“I have lately been reading your book, the ‘Autobiography of a
Seaman,’ and cannot resist the desire I feel of stating how much
pleasure I derived from its perusal, especially of that part which has
reference to the movements of the fleet in the Mediterranean from 1798
to 1800. Having been serving for the greater part of those years on
that station, your narrative excited in my mind a vivid recollection
of former times—as it were living that part of my life over again.
“With reference to the latter part of the volume which details the
proceedings in the attack on the enemy’s squadron in the Charente, I
wish to say as little as possible which may inculpate the conduct of
the Commander-in-chief, to whom, as you probably know, I owe a debt of
gratitude for his kindness to me.
“But at the same time I cannot but admit that he appears to me to have
acted injudiciously. It would have been far better had he moved the
squadron to a position just out of reach of the batteries on Isle
d’Aix, when he would have been able to see the position of the enemy’s
ships, and thus have decided for himself whether they could have been
attacked without needless risk, and not have been compelled to form
his determination entirely on the report of others.[30]
Footnote 30:
Who were more interested in the failure of the action than its
success, from the fact shown in the first volume of the ill-feeling
manifested towards me in consequence of my being a junior officer
temporarily appointed, though against my own will, and after all
others had declined the enterprise.
“Had he done so, it seems probable that he would have seen things in a
different point of view, and decided to send in a force sufficient to
have captured or destroyed the whole.
“I must, in conscience, declare that I do not think you were properly
supported, and that had you been so the result would have been very
different. _Much of what occurred I attribute to Lord Gambier’s being
influenced by persons about him who would have been ready to sacrifice
the honour of their country to the gratification of personal dislike
to yourself, and the annoyance they felt at a junior officer being
employed in the service._[31]
“I will only add that I consider your services in the _Speedy_,
_Pallas_, and _Impérieuse_ will entitle you to the warmest thanks of
your country, as well as to the highest honours which have been
awarded for similar services. Instead of which, you have in numerous
instances been persecuted in the most cruel and unrelenting manner.
“I desire to subscribe myself, with much respect and esteem,
“My dear Lord Dundonald,
“Yours very faithfully,
“FRANCIS W. AUSTEN.
“Admiral the Earl of Dundonald.”
-----
Footnote 31:
Though I had suggested the plan, after all other suggestions had
failed to satisfy the Board of Admiralty.
-----
If anything could alleviate the remembrance of the bitter persecutions
originating with this one-sided court-martial, it is an unsolicited
expression of opinion like that of the gallant Admiral Austen, whose
name, for evident reasons, was _not_ included in the list of those
summoned to give testimony on that remarkable occasion. That other
gallant officers still living entertain similar sentiments, I make no
doubt, for the simple reasons that, as honourable men, it is impossible
for them to entertain other opinions. What would have been the result of
the court-martial had such testimony as that of Admiral Austen been
permitted, may safely be left to public decision.
The gallant Admiral and the naval public at large will perhaps be
surprised to learn that my persecutions have not ceased at this day.
Despite my restoration to rank and honours, my banner has never been
restored to its place in Henry the Seventh’s Chapel, the unjust fine
inflicted on me in 1814 has never been remitted, nor other rights
withheld during my forced expulsion from the Navy conceded; the excuse
being want of precedent, though with that of the gallant Sir Robert
Wilson fresh in the archives of the nation.[32]
Footnote 32:
This fact, together with the particulars of Sir Robert Wilson’s
restoration, was obligingly communicated to me by that distinguished
patriot Joseph Hume, together with a letter expressive of his surprise
that my restoration had not been rendered complete. This letter and
the enclosures will be given in another place.
A few words may here be devoted to a point intimately connected with
this subject. In several reviews on the first volume of this work, the
public has been told of the handsome rewards which have been bestowed
for my services. The reader will perhaps be scarcely prepared to learn,
in answer to such statements, that with the exception of the ordinary
good service pension granted for general service in 1844, thirty-five
years after the action in Aix Roads, I never in my life received a
recompense from my country in any shape, the Order of the Bath alone
excepted. For my services in the _Pallas_, that of destroying three
heavily-armed French corvettes at the embouchure of the Garonne, and
cutting out the _Tapageuse_—all performed in one day—not a shilling was
awarded to myself, officers, and crew, though in the late war with
Russia I have been told that the destruction of a Russian gunboat was
scrupulously paid for. For my services on the coast of Catalonia in the
_Impérieuse_, to which Lord Collingwood testified that, single-handed, I
had stopped the advance of a French army, not a farthing was conceded,
whilst the thanks of Lord Collingwood were the only expressions of the
kind ever awarded for what English historians have eulogised even more
highly than did his Lordship.
For the partial destruction of the enemy’s fleet in Aix Roads not a
farthing was given to myself, officers, or crew; but nine years
afterwards, when told that I might take my share of head-money with the
rest of the fleet, I replied by refusing both the offer and the money,
on the ground that the ships only which took part in the action had a
right to it.
The reader will pardon this brief digression, which has arisen from
Admiral Austen’s allusions to the persecutions unworthily inflicted on
me, and I have chosen the opportunity to set the public right on a
subject which has been much misapprehended, to the detriment of myself
and family. Neither directly nor indirectly have my services throughout
my whole career ever cost the country a _penny_ beyond the ordinary pay
and the ordinary good service pension to which my rank entitled me; nor
did any of my family ever receive a place under government, other than
that to which they have risen in the ordinary course of naval
promotion.[33] After this positive assurance on my part, I feel
confident that the portion of the press which has expressed an opinion
that “I had been amply rewarded for my services,” will do me the justice
to acknowledge an unintentional error.
Footnote 33:
My third son is a post-captain, and my youngest a commander in the
navy, both having won their rank by services in action. With regard to
my eldest son, Lord Cochrane, the public shall judge of the favour
shown to him on my account. He was originally placed in the navy, in
which he served four years, but was driven from the service by the
animosity excited by the imputations against his father. After this he
entered the army, in which he served eighteen years. He was engaged
throughout the Canadian rebellion, and subsequently for eight
consecutive years in the pestilential climate of China during the war.
He there served under Lord Clyde, acted as aide-de-camp to
Major-General D’Aguilar, and subsequently as Quartermaster-General.
His health having at length broken down under the arduous nature of
his duties—he having been, as I have reason to believe, the only
officer who remained for so long a period on a station proverbially
unhealthy—he was ordered home on sick leave, and had to undergo the
unusual mortification of being periodically, and that too at short
intervals, ordered to appear before the Medical Board in London. This
was actual persecution, nor did it cease till Major-General D’Aguilar
himself went to the Horse Guards and remonstrated against such conduct
being pursued towards an officer whom he had sent home as being worn
out by eight consecutive years’ hard duty. On my son’s asking for an
unattached majority _by purchase_, he was told that his length of
service, from 1833 to 1851, was insufficient, notwithstanding that he
gave the precedent of earlier promotion in the case of an officer who
had married the daughter of the Master-General of the Ordnance, and
who got his majority in eleven years. Finding no prospect of
promotion, my son sold out, quitting the army as a captain, as the
state of his health did not warrant him in returning to his regiment.
I adduce this as a specimen of the kind of reward bestowed on me or my
family.
Since the receipt of Admiral Austen’s letter, I have been favoured with
another, from Capt. Hutchinson, who, at the time of the action in Aix
Roads, was a lieutenant in the _Valiant_, one of the two line-of-battle
ships reluctantly sent to the assistance of the _Impérieuse_, when
engaged single-handed with three of the enemy’s ships. Captain
Hutchinson was, therefore, in action throughout the whole affair, but,
like Admirals Austen and Maitland, _was not summoned to give evidence on
the court-martial_.
Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, whether in point of fact or ability, deserves
to be put on record as a proof that when naval officers have the
opportunity of speaking their minds on any subject connected with their
noble profession, there are few amongst them who will let self-interest
outweigh the honour of the service. So complete is the information
voluntarily given by Capt. Hutchinson, with whom I have not the pleasure
of being even personally acquainted, that it might have saved me much of
the lengthened critical explanation into which my sense of duty to the
naval service, as well as to my own reputation, has compelled me to
enter. As a further corroboration of my own proofs, written before the
reception of Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, I can only tell that gallant
officer how highly I appreciate it, and shall be surprised if the rest
of my brother officers do not form the same judgment.
Cumberland House, Chilham, Canterbury,
June 8th, 1860.
“MY LORD,
“I have read, with very great interest, the first volume of your
Autobiography, and if the second is not yet published, it is possible
that what I have to communicate may be of some service in any further
notice you may give of the attack upon the French fleet in Aix Roads.
I would not otherwise have taken the liberty of writing merely to
express the interest taken in your Memoirs, since I can only entertain
_that_ in common with every naval officer who has any true love for
his profession, and of esteem for those who have so eminently adorned
it by their gallantry and skill.
“I was fifth or junior lieutenant of the _Valiant_, on the mortifying
occasion above mentioned, and can bear testimony _to the indignation
which pervaded the whole fleet in witnessing the total want of
enterprise, and even common sense of duty, which then permitted so
many of the enemy’s ships to escape, when they were entirely at our
mercy_.
“I have, however, to mention some circumstances which may throw light
upon the mystified despatch of Lord Gambier, which certainly surprised
all those who were present. In the first place, Lord Gambier can have
given no _positive_ orders to Capt. Bligh of the _Valiant_ to _attack_
the French ships which were aground at the time indicated in the
despatch, for after we had anchored off the Boyart Shoal, Capt. Bligh,
seeing you go in with the _Impérieuse_ _unsupported_ (after waiting
some time, expecting to be _ordered_ by the Commander-in-chief to
assist you) went in his gig on board the _Caledonia_ to _volunteer his
services_. Lord Gambier expressed himself greatly obliged, but said
some other ship must accompany, upon which Capt. Bligh selected the
_Revenge_, from regard for Capt. Kerr, who had been acting for him in
the _Valiant_ some time before, when he had occasion to go on leave of
absence for private affairs.
“We accordingly ran in, as your Lordship has detailed, and I have
nothing to remark as to what followed but one circumstance, of which
your Lordship does not appear to have been aware. No doubt you would
have observed that on the evening of the 12th the crews of the _Ocean_
and two other enemy’s line-of-battle ships near her, were evidently
_flying from them in a panic, numerous boats from the shore assisting
in conveying them from the ships_.
“This was so apparent that our Captain, Bligh, went in his gig, with
two other Captains, as soon as it was dark, to reconnoitre these
ships, with a view to take possession of them with boats, if they were
deserted.
“These Captains returned, however, reporting that they had found them
surrounded by boats, &c., and that, consequently, they could not be
attacked. In the morning, however, no boats were near them, nor were
any persons seen stirring on board them; and it was not till about ten
o’clock, I think, that the crews, _finding that we had not taken
possession, took courage, ventured to return on board their ships, and
immediately began to warp them out of our reach_.
“Captain Bligh was a man of the firmest nerve I ever knew, and
therefore I can only suppose that the boats he saw were still engaged
carrying the crews on shore, though I believe it was at least ten
o’clock at night when he went to reconnoitre, and I know we were
greatly puzzled at the time to account for the presence of these
boats. As a proof that these ships _were_ totally deserted that night,
I need only refer your Lordship to the account of Admiral Gravière,
quoted by you, where he says, ‘_The panic was so great, that ships
which had not even been attacked were abandoned by their crews_.’
“But, my Lord, we heard soon after this disgraceful affair, by means
of some French vessel which had been boarded or taken, that such was
the case. I do not now perfectly recollect _how_ this information
reached us, but we had no doubt of the fact at the time, it being only
in accordance with our own observations and conjectures. I exceedingly
regret that I did not make note of this at the time, but the belief in
the fact of the crews having deserted those three ships was so general
and undoubted, that it never occurred to me that it might be
questioned.
“The report went further, and added one singular circumstance—that
there was _one_ man who _did_ remain when all the remainder of the
crews had quitted. This was a quarter-master on board the _Ocean_,
who, indignant at the cowardly desertion of the ships, _hid himself_,
when the crews were ordered to quit, and this was the salvation of
that three-decker and the two other ships, in a very extraordinary
way. A little midshipman belonging to one of our smaller vessels (I
believe a brig) had been sent in a jolly-boat that night with a
message to another ship, and having delivered it, instead of returning
immediately to his own vessel, he proposed to his men to go and look
at the French ships from which the crews had been seen to fly. His men
of course were willing, and they approached cautiously _very near_ to
the three-decker (the night was very dark) before they could observe
any stir on board or around her. They were then suddenly hailed by the
quarter-master before mentioned with a loud “Qui vive!” Of course the
poor little midshipman took it for granted that the ship was occupied
by more than that one man, and he hastily retreated, glad to escape
capture himself; but had he known the truth, _that little midshipman,
with his jolly-boat and four men, might have taken possession of a
three-decker and two seventy-fours_!
“This seems more like a story of romance than an actual occurrence,
and I greatly regret that I did not then make note of every name and
circumstance, which at this distance of time I cannot call to mind,
but I have never entertained any doubts as to the facts here detailed,
and I have always mentioned them in speaking of that most
unsatisfactory affair of Basque Roads. Admiral Gravière’s account is a
positive confirmation of what we observed and fully believed as to the
abandonment of the ships, and I only wonder that he should not have
mentioned the noble conduct of the quarter-master.
“Admiral Gravière, however, would probably not have heard of the
approach of the boat, and the quarter-master himself would not perhaps
have reflected upon the possible danger the ships were in from the
approach of only _one little boat_; yet if he had not been there to
hail that boat, it is more than probable that the little midshipman
would have continued cautiously to approach, till he discovered that
the ships were entirely deserted, and he would either have ventured to
take possession himself, or would certainly have returned to report
the circumstance, and a proper force would have been despatched to
take advantage of the abandonment, if it had been found to be as he
reported.
“It was the supposed abandonment of the ships, indeed, which induced
him to approach them at all, and it was this also which induced Capt.
Bligh to reconnoitre. These, my Lord, are the only circumstances I had
to communicate, and no doubt they will be in some degree interesting,
though not wholly satisfactory, from my inability to establish the
perfect correctness and truth of them. I _have_ not, and never _had_,
any doubt myself, though I am by no means inclined to believe
cock-and-bull stories. Of one thing I am very certain, that there was
a universal conviction, that, but for the ingenious ruse adopted by
your lordship of _running in singly with the Impérieuse, and then
making a signal of distress, or rather of want of assistance, nothing
whatever would have been effected against the French fleet_.
“I remain, my Lord,
“Your very obedient servant,
“CHAS. HUTCHINSON, Capt. R.N.
“The Right Honble. the Earl of Dundonald.”
To return to the testimony of eminent officers at the court-martial, by
which evidence Admiral Austen and Captain Hutchinson will be pleased to
find their disinterested opinions corroborated.
The first evidence adduced shall be that of another distinguished
officer, also still living, viz. Admiral Sir George Francis Seymour,
K.C.B., G.C.H., who commanded the _Pallas_ frigate at the action in Aix
Roads, and remained by me when the line-of-battle ships left the roads
on the morning of the 13th of April.[34]
-----
Footnote 34:
See vol. i. p. 392.
-----
An attempt was made to stop the evidence of Captain Seymour nearly at
its commencement, by Lord Gambier remarking that he had “_no further
questions to propose to Captain Seymour_;” who however promptly asked
whether he was not “bound by his oath to relate _every circumstance_
within his knowledge, respecting the proceedings of the fleet.”
(_Minutes_, p. 190.)
To this pertinent query the President replied; “If the questions that
_are asked you_ should not seem to embrace all the circumstances _to
which it refers_, you are still bound to relate them.” (_Minutes_, p.
190.)
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“From what period am I to give my answer?”
_President._—“From the time of your being _sent in to attack the
enemy_, and your having remained there.”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“_Without going back to the 11th?_”
PRESIDENT.—“No! _I take it from your going in on the 12th._”
(_Minutes_, p. 193.)
The President thus authoritatively stopped Captain Seymour from saying a
single word relative to the neglect of the Commander-in-chief in not
having sent ships to the attack before the _Ocean_ and group floated
away, as the _Pallas_ and the other vessels were withheld until the
_afternoon of the 12th_. This, however, did not prevent Captain Seymour
from taking the course which he had evidently proposed to himself.
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I think the ships _might_ have floated in sooner; that
they might have come in on the last half of the flood-tide.”[35]
PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they
actually did go in?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“At eleven o’clock.”
PRESIDENT.—“What time did the line-of-battle ships go in?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Within a short time after two o’clock.” (_Minutes_, p.
193.)
-----
Footnote 35:
Which rose as high as the last quarter of the ebb tide, when two
line-of-battle ships were sent in and remained without grounding.
-----
These three hours made all the difference in the result of the action,
and were in fact the point of inquiry before the court. At eleven
o’clock the whole fleet came to an anchor in Little Basque Roads,
instead of detaching a force to attack the enemy, as Captain Seymour
testifies they _might_ have done. The French ships were at that time
helplessly aground. Seeing the British fleet come to an anchor, the
enemy took heart, and strained every nerve to warp off, in which, being
unmolested, they succeeded—by throwing their guns and stores
overboard—and soon after _one o’clock_ had _effected their escape_.
At _two o’clock_—seeing me go in with the _Impérieuse_, in order to
prevent the other ships from escaping also, and rightly appreciating the
risk I was running single-handed, the Commander-in-chief then, but not
till then, reluctantly sent in two line-of-battle ships and some
frigates, and this only after repeated signals—the final one necessarily
being _in want of assistance_. So that _no attack_ was made on the
enemy’s ships till _after_ the escape of the _Ocean_, and all those
nearest the deep water, though these were most easily attackable; nor
would any attack have been made _at all_, but for my last signal. Had
Admiral Seymour been permitted to speak to this point, his evidence
would have been most conclusive, as the President must have seen when he
ordered the witness to speak only as to what occurred _after_ he was
sent in; that is, after the French ships had escaped, which was the
subject of inquiry, about which Admiral Seymour was thus ordered to say
nothing!
This forms, in fact, the history of the whole affair; three French ships
only being attacked in the afternoon, after all the outermost had been
quietly permitted to heave off and escape during the morning, and with a
rising tide in favour of the British force. Captain Seymour’s highly
honourable pertinacity in giving the above important opinion as to what
was clearly the duty of the Commander-in-chief at _eleven o’clock_,
after he had been cautioned by the President not to speak of anything
which occurred previous to _two o’clock_, when the _Pallas_ was sent in,
will be regarded—as it deserves to be regarded—in the light of truth and
honour holding itself superior to power. For the sake of the service no
less than for that of Admiral Seymour, I am proud to record this
instance in which self-interest weighed nothing in comparison with the
interest of the country, and the service which Captain Seymour evidently
considered to be at stake.
This reply of Captain Seymour took the Court by surprise, as opening the
very point sought to be avoided. This led to the subjoined angry
remonstrance from Admiral Young.
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“The general question is not meant to subject the
general conduct of the Commander-in-chief to the opinions of all the
officers serving under his command. If you think the two ships
(_Revenge_ and _Valiant_) not going in so early as you think they
might have floated to be an instance of neglect, it is your duty to
state it, that we may _inquire into it_, and hear _any other evidence_
upon it.”
The tendency and peculiarity of this remark to Captain Seymour, is
worthy of note. It more than insinuates that he was incapable of forming
a correct judgment, and plainly tells him that his evidence will go for
nothing, but “_to hear any other evidence_” upon it. A perusal of the
minutes of the court-martial will show the meaning of this expression,
viz. that when any officer in command spoke his mind on the subject, the
next witness was a master or other inferior officer _to contradict his
evidence_. For this purpose masters and others were recalled over and
over again—which is one of the most curious features of the
court-martial.
Captain Seymour had said nothing about the _two ships_, but that _the
ships_—meaning the British line-of-battle ships—might have gone in to
the attack at _eleven o’clock_, and thus replied to the insinuation.
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I have already stated that I cannot say it was
misconduct. I STATE THE FACT AND LEAVE THE COURT TO JUDGE.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“You state an opinion that _the fleet_ would have
floated in at eleven o’clock.”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Yes, THAT THERE WAS WATER ENOUGH.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Is that all you mean to say, that there would have
been water enough for them to have floated in?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Yes. That is all I _have_ said.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“When you say that the ships of the line would have
floated in at eleven o’clock, do you mean to speak to the depth of
water alone?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I confine myself to the _meaning of the words_, that
there WOULD HAVE BEEN WATER ENOUGH FOR THE LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS TO
HAVE FLOATED IN. That is what I mean to say. With regard to the
opposition they would have met with, THE COURT HAVE AS MUCH BEFORE
THEM AS I HAVE.”[36] (_Minutes_, p. 195.)
-----
Footnote 36:
Two ships of the enemy’s line afloat, viz. the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_!! “These,” said Lord Gambier in his defence, “_must have
entirely crippled every one of our ships in their approach through so
narrow a channel_. Besides which, _some of the grounded ships were
upright!!_ and could have brought their guns to bear on the entrance.”
(Lord Gambier’s Defence, _Minutes_, p. 125.) Two enemy’s ships, both
of which made sail for the Charente the moment the escaped ships had
got off, “_must have entirely crippled_” a powerful British
squadron!!!
-----
That is, in Captain Seymour’s opinion, the fleet ought to have proceeded
to the attack at eleven o’clock instead of then coming to an anchor, and
by that act, giving the enemy’s ships aground ample time to warp off and
escape, which they would not otherwise have attempted; a point on which
all French writers agree.
Attention must here be drawn to Admiral Young’s constantly repeated
expression “_floated in_.” The expression appears to have been used, not
more to prevent Captain Seymour from using any other, than to convey the
idea that there was no room in the Channel for operations, but that the
ships, if sent to the attack, must have _floated_ or _drifted_ in,
exposed to the fire of the enemy, had Lord Gambier directed them so to
do!
At the conclusion of Captain Seymour’s evidence, so clear and so
conclusive, the Commander-in-chief had the bad taste to remark that he
“_did not consider it of the least consequence_!” (_Minutes_, p. 196.)
An opinion in which posterity will assuredly not coincide.
I must here repeat that I was not permitted to be present in the court
during the examination of the witnesses, _or to know who had been
summoned to appear_, the evidence of Captain Seymour, and that of
several other eminent officers, would not have been taken at all, had I
not contrived to ascertain the names of those summoned. Finding that
most of these had either not been present in the action, or were known
to be in the interest of the Commander-in-chief, I went on the half deck
of the _Gladiator_, and wrote a note to the Court, pointing out the
unfairness of such proceeding, and naming other officers who ought to be
examined. They were _then_ summoned, and their evidence will be
conclusive to the reader, as it ought to have been to the Court, and
would have been so had not the Court itself been picked by the
Government, _i.e._ principally composed of officers who had been ordered
to hoist their flags to qualify them for sitting on the court-martial,
which, being ended, they were ordered again to strike their flags!
As a contrast to the evidence of Captain Seymour, I will turn to that of
three officers who were _not present in the action_, and in fact, do not
appear to have been in Aix Roads at all, either before or after it;
though without a minute knowledge of those Roads they could not be
competent to give even a general opinion on the subject. Without reason
assigned—as indeed it was not in their power to assign any—each thus
delivered his testimony.
QUESTION (_put to each in succession_).—“Was everything in your
judgment done that could be done, to effect the destruction of the
enemy’s ships?”
CAPT. BURLTON.—“I _think_ there was.”
CAPT. BALL.—“I _think_ there was everything done.”
CAPT. NEWMAN.—“Perfectly so.”
QUESTION.—“From the time the Commander-in-chief arrived in Basque
Roads to the time of your quitting it, can you state any instance of
neglect, misconduct, or inattention on his part to the public
service?”
CAPT. BURLTON.—“I know of none.”
CAPT. BALL.—“No; I cannot.”
CAPT. NEWMAN.—“None.”
Widely different was the testimony of Captain Malcolm of the
_Donegal_—the late Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm—-whose love of truth,
like that of Captain Seymour, was not to be fettered by negatives in
reply to leading questions. Captain Malcolm thus spoke of the only two
enemy’s ships afloat, _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, which two ships Lord
Gambier in his defence said “_must have entirely crippled_” the whole
British force, had it attempted to pass the channel leading to Aix
Roads.
“When those ships quitted their stations there was then _no obstacle_
to prevent the small ships from going in; by which I mean the
_frigates_, or even SEVENTY-FOURS. The fire from Isle d’Aix they
nearly _avoid_ by keeping near the Boyart.” (Capt. Malcolm’s evidence,
_Minutes_, pp. 208, 209.)
Lord Gambier had stated in his defence that he refrained from sending in
the ships on account of the danger from the fire of the fortifications.
Mr. Stokes supported this view by swearing that the ships would have
been “within point-blank range of shot.” The assertion of Captain
Malcolm that they would be nearly out of reach of shot, which was true,
was _malapropos_, though not to be shaken by the testimony of an
inferior officer. It was therefore dangerous to recal Mr. Stokes in
opposition to so high an authority as Captain Malcolm; Captain Kerr was
consequently recalled whilst Captain Malcolm _was under examination!_ to
say that his ship was _once_ hit from the batteries. After which
extraordinary interruption Captain Malcolm was suffered to proceed with
his testimony.
PRESIDENT.—“Was the enemy’s three-decker in a situation on the morning
of the 12th to have done any mischief to ships that had been sent in?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Till about noon she was heeling considerably, _and
appeared to me to be throwing her guns overboard_. When she righted,
she could have annoyed ships coming in.”
QUESTION.—“At what time did the three-decker remove from the situation
where you saw her on shore _heeling_?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“About two o’clock. I took no note of the time.”
QUESTION.—“Would you have sent ships in before the two ships were
removed and the three decker got off?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance
of destroying those ships _but by such an attack_, I certainly think
it _ought to have been made_. It was understood that they must all
again ground in the mouth of the Charente where it was the _received
opinion_ they could be attacked by bombs, gun-vessels, and fire-ships
again, _without risk_.”
QUESTION.—“Upon the whole, are you of opinion that, of all the French
ships which got ashore on the night of the 11th of April, any more
could have been destroyed than were destroyed had the British ships
been earlier sent in on the 12th of April to attack them?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my
opinion _they could not have been warped off from the shore, as it was
necessary to lay out anchors to heave them off_. Those that were not
aground had always the option of running further up the Charente. It
should be understood that it must have been at the risk of our fleet,
as I have already mentioned.” (_Minutes_, pp. 209 to 211).
Of course, every naval combat must be at the risk of fleets; such risk,
in my judgment, forming the chief object in building fleets for the
purpose of encountering it. But the risk to a whole squadron from two
ships afloat, and a three-decker ashore, “_heeling over, and throwing
her guns overboard_,” is what no brave seaman would ever take into
consideration. The chief risk, as has been alleged by Lord Gambier, was
from the fire of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, which he had shortly before
pronounced “_no obstacle_.” What this was, may be judged from the fact
that Captain Seymour, in the _Pallas_, Captain Woolfe, in the _Aigle_,
and myself in the _Impérieuse_, lay for two days in this formidable
position without loss of any kind.
The reply to the next question put to Captain Malcolm ought to have been
conclusive with the Court.
QUESTION.—“_Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent
in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?_”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“The moment that the two ships quitted their defensive
position the risk was then small of sending ships, and, OF COURSE, I
WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN INSTANTLY.” (_Minutes_, p. 212.)
This was spoken like a seaman. No greater contrast can be set in
juxtaposition with such evidence than that of the chartmaker Stokes, the
master of Lord Gambier’s flagship, who, though of no higher rank than
that of a warrant officer, was gravely consulted as to what, in his
opinion, was the Commander-in-chief’s duty!!
The subjoined evidence of Mr. Stokes is very curious, not only from its
effrontery in contradiction of superior officers, but in its own flat
and unblushing contradiction to itself. The portion of Mr. Stokes’s
evidence placed in a double column is truly wonderful; but it is more
wonderful that any tribunal should have so far forgot itself as to act
upon it.
“The ships would have been at half range of shell and point-blank
shot.” (_Minutes_, p. 148.)
“They would have remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries till
the tide floated them to the southward of the Palles Shoal; but this
retreat, in my opinion, they would not have been able to have gained.”
(P. 148.)
“If we had made the attack on the morning of the 12th, we should have
sacrificed our own ships without making any impression on the enemy,
or destroying _any_ of their ships.” (P. 148.)
“The enemy’s ships were _fast on the ground_ with their sterns to the
westward; and they _could not bring their guns to bear on the ships
that attacked them_. Had the French ships _grounded with their
broadsides flanking the passage, they could not have been attacked
with the least prospect of success_.” (P. 151.)
“I told Sir H. Neale that perhaps we might destroy _some_ of their
ships, but that we should sacrifice our own.”[37] (P. 151.)
“The three decker lay with her _broadside flanking the passage_. They
all three could have fired with _complete effect on any ships that
might approach_!!!” (P. 149.)
“Had four sail of the line run into Aix Roads when Lord Cochrane made
the signal, the whole fire of Isle d’Aix, as well as the fire of the
_Foudroyant_, _Cassard_, and _Ocean, three-decker_, would _have been
directed on them_!!” (P. 152.)
-----
Footnote 37:
This was said with the full knowledge that when “our own” were
reluctantly sent in, _no damage was sustained_. To use Lord Gambier’s
own words in making his defence, “_Not one, even of the smallest of
our vessels employed, has been disabled from proceeding on any service
that might have become necessary._” (_Minutes_, p. 138.)—A
circumstance not at all expected by the country when the destruction
of the enemy’s fleet was required.
-----
The only comment here necessary is, that nothing in the evidence
volunteered by Titus Oates in former years displayed greater effrontery.
The evidence of the other chartmaker Fairfax is almost as astounding.
QUESTION.—“Would ships of the line sent in have been within range of
shells and shot from the enemy’s batteries?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“From every chart I have seen they certainly would.”
QUESTION.—“Could any of the enemy’s ships before they run up the
Charente have _annoyed and raked_ (!!) any of the king’s ships that
might have been sent to attack them?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“_They certainly lay in a favourable place for it._”[38]
(_Minutes_, p. 144.)
QUESTION.—“Had even two or three ships of the line been sent in to
attack those two ships, were _any of the enemy’s ships aground(!)_ in
a position to annoy our ships, either in the anchorage or in their
approach to it?”