_Declaration of the Allies on entering
France--Switzerland--Schwartzenberg crosses the Rhine--Apathy of the
French--Junction of Blucher with the Grand Army--Crown Prince of
Sweden--Inferiority of Napoleon's numerical Force--Battles of
Brienne--and La Rothière--Difficulties of Buonaparte, during which
he meditates to resign the Crown--He makes a successful Attack on
the Silesian Army at Champ-Aubert--Blucher is compelled to
retreat--The Grand Army carries Nogent and Montereau--Buonaparte's
violence to his Generals--The Austrians resolve on a general
Retreat, as far as Nancy and Langres--Prince Wenceslaus sent to
Buonaparte's headquarters--The French enter Troyes--Execution of
Goualt, a Royalist--A Decree of Death against all wearing the
Bourbon emblems, and all Emigrants who should join the Allies._
It was time that Buonaparte should appear in the field in person, for
the eastern frontiers of his empire, assaulted on every point, were
yielding an almost unresisted entrance to the invading armies. The
allied sovereigns had commenced their operations upon a system, as
moderate and prudent in a political point of view, as it was bold and
decisive considered under a military aspect.
They had not been too much elated by the successes of the late campaign.
These had been bought at a high price, and events had shown, that if
Napoleon could be resisted and defeated, it could only be by
outnumbering his veteran armies, and accumulating such force against him
as even his skill and talents should find irresistible. They recollected
also the desperate efforts of which France and Frenchmen were capable,
and were prudently desirous to express the moderation of their purpose
in such a form as should have no chance of being mistaken.
Their manifestoes disclaimed the intention of dictating to France any
particular form of government. They only desired that she should remain
within the limits of her ancient territory, a peaceful member of the
European commonwealth, allowing to other states, as well as claiming for
herself, the full immunities of freedom and independence. The allied
sovereigns desired that there should be an end put to the system which
decided the fate of kingdoms, not according to the better right, but the
longest sword. They wished a total suppression of all domination of the
powerful over the weak; of all pretext of usurpation founded on alleged
natural boundaries, or, in other words, on the claim of a powerful state
to rend from a weak one whatever suited its convenience to possess. In a
word, they aimed at the restoration of the balance of power, which had
been long the political object of the wisest statesmen in Europe. It is
singular, that the three nations who were now united to oppose the
aggressions of Buonaparte, had themselves been the first to set the
example of violent and unprincipled spoliation in the partition of
Poland; and that they had reaped an abundant punishment in the measure
of retribution dealt to them by the instrumentality of the very man,
whose lawless outrages they, in their turn, were now combined to
chastise.
With respect to the nature of the changes which might take place in the
internal arrangements of France, in order to bring about the restoration
of the balance of power, the allied monarchs professed themselves
indifferent. If Napoleon should reconcile himself to the general
pacification they proposed, they did not pretend any right to state
objections to his remaining in authority. It was the military system of
usurpation, not the person of Buonaparte, against which they made war.
If, on the other hand, France could not return to a state of peace
without a change of her ruler, it was for France herself to consider
what that change should be. The allied sovereigns were determined she
should no longer work her uncontrolled will upon other states; but they
left her at full liberty to adopt what government, and what sovereign
she pleased, within her own territories.
[Sidenote: THE ALLIES IN SWITZERLAND.]
At the same time, having limited the purpose of their armament to such a
just and moderate object, the allies resolved to put such activity in
their measures as to satisfy the French that they had the power of
enforcing their demands; and for that purpose they determined to enter
the frontier. From Basle to Mentz, from Mentz to the mouth of the Waal,
the frontier of France and Belgium is defended by the Rhine, a strong
natural boundary in itself, and covered by a triple row of 140
fortresses, some of them of the very first class. Above Basle, where the
Rhine divides France from Switzerland, the frontier is more accessible.
But then this upper line could not be acted upon without violating the
neutrality which Switzerland had asserted, which Buonaparte had admitted
as affording protection for the weakest part of the threatened frontier,
and which, upon their own principle of respecting the rights of
neutrals, the allies were under a sort of necessity of acknowledging.
Nevertheless, the extreme facility of entering France on this side, led
Austria and Prussia to form the wish to set aside scruples, and
disregard the neutrality of Switzerland.
These two powers remembered how little respect Napoleon had shown to
neutral rights in the campaign of Ulm, when he marched without
hesitation through the Prussian territories of Anspach and Bareuth, in
order to accomplish the demolition of the Austrian army; nor did they
fail to quote his forcible interference in the affairs of the cantons of
Switzerland, at an earlier period of his history. Russia did not for
some time acquiesce in this reasoning; but when some plausible grounds
were alleged of breach of neutrality on the part of the Swiss, the
scruples of Alexander were removed; and it was resolved that the
Austrian grand army should traverse the Swiss territory for the purpose
of entering France. They halted before Geneva, and took possession of
the town, or rather it was yielded to them by the citizens.
The canton of Bern, also, which resented some alterations made by
Napoleon to the prejudice of their feudal claims upon the Pays de Vaud,
received the Austrians not as intruders but as friends. Buonaparte, in
his manifestoes, insisted vehemently upon the injustice of this
aggression upon the territories of the Swiss. Undoubtedly the
transaction was of a questionable character; but it was inconsistent in
Napoleon to declaim against it, since, in the case of the arrest of the
Duke d'Enghien, he had laid it down as national law, that the violation
of the territory of Baden was an offence pleadable by no other than the
sovereign of that territory. On his own doctrine, therefore, it was
incompetent in any other nation to resent, on behalf of the Swiss, that
which the Swiss did not resent for themselves.
Upon the 21st December, Maréchal Prince Schwartzenberg crossed the Rhine
with the Austrian army at four points, and advanced upon Langres, as had
been previously agreed. Moving with the extreme slowness and precision
which characterise Austrian manœuvres, paying always the same respect
to fortresses without garrisons, and passes without guards, as if they
had been in a posture of defence, the Austrians, instead of reaching
Langres on 27th December, did not arrive till the 17th January,
1814.[321] A serious intention had been for some time manifested to
defend the place, and it was even garrisoned by a detachment of
Buonaparte's old guard. The approach of the numerous Austrian
reinforcements, however, rendered the preparations for defence of the
town unavailing, and Langres was evacuated by all the French troops,
saving about 300 men, who surrendered to General Giulay on the 17th. A
division of the Austrians was immediately advanced to Dijon.
The apathy of the French at this period may be estimated from the
following circumstance: Dijon, summoned by a flying party of cavalry,
returned for answer, that a town containing 30,000 inhabitants, could
not with honour surrender to fifteen hussars, but that if a respectable
force appeared before its walls, they were ready to give up the keys of
their city.[322] This reasonable request was complied with, and Dijon
surrendered on 19th January.[323]
The city of Lyons, the second in the empire, had itself nearly fallen
into the hands of the Austrians; but the inhabitants showed a
disposition to defend the town, and being reinforced with troops sent to
secure a place of such importance, the Austrian general, Bubna, retired
from under its walls. It is allowed, that more activity on the part of
the allies might have saved this repulse, which was of considerable
importance. It was the only one which they had yet sustained.
While the grand army, under Schwartzenberg, was thus advancing into
France, the army of Silesia, which was the name given to that commanded
by the veteran Blucher, consisting, as formerly, of Prussians and
Russians, had made equal progress, though against greater resistance and
more difficulties. His army advanced in four columns, or grand
divisions, blockading the strong frontier fortresses of Metz,
Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Luxembourg, and others, passing the defiles of
the Vosges, and pushing forward to Joinville, Vitry, and Saint Dizier.
The army of Silesia was thus placed in communication with the grand
army, the advanced divisions of which had penetrated as far into France
as Bar-sur-Aube.[324]
[Sidenote: BERNADOTTE--HOLLAND.]
There was yet a third army of the allies, called that of the North of
Europe. It was originally commanded by the Prince Royal of Sweden, and
consisted of Swedes, Russians, and Germans. But the Crown Prince, whose
assistance had been of such material consequence during the campaign of
1813, did not, it appears, take an active share in that of 1814. There
may have been two reasons and weighty ones for this inactivity. To
assist in driving the French out of Germany, seemed a duty which the
Prince of Sweden could not, as such, decline, when the welfare of Sweden
demanded it. But an invasion of his native soil might seem to Bernadotte
a service unpleasing and unpopular in itself, and in which he could not
be so rightfully engaged, at least while the freedom of Germany and the
north opened another field of exertions, where his military efforts
could be attended with no injury to his personal feelings. Denmark was
still in arms, and Davoust still held out at Hamburgh; and the presence
of the Swedish army and its leader was necessary to subdue the one, and
clear the north from the other. It must also be remembered, that Sweden,
a poor kingdom, was not in a condition to sustain a war at a great
distance from its frontier, and arising out of causes in which it was
more remotely concerned. Her armies could not be recruited with the same
ease as those of the greater powers; and Bernadotte, therefore, rather
chose to incur the censure of being supposed cold in the cause of his
confederates, than the risk of losing the only body of troops which
Sweden had been able to fit out, and upon preserving which his throne
probably depended. The allied sovereigns, however, directed, that while
the Crown Prince remained in the north, a part of the Russian and
Prussian corps, who were placed under his command, should be ordered to
march towards France, for the purpose of augmenting the force which they
already possessed in Holland and Belgium. The Crown Prince having, by a
short war with Denmark, compelled that power to yield up her ancient
possession of Norway, left Bennigsen to continue the siege of Hamburgh,
and advanced in person to Cologne, to assist in the complete liberation
of Belgium.[325]
The French troops, which had been drawn together, had been defeated at
Merxem by General Bulow, and Sir Thomas Graham; and although the French
flag was still flying at Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, Holland might be
considered as liberated. General Winzengerode, at the head of the
Russian troops, and the Saxons, under Thielman, being the corps
detached, as above mentioned, from the army of the North of Germany,
soon reached the Low Countries, and entered into communication with
Bulow. General Sir Thomas Graham, with the English and Saxons, and with
such Dutch and Flemish troops as could be collected, was left to
blockade Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp, whilst Bulow and Winzengerode were
at liberty to enter France on the northern frontier: And thus, in the
hour of need (which soon afterwards arrived,) they were to act as a
reserve to the army of Silesia under Blucher. They pushed on as far as
Laon.
[Sidenote: PROGRESS OF THE ALLIES.]
These advances, which carried the armies of the allies so far into the
bosom of France, and surrounded with blockades the frontier fortresses
of that kingdom, were not made without an honourable though ineffectual
opposition, on such points where the French military could make any
stand against the preponderating numbers of the invaders. The people of
the country in general neither welcomed nor opposed the allies. In some
places they were received with acclamation--in a few others some
opposition was tendered--they encountered desperate resistance nowhere.
The allies did all that discipline could to maintain strict order among
their troops; but where there were so many free corps--Huhlans, Croats,
and Cossacks--whose only pay is what they can plunder, occasional
transgressions necessarily took place. The services of these irregular
troops were, however, indispensable. The Cossacks, in particular, might
be termed the eyes of the army. Accustomed to act in small parties when
necessary, they threaded woods, swam rivers, and often presented
themselves unexpectedly in villages many miles distant from the main
army to which they belonged, thus impressing the French with an idea of
the numbers and activity of the allies far beyond the truth. These Arabs
of the North, as Napoleon termed them, always announced their party as
the advanced guard of a considerable force, for whom they ordered
provisions and quarters to be prepared; and thus awed the inhabitants
into acquiescence in their demands. They are not reported to have been
cruel, unless when provoked, but were not in general able to resist
temptations to plunder. The excursions of these and other light troops
were of course distressing to the French territory.
On the other hand, in two or three cases, armed citizens in the towns,
summoned by small parties of the allies, fired upon flags of truce, and
thus justified severe reprisals. It was said to be by Buonaparte's
strict orders, that such actions were committed, the purpose being, if
possible, to excite deadly hatred betwixt the French and the allies.
Indeed, in the reverse of the circumstances, in which each had formerly
stood, Napoleon and the Austrian generals seemed to have exchanged
system and sentiments. He now, as the Archduke Charles did in 1809,
called out every peasant to arms; while Schwartzenberg, like Napoleon at
that earlier period, denounced threats of military execution, without
mercy or quarter, to every rustic who should obey the summons. The
impartial historian must proclaim, in the one case as in the other, that
the duty of resistance in the defence of our native country, does not
depend on the character of a man's weapons, or the colour of his coat;
and that the armed citizen is entitled, equally with the regular
soldier, to the benefit of the laws of war, so long as he does not
himself violate them. But from these various causes, it was plain that
the present apathy of the French people was only temporary, and that
some sudden and unforeseen cause was not unlikely to rouse so sensitive
and high-spirited a people into a state of general resistance, by which
the allies could not fail to be great sufferers. Rapidity in their
movements was the most obvious remedy against such a danger; but this
was the military quality least proper to coalitions, where many people
must be consulted; and besides, was inconsistent with the well-known
habits of the Germans, but especially of the Austrians.
It seems also, that the allies, having safely formed an almost complete
military line from Langres to Chalons, found themselves at some loss how
to use their advantages. Nothing could be better situated than their
present position, for such a daring enterprise as was now termed a
_Hourra_ upon Paris; and as all the high-roads, departing from various
points of the extensive line which they held, converged on the capital
as a common centre, while the towns and villages, through which these
roads passed, afforded an ample supply of provisions, this march might
have been accomplished almost without opposition, but for the tardy
movements of the grand army. The real weakness of Napoleon had been
disguised by the noisy and exaggerated rumours concerning his
preparations; and now when the allies learned that such an opportunity
had existed, they learned, at the same time, that it was wellnigh lost,
or at least that the road to Paris must first be cleared by a series of
bloody actions. In these the allies could not disguise from themselves
the possibility of their receiving severe checks; and under this
apprehension they began to calculate the consequences of such a defeat,
received in the centre of France, as that which they had suffered under
the walls of Dresden. There was here no favourable screen of mountains
to secure their retreat, no strong positions for checking a pursuing
army, as in the case of Vandamme, and turning a defeat into a victory.
The frontier which they had passed was penetrated, not subdued--its
fortresses, so strong and numerous, were in the greater part masked, not
taken--so that their retreat upon the Rhine must be exposed to all the
dangers incident to passing in disorder through a country in complete
possession of the enemy.
General councils of war seldom agree upon recommending bold measures. In
this sense, Solomon says, that in the multitude of counsellors there is
safety; meaning that the most cautious, if not the wisest measures, are
sure to have the approbation of the majority.
Accordingly, this spirit predominating in the councils of the allies,
led to a degree of uncertainty in their movements on this momentous
occasion, which, as is usual, endeavoured to disguise itself under the
guise of prudence. They resolved that the grand army should halt a short
space at Langres, in hopes either that Napoleon, renewing the
negotiation, the scene of which was now to be transferred to Chatillon
upon the Seine, would avert his present danger, by acquiescing in the
terms of the allies; or that the French nation, an event still less
likely to happen, would become tired of the military monarch, whose
ambition had brought such distress upon the country. In the meanwhile,
the allies declined the offers of such royalists as came forward in the
name, and for the interest, of the exiled family; uniformly replying,
that they would give no weight to any expression of the sentiments of
the French people, unless it was made in some quarter of the kingdom
where it could not be supposed to be influenced by the presence of the
allied army. They trusted chiefly at that moment to the effect of
negotiation with the present possessor of the throne.[326]
[Sidenote: STATE OF THE ARMIES--BRIENNE.]
But Napoleon, as firmly determined in his purpose as the allies were
doubtful, knowing himself to be the soul of his army, and absolute lord
of his own actions, felt all the advantage which a bold, active, and
able swordsman has in encountering an opponent whose skill is less
distinguished, and whose determination is more flexible than his own.
The allies had presented in the grand army a front of 97,000 men,
Maréchal Blucher one of 40,000, affording a disposable force of
137,000.[327] To oppose this the French Emperor had only, of old troops,
independent of those under Suchet in Catalonia, under Soult near
Bayonne, and also of garrisons, about 50,000 men; nor could he hope to
add to them more than 70,000 conscripts.[328] Nay, in fact his levies,
so far as they could be brought into the field, fell greatly short of
this number; for the allies were in possession of a considerable part of
the kingdom of France, and, in this moment of general confusion, it was
impossible to enforce the law of conscription, which was at all times
obnoxious. It was soon proved, that he who so lately had led half a
million of men to the Vistula, and 300,000 to the banks of the Elbe,
could not now muster, for the protection of the capital of his own
empire, a disposable force of more than 70,000 men.
The defensive war had no doubt considerable advantages to one who knew
so well how to use them. The highways, by which the allies must advance,
formed a half or quarter circle of rays, converging, as already
mentioned, on Paris as a centre. A much smaller army might, therefore,
oppose a large one, because, lying between Paris and the enemy, they
must occupy the same roads by a much shorter line of communication than
the invaders, who were farther from the centre, where the roads diverged
to a greater distance from each other. With this advantage of
collocation to balance a great inferiority in numerical force,
Buonaparte advanced to play for the most momentous stake ever disputed,
with a degree of military skill which has never been matched.
Arrived at Chalons on the 26th January, Buonaparte took the command of
such an army as he had been able to assemble, by the concentration of
the troops under the Maréchals Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, and Ney, all
of whom had retreated from the frontier. So much were the French corps
d'armée reduced, that these great and distinguished generals, who, in
former times, would have commanded 60,000 or 70,000 men each, had under
them all, when concentrated, but a total of 52,000, to which Napoleon
was only able to add about 20,000, brought from Paris. But no one ever
understood better than Buonaparte, the great military doctrine, that
victory does not depend on the comparative result of numerical
superiority in general, but on the art of obtaining such a superiority
on the field of action itself.
Blucher was, as usual, the foremost in advance, and Napoleon resolved to
bestow on this active and inveterate enemy, the terrible honour of his
first attack, hoping to surprise the Silesian corps d'armée before it
could receive succour from the army of Schwartzenberg. The maréchal was
apprised of the Emperor's purpose, and lost no time in concentrating his
forces at Brienne, on the Aube, fourteen miles below Bar. This is a
small village, seated on the ascent of a hill. The place has but two
streets; one of which ascends to the Chateau, occupied formerly as a
royal academy for young persons designed for the army; the other
conducts to Arcis-sur-Aube. The Chateau is partly surrounded by a park
or chase. It was at the military school of Brienne that Napoleon
acquired the rudiments of that skill in the military art with which he
had almost prostrated the world, and had ended by placing it in array
against him; and it was here he came to commence what seemed his last
series of efforts for victory;--like some animals of the chase, who,
when hard pressed by the hunters, are said to direct their final
attempts at escape upon the point from which they have first started.
The alert movements of Napoleon surpassed the anticipation of Blucher.
He was at table with his staff in the Chateau. General Alsusieff, a
Russian, occupied the town of Brienne, and General Sacken's corps was
drawn up in columns, on the road from Brienne to La Rothière. At once a
horrible tumult was heard. The Russian cavalry, 2000 in number, were
completely driven in by those of Napoleon, and at the same moment Ney
attacked the town; while a body of French grenadiers, who, favoured by
the wooded and broken character of the ground, had been enabled to get
into the park, threatened to make prisoners all who were in the Chateau.
Blucher, with his officers, had barely time to reach a postern, where
they were under the necessity of leading their horses down a stair, and
in that way made their escape with difficulty. The bold resistance of
Alsusieff defended the town against Ney, and Sacken advanced to
Alsusieff's assistance. The Cossacks also fell on the rear of the French
in the park, and Buonaparte's own safety was compromised in the
mêlée.[329] Men were killed by his side, and he was obliged to draw his
sword in his own defence. At the very moment of attack, his attention
was engaged by the sight of a tree, which he recollected to be the same
under which, during the hours of recreation at Brienne, he used, when a
school-boy, to peruse the Jerusalem Delivered of Tasso. If the curtain
of fate had risen before the obscure youth, and discovered to him in the
same spot, his own image as Emperor of France, contending against the
Scythians of the desert for life and power, how wonderful would have
seemed the presage, when the mere concurrence of circumstances strikes
the mind of those who look back upon it with awful veneration for the
hidden ways of Providence! Lefebvre Desnouettes fell, dangerously
wounded, in charging at the head of the guards. The town caught fire,
and was burned to the ground; but it was not until eleven at night that
the Silesian army ceased to make efforts for recovering the place, and
that Blucher, retreating from Brienne, took up a position in the rear of
that town, and upon that of La Rothière.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF LA ROTHIÈRE--TROYES.]
The result of the battle of Brienne was indecisive, and the more
unsatisfactory to Buonaparte, as the part of Blucher's force engaged did
not amount to 20,000 men, and the sole advantage gained over them, was
that of keeping the field of battle. Napoleon's principal object, which
was to divide Blucher from the grand army, had altogether failed. It was
necessary, however, to proclaim the engagement as a victory, and much
pains was taken to represent it as such. But when it was afterwards
discovered to be merely a smart skirmish, without any material results,
the temporary deception only served to injure the cause of Napoleon.
On the first of February, Blucher, strongly reinforced from the grand
army, prepared in his turn to assume the offensive. It would have been
Napoleon's wish to have avoided an engagement; but a retreat across the
Aube, by the bridge of Lesmont, which was the only mode of passing that
deep and scarce fordable river, would have exposed his rear to
destruction. He therefore risked a general action. Blucher attacked the
line of the French on three points, assaulting at once the villages of
La Rothière, Dienville, and Chaumont. The conflict, in which the Prince
Royal of Wirtemberg distinguished himself, was hard fought during the
whole day, but in the evening, the French were repulsed on all points,
and Buonaparte was compelled to retreat across the Aube, after losing
4000 prisoners, and no less than seventy-three guns. Ney, by the
Emperor's orders, destroyed the bridge at Lesmont. The allies were not
aware of the amount of their advantage, and suffered the French to
retire unmolested.[330]
A general council of war, held at the castle of Brienne [Feb. 2,] now
resolved that the two armies (although having so lately found the
advantage of mutual support) should separate from each other, and that
Blucher, detaching himself to the northward, and uniting under his
command the division of D'Yorck and Kleist, both of whom had occupied
St. Dizier and Vitry, should approach Paris by the Marne; while Prince
Schwartzenberg and the grand army should descend on the capital by the
course of the Seine. The difficulty of finding provisions for such
immense armies was doubtless in part the cause of this resolution. But
it was likewise recommended by the success of a similar plan of
operations at Dresden, and afterwards at Leipsic, where the enemies of
Buonaparte approached him from so many different quarters as to render
it impossible for him to make head against one army without giving great
opportunity of advantage to the others.[331]
Buonaparte reached Troyes, on which he retreated after crossing the
Aube, in a disastrous condition; but his junction with his old guard,
whose appearance and high state of appointments restored courage to the
dejected troops who had been beaten at La Rothière, gave a new impulse
to the feelings of his army, and restored the young levies to
confidence. He resolved, taking advantage of the division of the two
armies of the allies, to march upon that of Blucher. But, in order to
disguise his purpose, he first sent a small division upon Bar-sur-Seine,
to alarm the Austrians with an attack upon their right wing.[332]
Schwartzenberg immediately apprehended that Buonaparte was about to move
with his whole force in that direction; a movement which, in fact, would
have been most favourable for the allies, since it would have left the
road to Paris undefended, and open to the whole. But, terrified by the
idea that his left flank might be turned or forced, the Austrian general
moved his chief strength in that direction; thus at once suspending his
meditated march on the Seine, and increasing the distance betwixt the
grand army and that of Silesia. Buonaparte having deceived
Schwartzenberg by this successful feint, evacuated Troyes, leaving the
Maréchals Victor and Oudinot to oppose the Austrians with very
inadequate means, while he directed his own march against Blucher.
Blucher, in the meanwhile, having left Napoleon in front of the grand
army, and not doubting that the Austrians would find him sufficient
employment, hurried forward to the Marne, forced Macdonald to retreat
from Chateau Thierry, and advanced his headquarters to Vertus; while
Sacken, who formed his vanguard, pushed his light troops as far as Ferté
la Jouarre, and was nearer to Paris than was the Emperor himself.
General D'Yorck had advanced as far as Meaux, and Paris was in the last
degree of alarm.
Even Buonaparte himself was so much struck by the inextricable situation
of his affairs after the defeat of La Rothière, that a thought occurred
to him, which posterity, excepting on his own avowal, would hardly give
credit to. The plan which suggested itself, was that of sacrificing his
own authority to the peace of France, and of abdicating the crown in
favour of the Bourbons, while he had yet the means of resistance in his
possession. He felt he had reigned and combated long enough for his own
glory, and justly thought that the measure of his renown would be filled
up by such an act of generous self-denial. But a maxim occurred to him,
(suggested, he says, by Mr. Fox,) that restored monarchs could never
forgive those who had occupied their place. Probably his thoughts turned
also to the murder of the Duke d'Enghien; for there was no other point
of personal offence betwixt Buonaparte and the exiled family, which
their restoration, if the event took place by his intervention, might
not have fully atoned for. If our conjecture be real, it serves to show
how such a crime operates in its consequences to obstruct its
perpetrator in future attempts to recover the path of virtue and
honour. Had Napoleon been really capable of the generous act of
self-denial which he meditated, he must have been ranked, in despite of
the doubtful points of his character, as one of the greatest men who
ever lived.
But the spirit of egotism and suspicion prevailed, and the hopes of
accomplishing the discomfiture and defeat of the Silesian army, appeared
preferable to meriting, by one act of disinterested devotion, the
eternal gratitude of Europe; and the philosopher and friend of humanity
relapsed into the warrior and conqueror. There is, no doubt, something
meritorious in the conceiving of great and noble resolutions, even
although they remain unrealised. But this patriotism of the imagination
does not rise to a higher scale of merit, than the sensibility of those
who cannot hear a tale of sorrow without weeping, but whose sympathy
never assumes the expensive form of actual charity.
[Sidenote: ATTACK ON BLUCHER.]
The army of Napoleon was now to be transferred from the high-road
leading from Paris to Troyes, to that leading from Chalons to Paris, on
which Blucher was operating, and that by flank marches through an
impracticable country; but which, if they could be accomplished, would
enable the French Emperor to attack the Silesian army at unawares in
flank and rear. The lateral cross-roads, which connect one highway with
another through France, are generally scarce passable in winter, even
for the purpose of ordinary communication, much less for an army with
its carriages and artillery. Buonaparte had to traverse a country
intersected with thickets, marshes, drains, ditches, and impediments of
every kind; the weather was execrable, and but for the extraordinary
exertions of the Mayor of Barbonne, who collected 500 horses to
extricate the guns, they must have been abandoned on the road. But by
dint of perseverance, Buonaparte accomplished this forced march, on 10th
of February, and the flank of the Silesian army was in consequence
placed at his mercy.[333] They were moving on without the least
suspicion of such an attack. Sacken led the advance, the Russian General
Alsusieff followed, and Blucher himself brought up the rear with the
main body. All intent upon the advance to Paris, they were marching with
careless haste, and had suffered such large intervals to take place
betwixt their divisions, as to expose them to be attacked in detail.
Buonaparte fell upon the central division of Alsusieff, at Champ-Aubert,
surrounded, defeated, and totally dispersed them, taking their
artillery, and 2000 prisoners, while the remainder of the division fled
into the woods, and attempted to escape individually. The whole force of
the Emperor was now interposed between the advanced-guard under Sacken,
and the main body under Blucher. It was first directed towards the
former, whom Napoleon encountered sooner than he expected, for Sacken,
on hearing of the action at Champ-Aubert, instantly countermarched his
division to assist Alsusieff, or at least to rejoin Blucher; but he was
overwhelmed by the superior force of the French, and having lost
one-fourth of his division, about 5000 men, was forced to leave the
high-road, upon which Blucher was advancing, and retreat by that on
Chateau-Thierry. At this village Sacken was joined by General D'Yorck
and Prince William of Prussia; but, still unable to make a stand, they
could only secure a retreat by destroying the bridge over the Marne. War
began now to show itself in its most hideous forms. The stragglers and
fugitives who could not cross the bridge before its destruction, were
murdered by the peasantry, while the allied soldiers, in revenge,
plundered the village of Chateau-Thierry, and practised every excess of
violence. The defeat of Sacken took place on the 12th of February.[334]
Blucher, in the meanwhile, ignorant of the extent of the force by which
his vanguard had been attacked, pressed forward to their support, and,
in a wide and unenclosed country, suddenly found himself in the front of
the whole army of Napoleon, flushed with the double victory which they
had already gained, and so numerous as to make a retreat indispensable
on the part of the Prussians. Blucher, if surprised, remained
undismayed. Having only three regiments of cavalry, he had to trust for
safety to the steadiness of his infantry. He formed them into squares,
protected by artillery, and thus commenced his retreat by alternate
divisions; those battalions which were in motion to the rear, being
protected by the fire of the others then standing fast, and covering
them with theirs while they retired in turn. The French cavalry, though
so strong as to operate at once on the flanks and rear, failed in being
able to break a single square. After the Prussians had retired several
leagues in this manner, fighting every foot of their way, they were
nearly intercepted by a huge column of French horse, which, having made
a circuit so as to pass them, had drawn up on the causeway to intercept
their retreat. Without a moment's hesitation, Blucher instantly attacked
them with such a murderous fire of infantry and artillery, as forced
them from the high-road, and left the passage free. The Prussians found
the village of Etoges, through which they were obliged to pass, also
occupied by the enemy; but here also they cleared their way by dint of
fighting. This expedition of the Marne, as it is called, is always
accounted one of Napoleon's military _chefs-d'œuvre_; for a flank
march undertaken through such a difficult country, and so completely
successful, is not perhaps recorded in history. On the other hand, if
Blucher lost any credit by the too great security of his march, he
regained it by the masterly manner in which he executed his retreat. Had
the army which he commanded in person shared the fate of his vanguard,
it is probable there would have been no campaign of Paris.[335]
The Parisians, in the meantime, saw at length actual proofs that
Napoleon had been victorious. Long columns of prisoners moved through
their streets, banners were displayed, the cannon thundered, the press
replied, and the pulpit joined, in extolling and magnifying the dangers
which the citizens had escaped, and the merits of their preserver.[336]
[Sidenote: MONTEREAU.]
In the midst of the joy natural on such an occasion, the Parisians
suddenly learned that the town of Fontainbleau was occupied by Hungarian
hussars, and that not Cossacks only, but Tartars, Baskirs, and Kalmouks,
tribes of a wild and savage aspect, a kind of Asiatic Ogres, to whom
popular credulity imputed a taste for the flesh of children, had
appeared in the neighbourhood of Nangis. These renewed signs of
approaching danger arose from the grand army of the allies having
carried, at the point of the bayonet, Nogent and Montereau, and advanced
the headquarters of the monarchs to Pont-sur-Seine. This alarm to Paris
was accompanied by another. Schwartzenberg, learning the disasters on
the Marne, not only pushed forward from three directions on the capital,
but despatched forces from his right towards Provins, to threaten
Napoleon's rear and communications. Leaving the pursuit of Blucher, the
Emperor countermarched on Meaux, and, marching from thence to Guignes,
he joined the army of Oudinot and Victor, who were retreating before
Schwartzenberg. He here found the reinforcements which he had drawn from
Spain, about 20,000 in number, tried and excellent troops. With this
army he now fronted that of Schwartzenberg, and upon the 17th February,
commenced the offensive at all points, and with success, possessing
himself of Nangis, and nearly destroying the corps under Count Pahlen at
Mormant. The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg was forced to retreat to
Montereau.
So alarmed were the allies at the near approach of their terrible enemy,
that a message was sent to Napoleon from the allied sovereigns, by
Prince Schwartzenberg's aide-de-camp, Count Par, stating their surprise
at his offensive movement, since they had given orders to their
plenipotentiaries at Chatillon to sign the preliminaries of peace, on
the terms which had been assented to by the French envoy, Caulaincourt.
This letter, of which we shall hereafter give a more full explanation,
remained for some days unanswered, during which Napoleon endeavoured to
push his advantages. He recovered the bridge at Montereau, after a
desperate attack, in which the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg signalized
himself by the valour of his defence. In the course of the action
Napoleon returned to his old profession of an artilleryman, and pointed
several guns himself, to the great delight of the soldiers. They
trembled, however, when the fire attracted the attention of the enemy,
whose balls began to be aimed at the French battery. "Go, my children,"
said Buonaparte, ridiculing their apprehensions; "the ball is not cast
that is to kill me."
Having taken the place by storm, Buonaparte, dissatisfied with the
number of men he had lost, loaded with reproaches some of his best
officers. Montbrun was censured for want of energy, and Digeon for the
scarcity of ammunition with which the artillery was served; but it was
chiefly on Victor, the Duke of Belluno, that his resentment discharged
itself. He imputed to him negligence, in not having attacked Montereau
on the day before the action, when it was unprovided for resistance; and
he ordered him to retire from the service. The marshal endeavoured to
obtain a hearing in his own defence, but for some time could not succeed
in checking the stream of reproaches. At length they were softened into
a charge of broken health, and the love of repose, incident to wounds
and infirmities. "The best bed," said the Emperor, "which the quarters
afford must now be sought out for the once indefatigable Victor." The
marshal felt the charge more severely in proportion as it became
moderated within what was probably the bounds of truth; but he would not
consent to quit the service. "I have not," he said, "forgot my original
trade. I will take a musket. Victor will become a private in the
Guard."--Buonaparte could not resist this mark of attachment. He held
out his hand.--"Let us be friends," he replied; "I cannot restore to you
your corps d'armée, which I have given to Girard; but I will place you
at the head of two divisions of the Guard. Go--assume your command, and
let there be no more of this matter betwixt us."[337]
It was upon such occasions, when he subdued his excited feelings to a
state of kindness and generosity, that Buonaparte's personal conduct
seems to have been most amiable.
The allies, in the meantime, remembering perhaps, though somewhat of the
latest, the old fable of the bunch of arrows, resolved once more to
enter into communication with the Silesian army, and, concentrating near
Troyes, to accept of battle, if Buonaparte should offer it. The
indefatigable Blucher had already recruited his troops, and, being
reinforced by a division of the army of the North, under Langeron, moved
southward from Chalons, to which he had retreated after his disaster at
Montmirail, to Mery, a town situated upon the Seine, to the north-east
of Troyes, to which last place the allied monarchs had again removed
their headquarters. Here he was attacked with fury by the troops of
Buonaparte who made a desperate attempt to carry the bridge and town,
and thus prevent the proposed communication between the Silesian army
and that of Schwartzenberg. The bridge, which was of wood, was set fire
to in the struggle. The sharpshooters fought amid its blazing and
cracking beams. The Prussians, however, kept possession of Mery.
[Sidenote: RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS.]
A council of war was now held by the allies. Blucher urged the
fulfilment of their original purpose of hazarding an action with
Napoleon. But the Austrians had again altered their mind, and determined
on a general retreat as far as the line between Nancy and Langres; the
very position on which the allies had paused when they first entered
France. The principal cause alleged for this retrograde movement, by
which they must cede half the ground they had gained since their
entering France, was, that Augereau, who had hitherto contented himself
with his successful defence of Lyons, had been recruited by considerable
bodies of troops from the army of Suchet, which had been employed in
Catalonia. Thus reinforced, the French marshal was now about to assume
the offensive against the Austrian forces at Dijon, act upon their
communications with Switzerland, and raise in a mass the warlike
peasantry of the departments of the Doubs, the Saonne, and the mountains
of the Vosges. To prevent such consequences, Schwartzenberg sent General
Bianchi to the rear with a large division of his forces, to support the
Austrians at Dijon; and conceived his army too much weakened by this
detachment to retain his purpose of risking a general action. It was
therefore resolved, that if the headquarters of the grand army were
removed to Langres, those of Blucher should be once more established on
the Marne,[338] where, strengthened by the arrival of the northern army,
which was now approaching from Flanders, he might resume his
demonstration upon Paris, in case Buonaparte should engage himself in
the pursuit of the grand army of the allies.
This retrograde movement gave much disgust to the Austrian soldiers, who
considered it as the preface to a final abandonment of the invasion.
Their resentment showed itself not only in murmurs and in tearing out
the green boughs with which, as in sign of victory, they usually
ornament their helmets and schakos, but also, as is too frequently the
case in similar instances, in neglect of discipline, and excesses
committed in the country.
To diminish the bad effects arising from this discontent among the
troops, Schwartzenberg published an order of the day,[339] commanding
the officers to enforce the strictest discipline, and at the same time
explain to the army that the present retreat was only temporary, and
that on joining with its reserves, which had already crossed the Rhine,
the grand army would instantly resume the offensive, while Field-marshal
Blucher, at present moving northward, so as to form a junction with
Winzengerode and Bulow, should at the same time attack the rear and
flank of the enemy. The publishing this plan of the campaign, went far
to rouse the dejected confidence of the Austrian army.
On the evening of the 22d February, an answer to the letter of
Schwartzenberg was received, but it was addressed exclusively to the
Emperor of Austria; and while its expressions of respect are bestowed
liberally on that power, the manner in which the other members of the
coalition are treated, shows unabated enmity, ill-concealed under an
affectation of contempt. The Emperor of France expressed himself willing
to treat upon the basis of the Frankfort declaration, but exclaimed
against the terms which his own envoy, Caulaincourt, had proposed to the
plenipotentiaries of the other powers. In short, the whole letter
indicated, not that Napoleon desired a general peace with the allies,
but that it was his anxious wish to break up the coalition, by making a
separate peace with Austria. This counteracted in spirit and letter the
purpose of the confederates, distinctly expressed in their communication
to Napoleon.
The Emperor Francis and his ministers were resolved not to listen to any
proposals which went to separate the Austrian cause from that of their
allies. It was therefore at first resolved that no answer should be sent
to the letter; but the desire of gaining time for bringing up the
reserves of the grand army, who were approaching the Swiss frontier
under the direction of the Prince of Hesse-Homberg, as also for the
union of the army of the north, under Bulow and Winzengerode, with that
of Silesia, determined them to accept the offer of a suspension of
hostilities. Under these considerations, Prince Wenceslaus of
Lichtenstein was sent to the headquarters of Napoleon, to treat
concerning an armistice. The Emperor seemed to be in a state of high
hope, and called upon the Austrians not to sacrifice themselves to the
selfish views of Russia, and the miserable policy of England. He
appointed Count Flahault his commissioner to negotiate for a line of
demarcation, and directed him to meet with the envoy from the allies at
Lusigny, on 24th February.[340]
On the night of the 23d, the French bombarded Troyes, which the allied
troops evacuated according to their latest plan of the campaign. The
French entered the town on the 24th, when the sick and wounded, left
behind by the allies, were dragged out to grace Napoleon's triumph; and
a scene, not less deplorable, but of another description, was performed
at the same time.
[Sidenote: EXECUTION OF GOUAULT.]
Amid the high hopes which the entrance of the allies into France had
suggested to the enemies of Buonaparte's government, five persons, the
chief of whom were the Marquis de Vidranges, and the Chevalier de
Gouault, had displayed the white cockade, and other emblems of loyalty
to the exiled family. They had received little encouragement to take so
decided a step either from the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, or from the
Emperor Alexander; both of whom, although approving the principles on
which these gentlemen acted, refused to sanction the step they had
taken, or to warrant them against the consequences.[341] It does not
appear that their declaration had excited any corresponding enthusiasm
in the people of Troyes or the neighbourhood; and it would have been
wiser in Napoleon to have overlooked such a trifling movement, which he
might have represented as arising from the dotage of loyalty, rather
than to have, at this critical period, called the public attention to
the Bourbons, by denouncing and executing vengeance upon their
partisans. Nevertheless, Napoleon had scarce entered Troyes, when the
chevalier Gouault (the other Royalists having fortunately escaped) was
seized upon, tried by a military commission, condemned, and immediately
shot. He died with the utmost firmness, exclaiming, "_Vive le
Roi!_"[342] A violent and ill-timed decree promulgated the penalty of
death against all who should wear the decorations of the Bourbons, and
on all emigrants who should join the allies.[343] The severity of the
measure, so contrary to Napoleon's general conduct of late years towards
the Bourbons and their followers, whom he had for a long period scarce
even alluded to, made the world ascribe his unusual ferocity to an
uncommon state of apprehension; and thus it gave farther encouragement
to those into whom it was intended to strike terror.
At this period of the retreat of Schwartzenberg from Troyes, and the
movement of Blucher towards the Marne, we must leave the armies which
were contending in the interior of France, in order to retrace those
movements upon the frontiers, which, though operating at a distance,
tended at once to reinforce the invading armies, and to cripple
Napoleon's means of defence.
It is difficult for the inhabitants of a peaceful territory to picture
to themselves the miseries sustained by the country which formed the
theatre of this sanguinary contest. While Buonaparte, like a tiger
hemmed in by hounds and hunters, now menaced one of his foes, now sprung
furiously upon another, and while, although his rapid movements
disconcerted and dismayed them, he still remained unable to destroy the
individuals whom he had assailed, lest, while aiming to do so, he should
afford a fatal advantage to those who were disengaged--the scene of this
desultory warfare was laid waste in the most merciless manner. The
soldiers on both parts, driven to desperation by rapid marches through
roads blocked with snow, or trodden into swamps, became reckless and
pitiless; and, straggling from their columns in all directions,
committed every species of excess upon the inhabitants. These evils are
mentioned in the bulletins of Napoleon, as well as in the general orders
of Schwartzenberg.
The peasants, with their wives and children, fled to caves, quarries,
and woods, where the latter were starved to death by the inclemency of
the season, and want of sustenance; and the former, collecting into
small bodies, increased the terrors of war, by pillaging the convoys of
both armies, attacking small parties of all nations, and cutting off the
sick, the wounded, and the stragglers. The repeated advance and retreat
of the different contending parties, exasperated these evils. Every
fresh band of plunderers which arrived, was savagely eager after spoil,
in proportion as the gleanings became scarce. In the words of Scripture,
what the locust left was devoured by the palmer-worm--what escaped the
Baskirs, and Kirgas, and Croats of the Wolga, and Caspian, and Turkish
frontier, was seized by the half-clad, and half-starved conscripts of
Napoleon, whom want, hardship, and an embittered spirit, rendered as
careless of the ties of country and language, as the others were
indifferent to the general claims of humanity. The towns and villages,
which were the scenes of actual conflict, were frequently burnt to the
ground; and this not only in the course of the actions of importance
which we have detailed, but in consequence of innumerable skirmishes
fought in different points, which had no influence, indeed, upon the
issue of the campaign, but increased incalculably the distress of the
invaded country, by extending the terrors of battle, with fire, famine,
and slaughter for its accompaniments, into the most remote and
sequestered districts. The woods afforded no concealment, the churches
no sanctuary; even the grave itself gave no cover to the relics of
mortality. The villages were every where burnt, the farms wasted and
pillaged, the abodes of man, and all that belongs to peaceful industry
and domestic comfort, desolated and destroyed. Wolves, and other savage
animals, increased fearfully in the districts which had been laid waste
by human hands, with ferocity congenial to their own. Thus were the
evils which France had unsparingly inflicted upon Spain, Prussia,
Russia, and almost every European nation, terribly retaliated within a
few leagues of her own metropolis; and such were the consequences of a
system, which assuming military force for its sole principle and law,
taught the united nations of Europe to repel its aggressions by means
yet more formidable in extent than those which had been used in
supporting them.
FOOTNOTES:
[321] Lord Burghersh, _Operations of the Allied Armies_, p. 72.
[322] Lord Burghersh, _Operations_, &c., p. 88.
[323] "On receiving the news of the simultaneous invasion of the French
territory at so many different points, Napoleon's firmness of mind did
not forsake him. 'I am two months behind-hand,' he said; 'had I that
time at command, they should not have crossed the Rhine. This may be
attended with serious consequences; but I can do nothing single-handed.
Unless I am assisted, I must fail in the struggle.'"--SAVARY, tom. iii.,
p. 185.
[324] "Marshal Blucher established his army at Nancy in fifteen days
from the passage of the Rhine. What would have been the advantages, if,
in the same period the great armies had by the end of November advanced
to the same position? This question being put to Marshal Ney, he
answered, 'Messieurs les alliés auraient pû compter leurs journées
d'étapes jusqu'à Paris.'"--LORD BURGHERSH, _Operations_, p. 80.
[325] In a proclamation to the French, issued by Bernadotte from
Cologne, Feb. 12, he says, "Once more in sight of the banks of this
river, where I have so often fought for you, I feel a desire to
communicate to you my thoughts. It has been the constant effort of your
Government to debase every thing, that it might despise ever thing: it
is time that this system should change. All enlightened men desire the
preservation of France; they only require that she shall be no longer
the scourge of the earth. The allied sovereigns have not coalesced to
make war against nations, but to force your Government to recognise the
independence of states: Such are their intentions, and I pledge myself
to you for their sincerity."--MEREDITH'S _Memorials of Charles John_, p.
208.
[326] For the various opinions, as to the military operations to be
pursued from Langres, see the memoirs drawn up at the Prussian,
Austrian, and Russian headquarters.--_Operations_, &c., pp. 91, 94, and
104.
[327] Lord Burghersh, p. 99.
[328] Jomini, tom. iv., p. 524.
[329] "General Dejean, feeling himself closely pressed, turned about and
gave the alarm, by exclaiming, _The Cossacks!_ and at the same time
attempted to plunge his sabre into the breast of one of the assailants,
whom he thought he had secured. But the enemy had escaped; they then
darted on the horseman in the grey great-coat who was somewhat in
advance. Corbineau instantly rushed forward; Gourgaud made the same
movement, and, with a pistol-shot, stretched the Cossack dead at
Napoleon's feet."--BARON FAIN, _Manuscript de_, 1814.
[330] Lord Burghersh, Operations, &c., p. 113; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 527.
[331] Lord Burghersh, Operations, &c., p. 121.
[332] We ought to read _left_ wing. See Lord Burghersh, Operations, &c.,
p. 122.--ED. (1842.)
[333] "This bold incursion of the enemy roused Napoleon. He resolved, at
least, to make the Prussian army pay dearly for their temerity, and
formed the design of unexpectedly falling on their flank. The Emperor
was poring over his maps, with the compasses in his hand, when the Duke
of Bassano presented him with the despatches, which he had prepared for
Chatillon! 'Oh! here you are,' said Napoleon, as the duke entered the
apartment; 'but I am now thinking of something very different. I am
defeating Blucher on the map. He is advancing by the road of Montmirail;
I shall set out and beat him to-morrow. I shall beat him again the day
after to-morrow. Should this movement prove as successful as I have
reason to expect, the state of affairs will be entirely changed, and we
shall then see what must be done.'"--BARON FAIN.
[334] Jomini, tom. iv., p. 535; Burghersh, Operations, &c., p. 134.
[335] Lord Burghersh, p. 136; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 532.
[336] "No sooner had the battle of Champ-Aubert afforded a pretext for
exultation, than M. Denon ordered a medal to be executed to designate
the state of France at that moment. On the obverse, was the head of
Napoleon; on the reverse, an eagle erect; above his head was a star; his
claws rested on a thunderbolt; and on one side was the sign Pisces--on
the other a flying Victory. This was the only medal record of this
memorable campaign."--_Events at Paris_, Feb. 1814, p. 19.
[337] Baron Fain, Manuscript de, 1814.
[338] According to Lord Burghersh. (Operations, &c., p. 153,)
Schwartzenberg recommended the retreat of the Silesian army to Nancy;
but Blucher (_Ibid._, p. 186,) "took upon himself the responsibility of
declining to conform," &c.--ED., (1842.)
[339] Lord Burghersh, p. 168.
[340] Jomini, tom. iv., p. 529; Lord Burghersh, Observations, &c., p.
143.
[341] The presence of the allies in the ancient capital of Champagne,
had reanimated the hopes of the partisans of the Bourbons. The Emperor
of Russia could not help observing to them, "that he considered the step
they had taken a little premature; that the chances of war were
uncertain, and that he should be sorry to see them sacrificed."--BEAUCHAMP,
_Hist. de la Champagne de 1814_, tom. i., p. 241.
[342] It has been said that Napoleon had been persuaded to save his
life. But the result was similar to the execution, of Clarence.--S.--See
Baron Fain, Manuscript de, 1814, p. 156.
[343] Dated Troyes, Feb. 24. Moniteur, March 1.