“Lord COCHRANE hoped that, by degrees, this punishment might in due
time be abolished, but declared that it was impracticable to govern
any large body of men without having the power of recourse to it. He
believed, however, that much of the mischief which arose from the
punishment of flogging, especially in the navy, had been caused by the
influence of that House. Great parliamentary interest had enabled the
first families in the kingdom to force their children into the
service, when too young to understand the nature of the authority
entrusted to them. Many of them insisted on their decks being as clean
and as shining as the floor of a drawing-room, and that their kitchen
utensils should be scoured as bright as silver, with a variety of
other useless and fantastic commands; and if such commands were not
obeyed, they flogged severely those who had those articles in charge.
“The discipline of the navy depended on the commanding officer of each
ship; and if they continued to flog for such offences, the navy must
suffer. Gentlemen might think otherwise, but he knew it to be true,
and he was afraid they would be convinced of it too soon. The family
interest he had alluded to prevailed also, to such a degree, that even
the Lords of the Admiralty had lists made out, and when an officer
went to offer his services, or to solicit promotion for services
performed, he was asked—‘Are you recommended by my Lady this, or Miss
that, or Madam t’other?’ and if he was not, he might as well have
stayed at home.
“He could not, however, vote for the motion. It would be better to
look to those to whom power was entrusted, than to take away the power
of punishing altogether. If it were so taken away, it would ruin the
service. The best seamen in the navy would say so, and if put to the
vote among the sailors, he was sure the decision would be in favour of
the present mode of punishment; but they would at the same time tell
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they ought to be
commanded by persons of experience, and not by young men appointed by
parliamentary or any other influence. He hoped he should see the
practice of flogging abolished, while the power of inflicting it was
suffered to remain.”
Good seamen are thoroughly aware that they have nothing to fear from a
judicious and well-regulated captain, a man of sense, who knows his duty
and that of those under him. Such captains have indeed no difficulty in
manning their ships, whilst those in whom the men have no confidence
find difficulty. Good men on board ship stand as little in awe of the
cat as do the good people ashore—who make so much fuss about what they
cannot possibly understand. Amongst many hundreds of men there are
always some vagabonds, who, were it not for the fear of punishment,
would throw their whole work on the hands of others. On such men
reasoning has no effect, nor have good seamen any sympathy with them. On
the contrary, they would rather see them compelled to do their duty by
the dread, or even the application of the lash, than be obliged to do
the work of lazy men in addition to their own.
Landsmen also forget that a naval officer cannot get rid of a worthless
vagabond. He has to account for him to the Admiralty. Were it possible
to give an officer power to turn such over the side, as a landsman can
turn away an unprofitable servant, and he would have no occasion for the
lash. But so long as he is obliged to retain such men, he must secure
their obedience by the only means which will control them.
On the 16th of March came on one of those questions which added so
materially to our national debt. Lord Castlereagh proposed a sum of two
millions sterling as a subsidy to Portugal. He declared that the
circumstances of Portugal were so much improved, and her troops
exhibited so much valour, that he did not expect any opposition to the
measure. This was, however, opposed by several members, on the ground of
impoverishing ourselves by a system which did not produce the results
the nation had a right to expect. By myself it was not opposed, but I
embraced the opportunity of giving my opinion to the following effect:—
“LORD COCHRANE considered Portugal to be defensible against the French
arms chiefly at the lines of Torres Vedras, which were so strong as
not to require so great an army as we had there, and which gave us a
free communication with the sea; whereas our operations were conducted
on a much more extensive scale between Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajoz,—places which, if we got possession of them both, were not
tenable unless we had a force perfectly capable of coping with the
French forces in the open field. Both these places stood on plains,
and the French, it should be recollected, were much superior to us in
the number of their cavalry, and had often brought a much larger
general force into the field.
“The war would be much less expensive, were the lines of Torres Vedras
considered as the true defence of Portugal; by which means, instead of
our keeping 60,000 or 70,000 men in Portugal, comparatively idle, or,
at least, not in a state of military activity, we might detach just
now, as we might have done before, a portion of our army to Cadiz, and
raise the blockade of that city. A small portion of our army might
also be sent to Catalonia, where they might reverse all the success of
the enemy; and we might act all along the margin of the Mediterranean
with the best effect. There were numerous small forts on the coast
which we might get possession of, and thereby command all the
neighbouring country. We might have done much on the whole eastern
side of Spain—at Valencia particularly, and might probably retake
Barcelona. All this was not only useful, but practicable at a much
smaller expense than our present system. Thus we might have constantly
checked and counteracted the objects of the French.
“This suggestion he did not make as his own. It had been the
recommendation of others as well as his, and seemed obvious to
anybody. For the principles on which it was founded he had the
advantage of great authority, which he quoted. He declared that he saw
nothing in the war to occasion our despair, if we conducted it on
principles by which we might be enabled entirely to clear the
sea-coast, and have, at the same time, a large proportion of our army,
now in Portugal, disposable at home or elsewhere, for such objects as
we desired to obtain. The vote for the two millions might, if
applicable to these views, prove very beneficial; for no service could
be more important than to sweep the French, as we might do with one
effort, from the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and clear the whole
Mediterranean coast from their intrusion.
“The resolution was then put and carried.”
On the 4th of May, I gave notice of a motion for an account of the
quantity of French silks imported into this country under licence. The
effect of this system has on one or two occasions been brought under the
notice of the reader, as encouraging the French Navy, by encouraging
their shipping whilst our own laboured under every species of
discouragement.
On the statement of Mr. Rose, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, that
he had no objection to the motion, I then said that, if agreeable to the
House, I would at once proceed with it, and adverted to the fact that
large quantities of French silks were openly exposed for sale in this
country to the prejudice of our manufacturers, to whom not the slightest
concession was offered in return. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was the
established policy of the legislature to prevent the importation of
French manufactured goods, but the licence to do so to a small extent
had been construed into a licence to import to any amount, and that
without the necessary introduction through the Custom-house. I had been
credibly informed that silks, to the value of several hundred thousand
pounds, were at that moment lying in the river, whilst the only clause
in the licences under which these goods were suffered to be imported,
and which went to secure any reciprocity whatever to this country, was
one requiring that sugar or coffee, to the value of 5_l._ per ton
burden, should be exported in lieu of these rich manufactured goods of
the enemy. If this were the policy of our ministry at the present period
of unexampled distress to the manufacturing interests, the great
dissatisfaction of the manufacturers was by no means surprising.
The correctness of the statement being denied by Mr. Rose, I remarked
that if no silk goods had really been imported, the return would
effectually show this, and as effectually calm any dissatisfaction that
might prevail. After some further unimportant discussion, the motion was
agreed to.
On the order of the day for the third reading of the Sinecure Offices
Bill (June 15th), I expressed my conviction of the propriety of
abolishing all unnecessary offices during the present state of the
country, feeling persuaded that sinecures were the bond of union which
held parties together in that House, and that if sinecures did not
exist, much more attention would be paid to public expenditure. I did
not so much object to the expense which necessarily devolved on the
public, as to the influence which the power of giving sinecures gave to
the ministry for the time being.
The Parliament being shortly afterwards dissolved, my explanations, to
the electors of Westminster relative to the conduct I had deemed right
to pursue in Parliament were comprised in the following letters:—
“Portman Square, 28th September, 1812.
“GENTLEMEN,—Being conscious that I have not used the trust reposed in
me to my private advantage, or to promote the interests of those with
whom I am connected by the bonds of consanguinity or friendship, and
that I have no personal object to attain, I shall venture to submit my
conduct to the scrutiny it must undergo, on presenting myself with a
view of again becoming one of the representatives of this great city;
an honour which I do not aspire to from a vain notion that I possess
the qualifications requisite to perform its duties, otherwise than by
acting uniformly according to the best of my judgment, uninfluenced by
considerations of a personal nature. Should it appear, however, that I
have erred, I am ready to assign the reasons which have determined my
vote on every occasion.
“It is unnecessary to apprise you, Gentlemen, who are so well
acquainted with the fact, that it is impossible for an individual,
unconnected with either party, to succeed in any measure which has for
its object a diminution of the means of corruption, or, in other
words, the power of rewarding those who are base enough to support men
in office, regardless of their measures. Had the list of places and
pensions, possessed by the members of the House of Commons and their
relations, been granted, which list I moved for shortly after my
return to Parliament, the public would long ago have been convinced
that sinecures ought not to be considered, as they generally are, a
burden of a known amount. It has ever been my opinion that their
abolition alone would relieve the Crown from the thraldom in which it
is held; and restore the depreciating currency, by promoting the
proper inquiry into the general application of the public money,
particularly as to the sums demanded for our enormous and
disproportionate military establishment.
“I have frequently stated, without avail, that simply by enforcing the
acts relative to prize concerns, two-thirds of the navy now employed
would be more efficient than the whole is, under the mortification of
finding the fruits of their toil, and often more, taken for the mere
condemnation of legal captures! History shows, without the example of
the House of Commons, that this is not the way to stimulate men to
undergo fatigue, and encounter that kind of danger, from which no
honour is to be derived. On this subject I have not been able to
induce the House to look at the proofs which I held in my hand, and
offered to produce. I am averse to trespass on your time, though I
feel that I have material points to explain; but these I shall defer
to a more fit opportunity.
“I am, however, anxious to add, that my absence lately, on occasions
when you have had a right to expect my attendance, has been occasioned
solely by ill health, and not by a disposition to tamper with
ministers for employment, even in the execution of important plans
which I had suggested; and which, if prosecuted on a fit scale, would
afford France full employment in her own defence, instead of suffering
her troops to employ themselves in the subjugation of our allies, by
whom they are paid and maintained!
“Whether I am returned to Parliament or not, as soon as I shall have
tried every means to promote measures which, if disclosed at present,
would prove highly prejudicial to the public interests, I pledge
myself to prove to the country, that ten millions sterling may
annually be saved, and that the relative military force of England
will be increased.
“Viewing your exertions in the cause of freedom and the purity of
election with that admiration which they so justly deserve,
“I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
“Respectively, your obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.”
“Portman Square, Sept. 30, 1812.
“GENTLEMEN,—Since I had the honour of addressing you, by letter, at
your last meeting, I have been informed by the public prints and
otherwise that some gentlemen deemed it a material omission that I had
neglected to state my opinions therein relative to Parliamentary
Reform,—a course which I adapted, perhaps erroneously, as most
respectful to the Committee for promoting the Purity of Election;
under the conviction that they would judge of the future by the past,
and not by professions. Now, however, to clear up this doubt, if any,
after reflection, remains on their minds, I hereby pledge myself to
vote on all occasions for Reform, from a persuasion that the ruin of
the country can be averted by that means only. I will likewise support
every measure for the abolition of sinecures, which form the bond of
union in the House of Commons against the interests of the people.
Indeed, reflection impresses this fact so strongly on my mind, that I
am disposed to think, if the advocates for Parliamentary Reform were
to direct their efforts first against these glaring evils, that an
efficient Reform would not be so far distant as the difference of
sentiments amongst its advocates unhappily indicates.
“As to the Catholic Question, Gentlemen, it is proper to inform you
that so long as its inquisitorial auricular confession and its
principles so favourable to despotism prevailed on the Continent, I
was hostile to it; but that I am now inclined to grant the claims of
the Catholics of Ireland, provided that they are content to receive
the privileges of Englishmen, and to relinquish their predilection in
favour of the jurisdiction of the Pope, which, however, they seem
anxious to establish in that part of these kingdoms.
“Having said thus much on the most important questions that occur to
me, I have only to add, relative to the objection made to a naval
officer being a representative for Westminster (which I conclude is
meant to extend to all other parts of the kingdom) that one half of
the taxes levied on the people of England is disbursed on the navy—for
objects which the ability of all the civil members of Parliament
cannot detect to be erroneous from the inspection of accounts. Neither
are they judges of the means best calculated to give protection to
trade, and annoy the enemy by that mode of warfare to which England
must at last resort.
“I had nearly omitted to notice that I am no advocate for flogging;
although I maintain, from a knowledge of fact, that your fleets could
not be governed at present if the power did not exist,—a power which
will cease to be abused when Parliamentary influence shall cease to
place incompetent persons in command, and that in a great measure
depends upon your exertions.
“I have the honour to be,
“Gentlemen,
“Your most humble obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.”
The concluding paragraph of this letter will bear comment, even in our
day. The appointment of officers to commands ought to be regulated less
by interest than _desert_. The truth of this is now practically admitted
in other departments of the State, but unhappily the Admiralty, to which
is confided our only protection from invasion, is, to a great extent,
looked upon as a ministerial patronage preserve, and to this supposed
necessity the national safety may one day be sacrificed. It has been
urged, in defence of the system, that it is a matter of little
consequence, for that steam having bridged the Channel, invasion is only
a question of a few hours, whoever may be in command of our ships. This
I deny. If our ships are in a fit condition, and properly commanded, it
is as easy to destroy the enemy’s “bridge” as ever it was, and we shall
be as much at liberty to use our own bridge as in former days.
If the Admiralty could be freed from its political trammels, there is no
question but that those who direct its affairs would be generally guided
in their appointments _by merit alone_. That it is not so, is a proof
that, under the unfortunate prevalence of political influence and
patronage, no fair and well-understood system of promotion can be
established. Hence boys and subordinate officers, if destitute of
influence, have no stimulus to acquiring a knowledge of their
profession. Far otherwise, for whatever may be their proficiency or
services, the only certainty they have is that some one with more
influence and perhaps inferior claims may be promoted over their heads.
It is not reasonable to suppose that such a system can produce energetic
captains or admirals, except by accident.
As one ship well officered and manned is more effective than two of an
opposite description, a defined and well-regulated system of promotion
upon which all can rely will cost less to the nation, and become the
most economical as well as the most effective. The true strength of the
navy is not in the multitude of ships, but in the energies and alacrity
of officers and crews; and the repression of these qualities by a false
system of political influence, renders a double force requisite for the
accomplishment of the vital objects of the naval service. This is as
much a waste of power as the system itself is _want of power_.
The necessity of wholesome stimulating encouragement was deeply felt in
the wars consequent on the French Revolution, and it will be felt in
future wars whenever they arise. No one unacquainted with the matter can
imagine how much was lost during those wars from a total disregard of
the fitness of individuals appointed by political influence. The
subordinate officers appointed to ships of war were frequently so
incompetent as to paralyse the exertions even of the most able
commanders, who could not be expected to sustain the fatigue of being
always on deck. For my own part, I was so annoyed by the description of
persons attempted to be palmed upon me, that, as I have somewhere else
said, I preferred going to sea with midshipmen of my own training,
making them perform the duties of lieutenants, rather than run the risk
of receiving such lieutenants as were frequently appointed to situations
in active frigates, through aristocratic or political influence. I am
sorry the names of my midshipmen have for the most part escaped my
memory, but I may point to three of my own making—the late Lord Napier,
Captain Marryat, and the present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart.
These were my officers in Basque Roads, where I had only one lieutenant.
On quitting Plymouth in the _Impérieuse_ to undertake that perilous
duty, I sailed with _one lieutenant only_, to avoid the encumbrance of
persons in whom I feared to repose confidence.
To return to my subject. On my re-election for Westminster, I published
a long address to my constituents. From this I shall only adduce the
following extracts:—
“GENTLEMEN,—Being unable to convey in words the sensations I
experience in reflecting on the manner in which you have returned me
to Parliament, I shall leave it to you, who are capable of such acts,
to estimate my feelings.
“Gentlemen, no part of the cant of the times seems to me more
hypocritical than the declamation by party-men against what they term
the ‘overwhelming influence of the Crown;’ when the fact is notorious
to us all that the ruling faction in Parliament seize the offices of
state and share them amongst themselves. If a doubt as to this truth
exist in the mind of any one, let him reflect on the language of the
parties themselves, ‘Such an administration cannot stand.’ And why,
Gentlemen?—not because the royal protection has been withdrawn, but
because a sufficient number do not agree as to the division of the
spoil. Our liberties in these days are not in danger from violent and
open exercise of regal authority; such acts, being free from the
deception practised by the mock representatives of the people, would
not be tolerated for an instant. No, Gentlemen, it is by the House of
Commons alone that the Constitution is subverted, the prerogatives of
the Crown usurped, the rights of the people trampled upon.
“Gentlemen, I shall not attempt to enumerate the decisions of the late
House of Commons,—these stamp little credit on the memory of the
principal actors, who cannot escape from the contempt of posterity, as
may, from their insignificance, the nameless individuals who composed
their corrupt majorities. The _effects_, however, of this system of
corruption may be thus briefly stated; the prolongation of war, the
increase of the national debt, the depreciation of our currency, the
disappearance of our coin, the stagnation of our commerce, and the
consequent unexampled embarrassment of our manufactures.
“Hurtful, however, as the measures pursued have been, our total
neglect of others has proved still more prejudicial; for whilst France
has inflicted on us the evils of war, intimidating surrounding states
into compliance with her views, we, who have possessed facilities to
direct every portion of our force to unknown points within the
extensive range of 2000 miles of unprotected shore, have never even
made a demonstration with intention to disturb the enemy’s projects
and force him to keep his legions at home, but have left him at full
liberty to prosecute his plans at the expense of our allies, or in the
way most conducive to his interests; and, surely, none could suit him
better than to fix the little army of England in the centre of the
Peninsula, where its movements are not of a desultory nature, and
where, admitting the great ability of its commander, a comparatively
small portion of the enemy’s force is fully adequate to counteract its
_known movements_! What part of these kingdoms would be secure from
attack if the French possessed a naval superiority, with only 20,000
troops at their disposal? It is obvious that there must be in every
district a force equal to that which the enemy could bring against it.
“Gentlemen, I cannot avoid stating a fact to you which I have often
offered to prove at the bar of the late House of Commons, namely, that
whilst our commerce has decreased, that kind of trade which is most
beneficial to a state has augmented on the shores of the enemy, in a
prodigious ratio; and the produce of the northern and southern
provinces is freely interchanged under the protection of the abuses of
our Admiralty Courts, which afford better security than all the
batteries of France. The plain reason for this is, that each of the
numerous coasting vessels must, for the benefit of the court, be
separately condemned, at an expense greater than was formerly demanded
for the adjudication of an Indiaman! Gentlemen, the rapacity of these
courts is frequently not satisfied by appropriating the _whole_
proceeds to themselves, but the captors are compelled _to pay_ an
additional sum for thus performing a service to their country.
Gentlemen, that you may have a correct notion of a proctor’s bill, I
take the liberty of inclosing one for your inspection, which, I assure
you, may be considered very moderate, being only six fathoms and a
quarter long, or thirty-seven feet six inches, whereas I now possess
others that extend to fifty feet; but I prefer sending this to your
committee, as it is the one produced by myself in the House of
Commons, and by the venerable Earl of Suffolk in the House of Lords;
the exhibition of which was pronounced by the present Lord Chancellor
Eldon (the brother of the judge of the Admiralty Court) to be a
species of _mummery_ never before witnessed within those walls, and
altogether unbecoming the gravity of that branch of the legislature.
“The example of the industrious bee demonstrates by the laws of nature
that the drone is not to live at the expense of the community,
notwithstanding what the Whigs have said of sinecures being held by
tenure equal to that of freehold property.”
From the preceding incomplete enumeration of my parliamentary efforts,
it will be apparent that as regarded my profession I had not been idle;
but every step I took appeared to remove me farther from my chance of
being again employed. Notwithstanding that in those days the language of
members frequently passed those bounds which the modern practice of the
House of Commons has prescribed, in no instance, that I am aware of,
could I be accused of intemperate treatment of any subject under
discussion. Independently of the sore point of Lord Gambier’s
court-martial, which was no act of mine—my offending could have been
none other than the one of attempting to rouse the authorities to an
effort for the amelioration of the navy, for objects which under the old
system were notoriously not achieved, viz. _crippling the energies of
the enemy_. It was in the circle of my political opponents considered
that as member for Westminster I had no right to interfere with naval
matters—_because I was a post-captain_!
It is, nevertheless, a singular fact—and one which cannot be said of any
other officer of my then standing as a post-captain—that from 1801 to
1812,—on no occasion, not even for a single day was any vessel of
war—save the one in which my pennant flew—once placed under my command,
or once offered to me, with the single exception of the affair of Basque
Roads, when I was for a few days appointed to organise and make use of a
flotilla of explosion and fireships, the command of which _had been
declined by several other officers to whom it had been proposed_, and
then thrust on me contrary to my inclination.
That one cause of my being thus passed over was my unceasing advocacy of
the navy, admits of no doubt. It must be apparent that my motions
relative to the Courts of Admiralty raised the enmity of all who
profited by their abuses, and these were neither few nor
uninfluential,—that my repeated invectives against sinecures and
pensions arrayed against me all who benefited by them—whether personally
or through their connections. It is, indeed, not too much to say, that
those interested in sinecures and pensions comprised in those days a
majority of the House of Commons, who stood up for their own interest at
the national expense as for a right.
My motion respecting the treatment of French prisoners, and especially
my declaration of the probable motive for erecting the prison of
Dartmoor in a dreary, desolate, and unhealthy position, such as ought
not to have been selected for convicts, served to increase the
ministerial anger. Nor was the evil abated. On a second visit to the
place, I encountered a spectacle which made me ashamed of my country.
The reader will remember the action between the _Pallas_ and _Minerve_
in Basque Roads, as narrated in the first volume. My gallant adversary
in that frigate was Captain Collett, who kept the deck after every one
of his crew had been driven below by our fire, which, as the _Minerve_
had taken the ground, swept her decks. My gallant opponent, however,
kept the deck, or rather stood on a gun, with as much _sang-froid_ as
though we had been firing a salute. On our becoming entangled with the
_Minerve’s_ rigging, he raised his hat, with all the politeness of a
Frenchman of the old school, and bowed to me, a compliment which I
returned. Judge of my surprise, when refused admission into the prison
at Dartmoor, and prowling about its out-offices, at finding my gallant
enemy _located in the stall of a stable_, he having been recently made
prisoner. I promised to use my best endeavour to get him removed, and on
my arrival in London did so. I believe with effect, but to what other
locality has passed from my memory.
There is no necessity to enumerate other matters already familiar to the
reader in order to show the estimation in which I must have been held by
those who opposed what they considered innovations, though they must
have been as well aware of the evils of a rotten system as myself.
CHAP. XXXVI.
MY MARRIAGE.
ROMANTIC CHARACTER OF MY MARRIAGE.—UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES.—FAMILY
RESULTS.
The event recorded in this chapter is the most important and the
happiest of my life, in its results,—the “silver lining” to the “cloud,”
viz. my marriage with the Countess of Dundonald. It has been said by a
Scottish writer that “the Cochranes have long been noted for an original
and dashing turn of mind, which was sometimes called genius—sometimes
eccentricity.” How far this may be true of my ancestors, I shall not
stay to inquire. Laying no claim to the genius, I however dispute the
eccentricity in my own case, notwithstanding that appearances, so far as
relates to my past life, may be somewhat against me. Without a particle
of romance in my composition, my life has been one of the most romantic
on record, and the circumstances of my marriage are not the least so.
Early in the year 1812, it was my good fortune to make the acquaintance
of the orphan daughter of a family of honourable standing in the Midland
Counties, Miss Katherine Corbett Barnes. In consequence of the loss of
her parents, the lady had been placed during her minority under the
guardianship of her first cousin, Mr. John Simpson of Portland Place and
also of Fairlorn House, in the county of Kent, of which county he was
then High Sheriff. The story is the old one. Shortly after my
introduction to this lady I made proposals of marriage, and was
accepted.
But here an unexpected difficulty arose. I was at that time residing
with my uncle, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, who had realised a large fortune
in the East Indies. My attachment—though not my engagement—to my
_fiancée_ had by some means reached him, and he at once attempted to
divert my purpose by proposing to me a marriage with the only daughter
of an Admiralty Court official who had realised a very large fortune by
the practices which have already been made familiar to the reader.
I cannot describe the repugnance which I felt even to the proposition,
and pointed out to my uncle the impossibility of marrying the daughter
of one of those persons whom I had so severely denounced; adding that
not only would such a step be a deviation from those principles which
ought to guide a well-regulated mind in the selection of a wife, but
must be destructive of my public character, which would be so clearly
sacrificed for money, that it would render me contemptible to my
constituents, and would prevent my again meriting public confidence. His
reply was brief and caustic. “Please yourself: nevertheless, my fortune
and the money of the wife I have chosen for you, would go far towards
reinstating future Earls of Dundonald in their ancient position as
regards wealth.”
This conversation was communicated to the lady to whom I was affianced,
on whom I urged a consent to a secret marriage,—a proposition in which
she refused to acquiesce. My uncle, however, continuing firm in his
resolves, I at length prevailed upon her to overcome her repugnance, and
we were, on the 8th of August 1812, married at Annan in Scotland.
On my return my uncle again renewed the subject, and one morning, during
our walk he informed me that he had made his will, leaving me one half
his fortune. He, however declared, that compliance with his wish as to
my marriage with the heiress of the Admiralty Court official was
essential to its eventual confirmation. On arguing this, on the same
grounds as before, he observed that some other person of wealth must be
sought for, as his object was to retrieve the family fortune. Meanwhile
he required my assurance that I would not marry without his sanction.
Compliance with this was declined for the best of all reasons, that I
was already married.
The fact of our marriage was not long concealed, and I did not inherit a
shilling of my uncle’s wealth, for which loss however, I had a rich
equivalent in the acquisition of a wife whom no amount of wealth could
have purchased. A yet more singular sequel has to be told. On the
discovery of the marriage, my uncle, though then an old man, also
married, and was easily made to believe that non-payment of a large sum
due to him from Government, on account of some contracts undertaken
before he quitted India, had been delayed on account of my parliamentary
opposition to the Ministry. This may or may not have been the case, but
it induced my uncle to request that our future association might be less
frequent. An intimation followed by the still more questionable course
of his requesting an interview with Lord Liverpool, for the purpose of
informing his lordship of the step he had taken with regard to myself,
and assuring him that he had never countenanced my conduct in
Parliament. Singularly enough, my uncle’s demands upon the Government
were soon afterwards settled.
It was my wish here to have spoken of my wife’s devotedness to me amidst
the many trying circumstances in which, I have been placed. They do not
however, come within the scope of this volume, as regards their
chronological order, I therefore postpone their narration.
CHAP. XXXVII.
NAVAL ABUSES.
GREENWICH HOSPITAL.—DROITS OF ADMIRALTY.—PENSIONS.—MY EFFORTS
FRUITLESS.—CONTRADICTION OF MY FACTS.—THE MANCHESTER PETITION.—NAVAL
DEBATES.—RESOLUTIONS THEREON.—MR. CROKER’S REPLY.—REMARKS
THEREON.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT.—MY REPLY TO MR. CROKER.—RESOLUTIONS
NEGATIVED WITHOUT A DIVISION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S MOTION.—MR.
CROKER’S EXPLANATION.—HIS ATTACK ON ME CONFIRMING MY ASSERTIONS.—THE
TRUTH EXPLAINED.—ANOTHER UNFOUNDED ACCUSATION.—OFFICIAL CLAPTRAP OF
HIS OWN INVENTION.—MY REPLY.—ITS CONFIRMATION BY NAVAL WRITERS.—LORD
COLLINGWOOD’s OPINION.—MY PROJECTS ADOPTED IN ALL IMPORTANT
POINTS.—OFFICIAL ADMISSIONS.—THE RESULT TO MYSELF.
Soon after the commencement of the session of 1813, I made an attempt to
direct the attention of Parliament to the administration of the funds of
Greenwich Hospital, in the hope of restoring them to their legitimate
purpose of rewards for wounds and long service in the navy. At this
period their perversion had become notorious. In place of old retired
seamen, not a few of the wards were occupied, and pensions enjoyed, by
men who had never been in the navy at all, but were thus provided for,
to the exclusion of worn-out sailors, by the influence of patrons upon
whose political interest they had a claim.
As the only way to arrive at the full extent of the evil, in the absence
of definite knowledge as to the specific documents required, I moved in
the House of Commons, on the 11th of March 1813, for _all papers_
relative to the chest at Greenwich.
The motion was met by a suggestion from the Speaker—that “if those
papers _had been_ laid on the table during the present session there
would be no difficulty in granting them, but that if not, I must
_specify_ the particular papers required.” This, of course, I was unable
to do, but gave my reason for the motion as follows.
“LORD COCHRANE then proceeded to express his wish that the state of
the funds in Greenwich Hospital should be known, in order to ascertain
whether they were sufficient to make provision for that great body of
seamen and petty officers who would be entitled to be placed on the
establishment at the conclusion of the present war. The House, he was
satisfied, could have no objection to this information being laid
before them. One of his reasons for moving for it now was, the fact of
his having learned that it was in contemplation to devote the Droits
of the Admiralty to the current services of the year. The noble lord
concluded by moving, ‘That there be laid before this House an account
showing the revenues of Greenwich Hospital and the sources whence they
are derived, also the disbursements for management and the number of
pensioners in each class; distinguishing those maintained within the
hospital from the out-pensioners; also an account of the number
admitted in each year since 1800, and the amount of the pensioners at
that time maintained within and without the hospital.’
“LORD A. HAMILTON seconded the motion.
“THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said it was perfectly new to him that
there was any intention to devote the Droits of Admiralty in the
manner stated by the noble lord. He knew of no right which existed in
His Majesty’s Government to make such an application of those Droits,
and if they were so applied, it must be considered entirely as arising
from an act of royal bounty. The noble lord had adduced no reasonable
ground for the production of the papers for which he had moved.
Whether they were of an objectionable description or not he was unable
to judge; but he could not see why the table of the House was to be
crowded with useless and unnecessary documents. He should, therefore,
move the previous question.”
It was true that my having heard of the intention of the Government with
relation to the Droits of Admiralty might not be a parliamentary ground
for their production, but it was a ground for asking the question. Had
I, however, stated my real motives, the only effect would have been
prompt denial of the fact by all interested in the continuance of the
abuse, which could only be proved by the papers themselves. I therefore
endeavoured to procure them on other grounds.
“LORD COCHRANE persisted in the propriety of the House having before
them the information for which he had moved. There never was a period
at which it was more desirable that some steps should be adopted to
ameliorate the situation of His Majesty’s navy. Those brave men of
which it was composed were subject to the most heartrending
oppressions; and, in his opinion, had every cause to complain of their
situations. After having been released from the labours of a long and
arduous service, they were not, as they richly deserved, suffered to
return to the bosoms of their families, but were kept almost to the
last hour of their existence in a constant and unremitting state of
servitude, unless where they determined to sacrifice that reward which
their country had provided for them as a consolation for the buffeting
they had undergone to purchase their discharge.
“This had frequently been the case; and he had received constant
applications complaining of this species of hardship. Two men had
lately applied to him, who, after a service of seventeen years and a
half, as petty officers, had been sent to perform that most scandalous
of all duties—harbour duty; where there was no distinction whatever
between petty officers and private men; and, who, rather than submit
to be longer disgraced, had expended 80_l._ or 90_l._ each, to obtain
their discharge. These men were entitled to pensions of 12_l._ or
14_l._, a year; and he was convinced that there was not an insurance
office in town that would not have given, at their age, for the sums
they had paid for their discharge, annuities equal to their pensions.
Instead of Greenwich being a source of advantage and reward to aged
seamen it was made a means of recruiting for the navy.
“Unless some alteration was made in this system he should feel it his
duty to move for leave to bring in a bill to limit the service of the
navy. The House, he was convinced, would see the necessity of pointing
out some term at which a seaman’s service was to be brought to a
conclusion, and at which he might have some hope of resting his frame,
after an arduous and gallant service, in the lap of domestic happiness
and retirement. In consequence of the present arrangements, men were
employed who were absolutely incapable of performing their duty, and
in his own ship he had found men who, if he had the power, he would
much rather have discharged than have suffered to remain on board. In
other instances he knew men, who had been invalided three times and
sent into harbour duty, volunteer into active service three times, in
order to avoid that disgrace, and finally die amidst the roar of
battle, when their tottering limbs were scarce able to support them to
their quarters.
“MR. ROSE could not see that any grounds whatever had been laid for
the noble lord’s motion. The statement into which he had entered
tended to censure the practice that at present existed with respect to
the discharge of seamen. He recollected that this subject had been
before under discussion in the House, and that it was then stated that
the present practice had been introduced in order to exempt the men
from the necessity of finding two substitutes, under which they before
laboured. This question, however, had no connection with the motion,
which referred entirely to the management of Greenwich Hospital. He
believed that the affairs of that department were as well and
regularly conducted as any other branch of the public service.
“LORD A. HAMILTON said he understood the noble lord complained of the
present system by which the allowance received by seamen from
Greenwich Hospital was rendered useless to them, in consequence of the
large sums which they were compelled to pay for their release.
“MR. WYNN confessed he could see no connection between the matter of
the speech and the motion itself of the noble lord. As the case,
however, to which he had called the attention of the House, was
undoubtedly hard, it was very desirable that information should be
communicated in some mode.
“The previous question was then put and carried, when LORD COCHRANE
immediately gave notice that he would, that day month, move for leave
to bring in a bill to limit the service of the navy.”
There was not, in fact, much apparent connection between my speech and
the motion, because the Speaker had prohibited me from making the motion
in such a way as would establish the connection. Nevertheless, that both
the House and the Ministry well understood my aim, was evident from the
fact, that the Secretary of the Treasury was sufficiently alarmed by the
attempt which had been made, to induce him to come down to the House
_after I had quitted it_, and at the last moment of its sitting, in
order to defend the Admiralty from the effects of a motion which had
been refused!
“MR. CROKER, before the House adjourned, rose to make a few
observations upon what had fallen from the noble lord in the early
part of the evening, when he did not happen to be present. If,
however, he had correctly understood what had fallen from that noble
lord, he begged leave to say, that the noble lord had been wholly
misinformed with respect to the sums of money taken instead of
substitutes for the navy. The fact was, that the grossest frauds
having been practised upon the poor men under pretence of providing
substitutes for them, the Admiralty had come to the resolution of
receiving a certain sum of money from them, and to find substitutes.”
Notwithstanding the want of connection, Mr. Croker perfectly understood
the point to which I was coming in the end, and hence his taking the
course of flatly contradicting the premises after I had quitted the
House. My early connection with this gentleman has been stated in the
first volume[83], as well as the fact, that believing in his sincerity
as an ardent opponent of administrative abuses of all kinds, I had,
during our acquaintance, without reserve, and in the belief that I had
an able coadjutor, unbosomed to him my views with regard to the abuses
of naval administration. Now that he was in an official position which
required him to defend _all abuses_, and considering that I stood almost
alone in exposing them, he was in possession _of all my plans of
action_! There can, however, be no better proof of the soundness of my
views, than the fact, that although he had previously been made well
aware of my line of argument, he never attempted to meet me by argument,
but always by _flat contradiction of my facts_. We shall presently come
to some remarkable instances of this nature.
-----
Footnote 83:
Page 209.
-----
On the 2nd of June I presented to the House a petition from the
inhabitants of Manchester, a petition complaining of ill usage, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, whilst peaceably assembled to
petition Parliament for a reform. It is unnecessary to advert to these
allegations, as they are now an historical record, but that the people
of Manchester should have selected me as the exponent of their
grievances, only added to the ministerial aversion with which I was
regarded.
On this occasion, an attempt was made by Mr. Bathurst to procure the
rejection of the petition, on the ground that the petitioners, if
aggrieved, “_could seek redress in a court of law, but that the House
could not afford them relief_!” There was something so heartless in such
an attempt that it called up some members by no means hearty in the
popular cause.
“MR. WHITBREAD supported the motion, contending that to men in the
circumstances of the petitioners (some of them being now prisoners for
debt), it was a mere mockery and taunt to tell them that the courts of
law were open to them, where they might bring actions for malicious
prosecutions. It reminded him of a saying of the late Mr. Horne Tooke,
who, on being told that the courts were open to all classes, replied,
“Yes, and so is the London Tavern, if you have money enough.” As the
petition was couched in respectful terms, he thought it would be
setting a bad precedent to reject it; it was usual, even though
Parliament could not interfere, to see the magistrates did not exceed
the bounds of their jurisdiction.
“MR. WYNN observed that the House had been at all times peculiarly
jealous that no obstructions should be given to the exercise of the
right of petitioning; and as the present complaint related to an
alleged obstruction of that nature, it ought to be received.
“The petition was ordered to lie on the table.”
The circumstances which brought upon me the subsequent vengeance of the
Admiralty will be found in two debates which took place in the House of
Commons shortly before its prorogation—the one on the 5th, and the other
on the 8th of July 1813.
As the subject matter of these debates possesses great naval interest,
and as the causes which led to them are not wholly inoperative in our
day, I shall adduce them at some length, not so much for my own
vindication, as in the light of history teaching by example.
The subject matter of the debates being sufficiently included in the
reports of the time, very little comment will suffice.
“LORD COCHRANE rose, pursuant to notice, to bring forward his motion
for increasing the remuneration and limiting the service of seamen. He
thought it was his duty to lay before the House the reasons why our
seamen preferred the _merchant foreign service_[84] to that of their
own country, to enter which they discovered a very great reluctance.
“The facts by which he meant to prove this he had compressed into one
resolution; as he was anxious that when the members of that House
retired from their Parliamentary duties, they might consider these
facts at their leisure, and satisfy themselves as to the correctness
of the statement, in order that when they met again they might have no
hesitation in adopting such propositions, the object of which would be
the redress of those grievances which were the subject of it. As he
did not conceive that any objection could be made to the mode of
proceeding he had adopted, he would not occupy the time of the House
any longer than by reading the resolution. The noble lord then read
the following resolution:—
“‘That the honour of His Majesty’s Crown, the glory and safety of the
country, do, in a great degree, depend on the maintenance, especially
in time of war, _of an efficient naval establishment_:
“‘That during the late and present war with France, splendid victories
have been gained by His Majesty’s fleets and vessels of war, over a
vast superiority in the number of guns and men, and in the weight of
metal:
“‘That these victories thus obtained were acquired by the skill and
intrepidity of the officers, and by the energy, zeal, and valour of
the crews:
“‘That during the present war with the United States of America, His
Majesty’s naval service has, in several instances, experienced defeat,
in a manner and to a degree unexpected by this House, by the
Admiralty, and by the country at large:
“‘That the cause of this lamentable effect is not any superiority
possessed by the enemy, either in skill, valour, nor the well-known
difference in the weight of metal, which heretofore has been deemed
unimportant; but arises chiefly from the decay and heartless state of
the crews of His Majesty’s ships of war compared with their former
energy and zeal; and compared, on the other hand, with the freshness
and vigour of the crews of the enemy:
“‘That it is an indisputable fact, that long and unlimited confinement
to a ship, as well as to any other particular spot, and especially
when accompanied with the diet necessarily that of ships of war, and a
deprivation of the usual recreations of men, seldom fails to produce a
rapid decay of the physical powers, the natural parent, in such cases,
of despondency of mind:
“‘That the late and present war against France (including a short
interval of peace, in which the navy was not paid off) have lasted
upwards of twenty years, and that a new naval war has recently
commenced:
“‘That the duration of the term of service in His Majesty’s navy is
absolutely without any limitation, and that there is no mode provided
for by law for the fair and impartial discharging of men therefrom;
and that, according to the present practice decay, disease, incurable
wounds, or death, can alone procure the release of any seaman of
whatever age or whatever length of service:
“‘That seamen who have become wholly unfit for active service are, in
place of being discharged and rewarded according to their merits and
their sufferings, transferred to ships on harbour duty, where they are
placed under officers wholly unacquainted with their character and
former conduct, who have no other means to estimate them but on the
scale of their remaining activity and bodily strength; where there is
no distinction made between the former petty officer and common
seamen, between youth and age, and where those worn-out and wounded
seamen who have spent the best part of their lives, or have lost their
health in the service of their country, have to perform a duty more
laborious than that of the convict felons in the dockyards—and with
this remarkable distinction, that the labours of the latter have a
known termination:
“‘That though the seamen thus transferred and thus employed have all
been invalided, they are permitted to re-enter ships of war on actual
service; and that such is the nature of the harbour duty, that many,
in order to escape from it, do so re-enter—there being no limitation
as to the number of times of their being invalided, or that of their
re-entering:
“‘That to obtain a discharge from the navy by purchase, the sum of
80_l._ sterling is required by the Admiralty, which, together with
other expenses, amounts to twenty times the original bounty, and is
equal to all that a seaman can save with the most rigid economy during
the average period in which he is capable of service; that this sum is
demanded alike from men of all ages and of all lengths of
servitude—from those pensioned for wounds, and also from those
invalided for harbour duty; thus converting the funds of Greenwich,
and the reward of former services, into a means of recruiting the
navy:
“‘That such is the horror which seamen have of this useless
prolongation of their captivity, that those who are able, in order to
escape from it, actually return into the hands of Government all those
fruits of their toil which formerly they looked to as the means of
some little comfort in their old age:
“‘That, besides these capital grievances—tending to perpetuate the
impress service, there are others worthy the serious attention of this
House; that the petty officers and seamen on board of His Majesty’s
ships and vessels of war though absent on foreign stations for many
years, receive no wages until their return home, and are, of course,
deprived of the comforts which those wages, paid at short intervals,
would procure them; that this is now very severely felt, owing to the
recent practice of postponing declarations of war until long after the
war has been actually begun, by which means the navy is deprived,
under the name of Droits, of the first fruits and greatest proportions
of the prize-money to which they have heretofore been entitled; and
thus, and by the exactions of the Courts of Admiralty, the proportion
of captures which at last devolves to the navy is much too small to
produce those effects which formerly were so beneficial to the
country:
“‘That while their wages are withheld from them abroad, when paid at
home, which, to prevent desertion, usually takes place on the day
before they sail out again, having no opportunity to go on shore, they
are compelled to buy slops of Jews on board, or to receive them from
Government at fifteen per cent. higher than their acknowledged value;
and being paid in bank-notes they are naturally induced to exchange
them for money current in other countries, and which, it is notorious,
they do at an enormous loss:
“‘That the recovery of the pay and prize-money by the widows,
children, or relatives of seamen is rendered as difficult as possible;
and, finally, the regulations with regard to passing of the
examination requisite previous to an admission to the benefits of
Greenwich Hospital, subject the disabled seaman to so many
difficulties, and to such long delays, that, in numerous cases, he is
compelled to beg his way in the pursuit of a boon, the amount of
which, even in the event of loss of both eyes or both arms, does not
equal that of the common board-wages of a footman:
“‘That one of the best and strongest motives to meritorious conduct in
military and naval men is the prospect of promotion; while such
promotion is, at the same time, free of additional expense to the
nation; but that in the British naval service this powerful and
honourable incitement has ceased to exist, seeing that the means of
rewarding merit has been almost wholly withdrawn from naval
commanders-in-chief under whose inspection services are performed; in
fact it is a matter of perfect notoriety that it has become next to
impossible for a meritorious subordinate petty officer or seaman to
rise to the rank of lieutenant; that in scarcely any instance
promotion or employment is now to be obtained in the navy through any
other means than what is called parliamentary interest, that is to
say,—the corrupt influence of boroughs:
“‘That owing to these causes chiefly the crews of his Majesty’s ships
of war have in general become in a very considerable degree worn out
and disheartened and inadequate to the performance, with their wonted
energy and effect, of those arduous duties which belong to the naval
service; and that hence has arisen, by slow and imperceptible degrees,
the enormous augmentation of our ships and men, while the naval force
of our enemies is actually much less than in former years:
“‘That, as a remedy for this alarming national evil, it is absolutely
necessary that the grievances of the navy, some of which only have
been recited above, should be redressed; that a limitation of the
duration of service should be adopted, accompanied with the certainty
of a suitable reward, not subject to any of the effects of partiality;
and that measures should be taken to cause the comfortable situations
in the ordinary of the dockyards, the places of porters, messengers,
&c. &c., in and about the offices belonging to the sea service, the
under-wardens of the naval forests, &c., to be bestowed on meritorious
decayed petty officers and seamen, instead of being, as they now
generally are, the wages of corruption in borough elections:
“‘That this House, convinced that a decrease of energy of character
cannot be compensated by an augmentation of the number of ships, guns,
and men, which is, at the same time a grievous pecuniary burden to the
country, will, at an early period next session, institute an inquiry,
by special committee or otherwise, into the matters above stated, and
particularly with a view to dispensing suitable rewards to seamen;
that they will investigate the state of the fund of Greenwich
Hospital, and ascertain whether it is necessary to apply the Droits of
the Admiralty and the Droits of the Crown as the natural first means
of compensation to those who have acquired them by their valour, their
privations, and their sufferings.’”
“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT seconded the resolution.”
“MR. CROKER thought that, when the noble lord had adopted his present
method of proceeding, he would have acted only consistent with the
courtesy of Parliament had he _given notice_[85] of his intention to
those persons whose duty it might be to take part in any discussion.
The honourable member said he would have felt obliged by any
information the noble lord might have imparted; but though wanting
such, he had come unprepared into the House to meet the noble lord’s
resolution. He should be wanting in his duty if he did not state most
positively, that, excepting the tribute of just praise, which, in the
commencement of his resolution, the noble lord had paid to the
gallantry and heroism of our own seamen, _every other part of it was
liable to the charge of being wholly unfounded in fact_, or very much
indeed exaggerated. The statements those resolutions contained were so
astonishing—true it was _less astonishing when coming from the noble
lord than from any other person_—but still even from him they were so
astonishing, that surely they ought not to have been so suddenly, and
with so little preparation, brought under the consideration of that
House. There was no one but the noble lord who conceived that the
disasters which we had experienced in the course of the present war
with the United States were not to be attributed to a superior force
on the part of the enemy, but to a decay of all ardour in our seamen
in the defence of their country. Was the crew of the _Java_ then, who
had maintained so stubborn a conquest, dispirited? Was the crew of the
_Macedonian_ disheartened and reduced by hard-usage to imbecility and
cowardice? So far was that from being the fact, that it was in the
latter part of the action the spirit of the crew of the _Macedonian_
was most conspicuous, that the spirit of her officers and her brave
commander was most conspicuous. So little broken was the spirit of
that crew which the noble lord had described as utterly heartless and
imbecile, that till the very last they met the attacks of the enemy
with loud and repeated cheers.
“Now for another fact on which the noble lord had formed his
resolution. He had stated that seamen were obliged to purchase their
discharge by no less a sum than 80_l._, no matter what was the
condition of the individual. Now he had to state most positively that
this was not the case.[86] The sum specified might, indeed, be
_required from able seamen_ who wished for their discharge; but the
sum of 40_l._ only was required from ordinary seamen; from ordinary
seamen transferred to harbour duty, only 30_l._; from persons who were
originally landsmen, not more than 20_l._ And he had to state further
that many persons transferred to harbour duty, and considered unfit
for service, were discharged without any consideration whatsoever. The
noble lord had stated formerly in the House the case of a harbour duty
man who had been obliged to pay 80_l._ for his discharge.
“When the noble lord had thought proper to make that statement, he had
answered in his place that he could not take upon him to vouch for the
individual case. He had, however, subsequently been at considerable
pains to discover the particular case alluded to by the noble lord,
and had examined every document in which he thought it could be
traced—but in vain—he could find nothing of the kind; he had then
applied to the member for Bedford to procure for him the name of the
man from the noble lord, but this had not been done, and he had never
had the pleasure of seeing the noble lord since. Now he thought that
under such circumstances the noble lord should have abstained from
receiving the statement unless he was disposed to give the name of the
individual, and thus supply the means of confuting it.
“Our seamen, said the noble lord, were heart-broken; they would indeed
be heart-broken had they heard his resolutions; that was provided
always, though, he retained so much authority with them, as would
impart to his unjust assertions, with respect to them, the power of
inflicting pain which they would once unquestionably have possessed.
They would be heart-broken if the House passed a resolution which
constituted the grossest libel that was ever put forth against them.
Formerly, said the noble lord, they were full of vigour and life under
a better system; now they were deprived of every comfort, penned up on
board of ships which were rendered prisons to them, and their health
injured by defective sustenance.
“Now he had to state an improvement in the condition of those men
whose hardships the noble lord had deplored, which would enable them
to form fair conjectures as to the justice of his statement in
general. A practice had been adopted within these few years of
granting seamen leave of absence on a plan more liberal and better
adapted to promote their comfort than any that had been previously
thought of. When a ship returned from a foreign station, all the men
who had three years pay due to them got leave of absence for three
months, for the purpose of enabling them to visit their friends; if
the individuals were Scotch or Irish the time was prolonged. This
practice was now so well understood, that every ship’s company looked
upon it as a matter of right, and he was ready to say that though ill
effects had been expected to result from it, the expectation had been
found delusive. Several officers had anticipated desertion, others a
relaxation of discipline; but, he was happy to have to state, that so
far from their expectations being answered, the men returned to their
duty with their minds refreshed—new strung, and better fitted for the
toils imposed on them by their duty; and much fewer desertions took
place since the adoption of such a system of indulgence than before
it. He stated this to show what a tissue of false promises, as well as
false inferences, were contained in the resolution of the noble lord.
“The noble lord’s resolution asserted that there was no fair system of
promotion in the navy; that everything was conducted upon a principle
of corruption. Was, then, the commission of the noble lord himself
given him upon such a principle? Did he obtain the red ribbon, which
was before him never given to an individual of his rank, through
corruption? Was it through corruption that a relative of the noble
lord’s had made his way to the top of his profession, and had been
appointed governor of Guadaloupe? Was it through corruption that the
influence of the noble lord had had considerable weight in effecting
the promotion of those persons on whose behalf he had used it? He was
aware that an answer to this last question in the affirmative might be
grounded upon the assumption that the naval acquaintance of the noble
lord were persons of little worth, and such as could owe their
promotion to nothing but corruption. But he who well knew the reverse
would not allow him even this miserable refuge. Was the promotion of
Captain Duncan the effect of corruption? Were the honours which that
gallant officer’s father had obtained the result of corruption? The
friends of the noble lord had felt the benefit of his interference,
and much was it to be wished that it had been confined to promote
their wishes, and through them the interest of the country, and had
never been mischievously exercised on such occasions as the present.
Did not the noble lord recollect, when he had left his ship, that he
had been consulted as to who was the fittest to succeed him, and that
his recommendation had been acted upon?[87] If indeed he had never
left that ship it would have been well for his own reputation, as it
would have been well for the interests of his country. Most heartily
did he wish the noble lord had stayed in her to be serviceable to the
public instead of coming here to be the reverse. The noble lord loved
to deal in generals. He talked loud about corruption, but he wished
him to state who paid and who received the wages of corruption.
“He was conscious that he had spoken with much heat, and hoped for the
indulgence of the House; but he could not say that he had not meant to
reprehend, and that with as much severity as he could use, the conduct
of the noble lord; that he did not mean to set in as strong a light as
possible the futility of those labours for six months’ duration, which
had so engrossed the noble lord, that he had been unable to attend his
parliamentary duties; and which he now imagined would enable him to
call out in triumph to his constituents, ‘Behold, if I have appeared
to desert my duty, I have only appeared to do so; I have not spent my
time in idleness. Here are the fruits of my industry; here is the
operose conclusion of my labours, and the debt you, my constituents,
suppose me to have contracted, you now find fully liquidated.’
“Now, I beg the House to recollect that these accusations of the noble
lord have not been couched in fleeting and evanescent speech, but have
been regularly arranged in a written document, which it is the wish of
the noble lord should be studied by every member in the leisure which
the cessation of parliamentary duty will allow him. The noble lord, I
contend, has taken a very unfair method of conveying his opinion; he
would have acted more fairly in making them the subject of a pamphlet.
If he had done so, I certainly have not much time for writing, but out
of respect for the noble lord, I should certainly have answered him,
and I should have been glad of the opportunity of answering him when I
could have used freely those terms which he had deserved should be
applied to him. I must express my sanguine hope that the house will
not, by adopting such motions as those moved by the noble lord,
sanction the gross libel which they contain against the navy, against
parliament, and against the country. I wish to lay aside all little
considerations to suppose that the resolutions are not meant to apply
more to the persons now engaged in the management of our naval affairs
than their predecessors; but if it be otherwise, still I wish to sink
any feeling that might be supposed to arise in my mind in consequence,
and to answer the noble lord only as the defender of that gallant body
of men who have stood so long forward as our firmest bulwark against
the vileness of our foe, and who are well entitled to the warmest
feeling of gratitude we can cherish towards them. I hope, therefore,
that if the noble lord does dare to push the House to a division, that
he will be left in a minority such as will not merely mark their
sense, but also their indignation.”
-----
Footnote 84:
The American merchant service.
Footnote 85: