THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GERMAN MERCANTILE MARINE
For about seventy years the German Mercantile Marine had an interesting
career. It began in quite a small way, it was conducted with courage,
enterprise, far-sightedness and, eventually, with an astute cunning
which many people would describe under a stronger term. Its rise was
meteoric, and its descent at the time of its zenith was swifter still.
It is just because the true value of the sea began to be appreciated,
that Germany was able to build up such a vast and highly efficient
service within one generation. The result was that on the eve of the
Great War she was second only to the British Empire as a big owner of
steamships.
[Illustration: BIG SHIP MASTERS.
[_By courtesy the Cunard Line._
Captain C. A. Smith, C.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., of the “Berengaria.”
[_By courtesy the White Star Line._
Captain Sir Bertram Hayes, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N.R., of the “Majestic.”]
At that date 60 per cent. of Germany’s shipping was in the hands of ten
lines, working together with a solidarity that amounted practically to
a shipping union. These ten were the Hamburg-America Line, the North
German Lloyd, the Hamburg South-American Line, the Hansa Line, the
German Australian Line, the Kosmos Line, the Roland Line, the German
East Africa Line, the Woermann Line and the Hamburg-Bremen-Africa
Line. A month before the outbreak of war this huge organisation
comprised 3,194,000 gross tons, to say nothing of the German Levant
Line of 155,000 tons. Well organised, reaching to every part of the
world, subsidised by the German Government to the extent of £107,950
a year, this association was extremely successful in obtaining
an enormous amount of the world’s carrying trade and in furthering
Germany’s political aspirations. It was able to put up the severest
competition and to draw away from the United Kingdom a good deal of
carrying trade, and in their fight with the British companies of
steamships the Germans were helped not merely by subsidies, but by
attractive through-rates over their railway system. It was their unity
and energy in organisation, their ability to cut rates, and their
attention to the smallest details which gave them their vast success.
It is important to emphasise one great distinction. The British Isles
depend for their supplies and overseas trade on the tramp steamer.
Of the British tonnage before the war 60 per cent. represented tramp
tonnage and only 40 per cent. liners, and it was essential for the
nation to have a large amount of “loose” tonnage able to trade at
short notice to any part of the world, taking out, for instance, cheap
coal and coming back with cargoes of grain, cotton, wool, rice and so
on. This policy was the exact opposite of Germany, which built up its
Mercantile Marine on liner trades, and especially in the Atlantic,
their interest in tramp steamers being quite small. Now of those ten
German lines just mentioned the Hamburg-America and the North German
Lloyd, owning on the eve of war 1,093,000 and 716,000 gross tons
respectively, were at once the creative forces and the mainstays of
German shipping. Therefore if we consider their history we have before
us practically the whole evolution of the German Mercantile Marine.
The Hamburg-America Line at the time war broke out was the largest
merchant steamship enterprise in the world, owning between 400 and 500
ships, with seventy-five distinct services, its vessels calling at 400
of the leading ports of the world and carrying over 400,000 passengers
a year. It was thus an enormous corporation, that makes the old
Honourable East India Company look ridiculous. As a means of providing
national wealth and the ready transportation of German goods into the
remotest corners of the globe it was invaluable. It was founded on
May 27, 1847, with a capital of 465,000 marks, and it ordered three
sailing ships in England of about 717 tons each, which carried a score
of first-class passengers and a couple of hundred emigrants and a
little freight. These were full-rigged, three-masted vessels, with
heavy quarters, the white riband and painted square ports and the
high-steeved bowsprit so familiar in English shipping. The average trip
from Hamburg to New York took forty days, and twenty-nine days on the
return voyage. These three ships were the _Deutschland_, _Nordamerika_
and _Rhein_.
In 1854 the company had already prospered so much, thanks largely to
the emigrant traffic, that it decided to go in for steam. The screw was
replacing the paddle in British ships and iron was being used instead
of wood. They therefore gave an order to Caird of Greenock to build a
couple of 2026-ton screw steamers having a speed of about twelve knots.
The first of these was the _Borussia_, a three-masted vessel with
sails, clipper bow and one funnel. She made her appearance in 1856.
Hitherto British and other seamen had been largely employed for crews,
but now only Germans, dressed in uniform, and disciplined after the
custom of a man-of-war, were allowed. The German Mercantile Marine was
beginning to exist by itself.
The best speed obtained with these ships was sixteen days, and in
1858 came the _Saxonia_ and _Austria_, which reduced the passage
eastward-bound to a little over twelve days, the firm’s fleet now
consisting of eight sailing ships and four steamers. Presently the
former were all sold, and a fortnightly service to New York was
instituted, and other steamships were added. At the outbreak of the
American Civil War this line was carrying the United States mails and
calling at Southampton, and, after leaving the English port, New York
was reached in ten days. By the early ’seventies the fleet already
numbered twenty-five steamships, and was also running to the Spanish
Main, Mexico and West Indies.
The White Star and the Hamburg-America were the first Atlantic lines
to adopt the twin-screw system for passenger ships. It was in 1887
that the latter ordered the two steel, twin-screw ships _Columbia_ and
_Auguste Victoria_. The former was built at Birkenhead by Lairds, but
the latter was constructed at Stettin, and this was the first time a
German yard had attempted a ship of such a size, for she measured over
500 feet long, and she was of 8430 tons burthen. These two vessels
were immediately followed by two others, similar in type, of which one
was built on the Clyde and one at Stettin. With their three funnels,
high speed, improved ventilation, commodious cabins, bathrooms, suites
of rooms and general high standard of comfort, this quartette made a
sensation. It was the introduction of the German floating palaces into
the Atlantic.
Reference to the previous two chapters in this volume will show that
the British Atlantic companies were meeting this competition, but if
you ask how was it that, notwithstanding the fact that the German
Empire had been proclaimed as recently as 1871, this new Mercantile
Marine had been able to build up such a trade in so few years, the
answer is this. The repeal of the British Navigation Laws in 1849
enabled the Prussian ships to have the opportunity which came at
the right moment. But, secondly, it was the enormous increase of
emigrant passengers anxious to leave the European continent and try
their fortunes in the New World. I have no wish to weary the reader
with statistics, but the following few figures will substantiate this
argument. They are derived from a Board of Trade analysis based on
information afforded by the United States Immigration Bureau, and are
therefore beyond dispute.
Bearing in mind that the first Hamburg-America ship sailed in 1847, we
find that whereas the average annual emigration from Germany to the
U.S.A. had been only 19,000 up to 1844, during the next ten years it
jumped to 95,000, dropped during the next decade to 49,000, but then
rose to 113,000 in the decennial period ending 1874, was 109,000 up
to the year 1884, then dropped to 28,000 by 1904, but rose to 34,000
in the decade ending 1914. But in addition to these figures must be
added others. By reason of her geographical position Germany was most
favourably placed for capturing the emigrant traffic from the rest of
the continent, and of this she made the best advantage. It was not
until the decade ending 1874 that the Russians, for instance, began
pouring out from their own country to North America, and gradually the
German ships carried most of these. How valuable such a traffic was
can be at once realised. Beginning with an average of 2000 Russian
emigrants to the United States, this figure in ten years had increased
to 10,000, then to 38,000 and, finally, just before the war averaged
199,000.
In 1894 the German Government erected what were known as control
stations at various places on the Russian frontier, ostensibly to
prevent the spread of cholera by Russian emigrants travelling through
Germany. The erection and management of these controls were vested in
the Hamburg-America and North German Lloyd Lines. But whatever was
their original purpose, these stations came to be used by the German
steamship companies for confining the increasing stream of emigrants
to their own lines, who made it as difficult as possible for persons
not travelling by those lines to get through the control stations. In
addition to this, the German Government so legislated as to make it
very awkward and more costly for emigrants to get to America in British
ships. Thus, Germany, by doing everything from intimidation and bluff
to legislation, did succeed in obtaining a most valuable emigrant
traffic, and so was able, quite apart from her own increasing exports,
to build up a thoroughly up-to-date and steadily improving Merchant
Navy.
It is not to be wondered at that now she had learnt to construct steel
steamships for herself she made a bold bid for Atlantic merchant ship
supremacy. By the year of the Paris Exhibition in 1900 this line had
fourteen twin-screw steamers to carry passengers across. The latest was
the celebrated _Deutschland_, which was to win the “blue riband” of the
Atlantic; for this record-smasher succeeded in lowering the voyage
between New York and Plymouth to five days, seven hours, thirty-eight
minutes, and on one trip averaged 23·51 knots. This four-funnelled ship
was of 16,502 tons and measured 686 feet long. She was certainly an
eye-pleasing vessel, for it was before the practice of building lofty
superstructures had become the fashion. Her biggest day’s run was 601
knots, and the sumptuousness of her passenger comfort made her a very
popular ship. In 1906 came the _Kaiserin Auguste Victoria_, 24,581
tons, 687 feet long, and able to carry 4000 passengers and crew. She
was at the time the biggest steamer in the world.
But before we mention the mammoth German liners we must see briefly
how the North German Lloyd grew up. Their first transatlantic steamer
was the _Bremen_, built by Caird of Greenock in 1858, but their
real progress commences with the year 1881, when the first German
“express” steamer entered the line. This was the 4510-ton _Elbe_, a
four-masted screw ship built on the Clyde, and during the next ten
years Glasgow built _Ems_ and seven other British-made vessels, whose
speed varied from sixteen to eighteen knots. They were able to carry
1200 passengers. But when we come to the ’nineties the passenger
trade was so good that the North German Lloyd could afford to scrap
its old-fashioned craft and build the twin-screw _Kaiser Wilhelm der
Grosse_. This was to become an historic ship.
She measured 14,349 gross tons, and appeared in 1897. The Germans
were jealous of the achievements which had been made by the Cunard
_Campania_ and _Lucania_, and by attaining a mean speed of 22·81 knots
on her trip from New York to Europe did outstrip the Cunarders’ fine
record; and thus for the first time the “blue riband” of the Atlantic
temporarily passed to Germany. She was “made in Germany”—at Stettin—and
this triumphant voyage did a great deal to encourage the German
Mercantile Marine and German shipbuilders. She had been constructed on
the understanding that if during the trial trip across the Atlantic she
did not come up to the requirements of the contract, the North German
Lloyd were to be allowed to reject her. Actually she surpassed the
builders’ undertaking.
In 1907, whilst coming across the Atlantic in October weather
eastward-bound, this handsome ship fractured her rudder; but instead
of taking her into Halifax, the nearest port, her captain held on for
Plymouth and thence to Bremerhaven, the ship having been manœuvred by
means of her twin screws. It was a fine achievement, but some ships
are born to be adventurous. At the beginning of the Great War the
_Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ was in Germany. She was fitted out as a
raider, left Hamburg on August 4, 1914, evaded the Grand Fleet, passed
round the north of Iceland, and on August 7 sank a British trawler,
then proceeded down the Atlantic, sank a couple and molested two more
ships, and finally went into the Rio de Oro, a lonely anchorage in
Spanish territory in North-West Africa. But on August 26 arrived H.M.S.
_Highflyer_, and as the German refused to leave territorial waters,
the British cruiser opened fire and destroyed her. Thus, after nearly
twenty years’ service, this former Atlantic greyhound ended her days as
an armed merchant cruiser.
The North German Lloyd’s _Kaiser Wilhelm II_ was the next ship of this
line to cause a sensation. This was in 1903, and she was certainly a
triumph for the Stettin builders. Of 20,000 registered tons, she was a
little faster even than the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, for she kept
up an average speed of 23·58 knots between New York and Plymouth in one
voyage. Very useful was this speed to become eleven years later, for
she was in the North Atlantic when war broke out, and got safely into
New York on August 6. The _George Washington_, of 26,000 gross register
tons, was launched as the biggest of all the ships in the German
Mercantile Marine, though, with the speed of eighteen and a half knots,
by no means the fastest. She was added to the N.D.L. in 1908, and was
able to carry just under 3000 passengers for her owners when the list
was full. A very useful and luxurious ship she turned out to be, but
on the day after the war began she arrived in New York, was interned,
and is now one of the ships in the American Mercantile Marine. The
_Berlin_, another N.D.L. steamer, passed into the owners’ hands in
1909. She was of 19,200 gross tons, and originally could do her
eighteen knots. In the autumn of 1914 she laid the big minefield off
the north coast of Ireland, on which H.M.S. _Audacious_ and other ships
foundered. _Berlin_ afterwards scurried north and interned herself in
Norway.
[Illustration:
[_By courtesy the Cunard Line._
STOKEHOLD OF AN OIL-FUEL CUNARDER.]
[Illustration:
[_By courtesy the Cunard Line._
STARTING PLATFORM
Of the engine-room in a Cunarder.]
Such, then, was the progress of these two main supports of the German
Mercantile Marine until the coming of the mammoth Atlantic liners.
The ships of the Hamburg-America and the North German Lloyd were
admittedly as good, and sometimes better than, their competitors, the
Cunard and White Star; and during the period immediately preceding the
war, competition was very keen not merely on the New York route,
but in the trade with Central America, South America, East Africa and
Australia. The German Mercantile Marine was everywhere, and cutting
rates in an alarming manner. Her sea-borne trade was increasing, but
the bulk of her shipping still remained, on the eve of war, in the ten
powerful companies; and her main strength was still in the Atlantic
trade of the two big lines we have just been considering.
The North Atlantic had long since earned the title of the cockpit
where the mercantile supremacy at sea was to be fought out. Germany’s
final bid was a great effort. For in the year 1912 was built the
23½-knot _Imperator_, a stupendous creature of 52,022 tons, with her
swimming-bath and super-luxury. In 1914 was put into service the
26·75-knot _Vaterland_, which was bigger still, for she measured 950
feet long, against _Imperator’s_ 905 feet, and her tonnage worked
out at 52,282. The former at the outbreak of war was lucky to be in
Germany, where she remained until after hostilities. She was handed
over to the Cunard Company, who changed her name to _Berengaria_. The
_Vaterland_ got into New York on the day war was declared between Great
Britain and Germany, and was interned. She was eventually used for
carrying American troops to Europe, and after the war she passed into
the American Mercantile Marine, who changed her name to _Leviathan_.
When she was seized from Germany there were no plans of her available.
The United States Shipping Board, on making inquiries from her German
builders as to the price of these plans, were asked the enormous sum
of $1,000,000. This was declined, and the colossal task of preparing
these plans from the ship herself was successfully undertaken. But you
may imagine what it means to run a ship of this size when it cost the
American Mercantile Marine $50,000 a month merely to keep her efficient
whilst laid up. Finally there was finished in Germany during 1922 the
third mammoth, of 56,000 tons. Originally intended to be called the
_Bismarck_, she was handed over to the White Star Line, who changed her
name to _Majestic_.
Before the war Germany’s Mercantile Marine, according to the Managing
Director of the Hamburg-America Line, consisted of 5,459,000 gross
tons. Of this amount approximately she lost owing to war operations
2,700,000 tons. By reason of the Treaty of Versailles she lost a
further 2,900,000 tons approximately, leaving her about 400,000
tons.[8] If we select the spring of 1922 we are neither too near the
ending of the war nor too far removed from it to notice the efforts
which are being made to revive a merchant fleet which so suddenly
vanished from its high position. The Hamburg-America Line in 1922 had
but forty-three vessels of 165,707 gross tons, and the North German
Lloyd only twenty-five ships of 127,098 gross tons. A mighty contrast
to the summer of 1914. But both these and other lines were going ahead
with their building, and it was unofficially estimated that the German
Merchant Fleet on May 31, 1922, consisted of 1,546,000 gross tons.
In accordance with the Peace Treaty all German merchant ships of any
importance were handed over to the Entente Powers. This, in part, was
as compensation for the loss of tonnage during the U-boat campaign.
But Germany recompensed her shipping companies for the merchant
vessels thus surrendered and gave them every encouragement to build
up once more the fleets which meant so much to her, financially
and politically. For the Shipping Redemption Agreement of 1921
indemnified these companies, provided labour for the shipyards, and
ensured co-operation of the industries inland. The money paid to the
companies was taken from the national funds, but its distribution
and the supervision of the building programme have been entrusted to
a Shipowners’ Trust Company. Thus Germany still realises all that a
Mercantile Marine means to her, and she has every intention of building
it up again during the coming years.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] That is, tonnage built during the war.