"THE DICTATES OF REASON AND PURE AMERICANISM"
When Jefferson arrived in Philadelphia to attend the inauguration of the
new President, he had not seen Adams for four years and only
insignificant communications had passed between them, since Madison had
thought it proper to suppress the letter written by Jefferson at the end
of December, not knowing "whether the rather difficult temper of Mr.
Adams would not construe certain passages as a personal criticism."[339]
With Adams, however, the first impulse was often the best. At the time
he felt in a very conciliating mood; he even indulged in the hope that
it would be possible to announce a sort of political armistice and to
bring about a union of the different parties.
The two old friends had a cordial interview. Both of them, years later,
wrote accounts of this historical meeting; though differing in a few
details they agreed as to Adams' intention of burying the hatchet and
beginning anew. He offered to send Jefferson to Paris as special envoy,
insisting that he alone had the confidence of the French and would be
able to bring about an arrangement. Jefferson being both unwilling and
unavailable, Madison's name was mentioned, but nothing was decided as
both knew that Madison had refused such an offer when tendered by
Washington.
In his inaugural address Adams discreetly sounded a note of
reconciliation. He praised the Constitution, declared that it was
"better adapted to the genius, character, situation and relations of
this nation and country than any which had ever been proposed or
suggested"; he added, much to the disgust of the Federalists, that he
did not think of "promoting any alteration in it but such as the people
themselves in the course of their experience should see and feel to be
necessary or expedient"; finally, he seemed to desert the Federalist
camp when he averred that, since he had seen the Constitution for the
first time, "it was not then, nor had been since, any objection to it in
his mind that the Executive and Senate were not more permanent."
Not without good reason had Hamilton failed to show any enthusiasm over
the candidacy of Adams, and the Hamiltonians had some ground for
declaring that the speech "was temporizing" and "was a lure for the
favor of his opponents at the expense of his sincerity." Two days later
Jefferson and Adams attended a dinner offered by Washington to the new
administration. When they left the house they started walking home
together and the name of Madison being mentioned, Adams declared that
objections to the nomination had been raised. The President and the Vice
President had come to Fifth Street, where their roads separated; they
took leave of each other and the subject was never mentioned again. It
was really the parting of the ways after a timid effort toward
reconciliation. Adams in the meantime had called together his Cabinet
and the Cabinet, as he himself admitted afterwards, had proposed to
resign _en bloc_ if he insisted on Madison's nomination.
For the "incongruous portrait gallery" that constituted the Cabinet
inherited by Adams from Washington, we may refer to the vivid picture of
Mr. Bowers: "Ali Baba among his Forty Thieves is no more deserving of
sympathy than John Adams shut up within the seclusion of his Cabinet
room with his official family of secret enemies" may seem to some a
rather severe characterization. The least that can be said, however, is
that it was a Cabinet hand-picked by Hamilton and that neither
Pickering, Wolcott nor McHenry were the best minds Adams could have
chosen in his party. But there again the term party is inaccurate; if
Adams had, in some respect, Federalist tendencies, he was not a party
man or a party leader. The irritable, impulsive, patriotic, peevish old
New Englander was too individualistic to belong to any party; he was not
the man either to rally the hesitating, to uphold the vacillating, or to
encourage and educate the blind. Curiously enough, he has found very few
defenders. Severely treated by the friends of Jefferson, he has not been
spared by the admirers of Hamilton. He stands alone, one of the most
complicated and contradictory figures in American history--a pure
patriot, whose patriotic work is almost forgotten, a catholic spirit who
loved to play with ideas and paradoxes, a contrary mind, but in my
opinion more widely read than any of his American contemporaries, not
excepting Jefferson. A man who spent his life by the side of the severe
and haughty "New England Juno", but who had more ideas in his brain than
any sultan of the Arabian Nights had favorites in his harem.
He had taken the helm at the climax of external difficulties.
Complicated and delicate as were the problems of domestic
administration, they were overshadowed by the difficulties with France.
The misunderstandings, the incidents repeated on both sides, had
accumulated with such an effect that, at the beginning of 1797, war with
France seemed to be almost unavoidable. Though Jefferson had very little
to do with it, it is not out of place to recall the main facts.
Genet had unfortunately his American parallel in Gouverneur Morris. As
witty and devoid of ordinary morals and honesty as Talleyrand himself,
elegant, refined, and corrupt, Gouverneur Morris had been, since his
arrival in Paris, the toast of French aristocrats. His activities in
favor of the king and his partisans were not unknown to the French, and
when Genet was sent to America he had been requested to present
discreetly the situation to the American Government. Genet had made no
official representation, but he discussed Morris' attitude in a private
conversation with Jefferson, and Washington, apprised of the facts, had
seen the necessity of acting.
Monroe, on the contrary, had attempted to resume the Jeffersonian
tradition. A disciple of the former minister, a true Liberal, and
friendly to the French Revolution, he had been enthusiastically received
at once, in spite of the many difficult problems he had to present to
the government. But the Jay treaty had proved a bitter pill to swallow,
and the Directory had made strong representations to the American
minister: America was accused of having violated the treaties of
Alliance and Commerce, and when Monroe was recalled, the Directory not
only refused to receive the successor that had been appointed but even
ordered him to leave the French territory at once.
Without entering into the merits of the question, we may say that
Jefferson was still decidedly for peace, although somewhat doubtful of
Adams' intentions. Shortly after the inauguration he analyzed his
position as follows:
I sincerely deplore the situation of our affairs with France. War
with them, and consequent alliance with Great Britain, will
completely compass the object of the Executive Council, from the
commencement of the war between France and England; taken up by some
of them from that moment, by others more latterly. I still, however,
hope it will be avoided. I do not believe Mr. Adams wishes war with
France; nor do I believe he will truckle to England as servilely as
has been done. If he assumes this front at once, and shows that he
means to attend to self-respect and national dignity with both the
nations, perhaps the depredations of both on our commerce may be
amicably arrested. I think we should begin first with those who first
began with us, and, by an example on them, acquire a right to
re-demand the respect from which the other party has departed.
An ideal policy, but hardly enforceable with a man of Adams' temperament
and with the Cabinet he had inherited. Immediately after taking oath of
office, Jefferson had repaired to Monticello and was getting acquainted
with his duties as presiding officer of the Senate; in January he asked
his old master George Wythe to send him all possible information on
parliamentary procedure "whether in books or scraps of paper",[340] and
he was working on his "Parliamentary Manual." Early in April news of the
refusal of the Directory to receive Pinckney arrived in Philadelphia,
Adams proclaimed at once a day of fasting and prayer and called an
extraordinary session of Congress for May 15. It was to be feared that a
declaration of war would be the order of the day, for "the President did
not need the assistance of Congress to continue in peace."[341]
As soon as he reached Philadelphia, Jefferson studied the situation and
summed it up in a letter to Elbridge Gerry even before the opening of
Congress. He had already come to the conclusion that a rapprochement
between Adams and himself would prove impossible. There was really no
way to convince Adams that Jefferson had not coveted the first place and
did not nourish some rancor at his alleged failure to obtain it.
Furthermore, it was quite certain that the Hamiltonians would do
everything in their power to poison the mind of the President. This was
most unpleasant but of little import to politics. Jefferson considered
himself part of the legislative and not of the executive, and he had not
even the right to be heard in consultation. It was his duty as well as
his inclination to sit back, without trying to meddle in any way with
the conduct of government.
On the other hand, he had not given up the right of expressing an
opinion as a private citizen on matters of importance to the nation, and
after stating that he had no concern in the present situation, he
launched out on a long _expose_ of the political situation as he saw it
on the eve of the special session. With reference to foreign relations
his wish and hope was that "we should take our stand on a ground
perfectly neutral and independent towards all nations." This was
particularly true with respect to the English and the French, but more
easily said than done, since the English, not satisfied with equal
treatment, wanted special privileges. Then Jefferson drew up a very
impressive picture of the hold on the United States maintained by Great
Britain through her commerce. Without domestic industries the United
States had to go to England; she was the workshop of America. Goods were
largely transported in English bottoms; British merchants, some of them
fictitiously naturalized, were in every American port and in all the
cities and towns of the interior, occupying strategic positions. The
British also were dominating American banks and American finance and,
through finance, could exert a powerful influence on American political
life. Finally, they were accused of attempting to break the Union by
advocating in their subsidized press a scission between the North and
the South. If difficulties came to such a point that the only way to
avoid a secession was to go to war with Europe, Jefferson, much as he
abhorred war, was willing to become embroiled with Europe. He still
hoped, however, that it would be possible to find some means to keep out
of European quarrels and in the meantime gradually to free America from
all foreign influence, "political, commercial, or in whatever form it
may be attempted."
One might say that this was no original point of view to develop. It was
to a certain extent the policy advocated by Washington in his Farewell
Address. Curiously enough, it was not absolutely remote from Hamilton's
theory, for these two men who, temperamentally, could never come
together, held about the same view of the situation. That England had
the larger share of American commerce and that English manufactures had
a sort of monopoly of the American market had been repeatedly pointed
out by Hamilton. And on this Jefferson agreed completely. If one
objected to that condition, the obvious remedy according to the
Hamiltonian doctrine was, not to take measures to exclude English goods
from the market, but to encourage American manufactures so as to enable
them to compete with imported products. In this Jefferson differed from
Hamilton, but while complaining of the situation, he did not propose any
remedy, except perhaps to protect American inventors and thus stimulate
them to establish new manufacturing plants. One must admit that at this
point he let his "philosophy" interfere with realities.
As a matter of fact, he was thoroughly opposed to the development of
manufacturing plants, to the creation of large industrial cities housing
thousands of salaried workers. As we have said, his vision of America
was a sort of Arcadia where every man would live on his own farm, off
the products of his own land. In some respects it may seem perfectly
absurd, and yet it was very natural and to a certain extent quite
logical. It was purely and simply the extension of the Monticello type
of organization to the whole country. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt had
been struck by the fact that Monticello was practically a
self-supporting economic unit. Jefferson was raising his own horses and
just enough sheep to provide the wool spun by the women slaves to clothe
the workers and sometimes the masters. On the plantation lived smiths,
carpenters, cabinet makers, brick makers, and layers; some grain was
sold, some nails were manufactured and sold to the neighbors. Selling
comparatively little, buying practically nothing, Jefferson's estate
came as close to being a sort of Robinson Crusoe island as was possible
in a modern country. Thus the Virginia planter had come to develop a
philosophy of society not unlike the ideal society described by Rousseau
in the "Nouvelle Heloise" and more feudal than he himself realized,
since, after all, if serfdom had been abolished, it rested essentially
on slavery. He was unequivocally against great agglomerations, although
he had not visited any of the large industrial cities of England except
London; but at least he knew London and Paris, he had lived in
Philadelphia and New York, and he felt that it was not good for men to
herd too closely together. Work in factories was both unhealthy and
immoral, for in congested centers of population there developed a spirit
of discontent aggravated by the fact that industrial workers, who
generally did not own a particle of land, were footloose, unattached,
and free to move from one city to another at any time; they constituted
a restless and dangerous element. It mattered little that, for the
present, they gave their support to the Republicans and had joined the
Democratic clubs; Jefferson knew too well that they would be easily
influenced in their views by a good orator, by passions of the moment,
and could not be relied upon in an emergency.
It would be easy to point out the close resemblance of certain features
of this ideal of Jefferson with the theories of the Physiocrats. Such a
parallelism, however, can be easily exaggerated and to a great extent is
very misleading. Whether all riches came from the soil, or were the
product of labor in any form, or both, Jefferson did not know and did
not care. He was no more a disciple of Quesnay than of Adam Smith,
simply because he was not an economist but a sociologist. Hamilton, who
was an economist of the first rank, was primarily interested in the
development of production and in the circulation of wealth, and paid
little attention to the social modification that an industrialization of
the country would probably bring about. Jefferson, on the contrary, was
solely interested in protecting and preserving a certain pattern of
civilization which was essentially an agricultural pattern--the only
safe foundation for the political and private virtues of vital
importance in a democracy. Manufactures meant surplus production, which
meant, in turn, the necessity of exporting. If America became a great
industrial nation, she would have, sooner or later, to export her
surplus production and in turn to import many products from Europe. But
if the country maintained extensive trade connections with Europe she
would be necessarily caught in the maze of international politics. Her
commercial interests would clash with the interests of Europe, and this
would ultimately result in wars or at least in a constant threat of war.
It would also mean the building of a strong navy to protect American
commerce, perhaps the establishment of a permanent army; at any rate,
the immediate consequence would be an enormous increase in taxes, the
necessity of resorting to internal taxation, the burden of which would
fall on the backs of the farmers. Numerous tax collectors would have to
be appointed; Federal employees and officials ready to act at the beck
and call of the Government would swarm all over the country. State
rights and individual rights would be restricted and invaded, and
liberty would exist only in name. On the other hand, foreign commerce
was not to be entirely suppressed. Commerce was a natural and desirable
thing with one's neighbors. Geographically the West Indies had closer
connections with America than with Europe, and it was in that direction
that the United States could develop their trade. This was a natural law
and a natural right, and any obstacle put to the natural flow of trade
between the islands and the American continent was unjust and to be
fought persistently.
Such seems to have been at that time the political and social dream of
Jefferson. Like most dreams of the sort it was perfectly logical, even
if impossible to realize. But, as a matter of fact, it was far more
admissible than the ideal he was to propose four years later in his
inaugural address, following the lead of Washington: "peace, commerce
with all nations, entangling alliances with none." He was far more
clear-sighted when he came to the conclusion that America could not
combine political aloofness and commercial and economic relationship.
This formula was a desperate and none too successful attempt to coalesce
two contradictory principles and ideals, and for the last hundred and
thirty years America has been striving to achieve this impossible
program. Such a position has always seemed most absurd and
unintelligible to Europeans, with the result that America has often been
accused of hypocritical conduct in her foreign affairs, and more
indulgent historians have repeatedly confessed their puzzlement and
inability to understand her. The consequences of this incestuous union
of Jeffersonian political aloofness and Hamiltonian industrial and
commercial development are still apparent to-day. They were conspicuous
in the position taken by President Wilson during his first
administration; they reappear again and again in all American
declarations referring to the League of Nations, mandates, and
reparations. One of the first results was necessarily to embroil America
in all European wars and to raise again and again the question of
neutrality.
It is doubtful however whether, even in 1797, Jefferson would have
consented to carry to an extreme the realization of his bucolic dreams.
He knew full well that America had commercial aspirations that could not
be suppressed; all one could do was not to encourage them as Hamilton
wanted to do and, in the meantime, to reduce political connections to a
minimum.
At the end of the short session of Congress in which measures relative
to Europe had been debated, Jefferson wrote to Rutledge: "as to
everything except commerce, we ought to divorce ourselves from them
all." But this system would require "time, temper, wisdom, and
occasional sacrifice of interests; and how far all of these will be
ours, our children may see, but we shall not."[342] Such has been the
hope and the endeavor of America ever since that time; with what success
it is for others to judge.
Adams' speech had been a warlike one. That the Government of the United
States had been insulted by the French Directory was no "matter of
doubt." Pinckney, sent as successor to Monroe, had not been received by
the Government, and Monroe had been informed that the Directory "would
no longer recognize nor receive a minister plenipotentiary from the
United States, until after a reparation of the grievances demanded of
the American Government, and which the French Republic had a right to
expect." Pinckney himself had been notified that his presence in Paris
was illegal and that he could not stay in the country. No wonder that
Adams declared that: "Such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision
which shall convince France and the world that we are not a degraded
people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of
inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign
influence, and regardless of national honor, character and interest."
On May 23 the Senate sent an address to the President, indorsing his
views by a vote of seventeen to eleven. The fight was to take place in
the House and in the newspapers. "Foreign influence is the present and
just object of public hue and cry", wrote Jefferson to Thomas
Pinckney.[343] As always happens when the cry of wolf is raised, "the
most guilty and foremost and loudest in the cry", those who were
denouncing French influence, were to a large extent English
propagandists and not of the best type. But news from France was
infrequent and slight and, at the beginning of June, Jefferson waited
anxiously for the daily arrival of Paine and Monroe from whom he
expected a true account of the situation. Then came the news of
Bonaparte's latest victories and the announcement that the preliminaries
of peace were signed between France and Austria. This was the only thing
which could and did cool the fury of the British faction. "The victories
of the Rhine and Italy, peace with Austria, bankruptcy of England,
mutiny in her fleet, and the King's writing letters recommending
peace"--all that constituted a string of events nothing less than
miraculous.[344]
At this juncture Jefferson made a momentous political move. He wrote a
long letter to Colonel Aaron Burr to take him into his confidence. The
Vice President was beginning to gather up the loose threads: "Some
general view of our situation and prospects, since you left us, may not
be unacceptable. At any rate, it will give me an opportunity of
recalling myself to your memory, and of evidencing my esteem for you."
What could this mean in ordinary language if not that he counted on him
to counterbalance Hamilton's influence in New York and present the views
of the chief to the leaders of the party. First of all he called his
attention to the fact that the Republican party was losing ground in the
House as well as in the Senate, and that the majority was in the hands
of "five or six individuals of no fixed system at all, governed by the
panic or the prowess of the moment, who flap as the breeze blows against
the Republican or the aristocratic bodies."
For the present, the danger of going to war was less disquieting.
Bonaparte's victories had brought many to their senses and some were
complaining that Congress had been called together to do nothing. "The
truth is, there is nothing to do, the idea of war being scouted by the
events of Europe; but this only proves that war was the object for which
we were called." It had been a close call, and France might have
declared war against the United States if the Ancients had not
pronounced against it. "Thus we see two nations who love one another
affectionately, brought by the ill temper of their executive
administrations, to the very brink of a necessity to imbue their hands
in the blood of each other."
But leaving aside all sentimental considerations, Jefferson undertook
to demonstrate that such a war would have, as a result, the immediate
occupation of Louisiana by France, and with Louisiana again a
Gallo-American colony, the danger would indeed be great. Such were "some
of the truths that ought to penetrate into the Eastern States", and Burr
was no doubt intrusted with the mission to preach the true doctrine of
republicanism in his district.[345]
Four days later Jefferson announced with infinite joy to Elbridge Gerry
that he had been appointed to go as envoy extraordinary, jointly with
General Pinckney and Mr. Marshall, to the French Republic. Once more he
insisted upon the necessity of coming to some sort of an arrangement
with Europe. War against England or France could only result in civil
war in America and probably secession. The fate of the United States was
at stake.[346]
Congress was to adjourn on the twenty-eighth of June and Jefferson was
already looking forward to the rural quiet of Monticello, where he could
"exchange the roar and tumult of bulls and bears for the prattle of his
grandchildren and senile rest." His quiet however was disturbed by an
unexpected incident. Early in August he sent an urgent call to Madison
to come to Monticello with Monroe in order to consult with them on an
urgent matter. The letter written to Mazzei the preceding year had come
back, translated from the French, and was used as a political weapon
against Jefferson and the Republicans. Public repudiation of the letter
was impossible, since he had really written it, although the translation
had garbled the meaning of some important sentences. To remain silent
under fire and accept as true the accusations hurled against him was
equally difficult. His friends alone could help him out of the
difficulty. He finally decided to ignore the whole matter as he had
already been advised to do by his Philadelphia friends, but the letter
preyed on his mind and this was not an incident to be easily forgotten.
It was during the summer and fall of that year that certain principles
were definitely crystallized in his mind.
Deploring the fact that both factions had been incensed by political
considerations and political hatred rather than by a true judgment of
the situation and what he had called in a letter to Rutledge "the
dictates of reason and pure Americanism", he then reached for himself
certain conclusions which were to direct his political conduct during
the rest of his career. He was thoroughly sickened by the insults
passing in the press. Men of his own party he could not severely condemn
for this, nor could he take from their hands the weapons used to defeat
the enemy, but he was also loath to approve of their tactics. In
Democratic societies, established in large cities, he placed very little
confidence; they were fighting on his side, at least for the present,
and were vociferous enough; but to a large extent they were made up of
office hunters. They did not and could not constitute a trustworthy
bulwark for Republican institutions. Fortunately events had proved that
there existed in the country a large body of people sincerely attached
to republican principles; these had been slumbering and their leaders
had almost steered the ship into a foreign port, but they could be
enlightened and made to manifest their true sentiments; for all reforms
"must be brought about by the people using their elective rights with
prudence and self-possession, and not suffering themselves to be duped
by treacherous emissaries." "It is the sober sense of our citizens that
we are safely and steadily conducting from monarchy to republicanism,
and it is by the same agency alone that we can be kept from falling
back."[347] As to foreign questions, the fact that their intrusion into
American life had divided the nation against itself proved conclusively
that the only safe course to follow was to sever the last bonds that
connected America with Europe and "to place our foreign connections
under a new and different arrangement."[348] The time had come for
America to proclaim her independence in all foreign matters, for "we owe
gratitude to France, justice to England, subservience to none."
It was in coining these fine political maxims that Jefferson was at his
best. As had happened so often during his life, he refused to be carried
away by popular passions raging in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.
From the "mountain top" of Monticello he was able to judge
dispassionately the sordid struggles of party politics. He was no party
boss, not even a party leader; if he had any ambition at that time, it
was to become a national leader and the exponent of what he himself had
called in his letter to Rutledge "pure Americanism."
Congress had been called for November 13, but the Vice President felt no
inclination to hurry back to Philadelphia and reenter the scene of
strife. He did not leave until December 4 and found, as he had expected,
that Congress was marking time, waiting for news from Paris. Madison he
kept informed minutely of all the changes that had taken place during
the summer, of the progress of republicanism in Vermont and New York,
and of all the small talk of politics, interesting only as showing how
eagerly Jefferson kept his finger on the pulse of the country. He had an
ulterior motive in sending to Madison papers and pamphlets recently
published in Philadelphia; it was that "the paragraphs in some of these
abominable papers may draw from you now and then a squib." Matters
seemed to be on the mend; the latest official intelligence from Paris
was that the envoys "would find every disposition on the part of the
Government to accommodate with us."[349] The session dragged on.
Jefferson's melancholy statement that the Senate was divided
"twenty-two and ten and will probably forever be", was not helped by
Adams' declaration that:
No republic can ever be of any duration, without a Senate, and a
Senate deeply and strongly rooted, strong enough to bear up against
all popular storms and passions. The only fault in the Constitution
of our Senate is, that their term of office is not durable enough.
Hitherto they have done well, but probably they will be forced to
give way in time.[350]
The only important proposition before Congress was "the bill of foreign
intercourse and the proposition to arm our foreign vessels"; but both
parties seemed to be afraid to press the matter. Everything was in
suspense "as the ensuing month will probably be the most eventful ever
yet seen in modern Europe." If Bonaparte's projected invasion of England
succeeded the tables would turn; in the meantime the official ball given
on Washington's birthday offered to Philadelphia society a pretext for
engaging in hot controversies. Business was bad and bankruptcies
multiplying. Congress was thinking of appropriating some money for
national defense so as to furnish convoys to vessels going to Europe and
to provide for the protection of smaller vessels of the coast trade.
Adams had decided to reorganize his Cabinet. Wolcott would remain in
office, but it seemed that McHenry was to go and Pickering was very
doubtful whether he would stay.[351]
Meanwhile dispatches from the American envoys had arrived; they were
being deciphered and the President hesitated upon the advisability of
communicating them in full to Congress. Then, on the nineteenth, came
Adams' message declaring that "it was incumbent on him to declare that
he perceived no ground of expectation that the objects of their mission
could be accomplished on terms compatible with the safety, honor, or the
essential interest of the Nation."
On the twenty-first Jefferson wrote to Madison that "a great change has
taken place in the appearance of our political atmosphere"; the "insane
message" had had great effect but there was still a possibility that, if
all members were present, the war measures would be defeated by one
voice in the House. What was to be done in that case? The only possible
solution was to make a bid for time and wait for the results of
Bonaparte's expedition against Great Britain. Jefferson's plan therefore
was to propose an adjournment of Congress "in order to go home and
consult their constituents on the great crisis of American affairs now
existing." "To gain time is everything with us." In this letter
Jefferson made one of his few material errors, so strange on the part of
a man in his position, and hardly to be explained unless we suppose that
the wish was father to the thought. "We relied," he said, "with great
security on that provision which requires two-thirds of the Legislature
to declare war. But this is completely eluded by a majority's taking
such measures as will be sure to produce war." Certainly there was no
such article in the Constitution, unless Jefferson in his excitement
interpreted the ratification of treaties by two-thirds of the Senate to
imply also that a declaration of war should have such a majority.[352] A
week later he was convinced that "the question of war and peace depends
now on a toss of cross and pile. If we could gain but one season we
should be saved."[353] It was to these Fabian tactics that the
Republicans were to bend all their efforts in order to avoid a formal
declaration of war.
In the meantime the dispatches of the envoys were made public and the
famous X.Y.Z. case came to light. Debate was hot in Congress on the
Sprigg resolution declaring that "under existing conditions it is not
expedient for the United States to resort to war against the French
republic."[354] Adams then decided to communicate the letters from
Paris.
No more terrible blow could have been inflicted upon the friends of
peace. Jefferson heard the news on April 3, but as it was still
undecided whether they could be made public, he refrained from
discussing them with Madison until the sixth. His first impressions were
"very disagreeable and very confused." Yet he tried, as was his wont, to
see both sides of the question. With the story of the abortive
negotiations was interwoven
... some base propositions on the part of Talleyrand, through one of
his agents, to sell his interest and influence with the Directory
towards soothing difficulties with them, in consideration of a large
sum (fifty thousand pounds sterling); the arguments to which his
agent resorted to induce compliance with this demand were unworthy of
a great nation (could they be imputed to them), and calculated to
excite disgust and indignation in the Republicans particularly, whom
they so far mistake, as to presume an attachment to France and hatred
to the Federal party and not to the love of their country, to be
their first passion.
In the papers, as communicated, Adams had substituted for the names
given by the envoys--Hottinger, Bellamy, and Hauteval--the initials X.
Y. Z., hence the name given at once to the incident.
Whether the French bankers really represented Talleyrand is absolutely
immaterial; the result on American public opinion alone is to be
considered here. According to Jefferson, the public's first reaction was
one of astonishment;[355] furious indignation followed very quickly.
Sprigg's resolution was naturally discarded as not appropriate; war
seemed the order of the day. The last resort left to the remaining
Republicans was to avoid open hostilities with the French Republic and,
not being able to prevent a vote of credits for armaments, to insist
that they should be granted specially for internal defense and
preparation.[356] A more mature consideration of the letters convinced
Jefferson that the door to negotiation was not absolutely closed.[357]
But popular indignation was too strong; riotous scenes took place in the
streets of Philadelphia, addresses from all parts of the country came to
Adams, urging him to stand for national honor and the Federalist press
fanned the flames. The few faithful Republicans grew discouraged and one
by one drifted out of Philadelphia. "Giles, Clopton, Cabell, and
Nicholas have gone," wrote Jefferson on April 26, "and Clay goes
to-morrow. Parker has completely gone over to the war party. In this
state of things they will carry what they please. One of the war party,
in a fit of unguarded passion, declared sometime ago they would pass a
Citizen Bill, an Alien Bill, and a Sedition Bill."[358] Madison,
although urged to take up his pen "for heaven's sake and not desert the
public cause altogether", remained silent in Virginia. Jefferson felt
that the first and second measures were directed against his close
friend Volney,[359] who had been somewhat imprudent. That the republican
press would be muzzled for "the war hawks talk of septembrizing,
deportation and the examples for quelling sedition set by the French
executives. All the firmness of the human mind is now in a state of
requisition."[360]
It is remarkable, and not the smallest achievement of Jefferson, that he
kept a cool head in the midst of this turmoil. Insulted every day in the
press and in public meetings, lampooned and caricatured, he had to
remain silent because of his official position and could not protest to
the government. No stranger political situation could be imagined than
this,--a man recognized as the head of a party opposed to the
government, yet next to the President in rank, without power to defend
himself and to enter into polemics, ostracized, and, as he admitted
himself, "insulated in every society", forced to listen to the reading
of the most detestable things such as the Alien Bill, and still not
indulging in bitterness. A comparison of his letters with those written
by Adams and Hamilton at the same time would constitute the most
extraordinary tribute to his self-mastery. He persisted in seeing some
faint hope and refused to give up the ship.
First there was a possibility that when the merchants would see that
actual war meant War Tax, Land Tax, and Stamp Tax, these measures would
constitute sedatives to cool their ardor. The present session had
already cost two hundred thousand dollars and that was only a beginning.
Furthermore, there was also a possibility that, if an actual declaration
of war could be prevented during the summer, the coming election would
reenforce the republican party. Volney had decided to go back to France
with a few other aliens who had chartered a boat, without waiting for
the enactment of the Alien Bill. Many of them were much irritated, but
Volney at least was "thoroughly impressed with the importance of
preventing war, whether considered with reference to the interests of
the two countries, of the cause of Republicanism, or of man on a broad
scale."[361]
Isolated though he was in Philadelphia, from his room in the
Philosophical Society of which he was president, Jefferson persisted in
hoping against hope. One thing however was to be avoided at all cost. If
the situation became such that the Northern States, Connecticut and
Massachusetts particularly, clearly dominated the situation, it was far
better to submit temporarily and endure even detestable measures than to
break the Union. The beginning of the disaggregation could not be
stopped; a realignment of States conducing to new secessions would
finally be the result. Men must quarrel, and "seeing, therefore, that an
association of men who will not quarrel with one another is a thing
which never yet existed, from the greatest confederacy of nations down
to a town meeting or a vestry; seeing that we must have somebody to
quarrel with, I had rather keep our New England associates for that
purpose, than to see our bickerings transferred to others."[362]
This was a most important declaration and shows to what length Jefferson
was willing to go in order to avoid the only irremediable catastrophe.
Whatever may have been his weaknesses and shortcomings, his
inconsistencies and contradictions, the man who, in the hectic
atmosphere of Philadelphia, was able to put aside his own interests, the
interests of his party, his social and political ideals to think
nationally, was indeed a great American. We may even venture to say that
he was at the time the only great American in the country.
When Marshall came back from France--much to his surprise, as a war hero
and as an avenger of national honor--the Republicans began to take a
less pessimistic view of the situation. After all, the situation was not
so desperate as they had been led to believe; Gerry had remained in
Paris, and negotiations could be resumed. The show of honesty made by
the envoys in Paris was most gratifying to national honor and gave the
public a feeling of triumph over the corrupt practices of European
diplomacy. But with the return of Marshall a new campaign broke out
against Jefferson. Doctor Logan on his own initiative had gone to Europe
in the interest of peace, but had gone mysteriously and without telling
any one of his intentions. It was soon assumed that he had been sent on
an unauthorized and unofficial but highly objectionable mission by the
Jacobins "to solicit an army from France, instruct them as to their
landing, etc.", and Jefferson was again accused of being the arch
plotter. Nothing could be more ridiculous, for the poor doctor was
simply one of those idealistic pacifists who sometimes do more harm than
good, but whose intentions are not open to suspicion.
But popular passions once aroused cannot be silenced in a day and the
efforts of the friends of peace were weak and inefficient. On April 14 a
bill was passed on second reading by the Senate, declaring the treaties
with France void and nonexistent. Adams made it known that he would
refuse Gerry's request that other envoys be sent. If Congress remained
in session in a city where war hysteria had reached a paroxysm, extreme
measures were unavoidable. The only remedy was to adjourn as soon as
possible, for "to separate Congress now, will be withdrawing the fire
from under a boiling pot."[363] Congress did not separate, however,
without authorizing the President to increase the navy, to expend two
hundred fifty thousand dollars for fortifications, to purchase eight
hundred thousand dollars' worth of arms and ammunition, to raise an army
of ten thousand troops and to equip vessels to seize and bring to port
any armed vessels which had attacked American vessels or might be found
"hovering on the coast of the United States for the purpose of
committing depredations on the vessels belonging to the citizens
thereof." On July 6 were passed the famous Alien Bills, and on the
fourteenth, as a sort of defiance to the principles of the French
Revolution, Congress adopted the "Sedition Law", giving power to the
government "to prosecute persons or to prevent the circulating or saying
of any utterance against the Government of the United States, or either
House of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the
United States."