MERCANTILE SUPREMACY AT SEA
The end of the seventeenth century saw the British Mercantile Fleet as
the world’s leading traders. The disappearance of their Spanish and
then Dutch rivals in sea commerce was brought about not by battle, but
by the steady pressure of sea-power, as in the recent European War the
continuous pressure of the Grand Fleet throttled the Germans. Just as
the Battle of Jutland failed to bring about the downfall of our late
enemies, so the defeat of the Armada did not succeed in breaking Spain;
so, too, no single battle in the Anglo-Dutch wars brought the maritime
progress of the great Dutch Republic to a dead stop.
[Illustration:
[_By courtesy Messrs. T. H. Parker._
CAPTAIN THOMAS FORREST.
Navigator and Surveyor, who formed in 1770 for the H.E. India Company a
new settlement at Balambangan.]
This sea pressure having fulfilled its purpose, the English merchantmen
were able to scoop up from exhausted nations the world’s maritime
commerce; and the voyages of discovery, notably those of Dampier,
Anson and Cook, together with the enterprising penetration of the
East Indiamen, and to a smaller extent the West Indiamen (who enjoyed
the benefits of free trade), opened up fresh avenues of commerce. The
fighting fleets had opened up the oceans for the mercantile ships to
bring home riches. By the year 1688 the annual clearance outwards from
Great Britain was 191,000 tons of English shipping and 95,000 tons of
foreign shipping. In a hundred years the nation had become supreme,
simply because our forefathers, like any great business man, had
possessed the imagination to see that the ocean was the road to wealth,
and they had also not lacked the courage to put their maritime belief
to the test.
Thus in the year 1701-1702 its Mercantile Marine consisted of 3281
vessels of 261,222 tons, armed with 5660 guns and giving employment
afloat to 27,196 men. During the eighteenth century wet docks had to
be made both in the Thames and the Mersey, the first Marine Insurance
Company came into being, and Lloyd’s Register of Shipping was started.
The history of Lloyd’s is indicative of the progress of the Mercantile
Marine. In the seventeenth century a number of underwriters used to
meet in Edward Lloyd’s coffee-house in Tower Street for their business.
In 1692 this coffee-house was removed to Lombard Street, and then, in
1774, Lloyd’s gave up the coffee-house and went to their premises in
the Royal Exchange, where they have remained ever since.
It is clear from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping that from 1764 to the
end of that century most of the British ships were of not more than
300 tons; but we have to bear in mind two important facts. Firstly,
the East Indian monopoly prevented competition, and therefore any
stimulus to build anything larger; and secondly, from 1775 to 1815,
with only small patches of peace, there was a long series of wars.
These hostilities naturally caused the tonnage of commercial shipping
to drop, but every time that peace was restored the figures began to
go up again; so that in 1793, when war broke out with France, Great
Britain possessed 16,079 merchant ships as compared with the 3281 at
the commencement of the century. It was therefore an amazingly live
industry, which required only a fair opportunity for its development.
This development was, as might be expected, accurately reflected at the
Blackwall yard, in spite of the fact that the slips and shipwrights had
largely during those forty years to be employed for building men-of-war
for the Navy. By the middle of the century this yard had a wet dock,
three dry docks and a number of slips. It was the biggest private
dockyard in the country, and only the Royal yards could rival it. Here
the East Indiamen continued to be built, the direct ancestors of the
great liners of to-day. In the period 1750-1752 was here constructed
the East Indiaman _Falmouth_. She was a fine three-masted, full-rigged
ship of 668 tons burthen, measuring 108 feet 9 inches on the keel, and
having a beam of 34 feet. She carried topsails and t’gallant sails and,
with her large figure-head and rather wasteful, ornate design at bow
and stern, maintained her close connection with the ship architecture
of the seventeenth century.
[Illustration:
[_By courtesy Messrs. T. H. Parker._
BRUNSWICK DOCK, BLACKWALL.
Built especially for the use of the H.E. India Company’s ships, and
begun in 1789. It could accommodate sixty of these vessels.]
During the next thirteen years were launched such East Indiamen as the
642-ton _Osterley_, the 642-ton _Tilbury_, the _Valentine_ and _Ajax_,
each of 655 tons. In 1768 no fewer than five such ships of 670 tons
were constructed and fitted out, and then, a couple of years later,
ships of 700 tons began to be built. The East India Company used to
charter such ships practically as long as they were seaworthy; and
Blackwall in those days was able to do everything that the monopolists
required; for here not only were the ships built, rigged and laid
up, but ashore the houses were the homes of seafaring families,
shipwrights, caulkers and every trade concerned in the building of
these craft. And then in 1789 was launched from this yard the big
1612-ton _Bombay Castle_, a powerful vessel of seventy-four guns, which
the East India Company presented to George III. There is a picture
by Dodd which shows as many as four other big ships on the slips at
this time, together with four or five similar craft fitting out in
the stream. It is comparable only to the Clyde in the height of its
twentieth century shipbuilding.
With the increase in the number of these ships came, of course, the
greater need for docks where the vessels could lie in tiers in safety
and convenience; so in 1789 the Brunswick Basin was begun in the east
end of the Blackwall yard. Two years later the first ship was masted
here. This was the _Lord Macartney_, and you may guess of the keenness
and smartness of the men when you learn that her bowsprit and all her
masts were raised and fixed in the remarkable time of three hours and
forty minutes. To-day, with all the modern appliances of cranes and
labour-saving devices, this record is worth noting. Two years later was
launched from this yard the famous East Indiaman _Warren Hastings_,
which, as will be seen presently, was destined to become famous for her
achievement in 1806.
These East Indiamen, the backbone and beauty of the British Marine,
were frigate-built, and stately rather than fast sailers, badly
designed, requiring much ballast, and essentially but little
improved since the sixteenth century. For during the latter part of
the eighteenth century it was the French who were the finest naval
architects. But two names become associated with the history of this
yard before the close of the eighteenth century, and it is with these
two families that the golden age of the sailing ship will ever be
remembered. In another chapter we shall see how much the Wigrams and
Greens did to make the British ships unique in the annals of sail. It
is therefore worth mentioning that in the year 1764 comes the first
mention of Robert Wigram. His father had been master of a privateer.
After his death the young Robert came to London and was apprenticed
to a surgeon. Two years later Wigram took his surgeon’s diploma and
then sailed in that capacity in one of the East India Company’s ships.
This was the _Admiral Watson_. Subsequently he also served in the
_Duke of Richmond_, but about 1770, after acquiring valuable knowledge
of the Eastern trade, he became a merchant, and later one of the
proprietors of this yard, his son William afterwards becoming one of
the directors of the East India Company. It was in 1782 that George
Green was apprenticed to the yard, and owing to his ability and other
circumstances, was destined also to become later one of the partners.
It is interesting also to mention that young Wigram, during his voyage
in the _Admiral Watson_, formed a friendship with the second officer,
whose name was W. T. Money. We thus see the first association of those
three names, Money, Wigram and Green, which are inseparable from the
finest fleet of sailing ships in its most historic period.
But the time has not arrived to discuss the Victorian ships. The
Mercantile Marine of the eighteenth and the first part of the
nineteenth century had first to go through most trying times before
the blessings of permanent peace should arrive. We who are now alive
have not forgotten that for four years during the recent Great War
the merchant shipping of the Allies was subject to the attacks of our
enemies. But in the past it was for forty years, as we have already
seen, the British mercantile vessels had to endure this danger, and it
is our duty to observe how our seafaring forefathers carried on during
those trying times. The fighting spirit was by no means confined to the
Navy, and even apart from those forty years, there hardly seemed a long
period when the trading ship could proceed upon her lawful occasions
without fear of being attacked. If it was not a pirate, it was a
privateer or a warship of some kind. But the merchantman still went
about her business all the same, undaunted and undismayed.
We are familiar with ancient works on naval tactics, but there is in
the British Museum a rare and somewhat damaged volume, printed in
the year 1702, called _The Art of Seafighting_, written by a retired
merchant mariner named Robert Park of Ipswich. It was undertaken on
behalf of the Merchant Service at a time when the privateers were so
active. Park was a “whole-hogger,” who knew no difference between
foolhardiness and courage. He was a real “hard-case” sailorman, typical
of his time, who had no use for luxury, but was a firm believer in
trade and liberty. In this volume he tells his readers how to prepare
the ship for close-fighting, by making the bulkheads musket-proof,
and so on. He tells them how a ship can be worked under fire without
showing a man on deck, gives valuable hints on gunnery and the
importance of sobriety in the duties of a gunner. In the third part of
the book he gives the very same advice which the British Admiralty in
the recent war used to issue to the steamship captains. Park sensibly
reminds his brother seamen that they are merchantmen, that they are
sent to sea not to fight, but to get their cargoes to port, and if
possible they are to avoid engagement. Nevertheless it was a wicked
crime to leave an attacked consort to become a prey to the enemy.
He gives seamanlike hints on how a three-masted ship should escape. He
shows the ship stations and duties when preparing for battle, where the
master is to take up his position, where the gunner is to be stationed,
what the mate and the carpenter are to be doing. He gives the best
tactics with regard to the enemy’s boarding, and even discourses on the
handling of a fleet of merchantmen, incidentally maintaining that for
them the weather-gauge is not usually advantageous. He prefers having
a fleet in double, treble or even quadruple line, and gives diagrams.
It is a quaint book, of human as well as practical interest, and well
indicates the fine spirit of our eighteenth century merchantmen. Those
who read it must have found it extraordinarily useful.
It may be as well, before proceeding further, to make quite clear the
meaning of the two expressions “privateer” and “Letter of Marque.”
Legally there was no difference, but in practice a privateer was a
vessel which took out a licence for the purpose of cruising against
the enemy’s merchant ships. In order to send the prizes into port
she necessarily carried a large crew. A “Letter of Marque” was a
merchant ship with a cargo bound for her port in the usual manner,
but possessing this licence which exempted her from convoy, nominally
protected her crew from being impressed, and gave her the right to
attack an enemy merchantman without having to wait until the latter
attacked her. In a word, she was primarily a merchantman, whereas the
privateer was a fighting merchant cruiser.
But these British merchant captains were as clever as they were brave.
Take the following incident, which occurred at the end of January
1797 off the east end of Java. Here the French Rear-Admiral Sercey,
with a squadron of six frigates, was at sea when five homeward-bound
British East Indiamen came in sight. These five were all richly laden,
and their first duty was certainly to get their cargoes to England
and fight only if inevitable. The names of the British ships were the
_Woodford_, _Ocean_, _Taunton Castle_, _Canton_ and the _Boddam_. These
five were in charge of the senior officer, Captain Charles Lennox. The
latter took the situation in at once, and realised that it would be
useless to run away. Moreover the mere act of so doing would indicate
the inferiority of his squadron; so he did a very smart thing. He
hoisted the flag of Rear-Admiral Rainier at the mizzen, and made the
other four ships hoist pendants and ensigns as if they were men-of-war.
Furthermore, in order to maintain this gigantic piece of bluff, he
actually detached two of his ships to give chase and reconnoitre the
French squadron, and as these daring craft approached the _Cybèle_, the
latter crowded on sail to join her consorts and made the signal at her
masthead: “L’ennemi est supérieur aux forces Françaises.” Thereupon the
French Admiral also made sail. He certainly thought it curious that
when another of his frigates, the _Forte_, carried away her maintopmast
the British did not continue the chase, but the captain of _Cybèle_
hailed him, whilst passing, that he had made out the enemy to consist
of two line-of-battle ships and four frigates! Admiral Sercey therefore
continued his retreat, and the East Indiamen were never engaged. It was
not till a month later that he realised how he had been fooled.
The mere fact that a French naval officer should have taken East
Indiamen for line-of-battle ships is at once a proof of the stateliness
and formidable appearance which the company’s ships possessed. It shows
the great similarity which existed at that time between the ships of
war and of commerce. But finer even than this exploit was the following
brilliant achievement, which is one of the brightest incidents in the
whole story of the Merchant Service. It was on January 31, 1804, that
sixteen East Indiamen set forth from Canton for Europe. They were all
of a size of from 1200 to 1500 tons register, their names being the
_Earl Camden_, _Warley_, _Alfred_, _Royal George_, _Coutts_, _Wexford_,
_Ganges_, _Exeter_, _Earl of Abergavenny_, _Henry Addington_, _Bombay
Castle_, _Cumberland_, _Hope_, _Dorsetshire_, _Warren Hastings_, and
_Ocean_. The senior officer present was Captain Nathaniel Dance, in the
_Earl Camden_, and so was Commodore of all these ships. But it was a
fleet rather than a squadron, for, in addition to the above sixteen,
forty more vessels were also put under his charge to convoy them as far
as their courses remained the same. A convoy of forty sailing ships!
What a magnificent sight they presented, most of them carrying royals
and staysails, and the massive hulls with their stern galleries and
ornate figure-heads and painted ports heeling over gracefully to the
wind!
[Illustration: CAPTAIN HENRY WILSON,
A commanding officer in the H.E. India Company, who was wrecked in
the company’s ship “Antelope.” About 1788.
CAPTAIN HON. RICHARD WALPOLE,
Who commanded the H.E. India Company’s ship “New Houghton.” About 1805.
COMMODORE SIR NATHANIEL DANCE, 1804.
A very gallant mercantile officer. (See p. 98.)
SIR WILLIAM JAMES, BART.,
Commodore in the H.E. India Company, Chairman of the Court of
Directors, etc. About 1805.
(_By courtesy Messrs. T. H. Parker._)]
For Commodore Dance it was a most responsible task. This fleet was
carrying many thousand pounds’ worth of goods. There was the danger of
pirates and the possibility of falling in with the French men-of-war;
and there was the ever-present danger of collision. But those were
the days of seamanship, and where would you find to-day any mercantile
or naval officer who could handle a fleet of forty sail? We know
all too well how difficult it was to handle much smaller convoys of
steamships during the recent war; and with engines it is mere child’s
play compared with dependence on wind and sail. To Commodore Dance,
then, I suggest the greatest compliment is due for his leadership and
tactical seamanship alone. But that was not all.
Through night and day for a fortnight he kept his fleet under way
without mishap, and then at daybreak one February day when the fleet
was E.N.E. of Pulo-Auro, which was visible, the _Royal George_ made
a signal that she had sighted four strange sail to the south-west.
Commodore Dance therefore signalled the _Alfred_, _Royal George_,
_Bombay Castle_ and _Hope_ to go down and examine them. It happened
that in the Commodore’s ship there was a passenger named Lieutenant
Robert Fowler, R.N., lately in command of a ship that had been wrecked.
He now offered to go in the fast-sailing brig _Ganges_, which was
in the convoy. The Commodore assented, and she went away also to
examine the strange vessels. Before long the look-out ships signalled
that the strangers were actually a French squadron consisting of a
line-of-battle ship, three frigates and a brig.
At 1 p.m. the British Commodore signalled his scouts to return, and
formed the line of battle in close order. Admiral Linois, who was in
command of the French squadron, as soon as he could fetch in the wake
of the East Indiamen, put about. The Commodore expected his rear to be
attacked, but at nightfall the enemy, preferring a daylight action,
hauled close to the wind. The British ships lay-to all night, the men
at their quarters, ready for action, and at daybreak the enemy were
seen also lying-to, but were three miles to windward. Both forces
now hoisted their colours, and as the whole of the China fleet had
been only recently painted, they presented a wonderful sight with
their clouds of canvas. Admiral Linois’ flag was in the 74-gun ship
_Marengo_, his other units being the 40-gun frigate _Belle-Poule_,
the 36-gun frigate _Sémillante_, the 22-gun _Berceau_, and the 16-gun
_Aventurier_. It was no chance meeting, for the French Admiral was
on the look-out for this China fleet, of whose strength and time of
departure he had been informed.
At 9 a.m., as the enemy showed no intention of engaging, Dance formed
the order of sailing and continued his course, his fleet being under
easy sail on the starboard tack; whereupon the French filled and edged
towards the merchantmen. Four hours later, as it was obvious that
Linois was trying to cut off the rear of the fleet, Dance signalled
his fleet to tack in succession, bear down in line ahead, and engage
on arriving abreast of the enemy. This manœuvre was perfectly carried
out, the _Royal George_ leading, all of them in close order and under
t’gallant sails.[4] At 1.15 p.m. Linois opened fire upon the _Royal
George_ and leading ships, but this was returned in a very determined
manner. For about three-quarters of an hour the two enemies blazed
away at each other. The brunt was borne by the _Royal George_, but the
_Ganges_, _Earl Camden_, _Warley_ and _Alfred_ were all hotly engaged.
These five ships gave the French such a hot time that by two o’clock
_Marengo_ and her consorts ceased firing, hauled their wind, broke
off the engagement and stood away under all sail to the eastward. The
French warships had been beaten by British merchantmen and especially
by clever tactics. But that was not all.
Dance now made the signal for a general chase, and for two hours these
merchant ships chased the warships; and then, remembering that his
first duty was to his ships and their valuable cargoes, Dance feared
that further pursuit would take his fleet too far from the mouth of the
Malacca Straits, so ordered his fleet to tack, and eventually entered
the straits. The _Royal George_ had one man killed, one wounded, and
she received some shot holes in her hull and sails; the other British
ships were practically untouched. The sixteen East Indiamen carried
from thirty to thirty-six guns each, though not one of these ships was
armed better than the _Aventurier_, and this point is to be remembered,
that a warship is always more or less ready to fight, whereas these
East Indiamen were full of cargo and the decks were greatly lumbered.
The Commodore by his determination and promptitude had saved the whole
fleet, and it is to the credit of these sixteen merchantmen that their
smart appearance, the regularity of their manœuvres, and their bold
advance made the French Admiral wonder whether, after all, these were
not British men-of-war escorting the others.
For this remarkable victory the Commodore, officers and crews were
liberally rewarded. The Patriotic Fund Committee, which had originated
in Lloyd’s coffee-house in 1803, presented the Commodore with a sword
of the value of £100 and a silver vase of the same worth. Captain
Timmins of the _Royal George_ also received a sword, as did the other
captains and Lieutenant Fowler. The directors of the East India Company
set aside about £50,000, and rewarded their Commodore with 2000 guineas
and a piece of plate valued at 200 guineas. Captain Timmins received
1000 guineas and plate, the other captains receiving 500 guineas each
and a piece of plate. The chief officers each received 150 guineas, the
second officers 125 guineas, and so on through the ship, each seaman
receiving six guineas.
Dance was given also £5000 by the Bombay Insurance Society. He was
offered a baronetcy, but declined it and accepted a knighthood, and
thus concludes one of the finest incidents in the history of the
Merchant Service. This action showed that the ships and men were not
merely magnificent for their own particular job, but that they could
tackle any emergency that came along.
FOOTNOTES:
[4] For list of an East Indiaman’s sails, see Appendix.