POLITICAL LEADER AND STRATEGIST
When Jefferson went home after the adjournment of Congress he remained
completely silent for two months. But the newspaper war went on in
Philadelphia with more virulence than ever: attacks against the arch
plotter and the defender of the French Jacobins were multiplied,
prosecutions were begun in Massachusetts under the Sedition Act and for
a time Jefferson himself seems to have feared for his own safety. To
Samuel Smith, who had sent him a clipping in which he was vehemently
accused, he answered that he had "contemplated every event which the
Maratists of the day can perpetrate, and I am prepared to meet every one
in such a way, as shall not be derogatory to the public liberty or my
own personal honor." He naturally denied that he had in any way plotted
with Bache, the editor of the _Aurora_, or Doctor Leib; then he went on
to define once more his position. He had acted on the same principles
from the year 1775 to that day, and he was convinced that these
principles were those of the great body of the American people. He was
for peace certainly, not only with France but also with England. He was
aware that both of them "have given and are daily giving, sufficient
cause of war; that in defiance of the laws of nations, they are every
day trampling on the rights of the neutral powers, whenever they can
thereby do the least injury, either to the other." But he still
maintained that the best policy was and would have been "to bear from
France for one more summer what we have been bearing from both of them
these four years." With England the United States had chosen peace; with
France they had chosen war; to what extent the Government was supported
by the majority of the people was a thing to be seen in the coming
elections. He ended with a note of Christian forgiveness for Fenno and
Porcupine, who "covered him with their implacable hatred." "The only
return I will ever make them, will be to do them all the good I can, in
spite of their teeth."[364]
This was almost too godly to be true; but if we remember that his
letters were intercepted and read by Adams' police, as he repeatedly
complained, and that letters sent to him were opened on their way to
Monticello, we may wonder whether he did not write these lines for the
eye of the censor, and with his tongue in his cheek. That he really
believed at the time in the existence of a monarchical conspiracy
appears from a letter to Stephens Thompson Mason.[365]
The Alien and Sedition bills were just a beginning. If the people did
not revolt against them, the next step would be to persuade Congress
that the President should continue in office for life, reserving to
another time the transfer of the succession to his heirs and the
establishment of the Senate for life.
This was a very accurate prophecy of the course that events were to
follow, not in America, but in France, and this shows at least that
Jefferson had an exact understanding of the gradual steps through which
a republican government might become an empire. But France had
Bonaparte, while neither Adams nor Washington ever had the inclination
or the power to bring about such a change in America. Yet when one
thinks of the military ambitions of Hamilton, of his real opposition and
scorn for republican government, it would perhaps be unfair to dismiss
these apprehensions as absolutely groundless. Whatever the case may have
been, Jefferson thought the time had come to erect a strong barrier
against the encroachments of the Federal Government. Towards the end of
the same month, the two Nicholas brothers, George and Wilson C.,
discussed with Jefferson at Monticello a plan to put to work the
Republicans, who, finding themselves useless in Congress, had retired
from the field. A plan was finally adopted to arouse the State
legislatures; during these meetings were drawn up the famous
"Resolutions" that George Nicholas was to present to the legislature of
Kentucky, and which Madison was to bring before the Virginia
Assembly.[366]
The exact authorship of the "Resolutions" remained a matter of doubt
until Jefferson more than twenty years later acknowledged his
participation in a letter to the son of George Nicholas.[367] It was
well for Jefferson's peace of mind that he remained behind the scenes on
this occasion and let Madison take the responsibility of the
recommendation, which he did not allow to pass without modifying the
original text to a considerable degree. The Kentucky resolutions have
been the subject of many discussions, and Madison himself used a great
deal of ink and time to explain the true import of the measures he had
sponsored before the Virginia Assembly. They will become much more
intelligible when studied in the light of the theory developed by
Jefferson in the document in which he stated his views on the social
compact, considered as a _pactum foederis_ and not a _pactum
subjectionis_.[368] It was simply the reaffirmation that in forming a
society neither men nor States abdicate entirely their sovereignty but
reserve a specified part of their natural rights set forth in a Bill of
Rights--an essential foundation on which to build a constitution. Such
is clearly the meaning of the first resolution;
1. _Resolved._ That the several States composing the United States of
America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to
their general Government; but that, by a compact under the style and
title of a Constitution for the United States, and of amendments
thereto, they constituted a general Government for special
purposes--delegated to that Government certain definite powers,
reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their
own self-government; and that whensoever the general Government
assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and
of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and
is an integral party, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other
party: that the Government created by this compact was not made the
exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to
itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the
Constitution, the measure of its powers; but, that, as in all other
cases of compact among powers having no common judge, each party has
an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the
mode and measure of redress.
Not only was Jefferson perfectly consistent in repeating almost word for
word in this Resolution the doctrine of natural rights and State rights
already enunciated in 1776, but the last lines foretold the theory he
was to defend against Marshall during his presidency. By denying that
the parties to the Federal compact had a common judge, he refused in
advance to consider the Supreme Court as the guardian, interpreter, and
defender of the Constitution. This principle once asserted, Jefferson
endeavored to prove that the Sedition Bill, the Alien Bill and other
measures adopted by Congress at the instigation of the Federalists
constituted an infringement of State rights, since they did not deal
with matters specifically reserved to Congress and since it was provided
that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people." This was at the same time an attempt to
prove the unconstitutionality of the recent legislation and an endeavor
to define more exactly the powers of the Federal Government. The Eighth
Resolution, the longest, proposed the establishment of a committee of
correspondence to communicate the resolutions to the different
legislatures and enunciated the doctrine of nullification, namely that
the State had the right to consider as nonexistent such laws as might be
passed in defiance of the Constitution. Naturally the Law of Sedition
and the Alien Bill came under that category.
Strong as the language of the Resolutions may have been, it was not
Jefferson's intention to promote a rebellion of certain States against
the Federal Government and to provoke a secession. They contained a
strong affirmation that the subscribers to the Resolutions were
sincerely anxious for the preservation of the Union. As a matter of
fact, in Jefferson's intention they were a piece of political strategy
and he had no desire to push the matter too far. A letter he wrote to
Madison on the subject is particularly significant on that score: "I
think we should distinctly affirm all the important principles they
contain, so as to hold to that ground in future, and leave the matter in
such a train as that we may not be committed absolutely to push the
matter to extremities, and yet may be free to push as far as events will
render prudent."[369]
In other words, it was what the French call a gesture, the act of a
lawyer reserving certain points in a trial before a tribunal and the
right to present conclusions. It was not the act of a revolutionist and
for the time being at least, although adopted in a modified form both by
Kentucky and Virginia, it remained a gesture and a simple protest
against Federalist usurpations.
The end of the fall came, and Jefferson relapsed once more into his
cautious silence. One letter only, written from Monticello to John
Taylor, is found in the files for that period.[370] This time Jefferson
was more optimistic; the ardor of the Federalists for war seemed to have
cooled down and the people began to realize that national pride was a
very expensive article, that wars had to be paid for: "the Doctor is now
on his way to cure it, in the guise of the tax gatherer."
At the end of the month, the Vice President set out for Philadelphia to
attend the opening of the third session of the Fifth Congress. Adams'
address was anxiously awaited. Much to the surprise and disgust of the
war party, if it could not be called conciliatory, it was far less
provocative than the address of the twenty-first of June preceding. He
protested against the decree of the Directory constituting "an
unequivocal act of war" and maintained that "to invigorate measures of
defence" was the true policy of the United States. But while he thus
reiterated some of his previous statements, the tone was far less
truculent. President Adams, while frowning threateningly, held behind
his back the olive branch and was ready to extend it. The conclusion was
one of these milk-and-water statements, that curious balancing of two
positions so often found in American State papers relating to foreign
affairs:
But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the
necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room
to infer that we abandon the desire of peace.... An efficient
preparation for war can alone insure peace. It is peace that we have
uniformly and perseveringly cultivated, and harmony between us and
France may be restored at her option.
Then came the really important part: "The United States Government could
not think of sending another minister ... unless given positive
assurances that he would be received. It must therefore be left with
France (if she is indeed desirous of accommodation) to take the
requisite steps."
Apparently an innocuous statement, but yet it was a new note; as it was
known that Adams had received some communications from Gerry and was to
make these communications known, it was supposed that a real change and
a change for the better was about to take place in the relations between
the two countries. Therefore Jefferson could mention in the speech "a
moderation unlike the President", and he also knew that Vans Murray,
the American minister at the Hague, had informed his Government "that
the French Government is sincere in their overtures for reconciliation
and have agreed, if these fail, to admit the mediation offered by the
British Government."[371]
In the meantime the fight in Congress was merrily going on, with that
peculiar circumstance that both leaders remained behind the scenes. To
the Kentucky Resolutions, followed by much milder representations from
other State legislatures, Hamilton opposed his instructions sent to
Dayton, and since published in his "Works." If they had fallen into
Jefferson's hands he would have found in them ample grounds for his
fears. The Federalist leader was of the opinion that his party was
losing ground, and the late attempt of Virginia and Kentucky to unite
the State legislatures in a direct resistance to certain laws of the
Union, could be considered in no other light than as an attempt to
change the Government. Under the circumstances, and considering that
"the enemies of the Government were resolved, if it shall be
practicable, to make its existence a question of force", Hamilton had
devised a certain plan to be executed by the Federalist troops in
Congress. The measures came under four heads: establishments which will
extend the influence and promote the popularity of the Government;
provision for augmenting the means and consolidating the strength of the
Government; arrangements for confirming and enlarging the legal powers
of the Government; laws for restraining and punishing incendiary and
seditious practices. The detail of the recommendations showed a
perfectly well-concerted plan to concentrate all powers in the hands of
the Federal Government.
One of the most remarkable proposals was perhaps the project of
subdividing the larger States into several small States containing no
less than a hundred thousand persons each, as these new units would be
"better adapted to the purposes of local regulations and to the
preservation of the Republican spirit." It is not without interest here
to note that the Federalist leader proposed the very measures which had
been adopted in France when the old provinces were divided into
_departements_. In the case of the Federalists, as in the case of the
Constituents, the purpose was the same: a concentration of all powers
into the hand of a central authority and the suppression of local
government. Other recommendations were an extension of the judiciary
with a Federal judge at the head of each district; the appointment of
conservators or justices of peace, who were to supervise the energetic
execution of the laws and to promote "salutary patronage"; a stronger
army; improvement of roads; powers given to the Government to call out
the militia to suppress unlawful combinations and insurrections; power
given to Congress to build canals through the territory of two or more
States, that "all seditious writings levelled against any officers
whatever of the U. S. shall be cognizable in the courts of the United
States."
If the administrative reorganization advocated by Hamilton had been
effected, it would have made the United States not far different from
the France of Napoleon and, such being the plans of the Federalists, it
cannot be said that Jefferson's fear was entirely exaggerated.
One of the first victories of the Federalists was to pass the famous
Logan Law (January 30) forbidding any citizen of the United States to
commence or carry on any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse
with any foreign government, or any officer thereof in relation to any
disputes or controversies with the United States. Doctor Logan's
intentions had been of the best. He had seen members of the French
Directory in Paris and had brought with him "non-equivocal proofs of the
pacific dispositions of the French Government towards the United States"
and particularly the Statement of Merlin that "_la liberte des
Etats-Unis nous a coute trop de sang pour qu'elle ne nous soit pas
chere._"[372] None of these activities could be called treacherous, and
in normal times would not have been noticed. But behind Logan, Jefferson
was aimed at, and he was perfectly aware, as he wrote to Madison, that
"the real views in the importance they have given to Logan's enterprise
are mistaken by nobody."[373] Yet he thought he had to justify himself
to his friends, and sent a long letter on the subject to Gerry. Far more
important than his defense was a declaration of the principles he did
not fear to avow. "They are unquestionably," he said, "the principles of
the great body of our fellow-citizens." It was really the program of the
Democratic Party and the most luminous exposition of the Jeffersonian
doctrine ever made.
I do then, with sincere zeal, wish an inviolable preservation of our
present federal Constitution, according to the true sense in which it
was adopted by the States ... and I am opposed to the monarchising
its features by the forms of its administration, with a view to
conciliate a first transition to a President and Senate for life, and
from that to an hereditary tenure of these offices.... I am for
preserving to the States the powers not yielded by them to the Union,
and to the legislature of the Union its constitutional share in the
division of powers; and I am not for transferring all the powers of
the States to the General Government, and all those of that
Government to the executive branch. I am for a government rigorously
frugal and simple, applying all the possible savings of the public
revenue to the discharge of the national debt; and not for a
multiplication of officers and salaries merely to make partisans....
I am for relying, for internal defence, on our militia solely, till
actual invasion ... and not for a standing army in time of peace,
which may overawe the public sentiment; nor for a navy, which by its
own expenses and the eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will
grind us with public burthens, and sink us under them. I am for free
commerce with all nations; political connections with none; and
little or no diplomatic establishment ... I am for freedom of
religion, and against all manoeuvres to bring about a legal
ascendency of one sect over another: for freedom of the press, and
against all violations of the Constitution to silence by force and
not by reason the complaints of criticism, just or unjust, of our
citizens against the conduct of their agents. And I am for
encouraging the progress of science in all its branches; and not for
raising a hue and cry against the sacred name of philosophy....[374]
Jefferson ended with a paragraph in which he solemnly proclaimed the
integrity of his American nationalism, although he admitted that he was
a well wisher to the success of the French Revolution and still hoped
that it would succeed; but he added at once: "The first object of my
heart is my own country. In that is embarked my family, my fortune, my
own existence. I have not one farthing of interest, nor preference of
any one nation to another, but in proportion as they are more or less
friendly to us."
The man who drew up that program in the midst of an unprecedented
political strife and the riotous scenes of the streets of Philadelphia
was a political leader of the first rank. The letter to Gerry is more
than a letter from one individual to another; it transcends the
circumstances of the moment. It is the result of mature reflection; the
conclusions reached by Jefferson after almost thirty years of political
life. It is really the first program of his party and the first complete
definition of Government and of Americanism; for it was distinctly
American. I fail to perceive in it the influence of any foreign
political thinker except in so far as such principles as freedom of the
press, separation of the Church and the State may have been ideas common
to a great majority of political thinkers of the eighteenth century.
Even if Jefferson's request to Gerry to keep the communication
absolutely secret was obeyed, there is little doubt that we have here
the gist of the communication made orally by Jefferson to his friends
and to the leaders of the Republicans in Congress.
For the moment the letter contained a strong appeal to Gerry to place
every evidence at his disposal before the public, since the Government
refused to do it, and to publish in full the report on his mission. He
alone could save the situation by coming forward independently. But even
if Gerry acceded to this wish, some one else would have to present a
brief synopsis of the evidence and draw up a judicial arraignment of the
administration. At this juncture Jefferson thought of his old master
Pendleton, at whose feet he had sat in Williamsburg, and with whom he
had worked in the revision of the statutes of Virginia. He alone could
give the "_coup de grace_" to the ruinous principles and doctrines; he
alone could recapitulate all the vexations and disgusting details of the
Stamp Act and the Direct Tax. A small handbill would be printed and they
could "disperse ten or twelve thousand copies under letter covers,
through all the United States, by the members of Congress when they
return home."[375] To make Pendleton's cooeperation more certain,
Jefferson even drew up the plan of the indictment and inclosed all the
necessary documents.
February was for Jefferson a period of hectic activity. During all the
first part of the month he multiplied his entreaties to Pendleton to
gird up his loins and enter the fight. If he still refused to write for
the press he was not averse to communicating to the editors papers
written by his friends, and he begged these for expressions of opinion
to be sent to the press.
The engine is the press. Every man must lay his purse and his pen
under contribution. As to the former it is possible I may be obliged
to assume something for you. As to the latter, let me pray and
beseech you to set apart a certain portion of every post day to write
what may be proper for the public. Send it to me while here, and
when I go away I will let you know to whom you may send, so that your
name shall be sacredly secret.[376]
The propaganda was beginning to bear its fruits. John Ogden was writing
from Litchfield that "many publications in the _Aurora_ have reached
Connecticut, within four weeks, which have opened the eyes of the
dispassionate" and he was asking for more pamphlets.[377] But a week
later Ogden was arrested and to Jefferson he sent a letter "From
Lichtfield Goal (sic) at the suit of Oliver Wolcott Esq", to affirm that
"prison has no horror to the oppressed, inspired and persecuted." To
Aaron Burr in New York Jefferson wrote very affectionately and very
familiarly to acquaint him with the state of public affairs.[378] To
Monroe he was sending pamphlets, asking him to distribute them where
they would do most good, adding as usual "Do not let my name be
connected in the business." He never tired of repeating that the proper
argument to strike the voters was the enormous increase in the budget of
the United States: a loan authorized for five millions at eight per
cent., another of two millions to follow and that was just a beginning.
All these measures were accepted by Congress in the teeth of Gerry's
communications with Talleyrand, showing the French Government willing to
continue the negotiations.
Then on February 18 came "the event of events." While all the war
measures were going on, while the Government of the United States was
blockading the French West Indies and French vessels were captured,
while there were in several instances cases of actual warfare, the
President had had in his hand for several weeks letters exchanged
between Pichon, the French charge at the Hague, and Vans Murray,
declaring that the French Government was ready to receive "whatever
plenipotentiary the Government of the United States should send to
France to end our differences and that he would be received with the
respect due to the representative of a _free, independent, and powerful
nation_." Adams, almost on the eve of the adjournment of Congress, had
decided, as it seems, against the advice and without the knowledge of
his Cabinet, not only to communicate the Vans Murray-Pichon papers, but
to recommend that Murray be appointed as plenipotentiary to France. The
Federalists in the Senate were appalled and at first did not know what
to do.[379] But they were not lacking in strategy; not daring to come
out openly, they appointed on the President's recommendation, not only
Murray but Oliver Ellsworth and Patrick Henry, the last two "not to sail
from America before they should receive from the French Directory
assurances that they should be received with the respect due to the law
of nations, to their character, etc."
This, as Jefferson noticed at once, was a last effort to postpone the
patching-up of difficulties and also a last effort to provoke the
French, since they had already given such an assurance to Murray.[380]
"The whole artillery of the phalanx was played secretly on the P. and he
was obliged himself to take a step which should parry the overture while
it wears the face of acceding to it," he wrote to Madison.[381] But the
war party was defeated, the Federalists had received a fatal blow;
victory already was in sight when Congress adjourned at the beginning of
March.
Then Jefferson repaired to Monticello, while in the back counties
assessors clashed with farmers, troopers with small-town editors, while
Duane was flogged in the street after being dragged from his office by
militiamen. But he was not idle, although for some mysterious reason
several of the letters he published during the summer have never been
printed. He received many visitors, wrote to friends, proclaimed his
faith in ultimate victory for "the body of the American people is
substantially Republican, but their virtuous feelings have been played
on by some fact with more fiction. They have been the dupes of artful
manoeuvres and made for a moment to be willing instruments in forging
chains for themselves."[382] He encouraged Bache and Venable to publish
a gazette, for unfortunately "the people of Virginia were not
incorruptible and offices there as elsewhere were acceptable", so that
the situation was neither safe nor satisfactory. To William Greene he
wrote a truly splendid letter on "progress" in which he expressed his
belief "with Condorcet, that man's mind is perfectible to a degree of
which we cannot as yet form any conception", and predicted limitless
discoveries in the field of science. The present convulsions could only
be temporary, for it was impossible, he maintained, that "the enthusiasm
characterizing America should lift its parricidal hand against freedom
and science. This would be such a monstrous phenomenon as I cannot place
among possible things in this age and in this country."
At the same time he was not unmindful of keeping in complete harmony the
heterogeneous elements of the party just being formed. He strove to
placate Callender who, jealous of Bache, was writing epileptic letters
to complain of the whole universe, and asking at the same time that
Jefferson should send him some money, as he was short of funds.[383]
John Taylor, who was planning to declare void and unconstitutional laws
adopted by Congress, and to call together a convention to appoint a
dictator, had to be told to "forbear to push on to this ultimate
effort."[384] Much preferable was the work undertaken by Randolph in
presenting a legal refutation of the Federalist attitude towards the
foundation of law, and the similar document on which Wilson Nicholas was
working.[385]
All this time Jefferson was haunted by the fear that his letters would
fall into the hands of his enemies. To the few communications he wrote
during the later part of the summer, he did not even dare to put his
signature, "the omission of which has been rendered almost habitual with
me by the necessity of the post office; indeed the period is now
approaching during which I shall discontinue writing letters as much as
possible, knowing that every snare will be used to get hold of what may
be perverted."[386] He came to the point that on Monroe's advice he had
to refuse to see Madison in order to "avoid the appearance of a
collusion between them."[387]
At the beginning of December he was back in Philadelphia for the session
of Congress and soon after was able to send reassuring news to Monroe
who had become one of his "grand electors." Those who persist in
thinking him a dreamy idealist must read the letters he wrote between
January and May, 1800; not only did he keep his hand on the pulse of the
country, but he calculated the changes of the Republicans in every State
and figured out to a unit the possible number of votes they would
receive in the coming election. He knew the situation too well not to
admit that he was the natural choice of the Republicans even before any
census was held, and very early in January acknowledged it to Monroe:
Perhaps it will be thought I ought in delicacy to be silent on the
subject. But you, who know me, know that my private gratification
would be most indulged by that issue, which should leave me most at
home. If anything supersedes this propensity, it is merely the desire
to see this government brought back to its republican principles.
Consider this as written to Mr. Madison as much as yourself; and
communicate it, if you think it will do any good, to those possessing
our joint confidence, or any others where it may be useful and
safe.[388]
He was undoubtedly sincere in disclaiming any ambition, but under the
circumstances he was bound to observe a certain reticence, being the
President of the Senate, next to Adams in the Government and yet Adams'
adversary in the next election. But in his letters he made no pretense
of false modesty and frankly mentioned time and again what he called
"our ticket." Yet he was not the man who could ever give all his energy
to a single task, and absorbing as were his political preoccupations he
showed during the summer of 1800 as much versatility as ever. He took up
again the transformation of William and Mary College, this time to make
a real university of the old institution. He wrote to Priestley to send
him a good plan of reorganization and a few weeks later to Du Pont de
Nemours who composed for him his "Plan of a National Education."[389]
With Colonel Benjamin Hawkins he discussed the desirability of studying
the language and customs of the Indians, while there was still
time.[390] He was thinking of compiling a volume on the "Morals of
Jesus" and discussed religion with Bishop Madison who intended to write
a book to prove that the Christian religion, "rightly understood and
carried into full effect, would establish a pure Democracy over the
world. Its main pillars are--Equality, Fraternity, Justice, Universal
Benevolence."[391]
At the same time he was keeping close watch on the news coming from
France and on political developments in Congress. Rumors circulated that
a new revolution had taken place in Paris and that Bonaparte was at the
head of it. This was a wonderful opportunity to test out by actual
experience the disadvantage of a directory or executive committee as
compared with a single executive in a republic.[392] From what he knew
of the French character, he did not believe that a monarchy could be
reestablished in France, for "If Bonaparte declares for Royalty, either
in his own person, or that of Louis XVIII, he has but a few days to
live. In a nation of so much enthusiasm, there must be a million
Brutuses who will devote themselves to death to destroy him." But a few
days later he had come to the conclusion that it was probably what
Bonaparte had done, and what had been done in France could probably be
done in America when our Bonaparte, surrounded by his comrades in arms,
may step in to give us political salvation in his way. One thing was
certain, however: Bonaparte had clearly demonstrated that he had no
brains, no creative and constructive mind; and, with the pride of a man
who was engaged in a stupendous experiment, Jefferson pitilessly
criticized the Napoleonic reconstruction of France: "Whenever he has
meddled we have seen nothing but fragments of the old Roman government
stuck into materials with which they can form no cohesion; we see the
bigotry of an Italian to the ancient splendor of his country, but
nothing which bespeaks a luminous view of rational government."[393]
To his friend Samuel Adams, who had written him at the end of January,
he repeated the same judgment in less striking but perhaps even harsher
terms:
I fear our friends on the other side of the water, laboring in the
same cause, have yet a great deal of crime and misery to wade
through. My confidence has been placed in the head not in the heart
of Bonaparte. I hoped he would calculate truly the difference between
the fame of a Washington and a Cromwell. Whatever the views may be,
he has at least transferred the destinies of the republic from the
civil to the military arm. Some will use this as a lesson against the
practicability of republican government. I read in it a lesson
against the danger of standing armies.[394]
No more patent demonstration could be desired of the fact that in his
judgments of the French Revolution, Jefferson was at all times
influenced by the possible effects that European examples might have on
the American crisis. The precedent established by Bonaparte was a very
dangerous one and might put similar ambitions into the head of an
unscrupulous schemer. Whether he really believed or not that there was
such an immediate danger for America, and that Hamilton had really such
intentions, is an entirely different question. Probably he did not
himself know. He only felt that a permanent army would constitute a
permanent temptation and consequently a permanent danger, for he had
only limited faith in the virtue of individual man, although he
continued to believe in the wisdom of the collectivity.
Domestic matters and other more immediate preoccupations were no less
worthy of attention. He followed very closely every measure proposed in
the House on the coming elections, on the voting procedure to be
adopted, and anxiously studied the political forecasts. The situation
was decidedly on the mend. This appears clearly in the attitude of the
Federalists towards him, not only in public but also in private. For
Madison he wrote a very elaborate review of the comparative strength of
the two parties in all the States of the Union; he saw that the key
States were Pennsylvania, Jersey and New York, the other States being
equally divided, and he concluded that "Upon the whole the issue was
still very doubtful." But officially one had to maintain a confident
attitude.[395]
When April came, he thought that it would be desirable for the
Republicans to come out with a public declaration, stating their
program and their ideals. "As soon as it can be depended on," he said,
"we must have a Declaration of the principles of the Constitution, in
the nature of a Declaration of Rights, in all points in which it has
been violated."[396]
If the plan had been put to execution we would have had the first
presidential "platform" as early as 1800, and Jefferson would thus have
hastened the formation of distinct political parties. But more
commonplace measures were not to be neglected. Discussing the situation
in North Carolina, still a very doubtful State, he advised that "the
medicine for that State must be very mild and secretly administered. But
nothing should be spared to give them true information." We would like
Jefferson better if he had shown more discrimination in the choice of
the men selected to disseminate this true information. For at that time,
at least, he was still employing Callender in Richmond--an amusing
scoundrel not much better than Cobbet, the Peter Porcupine of the
Federalists. But Callender was a useful tool, who was doing his utmost
to publish the second volume of the _Prospect_ and to catch up with
Federalist propaganda. One could condone much in a man then writing: "I
had entertained the romantic hope of being able to overtake the Federal
Government in its career of iniquity. But I am now satisfied that they
can _act_ much faster than I _can write_ after them."[397]
Fortunately he had the approval and indorsement of much more respectable
characters. Samuel Adams had already written him; then it was John
Dickinson, the Revolutionary hero, who wrote, when sending his thanks
for a copy of the late "Resolutions of the Legislature of Virginia": "It
is an inestimable contribution to the cause of Liberty.... How
incredible was it once, and how astonishing is it now, that every
measure and every pretense of the stupid and selfish Stuarts, should be
adopted by the posterity of those who fled from this madness and tyranny
to the distant wilds of America."[398]
Such letters, the congratulations of George Wythe, who urged him to
publish the "Manual of Parliamentary Practice", those of Pendleton, who
consented to revise the final text and to "freely cast his mite into the
treasury", were indeed balm on the wounds made by the fierce attacks of
the Federalist press.[399]
The end of the session was approaching and the most earnest desire of
the Federalists was to adjourn as soon as possible, for fear that the
envoys to France should announce the conclusion of a treaty. Their power
seemed on the wane, but Jefferson was still very doubtful of ultimate
victory. To Livingston he wrote that his knowledge of the art, industry,
and resources of the other party did not permit him to be prematurely
confident. The tide had turned, to be sure, and the Federalists were
losing ground constantly, but the main question whether "that would
insure a Republican victory was still undecided and it might take one or
two elections more."[400]
Congress adjourned on May 14. During the session congressional caucuses
had nominated for the Federalists John Adams, and General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina; the choice of the Republicans
could only be Jefferson, and for candidate to the vice presidency they
selected Aaron Burr of New York.
In the course of the summer, Adams and his wife moved to the new Federal
City laid out by Major Lenfant, which boasted of one tavern, the
Capitol, the President's house, and a few boarding houses,--a capital in
the midst of the woods, in a veritable wilderness of trees, with
impassable paths,--a town unable to lodge Congress except at Georgetown,
which was connected with the new city by a clay road. Jefferson,
according to his custom, had hurried back to his "farm" and was
apparently absorbed by his domestic occupations, his children, and
grandchildren.
During the whole campaign he remained almost absolutely silent, not
daring to write, because his letters might have been intercepted and
used against him, receiving few visitors and reading without comment the
newspapers filled with the insults and abuse of the Federalists. He
broke his silence on few occasions, but these occasions are worth
studying in some detail. In a letter to Monroe, written from Eppington,
he discussed the best plans for assisting Callender, then jailed under
the Sedition Act, who "should be substantially defended whether
privately or publicly" and whose case should be laid before the
legislature.[401] These efforts did not avail since in August the
publicist wrote from his Richmond jail that he was in very bad health
"owing to the stink of the place."[402] There is not much that can be
said for Callender, and Jefferson might have better chosen his friends;
but when one reflects on the accusations commonly circulated against
Jefferson at the time, the interest taken by the Republican leader in
the pamphleteer seems less astonishing. If Callender had certainly
insulted Adams and Hamilton, had not the Reverend Cotton Mather Smith
accused Jefferson of "having robbed a widow and fatherless children of
an estate of which he was executor?" To Gideon Granger, who had called
his attention to the attacks of the clergyman, Jefferson easily
justified himself and seized the opportunity to discuss with his friend
a problem of general politics of far greater importance. It had very
little to do with the details of the election and for his remarkable
capacity to rise above contingencies Jefferson truly deserves the title
of "political philosopher." To incidents which he deemed without
permanent significance he paid little attention, but when dealing with
a phenomenon which seemed to him to indicate an important change in the
orientation of national policies, he always tried to penetrate beyond
the surface and reach the core of the question.
The thing that now disturbed him more than the possible victory of Adams
and Pinckney was the fact that political divisions seemed to correspond
to a geographical division. Not without reason had he written to Colonel
Benjamin Hawkins: "those who knew us only from 1775 to 1793 can form no
better idea of us than of the inhabitants of the moon."[403] The North
and the South had never been in complete harmony; economically they were
different and had different interests, but something new had developed
during the seven or eight years just passed. There was evidently a rift
in the Union; on several occasions talks of secession had been heard.
These rumors did not correspond to any real danger, but if the elections
proved that the Union was formed of two solid blocks of States, if the
North remained Federalist and the South were Republican, the very
existence of the nation would be put in question. Yet this seemed to be
a probable eventuality. In these circumstances, a victory of the South
would mean a defeat of the North, the country would be divided against
itself and the Union would be destroyed. This was particularly to be
feared if the powers of the Federal Government were enlarged. Leaving
aside all question of principle as to the moral merit of the questions
under dispute, Jefferson tried to show, on the one hand, that it was
impossible ever to organize a centralized form of government for the
simple reason that the United States were too big and covered a
territory much too large. If a centralized government were established
on paper, it would be necessary to have many agents of the Federal
Government with extensive powers distributed over all the States, and
because of their very remoteness they would be beyond the possibility
of continuous control. This could only mean corruption, plunder, and
waste. On the other hand, since on fundamental questions it was
impossible to bring into accord the North and the South, the true and
only remedy was to minimize the chances of conflict and to reduce to a
minimum the powers and attributes of the Federal Government. "The true
theory of our Constitution is surely the wisest and best, that the
States are independent as to everything within themselves, and united as
to everything respecting foreign nations." Once more, therefore, he came
back to the original theory of 1776 that, in forming a social compact,
liberty is exchanged for security and only those rights are given up
which the members of the new society have not full power to enforce.
Thus his theory of State rights was not only well founded in theory but
proved by practice and experience. Any other system would almost
necessarily conduce to a secession. The man who wrote these lines in the
summer of 1800, more than half a century before the Civil War, was
certainly not an ordinary politician; his was the clear farsightedness
of a great statesman and true political philosopher.
Furthermore, in the controversy which had been going on since 1793,
Jefferson had been submitted to fierce criticism on every possible
ground: as he wrote to McGregory, "the floodgates of calumny had been
opened upon him." It had been particularly distressing to him to see
that the religious issue had been injected into politics. There is no
doubt that his Bill for Religious Freedom proceeded, not from hostility
to religion, but from a deep and sincere conviction, reached after
careful study of the evidence available that "in law" there ought to be
no connection between the Church and the State and that if any had ever
been established, it was due to monkish fabrications and usurpations.
That he had turned against himself some of the Episcopalian clergy of
Virginia was quite natural, but before he went to France these attacks
were necessarily limited and did not extend beyond the borders of the
State or take the aspect of a national question.
When, on the contrary, he began to be criticized for his supposed foible
for the French Revolution, such attacks became far more pressing. The
excesses of the Revolution were attributed to the infidel doctrines of
the French philosophers; and, being "contaminated" by French political
philosophy, Jefferson was naturally accused of having brought back from
France its atheism. These views received confirmation when he befriended
Volney and Priestley, one a confirmed atheist, as Priestley himself had
demonstrated, the other a Unitarian--which in the eyes of the orthodox
clergy was possibly worse. The attacks from the pulpit became more
numerous, and a clergyman of New York, a close friend of Hamilton, even
published a pamphlet entitled "The voice of Warning to Christians on
ensuing election", in which Jefferson was accused of having answered to
a certain Doctor Smith, who expressed his surprise at the condition of a
church: "It is good enough for Him who was born in a manger."
Considering, on the other hand, that a large portion of the clergy were
enrolled under the Federalist banner, Jefferson had come to the
conclusion that the clergy had "a very favorite hope of obtaining an
establishment of a particular form of Christianity through the United
States; and as every sect believes its own form the true one, every one
perhaps hopes for his own, especially the Episcopalians and the
Congregationalists." Whether this was so absolutely untrue or
impossible, as some historians seem to believe, is a question far too
difficult to answer and one which probably cannot be solved. On the face
of things it does seem that there was in it a grain of truth, for no
human organization, whether ecclesiastical or civil, ever relinquishes
voluntarily the smallest particle of power or prestige.
One thing, however, is certain: if Jefferson had said the word, the
religious issue would have been injected into the campaign; and some of
his friends, believing that "Christianity was the strong ground of
Republicanism", were urging him to give his consent, for it was only
necessary for "Republicanism to ally itself to the Christian religion,
to overturn all the corrupted political and religious institutions in
the world."[404] But this was for Jefferson a forbidden subject. He had
"sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of
tyranny over the mind of man"; he had formed "a view of the subject
which ought to displease neither the rational Christian nor the Deists
and would reconcile many to a character they have too hastily rejected";
but this was not the time or the place to discuss matters that ought to
be reserved for a calm and dispassionate discussion between friends, so
he refused to authorize the publication of any statement referring to
his religious views.[405]
In the meantime the political campaign was going on and the Federalists'
affairs were assuming a decidedly unhealthy complexion. How this
happened is a story of extraordinary intrigue and machination, already
told several times and still a delight to historians fond of studying
political deals. To a large extent the victory of the Republicans was
due to divisions in the Federalist camp and it came to pass that no
other man did more than Hamilton to assure Jefferson's success. From the
beginning, the former leader of the Federalists had set himself against
Adams, employing every effort to have Pinckney receive the first place
in the nomination. The first sign of a Federalist defeat appeared in New
York State, where Burr had his headquarters and had so cleverly
maneuvered things that the State went Republican at the April election.
This was a personal defeat for Hamilton and also a terrible blow to the
Federalists. Then Adams went into one of those fits of anger which make
him such a picturesque figure; he decided that he had been betrayed by
his Cabinet, summarily dismissed his Secretary of War, McHenry, and
offered Pickering an opportunity to resign, which the Secretary of State
did not choose to take. Thereupon the President informed him that he
"discharged him from further service in the Cabinet." He then called
into the Cabinet John Marshall of Virginia as Secretary of State and
Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts as Secretary of War. From that time on,
the political campaign reads as if the leaders of the Federalists had
really lost their heads. Hamilton bent all his efforts towards holding
another election in New York and, failing in that, towards preventing
Adams from obtaining a majority. The affair culminated in the
publication of a pamphlet, entitled "The true conduct and character of
John Adams, Esq. President of the United States", pointing out the
weakness of Adams' character. The pamphlet was intended for private
distribution, but it found its way into the hands of the Republicans;
Aaron Burr had parts of it printed in the _New London Bee_ and the whole
was soon to be given to the public. When the whole pamphlet came out, it
added more fuel to the raging controversy. This is only one incident,
but not the least significant, among the many so vividly related by Mr.
Bowers.
The electoral colleges met in each State on December 4. Returns came in
slowly to Washington but by the thirteenth it was known, in so far as
could be, that the Federalists were defeated; it also appeared that
there was a tie between the two Republican candidates. At this juncture
Jefferson, who had remained perfectly silent, took the matter in hand
and calmly assumed that he would be elected. To Robert R. Livingston,
brother of Edward Livingston who was a member of Congress from New York,
Jefferson wrote a letter congratulating him on his communications to the
American Philosophical Society and discussing quite seriously the
discovery "of some large bones supposed to be of the mammoth" in the
vicinity of New York. Then, as in an afterthought, he mentioned the
political situation. The matter of the election was as good as settled:
"We may, therefore, venture to hazard propositions on that hypothesis
without being justly subjected to raillery or ridicule." "To put the
vessel on a Republican tack", they would require the entire cooeperation
of "men who could at once inspire the nation with perfect confidence in
their honesty and talents", and Jefferson asked Livingston whether he
would not assume the Secretaryship of the Navy. That in his own mind he
considered the election well over appears in the sentence in which he
speaks, not as a candidate but as the leader of his party, and as if no
other hypothesis could enter his mind: "Though I have been too honorably
placed in front of those who are to enter the breach so happily made,
yet the energies of every individual are necessary, and in the very
place where his energies can most serve the enterprise."[406]
The next day he wrote in the same vein to Aaron Burr to congratulate him
in no uncertain terms on his election as Vice President, expressing his
regrets that this distinction would prevent him from availing himself of
the services of Burr in the Cabinet. He based his conclusion on the
assurance he had received that South Carolina would withdraw one vote
from Burr, that Smith of Tennessee would give its second vote to
Gallatin. It was also surmised that the vote of Georgia would not be
entire. This would leave Burr well ahead of Adams but decidedly in the
second place. Jefferson indicated that several of the Federalists had
expressed the hope that "the two Republican tickets may be equal" and in
that case they expected to prevent a choice by the House and "let the
Government devolve on a President of the Senate." Then came a gently
insinuating sentence: "Decency required that I should be so entirely
passive during the late contest that I have never once asked whether
arrangements had been made to prevent so many from dropping votes
intentionally, as might frustrate half the Republican wish; nor did I
doubt till lately that such had been made." In the last paragraph,
Jefferson, refusing even to consider that Burr might aspire to the
presidency, indicated that he considered the matter as settled and
firmly put Burr where he belonged:
While I must congratulate you, my dear Sir, on the issue of this
contest, because it is more honorable, and doubtless more grateful to
you than any station within the competence of the chief magistrate,
yet for myself, and for the substantial service of the public,
I feel most sensibly the loss we sustain of your aid in the new
administration. It leaves a chasm in my arrangements, which cannot
be adequately filled up.
If we put things together, the letter of Jefferson certainly meant first
that the time had come to make some "arrangements" to thwart the schemes
of the Federalists; second, that a tie was almost certain, and finally
that it was up to Burr to declare that he was not running for the
presidency.
This conclusion is all the more probable because three days later,
writing to John Breckenridge, Jefferson did not mention again Georgia
and Tennessee, but declared that "we are brought into a dilemma by the
probable equality of the two Republican candidates." Then he added: "The
Federalists in Congress mean to take advantage of this, and either to
prevent an election altogether, or reverse what has been understood to
have been the wishes of the people, as to the President and
Vice-President; wishes which the Constitution did not permit them
specially to designate."[407] Nothing could be clearer; it was to some
extent the situation of 1796, but reversed as to the candidates, and
Jefferson expected that Burr would do the right thing by him.
This, however, was not so obvious to Burr himself. The letter he sent in
reply to Jefferson must have been most disappointing in this respect.
The colonel side-stepped the issue, refused to come out frankly and did
not write a single line that could be constructed as an acceptance of
Jefferson's point of view. On December 31, Jefferson wrote to Tench Coxe
to express his opinion that an agreement between the two higher
candidates was their only hope "to prevent the dissolution of the
Government and a danger of anarchy, by an operation, bungling indeed and
imperfect, but better than letting the Legislature take the nomination
of the Executive entirely from the people."[408]
This could have been construed as a hint to Burr to give up his unavowed
hopes of becoming President. But Burr, who was in New York, could not
easily be communicated with and kept his sphinxlike silence. January
passed without Jefferson's finding any necessity of writing any
political letters. With Hugh Williamson he discussed the range of
temperature in Louisiana and whether the turkey was a native bird:[409]
with William Dunbar the temperature, Indian vocabularies and the origin
of the rainbow.
In February, however, he again wrote to Burr. He had been informed that
certain individuals were attempting "to sow tares between us that might
divide us and our friends." He assured Burr that he had never written
anything that could be regarded as injurious by his running mate; the
only time that he had discussed his conduct was in a letter to
Breckenridge written on December 18, in which he had expressed the
conviction that the wishes of the people were that he and not Burr be
President. That was a pure statement of fact at which no man could take
offense. This time, Burr apparently did not answer at all, and while the
House was preparing for the balloting, Jefferson discussed with Caspar
Wistar the bones found in the State of New York, "the vertebra, part of
the jaw, with two grinders, the tusks, which some have called the
horns, the sternum, the scapula, the tibia and fibula, the tarsus and
metatarsus, and even the phalanges and innominata."[410]
On the morning of the election and before going to the Capitol he wrote
to Tench Coxe: "Which of the two will be elected, and whether either, I
deem perfectly problematical: and my mind has long been equally made up
for either of the three events." This was on a Wednesday. After the
result of the election had been officially announced, the House retired
to proceed to the election of the President. Ballots were taken,
Jefferson receiving eight States, Burr six, nine being necessary to a
choice. The House stayed in continuous session till eight o'clock the
next morning, taking twenty-seven ballots without any change in the
results; members of the House dozing between ballots, snatching a bit of
sleep whenever they could, all of them admiring the fortitude of Joseph
N. Nicholson who, although sick in bed, had been brought to the House
and rested in a committee room, voting at each ballot. The House
adjourned until eleven o'clock on Friday and then took two successive
ballots without being able to break the deadlock. On Saturday three
ballots were taken without any change in the alignment, and they
adjourned until Monday. In the meantime passions were raging. The
Federalists had been told in no equivocal terms that, should they
attempt to have the Government devolve to some member of the present
administration, "the day such an act would pass, the Middle States would
arm" and that "no such usurpation would be tolerated even for a single
day."
On the other hand, Jefferson had been approached by the more sensible
heads of the Federalists, and apparently by Gouverneur Morris, who
stopped him as he was coming out from the Senate Chamber, and had
offered to influence one member of Vermont, provided he would declare:
"1. that he would not turn all the Federalists out of office; 2. that
he would not reduce the navy; and 3. would not wipe off the public
debt." To which Jefferson answered that he would not become President by
capitulation and would not make any declaration. Then he went to see
Adams, who seemed ready to approve of the choice of Jefferson as
President and who told him that he could have himself elected by
subscribing to conditions analogous to those indicated by Morris.
Finally he was visited in his room by Dwight Foster, senator from
Massachusetts, who also reiterated the same offer. These are,
undoubtedly, some of the maneuvers he mentioned on Sunday, the day of
rest, in a letter he wrote to Monroe: "Many attempts have been made to
obtain terms and promises from me, I have declared to them
unequivocally, that I would not receive the government on capitulation,
that I would not go into it with my hands tied."[411]
On Sunday and Monday parleyings went on, caucuses were held, and no
change was yet apparent. But on Tuesday morning an agreement was
reached. It was described by Jefferson himself as follows:
"Morris of Vermont withdrew, which made Lyon's vote that of his State.
The Maryland Federalists put in four blanks, which made the positive
ticket of their colleagues the vote of the State. South Carolina and
Delaware put in six blanks, so there were ten states for one candidate,
four for another, and two blanks." And the speaker of the House,
Theodore Sedgwick, one of Jefferson's bitterest enemies, was forced to
announce his election.
The letter he wrote to Monroe the same day is not a paean of triumph. The
long-disputed victory, the irreducibility of a large portion of the
Federalists, made him fearful lest the fight would soon renew.
Furthermore, Adams had at once started making new appointments,
naturally without consulting his successor; Bayard was nominated
plenipotentiary to the French Republic, "Theophilus Parsons, Attorney
General of the United States in the room of C. Lee, who, with Keith
Taylor _cum multis aliis_ are appointed judges under the new system. H.
G. Otis is nominated a District Attorney."[412]
On his side, Jefferson wrote at once to Henry Dearborn to offer him the
Secretaryship of War in his Cabinet and courteously communicated with
Dexter, Secretary of the Treasury, and Stoddart, Secretary of the Navy,
to thank them for their offer to conduct the affairs of their
departments pending the arrival of their successors. To a certain Major
William Jackson whom he did not know and who had written him to express
the fear that he would discriminate against commerce, he answered that
he "might appeal to evidences of his attention to the commerce and
navigation of our country in different stations connected with them."
This was an evident allusion to his mission to France and to the
activity he had displayed in defending the commercial interests of the
United States. He resented particularly the fact that he had been
represented as a friend to agriculture and an enemy to commerce, "the
only means of disposing of its products."[413] The true position of
Jefferson on this matter has already been pointed out in a preceding
chapter; but the fact that the letter was written the very day he was
notified of his election is proof enough that he already intended to
conciliate both the agricultural and the commercial interests of the
country. To the smoothing over of old differences of opinion he bent all
his efforts during the three weeks that separated him from his
inauguration. Bayard having refused his appointment to France, he
approached at once Robert R. Livingston, intending to give the
nomination to the Senate at the first opportunity. At the same time he
repeated that the great body of the Federalist troops was discouraged
and truly repentant, or disposed to come back into the fold. Those who
were so inclined should be received with open arms for "If we can once
more get social intercourse restored to its pristine harmony, I shall
believe we have not lived in vain; and that it may, by rallying them to
true Republican principles, which few of them had thrown off, I
sanguinely hope."[414]
He resigned from the Chair of the Senate on the twenty-eighth, and made
the necessary preparations for the inauguration. The ceremonies were to
be very simple but dignified. John Marshall, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, was asked by Jefferson himself to administer the oath,
and on March 4, 1801, the new President was inaugurated, while John
Adams, who had refused to welcome his successor, was starting on his way
to New England.
BOOK FIVE
_The Presidency_
CHAPTER I
"ALL REPUBLICANS, ALL FEDERALISTS"
The battle over, Jefferson's first and only desire seems to have been to
bring about a reunion of the former political opponents. He had hardly
been elected when he declared that he was not the choice of one party,
but that the analysis of the last ballot showed clearly that "the former
federalists have found themselves aggregated with us and that they are
in a state of mind to be aggregated with us."[415]
And this, much to the surprise and disappointment of the militants who
had fought the hard battle with him and for him, was the keynote of his
inaugural speech. Throwing overboard his former defense of the French
Revolution, he did not hesitate to attribute the political storm which
the ship had just weathered to the baneful influence of European
disturbances:
During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the
agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and
slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the
agitation of the billows would reach even this distant and peaceful
shore; that this should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But
every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have
called by different names brethren of the same principles.
Then came the final and definitive formula: "We are all republicans--we
are all federalists."
In more than one sense this was the most characteristic and the most
masterly of Jefferson's political utterances. The battle of Capitol Hill
was ended, the last streamers of smoke had floated away and America had
found herself: "a rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land,
traversing all the seas with the rich productions of her industry,
engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right,
advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eyes."
This was not written simply for effect and for the public eye. To
Monroe, Jefferson had declared that the policy of the new administration
would not be a policy of reprisals. The victory had been won partly
through the repentance of former Federalists who had seen their error,
and during the awful suspense of the week of the eleventh to the
seventeenth of February, had feared that the country would become a prey
to anarchy. These he welcomed back into the fold; the leaders, of
course, were irreconcilable, but the majority were to be forgiven, and
few removals from office were to be made on the ground of political
divergences of opinion. "Some, I know, must be made. They must be as few
as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or
inherent disqualification."[416]
Of the thousands of Federal officers in the United States, the President
estimated that not twenty would have to be removed, while in two or
three instances, officers removed by Mr. Adams for refusing to sign
addresses were to be restored. Jefferson realized that by so acting and
"stopping thus short in the career of removal" he would give offense to
many of his friends, and he added with some melancholy: "That torrent
has been pressing me heavily, and will require all my force to bear up
against; but my maxim is "fiat justitia, ruat caelum."[417]
All this sounds perfectly sincere and true. Even the most superficial
consideration of Jefferson's life would convince any one that he was not
a man of vindictive character. By nature a pacifier and a harmonizer,
nothing would have been farther from his program than to revive the old
fires and to prolong party strifes. But if it takes only one to declare
war, it takes two to make peace, and the defeated party was in no
peaceful mood. Hamilton was removed from the scene, and the form of
government was apparently definitively settled by the election of
Jefferson, but the Federalists had not given up every hope; they were
still strongly intrenched and the battle went on during all of
Jefferson's administration. It was not so spectacular as the fight with
Hamilton, for the chief protagonist, John Marshall, lacked the dramatic
qualities of the former leader of the Federalists; but it was no less
momentous and no less important for the destinies of the United States.
When it came to actual removals, however, difficulties arose
immediately. Whether in all cases Jefferson was rightly advised or
inspired is open to question. The wisdom of appointing Samuel Bishop, a
man of "sound understanding, pure integrity and unstained character", as
collector of New Haven may be doubted, and there was something
undeniably worth considering in the protest of New Haven merchants, that
a man seventy-seven years old was unfit for such an office. The incident
in itself was paltry, but the letter written by the President in answer
to the protest put once again into light that curious mixture of
theoretical idealism and practical political sense so remarkable in
Jefferson. After all, the Federalists had begun with filling every
office with their partisans and it was necessary to reestablish a just
balance, even if some individuals had to suffer. If the rights of the
minority could not be ignored, the majority had its rights also and
could not submit to the monopoly claimed by the Federalists: "Total
exclusions," concluded the President, "call for prompt corrections. I
shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy to that
state of things, when only questions concerning a candidate shall be, is
he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?"[418] In
other words, Jefferson was not ready to proclaim the principle so
frankly avowed later "to the victor belong the spoils." His principle
was and remained absolutely different. But he considered that he was
confronted by a situation which had to be remedied without any delay,
and in his behavior he reminds one in some way of the French publicist
who, although theoretically opposed to the death penalty, declared,
"_Que messieurs les assassins commencent_!" Certainly this is not the
pure and exalted morality of the political philosopher, but neither is
it the cynical attitude of the political "boss", and one may wonder how
many men who have occupied high offices would stand better than
Jefferson in this respect if documents were available and could be
subjected to the same scrutiny.
The fact remains, however, that during the battle from which he had come
out victorious, Jefferson had to employ and sometimes associate with men
whose character was not absolutely spotless. The presence of Aaron Burr
in the government was already a thorn in his side. It was also
particularly unfortunate that he had given aid and assistance to
Callender, whose scurrilous attacks against Adams went far beyond a
legitimate discussion of public utterances and actions of a man at the
head of the government. Callender had been sentenced under the Sedition
Act to a term in jail and liberated by Jefferson with all the other
victims of the act when he took office. It was even more unfortunate
that the pamphlet of Callender, "The Prospect Before Us", was reprinted
under a modified title as the "History of the Administration of John
Adams" more than a year after the new administration had taken hold of
things. It was also regrettable that the son of John Adams should have
been removed from office after the election. Soon after the death of
Jefferson's younger daughter, Mrs. Adams, who had befriended the little
girl when she arrived in London all alone in 1787, wrote to the bereaved
father to express her sympathy. Jefferson took the opportunity to
reassert his personal friendship for John Adams. He could not help
mentioning, however, that one act of Adams' administration he had to
consider as personally unkind, his last appointment to office of
Jefferson's most ardent political enemies.[419] This letter called for
an answer, and Mrs. Adams was not a woman to miss an opportunity to
express her husband's views and her own on the removal of Federal judges
and particularly of John Quincy. Thus Jefferson was led to write a final
letter in which he expressed more clearly than he had done anywhere else
his opinion on the judiciary and on the place it should occupy in the
general scheme of government. To understand this letter fully it is
necessary to go back to the beginnings of Jefferson's administration.
The original draft of Jefferson's message to Congress, December 8, 1801,
contained a paragraph which, after more mature reflection, the President
decided to omit "as capable of being chicaned, and furnishing something
to the opposition to make a handle of."[420] In it Jefferson held the
theory that the three powers existing in any government had been
distributed among three equal authorities, constituting each a check on
one or both the others. The President asserted that each of these three
branches of the government had a right "to decide on the validity of an
act according to its own judgment and uncontrouled by the opinions of
any other department." According to this theory, even if opposition
developed among different departments, no permanent ill could ensue,
since at the next election the people were at liberty to refuse to
reelect those whose interpretation seemed erroneous.
Jefferson's disapproval of the Sedition Act had been known for a long
time; he had a right to assume that his election meant that the people
approved of his position and to make this declaration:
On mature deliberation, in the presence of the nation, and under
the tie of the solemn oath which binds me to them and to my duty,
I do declare that I hold that act in palpable and unqualified
contradiction to the constitution, considering it then as a nullity,
I have relieved from oppression under it those of my fellow citizens
who were within the reach of the functions confided to me.
In its final form the message was far less provocative. It simply
contained the statement that "the judiciary system ... and especially
that portion of it recently enacted, will, of course, present itself to
the contemplation of Congress." But the Federalists and particularly
Marshall were not placated by this apparent moderation; they knew that
the assault against the judiciary was about to begin. The debate between
Federalists and Republicans had already been transferred to another
ground.
No better account of it can be found than the chapters written on the
subject by Albert J. Beveridge in his "Life of Marshall." It must be
remembered, however, that Beveridge's account was necessarily colored by
his own political views, as were the views of most historians of the
subject.[421] One of the first episodes of the battle was the repeal of
the Judiciary Act passed in 1801 by the Federalists, in order to
reorganize the Supreme Court and to increase the number of Federal
judges. This was immediately followed by the impeachment of Judge
Pickering, the deposition of Judge Addison by the Senate of
Pennsylvania, and the famous decision given by Marshall on "Marbury
versus Madison." These incidents were of unequal importance and
significance. It was recognized by Pickering's friends and family that
the judge was half-demented and for several years had been unable to
fulfill his duties. But since the Act of 1801 had been repealed, no one
seemed to have authority at the time to remove the judge from office.
The Pickering case simply provided the Republicans with an opportunity
to test out their favorite contention, that impeachment was unrestricted
and could be enforced against any officer of the government deemed
undesirable by two thirds of the Senate.
Of far greater importance was the decision of Marshall in "Marbury
versus Madison." The senior member of the Supreme Court formulated on
this occasion a doctrine on the powers of the Court which, although
never written in the Constitution, was to obtain final recognition and
which to this day had remained one of the many unwritten laws of the
land. Another most curious situation this, so disconcerting to
historians and observers trained in the principles of Roman law, but
often recurring in American politics and administrative life. The case
itself was of no importance. Marbury was one of the "midnight judges"
whose commission, signed by Adams, had been withheld by Madison, on the
theory that the powers of the former President to make appointments had
really expired, not on the third of March, 1801, at midnight, but on the
day his successor was elected. It was maintained by the administration
that the commission not having been delivered Marbury had no right to
take office and to sit on the bench. Marbury had appealed to the Supreme
Court, but the sessions of the Court being suspended for fourteen months
by Congress, Marshall had at first no opportunity to declare himself
publicly on the matter.
When he finally passed on the case, the Chief Justice saw at once that
his hour had come, and gave his definition of the powers of the Court in
its relation to the executive and the legislative. Curiously enough, as
Beveridge remarked, the matter had never before come up and would have
remained undecided for a long time, if this particular juncture had not
made it a question of paramount importance for the destinies of the
country. Briefly summed up, the theory of Marshall, shorn of its legal
phraseology, was this: The happiness of the American people rested on
certain principles embodied in the Constitution. These principles could
not be altered by legislation; if, however, the legislative passed a law
evidently contrary to the Constitution, there must be for the individual
some recourse, some means of asserting his rights. In cases where
Congress adopts laws contrary to the Constitution, these laws must be
void. On this principle Jefferson and Marshall were in complete
agreement. But from that point on they differed widely. The next
question was to determine where does the power rest to declare a law
unconstitutional? With the Executive and even with the States, Jefferson
had first declared in his draft of 1801. With the Supreme Court,
answered Marshall; for this is essentially a judicial function. Under
this construction, the Constitution remains the supreme law of the land,
but it is within the powers attributed by the Constitution to the
judiciary, for the Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of
an act passed by the legislature. Thus the Court is not placed above the
Constitution, but its judges stand as the keepers and interpreters of
the superior law of the country.
Jefferson did not engage directly in a controversy with Marshall and
held his peace. But, as he was wont, he seized another opportunity to
express his views on the subject, and he did it in his letter written to
Mrs. Adams on September 11, 1804. In this, he maintained that "nothing
in the Constitution has given the judges a right to decide for the
Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both
magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to
them." Judges believing a law to be constitutional have a right to pass
sentences. But "the Executive believing the law to be unconstitutional
were bound to remit the execution of it; because that power has been
confided to them by the Constitution." What he did not say on this
occasion, but repeated on many others, was that, the ultimate source of
authority resting in the people, it was for the people to decide at the
next election in case a conflict of interpretation should arise between
any of the three branches of the government. In case of a conflict
between the judiciary and the legislative, however, impeachment
proceedings could be initiated and judges removed in a regular and,
according to him, perfectly constitutional way.
It must be recognized here that the position taken by Jefferson was
perfectly logical, far more logical than the interpretation given out by
Marshall. Whether Jefferson's theory would have worked out
satisfactorily is quite another matter. It is only too evident that
perfectly logical constructions do not always fit the complexity and
contradictions of human affairs. The system of democracy which was
Jefferson's ideal at that time might have worked in the case of a New
England town meeting; it would have been more difficult to apply to the
government of a State. In the case of a large and growing federation of
States, it would have injected into presidential and congressional
elections constant elements of discord and bitterness. Thus the cost of
liberty would not have been eternal vigilance, but eternal strife and
political dissensions.
It may even be doubted whether Jefferson would ever have entertained
such an extreme theory if at that time he had not been moved by
immediate considerations. He had come to see in the judiciary, as it was
constituted after the appointments made by Adams, an institution
endangering the very life of the Republic. As for Marshall, who had
hurled a challenge at the executive and the legislative branches of the
government, it had to be ascertained whether some means could not be
found to remove him from office.
That such was the ultimate intent of the Republican leaders was
understood generally when proceedings were started to impeach Judge
Chase of the Supreme Court. As in the case of Pickering, the
Republicans had carefully selected the card they intended to play. Was
he not the very man who had sentenced Fries to the gallows and Callender
to jail, who had been relentless in his application of the Sedition Act
and in the prosecution of Republicans? He had finally, and this was the
immediate ground for his impeachment, bitterly criticized from the bench
the repeal of the Federal judiciary act, and predicted that the country
would be enslaved by mob tyranny and that soon "they would all establish
the worst kind of government known to man."
The impeachment proceedings took place in the Senate room elaborately
decorated for the occasion with a display of crimson, green, and blue
cloth draping the rows of benches and the sections reserved for the
heads of departments, foreign ministers, members of the House, and the
general public. The Senate convened to hear the case on February 4,
1805, and for almost a month all other business was practically
suspended. But it was far more than the fate of a single judge which was
going to be decided. On the decision of the Senate hung not only the
future of the Constitution but probably the fate of the Union. For New
England had already on several occasions threatened secession; the North
resented what was already termed "Virginia tyranny", and it was to be
feared that these feelings of disaffection might be strengthened. It was
also the most exciting ceremony the new capital had yet witnessed, and
the formalities of the proceedings, the effort to clothe them with
dignity and solemnity, presented a strange contrast with the uncouth
appearance of the city itself, with its ramshackle boarding houses, its
muddy streets, and surrounding wilderness.
The debates provided a rare occasion for an extraordinary display of
American eloquence. This is not one of the least surprises to a student
of American civilization, to discover the taste of the people as a whole
for oratory and the remarkable gift of American orators for long
speeches, even in the early days. Scarcely less surprising was the
capacity of American audiences to listen patiently for long hours and
with apparent interest to discussions and debates. It seems as if the
gift attributed by Caesar to the Gauls of old had been transferred to the
new continent and to a people racially much different. Oratory was to a
certain extent a new art, for few occasions were offered in the colonial
times for long political speeches; but even in the early days of the
Revolution, born orators appeared and since that time have filled the
legislative halls with an inexhaustible flow of eloquence. This is said
without the least irony and merely as another illustration of the danger
of generalizing when discussing national characteristics. To the point
these speeches were, perhaps, but they were not short by any means. A
careful study of the development of the American school of oratory would
certainly repay a specialist in the history of public speaking.
During the session, the oratorical stars were Luther Martin of Maryland,
who spoke for Chase, and John Randolph, who summed up the case for the
administration. It appeared, however, when the final vote was taken,
that Jefferson had not been able to keep his party in hand. There were
thirty-four senators, of whom nine were Federalists and twenty-five
Republicans. Twenty-two votes were necessary to convict, but the
administration was able to muster only sixteen for impeachment, and on
one count Chase was proved unanimously "not guilty." For the time being
John Marshall was safe, and the acquittal of Chase was undoubtedly a
personal defeat for the President.
This wound to his _amour-propre_ was compensated by the success of the
last election. Jefferson had been reelected without opposition; the
strength of the Federalists as a separate party had dwindled to the
vanishing point, and only three days separated him from the beginning of
his second term. But everybody understood that the matter at issue had
not been settled and that another test would have to be made. The very
day Chase was acquitted, John Randolph introduced a resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution, to the effect that "The judges of the
Supreme Court, and of all other courts of the United States, shall be
removed by the President on the joint addresses of both Houses of
Congress requesting the same, anything in the Constitution of the United
States notwithstanding." This was referred to a committee and, as
Congress had only three more days to sit, it was decided by sixty-eight
votes against thirty-three that the motion would be made the order of
the day for the first Monday in December.
The assault against the judiciary constitutes one of the most striking
episodes of Jefferson's first administration and has received its due
share at the hands of American historians. It must not be forgotten,
however, that even in other respects the President had no easy sailing.
The friend of Priestley, Thomas Cooper, Volney, and Thomas Paine
continued to be represented in the press and in the public as the
champion of infidelity. The President could not engage in any
controversy in order to justify himself but, according to his favorite
methods, he encouraged his friends to hit back, and he became more and
more convinced that the intrusion of the churches into politics was one
of the worst evils that could befall any country. He soon came to the
conclusion that many members of the clergy were unworthy to speak in the
name of the great teacher; that the Christian doctrine had degenerated
in their hands, and that no true religion could long exist when it was
intrusted to the priests. Hence the many expressions of his preference
for the Quakers so often found in his correspondence.
The mild and simple principles of the Christian philosophy would
produce too much calm; too much regularity of good, to extract from
its disciples a support from a numerous priesthood, were they not to
sophisticate it, split it into hairs, and twist its texts till they
cover the divine morality of its author with mysteries, and require
the priesthood to explain them. The Quakers seem to have discovered
this. They have no priests, therefore no schisms. They judge of the
text by the dictates of common sense and common morality.[422]
The indignation of the Federalists and the clergy reached a paroxysm
when it was discovered that the President had not only invited Paine to
come to America but had even promised him passage on a public vessel.
For Paine was no longer remembered as the eloquent political writer who
in prophetic accents had celebrated the uniqueness of America's position
in the world. He was the detestable atheist who had participated in the
bloody excesses of the French Revolution--a wretch unworthy of being
thus honored by a Christian nation. Once more religion was injected into
politics. The President was bitterly reproved by the New England clergy
for having refused to proclaim days of fasting and thanksgivings as his
predecessors had done, and Jefferson, who would have preferred to let
sleeping dogs lie, had to come out and explain his position on an
alliance between "Church and State, under the authority of the
Constitution."[423]
That Jefferson, who was so restive under public criticism, suffered even
more than he dared admit appears in many passages of his letters. "Every
word of mine," he wrote to Mazzei, "which they can get hold of, however
innocent, however orthodox, is twisted, tormented, perverted, and like
the words of holy writ, are made to mean everything but what they were
intended to mean."[424] The whole subject is not an easy one to treat
and cannot be discussed here; but it would be very difficult to reach a
fair estimate of internal politics during Jefferson's first
administration if that element of hostility were entirely left out. We
can only express the hope that some day it will receive due attention.
An investigation of the New England papers and Church publications of
the time would undoubtedly bring to light many hidden currents of
hostility.
But, in spite of these difficulties, the new administration went ahead
with a program of political reforms of great moment. No tradition for
the respective duties of the Cabinet members and their relation to the
President had yet been established. Under Washington's administration
letters sent to the President were referred by him to the departments
concerned to be acted upon, and letters sent to the department heads
were submitted to the President with a proposed answer. Generally they
were sent back with his approbation; sometimes an alteration was
suggested, and when the subject was particularly important it was
reserved for a conference. In this manner Washington always was in
accurate possession of all facts and proceedings in all parts of the
Union. This procedure had been impossible to follow during Adams'
administration, owing to the long and habitual absences of the President
from the seat of government, and little by little the department heads
had assumed more and more responsibility, with the result that the
government had four different heads "drawing sometimes in different
directions." This usurpation of powers and this maladministration
Jefferson meant to end. In a very courteous, but very firm manner, he
reminded the members of the Cabinet that the President had been
intrusted with a certain set of duties incumbent upon him and for which
he was responsible before the public, and that he considered it
necessary to return to the procedure followed by Washington. What had
been an informal custom was to become a regular and official routine; it
entailed an enormous expenditure of time on the part of the President, a
great flexibility of mind, and a necessity of adapting himself to many
different problems in the course of one day. To a large extent,
Jefferson is responsible for placing on the shoulders of the chief
executive the enormous load under which several Presidents have broken
down.
This was not the most conspicuous reform introduced by Jefferson in the
plan of government, yet it was one of the most important. Of no less
consequence was the reform of the financial system of the United States.
The privilege of the bank had still several years to run, but many other
modifications could be introduced at once. Hamilton had multiplied the
number of internal taxes and at the same time the number of Federal
office-holders in order to strengthen his hold on the government. These
had to be done away with, as well as the abominable excise taxes which
had created so many difficulties under the preceding administrations.
They were at best a temporary expedient, to be resorted to only in case
of war, and the Federal Government had to make an effort to return to
the more orthodox system of bringing its expenditures within the limits
of revenue raised by taxes on importations. This was perfectly
consistent with Jefferson's theory of the State rights and the general
functions of the Federal Government. To substitute economy for taxation,
to reduce the debt as rapidly as possible, to keep down the expenses for
the navy and the army,--such was the policy of the new administration,
and in his second annual message on December 15, 1802, Jefferson could
point out with pleasure that "in the department of finance the receipts
of external duties for the last twelve months have exceeded those of any
former year." To care for the Louisiana Purchase, Gallatin recommended a
loan of $11,250,000, running for fifteen years and carrying a six per
cent. interest. But in his fourth message the President declared that
"the state of our finances continues to fulfill our expectations. Eleven
million and a half dollars received in the course of the year ending on
the thirtieth of September last, have enabled us, after meeting all the
ordinary expenses of the year, to pay upward of $3,600,000 of the public
debt, exclusive of interest." Thus it was amply demonstrated that the
financial structure of the Federal Government had not been endangered by
a departure from Hamilton's policies. It is worth noting also that
Jefferson's party, at that time, stood for a strong tariff, while the
last Federalists advocated internal taxes. In that respect, at least, it
is hardly possible to say that the present-day Democrats continue the
Jeffersonian policies.
This system, however, presented many advantages in the eyes of
Jefferson. In his first message he had made one of those many
declarations, so often found in official documents of the sort, by which
men in public life are wont to define their policies in almost sibylline
terms, so as to express their own aspirations and satisfy the members of
their party without arousing undue antagonism in an influential
minority. "Agriculture," he had written, "manufactures, commerce, and
navigation, the four pillars of our prosperity, are the most thriving
when left most free to individual enterprise." But at once he had added:
"Protection from casual embarrassments, however, may sometimes be
reasonably interposed. If in the course of your observations or
inquiries they should appear to need any aid within the limits of our
constitutional powers, your sense of their importance is a sufficient
assurance they will occupy your attention." This second statement could
only mean one thing, that the President was not ready to depart entirely
and radically from Hamilton's policy of giving encouragement to
manufactures. But there is no doubt that in his opinion America was to
remain essentially an agricultural nation. He still had before him the
vision of a large country in which every citizen would live on his own
land and from this land derive most of his subsistence instead of
congregating in large cities. It was a Vergilian vision magnified a
million times; it was based also to a large extent on his own experience
at Monticello where he had proved that it was possible to manufacture
tools, to bake bricks, to make furniture, and to maintain a
comparatively large family on the products of the soil. He was not ready
to antagonize openly those who dreamed of another future for America,
and he did not believe that he had a right to do so, since his duty was
to carry out the wishes of the people.
Jefferson was not the man to take the lead in these matters, but he was
not the man either to oppose any measure to encourage manufactures and
commerce that Congress would deem proper to adopt. On this point he had
not varied since the letter he had written from Paris to Hogendorp. His
preference for "an agricultural condition" remained largely theoretical,
sentimental, and personal. He may be considered as the leader of an
agrarian party, he may have felt in sympathy with the French
Physiocrats, but when it came to practice he acted very much like Du
Pont de Nemours himself who, in spite of his theories, spent all he had
to establish a tannery and a powder mill near Wilmington, and at the end
of his days proposed to the American Government a "Plan for the
Encouragement of Manufactures in America." If it is true that during
Jefferson's administration industrial and agricultural interests clashed
for the first time in America, I fail to see that the President made any
effort to favor agriculture at the expense of industry.
When the end of his first term approached, Jefferson did not need any
coercion to remain in the saddle for another period of four years. It
had already been decided that Aaron Burr would not and could not again
be a candidate, and George Clinton was chosen as running mate of
Jefferson. Never in the history of the United States was an election so
little contested: Jefferson obtained one hundred sixty-two electoral
votes while his opponent could only muster fourteen. The Republican
Party had really become the National party and the President had been
able to achieve political unity.
CHAPTER II
PROTECTIVE IMPERIALISM AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
The famous Inaugural Message of Jefferson gave more space to questions
of domestic politics than to foreign problems, but it contained a clear
definition of America's attitude towards Europe--a short and terse
statement in which the President reiterated the principles which had
guided him when Secretary of State. These were the same principles that
underlay the foreign policies of the United States from the early days
of the Revolution. They had already appeared in the Plan of Treaties
drawn up by Adams in 1776; they had been solemnly proclaimed by
Washington in his Farewell Address; and they still direct to a large
extent America's attitude in her dealings with foreign nations on the
American continent as well as abroad.
These principles were presented by Jefferson as being essentially the
result of natural conditions for which the Americans themselves were not
responsible: "Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the
exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to
endure the degradations of others; possessing a chosen country, with
room enough for our descendants to the hundredth and thousandth
generation", there was only one course for the American people to
follow: "commerce and honest friendship with all nations--entangling
alliances with none."
Thanks to the Republican victory, America no longer had to pay any
attention to the political convulsions which were tearing the vitals of
the Old World. The American experiment no longer depended on the issue
of the French Revolution. The Argosy had weathered the storm; America
had become the sole arbiter of her destinies, she had become, Jefferson
proclaimed, "a standing monument and example for the aim and imitation
of the people of other countries; and I join with you in the hope and
belief that they will see, from our example, that a free government is
of all others the most energetic; that the inquiry which has been
excited among the mass of mankind by our revolution and its
consequences, will ameliorate the condition of man over a great portion
of the globe."
Such a declaration should not be mistaken for a manifestation of a
missionary spirit by which Jefferson was never moved and which was
absolutely abhorrent to his nature. America was not to engage in any
crusade. She was not to preach a new gospel of liberty to the oppressed
peoples of the earth. She had proclaimed no _Declaration europeenne des
droits de l'homme et du citoyen_, as the French Revolution had
ambitiously done. She was not sending overseas to the shackled nations a
call to throw off the yoke and liberate themselves. Such declarations
would have seemed to Jefferson idle and dangerous. Every people had to
work out their own salvation; any attempt by America to help and
encourage them would only embroil her in difficulties which would retard
her own development. She could best serve the cause of humanity by
standing aloof and simply existing as an example which others, if they
had eyes to see, could not fail sooner or later to imitate. It was
essentially the doctrine which has been so often expounded by the
non-interventionists every time America has been invited to cooeperate
with Europe.
This doctrine therefore was not the expression of a passing mood; it
constituted one of the fundamental principles of Americanism and had a
permanent value, because, as Montesquieu would have said, it was the
result of "the nature of things", and not a deduction drawn from an _a
priori_ principle. On the other hand, it contained a new and interesting
affirmation of the unquestionable superiority of the American people
over all the peoples of the earth, not only morally but intellectually;
and this was not forgotten either, for the "high-mindedness" of
Jefferson was echoed and reflected more than a hundred years later in
the "too proud to fight" of Woodrow Wilson. Taken in itself, this
statement was no worse than so many statements made in political
speeches; all peoples like to be told and to believe that they are a
chosen people. But it must be confessed that Jefferson drew very
dangerous conclusions from that uniqueness of America's position.
One of the earliest and frankest expressions of that naive and almost
unconscious imperialism appears in an unpublished letter to Doctor
Mitchell. After discussing every possible subject under heaven, from
frosts to mammoth bones and electricity, Jefferson concluded with this
disquieting statement: "Nor is it in physics alone that we shall be
found to differ from the other hemisphere. I strongly suspect that our
geographical peculiarities may call for a different code of natural law
to govern relations with other nations from that which the conditions of
Europe have given rise to there."[425]
This idea was reiterated in a letter written to Short more than a year
later. In it Jefferson laid down the principle, the moral foundation of
American imperialism--a curious mixture of common sense, practical
idealism, and moralizing not to be found perhaps in any other people,
but more permanently American than typically Jeffersonian. To any sort
of arrangement with Europe he was irreducibly opposed: "We have a
perfect horror at everything connecting ourselves with the politics of
Europe." In order to protect America from the wiles of the European
diplomats, the best course was "in the meantime, to wish to let every
treaty we have drop off without renewal. We call in our diplomatic
missions, barely keeping up those to the most important nations. There
is a strong disposition in our countrymen to discontinue even these;
and very possibly it may be done." Jefferson admitted that the neutral
rights of the United States might suffer; they would undoubtedly suffer
temporarily, and one had to accept this as an unavoidable evil. But it
would be only temporary: "We feel ourselves strong and daily growing
stronger ... If we can delay but for a few years the necessity of
vindicating the laws of nature on the ocean, we shall be the more sure
of doing it with effect. The day is within my time as well as yours;
when we may say by what laws other nations shall treat us on the sea.
And we will say it."[426]
Nor was this imperialism purely theoretical. It was susceptible of
immediate applications and it manifested itself openly in a letter
written to James Monroe a few weeks later. The people of Virginia were
most anxious to get rid of a band of malefactors guilty of insurgency,
conspiracy, and rebellion. Had they been whites, the solution would have
been easy enough, but it happened that they were colored people and they
could not reasonably be sent to the northern boundary, or be provided
with land in the Western Territory. Could these undesirables be pushed
into the Spanish sphere of influence? To this solution Jefferson was
unequivocally opposed and for reasons worth considering: "However our
present situation may restrain us within our own limits," he wrote to
Monroe, "it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our
rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover
the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people
speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar
laws; nor can we contemplate either blot or mixture on that
surface."[427]
Truly enough, Jefferson said at the beginning of the letter that
publication of his views might have an ill effect in more than one
quarter. I shall not even advance the theory that Jefferson's foreign
policies constituted a systematic effort to put such a program into
effect. But that such aspirations and ambitions existed in his mind and
influenced him to a certain extent cannot be denied, and they should not
be overlooked in any discussion of his attitude during the negotiations
that led to the purchase of Louisiana.
Many of Jefferson's contemporaries, and not a few American historians,
have harshly criticized him for buying Louisiana from France, when no
clause in the Constitution authorized the acquisition of new territory.
On the French side, not only historians but even Bonaparte's brother
considered that the cession, without the previous consultation of the
Chambers, of a colony recently recovered by France was an act arbitrary
and unconstitutional. Both principals have been condemned and praised by
posterity, but there is no doubt that the full responsibility for the
transaction rests not upon the peoples of France and America, but on the
President of the United States and the Premier Consul. It was remarkable
that two great minds, so divergent in their views and principles, should
meet on a common ground instead of clashing. On neither side was it a
triumph of idealism, but of that enlightened self-interest which,
according to Jefferson, directs the actions of men as well as of
nations.
Nor were they entirely unsupported by the public opinion of their
respective countries. I have already indicated in a preceding book[428]
that a friendly conspiracy seems to have been organized in France in
order to induce the First Consul, and chiefly Talleyrand, to acquiesce
in the cession. At any rate, it appears from several letters of Volney
that the Ideologists were anxious to avoid an open conflict with the
United States and, at the same time, to promote a measure which, in
their opinion, would insure the growth and prosperity of the Republican
Promised Land. Volney, himself one of the "_voyageurs_" of the
Directory, had made a trip to the West and come back fully convinced
that France could never hope to develop an empire in the Mississippi
Valley. The few scattered French colonists who remained isolated in the
Middle West were condemned to be gradually absorbed by the influx of
American pioneers and to disappear before the rising flood of American
colonization. The question of the lower valley of the Mississippi was
different, to be sure, but if the United States were thwarted in their
development, if they were hemmed in on every side by powerful neighbors,
the theory of Montesquieu that only small nations could adopt the
republican system of government would seem vindicated. It was not only
the fate of the United States which was at stake, but the fate of the
doctrine of popular government, and it was the duty of all liberals to
bend every effort to make more secure the prosperity of America.
On the other hand, as we have already seen in previous chapters, while
Jefferson was satisfied to leave Louisiana in the hands of Spain, at
least temporarily, he had always watched for a favorable opportunity to
unite the Spanish colonies to the main body of the United States. It was
not so much desire of expansion and imperialism as the conviction that
colonies were only pawns in the game of European politics; that they
could change hands at any time according to the fortunes of war; that
there existed consequently a permanent danger of seeing France recover
some day her former colonies or, still worse, to have them fall into the
hands of the British. With England, or possibly France, on the northern
border, in the Floridas, on the Gulf, and in the valley of the
Mississippi, the old dream of European domination of the North American
continent would revive. The United States would be placed in the same
position as the old colonies with reference to France. A clash could not
be avoided; the issue would have to be fought out, until one of the
adversaries should remain in full and undisputed possession of the
whole northern part of the New World.
Although the Treaty of San Ildefonso, by which France was to recover and
occupy Louisiana at the first favorable opportunity, was intended to
remain secret, rumors that some deal had been concluded greatly
disturbed the American Government. As early as March, 1801, Rufus King
had been informed in London that such a cession was contemplated and
learned that General Collot intended to leave for Louisiana with a
considerable number of followers. On June 1, King called his
Government's attention to the fact that the cession of Louisiana "might
enable France to extend her influence, and perhaps her dominion, up the
Mississippi; and through the Lakes even up to Canada." The information
caused great concern to the British Government, and Lord Hawkesbury had
acquainted the American minister with the rumors. At that time, King,
who was evidently familiar with the views of Jefferson on the matter,
had answered by quoting Montesquieu that "it is happy for trading
powers, that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in the world,
since of all nations they are the most proper to possess a great empire
with insignificance." The purport of this quotation being, he wrote,
that, "we are contented that the Floridas remain in the hands of Spain,
but should not be willing to see them transferred, except to ourselves."
It was a double-edged answer, since it set at nil any hope the British
might have had of occupying Louisiana and the Floridas; and at the same
time it constituted a very accurate statement of the position maintained
by Jefferson when Secretary of State in all his dealings pertaining to
the Spanish colonies.
This policy was clearly defined in the general observations communicated
by the President to Charles Pinckney, minister in Madrid (June 9, 1801)
and in the instructions given to Livingston, hastening his departure for
France (September 28, 1801). Jefferson did not know yet what part of
the Spanish colonies was to be ceded to France and was more preoccupied
with the eventuality of the cession of the Floridas. The solution
preferred for the present was clearly the _status quo_. Should the
cession have irrevocably taken place, the rights to the navigation of
the Mississippi were to be safeguarded, and if possible France should be
induced "to make over to the United States the Floridas, if included in
the cession to her from Spain, or at least West Florida, through which
several of our rivers (particularly the important river Mobile) empty
themselves into the sea." Finally, if the cession had never been
contemplated, Livingston was instructed to induce France "to favor
experiments on the part of the United States, for obtaining from Spain
the cession in view."
The die was cast; for the first time the United States took the position
that the time had come for them to control the territory extending
between their States and the Gulf of Mexico, and to insure the peaceful
and unquestioned rights of navigation on the Mississippi. From the point
of view of international law or _droit des gens_, Madison reiterated the
doctrine of Jefferson, that it was a natural law that the States should
have access to the sea; and in this particular instance he hinted at
another principle--the application of which to the old territories of
Europe would be far-reaching--namely that the nation possessing a
certain river was entitled also to the mouth of the river. But this
again was probably in his opinion one of these "natural laws" which
applied to America only. At the end of November, Rufus King sent to
Madison a copy of the treaty between the Prince of Parma and Lucien
Bonaparte, signed at Madrid, March 31, 1801, and in December he had the
opportunity of mentioning the possibility of France paying her debts by
ceding Louisiana back to the United States, which only brought the curt
answer that "none but spendthrifts satisfy their debts by selling their
lands."
Livingston, in a letter to Rufus King, took the view that the cession
would be disastrous not only to the United States but to Spain and
England, since the French would not fail to contract alliance with the
Indians and to renew relations with "the peasantry of Canada", rendering
the possessions of Britain very precarious. He could only hope that King
would do his utmost to "induce the British ministry to throw all the
obstacles in their power in the way of a final settlement of this
business, if it is not already too late."
The British ministry refused to take the hint. Unwelcome as the passing
of Louisiana into French hands might be considered they were not
disposed to endanger the success of the negotiations shortly to be begun
at Amiens, and Rufus King was told that the subject would not even be
mentioned by Lord Hawkesbury.[429] Evidently England never intended to
draw the chestnuts out of the fire for the sole benefit of the United
States, and Livingston alone was left to face the situation. The letter
he wrote on his own initiative, unable as he was to consult the home
government, was somewhat blunt in tone. He called attention to the fact
that the arrival in Louisiana or Florida of a large body of French
troops could not fail to alarm the people of the Western Territory. He
conceded that no protest could be made under the sixth article of the
Treaty of 1778, since it had been superseded by the agreement of
September 30, 1800; but he maintained that even in the absence of a
formal treaty the clause expressed a very desirable policy, that at
least the United States wished to know exactly the boundaries of the
territory ceded by Spain. At the same time, he discreetly added that
"the government of the United States desired to be informed how far it
would be practicable to make such arrangements between their respective
governments as would, at the same time, aid the financial operations of
France, and remove, by a strong and natural boundary, all future causes
of discontent between her and the United States."
These different reports, and particularly Livingston's letter to King,
of December 30, created some perturbation in the mind of Jefferson, and
on March 16, Madison wrote the American minister in Paris "that too much
circumspection could not be employed." The great danger was that any
sort of a combination with Great Britain would have to be paid later in
kind or in territory. While Madison sent recommendations to Pinckney and
to Livingston, the clear wish of Jefferson was to keep out England as
much as possible. It was at that time that the President decided to take
a hand directly in the negotiations. At the beginning of April, 1802, Du
Pont de Nemours had written Jefferson that political as well as
commercial considerations made it imperative for him to go to France for
a short visit. Jefferson saw at once a possibility to use Du Pont as in
the past he had employed Lafayette, and asked him to come to Washington
to become acquainted "with certain matters that could not be committed
to paper."[430]
Very significantly he added: "I believe that the destinies of great
countries depend upon it, such is the crisis now existing." As Du Pont
answered that he could not possibly see the President before sailing,
Jefferson decided to explain his point of view fully in a long letter
and at the same time he expressed himself even more forcibly in a letter
to Livingston which he asked Du Pont to read before sealing it.
The two letters complete and explain each other. First of all, Jefferson
rejected as a very imperfect solution the granting free access to the
sea to the territories situated on the left bank of the Mississippi. He
bluntly declared that although America had a more natural and
instinctive friendship for France than for any other nation, it was
quite certain that the national characteristics of the two peoples were
so divergent that they could not live peacefully side by side for any
length of time. Even the cession by France of the Floridas and New
Orleans would be only a palliative which might delay but not suppress
the unavoidable conflict.[431] The only solution was for France to give
up entirely the rights she had acquired under the Treaty of San
Ildefonso and to return to the _status quo_. Any attempt by Bonaparte to
send soldiers to Louisiana would be considered as a _casus belli_, and
the President wrote significantly: "Peace and abstinence from European
interference are our objects, and so will continue while the present
order of things in America remains uninterrupted." If, on the other
hand, France insisted upon taking possession of Louisiana, it was the
declared intention of Jefferson to come to an agreement with England,
then to launch an expedition against New Orleans, to occupy the
territory claimed by France, so as to prevent any new European nation
from setting foot on the continent. That this policy of non-colonization
should apply to South America as well as to the northern continent was
evidently in the mind of the President, since he declared that after the
annihilation of the French fleet, two nations--America and Great
Britain--would rule the sea, and the two continents would be practically
"appropriated by them."
The threat was so formidable that Du Pont refused to believe that it was
seriously meant. He saw at once that if such representations were made
to the First Consul, even with proper diplomatic precautions, they would
be looked upon by him as a challenge that could not be ignored. "Give up
that country, or we shall take it", is not at all persuasive. "We will
defend it", is the answer that comes naturally to any man. Furthermore,
the old Physiocrat predicted that if the United States ever followed
such a policy, they would lose their prestige as a democratic and
peaceful nation. Jefferson would thus play into the hands of the
militaristic faction which ambitioned the conquest of Mexico; if, on
the contrary, Mexico were to be emancipated, it might become a dangerous
neighbor for the United States. He consequently urged Jefferson to
accept what he considered as a much more sensible program, namely a
compromise which would insure free access to the sea to "the territories
of the Cumberland, the Wabash and both banks of the Ohio." Finally he
warned the President against entering into such an alliance with
England, since England would never permit the United States to become a
naval power of first importance. If, however, the United States insisted
on having a free hand in the South, was it not possible, in view of the
impending war between France and England, to permit France to recover
Canada instead of Louisiana, and to tell Bonaparte: "Give us Louisiana
and at the first opportunity we shall restore Canada to you"?
Even if that were refused, if nothing could remove Jefferson's objection
to the establishment of a French colony on the northern continent, there
was still a possibility of giving satisfaction to both parties concerned
without unduly irritating the national pride of either. This was simply
for America to buy from France her claim on the Southern territory. True
to his training and doctrine, Du Pont had devised a commercial solution
to a political problem. The question of Louisiana was to be treated as a
business, with a political background to be sure, but essentially on
business terms.
The answer of Jefferson has unfortunately disappeared and was probably
destroyed by Du Pont; but another letter of the old Physiocrat permits
us to reconstruct its contents. Jefferson contended that the United
States had no money and could not afford to pay any important amount for
such a purchase. To which Du Pont answered that purchasing would be
infinitely more economical than going to war:
The sum offered and accepted will not exclude any compensation for
all or part of the sum which might be paid to you under the treaty.
To agree on the price is the important thing. To arrange for the
forms of payment, to charge against it legitimate reductions is only
a secondary matter, which will take care of itself. All the rest of
your instructions is easy to follow, and I shall follow them exactly.
Then proving himself to be as good a prophet as a philosopher Du Pont
added that Bonaparte would be more attracted by a frank and complete
proposal than by a compromise: "I hope it will succeed because Bonaparte
is a man of genius, and his character is much above ordinary
ideas."[432]
It is not entirely to the credit of Jefferson that, when he was thus
declaring to Du Pont that the United States could not afford to
negotiate on such a basis, Madison, on May 1, 1802, was writing to
Livingston, asking him to ascertain precisely the price at which the
Floridas, "if included in the cession would be yielded to the United
States."
The whole story of the negotiations as it appears in the Jefferson
papers and in the documents published in the Annals of Congress would be
worth retelling in detail. The evasions of the French minister
Talleyrand, the reticences of the Spanish ambassador as to the true
extent of the cession, the attempts of Rufus King to determine the
British Government to throw their influence on the side of the United
States, the blundering efforts of Livingston to place the case of his
Government before the eyes of Bonaparte, form one of the most
complicated and fascinating diplomatic mazes in which the inexperienced
and not highly skillful agents of the United States tried to find their
way. Livingston, who thought himself very adroit, was particularly
unfelicitous in his tone. The conclusion of the memoir he wrote on
August 10 and had printed for distribution to the French Government may
give an idea of his style:
In reasoning upon this subject, I have confined myself to such
observations as obviously presented themselves, without seeking any
of those subtleties which may serve to mislead the judgment. I have
candidly exposed the plainest facts, in the simplest language. If
ever they are opposed, it will be by a contrary course. Eloquence and
sophistry may reply to them and may obscure them; but time and
experience will evince their truth.
Such a language may have seemed to the American minister candid and
honest, but addressed to Bonaparte and Talleyrand it was very
undiplomatic, to say the least. One cannot help feeling, on reading the
documents, that had Livingston wished to break off negotiations he would
not have expressed himself otherwise, and it is difficult to share the
opinion of Henry Adams, who claimed for the American minister most of
the credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
By the end of the summer 1802, it appeared that, before going any
further, France intended to take possession of Louisiana, and Du Pont
knew only too well that such a step would cause an irresistible outburst
of public opinion in the United States. He kept in constant touch with
Livingston, giving counsels of moderation and patience. He even proposed
the project of a treaty which in his opinion would give temporary
satisfaction to the United States while being acceptable to France. This
plan included the cession of New Orleans and the Floridas, reserving for
French vessels the same treatment as for American shipping; France to
keep all the territories on the right bank of the Mississippi, but the
navigation of the river to be free to both nations. Finally the United
States were to pay the sum of six million dollars for the territories
described in the first article.[433]
In the meantime things were moving fast in America. The suspension of
the right of deposit by the Spanish authorities was taxing the none too
strong endurance of the inhabitants of the western territory, and the
war party was making great progress. Madison wrote on November 27,
1802, that should the Spanish intendant prove as obstinate as he has
been ignorant or wicked, nothing can temperate the irritation and
indignation of the Western country, but a persuasion that the energy of
their own government will obtain from the justice of that of Spain the
most ample redress.[434]
In his message to Congress read on December 15, the President included a
short paragraph pregnant with significance:
The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which
took place in the course of the late war, if carried into effect,
makes a change in the aspect of our foreign relations which will
doubtless have just weight in any deliberation of the Legislature
connected with that subject.
This sentence could have only one meaning: that if France took
possession of Louisiana, appropriations would be in order to prevent her
from establishing herself permanently in the territory. It was a direct
threat of war. The President had apparently given up any hope of
reaching an agreement and was yielding to the war party.
On December 17 it was, on motion of Randolph:
_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be requested to
cause to be laid before this house such papers as are in the
possession of the Department of State as relate to the violation on
the part of Spain, of the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and
Navigation, between the United States and the King of Spain.
Jefferson complied with this request on December 22, averring that he
"was aware of the obligation to maintain, in all cases, the rights of
the nation, and to employ, for that purpose, those just and honorable
means which belong to the character of the United States."[435]
There is no doubt that the President himself had lost patience and that
the United States were rapidly drifting towards overt acts that could
only have war as a consequence. On January 4 it was moved in the House
that the President be requested to communicate all the information at
his disposal on the reported cession of Louisiana. Then quite
unexpectedly, on January 11, Jefferson sent to the Senate a message
recommending that James Monroe be appointed special envoy to France with
full powers, "jointly with Mr. Livingston to enter into a treaty or
convention with the First Consul of France, for the purpose of enlarging
and more effectually securing, our rights and interests in the river
Mississippi, and in the territories eastward thereof." The next day, the
House, on recommendation of a committee which presented a lengthy
report, voted an appropriation of "two million dollars to defray the
expenses which may be incurred in relation to the intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations."
The sudden change in Jefferson's attitude can largely be attributed to
the fact that, between December 15 and January 11, he had received a
letter sent from Paris by Du Pont de Nemours on October 4,[436]
submitting a tentative plan for a treaty and discounting the pessimistic
reports of Livingston. There is not the slightest doubt that the
President was much impressed by Du Pont's letter. On January 18, Madison
wrote to Pinckney:
In order to draw the French government into the measure, a sum of
money will be made part of our propositions.... From a letter
received by the President from a respectable person, it is inferred,
with probability that the French government is not averse to treat on
those grounds; and that such a disposition must be strengthened by
circumstances of the present moment.[437]
Finally Jefferson himself wrote to Du Pont that his letter had been
received with particular satisfaction, because while it held up terms
that could not be entirely yielded, "it proposed such as a mutual
spirit of accommodation and sacrifice may bring to some point of
union."[438]
The President indicated, however, that the action of Spain in suspending
the rights of deposit had rendered imperative an immediate settlement:
"Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no delay as to our
course; and the use of the Mississippi so indispensable, that we cannot
hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its maintainance."
Despite this more conciliatory tone, the President did not recede from
the position he had taken previously with Du Pont. He repeated that the
country was in no position to offer such a sum as mentioned by Mr. Du
Pont (six million dollars) in order to insure the purchase of the said
territory.
In this, Jefferson was to some extent guilty of double-dealing with his
friend, or at least of not laying all his cards on the table. The
instructions given to Monroe and Livingston on March 2, 1803, specified
that "should a greater sum (than two million dollars) be made an
ultimatum on the part of France, the President has made up his mind to
go as far as fifty millions of _livres tournois_, rather than to lose
the main object." Incidentally, this passage explains how Monroe and
Livingston could feel authorized to accept the proposal to purchase the
whole territory for sixty million francs. They were not so bold as is
commonly supposed, since they were empowered by the President to go as
far as fifty million for part only of Louisiana. Whether Jefferson had
the constitutional right to promise such a sum without formal approval
of Congress is quite another matter. It is only fair, however, to recall
here that, due to the difficulty of communicating between Washington and
Paris and the urgency of the situation, it was an absolute necessity to
give considerable leeway to the plenipotentiaries and to provide for
every possible emergency. But it must also be remembered that had not
Jefferson taken at that precise time the responsibility of engaging the
resources of the United States, neither Livingston nor Monroe would have
felt authorized to sign a transaction involving six times the sum voted
by the House of Representatives. The blame or praise, whatever it may
be, must in final analysis fall entirely on Jefferson.
It is not without some interest to notice here that Livingston was
entirely unaware of the value of Du Pont de Nemours' plan. Unable to pin
down Talleyrand or Lebrun, he soon came to the conclusion that it was
impossible to treat and that he might as well leave Paris. "I see very
little use for a minister here, where there is but one will; and that
will governed by no object but personal security and personal ambition;
were it left to my discretion, I should bring matters to some positive
issue, or leave them, which would be the only means of bringing them to
an issue."[439] He maintained to the last minute that Du Pont de Nemours
had given the French government "with the best intentions, ideas that we
shall find hard to eradicate, and impossible to yield to",[440] and on
hearing that Monroe had been appointed, following receipt of Du Pont's
letter, he answered that he was much surprised that Du Pont should talk
"of the designs of this court, the price, &c., because he must have
derived these from his imagination only, as he had no means of seeing
anybody here that could give him the least information."[441]
Who was the better informed of the two it is not easy to decide. But by
a curious coincidence, while Livingston was writing this in Paris, the
ink was hardly dry on the instructions to Monroe which contained this
striking paragraph: "It is to be added that the overtures committed to
you coincide in great measure with the ideas of the person through whom
the letter of the President of April 30, 1802, was conveyed to Mr.
Livingston, and who is presumed to have gained some insight into the
present sentiments of the French Cabinet."[442]
The very same day Du Pont was able to write Jefferson that he had
several times seen Talleyrand and Lebrun and that the French Government
had decided to give every possible satisfaction to the United States. On
April 6, he added, without giving any detail, that good progress had
been made; but that he had not told everything to Livingston.
There is little doubt that the letter of Du Pont made Jefferson delay
any strong measure in the Mississippi Valley affair and stayed the hand
of the God of War. If negotiations had been broken off at that point, it
was the intention of the British government "to send an expedition to
occupy New Orleans."[443] What the consequences of such an action would
have been can easily be surmised.
The rest of the story lies outside of our province, since Jefferson had
nothing to do directly with it. Barbe-Marbois has told the dramatic
scene of Easter Sunday, April 10, 1803, when Bonaparte called in two
ministers and gave the first indication that he considered the whole
colony lost and that it might be better to give it up entirely. The next
morning the First Consul requested Marbois to act as plenipotentiary and
to see Livingston at once. When Monroe arrived, a preliminary
understanding had been reached. The treaty was concluded on May 4 and
signed four days later, although it was antedated and marked April 30.
The question of deciding whether Jefferson had foreseen the possibility
of acquiring the whole territory of Louisiana and had given to Monroe
instructions to that effect has provided his biographers, whether
friendly or unfriendly, with a nice bone to pick. It seems here that a
distinction must be established between the wishes of the President and
what he considered within the range of actual possibilities. From his
letters to Lafayette and Du Pont de Nemours, it is easily perceived that
he was unequivocally opposed to the reinstatement of France on any part
of the continent. On this point he never varied. On the other hand, he
had soon become convinced that France would never relinquish such an
enormous territory without a compensation that the United States could
not afford to pay. He limited his plans very soon to the acquisition of
the two Floridas, which he supposed had been made part of the
transaction, so as to give the United States access to the Gulf, while
taking a strong position on the Mississippi River. In his letter to Du
Pont de Nemours dated February 1, 1803, he reiterated that the United
States wanted and needed the Floridas, that "whatever power, other than
ourselves, holds the country east of the Mississippi, becomes our
natural enemy." But further he did not go. On February 27, 1803, he
wrote to Governor Harrison a letter which seems to settle the question:
"We bend our whole views to the purchase and settlement of the country
on the Mississippi, from its mouth to its northern regions, that we may
be able to present as strong a front on our western as on our eastern
border, and plant on the Mississippi itself the means of its own
defence." As for the Indians, they were either "to be incorporated with
us as citizens of the United States, or removed beyond the Mississippi."
Finally the letter written on July 29 to Livingston and Monroe is as
definite a statement as can be desired and ought to set the controversy
at rest:
When these (your instructions and commission) were made out, the
object of the most sanguine was limited to the establishment of the
Mississippi as our boundary. It was not presumed, that more could be
sought by the United States, either with a chance of success, or
perhaps without being suspected of a greedy ambition, than the island
of New Orleans and the two Floridas.... Nor was it to be supposed
that in case the French government should be willing to part with
more than the territory on our side of the Mississippi, an
arrangement with Spain for restoring the territory on the other side,
would not be preferred to a sale of it to the United States.... The
effect of such considerations was diminished by no information, or
just presumptions whatever.[444]
Whatever may have been Jefferson's satisfaction on hearing the news, he
did not write himself to the commissioners to congratulate and thank
them in the name of the nation. He was not the man to make grand
gestures. The Virginian could be as self-restrained as any New
Englander, as appears from a letter to Horatio Gates in which the two
envoys are mentioned: "I find our opposition very willing to pluck
feathers from Monroe, although not fond of sticking them into
Livingston's coat. The truth is, both have a just proportion of merit;
and were it necessary or proper, it would be shown that each has
rendered peculiar services and of important value."[445] More than that
he did not say, and probably said very little more to Monroe, his friend
and "_eleve_" when he came back from France.