THE AMERICAN MERCANTILE MARINE
Throughout the course of this story the reader will have observed many
references to the American Mercantile Marine. Let us now consider how
it began, developed, waned and again revived. We have seen how the
enterprise of the New England builders was to have a profound effect on
British shipping, but we desire now to regard the subject as a whole.
So long as a country, wherever situated, has a seaboard, it is very
evident that its civilised community will soon begin building craft of
some kind. The early colonists in America built a 30-ton vessel as far
back as 1607, and it is from this _Virginia_ that we must trace the
American Mercantile Marine. Seven years later a small ship was launched
at New Amsterdam, as, of course, New York was then called, and by the
second decade of the seventeenth century there were over 1000 ships in
colonial waters; for numbers of shipwrights had come over from England.
During the eighteenth century at Portland, Maine, and elsewhere were
built square-rigged ships, privateers, and the first schooners as well
as brigantines. This was quite apart from the shipping and timber sent
to England, and during the year 1769 the twelve colonies launched 389
ships, representing 20,000 tons.
In few countries of the world has the relation between war and
mercantile shipping been so accurately reflected, as we shall see as we
go on. The immediate result of the American revolution was to throttle
the Atlantic trade, and five of the first eleven Acts of Congress were
laws to encourage American shipping. In 1789 the State gave special
privileges to shippers engaged in the East Indian and China trades.
Many of these shippers and owners were located in Massachusetts, and
made fine profits, as, for instance, the _Mount Vernon_ of Salem, which
in 1799 made a profit of $100,000 in a single round trip to China; and
one ship made 700 per cent. on a cargo of pepper from Sumatra.
The registered American tonnage in the foreign trade grew from 123,893
tons in 1789 to 667,107 tons in 1800; for during the wars growing
out of the French Revolution the American Mercantile Marine actually
became the principal carriers of Europe, as at one time the Dutch and
the English had been. Thus for a second time the marine showed how
sensitive it was to the effect of war. But the war of 1812 caused
severe losses to American merchant ships, yet, on the other hand,
American privateers played havoc with English shipping. The effect,
even in those days of comparatively few ships, is at once seen by
looking at the port of Liverpool, the natural haven for American ships
arriving in Europe; for whereas in 1810, 6729 ships entered that port,
only 4599 came in during the year 1812. On the other hand, as soon as
peace returned these figures jumped up, and from 1815 to 1860 shipping
went ahead quickly.
For the United States were fast developing their industries, opening
up trade, and therefore had every need of a Mercantile Marine.
The legislation of Congress in 1828 opened up American ports to
cargo-carrying British ships from any country where American vessels
were on a similar footing to British ships, and two years later the
West Indies were opened to American shipping. In 1849 Great Britain
adopted the Free Trade policy, and full reciprocity was established
between British and American merchant vessels. The history of the
clipper ships and the competition between Great Britain and the United
States for the ocean-carrying trade has already been related in this
volume. It is only necessary once more to emphasise that war had yet
again a good deal to do with the future of the American Mercantile
Marine, for the Civil War of 1861 took away any chance which remained
to American ships of continuing as the great sea-carriers. The American
mind had to concentrate on fighting. Meanwhile, much of the tonnage
had passed under other flags, while in Great Britain the accessibility
of coal deposits, the cheapness of labour, the successful introduction
of iron for shipbuilding, the great advances in ship construction, and
especially the wonderful progress of the steamship, had been able to
give back to Great Britain her supremacy as a Mercantile Marine. And
when the Civil War was over, America was too interested internally to
pay a maximum amount of attention to ocean trading.
For the riches of the country were only beginning to be developed.
Mines and manufactures, railroads and so on were now needing all the
available capital. The New England shipyards, which for many years
had been so valuable owing to the ample supplies of timber ready to
hand, became unwanted in proportion as the Clyde, with its adjacent
coalfields, was becoming more important for building ships of iron and
then steel. It would be untrue to say that America ignored the building
of iron ships, and in the early ’seventies she was interested in a
mild way. The ’eighties passed without much enthusiasm for the subject,
and then in 1894 and following year the Cramp shipyard launched the
two fine transatlantic liners _St. Louis_ and _St. Paul_, both being
constructed of steel. There were many other steel ships built, and
orders were received from abroad, but, broadly speaking, and in strict
reference to merchant ships and not warships, America was not even now
a shipbuilding country.
Those splendid schooners with which the port of Gloucester is for ever
associated, and those other sailing craft along the American coast do
not alter the statement, nor do the vessels on the American lakes and
rivers. We are thinking of ocean-going ships, which are the essential
feature of any Mercantile Marine. The trade between the Atlantic and
Pacific ports still remained for the old full-rigged clippers, because
there were not enough cargoes east-bound to make it worth while for
the steamship. And so America went on, content to allow her Merchant
Service to be comparatively small and unprogressive.
But once again it required a war to call the national mind to consider
what a Mercantile Marine means to a country. The Spanish war of 1898
did this to the extent that there was aroused a strong support for
the Panama Canal project. The Act permitting this dates from 1892,
and it is really from this year that the new phase begins, though
only gradually. If you make direct and shorter roads on land leading
to important trading centres, you obviously at once attract trade. If
in the same manner you shorten communications by sea, it will have a
similar effect. Quite apart from its warlike strategic value, which is
outside our subject, the theory of the Panama Canal was based on the
fact that it would reduce the sea route from New York to San Francisco
by most of 8000 miles, and to Sydney and Yokohama by about 4000
miles. The 1892 Act also authorised admission to American registry of
foreign-built vessels not more than five years old.
Then again came another war, the Great War, which began on August 4,
1914, the year in which the canal was opened. Too late America had
begun to learn the value of a Mercantile Marine, and now she foresaw
that there would be an inadequate supply of shipping to carry her trade
across the ocean. Immediately she tried to make up for this by passing
a law a fortnight after the outbreak of war removing the age limit in
the Act of 1892. And now it becomes necessary to look into the matter
somewhat closely, otherwise what followed is not intelligible.
When the European War broke out, America, having regard to her
population, wealth, overseas trade and length of littoral, was in a
curious position. The following figures are for June 1914, and are
eloquent. In that month, of all the world’s _sea-going_ steel and iron
steam tonnage the British Empire owned 47·7, Germany 12, Scandinavia
8·7, France 4·5, the United States 4·3 and Japan 3·9 per cent. As the
war went on America realised at last that 71 per cent. of the world’s
steamships were in the hands of belligerents, and therefore the means
of transport for American exports and imports—in other words, the
exchange of wealth—had been taken away. Even farmers and cotton-growers
who had never seen the sea in their lives began to take an interest in
the subject when they suffered losses. It took the Great War to wake
up the great American nation, as it had taken the American clippers to
make our sailing shipowners become active.
Shipbuilding in America suddenly began to revive, for from the end
of 1915 ships were required by Britain, France and Norway. Mines and
submarines had caused losses to the two first, while the third required
more ships than ever for the profitable trade she was doing with
Great Britain and France. Moreover, the American Mercantile Marine
needed ships for herself; and the result was that in 1915 there was a
net increase of nearly 500,000 tons added to its commercial service,
including shipping which had been transferred to it. The position in
the carrying trade outside America was this. A large number of ships
were interned in various ports, some thousands of tons had been sunk by
the German mines and submarines, and yet the Allies were now requiring
more for maintaining food for nations and supplies for the armies in
the field. In addition to this, many ships had been taken from the
Merchant Service for purely naval purposes and other objects, such as
supply-vessels to the Fleet. And the unrestricted submarine campaign
which Germany began in April 1917 was to make matters considerably
worse; for in April of that year 545,282 tons of British merchant
shipping alone were lost by enemy action.
It was on September 7, 1916, that Congress passed a law creating the
United States Shipping Board, the original aim of which was to develop
more effectively the American Mercantile Marine. A very few months
later, on April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany,
and on May 4 the first American warships to reach Europe, consisting
of six destroyers, steamed into Queenstown harbour. It is a day firmly
fixed in my own memory, as the vessel I was then commanding was the
first to go alongside them, north of Daunt’s Rock lightship. Now with
America a participant in the war, and about to send armies to Europe
together with necessary military supplies, the need for American
merchant tonnage became positively acute. In the whole of the United
States there were not more than sixty-one shipyards, of which only
thirty-seven were building steel craft.
But America realised that ships must be built at once, regardless of
cost, both very quickly and in large numbers. Thus in a strange and
romantic manner there came unexpectedly a revival of the wooden ship.
An American writer has pointed out that of the entire transportation of
American troops about 48¼ per cent. were carried in British ships, and
43 per cent. in American Navy transports. But, with a fine patriotic
effort, shipbuilding of all kinds now went ahead, and soon there were
341 shipyards building sea-going craft. Actually 1284 launching ways
were now occupied. It was a remarkable lesson which war had taught
in respect of the Mercantile Marine. There is no room to go into
details, but it is sufficient to call attention to this exceptional
effort, which showed what could be done. Fabricated ships, that is,
vessels constructed by assembling the standardised plates made in the
engineering shops, rendered possible only through the existence of
numerous steel rolling mills, began to take the water; and if some of
these craft were not always well built, we must remember that they were
a temporary measure, and not intended to last.
The total construction of ships in the United States during the
years 1910-1916 had averaged 450,000 tons a year. In 1917 it was
nearly 1,000,000, in 1918 it was 3,223,506 tons, but in 1919 it was
6,558,823 tons, up to the end of the year in each case. These figures
are given for the purpose of showing what can be done in a country
which makes up its mind to have a commercial marine. America had been
a long time learning its lesson, but there was no question that she
had learned. Therefore it is not to be expected that she will let
this hardly-acquired realisation be forgotten. Indeed, the evidence
is strongly the other way. On June 5, 1920, was approved the Merchant
Marine Act for the promoting and maintaining an American Merchant
Marine. It is sufficient evidence merely to read the declaration of
policy as stated by Congress: “That it is necessary for the national
defence and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic
commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the
best-equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry
the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military
auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned
and operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it is
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever
may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a
merchant marine.”
With the failure of any immediate benefits of this policy it is not
necessary here to deal. But of all the many results of the Great War,
few historically are more interesting than this revival. Competition
between British and American shipping is inevitable, but it is merely
a repetition of what happened in the clipper era; and we have seen
that in the long run this spirit of emulation has always benefited
the Merchant Service. Comparing the figures given above for June
1914, let us place alongside them those for June 1921, which are as
instructive as the first. For now we find in the percentage of the
world’s total sea-going steel and iron steam tonnage that the British
Empire owns 39·3, the United States 22·7, France and Japan each 5·6,
but Scandinavia 7·7. Thus to have leapt from 4·3 to 22·7 in so short a
space of time, and to have become second only to the British Empire, is
a remarkable achievement.
The future remains to be seen. But we have noticed that the absence of
competition caused the East Indian portion—and that was the greater
part—of the British Mercantile Marine to get into a rut. It was only
the opening up to all of the East, the free and unfettered rivalry
there and in the Atlantic, which brought about progress and improved
conditions both for the trader and the passenger. In the face of the
lessons of history, is it not better to welcome competition rather
than to endeavour to hinder, by a series of laws which may do good,
but may also cause international friction, more dreadful wars, and do
little for the advancement of civilisation and the attainment of noble
aims? The practical value of history is that we are able to see at a
glance the mistakes of our forefathers. If it is not that, it is a mere
academic study. The world now realises that an adequate merchant fleet
is as necessary as an adequate fighting Navy. But it has required to
be confronted with big events before it could thoroughly grasp that
essential fact.