-----
Footnote 38:
This reply is very characteristic. He knew, as Stokes swore, that the
“_enemy’s ships were aground with their sterns to the westward_,” and
that not only could they not return a fire, but that a broadside from
a British ship must have gone clean through them from stern to bow;
but, unlike Stokes, he would not swear that ships in such a position
could have “_annoyed and raked the king’s ships_.” The enemy’s ships
were merely “_in a favourable place for it!!_” And so they were, had
they been _afloat_ instead of helplessly _ashore_, heeling over at an
angle of thirty degrees.
-----
The ingenuity of Mr. Fairfax in avoiding straightforward answers to
embarrassing questions is remarkable. He was one of Lord Gambier’s tract
distributors spoken of in the first volume, but though he had no
objection to construct an imaginary chart to serve his chief, his
conscience would not permit him to swear to its contents. Nevertheless
such evasion ought not to have been tolerated by any tribunal. Yet on
the charts and evidence of Stokes and this man was the result of the
court-martial made to rest, in opposition to the testimony of officers
of standing and character.
The opinion of another eminent officer, Captain Broughton of the
_Illustrious_, will be even more to the purpose.
PRESIDENT.—“From the first attack on the ships of the enemy on the
evening of the 11th of April to the time of your leaving Basque Roads,
according to your judgment, was everything done that could be done to
effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think it would have been more advantageous _if the
line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels had gone in at half
flood_, which I take to be at about _eleven o’clock_ A.M. or
_twelve_.”[39]
-----
Footnote 39:
Precisely the time at which Lord Gambier ordered the fleet to come
to an anchor, after it had been got under weigh with every
indication of proceeding to an attack.
-----
“The French admiral and two more got off and made sail towards the
river, very soon after the two that were afloat.”
QUESTION.—“By the French admiral you mean the _Ocean_?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Yes.”
QUESTION.—“As the two ships that remained at anchor did not change
their position till about noon, and the _Ocean_ continued in her
position till about the same time, if the British fleet had been
ordered in at eleven o’clock, which you thought would have been the
proper time——”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I would rather say between eleven and twelve, which,
in my judgment, was more advantageous.”
QUESTION.—“Would not the ships sent in have been exposed to the fire
of the _two ships_ that remained at anchor, the French Admiral’s ship,
and the batteries of Isle d’Aix, at the same time?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Certainly; but I conceive they were partly _panic
struck_, and on the appearance of a force coming in might have been
induced to cut their cables, and try to make their escape up the
river.” (_Minutes_, pp. 219-221.)
There was not much to be feared from a “_panic-struck_” enemy, with only
two ships afloat out of thirteen, eleven being on shore. Yet those who
peruse the minutes of the court-martial will marvel to find these two
ships set up as bugbears to a British fleet.
I will next adduce Captain Broughton’s testimony as to the trifling
opposition to be anticipated from the batteries on Isle d’Aix, which
three weeks previous to the action had been pronounced “_no obstacle_”
by the Commander-in-chief, in his letter to the Admiralty[40], but were
now considered formidable enough to prevent a British fleet from passing
within two miles of them!
Footnote 40:
See vol. i. p. 342.
It may here be remarked that Captain Broughton was well acquainted with
these batteries, from having previously been here under Admiral Keats,
as they were familiar to me from having been employed on the same spot
under Admiral Thornborough, and having, in fact, engaged the _Minerve_
frigate under their fire[41], which I held so cheap as not to consider
them or their ineffectual fire worthy attention. As Admiral Austen well
remarks—all Lord Gambier knew respecting them was from the reports of
others, who had not even ventured closely to reconnoitre the batteries.
The report of Captain Broughton, who had reconnoitred them, was not
acted upon.
-----
Footnote 41:
See vol. i. p. 191.
-----
PRESIDENT.—“In your services in Basque Roads had you any opportunity
of making observations upon the state of the enemy’s fortifications on
Isle d’Aix?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Yes, I had.”
PRESIDENT.—“Narrate those observations.”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I was on board the _Amelia_ when she was ordered to
dislodge the enemy from the Boyart Shoal, and, being _nearly within
gunshot_[42], I observed the fortifications. They appeared to me in a
very different state to what I observed them when serving two or three
years before under Sir Richard Keats. I thought they were repairing
the works from the quantity of _rubbish that was thrown up_; and I
counted on a semicircular battery which commanded the roadstead where
the enemy lay between _fourteen and twenty guns_, I am not positive as
to the exact number. There was a small battery lower down, nearer the
sea. I do not know the exact number of guns; there might be _six_ or
_nine_, I suppose. What I had before taken to be a block-house above
the semicircular battery seemed to have _no guns whatever_; it
appeared to be a barrack for containing the guard. I thought from this
observation that the fortifications of the island, at least in that
part, were _not so strong as we supposed_, and I reported my opinion
to that effect to Lord Gambier.”
-----
Footnote 42:
Mr. Stokes said the ships going in must have been “_at half range of
shell and point blank shot_!” (_Minutes_, p. 148.) Mr. Stokes’s
observation was taken “from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_;” that
of Captain Broughton from actual exposure to the fire of the
batteries.
-----
PRESIDENT.—“Are those the only guns you observed on Isle d’Aix that
could bear upon the anchorage?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“They were all that I observed; there might be more.”
QUESTION.—“Did it appear to you that the enemy was constructing new
works in front of the old ones, and nearer to the sea?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think the _rubbish_ was the remains of the old
works that _had been taken down_.
PRESIDENT.—“Would your Lordship wish to ask any questions on the
subject?”
LORD GAMBIER.—“I would wish Capt. Broughton to point out on the chart
the situation of the _Amelia_ when he was on board her and made those
observations?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“The south point of Isle d’Aix was just shut in with
Fouras Castle, and I think the bearing was nearly S.E. and by E. when
it was open. When it was touching the point we were JUST OUT OF
GUNSHOT FROM BOTH SIDES. THEY FIRED AT US FROM BOTH SIDES, BUT THE
SHOT DID NOT REACH US.” (_Minutes_, pp. 218, 219.)
This was decisive, and in his defence, the Commander-in-chief thus
attempted to evade the facts which had been officially reported to him
by Captain Broughton. To contradict them was impossible.
“With respect to the force of the Aix batteries, I apprehend what
appeared to Lord Cochrane and to the master of his ship as ruins of
the fort were, in fact, materials for _improving or increasing the
work_! Indeed, can it be natural to _suppose_ that the enemy, who are
so active in forming batteries wherever they can be useful, and whose
engineers are considered to be equal to any, would, of all moments,
choose that for dismantling or blowing up works when they expected
those works would be most required; for it is very certain the enemy
was as fully apprised of _our intentions of attacking their fleet as
myself_!!![43] And it will perhaps be considered less likely that the
enemy should _weaken their defences_ on Isle d’Aix, _raised evidently
for the protection of their fleet_, when at the same time they were
endeavouring to form others on the Boyart Shoal as a protection for
it.” (_Minutes_, p. 135.)
-----
Footnote 43:
Lord Gambier had just before written to the Admiralty that an attempt
with fireships would be “_hazardous if not desperate_.” He had no
intention of attacking otherwise. And after the enemy’s ships had been
driven ashore by the explosion vessels, Captain Broughton testifies to
Lord Gambier’s expressions that he did not intend to make any attack,
as the object of their destruction seemed to be already accomplished.
That is, neither before nor after the action did he intend to make any
attack with the fleet, nor would he have done so unless a partial
attack had been forced on him by my signal on the _afternoon_ of the
12th of April.
-----
There was no “_supposition_” in the matter, nor any necessity for
hypothesis, in face of the fact that the fortifications were for the
most part _débris_, or as Captain Broughton termed them, a mass of
“_rubbish_.” No one said that they had been “_blown up_” or that the
enemy were _weakening their defences_! The fact is, that only a month
before the action Lord Gambier had himself set the matter at rest, by
writing to the Admiralty as follows:—“The advanced work between the
Isles of Aix and Oleron, I _find_ was injured in its foundation, and is
in no state of progress, _it is therefore no obstacle to our bombarding
the enemy’s fleet_[44],” yet it was now an “obstacle” to even attempt
attacking ships on shore; and Lord Gambier condescended to resort to the
just quoted assertions, in contradiction to his own letter to the
Admiralty.
-----
Footnote 44:
See vol. i. page 342.
-----
On the utter worthlessness of the batteries, as calculated to impede the
operations of a British fleet, there was abundant evidence before the
Court, as will be seen on an examination of the minutes of the
court-martial, such testimony confirming the correctness of Lord
Gambier’s letter to the Admiralty on the 11th of March, and completely
disproving his Lordship’s contradictory assumptions in his extraordinary
defence read to the Court.
Captain Broughton was next examined with reference to the imaginary
shoal, which forms so conspicuous an object on Mr. Stokes’s chart (C).
“If the ships had been damaged in masts and rigging, considering the
direction and strength of the wind at that time, was there any place
those ships could have retired to?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think as the wind was north-westerly and
northerly, they might have found safe anchorage and protection in what
is called in the French chart I had on board “_Le Grand Trousse_” (see
Chart A), _where there is thirty or forty feet of water_ OUT OF RANGE
OF SHOT OR SHELLS IN ANY DIRECTION.”
QUESTION.—“How many ships would you have thought it necessary to send
into Aix Roads to attack the enemy?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I should think _five or six ships_ of the least
draught of water.”
“I conjecture that the _discomfited_ French squadron _would have made
very little resistance_.”
“From the situation in which the enemy were, _not having recovered
from the fright of the night before, I think our loss would have been
very little_, as few of the French ships were in a situation to FIGHT
THEIR GUNS!!”
QUESTION.—“Do you know that from the anchorage in Aix Roads to the
anchorage you have just now described, that _there is_ A BAR GOES
ACROSS?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“No! I do not know anything of it; I _sounded_ from
the wreck of the _Varsovie_ to that anchorage, and FOUND NO SHOAL
THERE!!”
PRESIDENT.—“_That is not the place!_ It _is_ marked in _some_ of the
charts that between the Boyart and the tail of the Pallas there _is_ a
bar!”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I _sounded as I came in from the fleet_ BUT DID NOT
FIND ANY BAR.” (_Minutes_, pp. 221-233.)
The extraordinary conduct of the President in saying “_That is not the
place_” and then that “in _some_ of the charts there _is_ a bar,” in the
place which was “_not_ the place,” needs no comment. The evidence of
Captain Broughton, who _had_ sounded there, should have been fatal to
the chart of Mr. Stokes, who _had not_ by his own admission taken
soundings. The fact was, that this bar, made for the occasion, formed
one of the main points in the Commander-in-chief’s defence, and Mr.
Stokes’s chart was retained in spite of the testimony of those who, from
having sounded, could alone know anything of the matter.
But Mr. Stokes shall first _prove_ and then disprove his imaginary _bar
or shoal_.
Notwithstanding that Mr. Stokes admitted that his knowledge of the
supposed shoal between the Palles and the Boyart was only founded on an
anonymous French MS., he subsequently forgot the admission, and swore to
his own _personal knowledge of the minutest particulars_ connected with
the imaginary shoal!!
LORD GAMBIER.—“Is there not a bank between the Boyart and the Palles
Shoal?”
MR. STOKES.—“Yes.”
“What water is there generally upon that bank at low water?”
MR. STOKES.—“From _twelve to sixteen feet in the deepest part_, but
that part is _very narrow_.”
“If there are only _sixteen feet_, line-of-battle ships could not pass
over it at all times?”
MR. STOKES.—_No[45], not until nearly two-thirds flood._ You must
reckon on going over that part at _twelve feet_.”
-----
Footnote 45:
It is marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart that the rise of tide is
_twenty-one feet_.
-----
“To get to the anchorage, it _is_ necessary to pass over the bank just
mentioned?”