CHAPTER LXXIV.

_Retrospect of Events on the Frontiers--Defection of Murat--Its

consequences--Augereau abandons Franche Comté--Carnot intrusted with

the command of Antwerp--Attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, by Sir Thomas

Graham--The Allies take, and evacuate Soissons--Bulow and

Winzengerode unite with Blucher--Wellington forces his way through

the Pays des Gaves--Royalists in the West--Discontent of the old

Republicans--Views of the different Members of the Alliance as to

the Dynasties of Bourbon, and Napoleon--Proceedings of the Dukes of

Berri and Angoulême, and Monsieur--Battle of Orthez--Bourdeaux

surrendered to Marshal Beresford--Negotiations of Chatillon--Treaty

of Chaumont--Napoleon's contre-projet--Congress at Chatillon broken

up._

While Napoleon was struggling in the campaign of Paris, for his very

existence as a monarch, events were taking place on the frontiers, by

all of which his fate was more or less influenced, and in almost all of

them unfavourably. Of these events we must give a brief detail,

mentioning at the same time, the influence which they individually

produced upon the results of the war.

[Sidenote: DEFECTION OF MURAT.]

The defence of Italy had been committed to Prince Eugene Beauharnois,

the viceroy of that kingdom. He was entirely worthy of the trust, but

was deprived of any means that remained to him of accomplishing his

task, by the defection of Murat. We have often had occasion to describe

Murat as distinguished on the field of battle--rather an undaunted and

high-mettled soldier, than a wise commander. As a sovereign he had

little claim to distinction. He was good tempered, but vain, limited in

capacity, and totally uninformed. Napoleon had not concealed his

contempt of his understanding, and, after the retreat from Russia, had

passed an oblique, but most intelligible censure on him, in a public

bulletin.[344] In writing to the wife of Murat, and his own sister,

Napoleon had mentioned her husband disparagingly, as one who was brave

only on the field of battle, but elsewhere, as weak as a monk or a

woman.[345] Caroline, in answer, cautioned her brother to treat her

husband with more respect. Napoleon, unaccustomed to suppress his

sentiments, continued the same line of language and conduct.[346]

Meanwhile, Murat, in his resentment, listened to terms from Austria, in

which, by the mediation of that state, which was interested in the

recovery of her Italian provinces, England was with difficulty induced

to acquiesce. In consequence of a treaty formed with Austria, Murat

declared himself in favour of the allies, and marched an army of 30,000

Neapolitans to Rome, for the purpose of assisting in the expulsion of

the French from Italy. He speedily occupied Ancona and Florence.[347]

There was already in Italy an army of 30,000 Austrians, with whom the

viceroy had fought the indecisive battle of Roverbello, after which he

retreated to the line of the Adige, on which he made a precarious stand,

until the war was concluded. The appearance of Murat's army on the side

of Austria, though he confined himself to a war of proclamations, was

calculated to end all French influence in Italy. Counter revolutionary

movements, in some of the cantons of Switzerland, and in the mountains

of Savoy, tended also to close the door through which Buonaparte had so

often transferred the war into the Italian peninsula, and from its

northern provinces, into the heart of Austria herself.

[Sidenote: AUGEREAU.]

The defection of Murat had the further effect of disconcerting the

measures which Napoleon had meditated, for recovery of the south-eastern

frontier of France. Augereau had received orders to advance from Lyons,

and receive the reinforcements which Eugene was to have despatched from

Italy across the Alps. These, it was calculated, would have given the

French maréchal a decisive superiority, which might have enabled him to

ascend towards the sources of the Saonne, call to arms the hardy

peasantry of the Vosgesian mountains, interrupt the communications of

the Austrian army, and excite a national and guerilla warfare in the

rear of the allies.

To stimulate more highly the energies of his early comrade in arms,

Napoleon caused the Empress, Maria Louisa, to wait upon the young

Duchess of Castiglione (the maréchal's wife,) to prevail on her to use

her influence with her husband, to exert all his talents and audacity

in the present crisis.[348] It was a singular feature of the declension

of power, when it was thought that the command of the Emperor, imposed

upon one of his maréchals, might require being enforced by the

interposition of a lady; or rather, it implied that Napoleon was

sensible that he was requiring of his officer something which no

ordinary exertions could enable him to perform. He wrote, however, to

Augereau himself, conjuring him to remember his early victories, and to

forget that he was upwards of fifty years old. But exhortations, whether

by a sovereign or lady, cannot supply the want of physical force.

Augereau was unable to execute the task imposed upon him, from not

receiving the Italian reinforcements, which, as matters stood in Italy,

Eugene could not possibly spare. Detachments from Suchet's Spanish

veterans did indeed join the maréchal at Lyons, and enabled him to

advance on General Bubna, whom he compelled to retreat to Geneva. But

the arrival of General Bianchi, with a strong reinforcement, which

Schwartzenberg had despatched for that purpose, restored the ascendency

of the allied armies on that frontier, especially as the Prince of

Hesse-Homberg also approached from Switzerland at the head of the

Austrian reserves. The last general had no difficulty in securing the

passes of Saonne. Augereau in consequence was compelled to abandon the

country of Gex and Franche Comté, and again to return under the walls of

Lyons. Napoleon was not more complaisant to his old comrade and

tutor,[349] than he had been to the other maréchals in this campaign,

who had not accomplished tasks which they had not the means to achieve.

Augereau was publicly censured as being inactive and unenterprising.

The north of Germany and Flanders were equally lost to France, and

French interest. Hamburgh indeed still held out. But, as we have already

said, it was besieged, or rather blockaded, by the allies, under

Bennigsen, to whom the Crown Prince of Sweden had left that charge, when

he himself, having put an end to the war with Denmark, had advanced

towards Cologne, with the purpose of assisting in clearing Belgium of

the French, and then entering France from that direction, in support of

the Silesian army. The Crown Prince showed no personal willingness to

engage in the invasion of France. The causes which might deter him have

been already conjectured. The Royalists added another, that he had

formed views of placing himself at the head of the government of France,

which the allied monarchs declined to gratify. It is certain that,

whether from the motives of prudence or estrangement, he was, after his

arrival in Flanders, no longer to be considered as an active member of

the coalition.

In the meantime, Antwerp was bravely and scientifically defended by the

veteran republican, Carnot. This celebrated statesman and engineer had

always opposed himself to the strides which Napoleon made towards

arbitrary power, and had voted against his election to the situation of

consul for life, and that of emperor. It does not appear that Napoleon

resented this opposition. He had been obliged to Carnot before his

unexampled rise, and afterwards, he was so far mindful of him as to

cause his debts to be paid at a moment of embarrassment. Carnot, on his

part, took the invasion of France as a signal for every Frenchman to use

his talents in the public defence, and, offering his services to the

Emperor, was intrusted with the command of Antwerp.

Bergen-op-Zoom was also still occupied by the French. This city, one of

the most strongly fortified in the world, was nearly taken by a

_coup-de-main_, by Sir Thomas Graham. After a night-attack of the

boldest description, the British columns were so far successful, that

all ordinary obstacles seemed overcome. But their success was followed

by a degree of disorder which rendered it unavailing, and many of the

troops who had entered the town were killed, or obliged to surrender.

Thus an enterprise ably planned and bravely executed, miscarried even in

the moment of victory, by accidents for which neither the general nor

the officers immediately in command could be justly held

responsible.[350] General Graham was, however, reinforced from England,

and was still enabled, with the help of the Swedes and Danes, as well as

Dutch and Flemish corps, to check any sallies from Bergen or from

Antwerp.

The liberation of the Low Countries being so nearly accomplished, Bulow

pressed forward on La Fère, and finally occupied Laon. Here, upon the

26th of February, he formed a junction with Winzengerode, who,

bequeathing Juliers, Venloo, and Maestricht, to the observation of the

Crown Prince, marched through the forest of Ardennes. Soissons offered a

show of desperate resistance, but the commandant being killed, the place

was delivered up. This was on the 13th February, and the allies ought to

have held this important place. But in their haste to join Prince

Blucher, they evacuated Soissons, which Mortier caused to be presently

reoccupied by a strong French garrison. The possession of this town

became shortly afterwards a matter of great consequence. In the

meantime, Bulow and Winzengerode, with their two additional armies,

entered into communication with Blucher, of whom they now formed the

rear-guard, and more than restored to him the advantage he had lost by

the defeats at Montmirail and Champ-Aubert.

On the south-western frontier the horizon seemed yet darker. The Duke of

Wellington having entered Spain, was about to force his way through the

strong country, called the _Pays des Gaves_, the land that is, of the

ravines formed by rivers and torrents. He maintained such severe

discipline, and paid with such regularity for the supplies which he

needed from the country, that he was voluntarily furnished with

provisions of every kind; while the army of Soult, though stationed in

the maréchal's own country, obtained none, save by the scanty and

unwilling means of military requisition. In consequence of this strict

discipline, the presence of the British troops was far from being

distressing to the country; and some efforts made by General Harispe, to

raise guerillas among his countrymen, the Basques, to act on the Duke of

Wellington's rear, became totally ineffectual. The small seaport town of

St. Jean de Luz supplied the English army with provisions and

reinforcements. The activity of English commerce speedily sent cargoes

of every kind into the harbour, where before were only to be seen a few

fishing-boats. The goods were landed under a tariff of duties settled by

the Duke of Wellington; and so ended the Continental System.

[Sidenote: ROYALISTS OF THE WEST.]

In the meantime, the state of the west of France was such as held out

the highest political results to the British, in case they should be

able to overcome the obstacles presented by the strong intrenched camp

at Bayonne, on which Soult rested his right flank, extending a line of

great length upon the Adour and the neighbouring Gaves.

We have mentioned already the confederacy of Royalists, which was now in

full activity, and extended by faithful agents through the whole west of

France. They were now at their post, and preparing every thing for an

explosion. The police of Buonaparte were neither ignorant of the

existence nor purpose of this conspiracy, but they were unable to obtain

such precise information as should detect and crush it. The two Messrs.

de Polignac were deeply engaged, and, becoming the subjects of

suspicion, it was only by a dexterous and speedy flight from Paris that

they eluded captivity, or perhaps death. They succeeded in reaching the

army of the allies, and were, it is believed, the first who conveyed to

the Emperor Alexander an exact state of the royal party in the interior

of France, particularly in the capital, which made a powerful impression

on the mind of that prince.

Throughout the west of France there started up a thousand agents of a

party, which were now to awake from a sleep of twenty years. Bourdeaux,

with its loyal mayor, Count Lynch, and the greater part of its citizens,

was a central point of the association. A great part of the inhabitants

were secretly regimented and embodied, and had arms in their possession,

and artillery, gunpowder, and ball, concealed in their warehouses. The

celebrated La Rochejacquelein, made immortal by the simple and sublime

narrative of his consort, solicited the cause of the Royalists at the

English headquarters, and made repeated and perilous journeys from

thence to Bourdeaux, and back again. Saintonge and La Vendée were

organised for insurrection by a loyal clergyman, the Abbé Jaqualt. The

brothers of Roche-Aymon prepared Perigord for a struggle. The Duke of

Duras had engaged a thousand gentlemen at Touraine. Lastly, the Chouans

had again prepared for a rising under the Count de Vitray, and

Tranquille, a celebrated leader, called _Le Capitaine sans peur_.

Numerous bands of refractory conscripts, rendered desperate by their

state of outlawry, were ready at Angèrs, Nantes, and Orleans, to take

arms in the cause of the Bourbons, under the Count de l'Orge, Monsieur

d'Airac, Count Charles d'Autichamp, the Count de Suzannet, and

Caudoudal, brother of the celebrated Georges, and his equal in courage

and resolution. But all desired the previous advance of the

_Blue-Flints_, as they called the English, their own being of a

different colour. Trammelled by the negotiation at Chatillon, and

various other political impediments, and anxious especially not to lead

these high-spirited gentlemen into danger, by encouraging a premature

rising, the English ministers at home, and the English general in

France, were obliged for a time to restrain rather than encourage the

forward zeal of the Royalists.

Such caution was the more necessary, as there existed at the same time

another conspiracy, also directed against Buonaparte's person, or at

least his authority; and it was of importance that neither should

explode until some means could be found of preventing their checking and

counteracting each other. This second class of malecontents consisted of

those, who, like Buonaparte himself, owed their political consequence to

the Revolution; and who, without regard to the Bourbons, were desirous

to get free of the tyranny of Napoleon. These were the disappointed and

degraded Republicans, the deceived Constitutionalists, all who had hoped

and expected that the Revolution would have paved the way for a free

government, in which the career of preferment should be open to talents

of every description--a lottery in which, doubtless, each hoped that his

own abilities would gain some important prize. The sceptre of Napoleon

had weighed harder upon this class than even upon the Royalists. He had

no dislike to the principles of the latter, abstractedly considered; he

felt some respect for their birth and titles, and only wished to

transfer their affections from the House of Bourbon, and to attach them

to that of Napoleon. Accordingly, he distributed employments and honours

among such of the old noblesse as could be brought to accept them, and

obviously felt pride in drawing to his court names and titles, known in

the earlier periods of French history. Besides, until circumstances

shook his throne, and enlarged their means of injuring him, he

considered the number of the Royalists as small, and their power as

despicable. But from those active spirits, who had traded in revolution

after revolution for so many years, he had much more both to fear and to

dislike, especially as they were now understood to be headed by his

ex-minister Talleyrand, with whose talents, both for scheming and

executing political changes, he had so much reason to be

acquainted.[351] To this class of his enemies he imputed the hardy

attempt which was made, not without prospects of success, to overthrow

his government during his absence in Russia. "You have the tail, but not

the head," had been the words of the principal conspirator, when about

to be executed; and they still rung in the ears of Buonaparte. It was

generally supposed, that his long stay in Paris, ere he again took the

field against the allies, was dictated by his fear of some similar

explosion to that of Mallet's conspiracy. Whether these two separate

classes of the enemies of Buonaparte communicated with each other, we

have no opportunity of knowing, but they both had intercourse with the

allies. That of Talleyrand's faction was, we believe, maintained at the

court of London, through means of a near relation of his own, who

visited England shortly before the opening of the campaign of which we

treat. We have no doubt, that through some similar medium Talleyrand

held communication with the Bourbons; and that, in the same manner as

the English Restoration was brought about by a union between the

Cavaliers and Presbyterians, there was even then upon foot some treaty

of accommodation, by which the exiled monarch was, in regaining the

crown, to have the assistance of those, whom, for want of another name,

we shall call Constitutionalists, it being understood that his

government was to be established on the basis of a free model.

It was of the greatest importance that both these factions should be

cautious in their movements, until it should appear what course the

allied monarchs were about to pursue in the impending negotiation with

Buonaparte. The issue of this was the more dubious, as it was generally

understood that though the sovereigns were agreed on the great point of

destroying, on the one hand, the supremacy of France, and, on the other,

in leaving her in possession of her just weight and influence, they

entertained a difference of opinion as to the arrangement of her future

government.

[Sidenote: THE BOURBONS.]

The Prince Regent of England, from the generosity of his own

disposition, as well as from a clear and comprehensive view of future

possibilities, entertained views favourable to the Bourbons. This

illustrious person justly conjectured, that free institutions would be

more likely to flourish under the restored family, who would receive

back their crown under conditions favourable to freedom, than under any

modification of the revolutionary system, which must always, in the case

of Buonaparte's being permitted to reign, be felt as implying

encroachments on his imperial power. The Bourbons, in the case presumed,

might be supposed to count their winnings, in circumstances where the

tenacious and resentful mind of Napoleon would brood over his losses;

and it might be feared, that with a return of fortune he might struggle

to repair them. But there were ministers in the British cabinet who were

afraid of incurring the imputation of protracting the war by announcing

England's adoption of the cause of the Bourbons, which was now of a date

somewhat antiquated, and to which a sort of unhappy fatality had

hitherto been annexed. England's interest in the royal cause was,

therefore, limited to good wishes.

The Emperor Alexander shared in the inclination which all sovereigns

must have felt towards this unhappy family, whose cause was in some

degree that of princes in general. It was understood that Moreau's

engagement with the Russian monarch had been founded upon an express

assurance on the part of Alexander, that the Bourbons were to be

restored to the Crown of France under the limitations of a free

constitution. Prussia, from her close alliance with Russia, and the

personal causes of displeasure which existed betwixt Frederick and

Napoleon, was certain to vote for the downfall of the latter.

But the numerous armies of Austria, and her vicinity to the scene of

action, rendered her aid indispensable to the allies, while the alliance

betwixt her Imperial house and this once fortunate soldier, threw much

perplexity into their councils. It was believed that the Emperor of

Austria would insist upon Buonaparte's being admitted to treat as

sovereign of France, providing the latter gave sufficient evidence that

he would renounce his pretensions to general supremacy; or, if he

continued unreasonably obstinate, that the Emperor Francis would desire

that a regency should be established, with Maria Louisa at its head.

Either course, if adopted, would have been a death's-blow to the hopes

of the exiled family of Bourbon.

Amid this uncertainty, the princes of the House of Bourbon gallantly

determined to risk their own persons in France, and try what their

presence might do to awake ancient remembrances at a crisis so

interesting.

Although the British Ministry refused to afford any direct countenance

to the schemes of the Bourbon family, they could not, in ordinary

justice, deny the more active members of that unhappy race the freedom

of acting as they themselves might judge most for the interest of their

cause and adherents. To their applications for permission to depart for

France, they received from the British Ministry the reply, that the

princes of the House of Bourbon were the guests, not the prisoners, of

Britain; and although the present state of public affairs precluded her

from expressly authorising any step which they might think proper to

take, yet they were free to quit her territories, and return to them at

their pleasure. Under a sanction so general, the Duke d'Angoulême set

sail for St. Jean de Luz, to join the army of the Duke of Wellington;

the Duke de Berri for Jersey, to correspond with the Royalists of

Brittany; and Monsieur for Holland, from which he gained the frontiers

of Switzerland, and entered France in the rear of the Austrian armies.

The movements of the two last princes produced no effects of

consequence.

The Duke de Berri paused in the isle of Jersey, on receiving some

unpleasant communications from France respecting the strength of the

existing government, and on discovering, it is said, a plot to induce

him to land at a point, where he must become the prisoner of Buonaparte.

Monsieur entered France, and was received at Vesoul with great

enthusiasm. But this movement was not encouraged by the Austrian

commandants and generals; and Monsieur's proposal to raise corps of

Royalists in Alsace and Franche Comté, was treated with coldness,

approaching to contempt. The execution of Gouault at Troyes, and the

decree of death against the Royalists, struck terror into the party,

which was increased by the retrograde movement of the grand army. The

enterprise of Monsieur, therefore, had no immediate result, though

undoubtedly his presence had a decisive effect, in consequence of

ultimate events; and the restoration would hardly have taken place,

without that prince having so adventured his person.

The arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême in the army of the Duke of

Wellington, had more immediate consequences. His royal highness could

only be received as a volunteer, but the effect of his arrival was soon

visible. La Rochejacquelein, who had dedicated to the royal cause his

days and nights, his fortune and his life, soon appeared in the British

camp, urging the general to direct his march on the city of Bourdeaux,

which, when delivered from the vicinity of Soult's army, would instantly

declare itself for the Bourbons, and be followed by the rising of

Guienne, Anjou, and Languedoc. Humanity, as well as policy, induced the

Duke of Wellington still to hesitate. He knew how frequently patriotic

enthusiasm makes promises beyond its power to fulfil; and he cautioned

the zealous envoy to beware of a hasty declaration, since the

conferences at Chatillon were still continued, and there was a

considerable chance of their ending in a peace between the allies and

Napoleon. La Rochejacquelein, undeterred by remonstrances, continued to

urge his suit with such intelligence and gallantry, as to receive at

last the encouraging answer, "Remain a few days at headquarters, and you

shall see us force the Gaves."

[Sidenote: THE BATTLE OF ORTHEZ.]

Here, accordingly, commenced a series of scientific manœuvres,

commencing 14th February, by which the Duke of Wellington, pressing step

by step on that part of the French army which were on the left side of

the Adour, drove them successively beyond the Gave de Mauleon, and the

Gave d'Oleron. On the right side of the latter Gave, the French took a

position on a very strong ground in front of the town of Orthez, where,

joined by Clausel and a strong reinforcement, Soult endeavoured to make

a stand. The Duke of Wellington commenced his attack on the enemy's

right, storming and taking the village by which it was commanded. The

desperate resistance which the enemy made on this point, occasioned one

of those critical movements, when a general is called upon, in the heat

of battle, to alter all previous arrangements, and, in the moment of

doubt, confusion, and anxiety, to substitute new combinations to

supersede those which have been planned in the hours of cool

premeditation. A left attack upon a chain of heights extending along

General Soult's left, was substituted for that to which Wellington had

at first trusted for victory.

At the same time, the appearance of General Hill's division, who had

forded the river, or Gave, above Orthez, and threatened the enemy's

flank and rear, made the defeat complete. For some time Marshal Soult

availed himself of the alertness of his troops, by halting and taking

new positions, to preserve at least the form of a regular retreat; but

at length, forced from one line to another by the manœuvres of the

British, sustaining new losses at every halt, and menaced by the rapid

approach of General Hill's division, his retreat became a flight, in

which the French suffered great loss. Whole battalions of conscripts

dispersed entirely, and many left their muskets regularly piled, as if

intimating their fixed resolution to retire altogether from the contest.

Another action near Aires, by General Hill, and the passage of the

Adour, under Bayonne, by the Honourable Sir John Hope, a manœuvre

which might well be compared to a great battle fought, gave fresh

influence to the British arms. Bayonne was invested, the road to

Bourdeaux laid open, and Soult, left with scarce the semblance of an

army, retreated towards Tarbes, to secure a junction with such French

corps as might be returning from Spain.

The battle of Orthez, with the brilliant and masterly manœuvres which

preceded and followed it, served to establish the superiority of the

British forces in points wherein they had till then been deemed most

deficient. Since the victories in Spain, it was no longer uncommon to

hear a French officer allow, that in the extreme tug of conflict, the

English soldier, from physical strength and high energy of character,

had perhaps some degree of superiority over his own impetuous but less

persevering countrymen. But he uniformly qualified such a stretch of

candour, by claiming for the French superior skill in contriving, and

promptitude in executing, those previous movements, on which the fate of

battles usually depends. The victory of Salamanca, though gained over a

general distinguished as a tactician, and in consequence of a previous

contest of manœuvres, was not admitted to contradict the opinion with

which Frenchmen were generally impressed. Yet, since the commencement of

the campaign on the Adour, the French army, though under command of the

celebrated Soult (_le Vieux Renard_, as he was familiarly called by his

soldiers,) was checked, turned, outmarched, and outflanked, on every

occasion; driven from position to position, in a country that affords so

many of peculiar strength, without having it in their power to injure

their victors by a protracted defence; and repeatedly defeated, not by

main force or superiority of number, but by a combination of movements,

at once so boldly conceived and so admirably executed, as left

throughout the whole contest the palm of science, as well as of enduring

energy and physical hardihood, with the British soldier. These

victories, besides adding another laurel to the thick-woven chaplet of

the English general, had the most decisive effect on the future events

of the war, as well as upon the public mind in the south of France.

[Sidenote: SURRENDER OF BOURDEAUX.]

Bourdeaux being thus left to follow the inclinations of the inhabitants,

and encouraged by the approach of an English detachment of 15,000 men,

under Field-Marshal Beresford, poured out its multitudes to receive the

Duke d'Angoulême. The numbers which thronged out of the city were

computed to be at least 10,000 persons. The mayor, Count Lynch, in a

short speech, told the English general, that if he approached as a

conqueror, he needed not his interposition to possess himself of the

keys of Bourdeaux; but if he came as an ally of their lawful sovereign,

he was ready to tender them up, with every token of love, honour and

affection. Field-Marshal Beresford reiterated his promises of

protection, and expressed his confidence in the loyalty of the city of

Bourdeaux. The mayor then uttered the long-forgotten signal cry of _Vive

le Roi!_ and it was echoed a thousand times from the thousands around.

Count Lynch then, pulling the three-coloured cockade from his hat,

assumed the white cockade of the Bourbons. All imitated his example, and

at a concerted signal, the old ensign of loyalty streamed from the

steeples and towers of the city, amid general acclamation.[352]

The enthusiasm with which the signals of loyalty were adopted, and the

shouts of _Vive le Roi_, repeated on all hands, mingled with blessings

upon the heads of the English and their leaders, formed a scene which

those who witnessed it will not speedily forget. It was a renewal of

early affections and attachments, which seemed long dead and

forgotten--a general burst of feelings the more generous and affecting,

because they were not only as disinterested as spontaneous, but might

eventually be deeply fraught with danger to those who expressed them.

Yet they were uttered with a generous enthusiasm, that placed the actors

far above the apprehension of personal consequences.

The same lively acclamations hailed the entrance of the Duke d'Angoulême

into this fine city. At the prince's entry, the inhabitants crowded

round him with enthusiasm. The archbishop and clergy of the diocese

recognised him; _Te Deum_ was sung in full pomp, while the united

banners of France, Britain, Spain, and Portugal, were hoisted on the

walls of the town. Lord Dalhousie was left commandant of the British;

and if excellent sense, long experience, the most perfect equality of

temper, and unshaken steadiness, be necessary qualities in so delicate a

trust, the British army had not one more fit for the charge.

Brilliant as these tidings were, they excited in Britain the most cruel

apprehensions for the fate which Bourdeaux might incur, if this

declaration should unhappily prove to be premature. The treaty at

Chatillon seemed to approach a termination, and vessels are said to have

been despatched to the Gironde, to favour the escape of such citizens as

might be most obnoxious to the vengeance of Buonaparte. Many of those

who wished most for British success, were tempted to regret that the

victory of Orthez had taken place; so great were their apprehensions for

those who had been encouraged by that success, to declare against the

government of Napoleon ere his power of injuring them was at an end.

That we may see how far those fears were warranted, we shall hastily

review the progress of this remarkable negotiation, of which, however,

the secret history is not even now entirely known.

The propositions for peace had begun with the communication of the Baron

St. Aignan, which had been discussed at Frankfort. The terms then

proposed to Napoleon were, that, abandoning all his wider conquests,

France should retire within the course of the Rhine and the barrier of

the Alps. Napoleon had accepted these conditions as a basis, under a

stipulation, however, which afforded a pretext for breaking off the

treaty at pleasure, namely, that France was to be admitted to liberty of

commerce and navigation; an implied challenge of the maritime law, as

exercised by the British. To this, the Earl of Aberdeen, the able and

accomplished representative of Britain, replied, that France should

enjoy such liberty of commerce and navigation as she had any right to

expect.[353] A subject of debate, and a most important one, was thus

left open; and perhaps neither of those powers were displeased to

possess a means of disturbing the progress of the treaty, according to

what should prove the events of the war.

Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, the minister of foreign affairs, was the

representative of Napoleon, at Chatillon, upon this most important

occasion. His first instructions, dated 4th January, 1814, restricted

him to the basis proposed at Frankfort which assigned Belgium to France,

thus conceding to the latter what Napoleon now called her natural

boundaries, although it certainly did not appear, why, since victory had

extended her frontiers by so many additional kingdoms, defeat should not

now have the natural effect of retrenching them.[354] But after the

inauspicious commencement of the campaign, by the battle of Brienne, in

which Napoleon gained little, and that of La Rothière, in which he was

defeated, he saw that as peace, like the Books of the Sibyls (to the

sale of which the negotiation has been compared,) would rise in price,

circumstances might render it necessary, also, that peace should be made

by Caulaincourt without communication with Napoleon. Depending upon the

events of war, it might be possible that a favourable day, nay, an hour

being suffered to elapse, might put the treaty out of his reach. For

these reasons, Caulaincourt was intrusted, over and above his

instructions, with a definitive and unlimited carte-blanche, in which he

was empowered to "bring the negotiation to a happy issue, to save the

capital, and prevent the hazards of a battle, on which must rest the

last hopes of the nation."[355]

[Sidenote: NEGOTIATIONS AT CHATILLON.]

Caulaincourt reached Chatillon sur Seine, which had been declared

neutral for the purpose of the conferences. At this memorable congress,

Count Stadion represented Austria, Count Razumowski Russia, Baron

Humboldt Prussia, and Great Britain had three commissioners present,

namely; Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart. Every

politeness was shown on the part of the French, who even offered the

English ministers the advantage of corresponding directly with London by

the way of Calais; a courtesy which was declined with thanks.

The commissioners of the allies were not long in expressing what

Napoleon's fears had anticipated. They declared, that they would no

longer abide by the basis proposed at Frankfort. "To obtain peace,

France must be restricted within her ancient limits," which excluded the

important acquisition of Belgium. Baron Fain[356] gives us an

interesting account of the mode in which Napoleon received this

communication. He retired for a time into his own apartment, and sent

for Berthier and Maret. They came--he gave them the fatal despatch--they

read, and a deep silence ensued. The two faithful ministers flung

themselves at their master's feet, and with tears in their eyes implored

him to give way to the necessity of the time. "Never," he replied, "will

I break the oath by which I swore at my coronation, to maintain the

integrity of the territories of the _Republic_, and never will I leave

France less in extent than I found her. It would not only be France that

would retreat, but Austria and Prussia who would advance. France indeed

needs peace, but such a peace is worse than the most inveterate war.

What answer would I have to the Republicans, when they should demand

from me the barrier of the Rhine? No--write to Caulaincourt that I

reject the treaty, and will rather abide the brunt of battle." Shortly

after he is said to have exclaimed, "I am yet nearer to Munich than they

are to Paris."

His counsellors were not discouraged. In a cooler moment, the ministers

who watched his pillow, obtained from him permission that the treaty

should proceed. He directed that the articles proposed by the allies

should be sent to Paris, and the advice of each privy counsellor taken

individually upon the subject. With one exception, that of Count Lacuée

de Cessac, all the privy counsellors agreed that the terms proposed at

Chatillon ought to be subscribed to. Thus sanctioned, Caulaincourt, on

the 9th of February, wrote to the commissioners of the allies, that if

an immediate armistice were entered into, he was ready to consent that

France should retreat within her ancient limits, according to the basis

proposed. He offered, also, that France should cede instantly, on

condition of the armistice being granted, some of the strong places,

which their acceptance of the terms offered obliged her to yield up. But

this offer of ceding the fortresses was clogged with secret conditions,

to be afterwards explained. The allies declared their readiness to

adhere to these preliminaries, and for a day the war might be considered

as ended.

But, in the meantime, the successes which Napoleon obtained over Blucher

at Montmirail and Champ-Aubert, had elevated him in his own opinion

above the necessity in which he stood after the battle of Brienne. From

the field of battle at Nangis, he wrote to Caulaincourt to assume an

attitude less humiliating among the members of the Congress;[357] and

after the defeat of the Prince of Wirtemberg, at the bridge of

Montereau, and the retreat of the grand army from Craonne, he seems to

have entirely resolved to break off the treaty.

[Sidenote: CONGRESS AT CHATILLON.]

When Schwartzenberg, as we have seen, demanded the meaning of Napoleon's

offensive movement, contrary to what had been agreed upon by the

congress at Chatillon, he answered, by the letter to the Emperor of

Austria, in which he rejected the conditions to which Caulaincourt had

agreed, and reprobated them as terms which, if known in Paris, would

excite general indignation. "It would realise," he said, "the dream of

Burke, who desired to make France disappear from the map of Europe. It

was placing England[358] in possession of Antwerp and the Low Countries,

neither of which he would ever surrender."[359]

In the same spirit, and at the same time, Napoleon wrote to

Caulaincourt, that "when he had given him his carte-blanche, it was for

the purpose of saving Paris, and Paris was now saved; it was for

avoiding the risk of a battle--that risk was over, and the battle won;

he therefore revoked the extraordinary powers with which his ambassador

was invested."[360]

We will not stop to inquire into the diplomatic question, whether

Caulaincourt had not effectually exercised, on 9th February, those

powers which were not recalled until the 17th, six days after; and,

consequently, whether his master was not bound, by the act of his envoy,

beyond the power of retracting. Enough remains to surprise us in

Napoleon's headstrong resolution to continue the war, when, in fact, it

was already ended upon terms which had been recommended by all his

counsellors, one excepted. His obligation to the Republic of France, to

maintain the integrity of its territories, could scarcely remain binding

on one, by whom that very Republic had been destroyed; and at any rate,

no such engagement can bind a sovereign from acting in extremity as the

safety of the community requires. Far less could the terms be said to

dishonour France, or strike her out of the map of Europe, unless her

honour and existence, which had flourished for twelve centuries,

depended upon an acquisition which she had made within twenty years. But

the real case was, that Buonaparte always connected the loss of honour

with the surrender of whatever he conceived himself to have a chance of

being able to retain. Every cession was to be wrung from him; he would

part with nothing willingly; and, like a child with its toys, that of

which there was any attempt to deprive him, became immediately the most

valuable of his possessions. Antwerp, indeed, had a particular right to

be considered as inestimable. The sums he had bestowed on its

magnificent basins, and almost impregnable fortifications, were immense.

He had always the idea that he might make Antwerp the principal station

of a large navy. He clung to this vision of a fleet, even at Elba and

Saint Helena, repeating often, that he might have saved his crown, if he

would have resigned Antwerp at Chatillon; and no idea was more riveted

in his mind, than that his refusal was founded on patriotic principles.

Yet the chief value of Antwerp lay in the event of another war with

Great Britain, for which Buonaparte was thus preparing, while the

question was, how the present hostilities were to be closed; and surely

the possibility of a navy which had no existence, should not have been

placed in competition with the safety of a nation deeply emperilled by

the war now waging in the very centre of his kingdom.[361] This he saw

in a different light from that of calm reason. "If I am to receive

flagellation," he said, "let it be at least under terms of

compulsion."[362]

Lastly, the temporary success which he had attained in the field of

battle, was of a character which, justly considered, ought not to have

encouraged the French Emperor to continue war, but, on the contrary,

might have furnished a precious opportunity for making peace, before the

very sword's point was at his throat. The conditions which he might have

made in this moment of temporary success, would have had the appearance

of being gracefully ceded, rather than positively extorted by necessity.

And it may be added, that the allies, startled by their losses, would

have probably granted him better terms; and certainly, remembering his

military talents, would have taken care to observe those which they

might fix upon. The reverses, therefore, in the month of February, which

obscured the arms of the combined monarchs, resembled the cloud, which,

in Byron's tale, is described as passing over the moon to afford an

impenitent renegade the last and limited term for repentance.[363] But

the heart of Napoleon, like that of Alp, was too proud to profit by the

interval of delay thus afforded to him.

The truth seems to be, that Buonaparte never seriously intended to make

peace at Chatillon; and while his negotiator, Caulaincourt, was

instructed to hold out to the allies a proposal to cede the frontier

fortresses, he received from the Duke of Bassano the following private

directions:--"The Emperor desires that you would avoid explaining

yourself clearly upon every thing which may relate to delivering up the

fortresses of Antwerp, Mayence, and Alexandria, if you should be obliged

to consent to these cessions; his Majesty intending, even though he

should have ratified the treaty, to be guided by the military situation

of affairs:--wait till the last moment. The bad faith of the allies in

respect to the capitulations of Dresden, Dantzic, and Gorcum, authorises

us to endeavour not to be duped. Refer, therefore, these questions to a

military arrangement, as was done at Presburg, Vienna, and Tilsit. His

Majesty desires that you would not lose sight of the disposition which

he will feel, _not to deliver up those three keys of France_, if

military events, on which he is willing still to rely, should permit him

not to do so, _even if he should have signed the cession of all these

provinces_. In a word, his Majesty wishes to be able, after the treaty,

to be guided by existing circumstances, to the last moment. He orders

you to burn this letter as soon as you have read it."

[Sidenote: TREATY OF CHAUMONT.]

The allies showed, on their side, that the obstinacy of Napoleon had

increased, not diminished their determination to carry on the war. A new

treaty, called that of Chaumont, was entered into upon the 1st of March,

between Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, by which the high

contracting parties bound themselves each to keep up an army of 150,000

men, with an agreement on the part of Great Britain, to advance four

millions to carry on the war, which was to be prosecuted without

relaxation, until France should be reduced within her ancient limits;

and what further indicated the feelings of both parties, the military

commissioners, who had met at Lusigny, to settle the terms of an

armistice, broke up, on pretence of being unable to agree upon a

suitable line of demarcation.[364]

The principal negotiation continued to languish at Chatillon, but

without much remaining hope being entertained, by those who were well

informed on either side, of the result being favourable.

On the 7th March, Rumigny, a clerk of Buonaparte's cabinet, brought to

the Emperor, on the evening of the bloody battle of Craonne, the

ultimatum of the allies, insisting that the French envoy should either

proceed to treat upon the basis they had offered, namely, that France

should be reduced within her ancient limits, or that Caulaincourt should

present a _contre-projet_. His plenipotentiary requested instructions;

but it appears that Buonaparte, too able not to see the result of his

pertinacity, yet too haughty to recede from it, had resolved, in

sportsman's phrase, to die hard. The 10th day of March having passed

over, without any answer arriving from Buonaparte to Caulaincourt, the

term assigned to him for declaring his ultimatum was extended to five

days; the plenipotentiary of France hoping, probably, that some decisive

event in the field of battle would either induce his master to consent

to the terms of the allies, or give him a right to obtain better.

It is said, that, during this interval, Prince Wenceslaus of

Lichtenstein was again despatched by the Emperor Francis, to the

headquarters of Napoleon, as a special envoy, for the purpose of

conjuring him to accommodate his ultimatum to the articles settled as

the basis of the conferences, and informing him that otherwise the

Emperor Francis would lay aside those family considerations, which had

hitherto prevented him from acceding to the dispositions of the other

allied powers in favour of the dynasty of Bourbon. It is added, that

Buonaparte seemed at first silenced and astounded by this intimation;

but, immediately recovering himself, treated it as a vain threat held

out to intimidate him, and said it would be most for the interest of

Austria to join in procuring him a peace on his own terms, since

otherwise, he might again be forced to cross the Rhine. The Austrian

prince retired without reply; and from that moment, it has been

supposed, the Emperor resigned his son-in-law, without further effort in

his favour, to the consequences of his own ill-timed obstinacy.[365]

Caulaincourt, in the meanwhile, played the part of an able minister and

active negotiator. He kept the negotiation as long afloat as possible,

and in the meantime, used every argument to induce his master to close

with the terms of the allies. At length, however, he was compelled to

produce a _contre-projet_, which he hoped might have at least the effect

of prolonging the negotiation.

[Sidenote: CONGRESS DISSOLVED.]

But the plan he offered was not only too vague to serve the purpose of

amusing the allies, but too inconsistent with the articles adopted by

all parties as the basis of the conference, to be a moment listened to.

He demanded the whole line of the Rhine--he demanded great part of that

of the Waal, and the fortress of Nimeguen, which must have rendered the

independence of Holland purely nominal--he required Italy, and even

Venice, for Eugene Beauharnois, although this important article was not

only in absolute contradiction to the basis of the treaty, but

peculiarly offensive and injurious to Austria, whom it was so much

Buonaparte's interest to conciliate. The possession of Italy embraced,

of course, that of Switzerland, either directly or by influence; so that

in future wars Austria would lie open to the incursions of France along

her whole frontier, and, while concluding a victorious treaty upon

French ground, would have been placed in a worse situation than by that

which Buonaparte himself dictated to her at Campo Formio! There were

stipulations, besides, for indemnities to Jerome, the phantom king of

Westphalia; to Louis, Grand Duke of Berg; and to Eugene, in compensation

of his alleged rights on the grand duchy of Frankfort. Nay, as if

determined to show that nothing which he had ever done, even though

undone by himself, should now be considered as null, without exacting

compensation at the expense of the rest of Europe, Buonaparte demanded

an indemnity for his brother Joseph, not indeed for the crown of Spain,

but for that very throne of Naples, from which he had himself displaced

him, in order to make room for Murat! The assembled congress received

this imperious communication with equal surprise and displeasure.[366]

They instantly declared the congress dissolved; and thus terminated the

fears of many, who considered Europe as in greater danger from any

treaty that could be made with Buonaparte, than from the progress of his

arms against the allies.

It was the opinion of such men, and their number was very considerable,

that no peace concluded with Napoleon could be permanent, and that any

immediate terms of composition could be only an armed truce, to last

until the Emperor of France should feel himself able to spend the

remainder of his life in winning back again the conquests which he had

spent the earlier part of it in gaining. They insisted that this was

visible, from his breaking off the treaty on the subject of Antwerp; the

chief utility of which, to his empire, must have been in the future wars

which he meditated with Britain. It was seeking war through peace, not

peace by war. Such reasoners were no doubt in many cases prejudiced

against Napoleon's person, and inclined to consider his government as a

usurpation. But others allowed that Napoleon, abstractedly considered,

was not a worse man than other conquerors, but that a run of success so

long uninterrupted, had made war and conquest so familiar to his soul,

that to use an expression of the poet, the "earthquake voice of victory"

was to him the necessary and indispensable breath of life.[367] This

passion for battle, they said, might not make Napoleon hateful as a man,

for much, far too much, allowance is made in modern morality for the

thirst of military fame; but it must be allowed that it rendered him a

most unfit monarch for those with whose blood that thirst was to be

stanched. Such reflections are, however, foreign to our present purpose.

It was not the least remarkable contingence in these momentous

transactions, that as Caulaincourt left Chatillon, he met the secretary

of Buonaparte posting towards him with the full and explicit powers of

treating which he had so long vainly solicited.[368] Had Napoleon

adopted this final decision of submitting himself to circumstances but

one day earlier, the treaty of Chatillon might have proceeded, and he

would have continued in possession of the throne of France. But it was

too late.

FOOTNOTES:

[344] "The King of Naples, being indisposed, has been obliged to retire

from the command of the army, which he has resigned into the hands of

the prince viceroy. The latter is more accustomed to the direction of

large masses, and possesses the entire confidence of the

Emperor."--_Moniteur_, Jan. 27, 1813.

[345] See papers relating to Naples, laid before the British Parliament

in 1815, _Parl. Debates_, vol. xxxi., p. 150.

[346] The following letter from Napoleon to Murat, dated Nangis, Feb.

18, 1814, fell into the hands of the allies:--"You are a good soldier in

the field of battle; but excepting there, you have no vigour and no

character. Take advantage, however, of an act of treachery, which I only

attribute to fear, in order to serve me by useful information. I rely

upon you, upon your contrition, upon your promises. The title of king

has turned your head. If you wish to preserve the former, keep your

word."--_Parl. Debates_, vol. xxxi., p. 151.

[347] On the 5th of March, just before the battle of Craonne, Napoleon

again wrote to Murat:--"I have communicated to you my opinion of your

conduct. Your situation had turned your head. My reverses have finished

you. You have surrounded yourself with men who hate France, and who wish

to ruin you. What you write to me is at variance with your actions. I

shall, however, see by your manner of acting at Ancona, if your heart be

still French, and if you yield to necessity alone. Remember that I made

you a king solely for the interest of my system. Do not deceive

yourself, if you should cease to be a Frenchman, you would be nothing

for me."--_Parl. Debates_, vol. xxxi., p. 153.

[348] Manuscript de 1814, p. 139.

[349] "Augereau did not know Napoleon until the latter had become a

general-in-chief. Augereau was certainly a good general, but he owed

this to the school of Napoleon, and at best he was inferior to Massena,

Desaix, Kleber, and Soult."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 92.

[350] London Gazette Extraordinary, March 14, 1814; Lord Burghersh,

Operations of the Allied Armies, p. 281.

[351] "I now began to watch M. de Talleyrand narrowly. I considered him

as the man who was about to become the leader of a party against the

Emperor; though certainly not against the dynasty sprung from a

revolution in which he had himself acted so conspicuous a

part."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 233.

[352] Journal de Bourdeaux, No. 1, March 14.

[353] "M. de Metternich said, 'Here is Lord Aberdeen, the English

ambassador: our intentions are common, we may, therefore, continue to

explain ourselves before him.' When I came to the article about England,

Lord Aberdeen observed, that the expressions _liberty of commerce_ and

_rights of navigation_ were very vague. Metternich added, that these

words might raise misunderstandings, and that it was better to

substitute others. He took the pen, and wrote, that England would make

the greatest sacrifices to obtain a _peace on these foundations_,"

(those previously described.)--_Report of BARON ST. AIGNAN._

[354] "You must hear and observe every thing. You must discover the

views of the allies, and write to me every day. Italy is yet untouched;

before the lapse of a week I shall have collected troops sufficient to

fight many battles. If I am seconded by the nation, the enemy are

hastening to their destruction. If fortune should betray me, my

resolution is taken: I cling not to the throne. I will neither disgrace

the nation nor myself by subscribing dishonourable conditions."--NAPOLEON,

_Memoirs_, tom. ii., p. 352; _Manuscript de 1814_, p. 66.

[355] Bassano to Caulaincourt, Troyes, Feb. 5.

[356] Manuscript de 1814--"A narrative which, from the official

situation (that of Secretary of the Cabinet of Napoleon) held by its

author, is calculated," says Lord Burghersh, "to excite a greater degree

of interest, and hereafter to be more relied upon, as an authority, than

any other publication which has appeared on the side of the French

army."

[357] "Nangis, Feb. 17.--Providence has blessed our arms. I have made 30

or 40,000 prisoners. I have taken 200 pieces of cannon, a great number

of generals, and destroyed several armies, almost without striking a

blow: Your attitude ought still to be the same; but my intention is that

you should sign nothing without my orders, because I alone know my own

situation."

[358] This alluded to the match, then supposed to be on the tapis,

betwixt the late Princess Charlotte of Wales and the Prince of

Orange.--S.

[359] Lord Burghersh, Observations, p. 156.

[360] Napoleon, Mémoires, tom. ii., p. 389.

[361] See Journal, &c., par M. de Las Cases, tom. iv., pp. 47, 53, 60.

[362] Manuscript de 1814, p. 186.

[363]

"There is a light cloud by the moon--

'Tis passing, and 'twill pass full soon;

If, by the time its vapoury sail

Hath ceased her shrouded orb to veil,

Thy heart within thee is not changed,

Then God and man are both avenged."

BYRON'S _Siege Corinth_.--S.

[364] For a copy of the Treaty, see Parl. Debates, vol. xxvii., p. 623.

[365] In a MS. memorandum, Lord Burghersh denies the whole of this

story. He distinctly states that Prince Wenceslaus of Lichtenstein was

never sent to Buonaparte after the 23d of February; and that the account

in the text misrepresents the feelings and intentions of the Emperor of

Russia at the period to which it refers. Compare his "Operations" under

the dates.--ED. (1842.)

[366] Napoleon, Mémoires, tom. ii., pp. 432-468; Manuscript de 1814, p.

296.

[367]

"The triumph, and the vanity,

The rapture of the strife--

The earthquake voice of victory,

To thee the breath of life."--BYRON.

[368] Baron Fain, p. 213.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF NAPOLEON TOWARDS THE PRINCE-ROYAL OF

SWEDEN.

(_Translated from the original French._)

[See pp. 64 and 97.]

It was Napoleon himself, who, by his insupportable pretensions, forced

Sweden to take a part in opposition to him. From the period of the

election of the Prince of Ponte Corvo, the only discussions the Prince

had with the Emperor consisted in refusals, on the Prince's part, to

enter into engagements hostile to the interests of the nation who had

chosen him to be her ruler.

When the first overtures respecting his election in Sweden were made to

him by a Swedish nobleman, and by General Count de Wrede, he went

immediately to St. Cloud, to inform the Emperor, who said to him:--"I

cannot be of any use to you--let things take their course," &c. The

Prince went to Plombières. At his return, he paid his respects to the

Emperor, who, addressing him in presence of a good many persons, asked

if he had lately had any news from Sweden? "Yes, Sire."--"What do they

say?" replied the Emperor.--"That your Majesty's _chargé d'affaires_ at

Stockholm opposes my election, and says publicly that your Majesty

prefers the King of Denmark."--The Emperor answered with surprise, "It

is not possible;" and changed the subject. It was, however, in

consequence of secret instructions given to M. Désaguiers, that he had

presented a note in favour of the King of Denmark; but Napoleon, in

order not to commit himself in an affair of such delicacy, and in which

a check would have been a proof of the decline of his political

ascendency, disavowed the conduct of M. Désaguiers. When this agent was

recalled a short time afterwards, the Duc de Cadore frankly confessed to

M. de Lagerbjelke, the Swedish minister at Paris, "_that they had

sacrificed an innocent person_."

The Emperor had expressed himself in the most friendly manner to King

Charles XIII., as well as to the Prince of Ponte Corvo, consenting that

the Prince should accept the succession to the throne of Sweden. The act

of election had been published in the _Moniteur_, and ten days had

elapsed without the Emperor's having said any thing about the

Prince-Royal's departure. Having finished the preparations for his

journey, and seeing that the Emperor still remained silent on the

subject, the Prince determined to apply to him for letters-patent,

emancipating him (the Prince) from his allegiance. To this formal

application, the Emperor replied, that the expediting of these letters

had been retarded only by the proposal made by a member of the

privy-council, of a preliminary condition.--"What is it?" said the

Prince.--"It is that you are to come under an engagement never to bear

arms against me." The Prince-Royal, greatly surprised, answered, that

his election by the Diet of Sweden, and the consent to it already given

by the Emperor, both to himself and to King Charles XIII., had already

made him a Swedish subject; and that, in that quality he could not

subscribe this engagement.--Here the Emperor frowned, and appeared

embarrassed. "Your Majesty tells me," added he, "that this is the

proposal of a member of the council. I am very sure it never could have

come from yourself, Sire; it must have come from the Arch-Chancellor, or

the Grand Judge, who were not aware to what a height this proposal would

raise me."--"What do you mean?"--"If you prevent me from accepting a

crown, unless I come under an engagement never to fight against you,

Sire--is not this, in fact, placing me in your line as a general?" The

Emperor, after a moment's reflection, said to him, in a suppressed

voice, and with a gesture which betrayed his agitation:--"Well, go;--our

destinies are about to be accomplished."--"I beg your pardon, Sire, I

did not hear you rightly."--"Go;--our destinies are about to be

accomplished," repeated the Emperor, in a more distinct, but equally

agitated voice.

When the report first became current that there was an intention in

Sweden to elect the Prince of Ponte Corvo Prince-Royal, Mareschal

Davoust, thinking to please his master, said, in the Emperor's

chamber:--"The Prince of Ponte Corvo suspects nothing." This piece of

irony made Napoleon smile. He answered in a low voice,--"He is not yet

elected." The Prince, who till then had been very undecided, intimated,

that if the King and the States of Sweden fixed their choice on him, he

should accept.

During this interval, Napoleon, constantly wishing to prevent him from

becoming heir to the throne of Sweden, said to him one day: "You will

probably be called to Sweden. I had formed the design of giving you

Arragon and Catalonia; for Spain is too great a country for my brother's

strength of capacity." The Prince made no reply. For a considerable time

back, not wishing to be an object of inquietude to government, he had

been considering what means he should use to gain Napoleon's confidence.

The greatness of France, the victories gained by her armies, and the

eclat which they reflected upon the commander, imposed on the Prince the

duty of not endeavouring to emulate the power of the Emperor. In his

conversations with Napoleon, he endeavoured to do away the impressions

which the Emperor entertained against him. For this purpose he took

general views, spoke of the interests of great states--of the fortunes

of men who had astonished the world by their successes, of the

difficulties and obstacles which these men had had to surmount, and

finally, of the public tranquillity and happiness which had been the

result of these circumstances, from the moment that secondary interests

had been satisfied. The Emperor listened attentively, and seemed almost

always to applaud the principles of stability and preservation which the

Prince enlarged upon. At times, when the latter reminded the Emperor of

the immensity of the means of recompense which he had at his disposal,

Napoleon, struck by what he said, held out his hand to him

affectionately, when they separated, and seemed, by his manner, to say

to him--"Reckon always upon my friendship and support." The Prince used

to return from these conversations, thinking himself no longer an object

of suspicion to the Emperor. He expressed this belief to the members of

Napoleon's family, in order that they, in their turn, might assure the

Emperor, that as the Prince went entirely into his system, both from

duty and from interest, any mistrust of him should be laid aside.

There were individuals of Napoleon's family, on those occasions, who

smiled at the Prince's simplicity, and told him what the Emperor had

said the evening before, immediately after the conversation the Prince

and he had had together; and all that the Emperor said bore marks of the

greatest insincerity, and of an ill-will constantly founded on his ideas

of the extravagant ambition of the Prince. This ill-will seemed to be

mitigated, when the time came for the Prince's departure for Sweden. One

of his friends was in high favour with Napoleon. On the very day the

Prince departed, Napoleon, seeing his friend come in, went up to him,

and said:--"Well! does not the Prince regret France?"--"Yes,

undoubtedly."--"And I, for my part, should have been very glad if he had

not accepted the invitation; but there is no help for it----" And then

checking himself--"Besides, he does not love me." On its being answered,

that Napoleon was mistaken, and that the Prince had chosen his party,

and had been frankly and cordially attached to him for a long time past,

the Emperor replied--"We have not understood each other: now it is too

late: he has his own interests, his own policy, and I have mine."

Napoleon had acquiesced in the reasons given him by the Prince, for his

refusal to engage not to take arms against him. He saw very well that he

ought to have expected such a refusal, and that he ought not to have

exposed himself to it. He had even endeavoured to efface any painful

impression which his proposal had made on the Prince, by making him the

most friendly promises of an indemnity of two millions for the cession

of his principality of Ponte Corvo, and his possessions in Poland, and

leaving him all the others in property. [The Prince never received more

than one million of the two which had been promised him.] He had,

besides, permitted him to take with him all his aides-de-camp.

The Prince knew not what was at the bottom of the Emperor's thoughts,

but when he left him he was full of confidence in him; and Napoleon had

no just motive for imputing to him any designs hostile to his interest,

and still less to the interest of France. This illusion, on the part of

the Prince, was of short duration. The reception he met with in all the

places he passed through, and particularly when he arrived in

Sweden--the speeches addressed to him, and the answers he made--all

contributed to displease the Emperor. It seemed to him as if the Prince

attracted some share of that general attention which should have been

fixed on him alone. The patriotic sentiments expressed by the speakers

of the four orders, were no more to his taste than those of the Prince

in his answers. He and the Swedes were equally the objects of the

Emperor's sarcasms, and even of his insults; he treated them as

Jacobins, as anarchists; and it was chiefly against the Prince that

these attacks were levelled. To show the Prince his displeasure, he

annulled all the promises he had made him; and took from him all the

lands with which he had endowed him, and which he re-united to his own

domains. He recalled all the Prince-Royal's French aides-de-camp. It was

in vain that the Prince, in his correspondence, tried to appease him, by

writing, among others, the following letter:--

"At the moment when I was going to address my thanks to your Majesty,

for your goodness in extending for a year the leave granted to the

French officers who have accompanied me to Sweden, I am informed that

your Majesty has retracted that favour. This unexpected disappointment,

and, indeed, every thing that reaches me from Paris, makes me sensible

that your Majesty is not well disposed towards me. What have I done,

Sire, to deserve this treatment? I suppose that calumny alone has been

the cause of it. In the new situation in which Fortune has placed me, I

should doubtless be more exposed to it than ever, were I not fortunate

enough to find a defender in your Majesty's own heart. Whatever may be

said to you, Sire, I beseech you to believe that I have nothing to

reproach myself with, and that I am entirely devoted to your person, not

merely through the strength of my old associations, but from a sentiment

that is unalterable. If things are not conducted in Sweden entirely

according to your Majesty's wish, this is solely owing to the

Constitution. To infringe the Constitution is not in the power of the

King, and still less in mine. There are still here many particular

interests to be melted down in the great national crucible--four orders

of the state to be tied up in one bundle--and it is only by means of

very prudent and measured conduct that I can hope to sit one day on the

throne of Sweden. As M. Gentil de St. Alphonse, my aide-de-camp, returns

to France in conformity to your Majesty's orders, I make him the bearer

of this letter. Your Majesty may question him; he has seen every thing;

let him tell your Majesty the truth. You will see in what a situation I

am placed, and how many measures I have to keep. He will tell your

Majesty whether or not I am anxious to please you, and if I am not here

in a state of continual torment between the pain of displeasing you, and

my new duties. Sire, your Majesty has grieved me by withdrawing from me

the officers whom you had granted me for a year. Since you command it, I

send them back to France. Perhaps your Majesty will be inclined to alter

your decision: in which case, I beg that you yourself will fix the

number that you may think proper to send me. I shall receive them from

you with gratitude. If, on the contrary, your Majesty retains them in

France, I recommend them to your goodness. They have always served with

distinction, and have had no share in the rewards which were distributed

after the last campaign."

Napoleon's ill-humour against the Prince changed to positive resentment.

He repented that he had agreed to his going, and he made no secret of

it; for he went the length of saying, before his courtiers--"That he had

a mind to make him finish his course of the Swedish language at

Vincennes." While the Prince refused to believe the information which he

had received from the Tuileries, of such a threat as this, Napoleon was

actually thinking of putting it in execution, and of repeating, upon

him, the capture of the Duc d'Enghien. The Prince at last was convinced

of the truth of what he had heard, by the discovery of a plot formed by

Napoleon's agents, for seizing him in the neighbourhood of Haga, and

carrying him on board a vessel which they had in readiness. The attempt

failed through a mere accident. The conspirators, all foreigners but

one, thought themselves discovered; they instantly embarked, and sailed

in the night.[369]

This conduct, odious as it was, made no change in the disposition of the

Prince towards Napoleon. He looked upon it as the effect of intrigues

formed by the personal enemies of both, and by enemies of France. He saw

nothing in it, besides, but a degree of personal animosity, which might

pass away, and which ought to have no influence on the political

determinations of Sweden. But Napoleon, listening to nothing but his

hatred, knowing that the Prince, being aware of his designs, would now

be on his guard, and having no longer any hope of surprising him,

desired to place the Prince in open hostility to him. He took the surest

method to accomplish this object, by seizing Pomerania, because he

thought that this insulting violation of public faith would force the

Prince-Royal to revenge the affront put upon Sweden, but at bottom

directed against the Prince personally. In order to leave no room for

doubt on this subject, the Emperor had given orders that the invasion

should take place on the 26th of January, the Prince-Royal's birth-day;

but this refinement, so much in character, was thrown away; for the

invasion could not be carried into effect till the morning of the

27th.[370]

The news of this invasion did not reach Stockholm till the 11th of

February. The Prince immediately wrote the Emperor the following

letter:--

"The accounts, which have just arrived, inform me that a division of the

army, under the orders of the Prince of Eckmühl, has invaded the

territory of Swedish Pomerania, in the night between the 26th and 27th

of January; that this division has continued its march, entered the

capital of the duchy, and taken possession of the island of Rugen. The

King expects that your Majesty will explain the reasons which have led

you to act in a manner so diametrically opposite to the faith of

existing treaties. My former connexion with your Majesty authorises me

to beseech you to explain your motives without delay, in order that I

may be enabled to give the King my opinion as to the future policy which

ought to be adopted by Sweden. This gratuitous outrage committed against

Sweden is deeply felt by the people, and doubly so, Sire, by me, who am

intrusted with the honour of defending them. If I have contributed to

the triumphs of France, if I have uniformly wished to see her respected

and happy, it never could enter into my thoughts to sacrifice the

interests, the honour, and the national independence of the country

which has adopted me. Your Majesty, so good a judge of what is right in

the case which has happened, has already penetrated my resolution.

Though not jealous of the glory and power by which you are surrounded,

Sire, I am extremely sensible to the disgrace of being looked upon as a

vassal. Your Majesty rules the greater part of Europe; but your dominion

does not extend to the country to whose government I have been called.

My ambition is limited to her defence; which I look upon as the lot

assigned me by Providence. The effect produced on the people by the

invasion which I now complain of, may have incalculable consequences;

and though I am not a Coriolanus, nor command Volscians, I have a good

enough opinion of the Swedes to assure you, Sire, that they are capable

of daring and undertaking every thing, to revenge affronts which they

have not provoked, and to preserve rights to which they are probably as

much attached as to their existence."

When the Emperor received this letter, it was observed that he foamed

with rage, and cried, "Submit to your degradation, or die with arms in

your hands!" This, indeed, was the only alternative which he wished to

leave the Prince; knowing very well what part would be taken by a man

whom he himself had called, "A French head, with the heart of a Roman."

There was no receding. The Prince declared to the King of England and

the Emperor of Russia, that he was at war with Napoleon; and wrote the

Emperor Alexander the following letter, dated from Stockholm, the 7th of

March, 1812:--

"The occupation of Swedish Pomerania by the French troops, induces the

King to despatch Count de Lowenhjelm, his aide-de-camp, to your Imperial

Majesty. This officer, who enjoys the entire confidence of his

sovereign, has it in charge to acquaint your Majesty with the motives

which have served as a pretext for an invasion so diametrically in

opposition to the subsisting treaties. The successive annexation of the

coasts of the Mediterranean, of Holland, and of the Baltic, and the

subjugation of the interior of Germany, must have pointed out, even to

the least clear-sighted princes, that the laws of nations being thrown

aside, were giving way to a system, which, destroying every kind of

equilibrium, would unite a number of nations under the government of a

single chief;--the tributary monarchs, terrified at this constantly

increasing dominion, are waiting in consternation for the development of

this vast plan. In the midst of this universal depression, men's eyes

are turned towards your Majesty; they are already raised to you, Sire,

with confidence and hope; but suffer me to observe to your Majesty, that

in all the successes of life, there is nothing like the magical effect

of the first instant;--so long as its influence lasts, every thing

depends on him who chooses to act. Minds struck with astonishment are

incapable of reflection; and every thing yields to the impulse of the

charm which they fear, or by which they are attracted. Be pleased, Sire,

to receive with favour the expression of my gratitude for the sentiments

which your Majesty has testified towards me. If I have still any wish to

form, it is for the continuation of a happiness of which I shall always

be worthy, in consequence of the value which I attach to it."

It was not, then, the Emperor of Russia who prevailed upon Sweden to

take up arms against Napoleon. It was himself--himself alone--who

irresistibly compelled the Prince to throw himself among his enemies. In

doing so, the Prince merely did what Napoleon desired; and the latter

wished it, because Sweden having given him no motive for directly

attacking her, he saw no other way of regaining the mastery of the

Prince's fortunes, but by placing him among the number of his enemies,

whom he looked upon as already conquered, without suspecting that he was

going to force them at last to conquer himself. Meanwhile, still wishing

to deceive the Prince, he made proposals to him. The Prince answered

them by the following letter, the bearer of which was M. Signeul:--

"Notes have just reached me; and I cannot refrain from expressing myself

on the subject of them to your Imperial Majesty, with all the frankness

which belongs to my character. When the wishes of the Swedish people

called me to succeed to the throne, I hoped, in leaving France, that I

should always be able to reconcile my personal affections with the

interests of my new country. My heart cherished the hope that it might

identify itself with the sentiments of this people, at the same time

preserving the remembrance of its first attachments, and never losing

sight of the glory of France, nor its sincere attachment to your

Majesty--an attachment founded on a brotherhood in arms, which had been

distinguished by so many great actions. It was with this hope that I

arrived in Sweden. I found a nation generally attached to France; but

still more to its own liberty and laws: jealous of your friendship,

Sire, but not desirous of ever obtaining it at the expense of its honour

and its independence. Your Majesty's minister chose to disregard this

national feeling, and ruined every thing by his arrogance: his

communications bore no marks of that respect which crowned heads owe

each other. While fulfilling, according to the dictates of his own

passions, the intentions of your Majesty, Baron Agguier spoke like a

Roman proconsul, without recollecting that he was not addressing himself

to slaves. This minister, then, was the first cause of the distrust

which Sweden began to show as to your Majesty's intentions with regard

to her; subsequent events [the invasion of Sweden] were calculated to

give it new weight. I had already had the honour, Sire, by my letters of

the 19th November and 8th December 1810, to make your Majesty acquainted

with the situation of Sweden, and the desire which she felt to find in

your Majesty a protector. She could attribute your Majesty's silence to

nothing but unmerited indifference; and it became incumbent on her to

take precautions against the storm that was ready to burst on the

Continent. Sire, mankind has already suffered but too much. For twenty

years the earth has been deluged with human blood; and to put a period

to these sufferings is the only thing wanting to complete your Majesty's

glory. If your Majesty desires that the King should intimate to his

Majesty the Emperor Alexander the possibility of an accommodation, I

augur enough, from the magnanimity of that monarch, to venture to

assure you, that he will give a willing ear to overtures equitable at

the same time for your empire and for the North. If an event, so

unexpected, and so universally wished for, could take place, with what

blessings would the nations of the Continent hail your Majesty! Then

gratitude would be increased in proportion to the terror they now feel

for the return of a scourge which has already been so heavy upon them,

and the ravages of which have left such cruel marks. Sire, one of the

happiest moments which I have experienced since leaving France was that

in which I became assured that your Majesty had not altogether forgotten

me. You have judged rightly as to my feelings. You have been aware how

deeply they must have been wounded by the painful prospect of either

seeing the interests of Sweden on the eve of being separated from those

of France, or of being constrained to sacrifice the interests of a

country by which I have been adopted with boundless confidence. Sire,

though a Swede by honour, by duty, and by religion, I still identify

myself, by my wishes, with that beautiful France in which I was born,

and which I have served faithfully ever since my childhood. Every step I

take in Sweden, the homage I receive, revives in my mind those bright

recollections of glory which were the principal cause of my elevation;

nor do I disguise from myself, that Sweden, in choosing me, wished to

pay a tribute of esteem to the French people."

Napoleon blames all the world for his reverses. When he has no longer

any one to blame, he accuses his destiny. But it is himself only whom he

should blame; and the more so, because the very desertion on the part of

his allies, which hastened his fall, could have had no other cause but

the deep wounds he had inflicted by his despotic pride, and his acts of

injustice. He was himself the original author of his misfortunes, by

outraging those who had contributed to his elevation. It was his own

hands that consummated his ruin; he was, in all the strictness of the

term, a political suicide, and so much the more guilty, that he did not

dispose of himself alone, but of France at the same time.

No. II.

EXTRACT FROM MANUSCRIPT OBSERVATIONS ON NAPOLEON'S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, BY

AN ENGLISH OFFICER OF RANK.

[See p. 135.]

Having examined into the probabilities of Ségur's allegation, that

Buonaparte entertained thoughts of taking up his winter-quarters at

Witepsk, the military commentator proceeds as follows:--

"The Russian army at Smolensk, seeing the manner in which the French

army was dispersed in cantonments between the rivers Dwina and Dneister,

moved, on the 7th of August, towards Rudnei, in order to beat up their

quarters. They succeeded in surprising those of Sebastiani, and did him

a good deal of mischief in an attack upon Jukowo. In the meantime,

Barclay de Tolly was alarmed by a movement made by the Viceroy about

Souraj, on the Dwina; and he countermanded the original plan of

operations, with a view to extend his right flank; and for some days

afterwards, the Russian army made various false movements, and was in a

considerable degree of confusion. Whether Napoleon's plan was founded

upon the march of the Russian army from Smolensk, as supposed by Ségur;

or upon their position at Smolensk, in the first days of August, he

carried it into execution, notwithstanding that march.

"Accordingly, he broke up his cantonments upon the Dwina on the 10th of

August, and marched his army by different columns by corps across the

front of the Russian army, from these cantonments to Rassassna, upon the

Dnieper. The false movements made by the Russian army from the 7th to

the 12th of August, prevented their obtaining early knowledge of this

march, and they were not in a situation to be able to take advantage of

it. On the other hand, Napoleon could have had no knowledge of the

miscalculated movements made by the Russian army.

"Being arrived at Rassassna, where he was joined by Davoust, with three

divisions of the first corps, he crossed the Dnieper on the 14th. The

corps of Poniatowski and Junot were at the same time moving upon

Smolensk direct from Mohilow.

"Napoleon moved forward upon Smolensk.

"The garrison of that place, a division of infantry under General

Newerofskoi, had come out as far as Krasnoi, to observe the movements of

the French troops on the left of the Dnieper, supposed to be advancing

along the Dnieper from Orcha. Murat attacked this body of troops with

all his cavalry; but they made good their retreat to Smolensk, although

repeatedly charged in their retreat. These charges were of little avail,

however; and this operation affords another instance of the security

with which good infantry can stand the attack of cavalry. This division

of about 6000 infantry had no artificial defence, excepting two rows of

trees on each side of the road, of which they certainly availed

themselves. But the use made even of this defence shows how small an

obstacle will impede and check the operations of the cavalry.

"It would probably have been more advisable if Murat, knowing of the

movement of Poniatowski and Junot directed from Mohilow upon Smolensk,

had not pushed this body of troops too hard. They must have been induced

to delay on their retreat, in order effectually to reconnoitre their

enemy. The fort would undoubtedly in that case have fallen into the

hands of Poniatowski.

"On the 17th of August, Napoleon assembled the whole of the operating

army before Smolensk, on the left of the Dnieper. It consisted as

follows:--

The cavalry, under Murat, 40,000

Guards, 47,000

First Corps, Davoust, 72,000

Third Corps, Ney, 39,000

Fourth Corps, the Viceroy, 45,000

Fifth Corps, Poniatowski, 36,000

Eighth Corps, Junot, 18,000

------

297,000

"These corps had, about six weeks before, entered the country with the

numbers above stated; they had had no military affair to occasion loss;

yet Ségur says, they were now reckoned at 185,000. The returns of the 3d

August are stated to have given the last numbers only.

"The town had been attacked on the 16th, first, by a

battalion--secondly, by a division of the third corps--which troops were

repulsed. In the mean time, Bagration moved upon Katani, upon the

Dnieper, having heard of Napoleon's movement from the Dwina; and Barclay

de Tolly having authorised the resumption of the plan of operations in

pursuance of which the Russian army had broken up from Smolensk on the

17th. He moved thence on the 16th, along the right of the Dnieper, back

upon Smolensk, and immediately reinforced the garrison. He was followed

that night by Barclay de Tolly, who relieved the troops under the

command of Bagration, which were in the town: and the whole Russian army

was collected at Smolensk, on the right of the Dnieper.

"Bagration moved during the same night with his army on the road to

Moscow. Barclay remained in support of the troops in Smolensk.

"Napoleon, after waiting till two o'clock, in expectation that Barclay

would cross the Dnieper, and move out of Smolensk, to fight a general

battle, attacked the town on the 17th, with his whole army, and was

repulsed with loss; and in the evening the Russian troops recovered

possession of all the outposts. Barclay, however, withdrew the garrison

in the night of the 17th, and destroyed the bridges of communication

between the French and the town. The enemy crossed the Dnieper by fords,

and obtained for a moment possession of the faubourg called Petersburg,

on the right of that river, but were driven back. The Russian army,

after remaining all day on the right of the river opposite Smolensk,

retired on the night of the 18th; and the French that night repaired the

bridges on the Dnieper.

"Before I proceed farther with the narrative, it is necessary to

consider a little this movement of Napoleon, which is greatly admired by

all the writers on the subject.

"When this movement was undertaken, the communication of the army was

necessarily removed altogether from the Dwina. Instead of proceeding

from Wilna upon Witepsk, it proceeded from Wilna upon Minsk, where a

great magazine was formed, and thence across the Beresina, upon Orcha on

the Dnieper, and thence upon Smolensk. The consequences of this

alteration will appear presently, when we come to consider of the

retreat.

"It is obvious, that the position of the great magazine at Minsk threw

the communications of the army necessarily upon the Beresina, and

eventually within the influence of the operations of the Russian

armies from the southward. Napoleon's objects by the movement might have

been three: First, to force the Russians to a general battle; secondly,

to obtain possession of Smolensk, without the loss or the delay of a

siege; thirdly, to endeavour again to obtain a position in rear of the

Russian army, upon their communications with Moscow, and with the

southern provinces of the Russian empire. This movement is much admired,

and extolled by the Russian as well as the French writers upon this war;

yet if it is tried by the only tests of any military movement--its

objects compared with its risks and difficulties, and its success

compared with the same risks and difficulties, and with the probable

hazards and the probably successful result of other movements to attain

the same objects--it will be found to have failed completely.

"The risk has been stated to consist, first, in the march of the

different corps from their cantonments, on the Dwina, to Rassassna, on

the Dnieper, across the front of the Russian army, without the

protection of a body of troops formed for that purpose; and, next, in

the hazard incurred in removing the communication of the army from

Witepsk to Minsk. This will be discussed presently.

"In respect of the first object--that of bringing the Russian army to a

general battle--it must be obvious to every body, that the fort of

Smolensk and the Dnieper river were between Napoleon and the Russian

army when his movement was completed. Although, therefore, the armies

were not only in sight, but within musket-shot of each other, it was

impossible for Napoleon to bring the enemy to an action on that ground

without his consent; and as the ground would not have been advantageous

to the Russian army, and an unsuccessful, or even a doubtful result,

could not have saved Smolensk, and there was no object sufficiently

important to induce the Russian general to incur the risk of an

unsuccessful result of a general action, it was not very probable he

would move into the trap which Ségur describes as laid for him.

"Neither was it likely that Napoleon would take Smolensk by any assault

which this movement might enable him to make upon that place. He had no

heavy artillery, and he tried in vain to take the place by storm, first,

by a battalion, then, by a division, and lastly, by the whole army. He

obtained possession of Smolensk at last, only because the Russian

general had made no previous arrangements for occupying the place; and

because Barclay knew that, if he left a garrison there unprovided, it

must fall into Napoleon's hands a few days sooner or later. The Russian

general then thought proper to evacuate the place; and notwithstanding

the position of Napoleon on the left of the Dnieper, and his attempts to

take the place by storm, the Russian general would have kept the

possession, if he could have either maintained the position of his own

army in the neighbourhood, or could have supplied the place adequately

before he retired from it.

"The possession of the place depended, then, on the position of the

Russian army; and what follows will show, that other measures and

movements than those adopted were better calculated to dislodge the

Russian army from Smolensk.

"There can be no doubt that, upon Napoleon's arrival at Smolensk, he had

gained six marches upon his enemy. If Napoleon, when he crossed the

Dnieper at Rassassna, had masked Smolensk, and marched direct upon any

point of the Dnieper above that place, he could have posted himself with

his whole army upon the communications of his enemy with Moscow; and his

enemy could scarcely have attempted to pass across his front, to seek

the road by Kalouga. Barclay must have gone to the northward, evacuating

or leaving Smolensk to its fate, and Napoleon might have continued his

march upon Moscow, keeping his position constantly between his enemy and

his communications with that city, and with the southern provinces. The

fate of Smolensk could not have been doubtful.

"Here, then, a different mode, even upon the same plan of manœuvring,

would have produced two of the three objects which Napoleon is supposed

to have had in view by these movements. But these were not the only

movements in his power at that time. The Viceroy is stated to have been

at Souraj and Velij. If, instead of moving by his right, Napoleon had

moved by his left, and brought the first, fifth, and eighth corps from

the Dneiper to form the reserve; and had marched from Souraj upon any

point of the Upper Dnieper, he would equally have put himself in the

rear of his enemy, and in a position to act upon his communications. He

would have effected this object with greater certainty, if he had

ventured to move the first, and the fifth and eighth corps through the

country on the left of the Dnieper. And in this last movement there

would have been no great risk--first, because Napoleon's manœuvres

upon the Dwina would have attracted all the enemy's attention; secondly,

because these corps would have all passed Smolensk, before the Russian

generals could have known of their movement, in like manner as Napoleon

passed the Dnieper and arrived at Smolensk without their knowledge. By

either of these modes of proceeding, Napoleon would have cut off his

enemy from their communications, would have obliged them to fight a

battle to resign these communications, and in all probability Smolensk

would have fallen into his hands without loss, with its buildings

entire--an object of the last consequence in the event of the campaign.

"Either of these last modes of effecting the object would have been

shorter by two marches than the movement of the whole army upon

Rassassna."

END OF VOLUME FOURTH.

FOOTNOTES:

[369] M. de Salazar, formerly aide-de-camp to the Duke of Ragusa, who

had quitted the service, and retired into England, was one of those who

gave information respecting a plan formed in France to carry off the

Prince-Royal. He made a full communication on this subject to an

illustrious personage in England, and to Baron de Rehausen, the Swedish

minister at London, who immediately informed Count d'Engestrom of what

had been revealed by M. de Salazar, as to the plots which Napoleon was

laying against the personal safety of the Prince. In order to facilitate

these communications, Baron de Rehausen was instructed to furnish M. de

Salazar with money to enable him to go to Sweden. He arrived at Orebro

during the diet of 1812, and was admitted to some private audiences, in

which he repeated to the Prince the declarations which he had previously

made to Baron de Rehausen and Count d'Engestrom.

[370] It was from a similar motive that the Prince-Royal opened the

ports of Sweden to all nations on the 15th August, 1812, Napoleon's

birth-day, and that the peace with England was signed at the same time.