was tendered to the Court by Mr. Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s
flag-ship _Caledonia_.
CHART C.
Constructed by M^r Stokes for the purposes of the Court Martial, and
exclusively adopted, though it narrows the channel to Aix Roads to _one
mile_ only, the official French Charts marking _two miles_.
[Illustration:
SKETCH OF D’AIX ANCHORAGE.
London: Richard Bentley, 1860.
]
This chart professed to show, and was sworn to by Mr. Stokes as showing,
the positions of the enemy’s ships aground _on the morning of the 12th
of April_, before the _Ocean_ three-decker, together with a group of
three outermost ships near her, had been permitted by the delay of the
Commander-in-chief to warp off and escape. Instead, however, of placing
these on his chart as they lay helplessly aground “nearest the deep
water” as _he had sworn in his evidence_, they were placed in on the
other side of the sand, in the positions occupied _after their escape!_
and _to this Mr. Stokes swore as their_ position _when first driven
ashore_! The _Ocean_ three-decker, and group in particular, which,
according to Mr. Stokes’s oral evidence, must, as already stated, have
been an easy prey to a gunboat had such been sent on the first quarter
instead of the last quarter flood, was thus placed on his chart where no
vessel could have approached them![22]
-----
Footnote 22:
Mr. Stokes, moreover swore, in his evidence, that the _Ocean_
three-decker lay _on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal_, and
that the group lay on the _western_ part of the same shoal, though the
latter observation was incorrect, as the group lay around the Ocean,
which formed a part of it. On his chart these vessels are placed to
the SOUTH-EAST of the shoal, and _the remainder_ nearly DUE EAST!!
That is, in place of being “_nearest the deep water_,” where they were
easily attackable, they were placed on the chart “_farthest from the
deep water_,” where they were not attackable. He swore too that they
lay with their broadsides “_flanking the passage_” to Aix Roads. On
his chart, not one of them “flanks the passage,” but all are made to
_flank the opposite direction_; so that they could not have fired on
any British ship which might have been sent in.
-----
This falsehood on Mr. Stokes’s chart, in opposition to his oral evidence
just given, as well as to the evidence of other officers, formed one of
the principal grounds of Lord Gambier’s acquittal; and it was for this
end that the official French charts presented by me for the information
of the court were rejected by the judge-advocate.
On the presentation of Mr. Stokes’s chart to the court, the subjoined
colloquy took place as to the methods adopted in its construction.
MR. BICKNELL.—“Produce a chart or drawing of the anchorage at Isle
d’Aix, with the relative positions of the British and French fleets,
and other particulars, on and previous to the 12th of April last.”
_The Witness produced it._
MR. BICKNELL.—“Did you prepare this drawing, and from what documents,
authorities, and observations; and are the several matters delineated
therein accurately delineated, to the best of your knowledge and
belief?”
MR. STOKES.—“I prepared that _drawing_ (Chart C), partly from the
knowledge I gained in sounding to the southward of the Palles Shoal,
and the anchorage of the Isle of Aix.[23] _The outlines of the chart
are taken from the Neptune François_, and the position of the enemy’s
fleet from Mr. Edward Fairfax, and from the French captain of the
_Ville de Varsovie_, and the British fleet from my own observation.”
The distance between the sands was copied from a French MS. which will
be produced, and that _I take it_ is correct.
MR. BICKNELL.—“Are the matters and things therein accurately
described?”
MR. STOKES.—“They are.”
PRESIDENT (_inspecting Mr. Stokes’s chart_).—“There was a large chart
you lent me?”
MR. STOKES.—“That is the chart I allude to. This chart I produce as
containing the _various positions_.”
JUDGE-ADVOCATE (_to the President_).—“THIS CHART IS PRODUCED TO SAVE A
GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE!!” (_Minutes_, pp. 23, 24.)
-----
Footnote 23:
In his subsequent evidence Mr. Stokes admitted that he had _never
sounded there at all_ previous to the action!
QUESTION.—“Had you any knowledge of that anchorage previous to the
12th of April?”
MR. STOKES.—“NONE WHATEVER!”—_Minutes_, p. 148.
He swears that everything on his chart is _accurately described_—then,
that “the distance between the sands,” which was one of the most
important points of the court-martial, _was copied from a French MS.!_
the name of whose author he does not think proper to communicate, nor
does the court ask him! nor was any MSS. produced in Court. Yet, as
master of the Admiral’s flagship, Mr. Stokes must have navigated her
by the French charts supplied by the Admiralty, though these when
tendered by me to the Court had been rejected. The fleet could, in
fact, have had no other for its guidance, as no British survey of Aix
Roads was in existence. Such charts were surely a better guide in any
case than an anonymous MSS.
-----
No doubt—the trouble of confirming the Commander-in-chief’s neglect of
duty in not following up a manifest advantage, as would have been shown
had the court allowed the _Neptune François itself_ to have been put, in
evidence; for it would have shown a clear passage of _two miles_ wide,
extending beyond reach of shot, instead of the _one mile_ passage in Mr.
Stokes’s “_accurate outlines_” of the French chart, and no shoal where
he had marked only twelve feet of water![24] That the president should
have allowed this to pass, after having himself detected the imposition
practised on the court, is a point upon which I will not comment.
-----
Footnote 24:
Compare charts A and C.
-----
Mr. Stokes further admitted his chart to be valueless, as regarded the
position of the enemy’s fleet ashore, for he said that position was
taken “_from Mr. Edward Fairfax and the captain of the Ville de
Varsovie_”, and the British fleet _from “his own observations._” That
is, he confessed to know nothing but from hearsay as to the position of
_the enemy’s fleet_, the important object before the court; but only of
the position _of the British fleet_, lying at anchor nine miles from the
enemy’s fleet ashore, a matter with which the court had nothing to do;
he being all the time on board the flagship, at that distance. Yet the
court insisted on this chart being _exclusively_ referred to throughout
the court-martial![25] It is strange that such a chart should have been
used at all, when the charts of the fleet were available, but more
strange that, when the court saw the two miles passage in the French
chart was reduced to little more than _one mile_ in Mr. Stokes’s chart,
he was not even asked the reason why he had not conformed to the scale
of the French chart, _to the correctness of the outlines of which he had
sworn_!
-----
Footnote 25:
The President thus dictated to Captain Beresford:—“Captain Beresford
_must_ say whether the ships are marked on _that_ chart (Mr. Stokes’s)
as they appeared to him.” Captain Beresford took no notice of the
order.
Captain Bligh was less independent when asked to vouch for the
accuracy of Mr. Stokes’s chart. He “_thinks_ the enemy’s ships, on the
morning of the 12th, were as there represented, though Mr. Stokes, in
contradiction to his own chart, had sworn _that they were not so
marked, but only those that were destroyed_!”
When asked if the ships aground could have annoyed the British ships
had they been sent in? Captain Bligh replied, “I _think_ they were
capable of annoying the British ships.”—_Minutes_, p. 154. He,
however, immediately afterwards stated that the ships “were not within
reach of the guns of the British squadron.”
Captain Kerr “_thinks_ the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the
morning of the 12th was marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart _as nearly as it
can be_. There were seven sail-of-the-line ashore, and two
afloat.”—_Minutes_, p. 166. What had the numbers ashore or afloat to
do with their exact position? A palpable evasion of the question was
permitted by the court.
-----
But the most glaring contradiction of Mr. Stokes’s chart is this: he
swore to his chart as truly depicting the positions of the _Ocean_ and
other grounded ships, as they lay _on the morning of the 12th of April,
which was the point before the Court_; but being further questioned,
reluctantly admitted that he had marked the _Ocean as she lay on the
13th of April_, viz. _on the following day when an attack was made on
her by the bomb vessel!_ though he had just sworn to the positions of
the ships on the chart as being those _on the morning of the 12th_,
immediately after having run ashore to escape destruction.
The fact was, as will be seen on inspection of the chart, that _not one_
of the ships under the cognizance of the court is marked on Stokes’s
chart as they lay on the morning of the 12th, which position, and not
that on the 13th, was the subject of inquiry. Though as already said
this misrepresentation was detected by the President, the court
nevertheless persisted in the exclusive use of Mr. Stokes’s chart
throughout the trial, in accordance with the suggestion of the
Judge-Advocate, that it was produced to “_save a great deal of
trouble_.”
The President thus commented on the manifest contradiction.
PRESIDENT.—“I observe in the chart I had from you the situation of the
_Ocean_ particularly is _not marked on the 12th. She is marked on the
13th as advanced up the Charente!_”
MR. STOKES.—“The _only ships_ marked on the chart _on the 12th are
those that were destroyed_. The reason I marked her on the 13th is,
that a particular attack was made on her by the bombs. _I observed her
from the mizentop of the Caledonia_[26], and I _also had an
observation from an officer_, so that I have no doubt her position is
put down within a cable’s length.” (_Minutes_ p. 147.)
-----
Footnote 26:
Nine miles off. This answer shows most forcibly the nature of the data
on which Mr. Stokes’s chart was constructed.
-----
There is something in this evidence almost too repugnant for
observation. Mr. Stokes first swore that his chart accurately described
the positions of the enemy’s ships ashore on the _morning of the 12th_.
He then admitted that the most material ship of the enemy’s fleet was
marked as she lay _on the 13th_!! On this mis-statement being detected
by the president, he then swore that the only ships marked on the 12th
were _those which were destroyed_, viz. _on the evening and night of the
12th!_—a matter foreign to the subject of inquiry; which was _how the
ships lay on the morning of the 12th, and whether Lord Gambier was to
blame for refraining from attacking them at that particular time_? So
that the positions of the enemy’s ships aground on the morning of the
12th, according to Mr. Stokes’s own admission, _were not marked on his
chart at all!_ though he had sworn to this very chart _as giving those
positions accurately to the best of his knowledge and belief_; and with
the full knowledge that their position on the _morning_ of the 12th,
when they were helplessly aground, was the point before the court,—not
their position _in the evening_, and on the following day after their
escape to a spot where the British ships could not have pursued them.
The fact is, Mr. Stokes swore to their positions _after their being
warped off in consequence of the British fleet being prematurely brought
to an anchor_—as being their positions _previous to their escape!_ which
was the matter of inquiry before the court, viz. as to whether the
Commander-in-chief had not committed a neglect of duty in permitting
them to escape _by the rising tide_, when and before when the British
force _could have operated with every advantage in its favour_. The
court had nothing whatever to inquire about with regard to the ships
which were _destroyed_, respecting which there could be no question; the
subject of inquiry being whether the escape of the _other_ ships run
ashore from terror of the explosion vessels on the night of the 11th,
and _still ashore_ on the morning of the 12th, ought to have been
prevented.
Not so much as one of the ships marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart formed part
of the “group” to which he had sworn, in his oral evidence, as lying on
the “western and northernmost edge of the Palles Shoal, _nearest the
deep water_, all of which escaped towards the Charente, where he truly
enough placed the _Ocean_ three-decker, but as she lay on the 13th
instead of the 12th, he having sworn to the truth of his chart as
showing her position on the morning of the 12th! It was a desperate
venture, and can only be accounted for by the supposition that, in
reality, Mr. Stokes had never seen the chart to which he was swearing.
It was no wonder, as proved in the first chapter, that Mr. Stokes
applied to the Admiralty for permission to _alter his chart_ before
producing it in a court of law, where it must have fallen under my
inspection!
I will indeed so far exonerate Mr. Stokes from a portion of blame, by
declaring my belief that he never had looked at the chart to which he
had sworn. There is little question in my mind but that this chart had
been fabricated under the auspices of Mr. Lavie, Lord Gambier’s
solicitor, the only hope of success consisting in affirming a false
position for the grounded ships; the chart being then given to Stokes
for paternity. Had it been otherwise, Stokes could not possibly have
sworn to a chart in diametrical opposition to his oral evidence, which
truly stated that on the morning of the 12th, the _Ocean_ and group lay
on “_the north-west edge of the Palles shoal, nearest the deep water_,”
where they were easily attackable. On his chart they were placed on the
_opposite side of the shoal!_ where no ship could have got near them.
Lord Gambier no doubt saw the mistake committed by the evidence of his
Master, and adroitly relieved him from the dilemma, by putting a
question of a totally different nature. With this course the court
complacently complied, notwithstanding that the president had detected a
discrepancy so glaring.
Another material point on Mr. Stokes’s chart was his marking _a shoal_
between the Boyart and the Palles Sands, where Capt. Broughton and
others present in the action, who _actually sounded there_, testify in
corroboration of the French chart to there being _no shoal
whatever_.[27] Yet Mr. Stokes marks only from twelve to sixteen feet, in
the deepest part. That this statement was a misrepresentation on the
part of Mr. Stokes, is proved by Lord Gambier himself, who, in his
defence, says that “Mr. Stokes found on this bar or bank from _fourteen
to nineteen feet”_ (_Minutes_, p. 134). When closely questioned on the
point, Mr. Stokes deposed to these soundings as “_having been reported
to him to have been found_”! (_Minutes_, p. 150.) The _Neptune François_
gives from twenty to thirty feet at low water, which was no doubt
correct.
-----
Footnote 27:
See p. 68.
-----
But even had there been only nineteen feet of water Mr. Stokes again
forgot his chart when he gave _oral_ evidence that “the rise of tide in
Aix Roads is _twenty-one_ feet, which is more than we ever found in
Basque Roads” (_Minutes_, p. 150). I had put the rise of tide at _twelve
feet_ only, so that by the oral evidence of Mr. Stokes there was
abundance of water for the British force to have operated with full
effect.
A still further falsification of the chart was, that it reduced the
channel by which the British fleet must have passed to the attack to
little more than _a mile_ in width, in defiance of the fact that on all
the official French charts the minimum distance between the Boyart Sand
and the fortifications on Ile d’Aix was nearly _two miles_, and that
Admiral Stopford, the second admiral in command, confirmed the
correctness of the French charts so far as to admit a width of _a mile
and a half_. The object of Mr. Stokes’s statement was to prove the
danger to which, in a channel _only a mile wide_, the British ships
would have been exposed from the batteries on Ile d’Aix had they been
sent to the attack. To this end was the chart no doubt produced, and as
narrowing the channel to a mile only—to meet the occasion—gave a colour
to this view, his chart was accepted by the court, whilst the French
charts which _marked two miles_, were rejected.
A yet more flagrant contradiction is—that within pistol shot of the
_western_ and _north-western_ edge of the Palles Shoal, where Mr. Stokes
first truly swore “the _Ocean_ three-decker and a group of four lay
_aground_ on the morning of the 12th,” he has placed _the attacking
British ships_, where their logs show that they never touched the
ground, notwithstanding that they took up their positions on a _falling
tide_. If they could float in safety much more could other ships have
done so at 11 A.M on _a rising tide?_ How such a manifest discrepancy
could have passed without comment from any member of the court-martial,
is a point which is not in my power to explain.
Such are some of the leading features of this famous chart, upon which
the acquittal of Lord Gambier was made to rest, though the chart was
admittedly constructed—not from personal observation, otherwise than
from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, nine miles off—but from unofficial
sources—from an anonymous manuscript, and _even from hearsay_!
Yet Lord Gambier did not scruple to introduce this chart for the
guidance of the court, in the following terms:
“I have to call the attention of the Court to the plan drawn by Lord
Cochrane of the position of the enemy’s ships as they _lay aground on
the morning of the 12th of April_, and to that position marked upon
the chart verified by Mr. Stokes; the former laid down from uncertain
data, the latter _from angles measured and other observations made on
the spot_[28]; the difference between the two is too apparent to
escape the notice of the Court, and the respective merits of these
charts will not, I think, admit of a comparison.” (_Minutes_, p. 133.)
-----
Footnote 28:
See note, p. 26.
-----
This statement was made by Lord Gambier in face of the admission
previously made by Mr. Stokes, that his observations were taken from the
mizentop of the _Caledonia_, three leagues off—that he had never sounded
in Aix Roads—that the soundings were only reported to him, the name of
the reporter being omitted—and that he had only marked upon his chart,
“_the ships that were destroyed_” on the evening and during the night of
the 12th, the destruction, in fact, not being complete till the morning
of the 13th.
This contradiction is so important to a right comprehension of what
follows, that I will, at the risk of prolixity, bring into one focus Mr.
Stokes’s admissions as to his _data_ for the construction of his chart.
“I prepared that drawing partly from the knowledge I gained _in
sounding_ to the southward of the Palles Shoal. The outlines of the
chart are taken from the _Neptune François_ (narrowed from two miles
to one!). The positions of the enemy’s fleet are from Mr. Fairfax and
the captain of the _Ville de Varsovie_. For the distance between the
sands I must refer the court to a chart _which I copied from a French
manuscript_!” (_Minutes_, pp. 23, 24.)
For this confused jumble from unauthoritative sources, the French charts
were rejected as not being trustworthy, and Lord Gambier did not
hesitate to endorse Mr. Stokes’s fabrication as being “from angles
measured and other observations taken on the spot;” whilst by this act
he decried the use of the French charts by which his own fleet had been
guided!
Comment, whether on Lord Gambier’s statement or on Mr. Stokes’s
involuntary contradiction thereof in his oral evidence, is superfluous.
If such were wanted, it must be sought for in the fact already adduced
in the first chapter, viz. that, in 1817 and 1818, Mr. Stokes, when
conscious that his fabrication must become public, and that it might
fall into my hands, thought it prudent to make affidavit before the
Court of Admiralty that this chart, produced at the court-martial nine
years before, _was incorrect_, and _therefore required alteration!!_ for
which purpose the Admiralty gave him back his chart, though this, as
already observed, remains to this day bound up amongst the Admiralty
records. The affidavits of Mr. Stokes will be in the remembrance of the
reader.
In a national point of view, Mr. Stokes’s chart has another and even
more important feature. A comparison between the French chart and that
produced by Mr. Stokes will show that the latter narrowed the entrance
to Aix Roads—which on the French charts is two miles wide—to one mile,
and that it filled a space with shoals where scarcely a shoal existed.
Of the imaginativeness of Mr. Stokes in this respect, the French
Government appears to have taken a very justifiable naval advantage,
calculated to deter any British admiral in future from undertaking in
Aix Roads offensive operations of any kind.
A chart of the Aix Roads based on a modern French chart has recently
been shown me, as on the point of being issued by the Board of
Admiralty, on which chart the main channel between Ile d’Aix and the
Boyart sand is laid down according to charts copied from fabricated
charts produced on Lord Gambier’s court-martial, and not according to
the hydrographic charts of the _Neptune François_. The comparatively
clear anchorage shown in the new chart is also filled with Mr. Stokes’s
imaginary shoals! the result being that no British admiral, if guided by
the new chart, would trust his ships in Aix Roads _at all_, though both
under Admiral Knowles and at the attack in 1809 British ships found no
difficulty whatever from want of water, or other causes, when once
ordered in.
CHART D.
Constructed by M^r Fairfax and produced for the guidance of the Court
Martial. Like Stokes’s Chart, it narrows the channel to Aix Roads from
_two miles_ to _one mile_ though also like him professing to be an exact
outline of the French Official Chart.]
[Illustration: London Richard Bentley, 1860]
The solution of the matter is not difficult. For the purpose of
deterring a future British fleet from entering Aix Roads, the modern
French Government appears to have followed the chart of Mr. Stokes in
place of their former official chart; and the British Admiralty, having
no opportunity of surveying the anchorage in question, has copied this
modern French chart; so that in future the fabrications of Mr. Stokes or
rather I should say, the ingenuity of Lord Gambier’s solicitor, or
whoever may have palmed the chart on Mr. Stokes, will form the best
possible security to one of the most exposed anchorages on the Atlantic
coast of France. Assuredly no British Admiral, with the new chart in his
hands,—should such be issued—would for a moment think of operating in
such an anchorage as is there laid down, notwithstanding that former
British fleets have operated in perfect safety so far as soundings were
concerned.