5,800 British infantry, 7,400 Portuguese infantry, 1,800 British
cavalry (including Le Marchant’s brigade at Castello Branco), 650
Portuguese cavalry, and about 600 artillery, &c., about 16,000 in
all. Drouet had the 9th Corps, now about 14,000 strong (it had
been recruited by the return to the ranks of the convalescents of
the 4,000 Albuera wounded), and six regiments of cavalry from the
Army of the South, bringing up his force to much the same figure.
[762] See above, pp. 587-8.
Hill’s orders from Wellington corresponded very closely to Drouet’s
orders from Soult. That is to say, Hill was to content himself with
‘containing’ the French force opposite him; to see that Elvas and Campo
Mayor were covered, to make no attempt on Badajoz, and to apply for aid
to his chief in the event of an increase of the hostile force on the
Guadiana. The summing up of the situation, in the original dispatch
which Wellington wrote to Hill when he left for the north, is simply
that the force in Estremadura must pair off against Drouet. ‘My wish
is that you should observe the movements of the 5th Corps. If the 5th
Corps should move off to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, you will then
march to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and proceed on by Castello
Branco to join this [the main] army.... If the 5th Corps should,
instead of crossing the Tagus, manœuvre upon you in Alemtejo, I request
you to move upon Portalegre, and there either stand their attack or
not, as you may think proper, according to your notion of their force
as compared with your own. If you cannot stand their attack, you will
retire by Gavião towards Abrantes, and thence across the Zezere, taking
the line of the Tagus, with Santarem on your right[763].’ It being
possible, though not likely, that Marmont might make an advance against
the central Portuguese frontier north of the Tagus, from the Zarza la
Mayor and Coria district, Hill was directed to keep one British and one
Portuguese brigade in the direction of Castello Branco, as a nucleus
on which troops coming from north and south might concentrate, for
serious opposition to an invasion. This precautionary move was made in
August, and the detachment remained north of the Tagus till September,
when Foy’s removal from Truxillo, and Marmont’s march to the relief of
Ciudad Rodrigo, showed that there was no longer any possible danger
in this direction[764]. Meanwhile the main body of the allied force
in Estremadura lay about Portalegre, Villa Viçosa, and Santa Olalla,
waiting for developments of the enemy’s plans which never came about.
For Drouet kept very quiet, generally with his head quarters at Zafra,
and a strong detachment at Merida, as anxiously expectant of Hill’s
movements as Hill was of his.
[763] Wellington to Hill, August 8th. (_Dispatches_, viii. pp.
180-2.)
[764] See for the recall the dispatch of October 4.
(_Dispatches_, viii. p. 321.)
All this time the space to the north of Hill’s cantonments was occupied
by the small remains of the Spanish Army of Estremadura, still under
Castaños. Since the Captain-General had sent off Carlos de España to
the borders of Leon, he remained with the rest of his troops in the
hilly region between the Guadiana and the Tagus, with his head quarters
at Valencia de Alcantara, and part of his infantry in Albuquerque,
which fortress he was engaged in repairing. His advance lay at Caçeres,
observing the French garrison in Truxillo, with which it often
bickered. But Castaños occasionally sent a flying column out under
Morillo or Penne Villemur to beat up the cantonments of the 5th Corps
south of the Tagus. They ranged as far as La Serena and the Sierra del
Pedroso, and on one occasion got even to Benalcazar on the very border
of Andalusia, whose garrison Morillo surprised and captured[765]. Such
raids were profitable for distracting the enemy, and gave Drouet much
trouble. But as Castaños’s whole force did not amount to much more
than 600 horse and 3,000 foot, the menace was not a serious one. In
the thinly peopled region of northern Estremadura it was impossible to
get recruits to fill the old cadres, and the army did not grow as the
commander had hoped. The regiments remained mere skeletons.
[765] For copious details see the _Life of Morillo_, by Don
Antonio Villa, pp. 47-55 (Madrid, 1910).
The removal of Foy’s division from Truxillo in September, when Marmont
drew him in to co-operate in the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, had serious
consequences in Estremadura. It will be remembered that, when the
campaign of El Bodon was over, the Army of Portugal did not send back
any detachment to reoccupy Truxillo--the connecting-point between the
Armies of Portugal and of the South. The responsibility for keeping
touch was thrown on to Drouet, who had already quite enough ground
to cover with his 14,000 men. But he was forced to send a strong
detachment northward from Merida, or his communication with Marmont
would have been wholly intercepted by Morillo’s habitual raids.
Accordingly Girard’s division of the 5th Corps was moved up to occupy
the front between the Guadiana and the Tagus, leaving the whole stretch
from the Guadiana southward to the Sierra Morena held by only one
division, that of Claparéde[766], and two cavalry brigades.
[766] At the breaking up of the 9th Corps in June, Claparéde took
over Gazan’s old division in the 5th Corps, and Conroux that of
Ruffin in the 1st Corps. But the 9th Corps battalions were not
all redistributed into their regiments till Conroux came back
from Soult’s campaign against the Murcians in August.
Wellington, seeing the weakness of Drouet, and knowing that Soult had
crushed the Murcian army in August, and therefore could find some
reinforcements for Estremadura if he should please, was for some time
under the belief that Hill would see new troops brought up against him
from the south[767]. He reiterated his old orders: ‘If you only had
cavalry, you certainly have infantry in sufficient numbers to beat the
5th Corps out of Estremadura. But your cavalry is not sufficiently
strong. I think, however, that you are able to prevent the 5th Corps
from doing anything, even though Soult should add to it another
division.... You must proceed with great caution, and endeavour to have
the best intelligence of the force Soult brings with him.... Canton
your troops (as soon as you find the enemy are serious in their advance
upon Badajoz) nearly on the ground which we occupied with the army
in the end of June and the beginning of July [the Caya position]....
If you should find Soult collects in too great force for you, retire
upon Portalegre, and thence, if necessary, upon Gavião and Abrantes.
It appears to me, however, scarcely possible for Soult to bring such
a force as to be able to attack you at Campo Mayor, or to cut your
communications at the same time both with Elvas and with Portalegre....
If Soult should bring a large army into Estremadura, with the view
to enable the Army of Portugal to co-operate in the invasion of
Valencia, I shall reinforce your corps with some infantry and nearly
all my cavalry--and I think we shall soon have back again the Army of
Portugal. If Soult comes only to throw provisions into Badajoz, I am
afraid we cannot prevent it under existing circumstances[768].’
[767] See Wellington to Hill, October 4 and October 10.
(_Dispatches_, viii. pp. 321, and 332-3.)
[768] Wellington to Hill, from Freneda, October 16.
(_Dispatches_, viii. pp. 333-4.)
Soult, however, neither came in person to Estremadura with a large
force, nor even drafted another division into the province to succour
Drouet, who got no reinforcements during the autumn. He was at this
time wrapped up in the internal affairs of Andalusia, and had no
intention of sending troops away, unless there was urgent necessity
for it. Hill, therefore, seeing that the 5th Corps had received no
succours, and remained spread out on the long front from the Tagus
to the Sierra Morena, while its two divisions were not in supporting
distance of each other, asked for leave to make a blow at Girard,
whose position was decidedly dangerous, because of his remoteness
from Drouet’s main body (October 15). Wellington saw the opportunity
and gave instant consent: ‘I should approve of adopting the measure,
which should be effectual, and should drive Girard from Caçeres over
the Guadiana, if you think you can do it without risking the safety
of Campo Mayor and Ouguella. It appears to me you are too strong for
Girard in every way, if the other division of the 5th Corps has not
crossed the Guadiana[769].’
[769] Same to same, October 17, acknowledging Hill’s proposal
made in a letter of October 15.
Circumstances were at this moment very much in Hill’s favour, for
Girard, seeking new regions to plunder for food, and angered by the
raids of Castaños’s detachments on the road from Merida to Truxillo,
had just marched to drive the Spaniards back. Sweeping them before
him, he had advanced as far as Caçeres, fifty miles from his base at
Merida, and was raising contributions there. He had with him his own
division of twelve battalions, a provisional brigade of cavalry under
General Bron[770], and one battery--in all about 5,000 foot and nearly
1,000 horse. Hill could concentrate against him a much larger force,
while still leaving something in front of Drouet, who (as he had taken
pains to discover) was cantoned about Zafra with the rest of his
corps--Claparéde’s division, and the bulk of the cavalry. He was not in
a position to accomplish anything against Campo Mayor or Elvas, for his
troops were scattered over the country-side, and he showed no signs of
any intention to move.
[770] Apparently 20th Dragoons, 27th _Chasseurs_, 10th Hussars.
On October 20th Hill wrote to Castaños to say that he relied on the
help of Morillo’s infantry and Villemur’s cavalry for a blow at Girard.
He himself would bring up Howard’s and Wilson’s (late Abercrombie’s)
brigades of the 2nd Division, nine battalions of Portuguese[771] and
Long’s cavalry brigade. The column would consist of 3,000 British
and 4,000 Portuguese infantry, 900 horse and two batteries. To this
Castaños could add about 2,000 infantry and 600 horse, so that a
striking force of 10,000 men would be collected. Meanwhile there would
be left in Portugal, to make a front against Drouet, if he should
move, the remaining brigade (Byng’s) of the 2nd Division[772], four
battalions and two cavalry regiments of Portuguese[773], and a British
cavalry brigade under Le Marchant recently arrived from home, which lay
at Castello Branco, but could be called south if required.
[771] 4th and 10th Line (2 batts. each) from Hamilton’s division,
6th and 18th Line (2 batts. each) and 6th Caçadores from
Ashworth’s Brigade.
[772] This was the brigade composed of the remnant of Colborne’s
and Hoghton’s old regiments, viz. Buffs, 1/57th, 2/31st, 2/66th.
[773] The remainder of Hamilton’s division, 2nd and 14th Line,
and the 5th and 8th Cavalry.
The essential part of Hill’s scheme was that Girard should be attacked
and brought to action before he was aware that there was anything in
his front save the Spaniards whom he had just hunted out of Caçeres.
If he were to discover that there was a large Anglo-Portuguese force
in his front, he would probably retire by forced marches upon Merida.
It was therefore necessary to concentrate the striking force with
suddenness, and to move it with the greatest possible speed. On October
22nd the three infantry and one cavalry brigades were collected at
Portalegre. On the 23rd they made a tremendous march, thirty miles
across the steep Sierra de San Mamed to the Spanish fortress of
Albuquerque. Here Hill received news from Castaños that Girard was
still at Caçeres, and had sent out flying parties to Arroyo del Puerco
and other places, sweeping the country-side for food. The allied column
at Albuquerque was as near Merida as the enemy, and had every chance of
intercepting him if he continued quiescent. Morillo and Penne Villemur
had moved to Aliseda, twenty miles from Albuquerque, and could join
the British force next day. On the 24th Hill advanced to Aliseda and
Casa de Santillana, and picked up the Spaniards. Next morning Penne
Villemur’s horse drove the French outposts out of Arroyo del Puerco.
When Girard’s cavalry screen had been driven in, Hill’s whole column
made a night march to Malpartida, only eight miles from Caçeres, but
learnt, after some delays, on the morning of the 26th that Girard had
left Caçeres on the preceding afternoon by the Torremocha road, making
a leisurely journey towards Merida. He had just received vague rumours
that there was an Anglo-Portuguese force coming from Portugal, and
thought it well to draw near to his base. Thus Hill’s precautions had
not been altogether successful. Girard’s departure was tiresome to
Hill, as the night-march to Malpartida had taken the allied columns too
far to the north, and the enemy was now between them and his own base.
But if it was too late to intercept him, there was still time to pursue
and overtake him, unless he should chance to quicken his pace. Before
dawn on the morning of the 27th Hill turned his face southward, and
marched on Torremocha; but when he had reached the pass of Trasquillon
he was informed by the peasantry that Girard had left Torremocha,
marching for Arroyo dos Molinos on the other side of the Sierra de
Montanches. The General called on his troops to make a final effort--if
Girard halted at Arroyo dos Molinos it was possible to cut him off by
continuing the long march. The men responded well to the appeal, and
by nightfall on the 27th the two British brigades were at Alcuescar,
five miles south-west of the camp of the French, and the Portuguese
and Spaniards close behind at Don Antonio. Girard had only gone twelve
miles that day--the Allies no less than twenty-eight, in abominable
weather, across two rough mountain ranges. It is astonishing that the
French general had not made more haste, and still more so that, with
three cavalry regiments for reconnoitring, he had not hit upon the
track of the Allies. Bron was evidently a poor director of cavalry--his
1,000 men should have sufficed to sweep the whole country-side. But it
is said that Girard was convinced that Hill had gone to Caçeres, and
would listen to no warnings[774].
[774] Hill in his dispatch says that the peasantry gave Girard
no news of his approach. But in Blakeney’s interesting narrative
of this campaign there is a story told that two _Afrancesados_
warned the Frenchman of Hill’s approach, and that he refused to
credit them. This was told to Blakeney by his prisoner, Colonel
the Prince of Aremberg, commanding the 27th _Chasseurs_. See
Blakeney, p. 236.
At half-past two o’clock on the morning of the 28th the weather was
still tempestuous, as it had been for the last twenty-four hours, and
Hill, covered by the driving rain, marched in the dark on Arroyo dos
Molinos, and covered the five miles which separated his comfortless
bivouac from the French head quarters without meeting a single hostile
vedette. He was able to arrange his force within half a mile of the
little town undiscovered, and to make his provisions for blocking
all the three roads by which Girard might escape. Arroyo dos Molinos
lies under the shoulder of the precipitous Sierra de Montanches,
with no track going directly northwards from it, but with country
roads to Truxillo, Medellin, and Merida diverging north-eastward,
south-eastward, and south-south-westward. Hill directed Wilson’s
brigade, supported by three Portuguese battalions, to march round the
town on its southward side, and block the Truxillo road, while the rest
of the infantry should attack the enemy in front, and the cavalry,
both English and Spanish, should form a central column which should
seize the Merida and Medellin roads and prevent the escape of Girard
southward.
Not a Frenchman was seen till Howard’s brigade, leading the advance of
the main body, ran upon a picket half a mile outside Arroyo, the men
huddling together under trees with their faces away from the driving
rain and the approaching enemy. Most of them were captured, but some
escaped to warn Girard, who till this moment had no knowledge that a
British column was within striking distance of him. As it chanced, the
French general had been preparing to start early, and Remond’s brigades
(the 64th and 88th of the line), escorted by one cavalry regiment, had
marched an hour before on the Merida road, and were now three miles
away. Girard had not, therefore, even his whole force assembled, but
only the six battalions of Dombrouski’s brigade (34th and 40th of the
line[775]), two cavalry regiments and half a battery with him--not
more than 4,000 men--while 10,000 of the Allies were converging upon
him from three separate quarters. At the moment when the first shots
were heard on the Alcuescar road, his infantry was just getting ready
to march, his baggage and a rearguard of one battalion were still in
the street of Arroyo dos Molinos, many of his horsemen had not yet
saddled up, and he himself was breakfasting in the Alcaide’s house.
[775] The regiments, which were incomplete in July (see Appendix
XVIII), had been joined before October by the battalion which
each had contributed to the garrison of Badajoz.
Within a few minutes of the first alarm the 71st and 92nd, at the
head of Howard’s brigade, burst into the little town, drove out the
battalion that was holding it, and captured the whole of Girard’s
baggage and many prisoners. General Bron was taken in the doorway of
the house which he had been occupying, just as he was about to mount.
Hurrying out on the other side of the place, the advancing British
found Dombrouski’s brigade hastily forming up for the march. Girard had
ordered an instant retreat along the Merida road. The formation of his
troops was soon disordered by the fire of the advancing 71st, followed
by that of three guns of Arriaga’s battery, which galloped out to the
town end and opened on the nearest regiment. The column, however,
started off, and had gone a little way, when it discovered the allied
cavalry advancing along the Merida road to meet it, Penne Villemur in
front, Long in support. Girard, seeing this road blocked, bade his
_chasseurs_ and dragoons hold off the British and Spanish horse at
all costs, and turned the infantry column towards the Truxillo road,
which skirts the precipitous foot of the Sierra de Montanches. His
cavalry became engaged in a confused fight, first with Penne Villemur’s
Spaniards and then with the 9th Light Dragoons and the 2nd Hussars of
the King’s German Legion. Being outnumbered, they were soon broken,
many were taken, and the rest scattered and tried to get off in small
parties.
The infantry, making the best speed that it could, but closely pursued
by Howard’s regiments and the Spanish brigade in their rear, finally
reached the spot where the Truxillo road turns the corner of the
sierra, a mile and a half outside Arroyo dos Molinos. By this time
the rain had ceased, and the mists dispersing showed the Frenchmen
Wilson’s brigade marching hard to cut them off, and less than half a
mile away. Both parties started to run, and the three light companies
of the 28th, 34th, and 39th, who were well ahead of their regiments,
reached the road just as the leading French battalion was pushing
across their front. Only 200 men were up, but Blakeney (commanding the
28th company) saw that if the hostile column were closely attacked in
flank, even by a small body, its progress would be stopped, and a few
minutes’ delay would bring down both Wilson’s and Howard’s brigades
upon it. Accordingly he led in person the charge of some scores of the
men nearest him against the throat of the French column[776]; they were
not exterminated (as might have been expected), for Girard, who was
present at the spot, told his men not to stop to fight, but to escape
by leaving the road and dashing uphill along the rocks of the sierra
above. He himself with the leading companies got clear, hitting on
a place where the side of the precipice was not too steep to climb,
though the officers had to turn loose their horses before they could
start on the scramble. The main body of the column was less lucky. An
absolutely impassable line of cliffs was above them, and after reaching
its foot a thousand men, in two or three disorderly masses, had to halt
and lay down their arms to the eager pursuers from both the British
brigades, who were converging upon them. A few got away by incredibly
dangerous climbing, and joined Girard on top of the sierra. Meanwhile
Morillo’s Spanish infantry had taken an easier path up the heights, far
to the left, and started in pursuit of the remnants of the French. They
kept up the chase for eight leagues, and took or slew many stragglers.
But Girard, Dombrouski, and four or five hundred men, bearing with them
the eagles of the 34th and 40th, escaped eastward, and, after much
wandering in the mountains, crossed the Guadiana at Orellana, beyond
Medellin, and got back to join Drouet. Other small parties and many of
the cavalry straggled in later, but Girard’s force had practically
been destroyed. Nearly 1,300 prisoners had been taken, including
General Bron, commanding the cavalry, the Prince of Aremberg, colonel
of the 27th _Chasseurs_,[777] the _chef d’état major_ of the 5th Corps,
and more than thirty other officers. In addition the French lost their
three guns and a contribution of 5,000 dollars levied on Caçeres a few
days before. Hill’s loss was insignificant--seven men killed and seven
officers and fifty-seven men wounded. Penne Villemur’s Spaniards, who
had behaved with excellent spirit, had about thirty casualties.
[776] Blakeney’s account of his own exploit (pp. 228-9 of his
book) is borne out by Hill’s recommendation of him, though he is
not mentioned in the formal dispatch of October 30.
[777] This Rheinbund prince had been in great favour with
Napoleon, and married Stephanie Tascher, niece of the Empress
Josephine. He had raised the 27th _Chasseurs_ at his own cost.
After the fighting was over, Hill directed Long’s cavalry, with the
Portuguese regiments, who had not been engaged, to march on Merida,
supporting them with Howard’s brigade when it had rested. It was
hoped that Remond’s column, which had escaped the disaster of Arroyo
dos Molinos by its early march, might be caught up. But the French
brigadier had a long enough start to render this impossible: warned by
fugitive cavalry of the fate of his chief, he marched through Merida
without halting, and retired towards Drouet by way of Almendralejo.
Hill, after following his vanguard to Merida on the 29th and stopping
there two days, returned by Wellington’s orders to his old cantonments
at Portalegre, which he reached on November 3rd.
‘It would have been useless,’ wrote Wellington, ‘for him to push on his
operations beyond the Guadiana--for Drouet would simply have retired
before him,--and equally so to remain at Merida.’ By this somewhat
cryptic phrase the British commander-in-chief meant that if he had
chosen to direct Hill, after his success at Arroyo dos Molinos, to
march against Drouet’s main body, there can be no doubt that he might
have driven it into the Sierra Morena. This would have caused Soult to
come to its aid with all the available troops that could be collected
in Andalusia. The reason why no such orders were issued was that the
British general did not wish to provoke Soult to concentrate. Hill
could do nothing against the Army of the South if it came against
him in force. But if it continued disseminated through all the four
kingdoms of Andalusia, as it was at present, with one mass of troops
opposite Cadiz, another at Granada, and the small available field force
busily engaged in hunting Ballasteros, it was not to be feared. As to
the uselessness of stopping at Merida, Wellington meant that Hill,
if posted there, would have been liable to be cut off from Elvas if
Soult should come up in haste from Andalusia to reinforce Drouet--as
was extremely likely. Wellington was contented with having broken up a
French division, and cut the communication between the Armies of the
South and of Portugal for a time. For when Girard was driven out of
the space between the Tagus and the Guadiana, Soult could no longer
communicate with Marmont.
Napoleon recalled Girard in disgrace, which he well deserved for his
reckless want of caution: his maltreated division was given to General
Barrois. But he was afterwards pardoned, and survived to die, still a
general of division, doing good service at the battle of Ligny.
In the first moment of alarm, after hearing of Girard’s disaster,
Soult had expected to be pressed, had sent 4,000 infantry to reinforce
Drouet, and had begun to collect other troops at Seville. But finding
that Hill had no further intention of striking at the 5th Corps, and
that Badajoz was not even threatened, he reverted to his earlier plans,
left Estremadura alone, and continued to hunt Ballasteros, and to make
preparation for his next important move--the siege of Tarifa. Drouet,
for his part, having recovered from the dismay into which Girard’s
defeat had thrown him, once more began to move his troops northward
with caution. On December 5th he reoccupied Almendralejo, on the 18th
he pushed Dombrouski with a brigade to Merida, and once more opened
up communication with the Army of Portugal by way of Truxillo. But
the road was not to be long open. Just before the year 1811 was out
(December 27th) Hill was sent forth a second time against the 5th
Corps, with far more serious intentions than in October, for this
expedition was part of Wellington’s preliminary movements for the siege
of Ciudad Rodrigo. It will be dealt with in its proper place.
For all intents and purposes the march to Arroyo dos Molinos forms
the last episode of the campaign of 1811. Its main interest was that
it showed Wellington in offensive mood, ready to take advantage of
the scattered condition of his enemy. It also made it clear that in
Hill he had an executive officer of the highest merit--but this was
known before to all who had studied the career of that much-loved and
well-served general, for whom the 2nd Division would do anything. There
was no more popular promotion during the whole war than that which made
him a Knight of the Bath in reward for his little campaign.
December had now arrived--the fatal detachment of 15,000 of Marmont’s
men to Valencia had been ordered by the Emperor. Wellington was ready
for his long-projected blow at Ciudad Rodrigo. How sharply it was
delivered will be told in another volume.
APPENDICES
I
THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL, JAN. 1, 1811
[FROM A RETURN IN THE _ARCHIVES NATIONALES_, PARIS]
2nd CORPS. REYNIER. At and about Santarem:
Present under
Arms. Detached. Sick. Total.
Officers. Men.
1st Infantry Division, Merle 154 4,214 150 1,549 6,067
2nd Infantry Division,
Heudelet 196 5,522 451 2,616 8,785
Cavalry Brigade, Pierre Soult 98 1,048 523 231 1,900
Artillery, Train, &c. 33 1,251 52 89 1,425
État-Major 65 -- -- -- 65
--- ------ ----- ----- ------
Corps Total 546 12,035 1,176 4,485 18,242
6th CORPS. NEY. Head quarters, Thomar:
1st Infantry Division,
Marchand 182 4,805 529 1,121 6,637
2nd Infantry Division, Mermet 212 6,040 743 1,077 8,072
3rd Infantry Division, Loison 174 4,415 1,037[778] 3,291 8,917
Cavalry Brigade, Lamotte 48 604 663 117 1,432
Artillery, Train, &c. 34 1,735 47 165 1,981
État-Major 77 -- -- -- 77
--- ------ ----- ----- ------
Corps Total 727 17,599 3,019 5,771 27,116
8th CORPS. JUNOT. Head quarters, Torres Novas:
1st Infantry Division, Clausel 185 3,822 484 3,989 8,480
2nd Infantry Division, Solignac 236 4,761 1,958[779] 3,537 10,492
Cavalry Brigade 86 895 698 238 1,917
Artillery, Train, &c. 23 1,083 24 392 1,522
État-Major 69 -- -- -- 69
--- ------ ----- ----- ------
Corps Total 599 10,561 3,164 8,156 22,480
Reserve Cavalry, Montbrun 140 2,729 1,486[780] 178 4,533
Artillery Reserve, Génie, &c. 42 1,546 219 283 2,090
Gendarmerie 7 190 -- -- 197
General État-Major of the Army 66 -- -- -- 66
----- ------ ----- ------ ------
Total 2,127 44,660 9,064 18,873 74,724
[778] Including 5/82nd, 528 strong, at Almeida.
[779] Including 4/15th and 3/86th, 1,451 strong, at Ciudad
Rodrigo.
[780] Including five squadrons, 875 strong, left between Ciudad
Rodrigo and Almeida.
Total present under arms of all ranks, 46,787 [Fririon gives only 45,131].
N.B.--The 9,064 detached include 2,854 men left at Rodrigo and Almeida,
and 6,210 men left behind in Spain at Salamanca and elsewhere.
Note the terrible proportion of sick in the raw divisions of Junot and
Loison, as compared with the lower percentage in the old divisions of
Ney’s and Reynier’s Corps.
9th Corps. DROUET D’ERLON. Head quarters approaching Leiria:
1st Division of Infantry,
Claparéde (at Guarda) 246 7,617 369 482 8,714
2nd Division of Infantry,
Conroux (near Leiria) 225 7,367 447 1,299 9,338
Cavalry Brigade, Fournier (at
the rear) 71 1,627 60 114 1,872
Artillery, Train, &c. 13 657 -- 72 742
État-Major 66 -- -- -- 66
--- ------ --- ----- ------
Corps Total 621 17,268 876 1,967 20,732
Only Conroux’s division being with the main army, its 7,592 effective
men alone have to be added to Masséna’s force, making a grand total of
54,116 for the available strength of the Marshal on Jan. 1, 1811.
On March 15th the total of 46,787 effectives in the old Army of
Portugal had gone down to 44,407 (according to the return in the
Paris Archives--Fririon says to only 40,751), though 1,862 drafts
were brought up to the front by Foy on Feb. 5. This shows a shrinkage
of 4,242 men effective since Jan. 1. But the loss in the sick is
terrible--on Jan. 1 there were 18,873; on March 15 only about 6,000
(5,424 in the three army corps; no figures preserved for artillery,
train, engineers, gendarmerie, &c.). Apparently multitudes must have
perished in hospital during these eleven weeks.
Conroux’s division had about 6,400 effectives on March 15, which would
make Masséna’s effective fighting force on that day 50,807. Claparéde’s
division (at Guarda and Celorico) was on March 15 about 6,000 strong.
On April 1 the total of 44,407 effectives of the old army on March 15
had gone down to 39,905 present with the colours, not including Conroux
and Claparéde.
On April 15 (the retreat having ended on April 5) the total of
effectives was 39,546, not including Conroux and Claparéde.
The states of May 1 (Paris Archives) will be found under the Table (No.
XII) entitled ‘The French Army at Fuentes de Oñoro.’
II
SOULT’S ARMY IN HIS FIRST EXPEDITION OF ESTREMADURA (JAN.-MARCH 1811)
Officers
and Men.
5th CORPS. Marshal MORTIER:
1st Infantry Division (Girard):
34th, 40th, 64th, 88th Line (three batts. each) 5,835
2nd Infantry Division (Gazan):
21st and 28th Léger, 100th and 103rd Line (three batts.
each) 5,775
Corps-Cavalry (Briche), 21st Chasseurs, 10th Hussars. 971
From 1st CORPS:
63rd Line (three batts.) 1,450
4th, 14th, 26th Dragoons 1,332
2nd Hussars 405
From 4th Corps: 27th Chasseurs à Cheval 990
Artillery and Train 1,261
Engineers and Sappers 698
4th Spanish Chasseurs à Cheval 246
Gendarmerie 25
État-Major-General 22
------
General Total 19,010
III
SPANISH TROOPS IN ESTREMADURA, MARCH, 1811
(A) ORIGINAL GARRISON OF THE PLACE
Officers. Men.
2nd of Majorca (two batts.) 43 466
1st of Badajoz (one batt.) 20 376
Provincial de Truxillo (one batt.) 27 694
Provincial de Plasencia (one batt.) 20 687
Dismounted Cavalry, organized in battalions 29 781
Artillery, and detachments lent to the artillery by
various corps 45 979
Sappers 6 167
--- -----
Total 190 4,150
(B) MENDIZABAL’S ARMY OF SUCCOUR
[Present with the Colours, Feb. 1, 1811]
Officers. Men.
Vanguard Division, Brigadier-General Carlos de España:
Principe (three batts.), 1st and 2nd of Catalonia,
Gerona, Vittoria (one batt. each) 137 2,550
1st Division, Major-General Garcia:
Leon (three batts.), Regimiento del General (three
batts.), La Union (two batts.), 1st of Barcelona,
Voluntarios Catalanes, Osuna, Zafra, Valladolid,
La Serena (one batt. each), 2nd of Seville (two
batts.) 357 5,594
2nd Division, Major-General Virues:
Rey (two batts.), Princesa (two batts.), Lobera
(three batts.), Toledo (two batts.), Zamora (two
batts.), Hibernia (two batts.), Fernando 7º (two
batts.), Tiradores de Castilla, Voluntarios de
Navarra, 1st of Seville (one batt. each) 282 4,926
Cavalry, Major-General Butron:
Carabineros Reales, Reina, Infante, Borbon,
Algarve, Sagunto, Lusitania, Hussares de
Estremadura, Perseguidores de Andalusia,
Imperiales de Toledo, Granaderos de Llerena,
Cruzada de Albuquerque [many regiments
very weak] 387 3,361
[with 2,595 horses]
Artillery, divisional, four batteries [not including
men in Badajoz] 19 498
----- ------
Total 1,182 16,929
N.B.--This total force of 18,111 men did not appear before Badajoz with
Mendizabal on February 5th. Fernando 7º, with 800 men, was garrisoning
Albuquerque. The 800 dismounted cavalry were at Valencia de Alcantara,
their dépôt. 2nd of Seville, with 34 officers and 582 men, had been
thrown into Badajoz in January. About 400 cavalry were detached with
Ballasteros. Two battalions were garrisoning Campo Mayor. It seems
that the actual army of succour consisted of about 2,500 men of Carlos
de España’s division, 8,500 from those of Garcia and Virues, 2,500 of
Butron’s cavalry and 450 artillery; also 950 Portuguese dragoons under
Madden.
Osuna, Zafra, Valladolid, and La Serena, with 132 officers and 2,559
men, were drafted into the garrison of Badajoz before the battle of the
Gebora, in which they did not take part. The total force present at
that light was about 9,000 infantry and 2,000 Spanish horse, besides
Madden’s 900 Portuguese dragoons.
IV
GRAHAM’S ARMY AT BARROSA, AND ITS LOSSES
_Offi- _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Total._
cers._ _Men._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._
Dilkes’s Brigade:
1st Guards, 2nd batt. 24 587 1 33 8 177 219
Coldstream Guards, 2nd
Batt. (2 comps.) 7 204 1 8 2 47 58
3rd Guards, 2nd Batt. (3
comps.) 8 314 1 14 2 85 102
2 comps. 2/95th Rifles 11 206 -- 6 -- 28 34
--- ----- -- -- -- --- ---
Total of Brigade 50 1,311 3 61 12 337 413
Wheatley’s Brigade:
1/28th Foot (8 comps.) 20 437 -- 6 -- 80 86
2/67th Foot 23 504 -- 10 4 31 45
2/87th Foot 32 664 1 44 4 124 173
--- ---- -- -- -- --- ---
Total of Brigade 75 1,605 1 60 8 235 304
Browne’s Flank Battalion
(2 comps, each of 1/9th,
1/28th, 2/82nd) 22 514 -- 25 11 200 236
Barnard’s Flank Battalion
(4 comps. 3/95th Rifles, 2
comps. 2/47th) 29 615 2 33 5 97 137
Flank Companies,
20th Portuguese 10 316 -- 9 5 42 56
Cavalry, 2 squadrons 2nd
Hussars K.G.L. 13 193 -- -- 2 32 34
Artillery 20 342 -- 6 8 40 54
Royal Engineers 9 50 -- 1 -- 2 3
Staff Corps 2 35 -- -- -- 1 1
--- ----- -- --- -- --- -----
Total of Army 236 4,981 6 195 51 986 1,238
Total of force was: Infantry, 4,533; Cavalry, 206; Artillery, 362;
Engineers, &c., 96 = Grand Total, 5,217.
N.B.--Of these troops on the field, Dilkes’s brigade _minus_ the
211 Coldstreamers, but _plus_ 260 of the 2/67th and Browne’s flank
battalion, formed the right column, while Wheatley’s brigade, _minus_
one wing of the 2/67th, but _plus_ the two Coldstream companies and
Barnard’s flank battalion, was on the left. All the guns were with the
latter column. Thus Dilkes’s command must have been about 1,950 strong,
Wheatley’s about 2,883. The cavalry were absent with Whittingham on the
coast-road till nearly the end of the engagement.
V
VICTOR’S ARMY AT BARROSA, AND ITS LOSSES
(1) TROOPS ENGAGED AGAINST THE BRITISH
_Present._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
_Off._ _Men._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._
DIVISION RUFFIN:
2/9th Léger 15 581 1 14 4 70 1 18 108
1/24th and 2/24th Ligne 37 1,156 2 33 7 214 3 21 280
1/96th Ligne 26 738 2 39 6 199 2 1 249
2 provisional batts. of see
Grenadiers note[781] 1 20 5 136 1 59 222
-- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -- ---
Divisional Total 78 2,475 6 106 22 619 7 99 859
DIVISION LAVAL:
1/8th and 2/8th Ligne 43 1,425 11 63 11 622 -- 19 726
1/45th Ligne 27 683 1 7 -- 44 -- 3 55
1/54th and 2/54th Ligne 42 1,281 3 26 10 284 -- -- 323
Grenadier companies
of the 3rd batts. of
the 8th, 45th, 54th,
24th, 96th Ligne, see
and 9th Léger 19 530 -- -- -- -- note[782] --
--- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -- -----
Divisional Total 131 3,919 15 96 21 950 -- 22 1,104
CAVALRY, 1st Dragoons 21 377 -- 2 6 30 1 3 42
ARTILLERY, 2 batteries 8 161 1 16 3 31 1 -- 52
ÉTAT-MAJOR ? ? 2 -- 2 -- 1 -- 5
--- ----- -- --- -- ---- -- --- -----
General Total 238 6,932 24 220 54 1,630 10 124 2,062
[781] These two battalions were formed of the fourteen grenadier
companies of the 1st and 2nd battalions of all the seven regiments of
Laval’s and Ruffin’s divisions, including those of the 16th Léger,
absent from the corps. The men are therefore all counted already in
their battalions, save those of the 16th Léger, which would probably
give 7 officers and 170 men to be added to the above total of 7,170.
That these companies of the 16th were present is shown by the fact that
two casualties of officers of the regiment are recorded in Martinien’s
lists at Barrosa.
[782] Losses of these six companies are included among those of the
other grenadiers in the return. They were little engaged, and probably
lost only 20 or 30 men.
(2) TROOPS ENGAGED AGAINST THE SPANIARDS, IN THE COMBAT BY THE TORRE
BERMEJA
_Present._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
_Off._ _Men._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._
DIVISION VILLATTE:
1/27th and 3/27th Léger 43 982 1 20 7 150 2 21 201
1/94th Ligne 15 535 1 9 3 49 -- -- 62
2/95th and 3/95th
Ligne 30 1,026 -- 1 -- 32 -- 1 34
CAVALRY, 2nd Dragoons 19 270 -- 3 -- 12 -- 4 19
ARTILLERY, 1 battery 3 75 -- -- -- --- -- -- --
ÉTAT-MAJOR ? ? -- -- 1 --- -- -- 1
--- ----- -- -- -- --- -- -- ---
110 2,881 2 33 11 243 2 26 317
N.B.--There were absent from their divisions:
(1) With Cassagne at Medina Sidonia--the 2/27th, 3/94th, 2/96th,
1/95th, and a battalion of _voltigeur_ companies from the 3rd battalion
of the 8th, 24th, 45th, 54th, 96th, and 6th Léger; also the 5th
Chasseurs à Cheval.
(2) Left in garrison in the Cadiz lines--the 1/9th Léger, 2/45th and
2/94th Ligne.
(3) Taken away by Soult--the 63rd Ligne and 16th Léger.
VI
BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE COMBATS
11TH-15TH MARCH, 1811
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
_Officers._ _Men._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._
POMBAL, March 11th:
1/95th Foot -- 1 1 4 -- -- 6
3rd Caçadores -- 10 1 20 -- -- 31
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Total -- 11 2 24 -- -- 37
REDINHA, March 12th:
Light Division:
1/43rd Foot -- -- -- 6 -- -- 6
1/52nd Foot -- 2 3 21 -- -- 26
1/95th Foot -- -- 1 24 -- 1 26
3rd Division:
2/5th Foot -- 3 1 5 -- -- 9
1/45th Foot -- -- 1 6 -- -- 7
5/60th Foot -- -- -- 10 -- 4 14
1/88th Foot -- -- 1 3 -- -- 4
1/94th Foot -- 2 1 13 -- -- 16
2/83rd Foot -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
4th Division:
2/27th Foot -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
1/40th Foot -- -- -- 8 -- -- 8
97th Foot -- 1 -- 6 -- -- 7
Cavalry:
1st Royal
Dragoons -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
4th Dragoons -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
Horse Artillery -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
Portuguese: From
1st, 3rd, 4th,
and 6th
Caçadores -- 9 3 51 -- 10 73
-- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Total -- 17 11 163 -- 15 206
CAZAL NOVO, and other skirmishes of March 14th:
Light Division:
1/43rd Foot -- -- 3 11 -- -- 14
1/52nd Foot 1 8 3 52 -- 1 65
1/95th Foot -- 3 2 10 -- -- 15
3rd Division:
2/5th Foot -- -- -- 8 -- -- 8
1/45th Foot -- 1 -- 9 -- 1 11
5/60th Foot -- -- 1 3 -- 1 5
74th Foot -- -- 1 4 -- -- 5
2/83rd Foot -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
1/88th Foot -- -- -- 2 -- 1 3
1/94th Foot -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
Portuguese -- 2 1 21 -- -- 24
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Total 1 14 11 125 -- 4 155
FOZ DO AROUCE, March 15th:
Light Division:
1/52nd Foot -- 2 -- 3 -- -- 5
1/95th Foot -- -- 2 17 -- -- 19
3rd Division:
2/5th Foot -- 1 -- 7 -- -- 8
1/45th Foot -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
5/60th Foot 1 3 -- 8 -- -- 12
74th Foot -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
2/83rd Foot -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
1/88th Foot 1 -- -- 1 -- -- 2
1/94th Foot -- -- -- 6 -- -- 6
1st Division:
1/79th Foot -- 1 -- 6 -- -- 7
2/24th Foot -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
2/42nd Foot -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
Portuguese -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Total 2 7 2 60 -- -- 71
VII
BRITISH LOSSES AT SABUGAL, APRIL 3RD, 1811
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
_Officers._ _Men._ _O._ _M._ _O._ _M._
Light Division:
1/43rd Foot 1 7 5 67 -- -- 80
1/52nd Foot -- 3 2 18 -- -- 23
1/95th Foot 1 1 2 12 -- 1 17
2/95th Foot -- 1 -- 2 -- -- 3
3rd Division:
2/5th Foot -- -- 2 6 -- -- 8
1/45th Foot -- -- -- 2 -- 1 3
5/60th Foot -- 2 -- 2 -- 1 5
2/83rd Foot -- -- -- 1 -- 1 2
1/88th Foot -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
2/88th Foot -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
1/94th Foot -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
Royal Horse
Artillery -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
1st Hussars
K.G.L. -- -- -- 1 -- 1 2
Portuguese -- 1 -- 9 1[783] 11
-- -- -- --- -- -- ---
Total 2 15 11 128 1 5 162
[783] This officer, Colonel Waters, of the Portuguese Staff, was taken
prisoner on the Coa many miles from the battlefield, by the outposts of
the French 6th Corps.
N.B.--Note that of all the 594 casualties in action during the period of
Masséna’s retreat all but 65 were in the Light and 3rd Divisions. All
the officers killed or wounded belonged to those divisions, except two in
the 4th and 6th Portuguese Caçadores wounded at Redinha.
VIII
FRENCH LOSSES AT SABUGAL, APRIL 3RD, 1811
[FROM A RETURN IN THE MINISTÈRE DE LA GUERRE, PARIS]
_Killed. _Wounded. _Missing. _Total._
Officers. Men._ Officers. Men._ Officers. Men._
2nd CORPS. MERLE’S Division:
2nd Léger 2 7 4 60 3 15 91
36th Ligne 1 8 5 63 1 18 96
4th Léger 1 1 5 57 1 19 84
HEUDELET’S Division:
17th Léger 3 13 12 118 -- 31 177
70th Ligne 6 9 11 122 -- 96 244
31st Léger 2 2 -- 6 -- -- 10
47th Ligne -- 1 -- 6 -- 1 8
Cavalry (PIERRE SOULT):
1st Hussars -- 7 -- 4 1 -- 12
8th Dragoons -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
25th Dragoons -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
22nd Chasseurs 1 4 -- 11 -- -- 16
Chasseurs
Hanovriens -- 2 -- 6 -- -- 8
Artillery 1 1 1 7 -- -- 10
-- -- -- --- -- --- ---
17 55 38 464 6 180 760
N.B.--The disproportionate number of wounded to killed among rank and
file, 464 to 55, or one to eight, while the normal proportion was about
one to five, suggests that some of the numerous ‘missing’ were really
killed. Note the excessive loss among officers, 61 to 699 rank and
file, one to eleven instead of the usual one to twenty.
There is some reason to suppose that the figures are incomplete, as
Martinien’s _Liste des officiers tués et blessés_ gives 19 killed and
46 wounded _by name_. We find in these tables the 1st Hussars with an
officer killed and three wounded, and the 70th Ligne with seven killed
and thirteen wounded, &c.
IX
FORCE OF WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT FUENTES DE OÑORO
[FROM THE RETURN OF MAY 1]
CAVALRY
_Brigadier._ _Regiments._ _Officers._ _Sergeants, _Regimental _Brigade
drummers, Total._ Total of
and rank Effectives._
and file._
Slade {1st Dragoons 24 364 388} 766
{14th Light Dragoons 25 353 378}
Arentschildt {16th Dragoons 30 332 362} 776
{1st Hussars K.G.L. 30 384 414}
Portuguese {4th Line -- 104 104}
Brigade, {10th Line -- 208 208} 312[784]
Barbaçena { }
---- ------ ------ ------
Total Cavalry 109 1,745 1,854 1,854
INFANTRY
1st Division. Lieut.-General SIR BRENT SPENCER:
{3rd Guards, 1st batt. 24 935 959}
Stopford {Coldstream G., 1st batt. 31 909 940} 1,943
{1 comp. 5/60th Foot 2 42 44}
{24th Foot, 2nd batt. 22 349 371}
{42nd ” ” ” 26 419 445}
Nightingale {79th ” 1st ” 39 883 922} 1,774
{1 comp. 5/60th Foot 1 35 36}
{50th Foot, 1st batt. 45 552 597}
Howard {71st ” ” ” 42 455 497} 1,934
{92nd ” ” ” 41 723 764}
{3/95th Foot, 1 comp. 3 73 76}
{1st Line Batt. K.G.L. 27 485 512}
{2nd ” ” 30 454 484}
Löwe {5th ” ” 29 393 422} 1,914
{7th ” ” 21 389 410}
{2 Light Comps. ” 5 81 86}
---- ------ ------ ------
Total 1st Division 388 7,177 7,565 7,565
3rd Division. Major-General T. PICTON:
{45th Foot, 1st batt. 24 484 508}
Mackinnon {74th Regiment 24 461 485}
{88th Foot, 2nd batt. 30 657 687} 1,863
{3 comps. 5/60th Foot 6 177 183}
{5th Foot, 2nd batt. 28 476 504}
Colville {83rd ” ” 33 427 460} 1,967
{88th ” ” 28 439 467}
{94th Regiment 31 505 536}
Power’s {9th Line, 2 batts. -- 910[785] 910}
Portuguese {21st ” ” -- 740[785] 740} 1,650
Brigade { }
Total 3rd Division 204 5,276 5,480 5,480
5th Division. Major-General SIR W. ERSKINE:
{1st Foot, 3rd batt. 39 633 672}
Hay {9th ” 1st ” 28 599 627} 1,770
{38th ” 2nd ” 21 381 402}
{1 comp. Brunswick Oels 3 66 69}
{4th Foot, 1st batt. 34 578 612}
Dunlop {30th ” 2nd ” 23 484 507}
{44th ” 3rd ” 27 410 437} 1,624
{1 comp. Brunswick Oels 3 65 68}
Spry’s {3rd Line, 2 batts. -- 724[785] 724}
Portuguese {15th ” ” -- 556[785] 556} 1,764
Brigade {8th Caçadores, 1 batt. -- 484[785] 484}
Total 5th Division 178 4,980 5,158 5,158
6th Division. Major-General ALEX. CAMPBELL:
{11th Foot, 1st batt. 49 788 837}
Hulse {53rd ” 2nd ” 21 438 459} 2,041
{61st ” 1st ” 31 666 697}
{1 comp. 5/60th Foot 2 46 48}
Burne {2nd Foot 30 528 558}
{36th ” 1st batt. 32 482 514} 1,072
Madden’s {8th Line, 2 batts. -- 915[785] 915}
Portuguese {12th ” ” -- 1,222[785] 1,222} 2,137
Brigade { }
Total 6th Division 165 5,085 5,250 5,250
7th Division. Major-General HOUSTON:
{51st Foot, 2nd batt. 39 551 590}
{85th Foot 22 365 387}
Sontag. {Chasseurs Britanniques. 31 808 839} 2,409
{Brunswick Oels, 8 comps. 32 561 593}
Doyle’s (late{7th Line, 2 batts. -- 713[786] 713}
Collins’s) {19th ” ” -- 1,026[786] 1,026} 2,181
Portuguese {2nd Caçadores, 1 batt. -- 442[786] 442}
Brigade { }
Total 7th Division. 124 4,466 4,590 4,590
Light Division. Major-General R. CRAUFURD:
{43rd Foot, 1st batt. 27 727 754}
Beckwith {95th ” 1st ” }
{ (4 comps.) 13 341 354} 1,184
{95th ” 2nd ” }
{ (1 comp.) 4 72 76}
{52nd Foot, 1st batt. 32 803 835}
Drummond {52nd ” 2nd ” 32 510 542} 1,734
{95th ” 4th ” }
{ (4 comps.) 14 343 357}
Portuguese {1st Caçadores -- 450[786] 450}
{3rd ” -- 447[786] 447} 897
Total Light Division 122 3,693 3,815 3,815
Ashworth’s {6th Line, 2 batts. -- 986[786] 986}
Portuguese {18th ” ” -- 1,130[786] 1,130} 2,539
Brigade, {6th Caçadores -- 423[786] 423}
unattached { }
ARTILLERY
English H. A. (Bull’s and Ross’s
troops) 10 157 167}
” Field (Lawson’s and Thompson’s
Companies) 10 260 270} 987
Portuguese (4 batteries) -- 550[786] 550}
ENGINEERS 10 30 40 40
TRAIN 15 211 226 226
[784] These Portuguese figures include the officers.
[785] These Portuguese figures include the officers.
[786] These Portuguese figures include the officers.
TOTAL
Cavalry 1,854
1st Division 7,565
3rd ” 5,480
5th ” 5,158
6th ” 5,250
7th ” 4,590
Light ” 3,815
Ashworth’s Portuguese 2,539
Artillery 987
Engineers 40
Train 226
------
Grand Total 37,504
[Total of Infantry, 34,397.]
N.B.--Pack’s Portuguese Brigade and the 2nd regiment from the 6th
Division were absent, in charge of the blockade of Almeida.
X
BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT FUENTES DE OÑORO
FIRST DAY, MAY 3RD, 1811
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Total._
1st DIVISION. Spencer:
Nightingale’s {24th Foot, 2nd batt. -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
Brigade {42nd ” ” ” -- 1 1 6 -- 1 9
{79th ” 1st ” 1 4 2 18 -- -- 25
{30th Foot, 1st batt. -- -- 2 3 -- -- 5
Howard’s {71st ” ” 1 7 5 33 -- 6 52
Brigade {92nd ” ” -- -- 1 9 -- -- 10
{3/95th Foot, 1 comp. -- -- 1 9 -- -- 10
{1st Line batt. K.G.L. -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
Löwe’s {2nd ” ” -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
Brigade {5th ” ” -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
{7th ” ” -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
{Light comps. ” -- 3 -- 8 -- -- 11
---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
Divisional Total 2 15 12 103 -- 7 139
---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
3rd DIVISION. Picton:
{45th Foot, 1st batt. -- -- -- -- -- 2 2
Mackinnon’s {74th ” ” -- 1 -- 9 -- -- 10
Brigade {88th ” ” -- -- -- 5 -- -- 5
{5/60th Foot, 3 comps. -- 3 2 9 -- 8 22
{ 5th Foot, 2nd batt. -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
Colville’s {83rd ” ” -- -- -- 9 -- 3 12
Brigade {88th ” ” -- -- -- 6 -- -- 6
{94th ” -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
Divisional Total -- 4 2 45 -- 13 64
---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
CAVALRY:
Slade’s {1st Dragoons -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Brigade {14th Light Dragoons -- 1 -- 1 -- 1 3
Arentschildt’s {16th Light Dragoons -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Brigade {1st Hussars K.G.L. -- -- 1 4 -- -- 5
---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
British General Total 2 20 15 153 -- 21 211
Portuguese loss (nearly all in 6th
Caçadores of Ashworth’s Brigade) -- 14 6 27 -- 1 48
---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
General Total of Allied Loss 2 34 21 180 -- 22 259
XI
BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT FUENTES DE OÑORO
SECOND DAY, MAY 5TH, 1811
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Total._
1st DIVISION. Spencer:
Stopford’s {1st Coldstream Guards -- 4 2 49 1 7 63
Brigade {1st Scots Fusilier
{ Guards 1 5 1 52 1 12 72
{24th Foot, 2nd batt. 1 4 -- 19 1 4 29
Nightingale’s {42nd ” ” ” -- 2 -- 23 -- -- 25
Brigade {79th ” 1st ” -- 27 9 126 -- 94 256
{30th Foot, 1st batt. -- 3 -- 21 -- -- 24
Howard’s {71st ” ” 2 11 4 71 2 37 127
Brigade {92nd ” ” -- 7 1 34 -- -- 42
{3/95th Foot, 1 comp. 1 1 -- 2 -- 2 6
{1st Line batt. K.G.L. -- -- -- 2 -- 1 3
Löwe’s {2nd ” ” -- 2 2 11 -- 2 17
Brigade {5th ” ” -- -- -- 8 -- 3 11
{7th ” ” -- 1 1 5 -- 2 9
{Light comps. ” -- -- -- 3 -- 2 5
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Divisional Total 5 67 20 426 5 166 689
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
3rd DIVISION. Picton:
{45th Foot, 1st batt. -- 3 -- 1 1 4 9
Mackinnon’s {74th ” ” 1 2 2 54 -- -- 59
Brigade {88th ” ” 1 1 2 47 -- 1 52
{5/60th Foot, 3 comps. -- -- 1 13 -- -- 14
{ 5th Foot, 2nd batt. -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
Colville’s {83rd ” ” 1 5 1 28 -- -- 35
Brigade {88th ” ” -- -- -- -- -- -- --
{94th Foot -- -- 1 4 -- -- 5
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Divisional Total 3 11 7 150 1 5 177
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
5th DIVISION. Erskine:
Hay’s { 1st Foot, 3rd batt. -- -- -- 9 -- -- 9
Brigade { 9th ” 1st ” -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
{38th ” 2nd ” -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dunlop’s { 4th Foot, 1st batt. -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Brigade {30th ” 2nd ” -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
{44th ” ” ” -- -- -- 4 -- -- 4
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Divisional Total -- -- -- 21 -- -- 21
6th DIVISION. Campbell:
No losses whatever -- -- -- -- -- -- --
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
7th DIVISION. Houston:
{51st Foot, 2nd batt. -- -- -- 5 -- 1 6
Sontag’s {85th ” ” 1 12 3 36 -- 43 95
Brigade {Chasseurs Britanniques -- 30 4 17 -- 7 58
{Brunswick Oels -- 1 1 6 -- 10 18
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Divisional Total 1 43 8 64 -- 61 177
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
LIGHT DIVISION. Craufurd:
Beckwith’s {43rd Foot, 1st batt. -- -- -- 9 -- -- 9
Brigade {1/95th Foot, 4 comps. -- -- -- 7 -- -- 7
{52nd Foot, 1st batt. -- 1 -- 6 -- -- 7
Drummond’s {52nd ” 2nd ” -- -- -- 14 -- -- 14
Brigade {2/95th Foot, 4 comps. -- 2 -- 4 -- -- 6
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Divisional Total -- 3 -- 40 -- -- 43
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
CAVALRY. Stapleton Cotton:
Slade’s {1st Dragoons -- 4 1 36 -- -- 41
Brigade {14th Light Dragoons -- 3 5 27 -- 3 38
Arentschildt’s {16th Light Dragoons -- 7 2 16 1 1 27
Brigade {1st Hussars K.G.L. -- 2 2 39 -- -- 43
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Cavalry Total -- 16 10 118 1 4 149
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
ARTILLERY. Howarth:
Horse -- 1 -- 1 -- -- 2
Field -- 5 3 18 -- -- 26
GENERAL STAFF -- -- 2 -- -- -- 2
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
British General Total of May 5th 9 146 50 838 7 236 1286
Portuguese losses (mainly in the 2nd
and 3rd Caçadores, and 6th and 21st
Line) -- 50 7 151 -- 51 259
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Allied General Total of May 5th 9 196 57 989 7 287 1545
---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ----- ------
Total of both days, May 3rd and 5th 11 230 78 1169 7 309 1804
XII
THE FRENCH ARMY AT FUENTES DE OÑORO, MAY 3-5, 1811
A. ARMY OF PORTUGAL, STATE OF MAY 1st
2nd CORPS. REYNIER.
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Division Merle:
Brigade {2nd Léger (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 55 1,812
Sarrut {36th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 55 1,595
4th Léger (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 61 1,313
--- -----
171 4,720 4,891
Division Heudelet:
Brigade {17th Léger (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 58 1,166
Godard {70th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 52 1,026
Brigade {31st Léger (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 55 1,528
Arnaud {47th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 60 1,546
--- -----
225 5,266 5,491
Cavalry Brigade:
1st Hussars 9 94
22nd Chasseurs 27 336
8th Dragoons 13 203
--- -----
49 633 682
For Artillery, Sappers, Train, &c., see Total of Army.
Total of Corps 11,064
6th CORPS. LOISON.
Division Marchand:
Brigade {6th Léger (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 43 1,202
Maucune {69th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 54 1,537
Brigade {39th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 53 1,286
Chemineau {76th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 64 1,633
--- -----
214 5,658 5,872
Division Mermet:
Brigade {25th Léger (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 67 1,800
Ménard {27th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 57 1,763
Brigade {50th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 57 1,356
Taupin {59th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.) 53 1,549
--- -----
234 6,468 6,702
Division Ferey:
{26th Ligne (4th, 5th, 6th batts.) 57 958
{Légion du Midi (1 batt.) 16 369
{Légion Hanovrienne (1 batt.) 19 412
{66th Ligne (4th, 5th, 6th batts.) 63 1,307
{82nd Ligne (4th, 6th batts.[787]) 44 987
--- -----
199 4,033 4,232
Light Cavalry Brigade Lamotte:
3rd Hussars 12 152
15th Chasseurs 13 157
-- ---
25 309 334
For Artillery, Sappers, Train, &c., see Total of Army.
Total of Corps 17,140
8th CORPS. JUNOT. [Clausel’s Division absent, guarding Communications.]
Solignac’s Division:
{15th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.[788]) 55 1,206
{86th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd batts.) 60 1,440
{65th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4th batts.[788]) 51 1,512
{Régiment Irlandais (1 batt.) 18 372
--- -----
184 4,530 4,714
For Artillery, Train, Sappers, &c., see Total of Army.
9th CORPS. DROUET.
Claparéde’s Division:
{54th Ligne (1 batt.) 14 270
{21st Léger ” 16 613
{28th Léger ” 17 457
{40th Ligne ” 19 500
{63rd Ligne ” 19 499
{88th Ligne ” 18 635
{64th Ligne ” 20 563
{100th Ligne ” 15 499
{103rd Ligne ” 18 524
--- -----
156 4,560 4,716
Conroux’s Division:
{16th Léger (1 batt.) 16 593
{9th Léger ” 21 739
{27th Léger ” 19 648
{8th Ligne ” 17 599
{24th Ligne ” 17 625
{45th Ligne ” 18 427
{94th Ligne ” 18 678
{95th Ligne ” 20 594
{96th Ligne ” 18 521
--- -----
164 5,424 5,588
Fournier’s Cavalry Brigade:
7th Chasseurs 12 270
13th Chasseurs 20 250
20th Chasseurs 16 226
-- ---
48 746 794
For Artillery, Sappers, Train, &c., see Total of Army.
Total of Corps 11,098
Montbrun’s Reserve Cavalry:
Cavrois’s Brigade:
3rd Dragoons 12 81
10th Dragoons 12 126
15th Dragoons 11 219
Ornano’s Brigade:
6th Dragoons 21 305
11th Dragoons 11 167
25th Dragoons 22 200
-- -----
89 1,098
Total Reserve 1,187
[787] The 5th battalion of the 82nd was in garrison at Almeida.
[788] One battalion of the 15th Ligne, 585 strong, and one battalion
of the 65th, 265 strong, and the Régiment de Prusse, 526 strong, were
left in garrison at Ciudad Rodrigo. The cavalry brigade of the corps,
composed of three provisional regiments of dragoons, was guarding
communications.
ARTILLERY.
Twelve batteries with 31 officers and 931 men appear in the state
of May 1 as totally destitute of horses, and were evidently left
in cantonments. Five batteries were taken into the field, with 20
officers, 410 men, and 425 horses.
ENGINEERS, SAPPERS, TRAIN, ÉQUIPAGES MILITAIRES.
The total strength of the Engineers and Sappers was 34 officers, 1,418 men.
Of the Train 17 officers, 1,175 men.
Of the Équipages Militaires 6 officers, 361 men.
How many of these were taken into the field it is impossible to say,
but if we take the same proportion as in the artillery, viz. about 30
per cent., the total would be about 17 officers and 880 men.
Total Army of Portugal: _Officers._ _Men._
2nd Corps, infantry and cavalry 445 10,619
6th Corps, infantry and cavalry 672 16,468
8th Corps, infantry 184 4,714
9th Corps, infantry and cavalry 368 10,730
Reserve Cavalry 89 1,098
Artillery 20 410
Sappers, Train, &c. 17 880
----- ------
Total 1,795 44,919
B. ARMY OF THE NORTH, MARSHAL BESSIÈRES
_Officers._ _Men._
Lepic’s Brigade of Guard-Cavalry:
Lancers 30 340
Chasseurs 13 222
Mamelukes 10 69
Grenadiers à cheval 12 185
-- ---
65 816
Wathier’s Light Cavalry Brigade:
11th Chasseurs 11 220
12th Chasseurs 9 172
24th Chasseurs 7 193
5th Hussars 7 165
-- ---
34 750
One battery of Artillery 3 70
_Officers._ _Men._ _Of all Ranks._
Total Army of the North 102 1,636
Total Army of Portugal 1,795 44,919
----- ------
General Total 1,897 46,555 48,452
N.B.--In Koch’s _Life of Masséna_ there is a table purporting to be
the strength of the Army of Portugal at Fuentes, and making it out to
be only about 40,000, excluding gunners, engineers, train, &c., or
presumably under 42,000 with them. This is not the May 1st return of
the Imperial muster-roll at the _Archives Nationales_, and I do not
know what authority it has. The figures given above are those of the
official return.
XIII
MASSÉNA’S ORDERS FOR FUENTES DE OÑORO
DISPOSITIONS POUR LA JOURNÉE DU 5
Le 6me Corps se mettra en mouvement demain à 2 heures du matin, à
l’exception de la 3me division, qui restera dans la position qu’elle
occupe: les deux autres divisions, 1re et 2de, se remueront au soir, en
deçà du grand mamelon de Nava de Aver, et en face de Pozzo Bello. Elles
seront prêtes à marcher perpendiculairement sur la ligne de l’ennemi;
les deux divisions auront leur artillerie avec elles, et se porteront à
la petite pointe du jour, en colonne par divisions, sur le village de
Pozzo Bello, pour attaquer l’ennemi dans la position qu’il occupe. La
division Ferey, qui occupe une partie du village de Fuentes d’Onoro,
fera ses dispositions comme si elle devrait attaquer l’ennemi sur ce
point, sauf cependant rien hasarder.
Le 8me Corps se portera sur les hauteurs de Fuentes, et suivra la 2de
division du 6me Corps, pour combattre dans le même ordre que ce corps;
il aura avec lui toute son artillerie.
Le 2me Corps observera par sa droite l’important débouché d’Alameda
qui conduit au Fort de la Conception: il fera cependant, pour seconder
l’attaque de l’armée, une démonstration générale sur la ligne; il
suivra l’ennemi dans tous ses mouvements, c’est-à-dire que si les
forces qu’il a devant lui se porteraient au secours du gros de l’armée
ennemie, qui est dans la direction de Fuentes d’Onoro, il le suivrait
dans sa marche, pour le prendre par sa gauche: tandis que le gros de
l’armée, qui l’aurait attaqué par Pozzo Bello, le prendrait par sa
droite. Le Général Reynier fera éclairer, s’il le juge nécessaire, par
la cavalerie la route du Fort de la Conception. S’il arrivait, ce qui
n’est pas à présumer, que l’attaque de Pozzo Bello n’a pas tout le
succès que l’on attend, et qu’elle fût repoussée, le Général Reynier
ferait sa retraite sur Gallegos. Le Général en chef, qui se trouvera
sur sa gauche, l’en ferait prévenir: mais ce serait toujours sur
Gallegos, dans le cas où il n’en recevrait pas d’ordre, et après s’être
bien assuré que le gros de l’armée serait en pleine retraite.
Le 9me Corps sera rendu avant le jour devant Fuentes d’Onoro, où il
se mettra en bataille sur deux lignes, laissant une grande distance
par régiment, pour donner à croire à l’ennemi que le 6me Corps occupe
toujours la même position.
L’armée est prévenue que le Prince Général en chef se trouvera au 8me
Corps.
M. le Général Montbrun, ayant sous ses ordres la réserve de dragons,
la brigade Fournier, et la brigade Wathier, se placera à la gauche du
6me Corps, pour tourner les positions de l’ennemi et le prendre par la
droite.
La Garde Impériale, qui est arrivée ce soir, coopérera demain à tous les
mouvements de l’armée.
MASSÉNA.
XIV
FRENCH LOSSES AT FUENTES DE OÑORO
N.B.--I have been unable to find any detailed table by regiments in the
_Archives de la Guerre_, or the _Archives Nationales_ at Paris, and can
only give the subjoined table of losses by corps.
COMBAT OF MAY 3RD.
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._
6th Corps (Divisions Ferey and
Marchand) 7 69 17 392 3 164 652
BATTLE OF MAY 5TH.
2nd Corps (all in 31st Léger) -- 3 3 46 -- -- 52
6th Corps (Divisions Ferey,
Marchand, Mermet) 12 95 47 757 -- 33 944
8th Corps (Division Solignac) -- 2 -- --- -- -- 2
9th Corps (Divisions Conroux
and Claparéde) 15 103 48 669 -- -- 835
Montbrun’s Cavalry 1 36 25 283 1 13 359
---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total 35 308 140 2,147 4 210 2,844
So far as this return can be tested by Martinien’s _Liste des Officiers
tués et blessés pendant les Guerres de l’Empire_, it appears to be very
fairly accurate; Martinien accounts for 171 casualties, the return for
179. In detail the figures compare as follows:--
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
2nd Corps, Martinien 0 4 In return 0 3 --
6th Corps, Martinien 22 63 In return 19 64 3
9th Corps, Martinien 14 41 In return 15 48 --
Cavalry, Martinien 1 26 In return 1 25 1
---- ----- ---- ----- ----
Totals 37 134 35 140 4
XV
THE ALLIED ARMY AT ALBUERA, AND ITS LOSSES, MAY 16, 1811.
I. BRITISH TROOPS
_Present._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ Loss._
2nd DIVISION (William Stewart):
{1/3rd Foot 27 728 4 212 14 234 2 177 643
Colborne’s { 2/31st Foot 20 398 -- 29 7 119 -- -- 155
Brigade {2/48th Foot 29 423 4 44 10 86 9 190 343
{2/66th Foot 24 417 3 52 12 104 -- 101 272
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total of Brigade 100 1,966 11 337 43 543 11 468 1,413
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
{29th Foot 31 476 5 75 12 233 -- 11 336
Hoghton’s {1/48th Foot 33 464 3 64 13 194 -- 6 280
Brigade {1/57th Foot 31 616 2 87 21 318 -- -- 428
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total of Brigade 95 1,556 10 226 46 745 -- 17 1,044
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
{2/28th Foot 28 491 -- 27 6 131 -- -- 164
Abercrombie’s {2/34th Foot 28 568 3 30 4 91 -- -- 128
Brigade {2/39th Foot 33 449 1 14 4 77 -- 2 98
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total of Brigade 89 1,508 4 71 14 299 -- 2 390
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Divisional Light Troops:
3 comps. 5/60th Foot 4 142 -- 2 1 18 -- -- 21
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total 2nd Division 288 5,172 25 636 104 1,605 11 487 2,868
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
4th DIVISION (Cole):
Myers’s {1/7th Fusiliers 27 687 -- 65 15 277 -- -- 357
Brigade {2/7th Fusiliers 28 540 2 47 13 287 -- -- 349
{1/23rd R. W. Fusiliers 41 692 2 74 11 246 -- 6 339
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total of Brigade 96 1,919 4 186 39 810 -- 6 1,045
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Kemmis’s Brigade, detachment of
one company each of 2/27th,
1/40th, 97th Foot 8 157 1 5 -- 14 -- -- 20
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total 4th Division 104 2,076 5 191 39 824 -- 6 1,065
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Alten’s Independent Brigade:
1st Light Batt. K.G.L. 23 565 -- 4 4 59 -- 2 69
2nd ditto 19 491 1 3 1 31 -- 1 37
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total of Brigade 42 1,056 1 7 5 90 -- 3 106
CAVALRY (Lumley):
De Grey’s {3rd Dragoon Guards 23 351 1 9 -- 9 -- 1 20
Brigade {4th Dragoons 30 357 -- 3 2 18 2 2 27
13th Light Dragoons 23 380 -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total Cavalry 76 1,088 1 12 2 28 2 3 48
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
ARTILLERY:
British (Batteries of Lefebure and
Hawker) 9 246 -- 3 1 10 -- 1 15
K.G.L. (Batteries of Cleeves and
Sympher) 10 282 -- -- 1 17 1 30 49
STAFF ? ? 1 -- 7 -- -- -- 8
----- ------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -------
Grand Total of British 529 9,920 33 849 159 2,574 14 530 4,159
II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS
_Officers _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total
and Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ Loss._
Harvey’s {11th Regt. (2 batts.) 1,154 -- 2 2 4 -- 5 13
Brigade {23rd Regt. (2 batts.) 1,201 1 3 1 14 -- -- 19
(4th {1st Batt. L.L.L. (1 batt.) 572 -- 66 6 89 -- 10 171
Division)
{2nd Line (2 batts.) 1,225 -- 3 -- 5 -- -- 8
Hamilton’s {14th Line (2 batts.) 1,204 -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
Division {4th Line (2 batts.) 1,271 -- 9 1 50 -- -- 60
{10th Line (2 batts.) 1,119 -- -- -- 11 -- -- 11
Collins’s {5th Line (2 batts.) 985 -- 10 4 36 -- 10 60
Brigade {5th Caçadores (1 batt.) 400 -- 5 -- 25 -- 1 31
{1st Regt. 327 -- -- -- -- -- --
Cavalry {7th Regt. 314 -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2
(Otway) {5th Regt. (1 squad.) 104 -- -- -- -- -- --
{8th Regt. (1 squad.) 104 -- -- -- -- -- --
Artillery (batteries of Arriaga
and Braun) 221 -- 2 -- 8 -- -- 10
Staff ? 1 -- 1 -- -- -- 2
-------- ---- ----- ---- ----- ---- ---- -----
Grand Total of Portuguese 10,201 2 100 15 246 -- 26 389
GRAND TOTAL OF BERESFORD’S ARMY
Infantry British, 8,738; Portuguese, 9,131 = 17,869
Cavalry British, 1,164; Portuguese, 849 = 2,013
Artillery British, 255; Portuguese, 221 = 476
--------
Grand Total 20,358 of all arms.
General Total of Losses: British, 4,159; Portuguese, 389 = 4,548.
III. SPANISH TROOPS[789]
_Present._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Total
(1) BLAKE’S ARMY _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ Loss._
VANGUARD DIVISION (Lardizabal):
Murcia (2 batts.), Canarias, 2nd of Leon, 107 2,291 4 59 13 215 291
Campo Mayor
3rd DIVISION (Ballasteros):
1st of Catalonia, Barbastro, Pravia, Lena,
Castropol, Cangas de Tineo, Infiesto 154 3,371 3 64 15 193 275
4th DIVISION (Zayas):
2nd and 4th Spanish Guards, Irlanda,
Patria, Toledo, Legion Estranjera,
4th Walloon Guards, Ciudad Real 197 4,685 -- 106 26 549 681[790]
CAVALRY (Loy):
Santiago, Husares de Castilla, Granaderos,
Escuadron de Instruccion 93 1,072 -- 7 2 31 40
ARTILLERY (1 battery) 7 96 -- 2 -- 7 9
STAFF ? ? 2 -- 9 -- 11
----- -------- ---- ----- ---- ------- -------
Total of Blake’s troops 558 11,515 9 238 65 995 1,307
----- -------- ---- ----- ---- ------- -------
(2) CASTAÑOS’S ARMY
Carlos de España’s INFANTRY:
3 batts., Rey, Zamora, Voluntarios
de Navarra, 1 company Sappers 57 1,721 -- -- 4 29 33
Penne Villemur’s CAVALRY:
Detachments of seven regiments,
none over 1 squadron strong 87 634 -- 11 3 14 28
ARTILLERY (1 battery) 4 58 -- -- -- -- --
----- -------- ---- ----- ---- ------- -------
Total of Castaños’s Troops 148 2,413 -- 11 7 43 61
----- -------- ---- ----- ---- ------- -------
Grand Total of Spaniards 706 13,928 9 249 72 1,038 1,368
GRAND TOTAL OF THE ALLIED ARMY
British Present of all arms, 10,449 Losses, 4,159
Portuguese ” ” 10,201 ” 389
Spaniards ” ” 14,634 ” 1,368
-------- -------
Total 35,284 5,916
[789] The return of losses is confused, there being mixtures of
units, and some errors between officers and rank and file. It
seems unlikely that Zayas’s division had 26 officers wounded and
none killed. I have endeavoured to reconstruct items as far as
possible. For the confused table see Arteche, vol. x. p. 524.
[790] Of this 681 no less than 98 killed and 517 wounded are in the
four battalions of the Spanish Guards and Irlanda, which fought so long
against Girard’s division. The other five battalions only lost 66 men
between them.
XVI
SOULT’S ARMY AT ALBUERA, AND ITS LOSSES
[The strength from a return of May 1st, filed under June 1st, in the
_Archives Nationales_. The losses from a return in the _Archives de la
Guerre_, dated July 19th.]
_Present._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ Losses._
INFANTRY[791]
5th CORPS.
1st Division (Girard):
34th Line (2nd and 3rd batts.) 23 930 4 104[792] 13 298 -- -- 419
40th Line (1st and 2nd batts.) 35 778 4 35 9 226 1 73 348
64th Line (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 50 1,539 5 99 18 361 -- 168 651
88th Line (2nd and 3rd batts.) 21 878 -- -- 5 253 6 141[793] 405
[792] The 34th regiment returned, as is clear, all its missing as
killed.
[793] The 88th regiment returned, as is clear, all its killed as
missing.
2nd Division (Gazan):
21st Léger (2nd and 3rd batts.) 43 745 3 61 11 154 2 24 255
100th Line (1st and 2nd batts.) 33 705 4 50 8 152 2 51 267
28th Léger (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 62 1,305 7 53 10 313 1 112 496
103rd Line (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 38 1,252 4 48 10 148 3 74 287
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total 5th Corps 305 8,132 31 450 84 1,905 15 643 3,128
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
Werlé’s Brigade:
12th Léger (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 62 2,102 3 108 14 511 1 132 769
55th Line (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 58 1,757 4 68 6 235 -- 38 351
58th Line (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 55 1,587 6 23 15 258 2 24 328
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
Brigade Total 175 5,446 13 199 35 1,004 3 194 1,448
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
Godinot’s Brigade:
16th Léger (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 49 1,624 2 39 7 321 -- 12 381
51st Line (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 65 2,186 -- 2 -- 1 -- -- 3
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
Brigade Total 114 3,810 2 41 7 322 -- 12 384
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
372
_Grenadiers Réunis_ of 45th, 63rd,
95th Line, of 1st Corps, and 4th (10 officers
Poles of 4th Corps (11 comps.)[794] 33 1,000 Only gross total of losses given. and 362 men)
----- ------- ---- ----- ---- ------- ---- ----- -------
Total Infantry 627 18,388 46 690 126 3,230 18 849 5,332
CAVALRY (Latour-Maubourg).
Briche’s Brigade:
2nd Hussars 23 282 1 4 3 57 -- 8 73
10th Hussars 24 238 1 3 4 21 -- 3 32
21st Chasseurs 21 235 -- 3 3 19 -- -- 25
Bron’s Brigade:
4th Dragoons 21 385 3 27 1 38 -- 1 70
20th Dragoons 22 244 1 6 3 10 1 4 25
26th Dragoons 27 394 1 5 2 12 -- 1 21
Bouvier des Éclats’s Brigade:
14th Dragoons 17 299 -- 6 1 17 -- -- 24
17th Dragoons 17 297 -- 12 3 29 -- 1 45
27th Dragoons 14 235 -- 2 3 11 -- 3 19
Unattached Cavalry:
1st Lancers of the Vistula 28 563 1 41 9 78 1 -- 130
27th Chasseurs 22 409 -- 7 2 11 1 5 26
4th Spanish Chasseurs 14 181 -- 2 -- 4 -- -- 6
----- -------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -----
Cavalry Total 250 3,762 8 118 34 307 3 26 496
----- -------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -----
ARTILLERY GÉNIE TRAIN:
Of 5th Corps 18 590 1 19 3 72 -- -- 95
Of other Units 25 600 No returns whatever. ?
ÉTAT-MAJOR ? ? 5 -- 8 -- -- -- 13
----- -------- ---- ----- ----- ------- ---- ----- -----
Total of Army 920 23,340 60 827 171 3,610 21 875 5,936
Return of casualties is signed Mocquery, 19 Juillet 1811.
Total present, 24,260. Total losses, 5,936.
[791] The 1/34th, 3/40th, 1/88th, 1/21st Léger, 3/100th were separated
from their regiments and garrisoned Badajoz.
[792] The 34th regiment returned, as is clear, all its missing as
killed.
[793] The 88th regiment returned, as is clear, all its killed as
missing.
[794] This assemblage of Grenadier companies can be identified, as to
its units, by the fact that in Martinien’s lists of killed and wounded,
we find names of officers of the 45th, 63rd, 95th, and 4th Poles, none
of which were present at Albuera. He accounts from these regiments for
4 officers killed and 9 wounded (45th 5 officers, 63rd 2 officers, 95th
1 officer, Poles 5 officers).
N.B.--The losses cannot be quite complete. Not only is the return
for artillery and engineers, &c., for all units except the 5th Corps
missing, but Martinien’s lists, which are absolutely secure evidence,
since they give the name and regiment of every officer hit, show much
larger totals than this report, 362 casualties instead of 241. This
enormous difference of 121 casualties among officers, reported in the
regimental lists, but ignored by Soult, cannot be explained away by
adding the 21 prisoners to his total of 241, granting that all the
prisoners were wounded. This still leaves a balance of 100 unaccounted
for. The details of difference and of total casualties are:--
_Soult._ _Martinien._
Staff 13 27
34th 17 15
40th 14 23
64th 23 26
88th 11 12
21st Léger 16 13
100th 14 20
28th Léger 18 30
103rd Ligne 17 18
12th Léger 18 29
55th 10 14
58th 23 24
16th Léger 9 17
Grenadiers 10 13
2nd Hussars 4 5
10th Hussars 5 7
21st Chasseurs 3 5
4th Dragoons 4 11
20th Dragoons 5 12
26th Dragoons 3 3
14th Dragoons 1 1
17th Dragoons 3 6
27th Dragoons 3 5
1st Lancers 11 14
27th Chasseurs 3 3
4th Spanish
Chasseurs -- 3
Artillery
Génie Train 4 6
--- ---
660 899
See notes in text above, p. 395.
XVII
STRENGTH OF THE SPANISH ARMIES IN THE SUMMER OF 1811
By the kindness of Commandant Figueras of the Department of Archives
in the War Ministry at Madrid, I am able to give the following sets of
figures for the armies in the summer campaign of 1811. Unfortunately
there is none for the Army of Catalonia (‘1st Army’ or ‘Army of the
Right’) whose main body was destroyed at Tarragona in July. The others
work out as follows:--
2ND ARMY, OR ARMY OF VALENCIA. General Charles O’Donnell.
_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division: Major-General
José Miranda 192 4,863 = 5,055 present under arms.
2nd Division: Major-General
Conde de Romré 108 2,892 = 3,000 ”
3rd Division: Major-General
Luis Bassecourt 47 2,006 = 2,053 ”
4th Division: Major-General
José Obispo 226 4,933 = 5,159 ”
Flying Column of the Empecinado ? 3,220 = 3,220 ”
Reserve (new levies):
Major-General B. Acuña 59 3,640 = 3,699 ”
Artillery 22 472 = 494 ”
Engineers 10 218 = 228 ”
---- ------ ------
June 1st, Field Army. Total 664 22,244 = 22,908 ”
Garrisons of Saguntum,
Oropesa, Peniscola 55 1,944 = 1,999 ”
N.B.--The cavalry regiments were not brigaded, but distributed among
the divisions, each having one regiment, save Miranda’s division, which
had two. Total about 2,565 sabres.
3RD ARMY, OR ARMY OF MURCIA. General Manuel Freire.
_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division: Brigadier-Gen.
A. La Cuadra 163 3,852 = 4,015 present under arms.
2nd Division: Brigadier-Gen.
Juan Creagh 166 4,276 = 4,442 ”
3rd Division: Brigadier-Gen.
Antonio Sanz 146 3,074 = 3,220 ”
1st Cavalry Division:
Brigadier-Gen. M. Ladron 129 885 = 1,014 ”
2nd ditto: Brigadier-Gen. V.
Osorio 80 629 = 709 ”
Artillery 35 751 = 786 ”
Engineers 22 245 = 267 ”
---- ------ ------
June 1st, Total Field Army 741 13,712 = 14,453 ”
Garrison of Cartagena 116 2,064 = 2,180 ”
5TH ARMY, OR ARMY OF ESTREMADURA. General Francisco Xavier Castaños.
_Officers._ _Men._