CHAPTER LXX.

_Napoleon reaches Leipsic on 15th of October--Statement of the

French and Allied Forces--BATTLE OF LEIPSIC, commenced on 16th, and

terminates with disadvantage to the French at nightfall--Napoleon

despatches General Mehrfeldt (his prisoner) to the Emperor of

Austria, with proposals for an armistice--No answer is returned--The

battle is renewed on the morning of the 18th, and lasts till night,

when the French are compelled to retreat, after immense loss on both

sides--They evacuate Leipsic on the 19th, the Allies in full

pursuit--Blowing up of one of the bridges--Prince Poniatowski

drowned in the Elster--25,000 French are made prisoners--The Allied

Sovereigns meet in triumph, at noon, in the Great Square at

Leipsic--King of Saxony sent under a Guard to Berlin--Reflections._

The last act of the grand drama, so far as the scene lay in Germany, was

now fast approaching.

During the two first weeks of October, the various movements of the

troops had been of an indecisive character; but after the 14th, when the

belligerent powers became aware of each other's plans, the corps of the

allies, as well as those of the French, streamed towards Leipsic as to a

common centre.

Leaving Duben, the Emperor reached Leipsic early on the 15th of October,

and received the agreeable information that his whole force would be in

twenty-four hours under the walls; that the grand army of Austria was

fast approaching; but that his demonstration against Berlin had alarmed

Blucher, and therefore that maréchal might be longer of advancing, from

his anxiety to protect the Prussian capital. An opportunity of fighting

the one army without the presence of the other, was what Napoleon most

anxiously desired.

In the meantime, cannon were heard, and shortly after Murat brought an

account of a desperate cavalry skirmish, in which each party claimed the

victory. He himself, marked by the splendour of his dress, had with

difficulty escaped from a young Prussian officer, who was killed by an

orderly dragoon that waited upon the King of Naples. Another remarkable

circumstance in this skirmish was, the distinguished behaviour of a

Prussian regiment of cuirassiers. When complimented on their behaviour,

they replied, "Could we do otherwise?--this is the anniversary of the

battle of Jena." Such a spirit prevailed among the allies, nor is it to

be supposed that that of the French was inferior. If the one had wrongs

to avenge, the other had honours to preserve.

The venerable town of Leipsic forms an irregular square, surrounded by

an ancient Gothic wall, with a terrace planted with trees. Four

gates--on the north those of Halle and Ranstadt, on the east the gate of

Grimma, and on the south that called Saint Peter's gate--lead from the

town to the suburbs, which are of great extent, secured by walls and

barriers. Upon the west side of the town, two rivers, the Pleisse and

the Elster, wash its walls, and flowing through meadows, divide

themselves into several branches, connected by marshy islands. Leipsic

cannot, therefore, be esteemed capable of approach by an enemy in that

direction, excepting by a succession of bridges which cross those rivers

and their connecting streams. The first of these bridges leads to a

village called Lindeneau, and thence to Mark-Ranstadt. It is close to

the gate of the city which takes its name from that village. This road

forms the sole communication betwixt Leipsic and the banks of the Rhine.

On the east side, the river Partha makes a large semicircular bend

around the city, enclosing extensive plains, with various heights and

points of elevation, which make it well adapted for a military position;

on the south the same species of ground continues, but more broken into

eminences, one of which is called the Swedish Camp, from the wars,

doubtless, of Gustavus Adolphus; another is called the Sheep-walk of

Meusdorf; it is then bounded by the banks of the Pleisse. This line is

marked by a variety of villages, which, in the fearful days which we are

now to describe, gained a name in history. About the village of

Connewitz begins the marshy ground, inundated by the Pleisse and Elster.

[Sidenote: FRENCH AND ALLIED FORCES.]

It was on this last line that, on the 15th October, the columns of the

grand army of the allies were seen hastily advancing. Napoleon

immediately made his arrangements for defence. Lindenau, through which

ran the Mark-Ranstadt road, by which the French must retreat, was

occupied by Bertrand. Poniatowski, advancing to the right bank of the

Pleisse, held all the villages along the side of the river--Connewitz,

Lofsnig, Dooblitz, and so on to Markleberg. As the line of defence swept

to the eastward, Augereau was established on the elevated plain of

Wachau. He was supported by Victor and Lauriston at a considerable

village called Leibertwolkowitz. Cavalry were posted on the wings of

these divisions. The Imperial Guards were placed in the rear as a

reserve, at a village named Probstheyda; and Macdonald occupied a gentle

and sweeping rising-ground, extending from Stoetteriz to Holzhausen.

On the opposite, that is, the northern side of the city, Marmont

occupied a line betwixt Moeckern and Euterizt. His troops were intended

to make head against Blucher, whose approach from the north was

momentarily to be apprehended. Almost all along the ground thus

defended, but especially on the south front, the allies had prepared

columns of attack; and the sentinels of both armies were, when evening

fell, in some places within musket-shot of each other. Neither side,

however, seemed willing to begin the battle, in which the great question

was to be decided, whether France should leave other nations to be

guided by their own princes, or retain the unnatural supremacy with

which she had been invested by the talents of one great soldier.

The number of men who engaged the next morning, was said to be 136,000

French, omitting the corps of Souham, who was not engaged, and of

Regnier, who was not yet come up. The allies are by the same accounts

rated at 230,000, without counting the division of the Crown Prince, or

that of Bennigsen, which had not as yet joined. Almost all the

statements assign a predominating force to the allies of 80,000 or

100,000 men superior to their enemy. It thus appears that they had at

last acted according to Napoleon's own idea of the art of war, which he

defined as the art of assembling the greatest number upon a given point.

Napoleon himself visited all the posts, gave his last orders, and took

the opportunity, as he frequently did on the eve of battle, to

distribute eagles to those regiments of Augereau's division, which,

being new levies, had not yet received these military emblems. The

ceremony, performed with warlike pomp, may remind the reader of the

ancient fashion of making knights on the eve of a battle. The soldiers

were made to swear never to abandon their eagles; and the Emperor

concluded by saying, in a loud voice, "Yonder lies the enemy. Swear that

you will rather die than permit France to be dishonoured."--"We swear

it!" exclaimed the battalions. "Long live the Emperor!" And

unquestionably they kept their word in the tremendous series of actions

which followed.

Napoleon's preparations were made chiefly upon the southern side of

Leipsic. It has been supposed, though, we think, with small probability,

that he scarce expected a serious attack upon the northern side at all.

In the evening, however, of the 15th, three death-rockets (_feux de

mort_,) displaying long brilliant trains of white light, were observed

to rise high in the southerly quarter of the heavens, and they were

presently answered by four of a red colour, which were seen in the

distant north. It was concluded that these were signals of communication

between the grand army of the allies, and those of the Crown Prince and

Blucher. The latter, therefore, must be at no incalculable distance.

Napoleon remained in the rear of his own guards, behind the central

position, almost opposite to a village called Gossa, which was occupied

by the allies.

At break of day, on the 16th October, the battle began. The French

position was attacked along all the southern front with the greatest

fury. On the French right, the village of Markleberg was fiercely

assaulted by Kleist, while the Austrian division of Mehrfeldt, making

their way through the marshes to the left bank of the Pliesse,

threatened to force themselves across that river. Poniatowski, to whom

the defence was confided, was obliged to give ground, so that the

Emperor was compelled to bring up the troops under Souham, which had

joined during the night, and which had been designed to support Marmont

on the north of Leipsic. Maréchal Victor defended the village of Wachau,

in front of the position, against Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. The town

of Leibertwolkowitz was made good by Lauriston against Klenau. The

allies made six desperate attempts on these points, but all were

unsuccessful. They were now something in the condition of wrestlers who

have exhausted themselves in vain and premature efforts; and Napoleon in

turn assuming the offensive, began to show his skill and power.

[Sidenote: BATTLE OF LEIPSIC.]

Macdonald was ordered to attack Klenau, and beat him back from

Leibertwolkowitz, with the cavalry of Sebastiani; while two divisions

descended to sustain General Lauriston. It was about noon when this

general advance took place along the centre of the French. It was for

some time fearfully successful. The village of Gossa, hitherto occupied

by the allies, and in the very centre of their line, was carried by the

bayonet. The eminence called the Sheepwalk was also in danger of being

lost, and the exertions of Macdonald put him in possession of the

redoubt called the Swedish Camp. The desperate impetuosity of the French

had fairly broken through the centre of the allies; and Napoleon, as if

desirous not to lose a moment in proclaiming his supposed victory, sent

the tidings to the King of Saxony, who commanded all the church-bells in

the city to be rung for rejoicing, even while the close continued roar

of the cannon seemed to give the lie to the merry peal. The King of

Naples, in the meantime, with Latour Maubourg, and Kellermann, poured

through the gap in the enemy's centre, and at the head of the whole body

of cavalry thundered forward as far as Magdeburg, a village in the rear

of the allies, bearing down General Rayefskoi, with the grenadiers of

the reserve, who threw themselves forward to oppose their passage.

But at this imminent moment of peril, while the French cavalry were

disordered by their own success, Alexander ordered the Cossacks of his

guard, who were in attendance on his person, to charge. They did so with

the utmost fury, as fighting under the eye of their sovereign,

disconcerted Buonaparte's manœuvre, and bore back with their long

lances the dense mass of cavalry who had so nearly carried the day.

In the meantime, while the carnage was continuing on the southern side

of Leipsic, a similar thunder of artillery commenced on the right, where

Blucher had arrived before the city, and suddenly come into action with

Marmont, with at least three men for one. Breathless aides-de-camp came

galloping to reclaim the troops of Souham, which, for the purpose of

supporting Poniatowski, had been withdrawn from their original

destination of assisting Marmont. They could, not however, be replaced,

and Blucher obtained, in consequence, great and decided results. He took

the village of Moeckern, with twenty pieces of artillery, and two

thousand prisoners; and when night separated the combat, had the

advantage of having greatly narrowed the position of the enemy.

But the issue on the south side of Leipsic continued entirely

indecisive, though furiously contested. Gossa was still disputed, taken

and retaken repeatedly, but at length remained in possession of the

allies. On the verge of the Pleisse, the combat was no less dreadful.

The Austrians of Bianchi's division poured on Markleberg, close to the

side of the river, with the most dreadful yells. Poniatowski, with

Augereau's assistance, had the utmost difficulty in keeping his

ground. From the left side of the Pleisse, Schwartzenberg manœuvred

to push a body of horse across the swampy river, to take the French in

the rear of the position. But such of the cavalry as got through a very

bad ford, were instantly charged and driven back, and their leader,

General Mehrfeldt, fell into the hands of the French. An Austrian

division, that of Guilay, manœuvred on the left bank of the Pleisse,

as far down as Lindenau, and the succession of bridges, which, we have

said, forms on the western side the sole exit from Leipsic towards the

Rhine. This was the only pass which remained for retreat to the French,

should they fail in the dreadful action which was now fighting. Guilay

might have destroyed these bridges; but it is believed he had orders to

leave open that pass for retreat, lest the French should be rendered

utterly desperate, when there was no anticipating what exertions they

might be goaded to.

The battle, thus fiercely contested, continued to rage till nightfall,

when the bloody work ceased as if by mutual consent. Three cannon-shot,

fired as a signal to the more distant points, intimated that the

conflict was ended for the time, and the armies on the southern line

retired to rest, in each other's presence, in the very positions which

they had occupied the night before. The French had lost the ground which

at one period they had gained, but they had not relinquished one foot of

their original position, though so fiercely attacked during the whole

day by greatly superior numbers. On the north their defence had been

less successful. Marmont had been forced back by Blucher, and the whole

line of defence on that side was crowded nearer to the walls of

Leipsic.[286]

Napoleon, in the meantime, had the melancholy task of arranging his

soldiers for a defence, sure to be honourable, and yet at length to be

unavailing. Retreat became inevitable; yet, how to accomplish it through

the narrow streets of a crowded city; how to pass more than 100,000 men

over a single bridge, while double that number were pressing on their

rear, was a problem which even Buonaparte could not solve. In this

perplexity, he thought of appealing to the sentiments of affection which

the Emperor of Austria must necessarily be supposed to entertain for his

daughter and grandchild. The capture of General Mehrfeldt served

opportunely to afford the means of communication with the better grace,

as, after the battle of Austerlitz, this was the individual, who, on the

part of the Emperor of Germany, had solicited a personal interview, and

favourable terms from Napoleon. In a private interview with this

officer, Napoleon received the confirmation of what he had long

apprehended, the defection of the King of Bavaria, the union of his army

with that of Austria, and their determination to intercept him on his

return to the Rhine. This fatal intelligence increased his desire of

peace, and he requested, yet in terms of becoming dignity, the

intercession of his father-in-law. He was now willing to adopt the

terms proposed at Prague. He offered to renounce Poland and Illyria. He

would consent to the independence of Holland, the Hanse towns, and

Spain; but he wished this last to be delayed till a general peace.

Italy, he proposed, should be considered as independent, and preserved

in its integrity. Lastly, as the price of the armistice to be

immediately concluded, he was willing to evacuate Germany and retreat

towards the Rhine.

These terms contained what, at an early part of the campaign, and

voluntarily tendered, would have been gladly accepted by the allies. But

Buonaparte's own character for ability and pertinacity; the general

impression, that, if he relinquished his views for a time, it was only

to recur to them in a more favourable season; and his terrible power of

making successful exertions for that purpose, hardened the hearts of the

allied sovereigns against what, from another (could any other save

Buonaparte be supposed in his situation) would, in the like

circumstances, have been favourably received. "Adieu, General

Mehrfeldt," said Napoleon, dismissing his prisoner; "when, on my part,

you name the word armistice to the two Emperors, I doubt not that the

voice which then strikes their ears will awaken many recollections."

Words affecting by their simplicity, and which, coming from so proud a

heart, and one who was reduced to ask the generosity which he had

formerly extended, cannot be recorded without strong sympathy.

General Mehrfeldt went out, like the messenger from the ark, and long

and anxiously did Buonaparte expect his return. But he was the raven

envoy, and brought back no olive branch. Napoleon did not receive an

answer until his troops had recrossed the Rhine. The allies had engaged

themselves solemnly to each other, that they would enter into no treaty

with him while an individual of the French army remained in Germany.

[Sidenote: PREPARATIONS FOR RETREAT.]

Buonaparte was now engaged in preparations for retreat; yet he made them

with less expedition than the necessities of the time required. Morning

came, and the enemy did not renew the attack, waiting for Bennigsen and

the Prince-Royal of Sweden. In the meanwhile, casks, and materials of

all kinds being plenty, and labourers to be collected to any extent, it

seems, that, by some of the various modes known to military

engineers,[287] temporary bridges might have been thrown over the Elster

and the Pleisse, which are tranquil still rivers, and the marshes

betwixt them rendered sufficiently passable. Under far more

disadvantageous circumstances Napoleon had bridged the Beresina within

the space of twelve hours. This censure is confirmed by a most competent

judge, the general of engineers, Rogniat, who affirms that there was

time enough to have completed six bridges, had it been employed with

activity. The answer, that he himself, as chief of the engineer

department at the time, ought to have ordered and prepared these means

of retreat, seems totally insufficient. Napoleon did not permit his

generals to anticipate his commands on such important occasions. It is

said, indeed, that the Emperor had given orders for three bridges, but

that, in the confusion of this dreadful period, that was seldom

completely accomplished which Napoleon could not look after with his own

eyes. Nothing of the kind was actually attempted, except at a place

called the Judges' Garden; and that, besides having its access, like the

stone bridge, through the town of Leipsic, was constructed of too slight

materials. Perhaps Napoleon trusted to the effect of Mehrfeldt's

mission; perhaps he had still latent hopes that his retreat might be

unnecessary; perhaps he abhorred the thought of that manœuvre so

much, as to lead him entirely to confide the necessary preparations to

another; but certain it is, the exertion was not made in a manner

suitable to the occasion. The village of Lindenau, on the left side of

the rivers, was nevertheless secured.

The 17th, as we have said, was spent in preparations on both sides,

without any actual hostilities, excepting when a distant cannonade, like

the growling of some huge monster, showed that war was only slumbering,

and that but lightly.

At eight o'clock on the 18th of October, the battle was renewed with

tenfold fury. Napoleon had considerably contracted his circuit of

defence; on the external range of heights and villages, which had been

so desperately defended on the 16th, the allies now found no opposition

but that of outposts. The French were posted in an interior line nearer

to Leipsic, of which Probtshedya was the central point. Napoleon

himself, stationed on an eminence called Thonberg, commanded a prospect

of the whole field.

Masses were drawn up behind the villages, which relieved their defenders

from time to time with fresh troops; cannon were placed in their front

and on their flanks, and every patch of wooded ground which afforded the

least shelter, was filled with tirailleurs. The battle then joined on

all sides. The Poles, with their gallant general, Poniatowski, to whom

this was to prove the last of his fields, defended the banks of the

Pleisse, and the villages connected with it, against the Prince of Hesse

Homberg, Bianchi, and Colleredo. In the centre, Barclay, Witgenstein,

and Kleist, advanced on Probtsheyda, where they were opposed by the King

of Naples, Victor, Augereau, and Lauriston, under the eye of Napoleon

himself. On the left, Macdonald had drawn back his division from an

advanced point called Holtzhausen, to a village called Stoetteritz,

which was the post assigned to them on the new and restricted line of

defence. Along all this extended southern line, the fire continued

furious on both sides, nor could the terrified spectators, from the

walls and steeples of Leipsic, perceive that it either advanced or

recoiled. The French had the advantage of situation and cover, the

allies that of greatly superior numbers; both were commanded by the

first generals of their country and age.

About two o'clock afternoon, the allies, under General Pirch and Prince

Augustus of Prussia, forced their way headlong into Probtsheyda; the

camp followers began to fly; the noise of the tumult overcame almost the

fire of the artillery. Napoleon in the rear, but yet on the verge of

this tumult, preserved his entire tranquillity. He placed the reserve of

the Old Guard in order, led them in person to recover the village, and

saw them force their entrance, ere he retreated to the eminence from

which he observed the action. During the whole of this eventful day, in

which he might be said to fight less for victory than for safety, this

wonderful man continued calm, decided, collected, and supported his

diminished and broken squadrons in their valiant defence, with a

presence of mind and courage, as determined as he had so often exhibited

in directing the tide of onward victory. Perhaps his military talents

were more to be admired, when thus contending at once against Fortune

and the superiority of numbers, than in the most distinguished of his

victories, when the fickle goddess fought upon his side.

The allies, notwithstanding their gallantry and their numbers, felt

themselves obliged to desist from the murderous attacks upon the

villages which cost them such immense loss; and drawing back their

troops as they brought forward their guns and howitzers, contented

themselves with maintaining a dreadful fire on the French masses as they

showed themselves, and throwing shells into the villages. The French

replied with great spirit; but they had fewer guns in position, and,

besides, their ammunition was falling short. Still, however, Napoleon

completely maintained the day on the south of Leipsic, where he was

present in person.

On the north side of Leipsic, the superiority of numbers, still greater

than that which existed on the south, placed Ney in a precarious

situation. He was pressed at once by the army of Blucher, and by that of

the Crown Prince, which was now come up in force. The latter general

forced his way across the Partha, with three columns, and at three

different points; and Ney saw himself obliged to retreat, in order to

concentrate his forces nearer Leipsic, and communicate by his right with

the army of Napoleon.

The Russians had orders to advance to force this new position, and

particularly to drive back the advanced guard of Regnier, stationed on

an eminence called Heiterblick, betwixt the villages of Taucha and

Paunsdorf. On a sudden, the troops who occupied the French line on that

point, came forward to meet the allies, with their swords sheathed, and

colours of truce displayed. This was a Saxon brigade, who, in the midst

of the action, embraced the time and opportunity to desert the service

of Napoleon, and declare for independence. These men had an

unquestionable right to espouse the cause of their country, and shake

off the yoke of a stranger, which Saxony had found so burdensome; but it

is not while on the actual battle-ground that one side ought to be

exchanged for the other; and those must be in every case accounted

guilty of treachery, who, bringing their swords into the field for one

party, shall suddenly, and without intimation given, turn them against

the power in whose ranks they had stood.

The Russians, afraid of stratagem, sent the Saxon troops, about 10,000

in number, to the rear of the position. But their artillery were

immediately brought into action; and having expended during that morning

one half of their ammunition on the allies, they now bestowed the other

half upon the French army. By this unexpected disaster, Ney was obliged

to contract his line of defence once more. Even the valour and exertions

of that distinguished general could not defend Schoenfeld. That fine

village forms almost one of the northern suburbs of Leipsic. It was in

vain that Buonaparte despatched his reserves of cavalry to check the

advance of the Crown Prince. He defeated all opposition that presented

itself, and pressed Ney into a position close under the walls of

Leipsic. The battle once more ceased on all points; and after the solemn

signal of three cannon-shot had been heard, the field was left to the

slain and the wounded.[288]

Although the French army kept its ground most valiantly during the whole

of this tremendous day, there was no prospect of their being able to

sustain themselves any longer around or in Leipsic. The allies had

approached so close to them, that their attacks might, on the third day,

be expected to be more combined and simultaneous than before. The

superiority of numbers became more efficient after the great carnage

that had taken place, and that for the simple reason, that the army

which had greatest numbers could best afford to lose lives. It is said

also by Baron Fain,[289] that the enormous number of 250,000

cannon-bullets had been expended by the French during the last four

days, and that there only remained to serve their guns about 16,000

cartridges, which could scarce support a hot fire for two hours. This

was owing to the great park of artillery having been directed on Torgau,

another circumstance which serves to show how little Buonaparte dreamed

of abandoning the Elbe when he moved from Dresden. To this the

increasing scarcity of provisions is to be added; so that every thing

combined to render Napoleon's longer stay at Dresden altogether

impossible, especially when the Bavarian general, now his declared

enemy, was master of his communications with France.

The retreat, however necessary, was doomed inevitably to be disastrous,

as is evident from the situation of the French army, cooped up by

superior forces under the walls of a large town, the narrow streets of

which they must traverse to reach two bridges, one of recent and hasty

construction, by which they must cross the Pleisse, the Elster, and the

marshy ground, streams, and canals, which divide them from each other;

and then, added to this was the necessity of the whole army debouching

by one single road, that which leads to Lindenau, and on which it would

be impossible to prevent dreadful confusion. But there was no remedy for

these evils; they must necessarily be risked.

[Sidenote: LEIPSIC.]

The retreat was commenced in the night time; and Buonaparte, retiring in

person to Leipsic, spent a third exhausting night in dictating the

necessary orders for drawing the corps of his army successively within

the town, and transferring them to the western bank of the two rivers.

The French troops accordingly came into Leipsic from all sides, and

filling the town with the ineffable confusion which always must attend

the retreat of so large a body in the presence of a victorious enemy,

they proceeded to get out of it as they best could, by the way

prescribed. Macdonald and Poniatowski, with their corps, were appointed

to the perilous honour of protecting the rear. "Prince," said Napoleon,

to the brave Polish prince, "you must defend the southern

suburbs."--"Alas, sire," he answered, "I have but few soldiers

left."--"Well, but you will defend them with what you have?"--"Doubt

not, sire, but that we will make good our ground; we are all ready to

die for your Majesty's service."--Napoleon parted with this brave and

attached prince, upon whom he had recently bestowed a maréchal's baton.

They never met again in this world.

The arrival of daylight had no sooner shown to the allies the

commencement of the French retreat, than their columns began to advance

in pursuit on every point, pushing forward, with all the animation of

victory, to overtake the enemy in the suburbs and streets of Leipsic.

The King of Saxony, the magistrates, and some of the French generals,

endeavoured to secure the city from the dangers which were to be

expected from a battle in the town, betwixt the rear-guard of the French

and the advanced guard of the allies. They sent proposals, that the

French army should be permitted to effect their retreat unmolested, in

mercy to the unfortunate town. But when were victorious generals

prevented from prosecuting military advantages, by the mere

consideration of humanity? Napoleon, on his side, was urged to set fire

to the suburbs, to check the pressure of the allies on his rear-guard.

As this, however, must have occasioned a most extensive scene of misery,

Buonaparte generously refused to give such a dreadful order, which,

besides, could not have been executed without compromising the safety of

a great part of his own rear, to whom the task of destruction must have

been committed, and who would doubtless immediately have engaged in an

extensive scene of plunder. Perhaps, also, Napoleon might be influenced

by the feeling of what was due to the confidence and fidelity of

Frederick Augustus of Saxony, who, having been so long the faithful

follower of his fortunes, was now to be abandoned to his own. To have

set fire to that unhappy monarch's city, when leaving him behind to make

terms for himself as he could, would have been an evil requital for all

he had done and suffered in the cause of France; nor would it have been

much better had Napoleon removed the Saxon King from his dominions, and

destroyed all chance of his making peace with the irritated sovereigns,

by transporting him along with the French army in its calamitous

retreat.

At nine o'clock Napoleon had a farewell interview with Frederick

Augustus, releasing him formally from all the ties which had hitherto

combined them, and leaving him at liberty to form such other alliances

as the safety of his states might require. Their parting scene was

hurried to a conclusion by the heavy discharge of musketry from several

points, which intimated that the allies, forcing their way into the

suburbs, were fighting hand to hand, and from house to house, with the

French, who still continued to defend them. The King and Queen of Saxony

conjured Buonaparte to mount his horse, and make his escape; but, before

he did so, he discharged from their ties to France and to himself the

King of Saxony's body guard, and left them for the protection of the

royal family.

[Sidenote: BRIDGE OF LEIPSIC.]

When Napoleon attempted to make his way to the single point of exit, by

the gate of Ranstadt, which led to the bridge, or succession of bridges,

so often mentioned, he found reason for thinking his personal safety in

actual danger. It must be remembered, that the French army, still

numbering nearly 100,000, were pouring into Leipsic, pursued by more

than double that number, and that the streets were encumbered with the

dead and wounded, with artillery and baggage, with columns so wedged up

that it was impossible for them to get forward, and with others, who,

almost desperate of their safety, would not be left behind. To fight his

way through this confusion, was impossible even for Napoleon. He and his

suite were obliged to give up all attempts to proceed in the direct road

to the bridge, and turning in the other direction, he got out of the

city through Saint Peter's Gate, moved on until he was in sight of the

advancing columns of the allies, then turning along the eastern suburb,

he found a circuitous by-way to the bridges, and was enabled to get

across. But the temporary bridge which we have before mentioned had

already given way, so that there remained only the old bridge on the

road to Lindenau, to serve as an exit to the whole French army. The

furious defence which was maintained in the suburbs, continued to check

the advance of the allies, otherwise the greater part of the French army

must inevitably have been destroyed. But the defenders themselves, with

their brave commanders, were at length, after exhibiting prodigies of

valour, compelled to retreat; and ere they could reach the banks of the

river, a dreadful accident had taken place.

The bridge, so necessary to the escape of this distressed army, had been

mined by Buonaparte's orders, and an officer of engineers was left to

execute the necessary measure of destroying it, so soon as the allies

should approach in force sufficient to occupy the pass. Whether the

officer to whom this duty was intrusted had fled, or had fallen, or had

been absent from his post by accident, no one seems to have known; but

at this critical period a sergeant commanded the sappers in his stead. A

body of Swedish sharp-shooters pushed up the side of the river about

eleven o'clock, with loud cries and huzzas, firing upon the crowds who

were winning their way slowly along the bridge, while Cossacks and

Hulans were seen on the southern side, rushing towards the same spot;

and the troops of Saxony and Baden, who had now entirely changed sides,

were firing on the French from the wall of the suburbs, which they had

been posted to defend against the allies, and annoying the retreat which

they had been destined to cover. The non-commissioned officer of

engineers imagined that the retreat of the French was cut off, and set

fire to the mine, that the allies might not take possession of the

bridge for pursuing Napoleon.[290] The bridge exploded with a horrible

noise.

This catastrophe effectually intercepted the retreat of all who remained

still on the Leipsic side of the river, excepting some individuals who

succeeded by swimming through the Pleisse and the Elster. Among these

was the brave Maréchal Macdonald, who surmounted all the obstacles

opposed to his escape. Poniatowski, the gallant nephew of Stanislaus,

King of Poland, was less fortunate. He was the favourite of his

countrymen, who saw in their imagination the crown of Poland glittering

upon his brow. He himself, like most of the Poles of sense and

reflection, regarded these hopes as delusive; but followed Napoleon with

unflinching zeal, because he had always been his friend and benefactor.

Besides a thousand other acts of valour, Poniatowski's recent defence of

the extreme right of the French position was as brilliant as any part of

the memorable resistance at Leipsic. He had been twice wounded in the

previous battles. Seeing the bridge destroyed, and the enemy's forces

thronging forward in all directions, he drew his sabre, and said to his

suite, and a few Polish cuirassiers, who followed him, "Gentlemen, it is

better to fall with honour than to surrender." He charged accordingly,

and pushed through the troops of the allied army opposed to him, in the

course of which desperate attempt he was wounded by a musket shot in the

arm. Other enemies appeared; he threw himself upon them with the same

success, making his way amongst them also, after receiving a wound

through the cross of his decoration. He then plunged into the Pleisse,

and with the assistance of his staff-officers, got across that river, in

which his horse was lost. Though much exhausted, he mounted another

horse, and seeing that the enemy were already occupying the banks of the

Elster with riflemen, he plunged into that deep and marshy river, to

rise no more. Thus bravely died a prince, who, in one sense, may be

termed the last of the Poles.[291]

The remainder of the French army, after many had been killed and drowned

in an attempt to cross these relentless rivers, received quarter from

the enemy. About 25,000 men were made prisoners, and as Napoleon seems

only to have had about 200 guns at the battle of Hannau, many must have

been abandoned in Leipsic and its neighbourhood.[292] The quantity of

baggage taken was immense.

The triumph of the allied monarchs was complete. Advancing at the head

of their victorious forces, each upon his own side, the Emperor of

Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, met and

greeted each other in the great square of the city, where they were soon

joined by the Emperor of Austria. General Bertrand, the French

commandant of the city, surrendered his sword to these illustrious

personages. No interview took place between the allied monarchs and the

King of Saxony. He was sent under a guard of Cossacks to Berlin, nor was

he afterwards restored to his throne, until he had paid a severe fine

for his adherence to France.

When reflecting upon these scenes, the rank and dignity of the actors

naturally attract our observation. It seems as if the example of

Buonaparte, in placing himself at the head of his armies, had in some

respects changed the condition of sovereigns, from the reserved and

retired dignity in which most had remained, estranged from the actual

toils of government and dangers of war, into the less abstracted

condition of sharing the risk of battle, and the labours of negotiation.

Such scenes as those which passed at Leipsic on this memorable day,

whether we look at the parting of Napoleon from Frederick Augustus, amid

the fire and shouting of hostile armies, or the triumphant meeting of

the allied sovereigns in the great square of Leipsic, had been for

centuries only to be paralleled in romance. But considering how

important it is to the people that sovereigns should not be prompt to

foster a love of war, there is great room for question whether the

encouragement of this warlike propensity be upon the whole a subject for

Europe to congratulate itself upon.

Policy and the science of war alike dictated a rapid and close pursuit

after the routed French; but the allied army had been too much

exhausted, by the efforts required to gain the battle, to admit of its

deriving the full advantage from success. There was a great scarcity of

provisions around Leipsic; and the stores of the city, exhausted by the

French, afforded no relief. The bridge which had been destroyed was as

necessary for the advance of the allies as the retreat of Napoleon.

Besides, it must be admitted that an allied army is always less decided

and rapid in its movements than one which receives all its impulses from

a single commander of strong and vigorous talents. Of this we shall see

more proofs. But, in the meantime, a great point was gained. The

liberation of Germany was complete, even if Napoleon should escape the

united armies of Austria and Bavaria, which still lay betwixt him and

the banks of the Rhine. And indeed the battles which he fought for

conquest terminated at Leipsic. Those which he afterwards waged were for

his own life and the sceptre of France.

FOOTNOTES:

[286] Jomini, tom. iv., pp. 450, 462; Baron Fain, tom. ii., p. 384;

Baron d'Odeleben, tom. ii., p. 32; Savary, tom. iii., p. 117.

[287] See Sir Howard Douglas's work on Military Bridges.--S.

[288] Jomini, tom. iv., pp. 465, 480; Baron Fain, tom. ii., p. 403.

[289] Manuscript de 1813, par le Baron Fain, tom. ii., p. 420.

[290] This story was at first doubted, and it was supposed that Napoleon

had commanded the bridge to be blown up, with the selfish purpose of

securing his own retreat. But, from all concurring accounts, the

explosion took place in the manner, and from the cause, mentioned in the

text. There is, notwithstanding, an obscurity in the case. A French

officer of engineers, by name Colonel Monfort, was publicly announced as

the person through whose negligence or treachery the post was left to

subordinate keeping. Nevertheless, it is said, that the only officer of

that name, in the engineer service of Buonaparte's army, was actually at

Mentz when the battle of Leipsic took place. This is alluded to by

General Grouchy, who, in a note upon his interesting Observations on

General Gourgaud's Account of the Campaign of 1815, has this remarkable

passage.--"One would wish to forget the bulletin, which, after the

battle of Leipsic, delivered to the bar of public opinion, as

preliminary to bringing him before a military commission, Colonel

Monfort of the engineer service, gratuitously accused of the breaking

down the bridge at Leipsic." Neither the colonel nor the

non-commissioned officer was ever brought to a court-martial.--S.

[291] His body was found, and his obsequies performed with great

military pomp; both the victors and vanquished attending him to the

tomb, with every honour which could be rendered to his remains.--S.

[292] "The French were computed to have lost 50,000 men, including the

sick abandoned in the hospitals at Leipsic, and 250 guns."--LORD

BURGHERSH, _Operations_, &c., p. 28.

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