Honourable Sir Thomas Cochrane, Knight Companion of the most
Honourable Order of the Bath, commonly called Lord Cochrane, escaped
out of the custody of James Houghton Stevens, the Deputy Marshal of
the Vice-Admiralty Court of this Island, from the prison of the
Castellanea during the course of last night. This is to give notice,
that whoever will apprehend or cause to be apprehended the said Lord
Cochrane, and deliver him into the custody of the said Deputy Marshal,
shall receive a reward of Two Thousand Scudis currency of Malta, and
that whoever will give such information as may lead to the
apprehension of any person, or persons, who was or were aiding and
assisting the said Lord Cochrane in such his escape, shall receive
upon such conviction, if only one person was so aiding and assisting,
the sum of One Thousand Scudis, or if more persons than one were so
aiding and assisting, then upon the conviction of each of such persons
the sum of Five Hundred Scudis, notwithstanding that in such latter
case the person so giving information shall himself have been aiding
and assisting to the said escape. Witness my hand, this sixth day of
March, 1811.—JAS. H. STEVENS, Deputy-Marshal. No. 188 Strada Stretta.’
“Now, Sir, although the treatment which I received is altogether
foreign to the main point, yet I am desirous to learn from you as
Speaker of this House, whether my imprisonment was or was not a breach
of the privilege of parliament?”
THE SPEAKER.—I do not know whether the House expects me to reply to
the questions which the noble lord has put to me, perfectly new as one
appears to be; but, as far as my information goes, I will give it, if
the House thinks fit that I should do so. (Hear, hear!) With respect
to the privileges of the House, I know of no means of enforcing its
privileges, but in the usual way, from time immemorial, by its own
officers; and I never knew one instance of any officer having been
sent across the seas at the instance of any member, on a complaint of
insult offered to him personally. (Hear, hear!) So much for the
question of privilege. In the next place I never knew an instance in
which any member of parliament, properly before a court of justice,
was at liberty to treat with impunity the proceedings of that court,
or to say that what was done in respect to himself was done in
contempt, or that could authorise him to say that the privileges of
parliament were infringed in his person for such conduct.
LORD COCHRANE.—Sir: It was at first my intention, to have moved an
address to the Prince Regent, to recall the judge, registrar, and
marshal, to answer for their conduct and proceedings, contrary to the
express words of acts of parliament; but on consideration, and in
compliance with the suggestion of the First Lord of the Admiralty, I
have thought it better to move, “That a committee be appointed to
examine, into the conduct of the judge, registrar, and marshal, and
their deputies, of the Court of Vice-Admiralty at Malta, for the
violation of the 37th, 38th, 39th, and 41st sections of the 45th, Geo.
3, cap. 72.”
MR. P. MOORE seconded the motion, not from any knowledge of its
merits, but thinking that if the matter of charge was not inquired
into it would reflect upon the House.
MR. STEPHEN could not avoid applauding the benevolent motive of the
honourable gentleman who had seconded the poor outcast of the noble
lord. With respect to the conduct of the learned judge alluded to, he
was satisfied it was the opinion of the House that he had done nothing
amiss—that the dignity of his office required that he should exert his
authority after the direct insult that the noble lord had offered to
the court. The charge against the noble lord was for taking down the
public document of the court, a charge which he had not denied, nay,
indeed, the noble lord had exhibited what he termed a fac-simile of
the table of fees, and so closely imitated, that the very impression
of the wafers—the document itself, and its smoke-dried appearance,
seemed to proclaim its originality. The conduct of the noble lord,
when required to answer for this contempt, was not merely that he
refused to obey the monition, but that he pulled out a pistol, and
threatened to shoot any man who attempted to execute it upon him.
Chapman, the officer, therefore (and the fact was confirmed by two
witnesses), thought it not prudent to execute a warrant at the point
of a pistol, and had not the courage to act. The noble lord had stated
that he refused to answer interrogatories, and that he made a protest
against the proceedings of the court. It was not regular for the court
to receive protest arraigning its proceedings, and upon the inquiry it
did not think there was sufficient grounds for discharging the noble
lord from his arrest. If, however, he was aggrieved, there was a
channel through which he might have had redress, without coming to the
House, by appearing before the Privy Council, and stating his charges
against Dr. Sewell, who would, if proved, be removed. But should there
not have existed, in the executive government, a disposition to
redress the noble lord’s grievances, then it would have been open for
him to appeal to the House, but to come at the end of the session was
not very regular. Dr. Sewell was a person of correct conduct, and
unlikely to act with injustice to any individual.
MR. YORKE objected to the motion on three grounds: first, because the
case was one of the _most frivolous_ ones he had ever met with;
secondly, because the noble lord, if he had just cause for complaint,
should have made it at the Admiralty, and that Board would have
investigated the complaint; and thirdly, because the complaint,
instead of being made by the noble lord, was by his own showing a
complaint against himself. He had this to state to the noble lord,
that if he had not been an officer on half-pay he would have heard
from the Board of Admiralty in a different way. With respect to the
marshal exercising the office of proctor, in conjunction, he would
recommend an inquiry to be made, as it was contrary to the express
provisions of the Act of Parliament. But with respect to the noble
lord’s case it was, he must repeat it, one of the most frivolous cases
ever brought before Parliament.[78]
-----
Footnote 78:
That is, the First Lord agreed with my statements, but objected to
inquiry because I moved for it!
-----
“Mr. Rose,” said his lordship in reply, “has expressed his persuasion
that the interests of the navy are best protected by being in the care
of the king’s proctor; that is,” continued his lordship, “under the
absolute control of one man, who, in addition to the management of his
majesty’s business in two courts, and the monopoly of libelling and
prosecuting to condemnation all the captures made by the navy,
possesses also the exclusive privilege of conducting the numerous and
intricate litigations which have arisen of late years out of the
seizure of neutrals; causes in which not only the property detained is
at stake, but all that a captor possesses is answerable for the costs
of suit and demurrage, which, if he is unable to pay, he may be thrown
into gaol, not for errors or misconduct of his own, but owing to
neglect arising from confusion in an office where there have formerly
been from 1800 to 2000 causes in progress at one and the same time; an
evil which, unfortunately for the country, is working its remedy in a
way highly prejudicial to its best interests. Let me ask, would the
right honourable gentlemen opposite exert themselves with zeal, if
every motion they made subjected them to risk of costs, damages, and
imprisonment? They would not sit on these soft cushions unless they
were amply paid, although it is easier to do so than to make captures
on the enemy’s coast. How would they like to be compelled, as the navy
is, to employ one attorney to conduct all their affairs, even if he
had not their opponent’s interests also to promote, as is the case
with the procurator-general? Will such management of their affairs
encourage the navy to impede suspicious commerce in neutral bottoms?
And if the condemnation of a boat costs as much as the condemnation of
a ship, is not the capture of the enemy’s coasting commerce virtually
discouraged?
“Nothing,” he continued, “can better demonstrate the effect which the
dread of fraud and neglect in the procurator’s office has on the
exertions of the navy, than an account before the House, by which it
appears, that the numbers of causes belonging to the whole navy
amounted only to ninety-two, including droits of the Admiralty and
Crown; while about three dozen privateers, possessing the inestimable
privilege of employing counsel of their own choice, had actually
110,—not injudicious captures, but such as had been sanctioned by the
decisions of the lower courts. The navy are told, by a public minute
in the procurator-general’s office, 6 that it is the king’s proctor’s
particular desire, in respect to his bills, first, that in all
successful cases they should be made out moderately; secondly, that in
unsuccessful cases they should contain those fees only which are
allowed on taxation.’ Permit me,” said Lord Cochrane, to ask what fees
he is entitled to that are disallowed on taxation; and permit me to
ask the treasurer, who is desirous to remove the misconception that
prevails in the navy, if he thinks that were the commanding officers
all compelled to employ one tailor, (the chancellor’s for instance,)
that it would be quite satisfactory to learn, whilst there was a
certainty of their cloth being damaged, that being cut and sewed by
old women it was made up cheaper, as might be ascertained by a minute
behind the shop-board; ‘that it was the master tailor’s particular
desire, in respect to his bills, first, that the old ladies should be
moderate in their cabbaging if the coat fitted; and secondly, if
spoilt, that they should take only what they could get,’ would not
persons thus restricted, and desirous of expedition or care, stimulate
the old ladies by a dram; and would not they quit one job and take up
another? Would the interests of all be best protected thus?”
Lord Cochrane instanced a case of capture, wherein the captor had a
balance of 11_l._ 14_s._ against him in the prize courts, after the
prizes were condemned. He stated a case wherein 63_l._ were deducted
from a bill upon taxation, and the same sum to a farthing charged for
taxing it; and he asked the attorney-general, whether he did, or did
not, receive twenty-two guineas out of the pockets of the navy for
every cause which came before the Court of Appeals, though he had
attended but once there since the court commenced sitting in November.
“Is this,” said he, “one of the law charges which the treasurer has no
occasion to disapprove of? And does he think it right that the
procurator, the boasted guardian of the interests of the navy, should
not only pay the attorney-general for staying away, but fee another
for coming to court, and performing his duty? I have passed nearly
twenty years in the navy. Having been constantly employed until
lately, I have had full opportunity to be acquainted with the feelings
of those with whom I have mixed, and I believe that, unless the laws
and regulations made to guide the Courts of Admiralty are reformed,
captures will soon cease to be made. Were that done, the enemy would
then suffer the loss of all the trade which is of such importance to
France and her dependent states. Two thirds of our present naval
establishment would be quite sufficient for the purposes of blockade,
and all others; nay, I am clearly of opinion, that if the courts were
reformed, it would be a benefit to our country if one third of our
ships were converted into fire-wood. I am sure that the First Lord of
the Admiralty would not vote against the production of papers and full
investigation, if he knew the extent of the evil. He has, however, no
means personally to become acquainted with the facts, and there are
but few who will venture to inform him.”
The motion was negatived without a division.
CHAP. XXXIII.
OPENING OF PARLIAMENT, 1812.
SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S ADDRESS SECONDED BY ME.—EMPLOYMENT OF THE
NAVY.—NAVAL DEFENCES.—THE ADDRESS REJECTED.—CURIOUS LETTER FROM
CAPT. HALL.—PERVERSION OF NAVAL FORCE IN SICILY.—A NAUTICO-MILITARY
DIALECT.—USELESSNESS OF OUR EFFORTS UNDER A FALSE SYSTEM, WHICH
EXCLUDES UNITY OF PURPOSE.
The opening of the session of 1812 was in many ways remarkable. The
speech of the Prince Regent, read by the Lords Commissioners, made
everything _couleur de rose_, both as regarded our foreign wars and
domestic policy. Notwithstanding that we were on the brink of war with
America, both Houses were assured that the affair of the _Chesapeake_
had been “finally adjusted, though other, discussions were not yet
brought to a close.” The finances were represented as being in a
flourishing condition, and His Royal Highness had no doubt of the
liberal disposition of Parliament “to sustain the country in the great
contest in which it was engaged.”
The hollowness of these representations was met by Lord Grenville, who
contrasted it with the “critical circumstances of the times, and the
present alarming state of the country. The framers of the speech, said
his Lordship, were the very men who by their obstinate blindness had
brought the country to the brink of ruin, but who, in the midst of the
distresses they had themselves occasioned, still held forth the same
flattering and fallacious language. He would protest against a
continuance of those measures which had brought such calamities upon the
country. People might choose to close their eyes, but the force of truth
must dispel the wilful blindness.”
Lord Grey similarly denounced the policy which was “the source of
present and impending calamities. Yet these very complications were
brought forward in assertion that the system of the government had
contributed to the security, prosperity and honour of the country!” &c.
&c.
In the House of Commons an unusual circumstance occurred. After the
speech had been read by the Speaker, Lord Jocelyn was rising to move the
usual complimentary address, but Sir Francis Burdett, having risen at
the same time, first caught the eye of the Speaker, who decided that Sir
Francis was in possession of the House.
One of the honourable baronet’s cutting speeches followed, in which he
denounced the Ministers as an “oligarchy of rotten-boroughmongers”—who
alike imposed upon the people and the Prince Regent. “A system of
taxation had been created which ruined many and oppressed all. This
fiscal tyranny being carried to its height, the lower orders had been
reduced to a state of pauperism—whilst the desperate resistance which
such pauperism was calculated to produce was kept down by the terrors of
a military force. Depôts, barracks, and fortifications had been
established in all quarters, and foreign mercenaries, who had been
unable to defend their own country, had been brought over to protect the
native land of courage and patriotism, or rather to protect its rulers
against an indignant and oppressed people, and to support the scandalous
invasions of the liberty of the press, and the severe punishments with
which those who ventured to express popular opinions were visited by the
courts of justice.”
This interruption by Sir Francis took the House by surprise, but still
greater was its astonishment when the honourable baronet proposed, in
place of the ordinary address to the Prince Regent, a memorial of
remonstrance, laying before his Royal Highness all the instances of
misgovernment and oppression—of infringement of the public liberty, and
accumulation of abuses, which had been characteristic of the system
pursued by Government for many years past.
As a matter of course, the address proposed by Sir Francis was read by
the Speaker, amidst the ill-concealed dismay of those most affected by
it. I then rose to second the address, denouncing the impolicy of the
war, and more still the way in which it was conducted, so far as the
policy of ministers was concerned. The subjoined is from the usual
reports of the period.
“LORD COCHRANE rose for the purpose of seconding the address of the
honourable baronet. He agreed with the speech delivered in the name of
the Prince Regent, that a high tribute was due to the bravery of our
army in Portugal, and to the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief, but he
would deny that the war in the Peninsula would come to speedy or
successful conclusion. The forces of Great Britain there were
insufficient to cope with those Buonaparte could bring against us as
soon as he had completed the subjugation of Spain and obtained command
of its resources. Of this, we were quiet spectators. To what was our
army indebted for its success and for maintaining itself in Portugal,
but to the unproductiveness of that country. Every credit was due to
Lord Wellington for his conduct of affairs, but even his lordship
expected little from the Portuguese, who were dragged to the army more
like slaves than soldiers, to support, they did not know what. At
Peniche he had seen ten thousand of them collected, almost naked, and
in want of every necessary.
“The Portuguese were themselves despots. The dungeons of the
Inquisition were full of victims, and the British minister, who formed
part of the Regency, was lately under the necessity of retiring from
Lisbon that he might not appear to countenance arrests and
imprisonments which he could not approve. He would not scruple to
assert that the Portuguese government was obnoxious to every class of
society in that country. Nay, farther, that both in Sicily and in
Portugal the British name was detested, because of the support which
this country gave to the respective governments of each with all their
oppressive abuses.
“With regard to Sicily, he thought that the real purpose of ministers
was not so much to keep the French out of that island as to keep the
people subject to one of the most despotic governments in existence.
With regard to Portugal, which was considered of such importance, he
would ask, How long would our army defend that country? Only till the
French had made themselves masters of Spain, and then it would be
compelled to retire within its fortified lines, the whole extent of
which could not afford grass enough to feed bullocks for six weeks’
subsistence of the troops alone. He would assert, as a fact,
extraordinary as it might appear, that even at present the bullocks
and flour for the supply of Lord Wellington’s troops passed through
the French army with licenses from the interior of Spain. This was a
notorious fact, and he would leave the House to make reflections upon
it.
“The noble lord then adverted to that part of the honourable baronet’s
proposed address, which referred to the internal state of the country,
and professed his concurrence with the greater portion of the
sentiments therein contained. All must own that the freedom of the
people had been greatly encroached upon, particularly by the
oppressive mode of levying taxes, the produce of which, he regretted
to say, was grossly misapplied. No part of a man’s house was free from
the visits of the tax-gatherer, and a man could not remove articles
that had paid duty on importation, without a permit, even so much as a
dozen of wine. The noble lord trusted that a committee would be
appointed to take both the conduct of the war, and the state of the
nation into consideration.
“Lord Cochrane then adverted to that part of the speech which referred
to the naval defences of the country, and maintained that our naval
force was not rendered efficient in annoying the enemy. Commanding the
seas, as this country did, our navy ought to be employed in
threatening the coast of France in all directions, by which means
Buonaparte would be compelled to keep his armies at home, instead of
sending them to be _fed, clothed, and paid by our allies!_ for the
purpose of their own subjugation. Were the gigantic naval force of
England used as it ought to be, _the whole force of France, vast as it
was, would prove inadequate to the defence of its widely extended
shores_. Perhaps demonstrations of attack might prove sufficient. If
the enemy despised these, it would _then_ be, as at this moment _it
was_, easy to destroy everything on the French coasts, for England
could, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, being a force to any
given point far superior to anything the enemy could assemble for our
annoyance, and thus we might effect most powerful diversions.”
The address proposed by Sir Francis and seconded by myself was, of
course, unsuccessful. The mover of the address originally intended was
Lord Jocelyn, who, when I had concluded, made not a word of allusion to
any part of the speeches of Sir Francis or myself, beyond stating that
“_he wholly disapproved of all we had said_.” Such was legislation in
those days, that the arguments of those who did not belong to the ruling
faction were not listened to, much less answered. Lord Jocelyn’s
address, which was only an echo of the Lords Commissioners’ speech, had,
however, to be proposed as _an amendment_ to that of Sir Francis, and
was carried without a division.
The feeling towards myself for having—as was said—“thought fit to
countenance Sir Francis”—needs not be animadverted on. Yet I had given
some good advice as to the way in which our naval power was frittered
away to no purpose. English historians, by their silence on this point,
appear to have little conception as to the extent of the evil.
As in seconding the address of Sir Francis Burdett, I had mentioned
Sicily, I will give a remarkable example of the way in which war was
carried on in that quarter _against the French_! The reader may deduce
from that why I was not permitted to put my plans of harassing the
French coast into execution.
The following letter is from Captain Robert Hall, commanding what was
singularly enough called the “_army flotilla_” at Messina. The document
is a curious one, and may do something towards enlightening future
English historians:—
“Messina, Jan. 14, 1812.
“MY DEAR LORD,—It is so long since I heard of you, and being
disappointed at not seeing you in this country, as the papers gave us
reason to believe, that I must take the liberty of asking you how you
are. We were led to expect you in the Mediterranean with a flying
squadron, but I am sorry to see there is _now_ no probability of it.
“I am serving here in an _amphibious_ kind of way—having the rank of
brigadier to command an ‘_army flotilla!_’ but why it should be an
‘army’ one I cannot find out, though I have well considered the matter
_for the last eighteen months_.
“There is _an immense naval establishment here of a hundred and forty
vessels of different descriptions quite independent of the
Admiral!_[79] These are maintained by the British Government, at an
expense of at least 140,000_l._ per annum. I have, in fact, lessened
its expense by 60,000_l._ a year, merely by reducing the pay of the
seamen to the standard of our own, though they have been paid at
double the rate of English sailors, whilst the _padrones_ of gunboats,
taken from the streets, _are paid more than our lieutenants_.
-----
Footnote 79:
I had only asked for three or four handy frigates to carry out my
plans, and indeed, could not have employed more with effect, as
being under my entire supervision.
-----
“It is a singular thing that this establishment cannot be thrown into
its proper channel—the navy. The island of Zante has another flotilla
of 60,000 dollars a month to protect it, and the commandant of the
barren rock of Lissa—not content with his gunboats—sent in, the other
day, a serious memorial, stating the necessity of defending his
island, by placing gunboats _all round it_, wherever there were no
guns on shore! If this flotilla mania should reach our West India
Islands, what will be the consequence? At least, I should think as
army matters are conducted, an expense equal to one half that of the
whole navy! It is the duty of officers to serve where they are
ordered, but this mixture of services is, I believe, altogether new,
and may, if followed up, be fatal to the independent spirit of the
navy. If that spirit perishes all ardour is gone, and we shall be like
some foreign countries where the services are mixed—neither the one
thing nor the other.
“My Lord, I believe you know me. You may therefore guess my feelings,
after _eighteen years’ service_, to be ordered to serve under a person
_who is a perfect stranger to the service to which I belong_. What do
you think of an order to make a passage to Zante in the dead of winter
by _sailing close to the land in the Gulf of Tarento_? It is too
ridiculous—and really deserves the consideration of the Admiralty.
“If we can combine our naval and military tactics, it will be a
greater effort of human ingenuity than has hitherto been devised. We
may then dispense with the rapidity of our manœuvres and ‘_march in
ordinary time_.’ Figure to yourself _eighteen subalterns of different
regiments commanding divisions of the flotilla_! When I took it out to
sea, they were all sea-sick, and——about the decks! Each of these
subalterns received _seventeen and sixpence a day for this
extraordinary and fatiguing service_;—nearly three times as much as a
lieutenant in the navy!
“Endeavour, my Lord, to reconcile the meaning of such an
establishment, glancing your eye at the same moment on the manner of
conducting the flotilla establishment at Cadiz. We have at this moment
_more troops on the Faroe line, than the French have in both
Calabrias_—independent of those which, under our nautico-military
chief, sacrificed our friends in Catalonia.
Yet there is a sad outcry here. We tell the Sicilians that they mean
to murder us all, and there is no doubt their will is good enough.[80]
Numerous are the remonstrances against sending a single soldier out of
the island. The firm and manly mind of Lord William Bentinck was proof
to this outcry, and it is to be regretted that circumstances did not
admit of this zealous and active officer accompanying the expedition
himself. Nothing can equal my respect for Lord William Bentinck as a
soldier and a gentleman, but I must say with old Neptune, when jealous
of the interference of some _“long shore” Deity_,
‘Non illi imperium pelagi sævumque tridentem
Sed mihi—sorte datum est.’
What end, what purpose, can it answer, to put a naval establishment
under the command of a person who acknowledges that he does not know
how to use it? As it was formed under the auspices of my Lord
Mulgrave, this arrangement may probably have been made with a view of
simplifying naval matters. For example, my Lord, the long sentence of
“_back the main topsail_,” might be more readily expressed by the
short word “_halt_!” “Filling and making sail,” according to the
strength of wind, might be called “_marching in quick or ordinary
time_!” Instead of boatswain’s mates to “_march off_” the different
“_detachments_” of the watch, it would, according to our present
system, be more regular to “_march them off with corporals_!” though
in squally weather this might be inconvenient. In short, there might
be many improvements. The _army officer_ appointed to command one of
our vessels mislaid what he called the “_route given him by the
Quarter-Master-General_!” “_lost his way_,” as he expressed it, and
got ashore in the Gulf of Squillace. On his exchange he reported to me
that “the night was _so dark, he could not see the rock on which the
vessel ran_!” and that when fast, “_a board broke in her bottom_, so
that the water ran in so fast, he could not _scoop it out_ again! Thus
it is, that Mr. Bull is humbugged. For my part, I have remonstrated
repeatedly on the folly of this establishment, and it only remains
with me to serve where I am ordered.
“Of the politics of this country the public journals will have
informed your Lordship. We are certainly doing nothing in the way of
amelioration, and all parties seem discontented. The newfangled
constitution strikes too much home to be popular amongst those who
profited by the old system. Our views are certainly for the prosperity
of Sicily, yet no Sicilian thinks so. They dislike us, and I believe
they know not why. Some of the knowing ones appear apprehensive of our
assuming the government altogether; and urge their fears of our
treating them as we do the Irish Catholics! The French partisans, of
course, make the most of this state of things.
“It is to be hoped that Buonaparte’s failure in Russia will blast his
other prospects, or Sicily will be his in a short time, if we do not
oblige the Government to adopt some energetic measures. If they would
only put the troops we have here on shore in Calabria, there would be
no necessity for gunboats. They would excite an immediate
insurrection, and would throw plenty of grain, of which we are in
want, into Sicily. But if the Sicilian troops should intend running
away on the approach of a French regiment—as they did formerly—we had
better remain and _colonise_ at Messina.
“Your Lordship’s faithful servant,
“ROBERT HALL.
“The Lord Cochrane.”
-----
Footnote 80:
See my speech on the address of Sir Francis Burdett.
-----
The above will show the useless manner in which our best naval force and
officers were employed—no less than their testimony to their own
uselessness. Yet with upwards of a thousand ships in commission, we had
no naval enemy to oppose, and persisted in employing our seamen anywhere
but on the enemy’s coast! For simply urging the common sense employment
of our numerous navy, and a proper investigation into the minor details
which crippled its action, I was regarded as a common disturber of the
ministerial peace.
Yet it had not been my intention to throw blame on the Admiralty, but
simply on _the system_ under which they continued to act, but which, for
all practical purposes, had become obsolete. The Admiralty, whatever
might be its wish, was unable to do its work for want of some one of
high professional skill and resolute character, whose business it should
be authoritatively to investigate the efficiency of naval
establishments, and personally to superintend investigation alike into
inefficiency and suggested improvements. Had this been done, many evils,
hidden from the knowledge of successive Admiralties, would be perceived
and remedied.
The Admiralty, even as at present constituted, is not sufficiently
numerous to execute so many and such varied duties, even though the
ability of the members comprised all professional knowledge, and that
their industry was indefatigable. The overwhelming pressure of detail
renders inquiry into, and deliberation on, important matters
impracticable, whilst on minor matters it is prohibitory, and thus
abuses remain unremedied, because unperceived.
The Board, at all times within my recollection, has been one of
reference to persons in inferior departments. These persons pronounce
_an unquestioned verdict_ on all matters referred to them; their reports
remaining concealed under a rule adopted to avoid trouble or
correspondence, the framers of the rule not anticipating that such
concealment may be fraught with the most injurious consequences to the
navy, whilst it may shield from exposure the most self-interested and
flagrant impositions.
This, however, is not the place to enter on a subject, the ramifications
of which have penetrated into every department, till beyond the control
of the most patriotic and unflinching; who, with all their pains, can
only arrive at the one fact, that the whole system requires renovation,
which, as it is nobody’s business, is never undertaken.
So long, however, as such a system exists, so long shall we be in danger
of being taken unawares by powers fully alive to the importance of unity
of purpose and action. To such a system we have nothing to oppose in
case of emergency but our own embarrassment.
CHAP. XXXIV.
MY SECRET PLANS.
MY PLANS SUBMITTED TO THE PRINCE OF WALES.—NEGOTIATIONS THEREON.—A
MODIFIED PLAN SUBMITTED, WHICH CAME TO NOTHING.—INCONSIDERATE
PROPOSITION.—RECENT REPORT ON MY PLANS.—OPINIONS OF THE
COMMISSIONERS.—PLANS PROBABLY KNOWN TO THE FRENCH.—FAITH KEPT WITH
MY COUNTRY IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES.—INJURIOUS RESULTS TO MYSELF
BOTH ABROAD AND AT HOME.—OPPOSITION TO MY PLANS INEXPLICABLE.—THEIR
SOCIAL EFFECT.—THE SUBJECT OF FORTIFICATIONS: THESE GREATLY
OVERRATED.—REASONS WHY.—THE NAVY THE ONLY RELIANCE.
Soon after my return from the Mediterranean, I had the honour of laying
before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, a new and most formidable
method of attacking and destroying an enemy’s fleet, and of performing
other warlike operations on a large scale. His Royal Highness was
pleased to refer the plans laid before him to a Secret Committee,
consisting of the late Duke of York, as president, Lord Keith, Lord
Exmouth, and the two Congreves, one of whom, Sir William, was the
celebrated inventor of the rocket which bears his name.
These officers—as stated to me in a private letter from Lord Keith, who
took a warm interest in the matter—gave it as their opinion that under
the circumstances detailed in my explanatory paper, such a mode of
attack would be irresistible, and the effect of the power and means
proposed, infallible; adding, however, that if the plan was divulged, it
might become perilous to our Colonial possessions; an observation marked
by no little foresight, _for had the same plan been known to the rebels
in the late Indian mutiny, not a European in India would have escaped_.
The Prince Regent and the Duke of York fully concurred with the
Committee in the destructive character of the plans submitted, for their
consideration as well as in the danger of divulging them. His Royal
Highness sending for me to Carlton House, commanded secresy on my part.
I told His Royal Highness that my plans were only known to Sir Alexander
Cochrane, and to my uncle, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who had, in fact
written out for me the papers which had been laid before His Royal
Highness, but that I would obey his injunctions, and had no fear of my
relatives disclosing so important a secret. The investigation being
secret, of course no official report was made on the subject.
Not long after this interview Lord Melville signified to me his
intention to put in execution _a portion_ of my plans, and requested my
attendance at the Admiralty for the purpose of conferring on the
subject. To this partial execution of the project I of course demurred,
as unfair to the invention and necessarily incomplete in operation,
whilst development of a portion might give the enemy such an insight of
the whole as would enable him to turn it against ourselves on a large
scale; his lordship, nevertheless, did not seem inclined to give way,
and I quitted the Admiralty without having been enabled to arrive at any
satisfactory conclusion.
Lord Melville having mentioned to Lord Keith the result of our
interview, Lord Keith urged me to acquiesce in the First Lord’s views,
adding, that he was too well acquainted with the soundness of my plans
to doubt the practicability of destroying with a portion only the
enemy’s ships in Genoa harbour and the outer roads of Toulon. His
lordship further urged that a success once achieved, the popular voice
would place it in my power to enforce the execution of the more
destructive portion of the invention within the enemy’s inner harbours.
In deference to Lord Keith’s opinion I at once prepared a plan of attack
on the outer roads of Toulon, in accordance with the views of Lord
Melville. That communication, omitting the essential parts of the plan,
I now subjoin.
“12 Portman Square, May 12th, 1812.
“MY LORD,—In consequence of the conversation I had the honour of
holding with your Lordship yesterday, and of your desire that I should
state what force would be required for carrying into execution the
plan submitted for the destruction of the Toulon fleet, I beg to
submit the following arrangements as applicable _to this particular
object_.[81]
-----
Footnote 81:
Viz. as not having reference to the execution of the whole.
-----
“One seventy-four.
“Two 38-gun frigates.
“Two 18-gun brigs.
“Two cutters or schooners.
“The above force is requisite as an escort, and to protect the boats.
“In order to ensure success, although one-half will probably be
sufficient, the subjoined will be necessary.
[Here follow particulars.]
“As your Lordship permitted me to recommend such officers as I thought
best calculated for this service, I beg leave to name the following:—
“Captain Robert Baine.
“Sir Thomas Staines, now of the _Hamadryad_.
“Captain Johnstone, now commanding the _Avenger_, if he has not
sailed; and if he has—
“Captain Hall, now commanding the gunboats at Messina, and lastly
“The Honourable Lieutenant Napier, now in the Mediterranean.
“My late first Lieutenant, Travers, now in the _Impérieuse_, to be
first of whatever ship your Lordship may be pleased to assign to me,
which, in order further to conceal the enterprise, may, if your
Lordship should think proper, be placed under the command of my
brother Captain Archibald Cochrane, late of the _Fox_ frigate. I can
furnish him confidentially with all the necessary instructions, so
that I might at once proceed to Lisbon, apparently in a private
capacity, so as to disarm suspicion.
“I have taken the liberty of submitting the names of the above
officers to your Lordship, because I am well acquainted with their
characters and zeal for the service, and am sure that whatever is
undertaken by them will first be well weighed, and then executed with
determination.
“The above operation is calculated _without the assistance of troops_,
but if your Lordship wish to _secure_ the ships, instead of
_destroying_ them, 4000 troops should be embarked at Messina[82] as
though under the destination of Catalonia, and having been shifted
into the ships of war now blockading Toulon, should be held in
readiness to be disembarked in the peninsula of Cape Cepet, the
heights of which may be held, although not yet fortified, against any
force that may be brought against them. When I was last there, with
Lord Collingwood’s fleet, I stood particularly close in, within point
blank range of shot, and there were not sufficient men in any of the
batteries to train more than one gun at a time—indeed, they appeared
merely to be stationed there to take charge of the stores. There was
neither smoke in the chimneys of the barrack-rooms, nor was there a
door or window open, though the weather was extremely hot.
“If the operations are to be extended along the coasts, your Lordship
will see the propriety of embarking 300 marines on board the
seventy-four, and 100 in each of the frigates.
“The expense of the expedition will be _within three months’ cost of
that of the blockading force_, and half the stores enumerated may
accomplish the service.
“I have, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Honourable Lord Melville, &c. &c.”
-----
Footnote 82:
How well these could have been spared is evident from Capt. Hall’s
letter, see page 221.
-----
Inconsiderable as was the expense, in comparison with other armaments
producing little or no result, Lord Melville hesitated to incur it; or
rather, as I have reason to believe, his lordship was overruled by the
ill-feeling against me at the Admiralty, as the concurrence of the Board
would have placed me in command of a squadron, with my flag flying in a
line-of-battle ship. This was evidently considered too high a position
for one who had been for three years kept unemployed from political and
personal dislike, was evidently not to be thought of, and the project
after long fruitless expectation was dropped.
I then proposed to conduct a similar expedition against Flushing, but
this also was declined. As, however, public dissatisfaction began to
manifest itself, Lord Melville informed me that I might make an attempt
on Toulon _on a small scale_! In other words, that I might, “on a small
scale,” show the enemy how to put my plans in operation against
ourselves _on a large scale_! The permission was so preposterous,
besides being not altogether free from the suspicion that failure would
be more acceptable than success, I declined it, notwithstanding the
renewed recommendation of Lord Keith to close with Lord Melville’s
offer. As at this time only a few sail of the line remained at Toulon, I
hesitated to comply, considering that the result of destroying these
would have been badly compensated by the disclosure of the means whereby
their destruction had been effected.
Soon after the accession of William IV. I submitted my plans to His
Majesty’s consideration, and being himself a practical seaman, His
Majesty at once admitted their importance and honoured me with personal
interviews on the subject, at which I explained my methods of putting
them in execution under various circumstances. His Majesty was further
pleased to observe that I ought to be rewarded as well for the plans as
for the secrecy which had been observed, yet not the slightest reward
did I ever reap for the invention or for having kept my secret out of
pure love to my country, a motive which will be better appreciated when
subsequent temptations to divulge it come to be shown.
An incontrovertible proof of the efficiency of the plans submitted by me
to various ministries is on record in the shape of a report _from a
comparatively recent commission_, one of the commissioners—who ranks
amongst the highest in his profession—_being still living_. As from the
non-employment of those plans on any occasion, an opinion may have gone
abroad that their destructive character is illusory, I feel myself
justified in dispelling the illusion by subjoining the report.
Towards the close of 1846, when the late Lord Auckland was at the
Admiralty, suspicion being excited as to the motives and intentions of
the then French government, another commission was appointed, to decide
upon a mode of trying my inventions in a way to satisfy the public as to
their efficacy, and at the same time to preserve secresy. This being
found impracticable, the trial was never made, but the commission
proceeded to report on the plans. The members were Sir Thomas Hastings,
Sir J.F. Burgoyne, and Lieut.-Col. Colquhoun.
The subjoined is their report, addressed to the then Master of the
Ordnance and forwarded to me by Lord Auckland.
“Ordnance Office, Jan. 16, 1847.
“MY LORD,—In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions, we, the
undersigned, have met to consider and report on the secret war plans
of Vice-Admiral the Earl of Dundonald, transmitted to us by the First
Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Auckland.
“These plans may be classed under three heads:—
“1st. One, on which an opinion may be formed without experiment, for
concealing or making offensive warlike operations; and we consider
that, under many particular circumstances this method of his Lordship
may be made available as well by land as by sea, and we therefore
suggest that a record of this part of Lord Dundonald’s plans should be
deposited with the Admiralty, to be made use of when in the judgment
of their Lordships the opportunity of employing it may occur.
“2nd. One on which experiments would be required before a satisfactory
conclusion could be arrived at.
“3rd. Nos. 1 and 2 continued for the purpose of hostile operations.
“After mature consideration, we have resolved that it is not desirable
that any experiments should be made. We assume it to be possible that
the plan _contains power for producing the sweeping destruction the
inventor ascribes to it_; but it is clear this power could not be
retained exclusively by this country, because its first employment
would develope its principle and application. The last observation
applies equally to plan No. 1.
“We considered in the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed
secret plans would accord with the feelings and principles of
civilised warfare. We are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and
3, would not do so.
“We therefore recommend that, as hitherto, plans Nos. 2 and 3 _should
remain concealed_. We feel that _great credit is due to Lord Dundonald
for the right feelings which prompted him not to disclose his secret
plans when serving in war as naval Commander-in-Chief of the forces of
other nations, under very trying circumstances, in the conviction that
those plans might eventually be of the highest importance to his own
country_.
“We have only to add that we have sealed up, under one cover all the
papers which have been submitted to our consideration by the First
Lord of the Admiralty and the Earl of Dundonald, and our
correspondence with the latter in another—both of which we have marked
‘secret.’
“With regard to the disposal and future custody of these papers, we
await instructions from your Lordship, or the Earl of Auckland, to
whom we propose this letter should—after your Lordship has perused
it—be transmitted.
“We have the honour to be,
“Your Lordship’s obedient servants,
“THOMAS HASTINGS, Capt. R.N., and
Principal Storekeeper.
“J.F. BURGOYNE.
“J.S. COLQUHOUN, Lieut.-Col. R.A.
“To the Marquis of Anglesey, K.G. and K.C.B.”
Let the public now judge of the nature and value of those plans—of the
merit of never having disclosed them, though exposed to severely trying
circumstances, and also whether they are impracticable.
I have been told, on indubitable authority that during the late war with
Russia an interchange of warlike plans took place between the English
and French Governments. It was further pointed out to me but the other
day, that a French journal of high authority had remarked to this
effect, “_should a war arise between England and France, the latter
power would bring warlike engines into play to which rifled cannon were
a trifle_.” From this I make little doubt but that my plans _are_ known
to the French Government, and if so, whenever they are applied, the
people of this country will find them no “trifle”—for as the report just
adduced infers, no power on earth can stand against them. It is one of
my most bitter reflections that such plans have been utterly thrown away
as regards our own nation, and that from the imprudence of Governments
they may one day be turned against my own country.
In the late war with Russia, I twice offered these plans to the
Government. The first time they were declared “_inexpedient!_” The
second time I offered to _conduct them myself_, either against Cronstadt
or Sebastopol—old as I was—the forts of Cronstadt being especially open
to their application. As regarded Sebastopol, the question was put to me
whether I would instruct two engineer officers in applying them? My
answer was, “No, I have offered to risk my own life and reputation on
their efficacy, but will not impart my mode of applying them to others,
who may not, either from preconceived notions or professional jealousy
of naval inventions, comprehend them.”
Had I not adduced the report of the last committees appointed to examine
the plans, this might be thought the bombast of an old admiral whose
physical vigour had outlived his judgment. I flatter myself, however,
that more years of sharp experience than usually falls to the lot, even
of admirals, has fixed my judgment of warlike operations too firmly to
be shaken even by age. I repeat that should those plans ever be turned
against ourselves, the English public will be in a condition to
pronounce an opinion on that point.
The report of the committee gives me great credit for _not having made
use of those plans elsewhere_. As before stated, I promised the Prince
Regent never to divulge them except for the honour and advantage of my
own country, and although driven from the profession of my choice I did
not forget my promise.
It may be permitted me to add that when, in 1820, I came with four ships
before the Castles of Callao, it was perfectly well known to me that
money and property considerably exceeding in value a million sterling,
besides all the plate in Lima, had been sent to these castles for
security. I could, with the aid of a small portion of my plans only, and
in spite of opposition, have possessed myself of this treasure in an
hour, and my share could not have been less than half a million
sterling.
Let posterity judge of my conduct, as compared with the blind enmity of
those who persecuted me wrongfully. Yet there was every inducement to
employ my own plans for my own benefit. When I entered the service of
the South American States, my private income, never large, and entirely
of my own creation, had been wholly wasted by the expenses consequent on
forced litigation and in defending myself from an iniquitous
prosecution. For more than four years I had been deprived of my
professional income, and at forty years of age found myself thrown on
the world to seek the means of making provision for myself and an
increasing family.
Had I been indifferent to the welfare of my own country, my position, as
Commander-in-Chief of the squadrons of Chili and Peru, and afterwards of
the Brazilian squadron, would have enabled me to amass an immense
fortune, by putting an early end to the wars of those countries through
the adoption of secret plans, as the Governments of those states
expected. For not having done so, they manifested their displeasure and
declined to pay me the stipulated rewards for what I effected towards
their liberation.
It was forcibly urged upon me by the South American governments that the
unjust deprivation of rank and honour in my own country released me from
any obligation to obey the injunction of secresy which had been imposed
upon me, and that I ought to profit from my own discovery, by applying
it to the ample opportunities before me. I can safely say, that love of
country, alone restrained me from listening to their temptations, and
that I did not yield to the great necessities of my position is now one
of the proudest consolations of my life.
Yet I repeat—and the assertion will one day be confirmed—that these
plans afford the infallible means of securing at one blow our maritime
superiority and of thereafter maintaining it in perpetuity—of at once
commencing and terminating war by one conclusive victory. A hundred
millions employed in war could not complete the ruin of our maritime
opponents so effectually as could be done by the simple methods
indicated in my plans; and that too in spite of the apparently
formidable fortifications and other defences of ports and roadsteads.
The expenditure of millions in the construction of such works on the
coasts of any country would be in vain, when any hostile power in
possession of the knowledge of such means of attack, could at a trifling
cost and with the utmost facility accomplish in a few hours any
assignable amount of destruction without impediment from such costly but
really impotent safeguards. Still more easily might this country protect
itself by destroying at one blow the marine of an enemy, and that by a
process which our most eminent engineer officers—as has been seen—have
pronounced infallible.
It is somewhat singular—that, notwithstanding my admitted experience, as
demonstrated by the acts and success of my early life, and
notwithstanding the destructive character of my plans as certified by
committees of the most eminent men to be found in both services, _I have
never, throughout my whole life, been officially consulted on the means
of defence of this country!_
This cannot have been accidental. It is not probable that any prime
minister should consider himself so well up in naval matters as to
despise my experience. Nor is it probable that he should prefer
consulting officers who never saw a shot fired in actual warfare,—as was
frequently the case previous to the Russian war,—to the opinions of one
whom committees of the highest professional character had declared to be
the inventor of plans which would totally change the aspect of war, and
supersede every known system of warlike operations.
When the dominion of the sea, the existence of our mercantile marine,
and the peace of Europe were—_as they are at this moment_—in question,
it is nevertheless difficult to conceive this extraordinary
inconsistency. Still there is the fact. None to whom my plans have been
submitted, have ever pretended to throw doubt on their efficacy. Some,
it is true, have said, “For heaven’s sake, don’t encourage such
plans,—what is to become of us?” What? Universal peace: for after their
disclosure not a man would be found to engage in war except for defence
of his country, when, as was said of the cholera by an eminent French
surgeon, “_Il cadavreisera le monde_.”
What can have been the cause of such neglect and contumely as I have
suffered, under the full knowledge that such a secret was in my power?
There can only have been two causes,—unmerited personal aversion without
reason, or want of political courage to put my plans in execution.
Whether of the two causes be accepted, they form the highest compliment
which was ever paid to man, viz. _that no amount of neglect or
persecution could induce me to betray my country_. The report of the
committee paid me the compliment which is at least my right, and how
great a compliment it is, futurity may one day unexpectedly have to
decide.
No doubt to use such powers for ambitious purposes would be wicked; but
what guarantee have we that if in the possession of ambitious nations,
they may not be turned against us. To use them in the defence of order
and civilisation would be praiseworthy, but to let the world know that
we are at all times prepared to use them against aggression, would be a
protection of the best interests of mankind no less than of our own.
Such knowledge can only be dangerous to those who have cause to fear it,
but to those possessing it it is power, strength, and safety.
The public is now in possession of all material circumstances connected
with the subject, except the plans themselves, which, for obvious
reasons, are, it is to be hoped, _still secret_.
I am not certain whether—were the plans disclosed—the advantage would
not be in favour of publicity. Such disclosure would demonstrate that
there could be no security in coast defences and other stationary
asylums, on the construction of which it is now proposed to expend so
many millions of the public money. It would show the inexpediency of an
expenditure of ten—which may mean twenty—millions for the construction
of forts and harbours, instead of applying half the amount to remodel
and renovate the navy. The disclosure might have the effect of
preventing useless expenditure, and of averting the danger of future
parsimonious naval administration, by leading to the adoption of
essential measures of nautical improvement, by which alone the safety of
the country can be preserved.
The disclosure of these plans would also have the effect of binding over
nations to keep the peace. Still less would the English public
countenance the extravagant and inefficient projects devised for the
protection of their insular position, open at all points, and only to be
protected by a superior naval force, which shah avert danger on the
first menace.
As the subject of fortifications is now uppermost in every man’s mind, I
will venture a few remarks on my experience of this mode of defence.
A story is told of the Duke of Wellington which embraces the whole
subject. On his appointment as Warden of the Cinque Ports, the
inhabitants of Dover, well known for their keen scent of a profitable
job, applied to the Duke for an increase of their fortifications,
already a stupendous monument to the folly of those who have added to
them.
The Duke’s reply was the perfection of military wisdom. “_The
fortifications of Dover would be, no doubt, very useful if an enemy came
in that way, but I don’t think he would! They might also be very useful
if an enemy went out that way, but I don’t think he would!_” In that
sentence is comprised the whole subject of fortifications, unless
erected specifically for the defence of a dockyard or an arsenal, as at
Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. It is true that in his last years the Duke
retracted his opinion in some degree, but I could never learn the
reasons he assigned for so doing.
Why should an enemy go to a coast fortification when he can land miles
away from it? I will take the instance of the Dover fortifications,
which are amongst the most stupendous in this country. What is there to
prevent an enemy from landing at Walmer, where there is nothing to
oppose him but the six popguns in the flower garden of the Castle? He
may effect a debarkation there at all times of the tide, in any wind and
almost in any weather. The distance from the fortifications of Dover is
little short of seven miles. By making a strong feint by sea on Dover,
the garrison could not quit their works to prevent the disembarkation at
Walmer, for if they did the feint would be turned into a real attack.
Neither, when the disembarkation had been effected, would they be likely
to quit their works for the purpose of harassing the invaders, for so
surely as they marched out for this purpose a sufficient portion of the
enemy would march in. The whole would simply amount to this, that the
garrison, say 10,000 or 20,000, would be cut off from communication with
the army elsewhere, and would thus be completely neutralised. Lastly,
when disembarked at Walmer, the fortifications of Dover could not in the
slightest degree interrupt the enemy’s communications by sea. Nothing
but an efficient navy could do that; and with an efficient navy the
disembarkation at Walmer would never be attempted. All this is plain
enough; for, after all, military tactics are founded on common sense,
and the amount of common sense decides their superiority.
Where fortifications are the key to a province, frequently advisable to
capture them, and this may be an easier matter than military men in
general are willing to admit. Of course, if they sit down before
fortifications _secundum artem_, the matter is one merely of time and
calculation, as we have learned at Sebastopol.
When on the coast of Chili I captured a province with 120 men only, and
that by storming its fortifications. These were thirteen in number, and
were garrisoned by 2000 men. I was accused of rashness for the attempt;
yet no more doubted the fact of my success than I doubted the reality of
the attack. It was simply a matter of well matured deliberation and
calculation, in which, of course, the panic of the enemy formed an
important item. The result was that I did not lose a man, whilst the
enemy’s killed and wounded amounted to more in number _than my whole
force_! With this in addition to my former experience it perhaps will
not be wondered at that my respect for fortifications is by no means
great, though my respect for an efficient navy _is_ excessive.
Full discussion of this matter would, however, require more space than
can here be devoted to it, and should my life be spared I will on a
future occasion enter more extensively into this and other cognate
subjects. Were I now to do so, I am afraid public faith in some of its
newly cherished fortifications would be materially shaken, and will
therefore refrain from so doing, in the hope that improvements in our
navy, the only true basis of national safety, will render such remarks
unnecessary.
In short, immovable stations of defence as a protection against
invasion, are not only costly and of doubtful utility, but a _reliance
on them_ is, in my mind, an indication of a declining state. It is
little short of national imbecility to suppose that because we erect
imposing fortifications an enemy _will come to them!_ when he can
operate elsewhere without the slightest regard to them; and the more so,
as the common experience of warfare will tell him that numerous
fortifications are in the highest degree national weakness, by splitting
up into detail the army which ought to be in the field against him, but
who are compelled to remain and take care of their fortifications. Yet
_half the sum_ required for fortifications as defences in case of war,
would suffice to place the navy in a condition of affording far more
effectual protection. There is no security equal to that which may be
obtained _by putting it out of the power of an enemy to execute hostile
intentions_. This can never be effected by forts, but may be
accomplished by the adoption of proper measures, which I shall at
present refrain from commenting on.
CHAP. XXXV.
NAVAL AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT.
SINECURES.—ADMIRALTY EXPENSES ILL DIRECTED.—WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH
SMALL MEANS.—FLOGGING IN THE ARMY AND NAVY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A BAD
SYSTEM: NEVERTHELESS, INDISPENSABLE.—NATIONAL MEANS WRONGLY
APPLIED.—INJURIOUS CONCESSIONS TO THE FRENCH.—DENIED BY THE
GOVERNMENT.—EXPLANATIONS OF MY PARLIAMENTARY CONDUCT ON THE
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.—LETTER TO MY CONSTITUENTS.—APPOINTMENT OF
OFFICERS BY MERIT INSTEAD OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE THE TRUE STRENGTH
OF THE NAVY.—MY RE-ELECTION FOR WESTMINSTER.—ADDRESS TO THE
ELECTORS.—MINISTERIAL VIEWS.—TREATMENT OF AN OFFICER.—MY
INTERFERENCE.
At the commencement of the session of 1812, it became known that His
Royal Highness the late Duke of Cambridge had voluntarily given up a
military emolument of nearly 5000_l._ a-year. The patriotism which moved
His Royal Highness to relinquish a lucrative command which had dwindled
into a sinecure, was too conspicuous to be lost sight of, not only on
account of his disinterestedness, but because there was hope this
practical specimen of reform, proceeding from so high a quarter, might
be brought to bear on others in such a way as to induce them to emulate
the example.
On the 23rd of January, I therefore moved for a copy of His Royal
Highness’s letter of resignation, for the purpose of grounding thereon a
resolution expressive of the opinion of the House on the subject, at the
same time intimating to sinecure-holders in general the desirableness of
imitating the magnanimity of the royal duke. The effort was, however, in
vain.
On the 23rd of February, a question was raised by Mr. Bankes respecting
the payment of 2790_l._ a-year to the Secretary of the Prince of Wales,
as paymaster of widows’ pensions. A former report on a committee of the
House had pronounced this office a perfect sinecure, of no public
utility whatever, and that the office of deputy-paymaster was little
better, the whole business being transacted by a clerk in the War Office
at a salary of 100_l._ a-year. The reply of Mr. Perceval (then Prime
Minister) to this statement was “that there was more danger to the
country _from declamations against sinecures than from the sinecures
themselves_!”
On this occasion I supported the _retention_ of the sinecure, on the
ground that the abolition of so insignificant a sum might _deceive the
public into a belief that their interests were watched in that House_.
The House had suffered the reports of various committees on the subject
to lie dormant for thirty years, and now wished to abolish _three only_
out of the long list of sinecures, which their committees had declared
to be useless and burdensome to the country. It was the bounden duty of
the House to have pronounced _on the whole class_, and not partially.
They ought to have enumerated the sinecures to be abolished, and thus
put it out of the power of ministers to exercise any discretion on the
subject; instead of singling out a comparatively insignificant place
from a long list of enormous sinecures, upon which the House had not so
much as expressed an opinion, notwithstanding the numerous
representations of its committees.
On the motion of the First Lord (the Right Hon. C. Yorke) that a sum of
upwards a million should be granted for the contingent expences of the
Admiralty, I spoke as follows:—
“LORD COCHRANE hoped, that, as a deviation from mere detail was
allowed when the army estimates were in a committee, it would not be
entirely out of course to offer a few general remarks while the supply
of the navy was before the House; not with a view to oppose the supply
for the ordinary establishment of the navy, but as to the proper
application of the enormous sums granted for that service generally.
“To this nothing could, in his opinion, contribute more than that the
Board of Admiralty should not be considered as a _mere appendage to
the minister of the day, and be displaced by every agitation of the
political system_—whereby misapplication of means was rendered
perpetual; for, just as the members acquired some knowledge of their
complicated duties, and of the powers they ought to direct against the
enemy, they were then displaced, to make room for others of _no
experience_.
“The observations which he had to address to the chairman related
chiefly to the means of annoying the enemy, which means the Government
possessed in a right disposal of the naval force of the country. This
was at present totally useless, except for the purpose of passive
blockades. Had 5000 men, with attendant naval transports, been kept in
readiness in such a central situation as Minorca, for instance, it
would have been impossible for the French to have made any progress on
the eastern side of the Peninsula; for no sooner should the enemy have
laid siege to Tarragona, Valencia, Alicant, or any other place on the
Mediterranean coast of Spain, than their affairs might have been
reversed at the other extremity. Rosas, for instance, was within
_twelve hours’ sail_ of Minorca, and about eighteen from Alicant,
whereas on the other hand it was _twenty-five days’ march_ at least
from Alicant to Rosas.
“Comparing the respective populations of Britain and France, it was
impossible to think of carrying on an equal warfare in the Peninsula.
A greater number of men than all the British who were at present
there, must perish before it could be possible to drive out the
French. The desultory nature of naval warfare was, in his opinion, the
best calculated for that purpose, and for this we had the highest
authorities in ancient and modern times. If the French, with a
contemptible flotilla, could keep this country in alarm, what was our
gigantic navy not capable of doing? The whole of France lay at the
mercy of the British ministry. Had the enemy a naval superiority, and
only 10,000 disposable troops, on what part of the shores of England
could people repose in tranquillity?
“The war as at present conducted could not possibly have a successful
termination. It was a great misfortune that the House of Commons
listened to nothing which was beyond the sphere of their own
knowledge; and when any professional man, like himself, rose up to
give information, _party_ was immediately thrown in his teeth;
_factious motives_ were instantly imputed, however pure his wishes for
the good of his country. He put it to the committee, whether the whole
force of this country was not on the alert, and almost concentrated on
the coasts of Kent and Sussex, when an invasion was threatened by a
contemptible flotilla of the enemy; and if so, what might not be done,
if the gigantic naval power of England was to threaten the enemy’s
shores? It was his sincere opinion, that the whole coast of France was
completely at the mercy of His Majesty’s ministers.
“The noble lord next adverted to the coasting trade carried on by
France, and which it was in our power to destroy. That trade existed
to an extent almost incredible. It was in our power to dismantle their
batteries,—to blow up their towers,—and, above all, to destroy that
chain of signal-posts, by which a telegraphic communication was kept
up from Flushing to Bayonne, and from the south-east point of Spain to
Venice. Each of those signal-posts could be successfully attacked by
ten men, as, except in a few situations, they were exposed, and seldom
had above two or three maimed soldiers to conduct them. He had no
interest whatever in forcing those observations on the attention of
the committee, and he hoped the right hon. gentleman would not think
them altogether unworthy of his consideration. He should not, he said,
at that time attempt to say more; but he trusted that members who were
far more capable to do justice to the subject than he could pretend to
be, would turn it in their minds, and bring the subject forward, or
that His Majesty’s ministers would investigate the truth and act
accordingly. In either case he was certain attention to the hints he
had thus thrown out could not fail of being attended by the most
beneficial results to the country. He did not think ministers, in not
having attended to the subject, were so much to blame as the House
itself, for they were, or ought to be, the guardians of the public
purse; but he was sorry to say, the practice of the House was _to vote
estimates to a very great amount, without at all troubling themselves
to inquire how those estimates were applied_.
“Besides the signal-posts he had mentioned, there were placed along
the whole coast of Spain many small parties of soldiers in churches,
convents, and other buildings, for the purpose of keeping the people
of the maritime towns in awe, and passing along supplies to the
armies, which supplies it was in our power to intercept, as the only
practicable military road was within a pistol-shot of the margin of
the sea. The smallest assistance would encourage the people to rise
upon them; but without such assistance they are afraid to do so,
knowing that the French would burn their houses, violate their wives,
and murder themselves. This he had seen them do.
“During all the time he was off Catalonia, the French had barely
sufficient force to defend themselves against the natives, and in
every enterprise which they undertook they were foiled. It was
notorious, however, to all the world, that the attention of ministers
was always engaged exclusively on one or two objects, and that they
never took an extended view of things. If our commander on that coast
had had discretionary powers to supply Figueras, which was the key of
Catalonia, with provisions, it could not have been taken by force, for
it was impregnable. If Government would only act in a proper way, it
was impossible that Buonaparte could go on a twelvemonth longer.
“The noble lord then referred to the American war: had ministers
during that war, instead of marching large armies through the country,
only transported 10,000 men from one place to another, they would soon
have laid waste the whole sea-coast, and the country must have
submitted.
“MR. HUTCHINSON deprecated the species of warfare recommended by the
noble lord, which he thought would not be productive of the effects he
expected.
“LORD COCHRANE, in explanation, defended the system which he had
recommended, as peculiarly calculated to injure the enemy’s coasting
trade, which was the great nursery of his seamen.
“After a few questions from Admiral Markham and Mr. Tierney, as to the
decrease in the estimates, and replies from Mr. Yorke, the resolution
was agreed to, as were also the other usual annual resolutions
relating to the navy.”
As the subject of flogging in the army and navy forms a prominent
subject in the present day, I may be pardoned for putting my own views,
then and now, on record. On the 13th of March, on the motion for the
third reading of the Mutiny Bill, Sir Francis Burdett, in a speech
distinguished for humanity and eloquence, animadverted on the punishment
of flogging in the army and navy, as a system derogatory to our country,
where the principles of liberty, of humanity, and of civilisation were
better understood and practised than in any other country.