army in August-September 1811 is given in Estalella’s _El
Batallon de Hostalrich_ (Madrid, 1909), an account of the
fortunes of Manso’s new _Cazadores de Cataluña_ in 1811-14.
When the enemy was under the delusion that with the fall of Montserrat
and Figueras the back of the resistance of the Principality had been
broken, Lacy began to take the offensive. On September 11-12, aided by
English ships, he drove the French out of the Medas Islands, at the
mouth of the Ter, and built on the largest of them a fort which gave
him a secure point of communication with the Mediterranean Squadron.
But this was a side-issue: in October he accomplished something far
more important. Descending on the line of garrisons by which the
French kept open the road from Barcelona to Lerida, he took 200 men
at Igualada on October 4, captured a large convoy near Cervera three
days later, and on October 11 took that town with 645 prisoners, and
the neighbouring Belpuig with 150 more on October 14. The chain of
forts was broken, and to the intense joy of all Catalonia the French
dismantled the monastery of Montserrat and evacuated the Holy Mountain.
Half of Suchet’s work in the summer had been undone. A few days later
Macdonald was recalled to Paris (October 28); he was the third marshal
whose reputation got no profit from his Catalonian campaign--his
failure was as bad as that of Augereau, and he had not even got the
small credit that St. Cyr won in battle. The command of the 7th Corps
fell to General Decaen.
SECTION XXIX
WELLINGTON’S AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1811
CHAPTER I
WELLINGTON’S BLOCKADE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1811
When Marmont, before the end of the second week of July, had taken his
departure from the valley of the Guadiana, and had begun to disperse
his army in cantonments on both sides of the Tagus, Wellington was
able to review his own situation at leisure, and to think out a new
plan of operations. The Army of Portugal had settled down in a central
position, from which it could transfer itself with equal facility
to reinforce the 5th Corps in Estremadura, if the Allies should
make another move against Badajoz, or the troops of Dorsenne in the
kingdom of Leon, if any attempt were made to strike at Ciudad Rodrigo
and Salamanca. Marmont had placed one division (Foy’s) and a cavalry
brigade at Truxillo, to keep up the communication across the mountains
with the 5th Corps. He had established his own head quarters at
Navalmoral, near Almaraz, and had three divisions[675] in his immediate
neighbourhood along the Tagus. The remaining two, which completed his
army, were placed, one at Plasencia, the other in the province of
Avila[676], somewhat more to the north, so as to command the passes
into the kingdom of Leon, by which the army would have to move to join
the Army of the North, supposing that Wellington took the offensive on
the Agueda and the Tormes. In this position the Marshal remained, in an
expectant attitude, for some ten weeks. The period of repose was very
grateful to him, since he had taken his army to the relief of Badajoz
in haste, before it was fully reorganized, and was anxiously expecting
the arrival of the drafts and convalescents whom he had left behind
him, and--what was still more important--a great supply of remounts
to strengthen his depleted cavalry, and of gun teams to bring his
batteries up to the total of eighty pieces, which had been prescribed
by the Emperor as his proper complement. He was aware that orders had
been issued from Paris that the Army of the North was to make over
to him 500 artillery horses, and that nearly a thousand cavalry were
coming from Bayonne, whither the 3rd and 4th squadrons of each of his
dragoon regiments had been sent back in May to pick up new chargers.
General Vandermaesen, as he was informed by a dispatch from Berthier
dated July 10th, was to be at Burgos by August 15th, with 850 remounted
dragoons, 1,100 artillery horses, and 6,000 drafts and recruits for the
infantry. But, as so often happened in Spain, this great reinforcement
had not turned up even by the middle of September; for though the
troops had started from Bayonne, great numbers of them were detained on
the way, not only by Dorsenne, but by mere post-commanders and chiefs
of small garrisons, who presumed to lay hands on them because they
thought themselves threatened by some movement of the Navarrese or
Cantabrian guerrilleros[677]. Vandermaesen got to Burgos, but could not
collect more than half of the column which he was directed to take to
the Army of Portugal, and so did not start. The divisions in the field
received no appreciable reinforcements till September was far advanced.
Meanwhile Marmont used the troops which lay immediately round his head
quarters to construct an important group of permanent fortifications
about Almaraz, the chief passage of the Tagus. The flying-bridge there
was replaced by a strong bridge of boats, protected at each end by
a closed work, partly in stone, partly in earth; the one was called
Fort Ragusa, the other Fort Napoleon. In addition, the defile in the
mountains, by which the road descends on to Almaraz, was protected by
a third structure called Fort Mirabete, from the neighbouring village.
This group of works gave the French a stronger hold on the central
Tagus than they had ever possessed before, and the permanent bridge
was invaluable, since it permitted troops to go south or north at a
much greater rate than had been possible when, as hitherto, they had to
be ferried over on a mere pontoon worked with ropes. Orders came from
Paris that a similar passage, protected by a fortified post, was to be
established at Alcantara, sixty miles further down the river, where
the broken Roman bridge[678] invited repair. But this was quite beyond
Marmont’s power--the position was far too near the Portuguese border
to be maintained save by a large garrison, which would have required
revictualling at frequent intervals, for the neighbouring region,
always desolate, was now absolutely depeopled. When Wellington had
large bodies of troops at Castello Branco and Portalegre, while there
was no solid force of the Army of Portugal nearer than Navalmoral, it
would have been too risky to expose a detachment at Alcantara. The
ruined remains of the mediaeval fortress there, which had been knocked
to pieces in the old War of the Spanish Succession, could not have been
patched up so as to resist artillery of the lightest sort.
[675] These divisions were those of Maucune, Sarrut, and Ferey.
[676] Clausel’s division in the province of Avila, Brennier at
Plasencia.
[677] For an interesting account of the experiences of an officer
sent to scrape together drafts and convalescents despite of the
petty governors, see the diary of Sprünglin, pp. 484-5. He had
special difficulties with Thiébault, the Governor of Salamanca.
[678] Correspondence from Berthier printed in Marmont’s
_Autobiography_, iv. p. 122.
Marmont had the greatest difficulty in maintaining his army in the
region which it now occupied. The western part of the kingdom of New
Castile was (as Wellington had found in the Talavera campaign) almost
incapable of feeding a large force. The Vera of Plasencia was the only
district which sufficed for itself even in time of peace. Normally
food would have been drawn from the direction of Toledo, Aranjuez, and
Madrid. But this district was in the occupation of the Army of the
Centre, and King Joseph protested in the most lively fashion at being
expected to furnish all the supplies for Marmont’s force, over which he
was denied control, and with which he seems to have felt himself little
concerned[679]. New Castile barely sufficed for his own needs, and when
an Imperial decree proclaimed that the districts of Toledo, Avila, and
Talavera were removed from his sphere of command and placed at the
disposition of the Army of Portugal, he considered that his brother
had broken the pledges which had been made to him during his short
visit to Paris, for in this bargain it had been stipulated[680] that
armies entering his sphere of activity came under his command. Before
evacuating the ceded districts, he withdrew all the movable stores
and munitions; Marmont declares that at Toledo the royal officials
sold all the corn in the magazines to private persons, just before the
arrival of his own commissaries, and handed over empty vaults to the
new-comers[681].
[679] See Joseph to Marmont in the correspondence of the latter,
iv. pp. 150-6.
[680] See above, p. 219.
[681] Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 58.
Even with the resources of the provinces of Avila and Toledo at its
disposition, the Army of Portugal only lived from hand to mouth, and
was unable to accumulate magazines of any importance. The transport
of the food-stuffs was the great problem; the army had practically
no vehicles left--as Marmont observed in one of his dispatches to
Berthier, he had received over from Masséna about ten waggons only--all
the rest that had belonged to the three corps that had marched into
Portugal had been left behind on the mountain roads between Santarem
and Sabugal in March[682]. Country carts might have been requisitioned
in the valley of the Tagus at an early stage of the war, but by 1811
they had entirely disappeared, along with the oxen that had drawn them.
The population had mostly vanished, and the fraction that remained
was in a condition of abject misery from Talavera as far as the
Portuguese border. Marmont calls the country from Almaraz to Merida
‘a horrible wilderness[683].’ He calculated that the whole of the
Avila-Plasencia-Talavera region could barely feed 15,000 men, and that
the rest of his army only subsisted by drawing on the comparatively
intact Toledo district.
[682] Intercepted dispatch from Marmont to Berthier of August
5th, printed in _Supplementary Wellington Dispatches_, xiii. p.
690.
[683] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 55.
Of all this trouble on the part of his immediate adversary Wellington
was aware, through intercepted dispatches, as well as through the
reports sent in to him by the Spaniards. And the facts that Marmont
had been forced to disperse his army into cantonments extending from
Truxillo to Avila, and had no magazines of any size, formed important
data in his calculations. It would clearly take many days to assemble
the whole Army of Portugal--whether it were required on the Guadiana or
on the Tormes. At the same time Marmont, by his march in June to join
Soult, had shown himself a general of energy and decision, and it must
be taken for granted that, if there was good reason for him to move, he
would do so, as quickly as the difficulties of supply would permit him.
His force, which Wellington very accurately calculated at about 30,000
infantry and 3,500 horse, or some 36,000 men of all arms[684], was the
central fact in all future operations. Clearly it would be moved south
or north whenever necessary.
[684] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, vii. p. 115.
As to Soult, he had now so much on his hands in Andalusia that he was
not to be feared for the present. It was known that he had left nothing
in Estremadura save the 5th Corps, now under Drouet, and five or six
regiments of dragoons. The troops drawn from Cordova and Granada had
been taken back to Andalusia. But two divisions were hunting Blake and
Ballasteros in the Condado de Niebla. The disposable remainder must be
very small. Soult therefore might be neglected as an enemy capable of
taking the offensive. If, however, the Anglo-Portuguese army were to
invade Andalusia, an operation which some of Wellington’s subordinates
had suggested to him as a possibility[685], the Duke of Dalmatia would
certainly raise the siege of Cadiz, probably abandon Granada, and march
against the Allies with a force which, including the 5th Corps, would
be 60,000 strong. Wherefore offensive action in this quarter could not
be thought of[686], all the more so because Marmont, if nothing was
left opposite him on the Tagus, might come down by Merida, threaten
Elvas and Abrantes, and perhaps take the Allies in the rear after they
had crossed the Sierra Morena.
[685] D’Urban in his diary often harps upon this project.
[686] ‘We should meet in Andalusia the whole force which lately
obliged us to raise the siege of Badajoz, with the addition to
it of the force which was left before Cadiz.... An attempt to
relieve Cadiz would certainly not succeed.’ _Dispatches_, vii. p.
118.
Nor was the idea of renewing the siege of Badajoz, during Soult’s
absence, tempting. The place could certainly be beset; but in ten
days or so Marmont and the 12,000 men of the 5th Corps would have
united to relieve it, and their joint force would be nearly equal in
total numbers to the Anglo-Portuguese and superior to them in cavalry.
‘Any success which we might derive from a general action, to which I
might bring the Army of Portugal and the 5th Corps, would not be very
decisive; on the other hand the loss which we would sustain by the
heat of the weather, and by the length of the marches which we should
be obliged to make would be very great[687].’ But the main objection
to a renewal of the siege of Badajoz was not the prospect of a pitched
battle, but the impossibility of sitting down to a leaguer in the
valley of the Guadiana at a time when it was known to be absolutely
pestilential. Already on the Caya the army had begun to suffer from
the well-known Guadiana fever, and its spread had only been stopped by
moving the troops back to the healthy towns in the highlands.
[687] From the same letter to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, vii.
118.
Wellington therefore ruled out of the list of possible operations any
movement to the south of the Tagus. There remained only the chance of
making another attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo, and from the end of July
onward this was the project which was engrossing his attention. To
make a move in this direction would certainly draw Marmont from the
Tagus, and cause him to unite with the Army of the North for the relief
of the fortress. But Wellington thought that he would prefer this
combination among his enemies to the other one, which would ensue if he
were to make his stroke in Estremadura. He gave three reasons to Lord
Liverpool for the preference[688]: the first was that in a campaign on
the frontiers of Leon he would have the assistance of all the militia
of northern Portugal for subsidiary operations. The second was that
the ground would be much more in his favour--he would have behind him
not the broad plains of the Alemtejo, but the rugged spurs of the
Serra da Estrella, where strong positions abounded, and where the
numerous French cavalry would be as useless as they had proved during
the campaign of Bussaco in the preceding year. The third advantage was
that to draw Marmont into Leon separated him from Soult by the whole
breadth of central Spain, and disconnected the operations of the two
main French forces. For the Army of the North was a less formidable
body than the Army of Andalusia, because it was scattered over an even
greater extent of territory. Nor were its distractions less than those
of Soult: the Galicians and Asturians, Longa, Porlier, and Mina, and
all the guerrilleros of Old Castile, were in existence to keep this
French force constantly harassed. In their way they were more effective
as irritants than Blake, Ballasteros, and the Murcians had proved to be
in the south.
[688] See the all-important dispatch of July 18, in which these
three points are set forth. _Dispatches_, vii. 118.
Wellington was not at this moment, the end of July, aware that the Army
of the North was about to receive reinforcements, which would make
it far more formidable in the autumn. He could not yet know that the
divisions of Souham, Reille, and Caffarelli were about to be thrown
across the Pyrenees, and that the first of them would be in the front
line during the operations of September. Even by August he was only
aware in a vague fashion[689] that more French troops were expected at
Vittoria from Bayonne, and supposed them to be about 10,000 or 11,000
strong[690], while they were really three full divisions of over 30,000
men. By the end of the month he was better informed--but by that time
his operations had begun, and it was too late to make a change[691].
[689] _Dispatches_, vii. 184: ‘I should imagine that the reports
have some foundation.’ August 9th.
[690] _Dispatches_, vii. p. 194. August 14th.
[691] By August 21st he has heard that the 5th Léger and other
new regiments from the interior of France are over the Pyrenees.
_Dispatches_, vii. p. 215.
Even from the first, however, Wellington was disposed to believe that
no great results would follow from a move against Ciudad Rodrigo. ‘I
am tempted to try this enterprise,’ he wrote to Lord Liverpool before
he had begun his march, ‘but I beg your Lordship to observe that I may
be obliged to abandon it. When the relative force of the two armies
will be so nearly balanced as in this, and particularly in an operation
in the Peninsula of Spain, it is impossible for me to foresee all the
events which may lead to this result. But the arrival of reinforcements
to the enemy, or further information, which may show them to be
stronger than I now imagine, or a falling off in the strength of our
army owing to sickness, would necessarily oblige me to abandon the
enterprise[692].’ Later comments are in the same cautious tone: on
August 9 Wellington thinks it ‘more than ever doubtful whether he will
be in a situation to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo’--but the
movement may afford an opportunity of striking an advantageous blow,
and cause the enemy, at least, to draw off troops from corners of the
Peninsula where they are badly wanted.
[692] _Dispatches_, vii. 119, July 18th.
Long before the army began to move towards the Agueda and the frontiers
of Leon, Wellington had given the preliminary order[693] which
committed him to the project of attacking Rodrigo. He had at last
received from England the heavy battering-train of siege artillery,
which would have been invaluable in May for the breaching of Badajoz.
It was on shipboard in Lisbon harbour. He directed it to be taken round
by sea to Oporto, sent up the Douro in boats as far as Lamego--where
lay the limit of river navigation--and then to be sent forward by
detachments to Trancoso, in the northern Beira, where he intended
to establish his base dépôt. Nearly 400 pairs of draught bullocks
and about 900 country carts were to be collected at Lamego for the
transport. The charge of the whole operation was given to Alexander
Dickson, whose energetic management of the very inefficient siege
artillery at Badajoz had inspired Wellington with a strong belief in
his resourcefulness, and his power of getting the largest possible
amount of work out of the Portuguese, military and civilians alike.
[693] It is contained in the ‘Memorandum for Colonels Frampton
and Fletcher’ of 19th July, dated the day after the dispatch to
Lord Liverpool which sets forth the whole project.
Dickson started at once for Oporto, where he found two companies of
British artillery[694] which had been sent from Lisbon, and picked up
somewhat later 300 Portuguese gunners, who were also placed at his
disposition. With their aid he began shipping up to Lamego the guns and
ammunition from the transports. So long as the transport was by water,
matters went slowly but easily, but the land voyage from Lamego onwards
turned out a heart-rending business, from the badness of the roads and
the difficulty of collecting cattle for draught. Dickson prevailed upon
Wellington in the end to make Villa da Ponte, rather than Trancoso,
his central dépôt--the town in the hills proving less convenient than
the large village fifteen miles further north. All through August and
September material was accumulating at Villa da Ponte, but it was
never sent forward, because, as the campaign worked out, no regular
siege of Ciudad Rodrigo ever became possible. Wellington would not
show his battering-train until it was certain that he could turn it to
good use, and kept it hidden far to the rear of his fighting-line. It
was only gradually that part of it began to be moved up to Almeida,
ostensibly to serve for the re-armament of that fortress, where the
damage done by the two explosions carried out by Brennier and Pack had
been repaired. It was not to be till December that the guns landed at
Oporto in August were employed. But all through the autumn Wellington’s
movements were greatly influenced by the fact that he had now a large
and efficient siege-train ready, in a position from which it could be
sent forward the moment that a fair opportunity should offer itself.
It was the existence of Dickson’s park at Villa da Ponte, as much, or
more, than any other factor in the situation, that kept Wellington on
the frontiers of Leon watching for his chance. It would seem that his
caution was justified--the French never quite realized that he was
ready to attack Rodrigo in the most effective style, when they should
give him the opportunity that he lacked, by dispersing their armies in
a way which rendered rapid concentration impossible.
[694] Bredin’s and Glubb’s, which had long been lying at Lisbon
without horses, and had taken no part in the field operations of
1810 and 1811. Holcombe’s battery was soon afterwards substituted
for Glubb’s. See Dickson’s _Diary_ (ed. Leslie) for months of
August-October 1811.
The march of the seven divisions which were destined for service on
the Agueda and the Azava began in the first week of August. The Light
Division and Arentschildt’s cavalry, moving up from Castello Branco,
were at Sabugal on the 8th and occupied Martiago, beyond the Agueda
and close to Rodrigo, on the 10th. On the following day Wellington in
person led a reconnaissance right up to the walls of the fortress, and
drove in all the French outposts. The blockade was then established
by the Light Division on the left bank of the Agueda, and the 3rd
Division on the right, the head quarters of the former being at Carpio,
those of the latter at Martiago. The road north-eastward to Salamanca
was only cut by means of cavalry posts and Julian Sanchez’s guerrilla
bands, and the infantry did not approach within some miles of Rodrigo.
Wellington’s purpose was merely to prevent the entry of provisions into
the place: he had no intention of drawing close up to it and opening
a siege, till he should have learnt that his battering-train should
have reached Trancoso: and it would obviously be a matter of many weeks
before the guns got up from Oporto. It might perhaps be argued that it
would have been better not to demonstrate at all against Rodrigo, or
to call the attention of Marmont and Dorsenne in this direction, till
there was some possibility of opening siege-operations. For to famish
the garrison must infallibly lead to a concentration of the enemy at
Salamanca for its relief, and draw together a large army. Marmont was
less dangerous in his scattered cantonments about the Tagus than with
his forces massed on the Tormes. And there was little hope of reducing
Rodrigo by famine alone; clearly the enemy would mass and fight, rather
than allow it to fall unaided[695].
[695] Wellington saw this clearly enough; he writes to Lord
Liverpool on August 27: ‘If we cannot maintain this blockade,
the enemy must bring 50,000 men to raise it, and then they can
undertake nothing else this year, for they must still continue to
watch Rodrigo, and we shall so far save the cause. Meanwhile if
they offer me a favourable opportunity of bringing any of them to
action, I shall take it.’ _Dispatches_, viii. p. 232.
Meanwhile Wellington moved his head quarters to Fuente Guinaldo,
sixteen miles south of Ciudad Rodrigo, on August 12th, and kept them
there till September 24th. The divisions not engaged in the blockade
were cantoned at various points to the rear. The first division lay
about Penamacor: it was no longer commanded by Spencer, who had so
long led it. He had gone home, ostensibly on sick leave, really
because he was annoyed that General Graham had recently been ordered
up from Cadiz, and was for the future to take charge of the whole left
wing of the army whenever the Commander-in-Chief was absent. This
responsibility had hitherto fallen to Spencer, and Wellington was not
alone in thinking that he had not discharged it over well[696]. The
arrival of Graham (August 8th) was welcomed by all ranks, and for the
future he assumed charge, nominally of the 1st Division, really of all
the troops in the north which were not actually under the master’s eye.
At any rate Graham could never be accused of dullness of apprehension
or indecision, the two charges habitually made against Spencer by
Wellington himself, no less than by many diarists of the time.
[696] Mr. Fortescue sends me the subjoined note on Spencer from
a suppressed letter of Wellington to Pole at Apsley House, not
to be found in any of the editions of the _Dispatches_. ‘The
person who is now here as second in command is very unfit for
his situation. He is a good executive officer, but has no mind,
and is incapable of forming any opinions of his own. He is the
centre of all the vulgar and foolish opinions of the day. Thus
you are aware that, from former experiences, I cannot depend
upon him for a moment, for anything. He gives his opinion upon
every subject, changes it with the wind, and if any misfortune
occurs, or the act recommended by him is disapproved of, there is
no effort to be looked for from him.’ This verdict does not much
differ, save in strength of expression, from the opinion of minor
contemporaries, such as Tomkinson and Stepney, e. g. ‘Sir Brent
Spencer, a zealous gallant officer, had no great military genius.
He was anxious and fidgety when there was nothing to do, but once
under fire looked like a philosopher solving a problem--perfectly
cool and self-possessed.’ (Stepney’s _Leaves from a Diary of an
Officer of the Guards_, p. 80.) See also in Stepney for notes as
to Spencer’s resentment at his supersession by Graham. This has
value, as the diarist was a favourite of the general, who had
offered to make him his aide-de-camp.
Not far off from the 1st Division was the 4th, under Cole, at Pedrogão,
twenty miles north-east from Castello Branco. The 5th Division,
meanwhile, lay at Perales, Payo, and Navas Frias watching the passes
of the Sierra de Gata, in case Marmont’s division at Plasencia should
make an unexpected forward movement towards Leon by the shortest route.
The 7th Division was at Villar Mayor near Sabugal and Fuente Guinaldo.
Lastly, the 6th Division, more to the left and forming the northernmost
section of the army, was cantoned between the Coa and the lower
Agueda, from Nava de Aver as far as the bridge of Barba del Puerco.
Of the cavalry, Alten’s brigade[697] was covering the Light and 3rd
Divisions in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, while the others, De Grey’s[698],
Slade’s[699], and Anson’s[700] were watching the frontier eastward
from Castello Branco, with observing parties in the passes but the main
bodies placed some way to the rear. The head quarters of the second
brigade was at Soita near Sabugal, that of the last-named at Idanha
Nova. These cantonments, it will be observed, were somewhat scattered,
there being no less than eighty miles between Barba del Puerco in the
north and Penamacor in the south, but Wellington calculated that he
would always have long notice of any concentration of the enemy in his
front, and three marches would suffice to unite the army on its centre,
between Fuente Guinaldo and Alfayates, or four to concentrate it on a
wing, if the French (a thing not very probable) should show signs of
operating either south of the Sierra de Gata or on the lower Agueda.
[697] 11th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars K.G.L.
[698] 3rd Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons. Properly belonging to
Erskine’s cavalry division in the Alemtejo, but borrowed.
[699] 1st Royals and 12th Light Dragoons.
[700] 14th and 16th Light Dragoons.
It should be noted that about this time Wellington, for the first time
since 1810, obtained the assistance of a Spanish force on the Beira
frontier. General Castaños, busy in reorganizing the ruined Army of
Estremadura, sent Carlos de España with the cadres of several infantry
regiments to the frontier of Leon, to fill them up with recruits from
the province of Salamanca. The rest of his troops, under Morillo
and Penne Villemur[701], were kept in Estremadura and continued to
co-operate with Hill. But Carlos de España fixed himself at Ledesma,
where he joined hands with the great partisan Julian Sanchez, and
soon collected some 3,000 men, who though useless for action, being
raw and not properly furnished with uniforms or arms, yet served to
hold a position in front of the lower Agueda, and gave much trouble to
Thiébault, the governor of Salamanca, by their sallies and incursions
into his district.
[701] For whose actions see section xxix. p. 597.
For some weeks after the arrival of the army on the Beira frontier
there was little stirring. The fact that Ciudad Rodrigo had been
cut off from communication with Salamanca did not at first provoke
the French to action, for the place was in no immediate danger of
starvation. A large convoy had been thrown into the place only two
days before the blockade was formed, and it was known that the allied
army had no siege-train in its company. Throughout the month of August
Dorsenne was much more troubled by the operations of the Galicians than
by Wellington’s demonstration, while Marmont, knowing that Rodrigo was
provisioned up to October[702], saw no reason for moving till it should
be drawing nearer to the end of its resources. It was only about the
middle of September that he got tardy news that there was a siege-train
making its way up from Oporto, and that the British divisions behind
the Agueda were making gabions and fascines. He then was stimulated
to activity, and concerted a junction with Dorsenne without further
delay--of which more hereafter. In August he found full occupation in
the organization of the provinces of New Castile, which the Emperor had
handed over to him, and was more worried by the difficulty of raising
taxes and collecting magazines, and by incessant wrangles with King
Joseph’s officials, than by military difficulties[703]. All that he did
was to move his head quarters to the neighbourhood of Plasencia[704],
and to shift some of the brigades cantoned along the Tagus to the
north of that river, in view of the fact that a march to relieve and
revictual Ciudad Rodrigo would ultimately become necessary. Foy’s
division was kept, however, at Truxillo--far to the south--till the
middle of September, in order that touch might not be lost with Drouet
and the Army of Andalusia. The Marshal, very rightly, scouted the idea,
which some of his subordinates had formed, that Wellington’s appearance
on the Beira frontier might portend a dash at Salamanca[705]. To gain
some further knowledge of the disposition of the Anglo-Portuguese he
sent out several cavalry reconnaissances from Plasencia towards the
Sierra de Gata. They found British outposts all along the passes, and
could not get forward, though one party succeeded in capturing a picket
of the 11th Light Dragoons at San Martin de Trebejos, near the Puerto
de Perales, on August 14th.
[702] Marmont to Berthier, _Correspondance_, p. 165, in the 4th
vol. p. 163 of his _Mémoires_.
[703] See all the August correspondence of 1811 in his
_Mémoires_, iv. pp. 143-62.
[704] On August 26th according to his narrative, iv. p. 61.
[705] Ibid., p. 60.
The news that Marmont was shifting troops northward, towards the passes
into the kingdom of Leon, induced Wellington to make a corresponding
movement with his own troops, and on August 27th the 1st and 4th
Divisions were ordered to prepare to move from Penamacor and Pedrogão
to the neighbourhood of Fuente Guinaldo, close to head quarters[706].
The notion that the Army of Portugal would, at some not very distant
date, march to raise the blockade of Rodrigo, was made even more
certain by the capture of a dispatch in cipher from Foy to Girard,
warning him that he was under orders to follow Marmont across the Tagus
and abandon Truxillo[707]. But Foy made no move for a fortnight more,
and Wellington rightly concluded that he need be under no apprehension
as to the concentration of the enemy, till he had received news that
Truxillo had been evacuated. It was also clear that Marmont intended
that Dorsenne should co-operate with him, and since that general,
with all the disposable troops of the Army of the North, was beyond
Astorga at the end of August, campaigning against the Galicians, there
was no need to feel any alarm till this force should be known to have
turned southward towards the Douro. On the third of September things
began to look a little more exciting, when Dorsenne was reported to be
starting from Astorga on his return journey: he made forced marches for
Salamanca, where it was known that a convoy for the supply of Rodrigo
was being organized[708]. But provisions were hard to collect in Leon,
and Marmont had refused to begin his march of concentration till it
should be certified to him that Dorsenne was nearly ready, and that the
convoy had been got together.
[706] Graham’s diary in his _Life_, by Delavoye, p. 577.
[707] Ibid., August 29th.
[708] Ibid., September 2nd, p. 582.
Hence it was not till September 17th that the time of crisis began.
On this day Wellington received the news that Foy had evacuated
Truxillo on the 15th, and that Montbrun’s cavalry was crossing the
sierra by the Puerto de Baños, with infantry columns following in its
rear. On the previous day an intercepted letter informed him that the
Salamanca convoy was to be ready on September 21st[709]. If Dorsenne
had stopped in front of the Galicians, or if Marmont had been moving
with only part of his troops, Wellington would have prepared to fight
a battle beyond the Agueda. But it was clear from several intercepted
dispatches that the Armies of Portugal and the North were about to
unite in full force, and, as the British general remarked in a letter
which lapsed into unwonted jocularity, ‘The devil is in the French for
numbers[710]’. He had got to know that Souham’s strong division had
come to the front to join Dorsenne[711], and that the guard-divisions,
of Roguet and Dumoustier, with their attendant cavalry and artillery
made up 15,000 men, and not 7,000 as he had hitherto supposed[712].
It was possible, nay probable, that the Army of the North would put
at least 25,000 men into the field for the combined movement now
pending[713], and Marmont, if he came in full force, might bring 35,000
more. It was impossible to stop such a mass of men in the plain east
of Rodrigo, where the ground was all suited to cavalry operations,
and where no good defensive positions were to be found. If the enemy
were determined to relieve the place he could certainly accomplish his
desire.
[709] Wellington to Graham, September 16, _Dispatches_, viii. 284.
[710] To Beresford, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 97.
[711] This is mentioned in his letters to Henry Wellesley of
August 22 and to Craufurd of August 28.
[712] To Henry Wellesley on August 28; cf. to Lord Liverpool of
same date.
[713] To Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, viii. 256.
Wellington had a little more than 46,000 men under his hand at this
moment. The total should have been higher, but all the newly arrived
detachments had been in the Walcheren expedition, and the heat of the
Spanish summer had brought out the fever which lurked in the bodies of
the men who had served in that pestilential spot. Battalions which had
landed at Lisbon in June with 700 or 800 men had gone down to 400 or
500 bayonets in September, though the marches had not been heavy[714].
Nor had the old Peninsular regiments escaped a touch of Guadiana fever
during their stay near Elvas in July. Wherefore there were no less than
14,000 sick in the British army at this moment, and the force present
under arms in the seven divisions on the Beira frontier was (excluding
the Portuguese) only 29,000 sabres and bayonets. Of the Portuguese
the seven infantry and two cavalry brigades serving with the main army
made up about 17,000 men more[715]. With 46,000 men Wellington refused
to offer battle beyond the Agueda to the combined French forces, which
might well amount to 60,000 men, and could not be less than 53,000
or 55,000. But he was determined not to retire an inch further from
Rodrigo than was necessary, being convinced that the enemy could
only remain concentrated for a few days, and could have no serious
intention of invading Portugal. Though he might not be able to fight
in the open plain, he was prepared to defend himself in the skirts
of the mountains, if the French should push out beyond Rodrigo. Here
he had two positions already selected, the first at Fuente Guinaldo,
where the rugged ground begins, the second by Rendo and Alfayates, in
front of Sabugal, which was far more formidable: this was the ground
which Spencer had been told to take up in April, when he had been left
opposite Masséna during Wellington’s absence at Badajoz. The Guinaldo
position, being less defensible by nature, was to be rendered strong by
art. During its stay there in September the 4th Division sketched out
an entrenched camp along the hills, but only two redoubts and some long
lines of trench had been completed when the crisis came at the end of
the month.
[714] Some typical regimental figures of September 15, 1811, may
serve as illustrations. The 68th (only just landed) had 233 sick
to 412 effective, the 51st (landed in April) 246 sick to 251
effective. The 77th landed on July 5th with 859 of all ranks, but
had only 680 effective on August 5, and 560 on September 15. The
40th had, on September 15, 791 effective and 513 sick. The total
sick on the last-named day were, ‘present’ 1,720, ‘hospitals’
12,517, or 14,237 in all.
[715] Brigades of Pack and MacMahon, with the other five brigades
incorporated in the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th Divisions, and two
weak cavalry brigades under Madden. See tables in Appendix XX.
Meanwhile Wellington did not intend to retire on Guinaldo, much less
on the Rendo-Alfayates position, unless he were forced to do so. He
thought it likely that Marmont and Dorsenne would content themselves
with relieving Rodrigo, and would push no further. Wherefore he
directed that Picton and Craufurd, the generals in command of the
two blockading divisions, should leave the Salamanca road open, when
the French appeared in strength, but should not give back from the
immediate neighbourhood of the fortress unless they were attacked in
force. Craufurd might get behind the Vadillo, a torrent which falls
into the Agueda five miles above Rodrigo. Picton was to occupy the
isolated plateau on which lie the villages of El Bodon and Pastores,
five or six miles south of Rodrigo. Here they were to stand, and
to see what the enemy intended to do; probably they would have to
retreat no further. This disposition, which was founded on a false
psychological estimate of the character of Marmont, was to lead
to trouble. The Marshal was more enterprising than Wellington had
calculated, and (as affairs turned out) it would have been safer to
concentrate the whole army on the Fuente Guinaldo position the moment
that the Armies of Portugal and the North appeared in front of Ciudad
Rodrigo.
SECTION XXIX: CHAPTER II
EL BODON AND ALDEA DA PONTE. SEPTEMBER 1811
The long-threatened advance of the French for the relief of Ciudad
Rodrigo began at last on September 22nd, when Marmont brought all
the infantry of the Army of Portugal, save the single division of
Foy, across the Sierra de Gata, and appeared with his vanguard at
Tamames, the little town on the Leonese side of the mountains where
del Parque had beaten Marchand in 1809. Foy alone had been left in New
Castile, with orders to demonstrate from his base at Plasencia against
Wellington’s posts between Castello Branco and Sabugal, where (as it
will be remembered) the 5th Division was lying, placed on this side
for the express purpose of warding off any attempt to strike at the
communications of the allied army.
On the day that Marmont with five divisions of infantry and Montbrun’s
cavalry began to debouch from Tamames, his colleague Dorsenne had
brought forward the disposable portion of the Army of the North to
San Muñoz, a long march in front of Salamanca, and was in easy touch
with the Army of Portugal. Dorsenne had concentrated four divisions of
infantry--the two of the Imperial Guard under Roguet and Dumoustier,
Souham’s newly arrived battalions, and the division so long commanded
by Serras, but now under General Thiébault, the governor of Salamanca,
which had been lying about the Esla and the Orbigo ever since 1809. He
had also with him two brigades of cavalry, Lepic’s 800 sabres of the
Imperial Guard, and Wathier’s _chasseurs_. The two armies joined on the
23rd, and showed a formidable total, larger than that which Masséna had
collected for the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro. For Marmont had brought
25,000 foot and over 2,500 horse, and Dorsenne a slightly larger
contingent, about 27,000 infantry and 2,000 sabres[716]. This heavy
force of 58,000 men, if artillery be reckoned in, was, as Wellington
had always foreseen, more than the Anglo-Portuguese army could face.
For including the division south of the Sierra de Gata, which was
protecting the southern communications of the army, Wellington had
with him as we have seen no more than 2,200 British and 900 Portuguese
cavalry, about 25,000 British and 16,000 Portuguese infantry, or a
total strength (including artillery, &c.) of about 46,000 officers and
men of all arms. The risk of fighting in the open plain in front of
Ciudad Rodrigo would clearly be too great, though by a retreat into
the Portuguese mountains it would be possible to find a position which
should compensate for the numerical deficiency of the allied army.
If the French should press forward, it would clearly be necessary to
retire on to better battle-ground, and Wellington’s ready eye had found
two successive positions, as we have already stated, the one at Fuente
Guinaldo on the foot-hills, the other between Rendo and Aldea Velha, in
front of Sabugal, well within the mountains.
[716] Thiébault (_Mémoires_, iv. p. 510) gives the total at
48,000 infantry and nearly 4,000 cavalry. I imagine the real
total to have been a little larger, about 58,000 in all. By the
returns of the summer of 1811 the two guard-infantry divisions
had 15,000 men, Serras’s (Thiébault’s) 4,000 men, Souham’s nearly
8,000.
Meanwhile it remained to be seen whether the French, with the large
force that they had collected, would content themselves with throwing a
new convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo, a thing that could not be prevented, or
whether they intended to press the allied army hard, and to endeavour
to bring it to action--in which case the retreat into the hills would
become necessary. On the morning of the 23rd Wellington, perfectly
informed as to the position of the enemy, and fairly well able to
estimate their numbers, wrote to Charles Stuart, ‘the French have not
yet appeared, but I think they will before evening. I shall have my
hands very full of business for the next three or four days[717].’ They
were to be fuller than was convenient, and partly by his own fault.
[717] Wellington to Charles Stuart, from Fuente Guinaldo,
September 23rd. _Dispatches_, viii. p. 299.
On learning that Marmont and Dorsenne were at San Muñoz with over
50,000 men, Wellington, if he had practised his accustomed caution,
would have concentrated on Fuente Guinaldo, withdrawing the two
divisions which lay close into Ciudad Rodrigo, the Light Division at
Martiago, the 3rd Division on the heights by El Bodon and Pastores.
It would have been sufficient to leave a cavalry screen as close to
the blockaded fortress as was practicable. But for once he showed an
unwonted tendency to take dangerous risks. He did not wish to fall back
unless he were pressed, and he thought it extremely probable that the
enemy had no further design than to revictual Rodrigo. Refusing to give
up valuable ground unless he were forced to do so, he left Craufurd and
Picton in their advanced positions all through the 23rd and 24th of
September. He did not call Graham and the 1st and 6th Divisions in from
the left, where their present position on the Azava covered the road
to Almeida and the valuable accumulation of artillery stores at Villa
da Ponte. Nor did he bring up the 7th Division to his head quarters at
Fuente Guinaldo, where he lay for these two days with the 4th Division
alone.
The cavalry at the head of the French column appeared in the plain
beyond Ciudad Rodrigo on the 23rd, as Wellington had expected, and
communicated with the place. It was in no way hindered, as the British
cavalry fell back beyond the Agueda by order, and left the Salamanca
road open. On the 24th a very large force was up--observers on the
heights of Pastores saw a great mass of cavalry in the plain below
them, and four divisions of infantry, one of which was made out by
telescopes to belong to the Imperial Guard, from its high plumes and
bearskins[718]. It was presently discovered that an even larger mass
was close behind, encamped on the Guadapero stream, beyond the low
hills which lie east of Ciudad Rodrigo. But on this day the enemy,
though he had some 4,000 cavalry in his front line, made no attempt to
push forward either against Picton or against Craufurd. This quiescence
on his adversary’s part evidently made Wellington conclude that he
need fear nothing, that the French had come merely to revictual their
garrison, not to take the offensive against the allied army. He left
his divisions in the scattered posts which they were occupying, with
sixteen miles between Graham on the left and Craufurd on the right.
And he neglected the fact that his concentration point at Fuente
Guinaldo was only fifteen miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, where the leading
section of the French army, over 20,000 strong as he had seen, was
already encamped. If it should march suddenly forward on the 25th, the
3rd Division was only five miles from its outposts, on the heights of
Pastores and El Bodon, and there was no other division save the 4th
placed directly to cover Fuente Guinaldo. If the flank divisions were
called in on an alarm, Graham was fifteen miles from Fuente Guinaldo,
Craufurd eleven, on the other side of a river with few fords. And
by the time that they could concentrate, the French van might be
supported by the large reserves which were known to be lying behind
Ciudad Rodrigo. It is one of the best-known axioms of war that the
concentration point of a scattered army must not be within one short
march of the base from which the opponent can strike.
[718] According to Marmont (_Mémoires_, iv. p. 63) only one
division, Thiébault’s, actually entered the town.
Wellington was so far right in his judgement of the enemy’s designs,
that it was true that Marmont had come forward without any definite
intention of forcing on a fight, or of advancing far into Portugal. His
subsequent offensive move, however, was provoked by his discovery that
the allied army was quite close to him, but wholly unconcentrated. On
the morning of the 25th it occurred to the Marshal that it would be
desirable to find out by reconnaissance whether Wellington had been
making any provision for a regular siege of Ciudad Rodrigo--whether he
had been collecting fascines and gabions in the neighbouring villages,
or had brought up heavy artillery close to his blockading line[719].
If this should turn out to be the case, the knowledge of it would have
a serious effect on all the future movements of the Army of Portugal.
For a siege is a different thing from a blockade, and, if Rodrigo were
in danger of actual leaguer, his own army would have to canton itself
in regions less remote from the Portuguese frontier than those which it
had hitherto occupied.
[719] This reason for his great reconnaissances of September 25th
is the only one given by Marmont (_Mémoires_, iv. p. 63).
Dorsenne was persuaded to assist the Army of Portugal in a great
reconnaissance, which was to push back Wellington’s cavalry screen
and see what lay behind it. In the morning of September 25th the two
cavalry brigades of the Army of the North went out on the Carpio-Espeja
roads to sweep the line of the Azava, with Wathier in command. At
the same time Montbrun took the bulk of the cavalry of Marmont, two
brigades of dragoons and two of light horse, and advanced along the
southern road, that which runs from Ciudad Rodrigo past El Bodon
towards Fuente Guinaldo. Only one infantry division, that of Thiébault,
the weakest in the two armies, was put under arms to support the
cavalry, and even these 4,000 men did not leave the immediate vicinity
of Ciudad Rodrigo--they merely crossed the Agueda and halted. The two
reconnaissances brought on two separate engagements, at a distance of
ten miles from each other, of which one had no importance, immediate
or ulterior, while the other led to sharp fighting and revealed to the
French the weakness of Wellington’s position. The cavalry screen of
the allied army was formed as follows: Madden’s Portuguese division
lay along the line of the lower Agueda, which was not threatened this
day. Anson’s brigade held the line of the Azava, and lay across the
Carpio road. Alten’s brigade was strung out along the low hills from
south of Carpio to the upper Agueda near Pastores, and had one of its
squadrons detached with the Light Division beyond that river, in front
of Martiago. Slade’s and De Grey’s brigades were far to the rear,
behind Fuente Guinaldo, in Villar de Toro and other villages along the
Coa river, and only came up to the front after midday on the 25th.
Wathier’s insignificant engagement on the lower Azava may be dealt
with first. About eight in the morning the pickets of the 14th Light
Dragoons detected a strong column of cavalry coming out of Rodrigo,
and were forced to retire from Carpio and other posts beyond the
stream. The enemy could be counted from the hills above, and it was
noted that they left six squadrons beside Carpio in reserve, and were
advancing with eight more. These crossed the river and felt their way
cautiously towards the heights. They were coming straight against the
front of the 6th Division, and Graham sent out the light companies of
Hulse’s brigade to line the wood which covered the position which he
was holding. The two British cavalry regiments (14th and 16th Light
Dragoons) gave back to the edge of the wood also, and formed up close
to their infantry supports. Misliking the look of the long belt of
trees which hid all from him, Wathier halted four squadrons more on the
flat ground just beyond the Azava, and moved the other four towards
Graham’s unseen line. This advanced guard consisted of the Lancers
of Berg and the 26th _Chasseurs_. When they were feeling their way
up the slope their leading squadron was charged and driven back by a
squadron of the 14th. The main body, however, picked up the beaten unit
and advanced again: when they had got close to the wood, the light
companies of the 11th, 61st, and 53rd fired a volley into them, and
while they stood staggered by the unexpected salute four squadrons
of the 14th and 16th charged them, broke them, and chased them for
two miles down to and across the Azava[720]. The French reserve left
close to that stream retired at once, covering the broken squadrons.
The French lost one officer and ten men killed, and five officers
and thirty-two men taken, mostly wounded. The British loss was very
small--an officer and ten men wounded and one man missing.
[720] This was the first time on which the British cavalry fought
lancers (at Albuera it was only infantry which were charged by
the Poles). Tomkinson of the 14th reports (_Diary_, p. 115):
‘They looked well and formidable till they were broken and closed
with by our men, and then their lances were an encumbrance....
Many caught in the appointments of other men, and pulled them to
the ground.’
Wathier stayed in line at Carpio, without making a further advance,
till evening, and reported that the English were in position with all
arms beyond the Azava, and not inclined to give way. This was important
news, for, if there were infantry so far north, it was clear that
Wellington had not yet concentrated his army on the Fuente Guinaldo
line.
Montbrun’s reconnaissance, along the Fuente Guinaldo road, turned
out a much more lively and important affair. He started out with a
heavy column consisting of two brigades of his own dragoons and two
of light cavalry[721], which came into touch with the vedettes of
Alten’s brigade almost the moment that it had crossed the Agueda,
for the British outposts lay within two miles of Rodrigo. Driving
straight before him, Montbrun pierced the screen, and pressing up the
slope found himself in the middle of the scattered fractions of the
3rd Division, which Wellington had only just begun to draw together
when he saw that the reconnaissance was being made by no less than
2,500 horse. There was not time to concentrate, because the posts of
Picton’s battalions were too close to the enemy, and the position was
unsatisfactory. Graham, who had surveyed it a few weeks before, remarks
in his diary that it was ‘by no means favourable--extensive, yet very
narrow, and the right thrown back across the plain towards the ford by
Pastores, where there is little advantage of ground but a bank and a
little water-run[722].’
[721] That of Lamotte (1st and 3rd Hussars, 15th and 22nd
_Chasseurs_) and that of Fournier (7th, 13th, 20th _Chasseurs_).
[722] Graham’s diary, in his _Life_ by Delavoye, p. 577.
At the moment when Montbrun broke through the cavalry screen, Picton’s
infantry was strung out on a front of six miles--the 74th and three
companies of the 5/60th were at Pastores, near the Agueda, the
remainder of Wallace’s[723] brigade (the 1/45th and 1/88th) was three
miles south-west of Pastores in the village of El Bodon. Colville’s
brigade and the Portuguese were equally split up--the 1/5th and 77th,
with the 21st Portuguese in support, being on high ground across the
road from Rodrigo to Fuente Guinaldo, in the centre, while the left
section of the front of the division (94th, 2/83rd and 9th Portuguese)
was on lower ground, two miles west of Colville, in the direction of
Campillo. Alten’s cavalry brigade, having sent a squadron of the 11th
Light Dragoons to watch Craufurd’s front, beyond the Agueda, and having
strong pickets out to right and left, had only 500 sabres left as its
main body. These five weak squadrons (three of the 1st Hussars K.G.L.,
two of the 11th Light Dragoons) were across the high-road, near the
5th and 77th, and with them the two Portuguese batteries under Major
Arentschildt which formed the divisional artillery of Picton.
[723] Wallace of the 88th was commanding the brigade vice
Mackinnon, on sick leave in England.
Marmont, on discovering the scattered position of the Allies, could
hardly believe that they had nothing more in his front than what he
saw--four groups of two or three battalions each, with huge gaps
between them. He suspected that Wellington must have reserves close
behind, not thinking it likely that he would have kept infantry so
close to Ciudad Rodrigo unless he were in force to resist an attack.
He accordingly resolved not to send for his infantry from the rear and
engage in a serious action, but to direct Montbrun to drive in one
section of the hostile front with his heavy column of cavalry, and so
to discover the exact strength and position of the Allies[724]. It
was lucky for Wellington that the Marshal limited his ambitions to
this modest scheme. Montbrun resolved to break in the allied centre,
across the high-road, and advanced up it, leaving on his left the two
fractions of Wallace’s brigade in Pastores and El Bodon. If he could
pierce the centre, this wing would be in a disastrous plight, being
cut off from its line of retreat and its power of rejoining Wellington
at Fuente Guinaldo. Accordingly the whole of the French horse came up
against the position across the road, where Colville’s two battalions
and Arentschildt’s batteries blocked the way, while Alten’s five
squadrons were covering their flank. The contest was of an abnormal
sort, 2,500 horse with one battery attacking a smaller force of all
arms--1,000 infantry, 500 sabres, and two batteries[725].
[724] ‘Comme la position des Anglais était très dominante, je
ne pouvais juger quelles forces ils avaient en arrière: il
était possible que ses premières troupes fussent soutenues par
d’autres. Ne voulant pas risquer un engagement sérieux, en les
faisant attaquer par la seule division d’infanterie qui fût à
portée [Thiébault], je pris le parti de n’employer à l’attaque
que de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie. Si l’ennemi était en
force, elle en serait quitte pour se retirer.’ (_Mémoires_, iv.
p. 64.)
[725] Not counting the 21st Portuguese, which came up later, and
was not engaged in the actual combat.
It was most important to Wellington that the detachment across the road
should not be driven in, and he gave orders that it was to hold its
ground to the last possible minute, in order to allow the battalions in
Pastores and El Bodon time to escape from their compromised position,
and to fall into the line of retreat behind the detaining force. His
command was well obeyed, and a most gallant struggle was kept up for
more than an hour, under the Commander-in-Chief’s own eyes.
Montbrun came on with three columns abreast, each formed of a brigade,
while a fourth brigade formed his reserve. His left column tried to
turn the right of Alten’s cavalry, his centre column attacked its
front, his right column, supported by a horse-artillery battery,
moved up against the Portuguese guns and their infantry supports.
There was fierce fighting all along the line: the allied horse, aided
by the steep slope in their favour, made a wonderful fight against
the superior numbers of the enemy, who had to attack in each point
on a narrow front, since only parts of the hillside were open ground
suitable for cavalry movements. Each time that the leading French
squadron neared the crest it was charged and thrown back. The 11th and
one squadron of the Germans dealt with the flank attack, the rest of
the legionary hussars with that in the centre. The defence was most
desperate, consisting in a long series of partial charges, in which one
or more of the defending squadrons beat back the head of the hostile
advance, and then retired under cover of the others. Montbrun, having
six or seven regiments with him, was always able to launch a new attack
up the hillside the moment that the last had been foiled. The colonel
of the German hussars wrote that from first to last the enemy came
on nearly forty times, yet never was allowed to reach the crest: the
individual squadrons of his regiment and of the 11th had charged eight
or nine times each[726].
[726] The best account of this fine skirmish, carefully
constructed from original authorities, is in Schwertfeger’s
_History of the German Legion_, i. 337-9.
Meanwhile, to the right of the plateau which the cavalry defended so
gallantly, the third French cavalry column had attacked the Portuguese
batteries whose fire was sweeping down the road. A dragoon brigade,
though suffering heavily from the grape poured into it as the range
grew close, succeeded in making its way to the guns, and burst in among
them, capturing four pieces; the artillerymen had held their ground
to the last, and earned Wellington’s praise for their steadiness.
But the pieces were not lost; close in support of them was the first
battalion of the 5th regiment under Major Ridge, who, when the hostile
horsemen halted for a moment around the captured guns, attacked them
without hesitation in line. The battalion advanced firing, and with
three volleys broke the dragoons, who were blown with their charge and
in much disorder. They recoiled down the hill in complete rout, and
the Portuguese gunners were able to get their pieces in action again
and resume their very effective fire[727]. This was a rare example of
a successful attack on cavalry by infantry in line: it could not have
been tried against intact squadrons, for there was no flank-support for
the 5th, and an enemy in good order would have turned the battalion
and cut it up from the side. But Ridge saw that the French were in
complete disarray, and unfit for the moment to manœuvre, wherefore he
was justified in trying the dangerous-looking movement which had such
complete success.
[727] Arentschildt’s gunners did not suffer so much as might
have been expected, and Wellington was inaccurate when, in his
dispatch, he says that they were cut down at their guns. The
Portuguese returns show that they lost only one man killed and
four wounded.
The French at last gave up their frontal attacks; it is said that when
the trumpets blew for one more advance, the Allies saw the regiment at
the head of the column refuse to move forward. Montbrun thereupon tried
a move which he might well have made half an hour earlier; he began to
extend his hitherto concentrated brigades, and thrust one of them into
the gap between the hill that he could not force and the village of El
Bodon.
Wellington then gave back; Picton and the two battalions in El Bodon
had by this time evacuated it, and were, as ordered, on their way to
the rear. The still more compromised detachment in Pastores had also
got away, and was making for Fuente Guinaldo by a very circuitous
road: it forded the Agueda, went ten miles on its further side, where
no French were as yet visible, and then recrossed again near Robleda,
joining the 4th Division at dusk.
The second period of the combat of El Bodon--to give its usual name
to the engagement--was less bloody than the first, but quite as
exciting. Wellington’s order of retreat was that the two batteries
of Arentschildt with a cavalry escort went first, then the 21st
Portuguese, which had remained in reserve all through the earlier
fighting, then the 5th and 77th in a single square[728], and lastly two
squadrons of the German hussars, which remained on the position till
the last moment. This column, retreating along the high-road, had in
front of it, and ultimately caught up, the other fractions of the 3rd
Division, Picton’s two battalions which had come in from the right, and
the 94th, 2/83rd, and 9th Portuguese, which had fallen into the road
from the left. But in the first hour of the retreat these detachments
had not yet been overtaken.
[728] They only made up 1,000 bayonets between them, and the
77th, only 450 strong, would have made a very small square by
itself.
Montbrun pressed on fiercely, the moment that he saw that the hill so
long held against him had been abandoned, and beset the retreating
column on all sides as it marched along the flat. The hussars in the
rear were driven in by overwhelming numbers, and had to retire to the
neighbourhood of the 21st Portuguese. This left the square composed
of the 5th and 77th exposed to the full force of the enemy. Montbrun
caused it to be charged on three sides at once; but the British
infantry showed no disorder, reserved their fire till the enemy was
within thirty paces, and then executed such a regular and effective
series of volleys that the dragoons were beaten off with loss, and
could not close at any point. The German squadrons then turned back and
charged them as they retired in disorder.
This repulse checked the French for half an hour, but presently they
were up again, not only hovering round the two squares, that of the
5th and 77th and that of the 21st Portuguese, which brought up the
rear, but riding all down the side of the division, which now formed
one long column of march. But they dared not charge again: Montbrun
merely brought up his horse-artillery battery, and plied the enemy
with fire from several successive positions. It was not ineffective,
but the allied infantry refused to be troubled with it, and continued
to march as hard as they could along the high-road. ‘For six miles
across a perfect flat,’ writes an eye-witness, ‘without the slightest
protection from any incident of ground, without their artillery, and
almost without cavalry (for what were five squadrons against twenty
or thirty?) did the 3rd Division continue its march. During the whole
time the French cavalry never quitted them: six guns were taking the
division in flank and rear, pouring in a shower of round shot, grape,
and canister. This was a trying and pitiable situation for troops to
be placed in, but it in no way shook their courage or confidence: so
far from being dispirited or cast down the men were cheerful and gay.
The soldiers of my own corps, the 88th, told their officers that if the
French would only charge, every officer should have a _nate_ horse to
ride upon. General Picton conducted himself with his usual coolness.
He rode on the left flank of the column, and repeatedly cautioned the
different battalions to mind their quarter-distance and the “tellings
off.” We had at last got close to the entrenched camp at Fuente
Guinaldo when Montbrun, impatient that we should escape from his grasp,
ordered his troopers to bring up their right shoulders and incline
towards our marching column. The movement was not exactly bringing his
squadrons into line, but the next thing to it, and they were within
half pistol-shot of us. Picton took off his hat, and holding it over
his eyes as a shade from the sun, looked sternly but anxiously at the
French. The clatter of the horses and the clanking of the sabres was
so great, when the right squadrons moved up, that many thought it the
preliminary to a general charge. Some mounted officer called out, “Had
we not better form square?” “No,” replied Picton, “it is only a ruse to
frighten us, and it _won’t do_.”[729]’
[729] Memoirs of Grattan of the 88th, pp. 116-17.
Montbrun’s bolt, indeed, was shot. For by this time troops were coming
out from Fuente Guinaldo to cover the retreating division, De Grey’s
heavy dragoons, who had just come up from the Coa, at the head of them.
The French horse slackened their pace, and finally drew off. Half an
hour later the retreating column had taken up its destined position in
the half-completed entrenched camp where the 4th Division was awaiting
it.
This long straggling fight cost the Allies only 149 casualties. The
cavalry had lost 70 men[730] in their long fight to hold the hill,
which they so long guarded, on the flank. Of the infantry the 1/5th
and 77th had lost 42 men, not by the sabres of the cavalry whom they
had driven off so serenely, but by the artillery fire which followed.
The other eight infantry battalions of the 3rd Division, British and
Portuguese, had lost only 34 men in all, mostly, it is to be presumed,
by the cannonade during the retreat. The Portuguese gunners had only 5
men hurt--a light loss considering that the enemy’s dragoons had been
among their pieces for five minutes.
[730] 1st Hussars K.G.L. 5 killed, 2 officers and 32 men wounded,
5 men missing; 11th Light Dragoons 8 killed, 2 officers and 14
men wounded.
Montbrun’s loss is nowhere accurately stated, but was probably about
200 at the least. Thirteen officers had been hit in the four brigades
engaged, and though cavalry was more heavily officered in proportion to
its numbers than infantry, we can hardly suppose that where 13 officers
fell less than 190 rank and file were killed or wounded[731].
[731] According to Martinien’s invaluable lists, the 25th
Dragoons lost 3 officers, the 22nd _Chasseurs_ 4, the 6th and
15th Dragoons 2 each, the 8th and 10th Dragoons 1 each.
Wellington was lucky to have paid no greater price for his rash
maintenance of a position so dangerously close to the walls of Ciudad
Rodrigo. If Marmont had brought up infantry close behind his great
cavalry force, the 3rd Division would have suffered far more; it
might even have been destroyed. But there was, as we have seen, only
one French infantry division under arms on the morning of the 25th,
that of Thiébault. Three more were encamped beyond Rodrigo, the rest
were still some miles to the rear, halting by the Guadapero river.
Marmont sent for Thiébault, when he had discovered the position and the
weakness of Picton’s scattered brigades. But, luckily for the British,
Dorsenne had also dispatched orders to this division, which formed part
of his own Army of the North. He had been alarmed at the strength of
the Allies on the Azava, which Wathier had discovered, and had told
Thiébault to march to his right and support the cavalry on the Carpio
road. When Masséna’s aide-de-camp arrived, to hurry up this infantry,
it was found to have gone off some miles to the north-west; and though
promptly recalled it did not reach the ground in front of Fuente
Guinaldo till late in the evening. Deprived of Thiébault’s battalions
by this chance--one of the many results of a divided command--Marmont
summoned up the three divisions which lay on the other side of Rodrigo.
Not having been warned for service on this day, they took some time
to get under arms, and more to file over the narrow bridge over the
Agueda. They only reached and joined the Marshal and Montbrun a short
time before Thiébault arrived. Thus all day Marmont had no infantry
in hand, with which to support his cavalry[732]. But at nightfall he
had 20,000 bayonets at the front, and the five rear divisions, left
hitherto on the Guadapero, were also coming up, and had reached and
passed the Agueda. There would be nearly 60,000 men at the front by
noon on the 26th.
[732] Marmont, in his _Mémoires_, iv. p. 65, says that he sent
for Thiébault’s division when Montbrun was checked, but ‘l’ordre,
envoyé lentement, fut exécuté plus lentement encore,’ and
Thiébault only appeared at nightfall. The general himself gives
the explanation (_Mémoires_, iv): the French right (i. e. the
wing towards Carpio) seeming to be menaced, ‘they sent me off to
a point where no enemy was to be found.’
Wellington’s position at Fuente Guinaldo was therefore very hazardous.
When night fell on the 25th he had only assembled in the half-finished
entrenchments the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Pack’s independent Portuguese
brigade, and the cavalry of Alten, De Grey, and Slade, or about
15,000 men. He had sent orders to the other fractions of his army to
concentrate there, but it was certain that some, and possible that
others, of them would not get up on the morning of the 26th. The
concentration orders had gone out too late. Graham was directed to
unite the 1st and 6th Divisions and McMahon’s Portuguese at Nava de
Aver, abandoning the lower Azava to a rearguard composed of Anson’s
cavalry. He was, as he wrote to his brother-in-law Cathcart, ‘amazingly
relieved’ to have permission to draw in towards the centre[733]; but
the orders came late and did not go far enough--at Nava de Aver, which
he reached at noon on the 26th, he had 13,000 men collected, but he was
still twelve miles from Fuente Guinaldo, and the road to that point by
Puebla de Azava was not out of reach of molestation by the French. It
was only in the afternoon that he received a second dispatch, telling
him not to move on Fuente Guinaldo, but to get behind the Villar Mayor
stream, and march by a circuitous route, through Villar Mayor and
Bismula, to join the main army at a point more to the rear[734]. The
Commander-in-Chief had resolved to evacuate Fuente Guinaldo.
[733] Graham to Cathcart, in his _Life_ by Delavoye, p. 598.
[734] Graham’s diary, ibid., August 26.
Thus, by his own fault, Wellington was short of two divisions and a
brigade from his left, in the perilous afternoon hours of the 26th.
And on his right also he was weak, owing to the fact that he had
deliberately left Craufurd upon the Vadillo, beyond the Azava, till the
25th. At the moment when the combat of El Bodon began, tardy directions
were sent to Craufurd to move the Light Division to join the army, by
the ford of Carros, near Robleda, high up the Azava. For it was no
longer possible for him to use the easy passage by the ford of Zamorra,
close under Pastores, since the French had gained possession of it when
they thrust the 3rd Division southward. Craufurd, leaving only cavalry
pickets along the Vadillo river, retreated that night to Cespedosa, a
few miles south of his former post at Martiago. But he refused to make
a night march to the ford of Carros, because the road was rough and
difficult, and he thought it likely that his column might get astray
and that some or all of his baggage might be lost[735]. Very possibly
he was right, but the result of his not starting from Cespedosa till
the dawn of the 26th was that, all through the long morning hours and
early afternoon of that day, he was not in line at Fuente Guinaldo,
where his chief wished to have him. He only got there, after a
fatiguing march of 16 miles along the upper Agueda and over the ford
of Carros, at four o’clock, when dusk was drawing near[736]. Meanwhile
Marmont had been, for all the day, in a position to attack Wellington
with very superior numbers.
[735] For notes on this point see the life of Craufurd by his
grandson, Rev. Alex. Craufurd, pp. 184-5. Wellington was vexed
that the Light Division had not done the night march, and,
according to Larpent’s _Journal_ (p. 85) observed to Craufurd,
with some asperity, ‘I am glad to see you safe.’ The answer was,
‘Oh! I was in no danger, I assure you.’ ‘But I was, from your
conduct,’ answered Wellington. Upon which Craufurd observed,
‘He’s d----d crusty to-day.’
[736] The account of the march of the Light Division on this day
is quite satisfactory. I have Sir John Bell’s note that the idea
that Craufurd thought for a moment of retreating by the Pass
of Perales, because he feared being intercepted at Robleda, is
‘nonsense.’
It has often been remarked, especially by French critics, that Craufurd
and his men were in grave danger on the afternoon of the 25th and the
morning of the 26th, since if Marmont had sent out a heavy column on
the right bank of the Agueda, to push the Light Division, it would not
have been able to use the ford near Robleda, and must have fallen
back into the rough country at the sources of the Agueda, where it
might have been overtaken, and have suffered heavily for want of a
road that would have served for its baggage. The danger has been
exaggerated: though the baggage might very probably have been lost,
there was nothing to prevent the troops from taking to the hill-paths,
and getting to Payo or the passes of Gata by some circuitous route. All
that a hot pursuit could have done would have been to make Craufurd
unable to reach Fuente Guinaldo, as he actually did, upon the 26th.
This would, no doubt, have been something of an advantage to the
French. But Marmont would have lost the services of the force sent
in pursuit, which would have had to be very strong, since no mere
detachment would have been able to venture near the Light Division, on
pain of being brought to action and defeated[737].
[737] Marmont (_Mémoires_, iv. p. 65) is very sure that he
could have ‘isolated, turned, and enveloped’ Craufurd, and have
destroyed him. But it is hard to see that he could really have
done more than drive him on to an eccentric line of retreat.
It seems that Marmont’s quiescence in front of the half-occupied camp
of Fuente Guinaldo, during the perilous hours of the morning and noon
of September 26th, was caused by a reluctance to tackle Wellington
when he had taken up a position and was offering battle. He writes in
his _Mémoires_ that, ‘as the day wore on, I had 40,000 men assembled,
within cannon-shot of the English front. But the enemy was known to
have collected if not all, at any rate a very great part of his force,
and was in an entrenched position. Much tempted to take advantage
of the union of the Armies of Portugal and the North, and to make a
stroke for victory, I passed the day in studying the English position.
Attacks made without careful preparation during the recent campaigns
[i. e. Bussaco and Fuentes de Oñoro] had succeeded so badly that I was
deterred from inconsiderate action. Moreover General Dorsenne, who
was only under my command accidentally and by his own consent, had no
wish for a battle, and this rendered the enterprise more delicate.
Then, too, if we tried our luck and were successful, we were not in a
condition to make profit of a successful engagement, by pursuing the
English into Portugal if they were beaten. So finally I gave up the
idea of forcing on a fight[738].’
[738] Thiébault, _Mémoires_, iv. p. 66.
There is an amusing picture of Marmont’s hesitation drawn by General
Thiébault in his clever but malicious autobiography. In this a very
different rôle is attributed to the commander of the Army of the
North: ‘At nine o’clock the Marshal and General Dorsenne rode to the
front with their glittering staffs. The troops were put under arms
at once. But the great men descended from their horses and got out
telescopes, with which they began to study the English position. “Yes,”
began the Marshal, determined to see that which was not visible, as
he peered through the large glass balanced on the shoulder of one of
his aides-de-camp, “Yes, my information was correct. The right of
the English line is flanked by an inaccessible declivity.” General
Dorsenne and I had excellent telescopes, but we could not see any such
precipice. Dorsenne told the Marshal as much. Taking no notice of his
remark, Marmont continued, “The whole camp is protected by closed
redoubts.” Dorsenne, after exchanging some words with me, replied
that he could only make out a few points at which earthworks had been
thrown up. The Marshal, ignoring the observations of his interlocutor,
went on, “And, just as I have been told, these closed redoubts are
armed with heavy guns of position forwarded from Almeida. Nothing can
be done[739].” He forthwith adjourned his reconnoitring, and invited
the generals to a heavy and sumptuous meal, served on silver plate in
front of the line. After the feast Montbrun remarked, “The English
position is impregnable--the thing that proves it so is that Wellington
is offering us battle upon it. We shall never make an end of him by
running at him head down; that would have no good result.” Marmont soon
after delivered his decision that Rodrigo, having been relieved, and
the position of the English being too strong, he intended to advance no
further, and should retire next day.’
[739] Marmont, _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 513-14.
If Thiébault’s report of Montbrun’s words and Marmont’s attitude be
correct, it is clear that Wellington had by mere ‘bluffing’ brought
the enemy to a standstill. He was using the reputation for caution
which he had gained in his former campaigns as a moral weapon. The
syllogism, ‘Wellington never fights save when he has his army in hand,
and has found a good position; he offers to fight now; therefore he
feels himself safe against any attack,’ seemed a legitimate logical
process to Marmont and Montbrun. So the English general had hoped; but
he did not know how entirely successful his demonstration had been;
and thought that the reconnaissance followed by a halt, which he had
observed in the morning, meant that the enemy was going to bring up
his last reserves before attacking. The rear divisions of the Army
of Portugal were seen to arrive in the French lines when the day was
far spent. Wellington supposed that Marmont had been waiting for
them, and would use them for a great combined attack on the 27th. He
had no intention of awaiting it, even though the Light Division had
reached him, and instead of ordering the other absent units of his army
to close in upon Fuente Guinaldo, sent orders to them all to place
themselves in the second position, nine miles to the rear, which he had
chosen as his real battle-ground.
The force at Fuente Guinaldo decamped after dusk, leaving the Light
Division and the 1st Hussars K.G.L. to keep up the bivouac fires
along the whole line till midnight. Marching in two columns, one by
the direct road by Casillas de Flores and Furcalhos, the other by a
secondary path through Aldea da Ponte, the whole reached the positions
in front of Alfayates where Wellington was ready to make his real
stand. On the morning of the 27th the main body was joined by the 5th
Division, which came down from Payo in the Sierra de Gata, having
found no enemy threatening the passes in that direction. The 7th
Division also arrived from Albergaria. Meanwhile Graham, with the 1st
and 6th Divisions and McMahon’s Portuguese, had arrived at Bismula
and Rendo, and so was at last in close touch with the main body. The
whole of Wellington’s 45,000 men were concentrated, and, well knowing
the strength of the position which he had now reached, his mind was
tranquil. The front was hidden by a strong cavalry screen, Alten’s
brigade covering the right, De Grey’s and Slade’s the centre, and
Anson’s the left, where Graham’s divisions lay.
Marmont was so far from guessing that his adversary would abandon
the position of Fuente Guinaldo, that he had ordered his own army
to retreat towards Rodrigo, at the very moment that the Allies were
absconding from his front. During the early hours of the night of the
26th-27th, the two adversaries were marching away from each other!
But at midnight Thiébault, who was in charge of the rearguard, noted
that the fires in Wellington’s lines seemed few and flickering, and
that his sentries had got out of touch with those of the British. A
reconnaissance soon showed him that there was nothing left in his
front. Prompt information was sent to Marmont, and the Marshal had to
reconsider his position. He determined to follow up the retreating
enemy, not with the fixed intention of bringing him to action, but
rather that he might be ready to take advantage of any unforeseen
chance that might occur. But the pursuit could not be rapid or
effective, for during the night the bulk of the Army of Portugal had
been marching back towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Montbrun’s and Wathier’s
cavalry were still at the front, but only two infantry divisions, those
of Souham and Thiébault, both belonging to the Army of the North. The
Marshal dared not press his enemy too hard, lest Wellington should turn
upon him, and find that only 11,000 infantry were up on the French
side. While the countermarch of the other seven divisions was in
progress, the vanguard must not commit itself unsupported to a general
action.
Accordingly Wellington’s retreat was not seriously incommoded.
Montbrun, followed by Souham’s division, took the road by Casillas de
Flores and Furcalhos: Wathier, with Thiébault’s infantry in support,
that by Aldea da Ponte. Montbrun ran about noon, against the Light
and 5th Divisions and Alten’s horse, drawn up in position in front
of Alfayates, and considered them too strongly placed to be meddled
with. Wathier, on the western road, was stopped in front of Aldea da
Ponte by the pickets of the 4th Division and of Slade’s dragoons. This
village lay outside the intended line of battle of the allied army, but
so close in front of it that Wellington had resolved not to let it go
till he was pushed by a strong force, since it was the meeting-place of
several roads and well placed for observation.
Wathier halted facing Aldea da Ponte, till Thiébault came up and
assumed the command, being senior to the cavalry general. Seeing that
the village was worth having, Thiébault resolved to attack it, and
drove out the light companies of the Fusilier brigade by an advance
of the three battalions of the 34th Léger, one of which cleared the
village while the other two turned it on each flank. Wellington,
observing that the enemy had only a single division on the ground,
refused to allow Aldea da Ponte to be so lightly lost, and sent against
the French the whole Fusilier brigade in line, flanked by a Portuguese
regiment in column. This advance forced Thiébault’s first brigade back
from the village, and thrust it northward some way upon the road.
Here the French rallied upon their second brigade, and formed up with
Wathier’s horse in support. Wellington would not push them further, and
contented himself with having recovered Aldea da Ponte and the junction
of the roads[740].
[740] Thiébault, in his elaborate account of the skirmish
(_Mémoires_, iv. pp. 522-5), says that he did not lose
Aldea da Ponte, but I prefer to take Wellington’s definite
statement that he did, supported by those of Vere (the
Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the 4th Division) and Lord
Londonderry--both eye-witnesses.
At dusk, however, Montbrun and Souham came up and joined Thiébault,
with the column which had followed the Furcalhos road. Souham
determined to try again the attack in which Thiébault had been
checked, and assailed Aldea da Ponte just as the light was failing.
The Fusiliers were driven out of the village, and Wellington refused
to reinforce them, or to allow them to make a second counter-attack,
because he did not wish to get entangled in heavy fighting in the
dark, or to expend many lives upon keeping a place which was outside
his line, and formed no essential part of it. There had been much
skirmishing all through the afternoon between Slade’s two cavalry
regiments and Wathier’s _chasseurs_, in which neither party had any
appreciable losses, nor gained any marked advantage.
The Anglo-Portuguese casualties in this rearguard action were just
100, of which 71 were in the Fusilier brigade, 13 in the Portuguese
battalions which had covered its flank, and 10 in Slade’s cavalry.
Thiébault says that he lost 150 men, a very probable estimate[741];
he adds that the British lost 500, and that he was engaged against
17,000 allied troops--which, considering that he fought no one save the
three battalions of the Fusilier brigade, one regiment of Portuguese,
and Slade’s horse--3,300 sabres and bayonets--seems sufficiently
astounding. It may serve as a fair example of his method of dealing
with figures.
[741] Thirty killed and 120 wounded. Martinien’s lists show 7
casualties among officers of Thiébault’s regiments (3 in the
34th Léger, 3 in the regiment of Neuchâtel, 1 in the 4th of the
Vistula). This at the average rate of 20 or 22 officers per
man seems just right. By a tiresome misprint Thiébault speaks
of himself as commanding the 31st Léger in many places. It was
really the 34th. The 31st was in the Army of Portugal, not in
that of the North.
Next morning Wellington’s line was drawn back into the position in
which he had determined to fight, with the French column at Aldea da
Ponte lying two miles in his front, on the lower ground. This position,
which was about seven miles long, was covered on either flank by the
ravine of the Coa, which here makes a deep hook or curve, with the town
of Sabugal at its point. The right wing was formed of the 5th Division,
holding the village of Aldea Velha on a steep hill by the source of
the Coa. The right-centre, which projected somewhat, was composed of
the 4th and Light Divisions ranged in front of the town of Alfayates,
close by the convent of Sacaparte[742]. From that point westward the
line was taken up by Pack’s and McMahon’s Portuguese brigades on each
side of the village of Nave. Finally, the left consisted of the 1st
and 6th Divisions under Graham, reaching from near Rendo as far as the
bridge of Rapoulla. This wing was covered in front by the ravine of a
torrent flowing into the Coa. The central reserve was formed of the 3rd
and 7th Divisions with De Grey’s and Slade’s dragoons, drawn up behind
Alfayates. Alten’s light cavalry brigade was with the Light Division,
its pickets thrown out on the Furcalhos road; Anson’s brigade was
placed in front of Nave and Bismula, with its advanced vedettes
watching the French in Aldea da Ponte. The position was well marked,
high-lying, and masked by woods and ravines. Its only fault was that
the Coa ran round its rear, with only two bridges, those of Sabugal
and Rapoulla da Coa, though there were at least six or seven fords in
addition, and the stream was low, and passable almost everywhere for
infantry. A defeat, however, would probably have meant much loss of
artillery and impedimenta, though Wellington had sent great part of
his baggage over the Coa, and detached all his Portuguese horse and
the Portuguese brigade of the 6th Division to cover its retreat. No
position is perfect, but Wellington did not think he could possibly be
evicted from this one, which was as strong as Bussaco and not nearly
so long. ‘He wished to be attacked, being confident of success,’ wrote
Graham three days later[743].
[742] Note the curious misprint in the first line of p. 307 of
_Wellington Dispatches_, vol. viii, of Light _Dragoons_ for
Light _Division_. Unless the misprint is noticed, the reader
will ask why Wellington has omitted Craufurd in describing
his order of battle. Napier, I know not why, has altogether
neglected to explain the distribution of the British army, in the
short paragraph of vol. iii. p. 342 which describes this day’s
operations.
[743] Graham to Cathcart, October 1, in Delavoye’s _Life of Lord
Lynedoch_, p. 598.
But his adversaries would not oblige him. After coming up to Aldea da
Ponte, and rebuking Thiébault and Souham for engaging in a profitless
skirmish on the preceding day[744], Marmont took a long survey of the
position of the allied army, and refused to advance any further. The
reasons which he had given for not attacking at Fuente Guinaldo on the
26th, when he still had a good chance of accomplishing great things,
were doubly valid on the 28th. After reasserting to Dorsenne and the
other generals that Wellington’s army was concentrated (which was now
quite true) and that his position was far too strong to be meddled
with, and adding that, even if there were a successful action, he
could not pursue Wellington into the mountains for want of food, he
gave his final orders for retreat. The main body of the army, which
had not come further forward than Fuente Guinaldo, began to retire
that same night towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The two infantry divisions at
Aldea da Ponte and the cavalry of Montbrun and Wathier brought up and
covered the rear. By the morning of the 29th the crisis was over, and
Wellington was dictating orders for the breaking up of his army and its
distribution into cantonments.
[744] Thiébault’s feelings were much hurt at the skirmish being
called a ‘scuffle.’ ‘Il se permit de dire que mon combat de la
veille était une échauffourée. Je ne rappelle le mot que pour
peindre l’arrogance d’un de ces hommes à qui leur titre de
Maréchal défendait d’admettre aucun mérite en dehors d’eux-mêmes’
(_Mémoires_, iv. 528).
After retiring to Ciudad Rodrigo Marmont and Dorsenne parted company
on October 1st, and each dispersed his troops into cantonments. The
Army of Portugal recrossed the Sierra de Gata, and was distributed
by divisions in the same regions of New Castile that it had occupied
in September. On returning to his head quarters at Talavera, Marmont
received the report of Foy, commanding the only section of his army
which had not taken part in the recent campaign. That general had been
ordered to demonstrate from Plasencia against Wellington’s rear during
the revictualling of Ciudad Rodrigo. With six battalions and a regiment
of light cavalry, about 2,800 men, he had taken the direction of the
pass of Perales. He reached Moraleja at the foot of the mountains, near
Coria, on September 27th, the day of the combat of Aldea da Ponte.
Next morning he started to ascend the Sierra, and his advanced guard
got to Payo on the 29th. There it was discovered that Marmont and
Dorsenne had abandoned the offensive, and started on their retreat for
Ciudad Rodrigo on the 28th, so that no French troops were anywhere in
the neighbourhood, while Wellington’s whole army was near Alfayates,
only fifteen miles away. Fearing to be discovered and overwhelmed, Foy
returned to Plasencia by forced marches: his demonstration had been
some days too late to be of any use. If he had appeared in the Perales
pass on the 25th, while the 5th Division was still holding Payo,
Wellington would have had to keep that force detached to protect his
flank, and could not have withdrawn it to join the rest of his army on
the Alfayates-Rendo position. But Foy came up only when the campaign
was over, and his movements had no effect whatever.
The best commentary on this five days of manœuvring between El Bodon
and Alfayates is that of the war-tried veteran Graham. ‘It was very
pretty--but spun rather fine. Had the enemy behaved with common spirit
on the 26th, we should not have got away so easily from Guinaldo. I
should have preferred, after it was ascertained that the enemy’s force
(54,000 infantry and 6,000 horse) was too formidable to be attacked
beyond the Agueda, drawing back our infantry to the ultimate position
(Aldea Velha, Alfayates, Rendo) which could have been made infinitely
stronger during the interval. There would have been no risk whatever,
nor any appearance to the troops of retreat. The enemy, as you can see,
might have amused us before Fuente Guinaldo, and, by a night march
from Ciudad Rodrigo, have massed at San Felices, and so have crossed
the river in force by the plain of Fuentes de Oñoro. Then, pushing on
rapidly by Nava de Aver, he would have tumbled us back in confusion.
I thought this would have been his course, from his superiority in
cavalry and artillery--all that country is like Newmarket Heath for
galloping across. However, all is well that ends well[745]!’
[745] Graham to Cathcart, in Delavoye’s _Life of Lord Lynedoch_,
p. 599.
The fact is that Wellington on the 25th made one of his rare slips.
He judged that Marmont would not advance beyond Ciudad Rodrigo, and
so left his troops dispersed along a vast front. When, contrary to
his expectation, his enemy fell upon the 3rd Division, and pushed it
back to Fuente Guinaldo, the chosen concentration point of the Allied
army, he was for twenty-four hours in the gravest danger. For if
Marmont had struck hard again at noon on the 26th, there was no mass
of troops collected to oppose him. Craufurd and Graham would have been
driven off sideways on eccentric lines of retreat, and the 3rd and 4th
Divisions must surely have suffered considerable loss in the hasty
retreat to Alfayates which would have been forced upon them. For on the
26th Marmont would not have been handicapped, as he was on the 25th,
by having no infantry at the front to assist his numerous and daring
cavalry. It may be added that, if the army had failed to concentrate at
Alfayates, Almeida would have been in danger, and what was still more
important, Dickson’s great siege-train at Villa da Ponte would have
been exposed--unless indeed Graham, driven away from his proper line of
movement, might have moved westward and covered it. But speculations as
to the merely possible are fruitless.
SECTION XXIX: CHAPTER III
THE END OF WELLINGTON’S CAMPAIGNS OF 1811. ARROYO DOS MOLINOS.
SEPTEMBER 1811
The moment that he had satisfied himself that the French were all in
full retreat, and were clearly about to disperse to their old garrisons
and cantonments, Wellington also broke up the army which had been
lying on the Alfayates-Rendo position. On the 29th September Graham
received orders to retire with the 1st and 6th Divisions to regular
winter quarters in the interior of Beira, about Guarda, Celorico, and
Freixadas. The 7th Division was sent southward to Penamacor. But the
3rd, 4th, and Light Divisions returned to the frontier of Spain, to
establish the same sort of distant blockade (or rather observation) of
Ciudad Rodrigo, which they had been keeping up in August and September.
The Light Division once more crossed the Agueda, and occupied its
old position at Martiago and Zamorra. The 4th Division watched the
Agueda from Gallegos to Barba del Puerco[746]; the 3rd Division, in
reserve behind the other two, was cantoned at Aldea da Ponte and Fuente
Guinaldo. The three light cavalry brigades of Anson, Alten, and Slade
took in turns the charge of covering the front of the Light and 4th
Divisions along the Agueda; the two brigades not on duty were kept
twenty miles to the rear, about Freixadas, Goveias, and Castel Mendo.
De Grey’s heavy dragoons and the head quarters of the cavalry division
were close behind, at Alverca. Soon after the line of observation along
the Agueda had been taken up, Wellington found it possible to send
cavalry pickets forward to Tenebron and Santi Espiritus, on the other
side of the Agueda, so as to block the road between Ciudad Rodrigo and
Salamanca. But these were mere posts occupied by half a troop--there
was no intention of risking any serious force in such advanced
positions. Meanwhile a more effective hindrance to communication
between Rodrigo and Salamanca was provided. Julian Sanchez and his
guerrilleros were pushed forward to their old haunts along the Yeltes,
and overran the whole country-side. Carlos de España’s Spanish infantry
brigade also recrossed the Agueda, and took up a forward position
facing Ledesma.
[746] There were changes in detail in November, for which see
Vere’s _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 21.
Thus the posture of affairs on the frontiers of Leon was restored to
the same aspect that it had displayed in the early autumn. It was clear
that when Ciudad Rodrigo again needed to be revictualled, it ought
to be necessary for the French to make another great effort, and to
concentrate once more an army of 50,000 men. Marmont had thrown a great
convoy into the place, but his calculations as to the time that these
stores would suffice to feed the garrison had been wrecked, by the fact
that his own army and that of Dorsenne had lived on the magazines of
Rodrigo for five days, and had consumed more than 200,000 rations. It
had been intended that the convoy should feed Rodrigo for six months,
but only two months’ food remained for its garrison of 2,000 men after
this enormous deduction had been made. Meanwhile Wellington thought
that there was nothing to be accomplished in the north for some time.
His ultimate design was to make a serious blow at Ciudad Rodrigo,
when he should learn that the disposition of the armies of Dorsenne
and Marmont rendered such a blow practicable. As long as they lay so
close together as to make their rapid concentration possible, he did
not intend to press matters. But two indispensable preliminaries for
the regular leaguer of Rodrigo were being perfected. Dickson’s great
siege-train was being completed at Villa da Ponte, and the repairs
to the walls of Almeida were at last finished. It was Wellington’s
intention to transfer the siege-train to Almeida when that fortress
was absolutely secure against an attack. Placed there, it would be in
a position to move up against Rodrigo in two days, when the time for
action should come. But it was not till November was far spent that
the order to move forward reached Dickson; meanwhile the roads between
Villa da Ponte, Pinhel, and Almeida were put in good order, by a corvée
levied on the local peasantry[747].
[747] For all this see Dickson’s _Diary_, edited by Major Leslie,
R.A., pp. 478-501. The order to start the first section of the
siege-train for Almeida was only given on November 14. (Dickson,
p. 505.)
The dispositions of the enemy remained the all-important factor in the
situation, and for the next two months Wellington was scrutinizing them
with the greatest care. The Army of Portugal, after it had recrossed
the Sierra de Gata, had been distributed by divisions in much the
same cantonments that it had occupied in September, save that no
force was sent to the distant southern post of Truxillo, to keep up
communications with Drouet in Estremadura. Foy’s division, which had
held that town during the early autumn, was reduced to such a state
of dilapidation, by its late march in the mountains, that Marmont
sent it to rest at Toledo, in comfortable cantonments. He replaced
it at Plasencia, its later base, by the troops of Brennier. The 2nd
Division (Clausel) occupied Avila and its province; the remaining three
divisions (Ferey, Maucune, Sarrut) settled down at Almaraz, Talavera,
Bejar, Oropesa, and the intermediate places. Montbrun’s heavy cavalry
remained near head quarters at Talavera; the light cavalry was placed
with Brennier, along the line of the Alagon, to watch the frontier of
central Portugal.
Dorsenne meanwhile executed a similar dispersion of his army. He left
at Salamanca only Thiébault’s division, strengthened by some light
cavalry, and one brigade of Souham’s[748]. The other troops that he
had taken to Ciudad Rodrigo in September were sent back to Valladolid,
Benavente, Palencia, and other posts in the valley of the Douro. The
Army of the North ceased to threaten either Portugal or Galicia:
but there was one task that it had to execute in order to replace
itself in the position that it had held in the summer. Napoleon had
protested at the time against the evacuation of the central Asturias
and Oviedo by Bonnet’s division, and had ordered that this region
should be reoccupied as soon as was possible. The troops told off for
its invasion were the same which had held it during the last twelve
months, the division of Bonnet. To support their movement through the
pass of Pajares, Dorsenne took to Leon one of his two divisions of
the Guard, placing the other at Valladolid. Thiébault’s and Souham’s
divisions alone were left in front line, facing towards Portugal and
Galicia. Bonnet’s expedition against the Asturias was executed with
complete success; indeed it met with hardly any opposition. General
Losada, who had occupied Oviedo after its evacuation, with the 1st
Division of the Army of Galicia, judged himself too weak to fight. He
abandoned the pass of Pajares after a mere skirmish, and made hardly a
greater effort to defend the passage of the Nalon, withdrawing westward
towards Galicia as the French advanced. Bonnet occupied Oviedo on the
6th of November without any fighting, and its port of Gijon on the
7th. Finding that Losada had retreated behind the Narcea, he sent a
brigade under Colonel Gauthier to pursue him. This column reached
Tineo on November 12th, but soon had to retire, for the Spaniards
had scattered themselves in small bands among the mountains, and had
turned back to attack Gauthier’s line of communication with Oviedo,
as well as that between Oviedo and the pass of Pajares. Bonnet found
that to maintain himself in the central Asturias was all that was in
his power. He could not at the same time provide garrisons for Oviedo,
Gijon, and the neighbouring places, and also put in the field a force
strong enough to menace Galicia. In fact his fine division of 8,000
men was practically immobilized in the district that it had seized. It
is more than doubtful whether the Emperor was wise to direct that the
central Asturias should be once more occupied. He deprived the Army of
the North of one of its five fighting divisions, and left the force
holding Leon and Old Castile too weak to restrain Wellington, when it
had at the same time to contain the Army of Galicia and to hunt all
the Spanish irregular forces. Julian Sanchez in the plains of Leon,
and Porlier and Longa in the mountains of Cantabria, were enemies
whom it was impossible to neglect. If left alone they executed feats
of great daring--it will be remembered that the former had surprised
and captured Santander in August[749], and though his ventures in
the autumn were less fortunate, they kept many hostile columns busy.
Sanchez, on October 15th, executed a very ingenious _coup de main_.
The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo possessed a herd of cattle, which was
habitually sent under guard to graze a mile or two from the ramparts.
Watching his opportunity, on a day when the governor, Renaud, was
inspecting the beasts, he swooped down on him, and carried him off with
his escort and his cattle, though they were barely out of cannon-shot
of the fortress. Thiébault, who commanded in the province of Salamanca,
had great difficulty in getting into Ciudad Rodrigo General Barrié,
whom he chose as Renaud’s successor (November 1st, 1811).
[748] Afterwards replaced by one brigade of Dumoustier’s division
of the Imperial Guard.
[749] See p. 472.
Between the Tagus, therefore, and the Bay of Biscay matters had
come once more to a deadlock after the short campaign of September
24th-29th, 1811. For the following three months neither the Allies nor
the French made any serious movement, with the exception of Bonnet’s
invasion of the central Asturias. The main armies on both sides were
dispersed. Wellington, with his troops distributed into cantonments,
was waiting his opportunity for another and more effective blow at
Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne was striving to put down the guerrilleros,
by hunting them ineffectually with many small columns--a task which
he found more difficult now that he was deprived of Bonnet’s powerful
division. Marmont, with his troops dispersed from Plasencia to Toledo,
was practically waiting on Wellington’s movements, and showed no
signs of wishing to take the offensive. His quiescence was not in
the least affected by an Imperial dispatch sent from Compiègne on
September 18th, which reached him shortly after his return to the
valley of the Tagus[750]. In this document a most ambitious plan of
operations was proposed to him. Berthier explained that the Emperor
took it for granted that Ciudad Rodrigo would have been revictualled
for three months before October 1st, and that the Army of Portugal
would have received the cavalry drafts which General Vandermaesen was
bringing from the north[751]. When these had arrived Marmont would have
41,000 men present with the colours. Let him march with this force
into Estremadura, pick up Drouet and the 5th Corps, which should
be placed under his orders, and lay siege to Elvas. Soult should be
asked to find him 3,000 cavalry, and he would have a force of 57,000
men, which would be more than Wellington would be able to face. For
if the English general hurried to save Elvas, a course which he was
almost bound to take, he would probably leave two divisions in front
of Almeida to ‘contain’ Dorsenne and the Army of the North. Though he
would pick up instead the corps of Hill, which had so long been lying
in the Alemtejo, yet he would still have no more than 45,000 men of
all nations, even including Castaños’s Spanish levies. This would not
be enough to cope with 57,000 French: if Wellington fought he would
be beaten; if he did not, he would lose Elvas, the most important
fortress of Portugal. ‘This is the only movement, M. le Maréchal,
which can bring back honour to our arms, free us from the defensive
attitude in which we lie, strike terror into the English, and take us
a step forward to the end of the war.... The prospect of capturing a
great fortress under the eyes of the English army, of conquering a
province of Portugal which covers our Army of the South, of uniting to
your forces 25,000 men of that army [the 5th Corps and the cavalry]
should serve you as incentives for glory and success.’ Berthier then
grants that it is just possible that Wellington may refuse to march
to the relief of Elvas, and reply to the menace against that fortress
by invading Leon and falling upon Dorsenne, who would be too weak to
face him. If he does this, the Army of the North may retire first to
Salamanca, then to Valladolid, then even to Burgos. At the latter
point, having called in all its detachments, it would be 50,000 strong,
and able to ‘contain’ the allied forces, even if Wellington had brought
forward every available man. But Marmont might take it for granted that
his adversary would do nothing of the kind: he would hurry south to
save Elvas and cover his base at Lisbon. If he left no troops behind
him on the Coa, Dorsenne should dispatch 15,000 men of the Army of the
North to Estremadura, and bring up the force before Elvas to a total of
62,000 men, a number which Wellington could not possibly resist. Elvas
must infallibly fall. Only one caution was added to this scheme of
campaign: Marmont must be sure that Wellington had not a siege-train
at Almeida, or any other place near Ciudad Rodrigo. For if he were to
answer the French movement on Elvas by laying formal siege to Rodrigo,
Dorsenne would not be strong enough to prevent him from taking it, and
the Army of Portugal would have to turn back to the rescue from its
distant position in the Alemtejo.
[750] It may be found in Belmas, Appendix to vol. i. pp. 585-8.
Marmont, for reasons not hard to divine, does not print it among
the many documents containing his correspondence with the Emperor
which appear in the Appendix to his Book XV. (_Mémoires_, vol.
iv.)
[751] See p. 546 above.
This last caution was, in effect, a fatal block to the whole plan. For
Marmont, during the El Bodon campaign, had heard of the existence of
Wellington’s siege-park at Villa da Ponte. And he had also found in
the cantonments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions a stock of gabions and
fascines, whose preparation could only mean that the British had been
contemplating regular siege operations at some future date. The wood
and wickerwork had been burned[752], but there was nothing to prevent
Wellington from replacing it at short notice.
[752] The destruction of these stores is mentioned in Marmont’s
_Mémoires_, iv. p. 68.
Yet even if Marmont had not been aware of the existence of Dickson’s
guns, the plan proposed to him was not so tempting at a second as at a
first glance. He was well aware that such parts of it as depended on
the loyal co-operation of his colleagues might not work out easily.
Would not Soult find some excuse for refusing to send the 3,000 cavalry
from Andalusia? Could Dorsenne be trusted to dispatch 15,000 men to the
Alemtejo, if he discovered that Wellington had left no serious force on
the Coa? And even if he did show such an unwonted self-abnegation as to
detach two of his divisions to such a distant destination, would they
get up in time for the crisis? For if Wellington marched promptly with
his whole army, by Alfayates, Castello Branco, and the bridge of Villa
Velha, he would be at Elvas many days before Dorsenne’s detachment,
which would have to take the circuitous route by Bejar, the bridge of
Almaraz, Truxillo, Merida, and Badajoz. Supposing that the whole allied
army came down from the north, and picked up Hill and Castaños, it
would consist of well over 60,000 men, and the Army of Portugal when
joined by Girard’s corps would only make 57,000 men if Soult sent his
cavalry, or 54,000 if (as was more likely) he found some excuse for
refusing his co-operation. Could 54,000 men lay siege to a first-class
fortress, and at the same time provide a covering force strong enough
to fend off 64,000 of the Allies? If they tried to do so, would not
the covering force be beaten in all probability? And it was probable
that Wellington would come to save Elvas with every available man, for
he knew that Dorsenne was not able to make any serious irruption into
northern Portugal. The Army of the North could not collect more than
27,000 men for field operations (as the late campaign had shown) and
such a force, destitute of stores and acting at short notice, would not
get far into the wilderness of the devastated Beira, much less threaten
Lisbon.
These arguments, in all probability, must have occurred to Marmont,
but we have no proof that he used them. In his reply to Berthier,
written at Talavera on October 21st[753], he takes another line--he
reports that the difficulties of supply are so great that he has, after
returning from the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, dispersed his army from
Plasencia to Toledo. He is beginning to collect great central magazines
at Navalmoral, near Almaraz, which will serve for his army when next
it is massed either for offensive or defensive purposes. Meanwhile,
till the magazines are formed, he asks for the Emperor’s leave to wait
with his troops in their present positions. Wellington, he thinks, can
do nothing serious for want of numbers, and the dispersion of his army
into cantonments has been caused by the difficulty of feeding his men
in the highlands, from which he has just retired. If, nevertheless, he
tries some forward movement into Estremadura, the Army of Portugal is
well placed for falling on him in the valley of the Guadiana. As for
offensive plans, nothing can be done till magazines are formed, but he
hopes to submit a scheme of his own to the Emperor when leave has been
granted.
[753] This may be found printed in Belmas, vol. i. Appendix, pp.
588-90.
But meanwhile Napoleon’s mind had swerved away from the scheme for an
attack on Elvas and the Alemtejo, which had been formulated in the
Compiègne dispatch of September 18th. Just a month later Berthier
writes, by his orders, from Amsterdam, to lay down a wholly new plan.
This dispatch of October 18th contains the germ of the great central
error which was to make possible Wellington’s sudden offensive move of
the following midwinter, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo--the exploit
which was to be the turning-point of the whole Peninsular War. Suchet
had now started upon his long-projected march on Valencia, with which
we shall deal in its proper place. He had made a good commencement, but
had been brought to a stand before the walls of Saguntum. The Spaniards
had begun to reinforce their eastern armies, and the Emperor realized
that Suchet needed support. Therefore the army of Wellington ceased for
a moment to be the central point on which his attention was fixed. ‘Le
principal objet aujourd’hui est Valence,’ writes Berthier in obedience
to his master’s changed opinion. And he thereupon instructs Marmont
that the Army of the Centre will have to stretch itself eastward to
Cuenca, to support Suchet, and that in consequence the Army of Portugal
will have to ‘facilitate the task of the King of Spain,’ i. e. spare
troops to occupy those parts of New Castile from which Joseph must
withdraw men for the expedition to the Valencian border. This was but
the beginning of the scheme, which was to end by distracting a great
body of Marmont’s host to the shore of the Mediterranean, out of call
of their commander. As we shall see, the Duke of Ragusa was finally
ordered to make such a huge detachment to aid Suchet, that Wellington
at last got his opportunity to strike, when the Army of Portugal was so
lowered in numbers that it could not hope to restrain him. The first
hint came in the above-cited orders of October 18th; in the second
crucial dispatch, that of November 21st[754], Marmont is told not only
that he will have to ‘facilitate the task’ of King Joseph, but that
he must select a body of 12,000 men to march at once on Valencia, and
set aside 3,000 more to keep up the line of communication with the
expeditionary force. ‘We are informed,’ continues Berthier, ‘that
the English army has 20,000 sick[755], and barely 20,000 able-bodied
men with the colours, so that they cannot possibly try any offensive
enterprise.’
[754] Printed in Appendix to Marmont’s _Mémoires_, vol. iv. pp.
257-8.
[755] The sick have grown from 18,000 to 20,000 since the day
before, which is the date of a less important dispatch, in which
Marmont had been warned to set aside 6,000 men only for the
Valencian expedition, because Wellington is absolutely unable to
strike a blow.
This is a typical result of the endeavour to conduct the Peninsular
War from Paris as head quarters. On the wholly false hypothesis that
Wellington’s army is reduced to a skeleton, and can do nothing, the
Emperor orders his lieutenant to detach a third of the Army of Portugal
beyond the reach of recall. But the English, though indeed there were
many sick, had not 20,000 but exactly 38,311 men with the colours at
that moment, not to speak of 24,391 Portuguese, of whom the Emperor (as
usual) took no account in his calculations[756]. Wellington had been
patiently waiting for months for the moment when the Army of Portugal
should no longer be able to ‘contain’ him. The Emperor was obliging
enough to provide the opportunity in December 1811, and when Montbrun
had marched with two divisions of foot and one of horse to the other
side of the Peninsula, Wellington struck, suddenly and successfully.
‘The movements of Marmont’s army towards Toledo, to aid Suchet as is
supposed, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad
Rodrigo,’ wrote Wellington on the 28th of that month[757]. On the 9th
of January, 1812, the place was invested; on the 19th it fell; and then
followed in rapid succession all the triumphs of 1812. There were other
circumstances, to be mentioned in their due place, which facilitated
Wellington’s advance: but the departure of Montbrun’s 15,000 men for
Valencia, by the Emperor’s direct command, was the main governing fact.
It is impossible to deny assent to Marmont’s bitter criticism on the
orders that kept coming to him during the autumn and early winter of
1811. ‘Napoleon was at this period living in a non-existent world,
created by his own imagination. He built structures in the air, he
took his desires for realities, and gave orders as if ignorant of
the true state of affairs, as if the actual facts had been purposely
hidden from him[758].’ It was no use to tell him that magazines were
non-existent, that numbers were low, that roads were impracticable,
that communications were intercepted, that he had undervalued the
enemy’s forces; he continued, with all serenity, to ignore tiresome
hindrances, and to issue orders grounded on data many weeks old, often
on data which had never been true at any moment, but which it suited
him to believe. And so the catastrophe of 1812 came nearer.
[756] To be exact, Wellington’s Return of November 22, the day
after Napoleon dictated this dispatch, was:--
British. Present, 38,311; Detached, 3,917; sick (present and
absent), 16,000.
Portuguese. Present, 24,391; Detached, 2,087; sick (present and
absent), 6,000.
[757] Memorandum, dated 28th December, 1811, at Freneda.
(_Dispatches_, viii. pp. 518-19.)
[758] Note in Correspondence, Appendix of vol. iv of _Mémoires_,
p. 259.
We have now taken the operations of Wellington and his chief
adversaries, Marmont and Dorsenne, down to the winter of 1811. But
there still remains to be told the story of the autumn months in the
secondary fields of operations in southern Spain. The doings of Soult
in Andalusia have been followed no further than July and August, when,
returning from the relief of Badajoz, he freed Seville from the menaces
of Blake, and forced the Murcian army to take refuge with undignified
haste within the boundaries of its own province[759]. Nor has anything
been said about the operations of Hill in Estremadura, where he lay
opposite Drouet and the French 5th Corps from August to December. With
these subsidiary affairs we now have to deal.
[759] See pp. 474-82 above.
Soult’s victorious campaign on the border of Murcia, and the flight
of Freire’s army homewards, had reaffirmed the French domination in
eastern Andalusia, to the extent that the large towns and the main
lines of communication were again safe. But the Alpujarras were still
in arms, and Ballasteros was giving much trouble from his new base in
the extreme south. Excited by his presence, the Serranos of the Sierra
de Ronda spread their incursions on every side, as far as Osuna and
Marbella, in spite of all the efforts of Godinot, who had been told
off to crush them. The strength of Ballasteros’s position was that he
had behind him two secure places of refuge--the old Spanish lines in
front of Gibraltar, with the great fortress behind them, and, thirty
miles away, the newly-repaired stronghold of Tarifa, which had been
held since the late winter by a detachment of the British garrison of
Gibraltar. Avoiding serious combats, and confining his ambition to the
surprise of small posts and the cutting off of detachments, Ballasteros
made himself such a nuisance to the French that Soult at last prepared
a great combined scheme for surrounding him. Godinot’s force, operating
from the north, was to work in unison with two other columns under
Generals Barrois and Sémelé, sent out by Victor from the lines in front
of Cadiz. The concentric advance only succeeded in driving Ballasteros
southward, not in trapping him. He evacuated San Roque and Algesiras,
and went under the protection of the cannon of Gibraltar, from which
secure position he defied the enemy (October 14th-15th). For a moment
10,000 French lay before the English fortress, but they had not come
prepared for a siege, and soon departed when their provisions failed.
Godinot then made a dash at the much weaker walls of Tarifa, but was
caught on the march along the seaside road--the only one that cannon
could take--by a squadron of British warships, which did him so much
damage that he drew off inland without even reaching his objective
(October 18).
Meanwhile Ballasteros, slipping out from under the cover of Gibraltar
the moment that his enemy was gone, followed Sémelé’s column, which
was returning to the Cadiz lines by a separate route, and surprised it
at Bornos (November 5). The French (1,500 men of the 16th Léger) cut
their way through the enemy with the loss of only 100 men[760]; but a
_Juramentado_ battalion which was accompanying them threw up the butts
of its muskets and surrendered _en masse_ or dispersed, and a howitzer
was captured.
[760] Martinien’s invaluable lists show only three officers
wounded in the 16th.
Soult was incensed at the failure of his great combined movement, and
laid the blame on Godinot, who after a stormy interview with his chief
at Seville committed suicide. The chase of Ballasteros began again,
with a new set of hunters; but, as we shall see in a later chapter, was
destined to prove fruitless. Nor did a serious attempt to beleaguer
Tarifa with a heavy siege-train come to any good. But its siege, though
commenced in the last days of the old year 1811, belongs rather to the
campaign of 1812, and will be dealt with in the next volume of this
work.
There remains only to be considered the state of affairs in
Estremadura, where we left Hill with his two divisions, facing Drouet
and the 5th Corps, in July. Their forces were not unequal[761], and
each had been given by his commander a defensive rather than an
offensive rôle. Soult had directed Drouet to see that Badajoz was not
molested, to keep up communication, via Truxillo, with the Armies of
Portugal and the Centre, and to risk nothing. If the Allies detached
more troops into the Alemtejo, he was to make no attempt to face
superior numbers, but to call without delay for help to his neighbours,
and to retire on Merida or on Monasterio as seemed more suitable at the
moment. But it was judged unlikely that Wellington would be able to
make any serious detachment southward, so long as he was ‘contained’
by the Army of Portugal, which lay in the valley of the Tagus, ready
to move towards Ciudad Rodrigo on the one hand, or Badajoz on the
other, as necessity might dictate. Meanwhile here, as everywhere else
in western Spain, the French had completely abandoned the offensive,
and their plans contemplated the parrying of Wellington’s strokes,
rather than the delivery of any blows of their own. The scheme for an
attack on the Alemtejo, which Napoleon had suggested to Marmont[762],
was never within any measurable distance of being put into practical
operation. By this time the only part of the Peninsula in which the
Imperial armies retained an offensive posture was the east coast.
Suchet had started on that Valencian expedition which was to have such
brilliant success in itself, but was to indirectly destroy the French
hold on Spain, by calling away troops from opposite Wellington at the
critical moment in the midwinter of 1811-12.