is a correct tracing of Aix Roads from the _Neptune François_, a set of
charts issued by the French Hydrographical Department—bound in a volume,
and supplied for the use of the French navy previous to 1809[7]; copies
from the same source being at that period supplied under the auspices of
the Board of Admiralty for the use of British ships on the French
coasts—these, in fact, forming the only guides available at that period.
-----
Footnote 7:
Sets of these charts, bound as described, were found on board the
grounded ships captured in the afternoon of the 12th of April, and
were therefore available for the purposes of the court-martial, had it
been deemed expedient to consult them.
-----
Chart A shows a clear entrance of two miles, without shoal or hindrance
of any kind, between Ile d’Aix and the Boyart Sand; the soundings close
to the latter marking thirty-five feet at low water, with from thirty to
forty feet in mid-channel. The chart shows, moreover, a channel leading
to a spacious anchorage between the Boyart and Palles Sands, marking
clear soundings at low water of from twenty to thirty feet close to
either sand, with thirty feet in mid-channel. In this anchorage
line-of-battle-ships could not only have _floated_, without danger of
grounding, but could have effectively operated against the enemy’s
fleet, even in its entire state before the attack, wholly out of range
of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, as will hereafter be corroborated by the
logs and evidence of experienced officers present in the attack, and
therefore practically acquainted with the soundings. To a naval eye, it
will be apparent that, by gaining this anchorage, it would not at any
time have been difficult for the British force to have interposed the
enemy’s fleet between itself and the fortifications on Ile d’Aix in such
a way as completely to neutralise the fire of the latter.
Further inspection of the chart will indicate an inner anchorage, called
_Le Grand Trousse_, to which any British vessel disabled by the enemy’s
ships—two only of which, out of thirteen, remained afloat,—might have
retired with safety to an anchorage capable of holding a fleet—the
soundings in _Le Grand Trousse_ marking from thirty to forty feet at low
water. Between these anchorages it will be seen on the chart that there
is no shoal, nor any other danger whatever.[8]
-----
Footnote 8:
This anchorage was plainly marked on the French charts supplied to the
British ships, as deposed to by the officers present in the action.
(See the evidence of Captain Broughton, _Minutes_, p. 222, and that of
Captain Newcomb, p. 198). The correctness of the chart furnished by me
being thus clearly established in evidence.
-----
The rise of tide marked on the chart was from ten to twelve feet[9],
consequently amply sufficient _on a rising tide_ for the two-deckers and
frigates to have been sent to the attack of the enemy’s ships aground on
the Palles Shoal, as testified by the evidence of Captains Malcolm and
Broughton.[10] The flood-tide making about 7·0 A.M. gave assurance of
abundant depth of water by 11·0 A.M., which is the time marked in the
Commander-in-chief’s log[11] as that of _bringing the British ships to
an anchor!_ in place of forwarding them to the attack of ships on shore!
-----
Footnote 9:
In reality, from eighteen to twenty feet, at spring tides, as appeared
from the testimony of various officers, Admiral Stopford amongst
others. Even Mr. Stokes marked on his chart a rise of twenty-one feet,
so that there was abundance of water for the operation of ships of the
largest class. The defence of the Commander-in-chief was, that there
was not sufficient water at half-flood to float the ships!
Footnote 10:
See pp. 58 and 63.
Footnote 11:
Erroneously, according to the logs of the other ships.
-----
This chart was tendered by me to the Court, in explanation of my
evidence. It was, however, rejected, because I could not _produce the
French hydrographer to prove its correctness!_ though copies of a
similar chart, as has been said, were furnished to British ships for
their guidance! Being thus repudiated, my chart was flung contemptuously
under the table, and neither this nor any other _official_ chart was
afterwards allowed to corroborate the facts subsequently testified by
the various officers present in the action, they being imperatively
ordered to base their observations on the chart of Mr. Stokes alluded to
in the last chapter, as having been—eight years after the
court-martial—pronounced by the Court of Admiralty so incorrect as to
require material alteration before it could be put in evidence in a
court of law! To this point we shall presently come.
A singular circumstance connected with the rejected chart should rather
have _secured its reception_, viz. that it was taken by my own hands out
of the _Ville de Varsovie_ French line-of-battle ship shortly before she
was set fire to, and therefore its authenticity, as having been
officially supplied by the French government for the use of that ship,
was beyond doubt or question. I also produced two similar charts, on
which were marked the places of the enemy’s ships aground at daylight on
the 12th of April, as observed from the _Impérieuse_, the only vessel
then in proximity. The positions of the grounded vessels are marked on
Chart B.
The manner of the rejection by the Court—at the suggestion of the
Judge-Advocate—of the chart tendered by me, is worthy of note.
PRESIDENT.—“I think your lordship said just now, that you thought
there was water enough for ships of any draught of water?”
LORD COCHRANE.—“Yes.”
PRESIDENT.—“Have you _an authenticated chart_, or any evidence that
can be produced to show that there is _actually_ such a depth of
water?”
LORD COCHRANE (_putting in the charts_).—“It was _actually_ from the
soundings we had going in, provided the tide does not fall more than
twelve feet, which I am not aware of. I studied the chart of Basque
Roads for some days before. The rise of the tide, as I understand from
that, is from ten to twelve feet. It is so mentioned in the French
chart. I have no other means of judging.”[12]
_Judge-Advocate._—“THIS CHART IS NOT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT,
BECAUSE HIS LORDSHIP CANNOT PROVE ITS CORRECTNESS!!”
PRESIDENT.—“_No! It is nothing more than to show upon what grounds his
lordship forms his opinion on the rise and fall of the tide!!_”[13]
-----
Footnote 12:
This was fully corroborated by Captain Malcolm, when, having said that
“there were _no obstacles_ to prevent the frigates and some ships of
the line from going into Aix Roads, he was asked by the President, “if
he made known to the Commander-in-chief that by keeping close to the
Boyart Shoal the ships _might have gone in?_”
The reply was in every way remarkable.
CAPTAIN MALCOLM.—“I do not know that I mentioned this to the
Commander-in-chief. _The charts showed it._”—_Minutes_, p. 214. A
complete corroboration of the correctness of my charts tendered to but
rejected by the Court; though as these had been supplied under the
sanction of the Admiralty, it was out of the question to reject them
as the basis of evidence, inasmuch as there could be none other of a
reliable nature.
Footnote 13:
The following extract from my evidence, and the singular remark from
Admiral Young, are extracted from the minutes of the court-martial.
“The Commander-in-chief had the same charts as I was in possession of,
and from these I formed my conclusion with respect to the anchorage.
In reconnoitring the enemy’s fleet, _so near as to induce him to open
a fire from almost his whole line_, I reported to the
Commander-in-chief the ruinous state of Ile d’Aix, _the inner
fortifications being completely blown up and destroyed_. There were
only 13 guns mounted.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane, before you go on,
HOW FAR THIS IS RELEVANT”!!!—_Minutes_, p. 58.
My assertion of the fact that the Commander-in-chief’s charts were
identical with my own, as having come from the Admiralty, was
considered _irrelevant_, because, had they been put in, or mine not
rejected, there could have been no doubt of the result of the
court-martial.
-----
It was not put in for any purpose of the kind—for I had expressly said
that I had no opinion as to the rise and fall of the tide, except as
marked on the French official charts. The object of my putting in those
charts was to _show the truth of the whole matter before the Court_. The
president, however, flung the chart under the table with as much
eagerness as the Judge-Advocate had evinced when objecting to its
reception in evidence.[14]
-----
Footnote 14:
It is a singular circumstance that notwithstanding the chart was flung
under the table and rejected by the Court, I found it _bound up
amongst the Admiralty records_!
-----
The object of the chart was in fact to prove, as indeed _was
subsequently proved_ by the testimony of eminent officers, and _would_
have been proved even by the ships’ logs had they been consulted, that
there was plenty of channel room to keep clear of the batteries on Ile
d’Aix, together with abundant depth of water[15]; and that the
commander-in-chief, in ordering all the ships to _come to an anchor_, in
place of sending a portion[16] of the British ships to the attack of the
enemy’s vessels aground on the north-west part of the Palles Shoal, on
the morning of the 12th of April, had displayed a “_mollesse_”—as it was
happily termed by Admiral Gravière—unbecoming the Commander-in-chief of
a British force, superior in numbers, and having nothing to fear from
about a dozen guns on the fortifications of Aix; which, had the ships
been sent in along the edge of the Boyart, could have inflicted no
material damage, either by shot or shell.[17]
-----
Footnote 15:
The ships which were sent in though too late were untouched by shot or
shell. For the depth of water they found on going in, see page 71.
Footnote 16:
My signals were, “_half the fleet_ can destroy the enemy.” Then, “the
_frigates alone_ can destroy the enemy.” Yet in his defence Lord
Gambier assumed that I had signalled for the fleet at a time when, as
he alleged, it could not have floated for want of water?
Footnote 17:
See Captain Malcolm’s evidence, page 58. Also Captain Godfrey’s, of
the _Etna_, who “_thinks_ some of the enemy’s shot went over them”
(_Minutes_, p. 173), but admits that not a mast, yard, or even a
rope-yarn was touched.
-----
These were precisely the points which the ministry did not want proved,
and which—as will presently be seen—the Court was no less anxious to
avoid proving. Had the French chart been received in evidence, as it
ought to have been—I do not say mine, but those on board the flagship
itself, or indeed _any copy_ supplied by the Admiralty to the fleet—a
vote of thanks to Lord Gambier would have been _impossible_, and with
the impossibility would have vanished the Government _prestige_ of a
great victory gained by their commander-in-chief, under their
auspices.[18]
-----
Footnote 18:
“I was furnished by Lord Cochrane with a French chart, _and considered
it a good one_.”—_Evidence of Captain Newcomb_, p. 199.
I had for several years been in the possession of official French
charts, which, in my previous cruises, had not been found defective,
and from those charts I had at all times drawn my conclusions with
respect to the depth of water, or other circumstances which related to
the navigation on the enemy’s coast.”
PRESIDENT.—“The coast of the enemy, I suppose you mean?”
LORD COCHRANE.—“I refer to the French coast.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“When did you discover that there was this anchorage in
deep water?”
LORD COCHRANE.—“I have said that in going in I found the soundings
correct, and that, in fact, I had such confidence in the chart, that I
had said to Admiral Keates, when we were off there, and to Admiral
Thornborough, that there _could be no difficulty in going in there and
destroying the enemy’s fleet_. I took the chart on board Admiral
Thornborough’s ship.”—See my Letter to Admiral Thornborough, vol. i.
p. 195.—_Lord Cochrane’s Evidence_, p. 57.
-----
The French official chart being thus adroitly got rid of by the
Judge-Advocate, the other charts tendered by me to mark the positions of
the enemy’s ships aground shared the like fate, though not open to the
same objection. The exactness of the positions was moreover confirmed by
the evidence of Mr. Stokes, the master of the _Caledonia_, Lord
Gambier’s flagship; though his chart, substituted for those in use
amongst the British ships, was in direct contradiction to his oral
evidence.
The positions, of the ships aground as marked on my charts, were as
follows.
The _Ocean_, three-decker, bearing the flag of Admiral Allemand, and
forming a group with three other line-of-battle ships close to her, lay
aground on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal, nearest the deep
water, where even a gun-boat, had it been sent whilst they lay on their
bilge, could have so perforated their bottoms, that they could not have
floated with the rising tide. All were immoveably aground, and were
therefore incapable of opposition to an attacking force[19]; whilst each
of the group of three lay so much inclined towards each other as to
present the appearance of having their yards locked together.[20] They
had, in fact, drifted with the same current, into the same spot, and
being nearly of the same draught of water, had grounded close to each
other. The one separate was a vessel of less draught than these, and had
gone a little further on the shoal.
-----
Footnote 19:
“Till _about noon_, the _Ocean_, three-decker, was _heeling
considerably, and appeared to me to be heaving her guns
overboard_.”—_Captain Malcolm_ (_Minutes_, p. 209). She escaped about
two o’clock P.M., just before I advanced in the _Impérieuse_, lest all
should escape.
-----
The correctness of these positions, as marked on my chart, was
completely confirmed by Mr. Stokes, master of the flag-ship, in his oral
evidence as subjoined.
QUESTION.—“State the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the morning of
the 12th of April.”
MR. STOKES.—“At daylight I observed _the whole of the enemy’s ships,
except two of the line, on shore_. Four of them _lay in group_, or lay
together on the western part of the Palles Shoal. The three-decker
(_L’Océan_, flagship) was _on the north-west edge_ of the Palles
Shoal, with her broadside flanking the passage; _the north-west point
nearest the deep water_.”[20]—(_Minutes_, page 147.)
-----
Footnote 20:
“I _think_ their yards were not locked.”—_Evidence of Mr. Fairfax_,
_Minutes_, p. 144. It was, however, _so nearly_, that Mr. Fairfax, a
witness carefully in Lord Gambier’s interest, could only _think_ about
it. He reluctantly admitted that all lay “_within a ship’s length of
each other_,” and ships lying aground on their bilge inclined towards
each other at an angle of thirty degrees are—if not locked
together—completely incapable of resistance.
-----
This was the truth as to the positions of the grounded ships which
escaped; these being referred to in Mr. Stokes’s evidence precisely as
marked on my rejected chart. That is, his evidence showed, in
corroboration of my chart, the _utter helplessness of an enemy which a
British admiral refrained from attacking, though aground_!
The French charts produced by me being thus rejected, those in the
possession of the Commander-in-chief not produced, and those connected
with the fleet not being called for, the court decided to rely upon two
charts professedly constructed for the occasion by the master of the
_Caledonia_, Mr. Stokes, and the master of the fleet, Mr. Fairfax,
_neither of whom was present in the attack_.[21]
-----
Footnote 21:
It is a remarkable fact that many of the witnesses chiefly relied on
by the Commander-in-chief, in confirmation of his having done his
duty, _had not been in Aix Roads at all_, and could therefore have no
knowledge of anything, except their remaining inactive with the fleet
whilst the enemy’s ships were warping off. Mr. Stokes was of this
number; yet all were questioned on points known only to officers
intimately acquainted with Aix Roads, and present at the action. But
for the court to adopt _exclusively_, as will presently be seen, a
chart constructed by a man who admitted that an important portion had
been laid down _from hearsay_, was monstrous; the more so, as the
official charts, would have shown the truth.
-----
* * * * * * *