_Retreat of the French from Germany--General Defection of Napoleon's
Partisans--Battle of Hannau fought on 30th and 31st
October--Napoleon arrives at Paris on 9th November--State in which
he finds the public mind in the capital--Fate of the French
Garrisons left in Germany--Arrival of the Allied Armies on the banks
of the Rhine--General view of Napoleon's political
relations--Italy--Spain--Restoration of Ferdinand--Liberation of the
Pope, who returns to Rome--Emancipation of Holland._
[Sidenote: RETREAT FROM GERMANY.]
Napoleon was now on his retreat, and it proved a final one, from Germany
towards France. It was performed with disorder enough, and great loss,
though far less than that which had attended the famous departure from
Moscow. The troops, according to Baron d'Odeleben, soured by misfortune,
marched with a fierce and menacing air, and the guards in particular
indulged in every excess. In this disordered condition, Napoleon passed
through Lutzen, late the scene of his brilliant success, now witness to
his disastrous losses. His own courage was unabated; he seemed indeed
pensive, but was calm and composed, indulging in no vain regrets, still
less in useless censures and recriminations. Harassed as he passed the
defiles of Eckartsberg, by the light troops of the allies, he pushed on
to Erfurt, where he hoped to be able to make some pause, and restore
order to his disorganised followers.
On the 23d of October, he reached that city, which was rendered by its
strong citadel a convenient rallying point; and upon collecting the
report of his losses, had the misfortune to find them much greater than
he had apprehended. Almost all the German troops of his army were now
withdrawn from it. The Saxons and the troops of Baden he had dismissed
with a good grace; other contingents, which saw their sovereigns on the
point of being freed from Napoleon's supremacy, withdrew of themselves,
and in most cases joined the allies. A great many of those Frenchmen who
arrived at Erfurt were in a miserable condition, and without arms. Their
wretched appearance extorted from Buonaparte the peevish observation,
"They are a set of scoundrels, who are going to the devil!--In this way
I shall lose 80,000 men before I can get to the Rhine."
The spirit of defection extended even to those who were nearest to the
Emperor. Murat, discouraged and rendered impatient by the incessant
misfortunes of his brother-in-law, took leave, under pretence, it was
said, of bringing forces up from the French frontier, but in reality to
return to his own dominions, without further allying his fortunes to
those of Napoleon.[293] Buonaparte, as if influenced by some secret
presentiment that they should never again meet, embraced his old
companion-in-arms repeatedly ere they parted.
The Poles who remained in Napoleon's army showed a very generous spirit.
He found himself obliged to appeal to their own honour, whether they
chose to remain in his service, or to desert him at this crisis. A part
had served so long under his banners, that they had become soldiers of
fortune, to whom the French camp served for a native country. But many
others were men who had assumed arms in the Russian campaign, with the
intention of freeing Poland from the foreign yoke under which it had so
long groaned. The manner in which Napoleon had disappointed their hopes
could not be forgotten by them; but they had too much generosity to
revenge, at this crisis, the injustice with which they had been treated,
and agreed unanimously that they would not quit Napoleon's service until
they had escorted him safely beyond the Rhine, reserving their right
then to leave his standard, of which a great many accordingly availed
themselves.
[Sidenote: ERFURT--HANAU.]
Napoleon passed nearly two days at Erfurt, during which the
re-organisation of his troops advanced rapidly, as the magazines and
stores of the place were sufficient to recruit them in every department.
Their reassembled force amounted to about 80,000 men. This, together
with the troops left to their fate in the garrison towns in Germany,
was all that remained of 280,000, with which Napoleon had begun the
campaign. The garrisons amounted to about 80,000, so that the loss of
the French rose to 120,000 men. These garrisons, so imprudently left
behind, were of course abandoned to their fate, or to the discretion of
the enemy; Napoleon consoling himself with the boast, "that if they
could form a junction in the valley of the Elbe, 80,000 Frenchmen might
break through all obstacles." Instructions were sent to the various
commanders, to evacuate the places they held, and form such a junction;
but it is believed that none of them reached the generals to whom they
were addressed.
It is probable that, but for the relief afforded by this halt, and the
protection of the citadel and defences of Erfurt, Napoleon, in his
retreat from Leipsic, must have lost all that remained to him of an
army. He had received news, however, of a character to preclude his
longer stay in this place of refuge. The Bavarian army, so lately his
allies, with a strong auxiliary force of Austrians, amounting in all to
50,000, under Wrede, were hurrying from the banks of the Inn, and had
reached Wurtzburg on the Mayne, with the purpose of throwing themselves
in hostile fashion between the army of Napoleon and the frontier of
France. In addition to this unpleasing intelligence, he learned that the
Austrians and Prussians were pressing forward, as far as Weimar and
Laugensalza, so that he was once more in danger of being completely
surrounded. Urged by these circumstances, Napoleon left Erfurt on the
25th of October, amid weather as tempestuous as his fortunes.
An unfortunate determination of the allied councils directed Marshal
Blucher to move in pursuit of Napoleon by Giessen and Wetzlar, and
commanded him to leave the direct road to the banks of the Rhine, by
Fulda and Gelnhaussen, open for the march of an Austrian column,
expected to advance from Schmalkald.[294] The most active and energetic
of the pursuers was thus turned aside from Napoleon's direct path of
retreat, and the Austrians, to whom it was yielded, did not come up in
time to overtake the retreating enemy. The French were still followed,
however, by the arrival of Cossacks under their adventurous leaders,
Platoff, Czernicheff, Orloff-Denizoff, and Kowaiski, who continued their
harassing and destructive operations on their flanks and their rear.
In the meanwhile, General Wrede, notwithstanding the inferiority of his
forces to those of Buonaparte, persevered in his purpose of barring the
return of Napoleon into France, and took up a position at Hanau for that
purpose, where he was joined by the chiefs of the Cossacks already
mentioned, who had pushed on before the advance of the French army, in
hopes that they might afford Wrede their assistance. If Blucher and his
troops had been now in the rear of Napoleon, his hour had in all
probability arrived. But Wrede's force, of whom he had been unable to
bring up above 45,000 men, was inferior to the attempt, almost always a
dangerous one, of intercepting the retreat of a bold and desperate enemy
upon the only road which can lead him to safety. It was upon a point,
also, where the Bavarians had no particular advantage of position, which
might have presented natural obstacles to the progress of the enemy.
Upon the 30th, the Bavarians had occupied the large wood of Lamboi, and
were disposed in line on the right bank of a small river called the
Kintzig, near a village named Neuhoff, where there is a bridge. The
French threw a body of light troops into the wood, which was disputed
from tree to tree, the close fire of the sharpshooters on both sides
resembling that of a general _chasse_, such as is practised on the
continent. The combat was sustained for several hours without decided
success, until Buonaparte commanded an attack in force on the left of
the Bavarians. Two battalions of the guards, under General Curial, were
sent into the wood to support the French tirailleurs; and the Bavarians,
at the sight of their grenadier-caps, imagined themselves attacked by
the whole of that celebrated body, and gave way. A successful charge of
cavalry was at the same time made on Wrede's left, which made it
necessary for him to retreat behind the Kintzig. The Austro-Bavarian
army continued to hold Hanau; but as the main road to Frankfort does not
lead directly through that town, but passes on the south side of it, the
desired line of retreat was left open to Napoleon, whose business it was
to push forward to the Rhine, and avoid farther combat. But the
rear-guard of the French army, consisting of 18,000 men, under command
of Mortier, was still at Gelnhaussen; and Marmont was left with three
corps of infantry to secure their retreat, while Buonaparte, with the
advance, pushed on to Williamstadt, and from thence to Hockstadt, in the
direction of Frankfort.
On the morning of the 31st, Marmont made a double attack upon the town
of Hanau, and the position of Wrede. Of the first, he possessed himself
by a bombardment. The other attack took place near the bridge of
Neuhoff. The Bavarians had at first the advantage, and pushed a body of
1000 or 1200 men across the Kintzig; but the instant attack and
destruction of these by the bayonet, impressed their general with
greater caution. Wrede himself was at this moment dangerously wounded,
and the Prince of Oettingen, his son-in-law, killed on the spot. General
Fresnel, who succeeded Wrede in the command, acted with more reserve. He
drew off from the combat; and the French, more intent on prosecuting
their march to the Rhine than on improving their advantages over the
Bavarians, followed the Emperor's line of retreat in the direction of
Frankfort.
An instance of rustic loyalty and sagacity was displayed during the
action, by a German miller, which may serve to vary the recurring detail
of military movements. This man, observing the fate of the battle, and
seeing a body of Bavarian infantry hard pressed by a large force of
French cavalry, had the presence of mind to admit the water into his
mill-stream when the Bavarians had passed its channel, and thus suddenly
interposed an obstacle between them and the pursuers, which enabled the
infantry to halt and resume their ranks. The sagacious peasant was
rewarded with a pension by the King of Bavaria.
[Sidenote: LOSSES OF THE FRENCH.]
The loss of the French in this sharp action was supposed to reach to
about 6000 men; that of the Austro-Bavarians exceeded 10,000. Escaped
from this additional danger, Napoleon arrived at Frankfort upon the 30th
October, and left, upon the first November, a town which was soon
destined to receive other guests. On the next day he arrived at Mayence,
(Mentz,) which he left upon the 7th November, and arriving on the 9th at
Paris, concluded his second unsuccessful campaign.
The Emperor had speedy information that the temper of the public was by
no means tranquil. The victory of Hanau, though followed by no other
effect than that of getting clear of the enemy, who had presumed to
check the retreat of the Emperor, alone shed a lustre on the arms of
Napoleon, which they greatly needed, for his late successive misfortunes
had awakened both critics and murmurers. The rupture of the armistice
seemed to be the date of his declension, as indeed the junction of the
Austrians enabled the allies to bear him down by resistless numbers.
Nine battles had been fought since that period, including the action at
Culm, which, in its results, is well entitled to the name. Of these,
Buonaparte only gained two--those of Dresden and Hanau; that at Wachau
was indecisive; while at Gross-Beeren, at Jauer on the Katzbach, at
Culm, at Dennewitz, at Mockern, and at Leipsic, the allies obtained
decisive and important victories.
The French had been still more unfortunate in the number of bloody
skirmishes which were fought almost every where through the scene of
war. They were outnumbered in cavalry, and especially in light cavalry;
they were outnumbered, too, in light corps of infantry and
sharpshooters; for the Germans, who had entered into the war with
general enthusiasm, furnished numerous reinforcements of this
description to the regular armies of the allies. These disasters,
however they might be glossed over, had not escaped the notice of the
French; nor was it the sight of a few banners, and a column of 4000
Bavarian prisoners, ostentatiously paraded, that prevented their asking,
what was become of upwards of 200,000 soldiers--what charm had dissolved
the Confederation of the Rhine--and why they heard rumours of Russians,
Austrians, Prussians, Germans, on the east, and of English, Spanish, and
Portuguese on the south, approaching the inviolable frontiers of the
great nation? During the bright sunshine of prosperity, a nation may be
too much dazzled with victory; but the gloomy horizon, obscured by
adversity, shows objects in their real colours.
The fate of the garrisons in Germany, which Buonaparte had so
imprudently omitted to evacuate, was not such as to cure this incipient
disaffection. The Emperor had never another opportunity during this war,
to collect the veteran troops thus unhappily left behind, under his
banner, though often missing them at his greatest need. The dates of
their respective surrender, referring to a set of detached facts, which
have no influence upon the general current of history, may be as well
succinctly recited in this place.
St. Cyr, at Dresden, finding himself completely abandoned to his own
slender resources, made on the 11th of November a capitulation to
evacuate the place, with his garrison of 35,000 men, (of whom very many
were, however, invalids,) who were to have a safe conduct to France,
under engagement not to serve against the allies for six months.
Schwartzenberg refused to ratify the capitulation, as being much too
favourable to the besieged. He offered St. Cyr, who had already left
Dresden, to replace him there in the same condition of defence which he
enjoyed when the agreement was entered into. This was contrary to the
rules of war; for how was it possible for the French commandant to be in
the same situation as before the capitulation, when the enemy had become
completely acquainted with his means of defence, and resources? But the
French general conceived it more expedient to submit, with his army, to
become prisoners of war, reserving his right to complain of breach of
capitulation.
Stettin surrendered on the 21st of November, after an eight months'
blockade. Eight thousand French remained prisoners of war. Here the
Prussians regained no less than 350 pieces of artillery.
On the 29th of November, the important city of Dantzic surrendered,
after trenches had been open before it for forty days. As in the case of
Dresden, the sovereigns refused to ratify the stipulation, which
provided for the return of the garrison to France, but made the
commandant, Rapp, the same proposal which had been offered to the
Maréchal St. Cyr, which Rapp in like manner declined. About 9000 French
were therefore sent prisoners into Russia. But the Bavarians,
Westphalians, and Poles, belonging to the garrison, were permitted to
return to their homes. Many of them took service with the allies. The
detention of this garrison must also be recorded against the allies as a
breach of faith, which the temptation of diminishing the enemy's forces
cannot justify.
After the battle of Leipsic, Tauentzein had been detached to blockade
Wittenberg, and besiege Torgau. The latter place was yielded on the 26th
December, with a garrison of 10,000 wretches, amongst whom a
pestilential fever was raging. Zamosc, in the duchy of Warsaw,
capitulated on the 22d, and Modlin on the 25th of December.
At the conclusion of the year 1813, only the following places, situated
in the rear of the allies, remained in the hands of the French;
Hamburgh, Madgeburg, Wittenberg, Custrin, Glogau, with the citadels of
Erfurt and of Wurtzburg, the French having in the last two instances
evacuated the towns.
[Sidenote: FRENCH GARRISONS IN GERMANY.]
Two circumstances are remarkable concerning the capture of the
surrendered fortresses. The first is the dismal state of the garrisons.
The men, who had survived the Russian campaign, and who had been
distributed into these cities and fortresses by Murat, were almost all,
from the hardships they had endured, and perhaps from their being too
suddenly accommodated with more genial food, subject to diseases which
speedily became infectious, and spread from the military to the
inhabitants. When the severities of a blockade were added to this
general tendency to illness, the deaths became numerous, and the case of
the survivors made them envious of those who died. So virulent was the
contagion at Torgau, that the Prussians, to whom the place was rendered
on the 26th December, did not venture to take possession of it till a
fortnight afterwards, when the ravage of the pestilence began to
decline. Thus widely extended, and thus late prolonged, were the fatal
effects of the Russian expedition.
The other point worth notice is, that the surrender of each fortress
rendered disposable a blockading army of the allies, proportioned to the
strength of the garrisons, which ought, according to the rules of war,
to be at least two to one.[295] Thus, while thousands after thousands of
the French were marched to distant prisons in Austria and Russia, an
addition was regularly made to the armies of the allies, equal at least
to double the number of those that were withdrawn from the French army.
While these successes were in the act of being obtained in their rear,
the allied sovereigns of Russia and Prussia advanced upon the Rhine, the
left bank of which was almost entirely liberated from the enemy. It is a
river upon which all the Germans look with a national pride, that
sometimes takes almost the appearance of filial devotion. When the
advanced guard of the army of the allies first came in sight of its
broad majesty of flood, they hailed the Father River with such
reiterated shouts, that those who were behind stood to their arms, and
pressed forward, supposing that an action was about to take place. The
proud and exulting feeling of recovered independence was not confined to
those brave men who had achieved the liberation of their country, but
extended every where, and animated the whole mass of the population of
Germany.
The retreat of the French armies, or their relics, across the land which
they had so long overrun, and where they had levelled and confounded
all national distinctions, might be compared to the abatement of the
great deluge, when land-marks which had been long hid from the eye began
to be once more visible and distinguished. The reconstruction of the
ancient sovereignties was the instant occupation of the allies.
From the very field of battle at Leipsic, the Electoral Prince of Hesse
departed to assume, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, the
sovereignty of the territories of his fathers. The allies, on 2d
November, took possession of Hanover and its dependencies in name of the
King of England. The gallant Duke of Brunswick, whose courage, as well
as his ardent animosity against Buonaparte, we have already had occasion
to commemorate, returned at the same time into the possession of his
hereditary estates; and the ephemeral kingdom of Westphalia, the
appanage of Jerome Buonaparte, composed out of the spoils of these
principalities, vanished into air, like the palace of Aladdin in the
Arabian tale.
Those members of the Confederacy of the Rhine who had hitherto been
contented to hold their crowns and coronets, under the condition of
being liege vassals to Buonaparte, and who were as much tired of his
constant exactions as ever a drudging fiend was of the authority of a
necromancer, lost no time in renouncing his sway, after his talisman was
broken. Bavaria and Wirtemberg had early joined the alliance--the latter
power the more willingly, that the Crown Prince had, even during
Napoleon's supremacy, refused to acknowledge his sway. The lesser
princes, therefore, had no alternative but to declare, as fast as they
could, their adherence to the same cause. Their ministers thronged to
the headquarters of the allied sovereigns, where they were admitted to
peace and fraternity on the same general terms; namely, that each state
should contribute within a certain period, a year's income of their
territories, with a contingent of soldiers double in numbers to that
formerly exacted by Buonaparte, for maintaining the good cause of the
alliance. They consented willingly; for though the demand might be heavy
in the meantime, yet, with the downfall of the French Emperor, there was
room to hope for that lasting peace which all men now believed to be
inconsistent with a continuance of his power.
Waiting until their reinforcements should come from the interior of
Germany, and until the subordinate princes should bring forward their
respective contingents of troops, and desirous also to give Napoleon
another opportunity of treating, the allied sovereigns halted on the
banks of the Rhine, and cantoned their army along the banks of that
river. This afforded a space to discover, whether the lofty mind of
Napoleon could be yet induced to bend to such a peace as might consist
with the material change in the circumstances of Europe, effected in the
two last campaigns. Such a pacification was particularly the object of
Austria; and the greater hope was entertained of its being practicable,
that the same train of misfortunes which had driven Napoleon beyond the
Rhine, had darkened his political horizon in other quarters.
[Sidenote: ITALY--SPAIN.]
Italy, so long the scene of his triumphs, was now undergoing the same
fate as his other conquests, and rapidly melting away from his grasp. At
the beginning of the campaign, the Viceroy Eugene, with about 45,000
men, had defended the north of Italy, with great skill and valour,
against the Austrian general, Hiller, who confronted him with superior
forces. The frontiers of Illyria were the chief scene of their military
operations. The French maintained themselves there until the defection
of the Bavarians opened the passes of the Tyrol to the Austrian army,
after which, Eugene was obliged to retire behind the Adige. The warlike
Croatians declaring in favour of their ancient sovereigns of Austria,
mutinied, and rose in arms on several points. The important seaport of
Trieste was taken by the Austrians on the 21st of October. General
Nugent had entered the mouth of the Po with an English squadron, with a
force sufficient to occupy Ferrara and Ravenna, and organise a general
insurrection against the French. It was known also, that Murat, who had
begun to fear lest he should be involved in the approaching fall of
Napoleon, and who remembered, with more feeling, the affronts which
Napoleon had put upon him from time to time, than the greatness to which
he had been elevated by him, was treating with the allies, and
endeavouring to make a peace which should secure his own authority under
their sanction. Thus, there was no point of view in which Italy could be
regarded as a source of assistance to Buonaparte: on the contrary, that
fair country, the subject of his pride and his favour, was in the
greatest danger of being totally lost to him.
The Spanish Peninsula afforded a still more alarming prospect. The
battle of Vittoria had entirely destroyed the usurped authority of
Joseph Buonaparte, and Napoleon himself had become desirous to see the
war ended, at the price of totally ceding the kingdom on which he had
seized so unjustifiably, and which he had, in his fatal obstinacy,
continued to grasp, like a furious madman holding a hot iron until it
has scorched him to the bone.
After that decisive battle, there was no obstacle in front to prevent
the Duke of Wellington from entering France, but he chose first to
reduce the strong frontier fortresses of Saint Sebastian and Pampeluna.
The first capitulated finally on the 9th September; and notwithstanding
the skill and bravery of Soult, which were exerted to the uttermost, he
could not relieve Pampeluna. The English army, at least its left wing,
passed the Bidassoa upon the 7th October, and Pampeluna surrendered on
the 31st of the same month. Thus was the most persevering and the most
hated of Buonaparte's enemies placed in arms upon the French soil, under
the command of a general who had been so uniformly successful, that he
seemed to move hand in hand with victory. It was but a slender
consolation, in this state of matters, that Suchet, the Duke of
Albufera, still maintained himself in Catalonia, his headquarters being
at Barcelona. In fact, it would have been of infinitely more importance
to Buonaparte, had the maréchal and those troops, who had not yet been
discouraged by defeat, been on the north side of the Pyrenees, and ready
to co-operate in defence of the frontiers of France.
[Sidenote: RESTORATION OF FERDINAND.]
To parry this pressing danger, Napoleon had recourse to a plan, which,
had it been practised the year before, might have placed the affairs of
Spain on a very different footing. He resolved, as we have hinted, to
desist from the vain undertaking, which had cost himself so much blood
and treasure; to undo his own favourite work; to resign the claims of
his brother to the crown of Spain; and, by restoring the legitimate
sovereign to the throne, endeavour to form such an alliance with him as
might take Spain out of the list of his enemies, and perhaps add her to
that of his friends. Had he had recourse to this expedient in the
previous year, Ferdinand's appearance in Spain might have had a very
important effect in embroiling the councils of the Cortes. It is well
known that the unfortunate distinctions of Royalists and Liberalists,
were already broken out among the Spaniards, and from the colours in
which his present Majesty of Spain has since shown himself, there is
great room to doubt whether he had either temper, wisdom, or virtue
sufficient to act as a mediator betwixt the two classes of his subjects,
of which both were inclined to carry their opposite opinions into
extremes. It is more than probable that a civil war might even then have
taken place, between the King, desirous of regaining the plenitude of
authority conferred on him by the ancient constitution, and the Cortes,
anxious to maintain the liberties which they had recently recovered, and
carried, by their new constitution, to the extent of republican license.
If such a war had arisen, King Ferdinand would probably have fallen into
the snare prepared for him by Buonaparte, and called in his late jailor,
in the capacity of his ally, against the Cortes, and perhaps also
against the English, who, though not approving of the theoretical
extravagances of the system of government, which had divided the
patriots into two civil factions, must, nevertheless, have considered
that assembly as the representatives of the Spanish people, and the
allies with whom the British had formed their league. Talleyrand is said
to have recommended the liberation of Ferdinand at a much earlier
period. He called the measure an olla podrida for Spain.
But Napoleon's present concession came too late, and was too evidently
wrung from him by the most pressing necessity, to permit Ferdinand,
however desirous of his liberty, to accept of it on the terms offered.
The reader may, indeed, be curious to know in what language Napoleon
could address the prince whose person he had seized and imprisoned like
a kidnapper, and on whose throne he had so long and so pertinaciously
endeavoured to support a usurper. Perhaps, when writing the following
letter, Buonaparte was himself sensible that his conduct admitted of no
glossing over; he, therefore, came to the point, it will be observed, at
once, trusting probably that the hope of being restored to his liberty
and kingdom would be so agreeable in itself, that the captive monarch
would not be disposed strictly to criticise the circumstances which had
occasioned so pleasing an offer, or the expressions in which it was
conveyed.
"My Cousin--The state of my empire and of my political situation, lead
me to put a final adjustment to the affairs of Spain. The English are
exciting anarchy and jacobinism; they endeavour to overthrow the crown
and the nobility, in order to establish a republic. I cannot, without
being deeply affected, think on the destruction of a nation which
interests me, both by its neighbourhood, and its common interest
concerning maritime commerce. I wish to re-establish the relations of
friendship and good neighbourhood, which have so long been established
betwixt France and Spain. You will therefore listen to what the Comte de
la Forest will propose in my name," &c.
Considering the terms of this letter, and contrasting them with the
manner in which the friendly relations alluded to had been broken off,
and that in which the interest taken by Napoleon in the kingdom of Spain
had been displayed, the hypocritical professions of the writer were too
obviously dictated by necessity, to impose upon the meanest
understanding. The answer of Ferdinand was not without dignity. He
declined to treat without having an opportunity of consulting with the
Regency of Spain, and required permission to hear a deputation of his
subjects, who might at once inform him of the actual state of affairs in
Spain, and point out a remedy for the evils under which the kingdom
suffered.
"If," said the prince, in his reply to Napoleon's proposal, "this
liberty is not permitted to me, I prefer remaining at Valençay, where I
have now lived four years and a half, and where I am willing to die, if
such is God's pleasure." Finding the prince firm upon this score,
Napoleon, to whom his freedom might be possibly some advantage, and when
his captivity could no longer in any shape benefit him, consented that
Ferdinand should be liberated upon a treaty being drawn up between the
Duke of St. Carlos, as the representative of Ferdinand, and the Comte de
la Forest, as plenipotentiary of Napoleon; but which treaty should not
be ratified until it had been approved of by the Regency. The heads were
briefly these:--I. Napoleon recognised Ferdinand as King of Spain and
the Indies. II. Ferdinand undertook that the English should evacuate
Spain, and particularly Minorca and Ceuta. III. The two governments
became engaged to each other, to place their relations on the footing
prescribed by the treaty of Dunkirk, and which had been maintained until
1772. Lastly, The new king engaged to pay a suitable revenue to his
father, and a jointure to his mother, in case of her survivance; and
provision was made for re-establishing the commercial relations betwixt
France and Spain.
In this treaty of Valençay, subscribed the 11th of December, 1813, the
desire of Buonaparte to embroil Spain with her ally Great Britain, is
visible not only in the second article, but in the third. For as
Napoleon always contended that his opposition to the rights exercised on
the sea by the English, had been grounded on the treaty of Utrecht, his
reference to that treaty upon the present occasion, shows that he had
not yet lost sight of his Continental System.
The Regency of Spain, when the treaty of Valençay was laid before them,
refused to ratify it, both in virtue of a decree of the Cortes, which,
as early as January, 1811, declared that there be neither truce nor
negotiation with France, until the King should enjoy his entire liberty,
and on account of their treaty with England, in which Spain engaged to
contract no peace without England's concurrence. Thus obliged to
renounce the hopes of fettering Spain, as a nation, with any conditions,
Buonaparte at length released Ferdinand from his confinement, and
permitted him to return to his kingdom, upon his personal subscription
of the treaty, trusting that, in the political alterations which his
arrival might occasion in Spain, something might turn up to serve his
own views, which could never be advanced by Ferdinand's continuing in
confinement. Nothing of the kind, however, took place, nor is it needful
either to detain the reader farther with the Spanish affairs, or again
to revert to them. Ferdinand is said, by the French, to have received
Napoleon's proposals with much satisfaction, and to have written a
letter of thanks to the Emperor for his freedom, obtained after nearly
six years' most causeless imprisonment. If so, the circumstance must be
received as evidence of Ferdinand's singularly grateful disposition, of
which we believe there are few other examples to be quoted. The
liberated monarch returned to his territories, at the conclusion of all
this negotiation, in the end of March 1814. The event is here
anticipated, that there may be no occasion to return to it.
Another state-prisoner of importance was liberated about the same time.
Nearly at the commencement of the year 1814, proposals had been
transmitted, by the agency of Cardinal Maury and the Bishops of Evreux
and Plaisance, to Pius VII., still detained at Fontainbleau. His
liberation was tendered to him; and, on condition of his ceding a part
of the territories of the Church, he was to be restored to the
remainder. "The dominions of Saint Peter are not my property," answered
the Pontiff; "they belong to the Church, and I cannot consent to their
cession."--"To prove the Emperor's good intentions," said the Bishop of
Plaisance, "I have orders to announce your Holiness' return to
Rome."--"It must, then, be with all my cardinals," said Pius
VII.--"Under the present circumstances, that is impossible."--"Well,
then, a carriage to transport me is all I desire--I wish to be at Rome,
to acquit myself of my duties as Head of the Church."
An escort, termed a guard of honour, attended him, commanded by a
colonel, who treated his Holiness with much respect, but seemed disposed
to suffer no one to speak with him in private. Pius VII. convoked,
however, the cardinals who were at Fontainbleau, to the number of
seventeen, and took an affecting farewell. As the Pope was about to
depart, he commanded them to wear no decoration received from the French
Government; to accept no pension of their bestowing; and to assist at no
festival to which they might be invited. On the 24th of January, Pius
left Fontainbleau, and returned by slow journeys to Savona, where he
remained from the 19th of February to the 19th of March. He reached
Fiorenzuola on the 23d, where his French escort was relieved by an
Austrian detachment, by whom the Pontiff was received with all the usual
honours; and he arrived at Rome on the 18th of May, amid the
acclamations of thousands, who thronged to receive his benediction.
With such results terminated an act of despotic authority, one of the
most impolitic, as well as unpopular, practised by Buonaparte during his
reign. He himself was so much ashamed of it, as to disown his having
given any orders for the captivity of the Pontiff, though it was
continued under his authority for five years and upwards. It was
remarkable, that when the Pope was taken from Rome as a prisoner, Murat
was in possession of his dominions, as the connexion and ally of
Buonaparte; and now his Holiness found the same Murat and his army at
Rome, and received from his hands, in the opposite character of ally of
the Emperor of Austria, the re-delivery of the patrimony of Saint
Peter's in its full integrity.
[Sidenote: EMANCIPATION OF HOLLAND.]
Thus was restored to its ancient allegiance that celebrated city, which
had for a time borne the title of SECOND in the French dominions. The
revolution in Holland came also to augment the embarrassments of
Napoleon, and dislocate what remained of the immense additions which he
had attempted to unite with his empire. That country had been first
impoverished by the total destruction of its commerce, under pretence of
enforcing the continental system. It was from his inability to succeed
in his attempt to avert this pest from the peaceful and industrious
Dutchmen, that Louis Buonaparte had relinquished in disgust a sceptre,
the authority of which was not permitted to protect the people over whom
it was swayed.
The distress which followed, upon the introduction of these unnatural
restrictions into a country, the existence of which depended on the
freedom of its commerce, was almost incredible. At Amsterdam, the
population was reduced from 220,000 to 190,000 souls. In the Hague,
Delft, and elsewhere, many houses were pulled down, or suffered to fall
to ruin by the proprietors, from inability to pay the taxes. At
Haarlem, whole streets were in desolation, and about five hundred houses
were entirely dismantled. The preservation of the dikes was greatly
neglected for want of funds, and the sea breaking in at the Polders and
elsewhere, threatened to resume what human industry had withdrawn from
her reign.
The discontent of the people arose to the highest pitch, and their
thoughts naturally reverted to the paternal government of the House of
Orange, and the blessings which they had enjoyed under it. But with the
prudence, which is the distinguishing mark of the national character,
the Dutch knew, that until the power of France should be broken, any
attempt at insurrection in Holland must be hopeless; they therefore
contented themselves with forming secret confederations among the higher
order of citizens in the principal towns, who made it their business to
prevent all premature disturbances on the part of the lower classes,
insinuating themselves, at the same time, so much into their favour,
that they were sure of having them at their disposal, when a propitious
moment for action should arise. Those intrusted with the secret of the
intended insurrection, acted with equal prudence and firmness; and the
sagacious, temperate, and reasonable character of the nation was never
seen to greater advantage than upon this occasion. The national guards
were warmly disposed to act in the cause. The rumours of Buonaparte's
retreat from Leipsic--
"for such an host
Fled not in silence through the affrighted deep,"
united to prepare the public mind for resistance to the foreign yoke;
and the approach of General Bulow towards the banks of the Yssel, became
the signal for general insurrection.
On the 14th November, the Orange flag was hoisted at the Hague and at
Amsterdam, amid the ancient acclamations of "Orange-boven" (Up with the
Orange.) At Rotterdam, a small party of the Dutch patriots, of the
better class, waited on the prefect, Le Brun, Duke of Placentia, and,
showing the orange cockade which they wore, addressed the French general
in these words:--"You may guess from these colours the purpose which has
brought us hither, and the events which are about to take place. You,
who are now the weakest, know that we are strongest--and we the
strongest, know that you are the weakest. You will act wisely to depart
from this place in quiet; and the sooner you do so, you are the less
likely to expose yourself to insult, and it may be to danger."
A revolution of so important a nature had never certainly been announced
to the sinking party, with so little tumult, or in such courteous terms.
The reply of General Le Brun was that of a Frenchman, seldom willing to
be outdone in politeness:--"I have expected this summons for some time,
and am very willing to accede to your proposal, and take my departure
immediately." He mounted into his carriage accordingly, and drove
through an immense multitude now assembled, without meeting any other
insult than being required to join in the universal cry of Orange-boven.
The Dutch were altogether without arms when they took the daring
resolution to re-construct their ancient government, and were for some
time in great danger. But they were secured by the advance of the
Russians to their support, while forces from England were sent over, to
the number of 6000 men, under General Graham, now Lord Lynedoch; so that
the French troops, who had thrown themselves into two or three forts,
were instantly blockaded, and prevented from disturbing the country by
excursions.
No event during the war made a more general and deep impression on the
mind of the British nation, than the liberation of Holland, which is
well entitled by a recent author, "one of the most fortunate events
which could at that moment have taken place. The rapidity with which the
Dutch, from being obstacles to the invasion of France, became the
instruments by which that undertaking was most facilitated, could only
have been brought about through the detestable system of government
which Buonaparte had pursued with them."[296]
Thus victory, having changed her course, like some powerful spring-tide,
had now, in the end of the year 1813, receded at every point from the
dominions which its strong and rapid onward course had so totally
overwhelmed.
FOOTNOTES:
[293] "The hasty journey of the King of Naples through France created
general surprise. The first idea excited by it was, that the Emperor had
commissioned him to assemble the army and form a junction with the force
under the viceroy, in order to protect Italy from an invasion, which
appeared to be contemplated, and the execution of which was at that time
rendered probable, by the movements of the English troops in Sicily.
Nobody attributed his return to any other object."--SAVARY, tom. iii.,
p. 126.
[294] This account of Blucher's march is derived from Lord Burghersh's
"Memoir of the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814," pp.
35, &c.--ED. (1842.)
[295] Three to one, according to the general rule of war, is the
proportion of a blockading army to the garrison which it masks. But
where there is little apprehension of relief or of strong sorties, the
number may be much reduced.--S.
[296] See Memoir of the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and
1814, by Major-General Lord Burghersh; second edition, p. 49.