ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Is there a channel of sixteen feet all across?”
MR. STOKES.—“_There is a channel of sixteen feet all across_, but that
is _narrow_. There are about the middle of it patches of twelve feet.”
PRESIDENT.—“_There is_ no going into the channel of sixteen feet
without, in _some instances_, passing over that of twelve feet?”
MR. STOKES.—“You _may_ go over the channel of sixteen feet, but _it is
so narrow_ that I should calculate going over that part which is _only
twelve feet_.”
PRESIDENT.—“It is _so intricate_, you _must_ count on passing over
some part with only _twelve feet_?”
MR. STOKES.—“I should calculate on going over part of the twelve feet,
because _it is so narrow_, it is _difficult to hit_ the passage of
_sixteen feet_.”[46]
-----
Footnote 46:
Yet Captain Broughton had “hit” it, and that without finding any shoal
at all!
-----
This is pretty minute for a man who was not present in the action, who
confessed that he was “ignorant of the distance between the sands,” and
had, in fact, “never sounded there at all,” that his survey had been
made from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, nine miles off, and that he
had his information from Mr. Fairfax and an “anonymous French MS.,”
which was not even produced in Court, nor demanded by the Court, so that
it is not known to this day who was the author of that MS., or, indeed,
whether it ever existed; a matter which, from its non-production, I do
not hesitate to doubt.
The President was, however, bent on confirming Mr. Stokes’s shoal, but
the result was most unfortunate. In order further to substantiate the
alleged fact, Captain Woolfe of the _Aigle_, which vessel was present
during the action, thus replied to an interrogation on the point.
“I think _four or five sail of the line_ might have lain clear of the
enemy’s batteries. I lay there with the _Pallas_ and _fifteen or
sixteen brigs, gun-brigs, cutters, and schooners_!” (_Minutes_, p.
86.)
PRESIDENT.—“_Would the casting your eye upon this chart_ (Stokes’s)
_give you a clearer comprehension!!!_”
CAPT. WOOLFE.—“No! I have it all in my mind. _I received orders to
assist Mr. Stokes on a survey._
PRESIDENT.—“What was the report of the depth of water at any
particular time of tide in the situation _I have pointed out between
the Palles and the Boyart, if you can recollect it_?”
CAPT. WOOLFE.—“Mr. Stokes said HE HAD FOUND DEEPER WATER AND A LITTLE
MORE ROOM FARTHER TO THE SOUTHWARD.”
Is it not wonderful that in face of such facts, the Court should have
acted on Mr. Stokes’s chart or his evidence? Where Mr. Stokes had found
“_deeper water_” he had marked on his chart a shoal, on which no admiral
in his senses would have trusted a frigate, though the _Revenge_ and
_Valiant_ line-of-battle ships, with five or six frigates had found
plenty of water, and, whilst destroying two enemy’s ships, remained
there through a whole tide without grounding! The following are extracts
from the logs of the ships present.
“3·0 p.m. Shortened sail and anchored _in 7 fathoms_, near the outer
ship of the enemy, _Valiant_ in company.” (_Log of the_ Pallas.)
“3·30. Came to with the best bower _in 6 fathoms_.” (_Log of_
Valiant.)
“4·0. Anchored _in 5½ fathoms_.” (_Log of_ Unicorn.)
“3·30. Anchored _in_ 7 _fathoms_.” (_Log of_ Indefatigable.)
“2·30. Anchored _in_ 6 _fathoms_.” (_Log of_ L’Aigle.)
The subjoined evidence of Mr. Spurling, the master of the _Impérieuse_,
will render further allusion to the subject unnecessary.
“Where we anchored, which was _out of the reach of shot and shell_, we
lay _in five and a half fathoms at low water_. Three or four cables’
length _nearer_ to the Pallas Shoal than we lay, was a good berth for
three or four sail of the line to anchor in five and a half or six
fathoms _dead low water_. The marks for such anchorage I took myself.”
“I know this from my own observation. It was marked on the French
chart, but I did not choose to trust it, but wished to prove it. The
lead was kept going the whole of the time on both sides.”
PRESIDENT.—“What water did you find in working out between the tail of
the Pallas Shoal and the shoal towards the Boyart, when working to and
fro?”
“_From six and a half to seven fathoms._”
“Did you make any observation before you began to engage?”
“Yes. On the morning of the 12th I was desired by Lord Cochrane to lay
a buoy on the Boyart Shoal, which I did in _six and a half fathoms
water_, a sufficient distance to allow _any ship_ to tack round that
buoy.”
The reader must not imagine that I am too minutely descending into
particulars. I am writing history—naval history—in which Lord Gambier is
nothing—myself less, except as unavoidably connected with the
proceedings of the court-martial. I have no wish to speak of Lord
Gambier where it can be avoided. The subject is, however, one in which
the nation is collectively interested, and the national, no less than
naval character, involved. Now that the justice of the Duke of Somerset
has given me the means of incontrovertible explanation, I am personally
gratified in availing myself of it; but I repeat that my object is now,
as it ever was, national; and having at length those means, it is my
duty, no less than my pleasure, to use them as a warning to future
generations of the noble service to which I have the honour to belong.
I must reluctantly turn for a moment to the evidence founded on Mr.
Fairfax’s chart (D). First premising, that when Mr. Fairfax was asked to
“state the situation of the enemy’s ships at noon,” he replied, that “at
_eleven o’clock_ he went down below, and did not come up again till near
two.” (_Minutes_, p. 143). That is, during the whole of the three hours’
delay, and the consequent escape of the grounded ships, which
constituted the question before the Court, Mr. Fairfax had been, by his
own voluntary admission, in his berth, recovering himself from the
fatigues of the previous night.
During these three hours, as has been said, the _Océan_, three-decker,
and the three other line-of-battle ships had _quietly hove off_, and
were running into the Charente. This was proved by the concurrent
testimony of _all_ the witnesses, and their escape formed the neglect,
if any, of the Commander-in-chief. Yet Mr. Fairfax unblushingly
testified that his chart showed their position on the morning of the
12th, and that when at two o’clock he returned from his _three hours’
nap_, the enemy’s ships were “NEARLY IN THE SAME POSITION as when he
went below at _eleven o’clock_!” All the other witnesses, without
exception, stating the fact that they had warped off and escaped beyond
reach! Yet the Court made no comment on Mr. Fairfax’s evidence.
When pressed to describe their position more minutely, Mr. Fairfax, with
real or assumed indignation, replied, “_I have described them in the
chart produced by me_.” The Court complacently declined further
question, and Mr. Fairfax thus escaped the struggle between his chart
and the truth, which had so much embarrassed Stokes, who had not the
sagacity to perceive that his silence would have been more acceptable
than his volubility.
Mr. Fairfax’s minute description of the “nearly same position” of the
ships which had _escaped while he was below!_ is yet more extraordinary.
“Were any of the enemy’s ships aground lying so close together as to
have the yards of two of them locked together?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“By perspective those near the _Tonnerre_ seemed to be
_very close_. If you draw a line they appear in one.”
PRESIDENT.—“The question is, whether these two ships were lying so
close together that their masts and yards might be locked in, or
whether they were distinct?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“They were _distinct at night_!”
“Were you in any situation which enabled you to determine that they
were _not_ near each other?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“No; it was prior (_i. e._ before daylight) that I
distinguished them separate.”
“Can you determine _how far_ they were asunder?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“I should think a ship’s length from each other, _those
three_.”
Yet even the reluctant vision of Mr. Stokes, at a distance of nine
miles, could perceive _at daylight_ four of the enemy’s vessels lying
helplessly “in a group.” Mr. Fairfax—from whom a straightforward answer
could not be got—said, when pressed, that amidst _pitch_ darkness, and
by “_perspective_,” he could plainly distinguish them as distinct from
each other; and was thus, with difficulty, made to tell almost the truth
as to how they lay when driven ashore on the preceding night. He could
see in the darkness that their yards were not locked together, but they
were only “a ship’s length from each other”—a distinction almost without
a difference.
The whole affair was made to turn on the evidence of these two masters,
Stokes and Fairfax, who unhesitatingly contradicted in that evidence the
testimony of the most experienced officers present in the action, though
the latter, had it not been for my pertinacity, as before described,
_would not have been allowed to give evidence before the Court_. It has
been shown that the charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax were used to
the exclusion of the actual charts of the enemy’s coast supplied under
sanction of the Admiralty itself, because there were none more reliable
in existence.
It would be easy to extract from the evidence of Fairfax much more to
the same effect; but the subject is nauseating, and the naval reader
may, if he choose, search the _Minutes_ of the court-martial for
himself. The young officer could scarcely occupy himself more
profitably, if he wish to become acquainted with the practice of the
service fifty years ago.
A short extract from Mr. Fairfax’s evidence relative to the explosion
vessel and the _Mediator_ is necessary, as Lord Gambier avowed in his
defence that the “explosion vessels _failed in their object_;” and to
corroborate this, Mr. Fairfax falsely placed on his chart the spot where
the explosion took place, in a false position, in order to confirm to
the _eye_ of the Court the asseverations of the Commander-in-chief in
his defence. Like Mr. Stokes, Mr. Fairfax swore the _truth_ in his
evidence in contradiction to his chart.
The assertion of the Commander-in-chief in his defence, with regard to
the explosion vessels, is as follows:—
“The explosion vessels, conducted by Lord Cochrane, _failed in their
object_, as will be seen with reference to the _small chart_ which I
now deliver into Court. (Mr. Fairfax’s chart D.) This points out where
two of them blew up. The situation in which, and the time when, those
vessels blew up, _proved prejudicial to the enterprise in several
respects_.... In fact, had not Captain Wooldridge and some of the
other officers, wholly disregarding the explosion, taken their
fireships in _a proper direction_ for the enemy, it is more than
probable that _none of them would have produced any effect on the
enemy’s fleet_.” (Lord Gambier’s Defence, _Minutes_, p. 124.)
Lord Gambier uttered this with the full knowledge that NOT A SINGLE
FIRESHIP DID TAKE EFFECT ON THE ENEMY’S FLEET, a fact which his lordship
openly states in another part of his defence; so prematurely were the
fireships kindled, and so badly were they directed. That Captain
Wooldridge took his fireship in “a proper direction,” is wholly
disproved by the very man upon whose chart his lordship relies; viz.
Fairfax, who states in his evidence that _after_ the explosion had taken
place he “_hailed the Mediator_ to ALTER HER COURSE, OR SHE WOULD MISS
THE FRENCH FLEET!!
I am sorry to bring such evidence as the subjoined to confute the
unfounded assertions of a British admiral, but justice to myself leaves
me no alternative.
QUESTION.—“Do you recollect when and where the explosion vessel blew
up on the night of the 11th of April?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“She was about _two cables’ length from the Lyra_. The
_Lyra_ is marked in the chart produced by me, as well as the explosion
vessel. _When she blew up the fire vessels all seemed to steer for
that point_. I hailed four of them and the _Mediator_, and _desired
the Mediator to steer south-east, or else she would miss the French
fleet_.”
Here Mr. Fairfax proved; 1st, that the explosion-vessel took effect
before a single fireship was kindled. 2ndly, that the _Mediator_ was
steering in a _wrong direction_, not a “_proper direction_,” as alleged
by Lord Gambier. 3rdly, and that therefore the boom was destroyed before
the _Mediator_ could have got near it. The _Mediator’s_ log is, however,
luckily amongst the Admiralty records, and is carried up to the time the
ship was set on fire, viz. 9·30 P.M., but not a word is said of breaking
any boom, or even coming in contact with one, though had she done so the
shock must have shook her from stem to stern. The subjoined are the
_Mediator’s_ last log entries previous to her being set on fire.
“8·30 P.M. Cut the cable and made sail for the French squadron.
“9·30. _Set the ship on fire._”
The preceding extract from Mr. Fairfax is taken from the “_revised_”
minutes. He says: “_When the explosion vessel blew up all the
fire-vessels seemed to steer from that point_.What he really said was,
“_I was below at the time of the first explosion!_ which I supposed was
some shells bursting in the top, but I got on deck time enough to see
her blow up!” This was expunged, and the above version substituted. The
fact was, as every seaman will comprehend in a moment, that there was
not a grain of powder, or a single shell, anywhere but in _a mass in the
hold_, and this, as a matter of course, exploded _in an instant_! I do
not say that Mr. Fairfax can be accused of this perversion of his
evidence, as it was evidently the work of the person who _revised_ the
minutes for publication by a Portsmouth bookseller.
The _Mediator’s_ log was taken out of her previously to her being set on
fire, and is subsequently continued up to midnight, two hours and a half
afterwards, but still not a word is mentioned of coming in contact with
a boom. This should be conclusive on the subject, and it is not my fault
that a fact beyond dispute, must necessarily disprove the asseverations
of the Commander-in-chief in his defence before the court-martial.
These, however, are both facts. Let the reader make the most of them.
Yet in his letter to the Admiralty of April 14th, Lord Gambier stated
that “the weight of the _Mediator_ broke the boom,” in that letter also
ignoring the effect of the explosion vessels altogether. His Lordship
says, in his defence, that they were _signals for the fireships_!! The
subjoined are his Lordship’s words:—“Their explosion was to point out
_the proper time for the officers commanding the fireships to set fire
to their respective vessels_, and to intimidate and prevent the enemy
from towing off the fireships.”[47] Three explosion vessels fitted at an
enormous cost for ammunition, &c., to do that which a signal rocket
could have done as well!! If the explosion vessels did not strike terror
into the enemy assuredly nothing did, for at page 125 of his defence he
admits that “_not one of the enemy’s ships was actually destroyed by
means of fireships_.”
Footnote 47:
_Minutes_, p. 123.
This perseverance on the part of the Commander-in-chief in persisting
that the explosion vessels “failed in their object,” though according to
his own admission that the fireships failed also, was attempted to be
corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Fairfax, but in a different way,
viz. by swearing that she blew up at too great a distance from the enemy
to produce any effect at all!
PRESIDENT.—“To the best of your judgment, what was the distance of the
explosion vessel from the enemy when she blew up?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“About a mile.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—-“What sort of a night was it?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“Very dirty, and blowing strong. The _Lyra_ was pitching
bows under.”
“Was the night light or dark?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“_Very dark at intervals._”
“How then did you, in a _very dark night_, ascertain that the
explosion vessel blew up _within a mile_ of the enemy?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“By her computed distance from us in the _Lyra_, judging
the distance she was from the enemy.” [_Minutes_, p. 177.)
At first sight, these questions on the part of the Court seem impartial,
but their object was to make Mr. Fairfax say that she might have been
_more_ than a mile from the enemy, as appears from the subsequent
evidence. Mr. Fairfax would not say this. He, however, placed her on his
chart on this _“very dark” night near the Boyart shoal_, and not _close
to the Ile of Aix and the boom_, where Captain Proteau, who was lying
under the lee of the boom, says she blew up.
Unfortunately for the veracity of Mr. Fairfax on this point, he had
previous to the trial unwittingly written a letter to the editor of the
_Naval Chronicle_, evidently not for publication, but in explanation of
a chart. The editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, however, published the
explanatory remarks, which are in complete contradiction to Mr.
Fairfax’s evidence on the court-martial—in fact, this portion of the
letter tells the truth in the following language:—
“I have it from good authority that the fuses on board one of the
explosion vessels only burned six minutes and a half, instead of
twenty.[48] Had they burned twelve minutes longer _nothing could have
been better placed_! I saw the French ships with lights up
_immediately after the explosion, before any of the fireships got
near_!!—EDWARD FAIRFAX.” (_Naval Chronicle for 1809_, vol. xxii. p.
49.)
-----
Footnote 48:
This is incorrect. They were calculated to burn twelve minutes, and
exploded in about half that time.
-----
With this glaring contradiction between his evidence and his previous
_honest_ assertion to the editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, I take my
leave of Mr. Fairfax and the subject, being quite content to rest my
character on the contradictory evidence of those suborned to serve the
cause of an administration in want of the prestige of a victory, at the
expense of truth and even common sense, had such been relied on in the
investigation.
I will conclude with the remark, that had I been permitted access to the
charts _before the lapse of fifty-one years_ from the date of the
action—or could I after the court-martial have prevailed on Parliament
to investigate the matter, by demanding the production of the minutes of
the court-martial before voting thanks to the Commander-in-chief, the
Administration of that corrupt day would never have dared to treat me as
an officer maligning my Commander-in-chief unjustly, nor to have
followed up their malignity to its final consummation of driving me from
the British Navy, on the imputation of an offence of which I had not the
smallest cognisance, as will by and by appear as plainly, and I trust as
satisfactorily, as do these extraordinary revelations concerning a
court-martial which will stand a beacon and a warning to the naval
service as long as that service may exist. God grant that the records of
that noble service to the latest day of its existence may never again be
sullied in like manner!