lent for short times only, is continually

in the market seeking an investment. The capital of those who live on the

interest of their own fortunes has generally sought and found some fixed

investment, such as the public funds, mortgages, or the bonds of public

companies, which investment, except under peculiar temptations or

necessities, is not changed.

§ 3. Circumstances which Determine the Fluctuations.

Fluctuations in the rate of interest arise from variations either in the

demand for loans or in the supply. The supply is liable to variation,

though less so than the demand. The willingness to lend is greater than

usual at the commencement of a period of speculation, and much less than

usual during the revulsion which follows. In speculative times,

money-lenders as well as other people are inclined to extend their

business by stretching their credit; they lend more than usual (just as

other classes of dealers and producers employ more than usual) of capital

which does not belong to them. Accordingly, these are the times when the

rate of interest is low; though for this too (as we shall immediately see)

there are other causes. During the revulsion, on the contrary, interest

always rises inordinately, because, while there is a most pressing need on

the part of many persons to borrow, there is a general disinclination to

lend.(287)

This disinclination, when at its extreme point, is called a panic. It

occurs when a succession of unexpected failures has created in the

mercantile, and sometimes also in the non-mercantile public, a general

distrust in each other’s solvency; disposing every one not only to refuse

fresh credit, except on very onerous terms, but to call in, if possible,

all credit which he has already given. Deposits are withdrawn from banks;

notes are returned on the issuers in exchange for specie; bankers raise

their rate of discount, and withhold their customary advances; merchants

refuse to renew mercantile bills. At such times the most calamitous

consequences were formerly experienced from the attempt of the law to

prevent more than a certain limited rate of interest from being given or

taken. Persons who could not borrow at five per cent had to pay, not six

or seven, but ten or fifteen per cent, to compensate the lender for

risking the penalties of the law; or had to sell securities or goods for

ready money at a still greater sacrifice.

The pernicious and hurtful custom exists in various States in this

country of making any interest beyond a certain rate illegal. When

it is remembered that legitimate business is often largely done on

credit—until the proceeds of goods sold on credit are

collected—the rate of interest from day to day is very important

to trade. So, when there is a sudden demand for loans, a rate

higher than the legal one will certainly be paid, and the law

violated, if the getting of a loan is absolutely necessary to save

the borrower from commercial ruin. The effect of a legal rate is

to stop loans at the very time when loans are most essential to

the business public. It would be far better to adopt such a

sliding scale as exists at great European banks, which allows the

rate of interest to rise with the demand. No one, then, with good

security, need want loans if he is willing to pay the high rates;

and those not really in need will defer their demand until the

sudden emergency is past. Already in New York the legal penalty

has been removed for loaning at higher than the legal rates when

charged upon call-loans; and it has mitigated the extreme

fluctuations of the rate in a market when financial necessity is

contending against the law.

Except at such periods, the amount of capital disposable on loan is

subject to little other variation than that which arises from the gradual

process of accumulation; which process, however, in the great commercial

countries, is sufficiently rapid to account for the almost periodical

recurrence of these fits of speculation; since, when a few years have

elapsed without a crisis, and no new and tempting channel for investment

has been opened in the mean time, there is always found to have occurred

in those few years so large an increase of capital seeking investment as

to have lowered considerably the rate of interest, whether indicated by

the prices of securities or by the rate of discount on bills; and this

diminution of interest tempts the possessors to incur hazards in hopes of

a more considerable return.

The demand for loans varies much more largely than the supply, and

embraces longer cycles of years in its aberrations. A time of war, for

example, is a period of unusual draughts on the loan market. The

Government, at such times, generally incurs new loans, and, as these

usually succeed each other rapidly as long as the war lasts, the general

rate of interest is kept higher in war than in peace, without reference to

the rate of profit, and productive industry is stinted of its usual

supplies.

The United States during the late war found that it could not

borrow at even six or seven per cent. By receiving depreciated

paper at par for its bonds it really agreed to pay six gold

dollars on each loan of one hundred dollars in paper (worth,

perhaps, at the worst only forty gold dollars), which was

equivalent to fifteen per cent. This high rate was largely due to

the weakened credit of the Government; but still it remains true

that the rate was higher because the United States was in the

market as a competitor for large loans. Now the Government can

refund its bonds at three per cent.

Nor does the influence of these loans altogether cease when the Government

ceases to contract others; for those already contracted continue to afford

an investment for a greatly increased amount of the disposable capital of

the country, which, if the national debt were paid off, would be added to

the mass of capital seeking investment, and (independently of temporary

disturbance) could not but, to some extent, permanently lower the rate of

interest.

The rapid payment of the public debt by the United States,

$137,823,253 in 1882-1883, and more than $100,000,000 in

1883-1884, has taken away the former investment for enormous sums

of loanable funds, and to the same extent increased the supply in

the market. Without doubt this aids in making the present rate of

interest a very low one. Whether the rate will remain “permanently

lower,” however, will depend upon whether the field of investment

in the United States is already practically occupied. We believe

it is not.

The same effect on interest which is produced by government loans for war

expenditure is produced by the sudden opening of any new and generally

attractive mode of permanent investment. The only instance of the kind in

recent history, on a scale comparable to that of the war loans, is the

absorption of capital in the construction of railways. This capital must

have been principally drawn from the deposits in banks, or from savings

which would have gone into deposit, and which were destined to be

ultimately employed in buying securities from persons who would have

employed the purchase-money in discounts or other loans at interest: in

either case, it was a draft on the general loan fund. It is, in fact,

evident that, unless savings were made expressly to be employed in railway

adventure, the amount thus employed must have been derived either from the

actual capital of persons in business or from capital which would have

been lent to persons in business.

§ 4. The Rate of Interest not really Connected with the value of Money,

but often confounded with it.

From the preceding considerations it would be seen, even if it were not

otherwise evident, how great an error it is to imagine that the rate of

interest bears any necessary relation to the quantity or value of the

money in circulation. An increase of the currency has in itself no effect,

and is incapable of having any effect, on the rate of interest. A paper

currency issued by Government in the payment of its ordinary expenses, in

however great excess it may be issued, affects the rate of interest in no

manner whatever. It diminishes, indeed, the power of money to buy

commodities, but not the power of money to buy money. If a hundred dollars

will buy a perpetual annuity of four dollars a year, a depreciation which

makes the hundred dollars worth only half as much as before has precisely

the same effect on the four dollars, and therefore can not alter the

relation between the two. Unless, indeed, it is known and reckoned upon

that the depreciation will only be temporary; for people certainly might

be willing to lend the depreciated currency on cheaper terms if they

expected to be repaid in money of full value.

In considering the effect produced by the proceedings of banks in

encouraging the excesses of speculation, an immense effect is usually

attributed to their issues of notes, but until of late hardly any

attention was paid to the management of their deposits, though nothing is

more certain than that their imprudent extensions of credit take place

more frequently by means of their deposits than of their issues. Says Mr.

Tooke: “Supposing all the deposits received by a banker to be in coin, is

he not, just as much as the issuing banker, exposed to the importunity of

customers, whom it may be impolitic to refuse, for loans or discounts, or

to be tempted by a high interest; and may he not be induced to encroach so

much upon his deposits as to leave him, under not improbable

circumstances, unable to meet the demands of his depositors?”

In truth, the most difficult questions of banking center around

the functions of discount and deposit. The separation of the Issue

from the Banking Department by the act of 1844, which renewed the

charter of the Bank of England, makes this perfectly clear. After

entirely removing from their effect on credit all influences due

to issues, England has had the same difficulties to encounter as

before, which shows that the real question is concerned with the

two essential functions of banking—discount and deposit. Since

1844, there have been the commercial disturbances of 1847, 1857,

1866, and 1873. Although no expansion of notes, without a

corresponding deposit of specie, is possible.

§ 5. The Rate of Interest determines the price of land and of Securities.

Before quitting the general subject of this chapter, I will make the

obvious remark that the rate of interest determines the value and price of

all those salable articles which are desired and bought, not for

themselves, but for the income which they are capable of yielding. The

public funds, shares in joint-stock companies, and all descriptions of

securities, are at a high price in proportion as the rate of interest is

low. They are sold at the price which will give the market rate of

interest on the purchase-money, with allowance for all differences in the

risk incurred, or in any circumstance of convenience.

The price of land, mines, and all other fixed sources of income, depends

in like manner on the rate of interest. Land usually sells at a higher

price, in proportion to the income afforded by it, than the public funds,

not only because it is thought, even in [England], to be somewhat more

secure, but because ideas of power and dignity are associated with its

possession. But these differences are constant, or nearly so; and, in the

variations of price, land follows, _cæteris paribus_, the permanent

(though, of course, not the daily) variations of the rate of interest.

When interest is low, land will naturally be dear; when interest is high,

land will be cheap.

A lot of land, which fifty years ago gave an annual return of

$100, if ten per cent was then the common rate of interest, would

sell for $1,000. If the return from the land remains the same

($100) to-day, and if the usual rate of interest is now five per

cent, the same piece of land, therefore, would sell for $2,000,

since $100 is five per cent of $2,000.

The price of a bond, it may be said, also varies with the time it

has to run. At the same rate of interest, a bond running for a

long term of years is better for an investment than one for a

short term. The lumberman, who looks at two trees of _equal

diameter_ at the base, estimates the total value of each according

to the _height_ of the tree. Then, again, a bond running for a

short term may be worth less than one for a long term, even though

the first bears a higher rate of interest. That is, to resume the

illustration, one tree, not rising very high, although _larger_ at

the bottom, may not contain so many square feet as another, with

perhaps a _less_ diameter at the bottom, but which stretches much

higher up into the air.

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