CHAPTER III

SIR GARNET WOLSELEY AT PRETORIA

Our disaster at Isandlwana caused enormous excitement in Pretoria.

Great and unconcealed rejoicing among the Boers took place; work was

suspended, all heads were put together to make capital out of Great

Britain's misfortunes. Notices were sent out on the 18th of March,

summoning the burghers to a mass meeting to be held some thirty

miles from the town. These meetings, it must here be noted, were

scarcely attended by invitation. A large number of the people

appeared on compulsion, brought "to the scratch" by threats. One of

the menaces, a favourite one according to Mr. Rider Haggard, was

that those who did not attend should be made "biltong" of when the

country was given back. Biltong is meat cut into strips and hung in

the sun to dry. The result of the notices, backed by threats, was a

meeting of some three thousand armed Boers, who evidently meant

mischief.

The threatening aspect of the Boers caused the corps known as the

Pretoria Horse, a corps raised for the purpose of acting as cavalry

on the Zulu border, to be retained for service in and around the

capital. While matters stood thus, and the general discontent seemed

to portend even further hostilities, Sir Bartle Frere went to

Pretoria for the purpose of discussing affairs with the Boer

leaders. These all clamoured for their independence. They had gone

as far as to assert it by stopping posts, carts, and persons, and

sending armed patrols about the country.

Nothing definite resulted from this attitude, however, for before

very long the conclusion--the successful conclusion--of the Zulu war

appeared imminent, and those in revolt against British authority saw

plainly that there would shortly be troops in plenty at hand to

restore law and order. Consequently for the time being they

subsided. The loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal entertained Sir

Bartle Frere prior to his departure, and at the public dinner given

on that occasion at Potchefstrom, he took the opportunity to assure

them that the Transvaal would never be given back! It may be

interesting to some to know, that at a public meeting on the 24th

of April in Pretoria, within a week of the breaking up of the camp

which had been threatening its safety, the following resolution was

passed:--

"This meeting reprobates most strongly the action of a certain

section of the English and Colonial press for censuring, without

sufficient knowledge of local affairs, the policy and conduct of Sir

Bartle Frere, and it desires not only to express its sympathy with

Sir Bartle Frere, and its confidence in his policy, but also to go

so far as to congratulate most heartily her Majesty the Queen, the

Home Government, and ourselves, on possessing such a true,

considerate, and faithful servant as his Excellency the High

Commissioner."

Having made allusion to Sir Bartle Frere's departure, it may be as

well to explain that before the battle of Ulundi it was arranged

that Sir Garnet Wolseley should be sent out from home to supersede

Lord Chelmsford in the command of the army, Sir H. Bulwer as

Governor of Natal, and Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner of the

Transvaal, Natal, and all the eastern portion of South Africa. Sir

Garnet reached Cape Town on the 28th of June, and proceeded without

delay to Natal. But, as we know, before he could reach the seat of

war the battle of Ulundi was won.

The fighting was now at an end; the Zulus expressed themselves

beaten, and Cetchwayo, after an exciting chase, which space does not

permit us to describe, was taken prisoner on the 28th of August. He

was afterwards removed to Cape Town, and rooms were given him in the

castle. Hostilities having happily terminated in Zululand, Sir

Garnet Wolseley then started for Pretoria. He there finally set up

the government of a Crown Colony with a nominative Executive Council

and Legislative Assembly.

One of his first acts on reaching Pretoria was to issue a notable

proclamation. It ran thus:----

"Whereas it appears, that notwithstanding repeated assurances of

contrary effect given by her Majesty's representatives in this

territory, uncertainty or misapprehension exists among some of her

Majesty's subjects as to the intention of her Majesty's Government

regarding the maintenance of British rule and sovereignty over the

territory of the Transvaal: and whereas it is expedient that all

grounds for such uncertainty or misapprehension should be removed

once and for all beyond doubt or question: now therefore I do hereby

proclaim and make known, in the name and on behalf of her Majesty

the Queen, that it is the will and determination of her Majesty's

Government that this Transvaal territory shall be, and shall

continue to be for ever, an integral portion of her Majesty's

dominions in South Africa."

On the same subject Sir Bartle Frere, writing to England, said that

he was very certain "that to give up the Transvaal is as little to

be thought of as surrendering Ireland or India." In his opinion the

Boer malcontents were few and inconsequential, most of the leaders

and instigators being foreigners, who were personally interested in

making themselves prominent, owing to the prevailing notion that the

country would be given up. As to the effect of the abandonment of

the Transvaal on the prospects of confederation he said: "To every

colony concerned such a step would appear as a confession of

weakness, of infirmity of purpose, and of disregard for solemn

pledges and obligations, which would destroy all respect, all wish

to belong to a Government which could so behave."

In writing to Sir M. Hicks Beach, in December 1879, Sir Bartle gave

his personal impression of the feeling in Pretoria at the time of

the annexation:--

"When our power of enforcing the law and upholding the authority of

Government were at the lowest, in April last, ... experienced men

at Pretoria gave me, through Colonel Lanyon, the following estimate

of the strength of parties in the malcontent camp. The educated and

intelligent men of influence, who advocated the most extreme

measures, or were prepared to acquiesce in them, were reckoned at

not more than eight. Three, or perhaps four, were men of property

in the Transvaal; the rest foreign adventurers, with no property

and little weight beyond that due to their skill as political

agitators. Their unflinching and uncompromising followers in the

Boer camp were not reckoned at more than eighty. The disaffected

waverers who, according to circumstances, would follow the majority

either to acts of overt resistance to Government and lawless

violence, or to grumble and disperse, 'accepting the inevitable,'

were reckoned at about eight hundred at the outside. The rest of

the camp, variously estimated as containing from sixteen hundred to

four thousand in all, but probably never exceeding two thousand

five hundred present at one time, were men brought to the camp by

intimidation, compulsion, or curiosity, who would not willingly

resist the authority of Government, and would, if assured of

protection, prefer to side with it."

Viewed in the light of later events, these opinions are extremely

interesting and cannot be disregarded.

[Illustration: OFFICER of the 16th LANCERS.

Photo by Gregory and Co., London.]

Before passing on, it is necessary to state that during the period

from 1878 to 1879, the native chief Sekukuni--Cetchwayo's dog, as

the blacks called him--had become obstreperous. He had been engaged

in raids into the Transvaal--raids of the same character as those

which, as has been already mentioned, had helped to bring about the

collapse of the Republic. Colonel Rowland's expedition, which

started in November 1878 for the suppression of this ruffian, was

baffled by fever and horse sickness. Colonel Lanyon in the following

June returned to the attack, and was on the eve of success, when Sir

Garnet Wolseley (who arrived late in that month) sent orders to

cease operations. These orders he found, on reaching the

Transvaal, to be a mistake. Sekukuni was not a person to be trifled

with nor ignored, so the campaign began again in November, with the

result that within a period of eight days the chief's stronghold was

taken and himself made prisoner. About fifty Europeans and some five

hundred Swazi allies were killed or wounded.

Here we see, within one year, how much was done for the protection

of the Transvaal at the cost of British money and British blood.

Looking back, it is easy to perceive that, but for our intervention,

the South African Republic would have been slowly but effectually

swallowed up. Cetchwayo and Sekukuni between them would have made a

meal of the Transvaal.

The brilliant and complete success of Sir Garnet Wolseley was highly

praised, and the names of Colonel Lanyon, Captain Clark, R.A., and

Captain Carrington especially mentioned as deserving a share of the

credit for the accurate information they had collected during the

previous months.

So much having been done for the security of the Boers and for the

maintenance of British prestige, it is no marvel that Sir Garnet

Wolseley thought himself justified in expressing the trend of

British policy in plain terms. At the dinner given at Pretoria on

the 17th of December 1879 he took the opportunity of making the

British programme well understood. He declared with emphasis that

there could be no question of resigning the sovereignty of the

country. "There is no Government," he said, "Whig or Tory, Liberal,

Conservative, or Radical, who would dare under any circumstances to

give back this country. They would not dare, because the English

people would not allow them!" At that time it was evident that Sir

Garnet had never heard the story of the philanthropic Belarmine, an

individual who gave himself to the she-bear to save her and her

young ones from starvation. Or, if the tale was known to him, he

probably took it for what it was worth, and never foresaw that the

British Government would emulate the action of the self-sacrificing

lunatic, and spend precious blood for the sole purpose of nourishing

and resuscitating the powers of a languishing enemy.

MR. GLADSTONE OUT OF OFFICE AND IN OFFICE

But British speeches and proclamations had ceased to impress the

Boers. They had had too many of them, and they began to think the

British Government a somewhat knock-kneed institution whose joints

had ceased to hold together. Sir Garnet Wolseley, however, with

characteristic energy and determination, dealt with the malcontents

one by one, converting them, and causing them to sensibly consider

on which side their bread was buttered. Indeed, so diplomatically

did he conduct his work, that a sop was given to the aggressive

Pretorius, who, instead of being put in prison as he deserved, was

offered a seat on the Executive Council, with a salary attached.

This he was inclined to jump at, but, at the time, public feeling

ran too high to allow of his making a decision. The fact was that

the political speeches delivered by Mr. Gladstone in the south of

Scotland, during the months of November and December 1879, were

putting a new complexion on affairs. They were reprinted all the

world over, and they were profusely circulated among the Boers. The

Boer leaders and obstructionists at once saw in this British

statesman their saviour, and were convinced that, on the return of

Mr. Gladstone to power, their independence would be assured. They

therefore sent Messrs. Kruger and Joubert as a deputation to the

Cape, and these two gentlemen persuaded the Cape Parliament to

reject the Confederation Scheme then being proposed by Sir Bartle

Frere. Selections from the attacks on the Government, from which the

Boers then derived their encouragement and support, are here

reprinted in order that the sincerity of Mr. Gladstone's attitude

may be examined.

Speaking in Edinburgh, he said of the Government:--

"They have annexed in Africa the Transvaal territory, inhabited by a

free European, Christian, Republican community, which they have

thought proper to bring within the limits of a Monarchy, although

out of 8000 persons in that Republic qualified to vote upon the

subject, we are told--and I have never seen the statement officially

contradicted--that 6500 protested against it. These are the

circumstances under which we undertake to transform Republicans into

subjects of a Monarchy."

Now, Sir T. Shepstone's despatches show that the ground on which the

Transvaal was annexed was because the State was drifting into

anarchy, was bankrupt, and was about to be destroyed by native

tribes. He said "that most thinking men in the country saw no other

way out of the difficulty," and Carlyle has taught us what is the

proportion between thinking men and the general public. He also

said, in the fifteenth paragraph of his despatch to Lord Carnarvon

of the 6th of March 1877, that petitions signed by 2500 people,

representing every class of the community, out of a total adult male

population of 8000, had been presented to the Government of the

Republic, setting forth its difficulties and dangers, and praying it

"to treat with me for their amelioration or removal." He likewise

stated, and with perfect truth, that many more would have signed had

it not been for the terrorism that was exercised, and that all the

towns and villages in the country desired the change.

Mr. Gladstone went on to say:--

"We have made war on the Zulus. We have thereby become responsible

for their territory; and not only this, but we are now, as it

appears from the latest advices, about to make war upon a chief

lying to the northward of the Zulus; and Sir Bartle Frere, who was

the great authority for the proceedings of the Government in

Afghanistan, has announced in South Africa that it will be necessary

for us to extend our dominions until we reach the Portuguese

frontier to the north. So much for Africa."

At Dalkeith he remarked:--

"If we cast our eyes to South Africa, what do we behold? That a

nation whom we term savages have, in defence of their own land,

offered their naked bodies to the terribly improved artillery and

arms of modern European science, and have been mowed down by

hundreds and by thousands, having committed no offence, but having,

with rude and ignorant courage, done what were for them, and done

faithfully and bravely what were for them the duties of patriotism.

You may talk of glory, you may offer rewards,--and you are right to

give rewards to the gallantry of your soldiers, who I think are

entitled not only to our admiration for courage, but to our

compassion for the nature of the duties they have been called to

perform--but the grief and pain none the less remain."

At Glasgow he continued in the same strain:--

"In Africa you have before you the memory of bloodshed, of military

disaster, the record of 10,000 Zulus--such is the computation of

Bishop Colenso--slain for no other offence than their attempt to

defend against your artillery, with their naked bodies, their

hearths and homes, their wives and families. You have the invasion

of a free people in the Transvaal, and you have, I fear, in one

quarter or another--I will not enter into details, which might be

injurious to the public interest--prospects of further disturbance

and shedding of blood."

These speeches, as may be imagined, did an incalculable amount of

mischief. Besides fanning the smouldering sparks of discontent, they

served up catchwords wholesale for that section of the British

public whose political machinery is largely fed by catchwords. But,

as has been decided by axiom, "any stick will serve to beat a dog

with," and the Transvaal difficulty was a convenient weapon for the

attack on the Government. The real feeling of the Boer community was

an outside matter, and, as we shall presently see, had nothing to do

with the case, though in March 1880 Mr. Gladstone had the

satisfaction of receiving a letter from a committee of Boer

malcontents, wherein "he was thanked for the great sympathy shown in

their fate." The thanks were a little premature. In April 1880 the

elections took place, and Mr. Gladstone came into power with a

large majority. Then he was asked the great question: Would he

maintain his oft-repeated pledge to retain the Transvaal, or would

he continue to take up the tone of his Midlothian denunciations?

The riddle was shortly to be solved. In the debate on the Queen's

Speech the Prime Minister thus expressed himself: "I do not know

whether there is an absolute union of opinion on this side of the

House as to the policy in which the assumption of the Transvaal

originated. Undoubtedly, as far as I am myself concerned, I did not

approve of that assumption. I took no part in questioning it nor in

the attempt to condemn it, because, in my opinion, whether the

assumption was wise or unwise, it having been done, no good but only

mischief was to be done by the intervention of this House. But

whatever our original opinions were on that policy--and the opinions

of the majority of those who sit on this side of the House were

decidedly adverse to it--we had to confront a state of facts; and

the main fact which met us was the existence of the large native

population in the Transvaal, to whom, by the establishment of the

Queen's supremacy, we hold ourselves to have given a pledge. That is

the acceptance of facts, and that is the sense in which my right

honourable friend, and all those who sit with him, may, if they

think fit, say we accept the principles on which the late Government

proceeded. It is quite possible to accept the consequences of a

policy, and yet to retain the original difference of opinion with

regard to the character of that policy as long as it was a matter of

discussion."

And shortly after he wrote to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert:--

"It is undoubtedly matter for much regret that it should, since the

annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population

of Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of

that territory, but it is impossible to consider that question as if

it were presented for the first time. We have to deal with a state

of things which has existed for a considerable period, during which

obligations have been contracted, especially, though not

exclusively, towards the native population, which cannot be set

aside.

"Looking to all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the

rest of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal

of disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only

to the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is,

that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over

the Transvaal, but, consistently with the maintenance of that

sovereignty, we desire that the white inhabitants of the Transvaal

should, without prejudice to the rest of the population, enjoy the

fullest liberty to manage their local affairs. We believe that this

liberty may be most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal as

a member of a South African Confederation."

THE COMMENCEMENT OF REBELLION

When the Liberal Ministry came into power, it will be observed, Mr.

Gladstone's attitude changed, and that he was compelled to abandon

the sympathetic tone of his Midlothian speeches. How far he really

meant to be bound by the promise made that "the Queen cannot be

advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal" is not

known, for later on, in June 1881, in a letter to the Transvaal

loyalists, he explains that there was "no mention of the terms or

date of this promise. If the reference be to my letter of the 8th of

June 1880 to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, I do not think the language

of that letter justifies the description given. Nor am I sure in

what manner, or to what degree, the fullest liberty to manage their

local affairs, which I then said her Majesty's Government desired to

confer on the white population of the Transvaal, differs from the

settlement now about being made in its bearing on the interests of

those whom your committee represents."

This letter was a masterpiece of one whose talent for ambiguity was

becoming world famous, and a stone in shape of a loaf was thus

hurled at the heads of the expectant loyalists.

But to return to the events of 1880. Finding that the Premier was no

longer to be the mainstay of their hopes, the Boers began to renew their

agitations. These agitations, it will be remembered, during the end of

the Zulu war and Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival in the Transvaal, were

merely suppressed, because at that time British ascendency throughout

the country seemed to be established. An excellent opportunity for

rebellion now suggested itself. The Cape Government was engaged with the

Basuto war. Sir Owen Lanyon, who succeeded Sir T. Shepstone in March

1879, had supplied a body of 300 or more volunteers--mostly

loyalists--to assist in the military operations, while the only regiment

of cavalry had been sent elsewhere by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Big things

have often small beginnings, and the Boer rebellion, that has brought so

many complications in its train, commenced with a very small incident. A

certain Bezeidenhout, having refused to pay his taxes, had, by order,

some of his goods seized and put up to auction. This was the signal for

the malcontents to attack the auctioneer and rescue the goods. So great

became the uproar and confusion, the women aiding and abetting the men

in their disobedience of the law, that military assistance was summoned.

Major Thornhill, with a few companies of the 21st Regiment, was sent to

support the Landrost in arresting the rioters, and special constables

were enrolled to assist him in restoring order. But these united

exertions were unavailing. All attempts to carry out the arrests were

openly set at defiance. This scene occurred on the 11th of November

1880. On the 26th Sir George Colley--who had relieved Sir Garnet

Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief--was applied to for more troops. Sir

George, who was daily expecting an outbreak of Pondos, and a possible

appeal for help from Cape Colony, merely suggested that the "authorities

should be assisted by the loyal inhabitants." This, it must be owned,

was hard on the royalists, who from that time to this have had to pay

dearly for their allegiance to the Crown. A mass meeting was held at

Paade kraal, where Krugersdorp now stands, and the rioters unanimously

decided to commit their cause to the Almighty, and to live or die in the

struggle for independence. Thereupon Messrs. Kruger, Pretorius, and

Joubert were elected a triumvirate to conduct the Government, and on the

16th of December 1880 (Dingaan's Day) the Republic was formally

proclaimed, and its flag again hoisted. The proclamation, dealing with

the events of the preceding years, and offering terms to her Majesty's

Government, was forwarded to Sir Owen Lanyon. The Boer leaders therein

expressed their willingness to enter into confederation and to guide

their native policy by general rules adopted in concurrence "with the

Colonies and States of South Africa," and at the same time declared that

they had no desire for war or the spilling of blood. "It lies," they

said, "in your hands to force us to appeal to arms in self-defence."

On the very day of the proclamation, however, blood was shed.

Commandant Cronje, with a party of burghers, marched into

Potchefstroom for the purpose of printing the proclamation. They

promptly seized the printing-office, and Major Clarke, who thought

it advisable to interfere, was refused admittance. Soon after a Boer

patrol fired on our mounted infantry, who returned the compliment.

That was the signal for the opening of hostilities. On this matter

it may be urged that Boer reports differ from ours, but Boer

veracity may be defined by the algebraic quantity _x_, and cannot be

accepted. Lieutenant-Colonel Winsloe, of the 21st Regiment, who was

commanding at a fort outside the village, signalled orders to Major

Clarke to begin firing. This officer was fortified in the Landrost's

office with a small force of some twenty soldiers and twenty

civilians, while the Boers occupied positions in the surrounding

houses. The siege lasted two days (during the 17th and the morning

of the 18th), and then when one officer (Captain Falls) and five men

had been killed and the thatched roof fired, Major Clarke deemed it

best to surrender. Colonel Winsloe held the camp throughout the war,

surrendering only after an armistice was declared.

A still more terrible disaster was in store. Mr Rider Haggard, who is

perhaps the best authority on the subject, describes it as a "most cruel

and carefully planned massacre." Other writers, however, hold that the

outrage could scarcely be called a massacre, since Colonel Anstruther

had been fully warned of the risks he ran of Boer treachery and Boer

artifice. It appears that Colonel Anstruther had received orders from

Sir Owen Lanyon to concentrate his forces in Pretoria. Accordingly, he

marched from Lydenburg--situated about 180 miles from Pretoria--with

such troops as he had at his disposal. These were two companies of the

94th Regiment. They were accompanied by three women, two children, and a

ponderous train of luggage-waggons. Their progress was necessarily slow,

but the Colonel, in spite of having been warned of Boer ways and Boer

tactics, evinced no anxiety. Indeed, from all accounts it appears that

he followed the good old British habit of under-estimating the enemy's

physical, while over-estimating his moral, qualities. For this reason he

probably disregarded the precautions necessary after the warnings he had

received on starting. Be this as it may, on the 20th of December he and

his long waggon-train were nearing a point called Bronker's Spruit,

about thirty-eight miles from Pretoria, when suddenly there appeared a

huge crowd of some five hundred mounted Boers. From this crowd a man was

seen approaching with a white flag. The column, about half a mile in

length, halted; the band ceased; Colonel Anstruther advanced to the

parley. The messenger then handed a letter. It was an intimation of the

establishment of the South African Republic, and declared that till Sir

Owen Lanyon's reply to the proclamation was received, and they were

aware whether war was or was not declared, they could not allow the

progress of troops. The Colonel's reply was plain. He was ordered to

proceed to Pretoria, and proceed he would.

Then, before Colonel Anstruther had rejoined his column, a volley

was poured in on them by the farmers, who, emerging from the cover

of rocks and trees, had gradually closed round the troops. A

vigorous but short resistance followed. The Boers, skilled by long

practice in marking their most cherished enemies, picked off the

officers one by one. Seven out of nine dropped to their guns, while

a perpetual hailstorm of bullets beat over men, women, and waggons.

In a few minutes so many were disabled that the Colonel, himself

mortally wounded, had to surrender. Out of the party 56 were killed

and 101 wounded. One of these was a woman.

A great deal was said at the time by British sympathisers of the

kindness of the Boers to the prisoners and wounded of their

antagonists; but the opinions of Mr. Rider Haggard and Sir Owen

Lanyon are worth considering. The former, in writing of this

engagement, says that "after the fight Conductor Egerton, with a

sergeant, was allowed to walk into Pretoria to obtain medical

assistance, the Boers refusing to give him a horse, or even allow

him to use his own.... I may mention that a Zulu driver, who was

with the rear-guard, and escaped into Natal, stated that the Boers

shot all the wounded men who formed that body. His statement was to

a certain extent borne out by the evidence of one of the survivors,

who stated that all the bodies found in that part of the field,

nearly three-quarters of a mile away from the head of the column,

had a bullet-hole through the head or breast, in addition to their

other wounds." The Administrator of the Transvaal in Council thus

comments on the occurrence in an official minute: "The surrounding

and gradual hemming in under a flag of truce of a force, and the

selection of spots from which to direct their fire, as in the case

of the unprovoked attack of the rebels upon Colonel Anstruther's

force, is a proceeding of which very few like incidents can be

mentioned in the annals of civilised warfare."

Sir Owen Lanyon, writing from the scene of action in Pretoria,

says--"The Boers were very clever in being kind to our wounded

soldiers, for they well knew that such action would obtain sympathy

at home. But where it was impossible for their deeds to become known

their conduct was far from creditable to them. Poor Clarke and Raaf

were kept for two months in a dark room, and were only allowed out

twice for exercise. Barlow was robbed of everything, and only left

the clothes he stood in. A Hollander, who is secretary to Cronje at

Potchefstrom, is still wearing the rings of poor Captain Falls, who

was shot. Englishmen have been murdered, flogged, and robbed of

everything. The Boers at Potchefstrom forced the prisoners of war to

dig their trenches, and some were shot from the Fort while so

employed. Woite and Van der Linden were shot as spies, because they

had been in the Boer camp and left it some days before they

proclaimed the Republic. Carolus, a Cape boy, was shot by Boer

court-martial because he left the Fort when food became scarce. A

white man and nine natives were similarly shot without any trial.

Explosive bullets were used, notwithstanding that Colonel Winsloe

pointed out to the Boer leader in a letter that such was against the

rules of war."

There is ample evidence that acts of treachery and barbarity similar

to and worse than those mentioned by Colonel Lanyon were perpetrated

by the insurgents.

THE FATE OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT

The sole officer who escaped from the massacre at Bronker's Spruit

was Captain Elliot, who was subsequently treacherously murdered

while crossing the Vaal. The account of this tragedy was given by

Major Lambart in a report to Sir George Colley, and should be read

by all who wish to get a fair view of the events of that period,

particularly by those who insist on our brother-relationship to the

Boers:--

"SIR,--I have the honour to report, for the information of his

Excellency, that as I was returning from the Orange Free State on

December 18 (where I had been on duty buying horses to mount

Commandant Ferreira's men for the Basuto war, and also remounts for

my troop of Mounted Infantry and the Royal Artillery), when about

thirty miles from Pretoria, on the road from Heidelberg, I was

suddenly taken prisoner by a party of twenty or thirty Boers, who

galloped down on me (all around), and, capturing the horses, was

taken back to Heidelberg. After being there some six or eight days,

I was joined by Captain and Paymaster Elliot, 94th Regiment (the

only officer not wounded in the attack on the detachment of the 94th

Regiment), who arrived with some forty prisoners of war of the 94th

Regiment. On the following day (the 24th of December) we received a

written communication from the Secretary of the Republican

Government, to the effect 'that the members of the said Government

would call on us at 3.30 that day,' which they did. The purport of

their interview being 'That at a meeting of Council they had decided

to give us one of two alternatives. (1) To remain prisoners of war

during hostilities in the Transvaal. (2) To be released on _parole,

d'honneur_, that we would leave the Transvaal at once, cross into

the Free State under escort, and not bear arms against the

Republican Government during the war.' Time being given us for

deliberation, Captain Elliot and myself decided to accept No. 2

alternative, and communicated the same to the Secretary of the South

African Republic, who informed us, in the presence of the

Commandant-General, P. Joubert, that we could leave next day, taking

with us all our private property. The following days being

respectively Christmas Day and Sunday, we were informed we could not

start till Monday, on which day, having signed our _parole

d'honneur_, my horses were harnessed, and we were provided with a

duplicate of our parole or free pass, signed by Commandant-General,

and escort of two men to show us the road to the nearest drift over

the Vaal River, distant twenty-five miles, and by which P. Joubert

personally told us both we should cross, as there was a punt there.

We started about 1 P.M. from the Boer camp, passing through the town

of Heidelberg. After going about six or eight miles I noticed we

were not going the right road, and mentioned the fact to the escort,

who said it was all right. Having been 'look-out' officer in the

Transvaal, I knew the district well. I was certain we were going

wrong, but we had to obey orders. At nightfall we found ourselves

nowhere near the river drift; and were ordered to outspan for the

night, and next morning the escort told us they would look for the

drift. In spanning at daybreak we again started, but after driving

about for some hours across country, I told the escort we would stop

where we were while they went to search for the drift. Shortly after

they returned and said they had found it, and we must come, which we

did, eventually arriving at the junction of two rivers (Vaal and

Klip), where we found the river Vaal impassable, but which they said

we must cross. I pointed out that it was impossible to get my

carriage or horses over by it, and that it was not the punt the

General said we were to cross. The escort replied it was to

Pretorius' Punt that the General told them to take us, and we must

cross; that we must leave the carriage behind and swim the horses,

which we refused to do, as we should then have had no means of

getting on. I asked them to show me their written instructions,

which they did (written in Dutch), and I pointed out that the name

of Pretorius was not in it. I then told them they must either take

us back to the Boer camp again or on to the proper drift. We turned

back, and after going a few miles the escort disappeared. Not

knowing where we were, I proposed to Captain Elliot we should go to

the banks of the Vaal and follow the river till we came to the

proper punt. After travelling all Monday, Tuesday, and up till

Wednesday about 1 P.M., when we found ourselves four hours, or

twenty-five miles, from Spencer's Punt, we were suddenly stopped by

two armed Boers who handed us an official letter, which was opened

and found to be from the Secretary to the Republican Government,

stating that the members were surprised that as officers and

gentlemen we had broken our _parole d'honneur_ and refused to leave

the Transvaal; that if we did not do so immediately by the nearest

drift, which the bearers would show us, we must return as prisoners

of war; that as through our ignorance of the language of the country

there might be some misunderstanding, they were loth to think we had

willingly broken our promise. We explained that we should reply to

the letter, and request them to take it to their Government, and

were prepared to go with them at once. They took us back to a

farmhouse, where we were told to wait till they fetched their

Commandant, who arrived about 6 P.M., and repeated to us the same

that was complained of in our letter of that day. We told him we

were ready to explain matters, and requested him to take our answer

back to camp. He then ordered us to start at once for the drift. I

asked him, as it was then getting dark, if we could start early next

morning, but he refused. So we started, he having said we should

cross at Spencer's, being closest. As we left the farmhouse, I

pointed out to him that we were going in the wrong direction, but he

said, 'Never mind, come on across a drift close at hand.' When we

got opposite it, he kept straight on; I called to him, and said this

was where we were to cross. His reply was, 'Come on.' I then said to

Captain Elliot, 'They intend taking us back to Pretorius,' a

distance of some forty miles. Suddenly the escort (which had all at

once increased from two to eight men, which Captain Elliot pointed

out to me, and I replied, 'I suppose they are determined we shall

not escape, which they need not be afraid of, as we are too keen to

get over the border') wheeled sharp down to the river, stopped, and

pointing to the banks, said, 'There is the drift; cross.' Being

pitch dark, with vivid lightning, the river roaring past, and as I

knew impassable, I asked, 'Had we not better wait till morning, as

we do not know the drift?' They replied, 'No; cross at once.' I

drove my horses into the river, when they immediately fell; lifted

them, and drove on about five or six yards, when we fell into a

hole. Got them out with difficulty, and advanced another yard, when

we got stuck against a rock. The current was now so strong, and

drift deep, my cart was turned over on to its side, and water rushed

over the seat. I called out to the Commandant on the bank that we

were stuck, and to send assistance, or might we return? to which he

replied, 'If you do we will shoot you.' I then tried, but failed to

get the horses to move. Turning to Captain Elliot, who was sitting

beside me, I said, 'We must swim for it,' and asked could he swim?

to which he replied, 'Yes.' I said, 'If you can't, I will stick to

you, for I can.' While we were holding this conversation, a volley

from the bank, ten or fifteen yards off, was fired into us, the

bullets passing through the tent of my cart, one of which must have

mortally wounded poor Elliot, who only uttered the single word 'Oh!'

and fell headlong into the river from the carriage. I immediately

sprang in after him, but was swept down the river under the current

some yards. On gaining the surface of the water, I could see nothing

of Elliot; I called out his name twice, but received no reply.

Immediately another volley was fired at me, making the water hiss

around where the bullets struck. I now struck out for the opposite

bank, which I reached with difficulty in about ten minutes; but as

it was deep, black mud, on landing I stuck fast, but eventually

reached the top of the bank, and ran for about two thousand yards

under a heavy fire the whole while. The night being pitch dark, but

lit up every minute by vivid flashes of lightning, showed the enemy

my whereabouts. I found myself now in the Free State, but where I

could not tell, but knew my direction was south, while, though it

was raining, hailing, and blowing hard, and bitterly cold, an

occasional glimpse of the stars showed me I was going right. I

walked all that night and next day till one o'clock, when I

eventually crawled into a store kept by an Englishman called Mr.

Groom, who did all in his power to help me. I had tasted no food

since the previous morning at sunrise, and all the Dutch farmers

refused me water, so without hat or coat (which I had left on banks

of Vaal), and shoes worn through, I arrived exhausted at the above

gentleman's place, who kindly drove me to Heilbron, where I took the

post-cart to Maritzburg. I fear that Captain Elliot must have been

killed instantly, as he never spoke, neither did I see him again. I

have to mention that both Captain Elliot and myself, on being told

by South African Republican Government that the soldiers who had

been taken prisoners were to be released on the same conditions as

ourselves, expressed a wish to be allowed to keep charge of them,

which was refused, but we were told that waggons, food, and money

should be supplied to take them down country. But when they reached

Spencer's Punt over the Vaal were turned loose, without any of the

above necessaries, to find their way down country. They met an

English transport rider named Mr. F. Wheeler, who was going to

Pietermaritzburg with his waggon, which had been looted by the

Boers, and who kindly gave them transport, provided them with food,

and is bringing them to the city, which, as I passed them at the

Drakensburg on Tuesday, they should reach on Sunday next--consisting

of one sergeant and sixty-one men, all that remain of our Leydenburg

detachment and headquarters of the 94th Regiment.--I have the honour

to remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

"R. H. LAMBART,

_Captain Royal Scots Fusiliers_."

Major Lambart's report speaks more eloquently than many descriptions

as to the character of the "simple-minded Boer." We discovered to

our cost during the Indian Mutiny that the "gentle native" was not

all our fancy painted him, and it may be as well to realise that our

simple-minded and pious brother in the Transvaal is scarcely so

righteous as we have been led to suppose.

[Illustration: THE ORANGE RIVER AT NORVAL'S PONT.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

LAING'S NEK

Since we have been tracing the causes of the Boer rebellion, it may

be advisable to refer to a letter written on the 28th of December

1880 by Sir Bartle Frere to Mr. F. Greenwood, editor of the _St.

James's Gazette_. He therein throws a most important light on the

political position. He wrote: "In 1879, when I was among the Boers

in the Transvaal, I found that the real wire-pullers of their

Committee were foreigners of various nationalities, notably some

Hollanders (not Africanders), imbued with German Socialist

Republicanism, and an Irishman of the name of Aylward. I was told he

was a man of great natural ability, educated as a solicitor, an

ex-Fenian pardoned under another name (Murphy, I think), for turning

Queen's evidence against others who had murdered the policeman at

Manchester. Emigrating to the Diamond Fields, he was tried,

convicted, and suffered imprisonment there for homicide. When he

came out of prison he betook himself to the Transvaal and had a

command of foreign free lances under Mr. Burgers, then President of

the Transvaal Republic, in his unsuccessful attempt to take

Secocoeni's stronghold. After the annexation of the Transvaal he

came to England and published one of the few readable books on the

Transvaal, and went out to Natal during the darkest hours of our

Zulu troubles, seeking employment; but he was an impossible man, and

was urging the Boers to rise at the same time that he was offering

his services to me and Lord Chelmsford. Finally he settled at

Pietermaritzburg, where he was, when I last heard of him, as editor

of the _Witness_, writing anti-English republicanism and sedition

with much ability, especially when opposing the Cape Government and

its governor, whom he never forgave for warning the Boers against

following Fenian advice. When I was in the Transvaal and afterwards

I found him always connected with any opposition to the English

Government. He knew all the leaders of the simple-minded but very

suspicious Boers, and had gained their ear, so that he had no

difficulty in persuading them to reject any good advice I offered

them--'Wait-a-bit' being always the most acceptable suggestion you

can offer to a Boer.

"Directly I heard of the attack on our troops in the Transvaal, I

felt assured that my old acquaintance was pulling the wires with a

view to create a diversion in favour of his old colleagues in

Ireland.

"The attack took place apparently near the farm of Solomon Prinsloo,

one of the most bitter malcontent Boers, who was always a firebrand,

and who, when I visited the Boer camp in 1879, was with difficulty

held back by Pretorius and Kruger from directing an attack upon us

in Pretoria. I very much doubt whether, without some such external

instigation, the Boers would have broken out....

"The facts I have mentioned and many more about Aylward are on

record in Scotland Yard, and in the Colonial Office, and I am

anxious you should know the truth and not attribute too much of the

blame in this sad business to the unfortunate, misguided Boers, the

victims of his bad advice, still less to any fault of Colonel

Lanyon's administration."

Sir Bartle was right in his conjecture, for Aylward had joined the

insurgents and was one of the acknowledged leaders of Joubert's

staff.

Major-General Hope Crealock, in a letter to Sir Bartle, wrote

(January 7, 1881): "A young Irishman named S----, who knew Aylward

in Natal, and who was under my command in the Natal Pioneers, called

on me to-night and told me Aylward formerly used to boast of being a

Fenian, and vowed he would pay the English Government off for what

he had got, by raising the Boers whenever Ireland was rising; and

within the last few days has written to him saying he gloried in

being one of the instigators of the present Boer revolt, &c., &c. He

wrote from Utrecht...."

It will be seen from these quotations that our relations with the

Transvaal, hostile as they may have been, were scarcely true

relations--that the real enmity and rancour, the blood-spilling and

wretchedness that commenced at this period, and are at the moment of

writing still continuing, were due, firstly, to party spirit in

Great Britain, and secondly, to the machinations of adventurers,

who, having no status elsewhere, put the ignorance of a race of

farmers to their own vile uses.

To return to the events of the last chapter. When Sir Owen Lanyon

heard of the misfortune that had befallen Colonel Anstruther's

troops, he issued a proclamation placing the country under martial

law, and Sir George Colley, dreading the results of bad blood raised

between Boers and British soldiers by the affair at Bronker's

Spruit, caused the following general order to be published:--

"HEADQUARTERS, PIETERMARITZBURG,

_December 28th, 1880_.

"The Major-General Commanding regrets to inform the troops of his

command, that a detachment of 250 men of the 94th Regiment, on its

march from Leydenburg to Pretoria, was surprised and overwhelmed by

the Boers--120 being killed and wounded, and the rest taken

prisoners. The attack seems to have been made while the troops were

crossing a spruit, and extended to guard a long convoy. The

Major-General trusts to the courage, spirit, and discipline of the

troops of his command, to enable him promptly to retrieve this

misfortune, and to vindicate the authority of her Majesty and the

honour of the British arms. It is scarcely necessary to remind

soldiers of the incalculable advantage which discipline,

organisation, and trained skill give them over numerous but

undisciplined forces. These advantages have been repeatedly proved,

and have never failed to command success in the end against greater

odds, and greater difficulties, than we are now called on to contend

with. To all true soldiers the loss we have suffered will serve as

an incentive and stimulus to greater exertions; and the

Major-General knows well he can rely on the troops he has to

command, to show that endurance and courage which are the proud

inheritance of the British army. The stain cast on our arms must be

quickly effaced, and rebellion must be put down; but the

Major-General trusts that officers and men will not allow the

soldierly spirit which prompts to gallant action to degenerate into

a feeling of revenge. The task now forced on us by the unprovoked

action of the Boers is a painful one under any circumstances, and

the General calls on all ranks to assist him in his endeavours to

mitigate the suffering it must entail. We must be careful to avoid

punishing the innocent for the guilty, and must remember, that

though misled and deluded, the Boers are in the main a brave and

high-spirited people, and actuated by feelings that are entitled to

our respect. In the operations now about to be undertaken, the

General confidently trusts that the good behaviour of the men will

give him as much cause for pride and satisfaction as their conduct

and gallantry before the enemy, and that the result of their efforts

will be a speedy and successful termination to the war."

The proclamation had a good effect, particularly among the Dutch,

who, though loyal to the Crown, were much in sympathy with their

kinsmen in the Transvaal. On the 23rd of January 1881, General

Colley sent an ultimatum ordering the insurgents to disperse. Of

this no notice was taken until General Joubert, from Laing's Nek on

January the 29th, sent the following reply:----

"_To_ SIR GEORGE P. COLLEY.

"We beg to acknowledge receipt of yours of the 23rd. In reply, we

beg to state that, in terms of the letter, we are unable to comply

with your request, as long as your Excellency addresses us as

insurgents, and insinuates that we, the leaders, are wickedly

misleading a lot of ignorant men. It is nearly hopeless for us to

attempt to find the proper words for reply; but before the Lord we

would not be justified if we did not avail ourselves of this,

perhaps the last, opportunity of speaking to you as the

representative of her Majesty the Queen and people of England, for

whom we feel deep respect. We must emphatically repeat, we are

willing to comply with any wishes of the Imperial Government

tending to the consolidation and confederation of South Africa;

and, in order to make this offer from our side as clear and

unequivocal as possible,--although we have explained this point

fully in all our documents, and especially in paragraphs 36 to 38

of our first proclamation,--we declare that we would be satisfied

with a rescinding of the annexation and restoration of the South

African Republic under a protectorate of her Majesty the Queen, so

that once a year the British Flag shall be hoisted, all in strict

accordance with the above-mentioned clauses of our first

proclamation. If your Excellency resolves to reject this, we have

only to submit to our fate; but the Lord will provide."

Sir George Colley started on the 24th of January from Newcastle for

the border. The road from Newcastle to Laing's Nek runs up a

precipitous hill for three miles, and thence leads down the steep

mountain of Skheyns Hoogte. The movement of the column was slow and

laborious, the roads, if roads they could be called, were almost

impassable owing to great ruts, mud-holes deep enough to bury a

waggon up to the bed-planks, with boulders and other impediments

thrown in.

Here, as Laing's Nek is so prominent a feature in our history, it

may be well to give Mr. Carter's concise description of the

geographical nature of the position:--

"Laing's Nek is the lowest point in an unbroken ridge which connects

the Majuba Mountain with hills running right up to the banks of the

Buffalo River. A slight cutting, not more than four or five feet

deep, forms the waggon road over this ridge; from the waggon road on

either side the ground runs up somewhat abruptly, and is stony and

irregular. How gentle the rise is to the Nek from the level ground

in front of it towards Newcastle (and along which the approach is by

the main road), may be judged from the fact that a horse can canter

easily up the slope, or for the matter of that, over the two miles

of ground which lead to the foot of the slope. From the top of the

ridge to the level ground at the base is not more than five hundred

yards. The chain of hills, in the centre of which is the Nek, is

semicircular, the horns of the crescent pointing towards Newcastle,

and offering strong positions for any force intent on defending the

only practicable approach to the Nek; but to occupy these flank

positions a large body of men would be necessary, as the area from

point to point is great. On the reverse, or Coldstream side of the

Nek, the ground at the foot of the incline is broken and marshy, a

regular drain for all the water running from the surrounding hills."

[Illustration: DRUM-MAJOR and DRUMMERS, COLDSTREAM GUARDS.

Photo by Gregory and Co., London.]

To return to the troops. While this column was advancing, the Boers

were also advancing in a parallel line to the Nek. The following

day, 25th, the British column reached the high ground overlooking

the Ingogo River, where they encamped (here the engagement of the

8th of February took place). At dawn on the 26th the column again

laboriously mounted the terrible steeps leading to Mount Prospect,

and fixed their camp about four miles from the Nek. Owing to the

abominable state of the weather the nearing of the Nek was not

attempted, and attack was postponed till the following day. The

night was passed at Mount Prospect, and a laager made.

[Illustration]

At six o'clock on the morning of the 28th the advance was sounded,

and at 9.55 A.M. the guns began shelling the Nek. The Boers were not

yet ready. Some took shelter behind the walls of Laing's Farmhouse,

while others kept on the heights above, covered by the ridge from

shells. Those in Laing's kraals had a warm time when the Naval

Brigade began to play on them with their guns, and they soon

evacuated the place.

Those on the Nek, after being for twenty minutes under a hot fire,

were beginning to think they had had enough of it, when our lines

ceased firing, and the mounted squadron advanced to take a

hillock--the most advanced spur of the Boer left flank position. The

58th also prepared to charge. The officers commanding the mounted

squadron were Major Brownlow and Captain Hornby, while Colonel

Deane, Major Essex (an officer with a charmed life, who survived

Isandlwana and the engagement at the Ingogo heights), Major Poole,

Lieutenant Elwes, and Lieutenant Inman were in front of the 58th.

The leading companies of the 58th having got half-way up the rise--a

heavy business considering the slipperiness of the slopes--the first

troop of the mounted squadron charged the kopje, going to right and

left of the lines taken by the 58th. No sooner were they within

sight of the Boers than they were greeted by a heavy fire that

emptied half their saddles. Still, those who were left mounted,

reformed in a pouring shower of bullets, and again charged.

But gallantry was of no avail, for there was no reserve to back up

the charge of mounted troops. Seventeen men were killed and wounded,

and thirty-two horses killed.

The repulse of this charge took place just as the 58th gained sight

of the foe, who, flushed with triumph, could now turn their

attention from the mounted troops to the right flank of the 58th.

The men, worn out with their sufficiently arduous task of climbing,

crushed together, in consequence of their not having been ordered to

deploy before making the ascent, dropped like nine-pins under the

heavy fire of the Boers. Before the order to deploy could be carried

out, volley after volley was delivered into their ranks, and an

enfilading fire was opened by the Boers on their right flank with

disastrous results. Meanwhile the Boers were well under cover behind

their sheltered trenches, and it was impossible, while the 58th were

coming to closer quarters with them, to fire from the plains below

without risk to the assailants. As a natural consequence, therefore,

the Boers, skilled as they are in marksmanship, were able at their

leisure to pick off each man as he approached.

Seeing that the Boers were more than a match for him, Colonel Deane

resorted to the bayonet. But, just as the order was being obeyed his

horse was shot under him. Rising again on the instant, and crying "I

am all right," to encourage his men, he rushed on, heading his

regiment, and again fell, this time mortally wounded. Major

Hingeston, who then took command, fell also, and his gallant brother

officers, Major Poole and Lieutenant Dolphin, shared the same fate.

They were at that time within some thirty yards of the enemy. So

great was our loss that the charge could not be sustained, and many

officers, who still persisted in emptying their revolvers on the

enemy, were severely wounded. At last there was nothing for it but

to fall back. The Boers, intoxicated with victory, now boldly came

out from cover, and poured volley after volley on the retiring men.

But for the guns at the base of the hill, which were now able to

play on the enemy, these must have been entirely swept away. So

small was the margin between our men and the victors, that but for

the nicety of this artillery practice many of the men of the 58th

must have been accidentally killed. During the retreat Lieutenant

Baillie, carrying the regimental colours, was mortally wounded. Such

magnificent deeds of heroism took place on this occasion that of

themselves they would form an inspiriting volume. Lieutenant Hill of

the 58th earned the Victoria Cross by his repeated deeds of valour

in saving soldiers under heavy fire.

The whole force fell back towards the camp, the casualties amongst

the 58th being seventy-three killed and one hundred wounded. A flag

of truce was sent forward to the enemy, and both parties engaged in

the sad work of burying their dead and removing the wounded.

Report says that on this occasion Kaffirs or Hottentots were seen to

be fighting among the Boer ranks.

Very pathetic and very manly was the speech addressed by Sir George

Colley to the camp on the evening after the fight:--"Officers,

non-commissioned officers, and men,--I have called you together this

evening, being desirous of saying a few words to you. I wish every

one present to understand that the entire blame of to-day's repulse

rests entirely upon me, and not on any of you. I congratulate the

58th Regiment for the brave and noble manner in which they fought

to-day. We have lost many gallant men, and amongst them my intimate

friend, Colonel Deane. (Emotion.) I might say, however, that

notwithstanding the loss of many troops to-day, we have not lost one

atom of the prestige of England. It is my duty to congratulate Major

Brownlow on the gallant charge he made this day. Owing to the loss

we have suffered, I am compelled to await the arrival of

reinforcements, but certainly we shall take possession of that hill

eventually, and I sincerely hope that all those men who have so

nobly done their duty to-day will be with me then. Good-night."

Of the mistakes that marked this attack it is unnecessary to write,

for they have been freely discussed, and those who were responsible

have laid down their lives in payment of whatever errors in judgment

they may have committed.

INGOGO

Life in camp continued as usual until the 7th of February, when an

escort proceeding with the post from Newcastle to the General's

camp, having encountered the enemy, been fired at, and forced to

return, Sir George Colley thought a demonstration in force would be

sufficient to deter the Boers from further interference with the

line of communication. Consequently the next morning, the 8th of

February, he marched with five companies of the second battalion of

the 60th Regiment, four guns and thirty-eight men of the Mounted

Squadron. The force crossed the river Ingogo, then only knee-deep,

and gained a plateau in shape like an inverted L, the base being the

side nearest Newcastle. On arrival here an orderly suddenly reported

that the enemy, concealed among boulders and large blocks of

granite, was waiting in great force. Almost immediately afterwards

about a hundred mounted Boers became visible on the right. The order

was given to prepare for action, and, just as the guns were on the

point of firing, the Boers wheeled round and went off. They galloped

away to the bottom of the ravine, followed by a shell which,

unfortunately, burst beyond them. The Rifles were also firing, but

unsuccessfully, at the retreating riders. Soon it became apparent,

however, that the British party was surrounded on all sides by the

enemy, who were comfortably screened by the tall tambookie grass and

the immense boulders that were to be found in clumps all round the

position. Our men were also hiding behind rocks and boulders, and

firing whenever a Boer head became visible. Soon after, the

engagement opened in earnest. A hot fire was kept up by the

9-pounder in charge of Lieutenant Parsons, R.A., to which the enemy

replied, directly the gun was discharged, by a hail of bullets aimed

at the gunners while they reloaded.

In order to rout the Boers from their cover, an order was given to

the mounted men to charge. At that moment the Boers fired a heavy

volley, which incapacitated most of the horses and forced Major

Brownlow to retire to the plateau. Fortunately only one of the men

was wounded. The artillerymen now suffered considerably, having no

shelter but the doubtful shelter of their guns, which afforded a

convenient mark for the Boers. As soon as the General, who was going

from point to point with his usual coolness, saw the state of

affairs--ammunition and even gunners having run short--he sent to

Mount Prospect camp for reinforcements. Still the fight continued.

The Boers now steadily and surely crept to close quarters, while the

British columns became momentarily thinner and thinner. Yet every

man continued to hold his ground till hopelessly struck down.

Hopelessly is a word used advisedly, for many who were struck down

rose several times and continued to fire till mortally wounded.

Of the splendid gallantry of the force it is impossible to say

enough. The fighting continued for six terrible hours through rain

that fell literally in torrents, in an arena where wounded and dying

lay thick, their despairing cries mingling with the continued growl

of thunder interspersed with the roar of artillery. Then a white

flag was displayed by the Boers. But, when the Rev. Mr. Ritchie in

return displayed the British white flag, he was instantly fired

upon. The object of the use of the white flag on the part of the

Boers was to enable them to take advantage of the temporary inaction

to make rushes to cover nearer to the British lines than that they

had previously occupied! The fighting began, and, for the small body

of British troops, continued disastrously. At last, when darkness

came on, both sides were forced to cease firing. Now and then, only

when a flash of lightning lit up the terrible scene, the firing of

bullets demonstrated that the Boers were still thoroughly on the

alert.

The darkness descended, and in the middle of the pouring rain and

the murky obscurity the noble British dead were counted. The wounded

were also tended as well as it was possible to tend them when water

and restoratives were wanting, and the only relieving moisture had

to be sucked from the storm-drenched grass. Finally, the General,

viewing the deplorable state of the men, decided to withdraw the

force from the field. It was plain that any renewal of attack on the

morrow by the reinforced Boers could but mean annihilation or

surrender. So the remnants of the force started on their return

journey. This was now a terrible task, the Ingogo, which had been

crossed at knee-depth, had swollen dangerously; the gentle stream

had become a torrent. The bed of the river being full of holes, it

was in some places some ten to twelve feet deep.

Of the perils by field and flood it would be impossible to speak at

length. Mr. Carter, who was present at the melancholy fight and a

witness of all connected with the reverse, gives in his wonderful

narrative of the Boer war an interesting description of the misery

of that return march:--

"Knowing that moments were precious in the then state of the river,

I went ahead with the advance guard and crossed the stream; it was

then nearly up to my armpits, and running very swiftly. By holding

my rifle aloft, I managed to keep it dry, but every cartridge in my

pockets was under water. Only with the greatest care, and thanks to

a knowledge of the whereabouts of the treacherous hole in the

drift, did I manage to keep on my legs. On gaining the opposite

bank, I scooped up and drained off a helmetful of the precious

fluid, and then urging on through the next ford--an insignificant

one compared to the first--gained admission at Fermistone's hotel,

after being duly cross-questioned through the keyhole of the door.

Some hot tea and whisky was recommended by the host, and palatable

it was. In a short time the other "Correspondent" arrived, _minus_

his rifle. He had been carried down the stream like a cork, and only

saved from drowning by being washed against some reeds at a bend of

the river. He decided that he had had enough of the march for that

night, and elected to go to bed. Next came in the General, and a

gentleman who claimed to be a surgeon (a Transvaal surgeon) escaped

from the Boer lines. He had been allowed free access to the camp at

Mount Prospect, and had accompanied the Ingogo expedition, but not

as a surgeon. From the General I learnt that there had been some men

washed down the stream in spite of the precaution adopted of joining

hands."

The return to camp was still more trying. The roads were slippery as

glass, and men and horses, thoroughly worn out, dropped exhausted by

the way. But it is needless to dwell on this melancholy event--an

event rendered so much more melancholy by regret for sublime effort

wasted in the support of a Government that was at that very moment

entertaining the proposals for craven surrender.

MAJUBA

On Sunday, the 27th of February, Sir George Colley made his last

move. During the afternoon of the previous day the General, who was

a great theorist, had been cogitating some scheme which he only

communicated to Colonel Stewart, and to one or two others. No sooner

had "lights out" been sounded, than an order was passed round for

detachments of the 58th, third battalion of the 60th Rifles, Naval

Brigade, and Highlanders, to parade with three days' rations. Then

the order came that the force was to form up by the redoubt nearest

the main road on their left. At ten a start was made, the General

and staff riding in front, with the 58th leading, followed by the

60th, and the Naval Brigade in the rear. The direction taken was

straight up the Inguela Mountain. Arrived on a plateau about

half-way up, the troops proceeded by a path, narrow almost as a

sheep path, which winds across the steepest part of the mountain.

Great boulders edged the hillside, and masses of rock hung

perpendicularly above the surface of the ground. One false step and

the climber would have been hurled down some thirty feet, to be

dashed to pieces against the stones, or entangled in the bush. This

march was conducted in strict silence, no voice being raised, and

indeed not a breath more than was required for climbing expended.

Men and officers, all were bent on the one great feat of mounting

and gaining the summit. The march continued over loose stones, and

boulders and obstacles multifarious--sometimes round wrong tracks,

owing to mistakes of the guide, and sometimes over grass and glassy

slopes, where a man could make progress merely by means of hands and

knees. Thus the force stealthily ascended, creeping up in ones and

twos, the General and staff leading the way in ever-increasing

darkness and silence.

So heavy was the work of ascent that, when at last they reached the

top, the troops almost dropped from exhaustion. It was this

exhaustion that is said by some to have influenced the General's

plans, but others declare that he was not likely so to be

influenced. Instead of attempting at once to throw up a rough

entrenchment, he refused to permit it, declaring that the men were

already over fatigued. A slight entrenchment might have made all the

difference in the sad history of Majuba, but the General gave no

orders to entrench, and thus the troops were left open to the enemy.

At early dawn, on looking towards the Nek, it was obvious that a

large Boer force was there congregated, while at the base of the

mountain was the right flank of the Dutch camp. Gazing down from the

great height which had been so perseveringly gained, all hearts

warmed with a glow of triumph and of anticipation. The rocket tubes

and Gatlings would soon arrive, and then those below would be

awakened to the tune of the guns! From their point of vantage it

seemed as though the British had the Boers at their mercy.

The hilltop of Majuba was hollowed out basinwise, and there seemed

only a necessity to line the rim of it in the event of a rush from

the enemy. But the suspicion that the Boers would creep from ridge

to ridge, and mount the crest, never dawned on any one. In the dense

darkness it was impossible to become acquainted with the nature of

all sides of the hill, and the troops imagined them all to be

equally impregnable.

Mr. Carter, who was there, says that at this time some twenty

Highlanders stood on the ridge watching the lights of the enemy, and

pointing to the camp below them, and laughingly repeating their

challenge, "Come up here, you beggars." They never imagined it would

be possible for them indeed to come! He further states his belief

that the reason why no entrenchments were attempted was that every

staff officer on Majuba felt certain "that the Boers would never

face the hill--entrenchments or no entrenchments on the summit--as

long as the British soldier was there." For this almost fatuous

belief in their own security these gallant soldiers were destined to

pay heavily.

So soon as daylight served to show our troops standing against the

sky-line, the enemy began to advance at the base of the mountain.

The first shot on that eventful day was fired at a Boer scout by

Lieutenant Lucy of the 58th, but the General, hearing it, sent word

to "stop that firing." Silence again reigned. But in the meantime

the Boers were crawling cautiously up the hill after leaving their

horses safely under cover. About 6 A.M. they opened a steady fire,

to which the British troops responded cordially. The Boer bullets,

though doubling those of the British, did little damage, as the

troops were partially sheltered within the basin of the hilltop.

Thus the fight continued till nine, none of the officers at that

time even suspecting that the enemy would venture to "rush" their

stronghold. No one was wounded, and nothing was to be seen on any

side of the hill, as the Boers kept closely under cover. At this

juncture many men, worn out and fatigued, laid themselves down to

sleep. Suddenly Lieutenant Lucy appeared asking for reinforcements,

and saying that the fire was "warming up" in his direction. Some

minutes later the General, who was perpetually moving round the

line, cool, collected, and calculating as ever, flashed a message to

Mount Prospect camp, ordering the 60th Rifles to be sent from

Newcastle to his support.

Later the General espied two Boers within 600 yards or so of him

mounting the ravine, and pointed them out. He had scarcely done this

when Commander Romilly fell. This gallant sailor was deservedly

popular, and gloom suddenly spread over the hitherto cheerful force.

Still, no one dreamed that the Boers would really get to close

quarters. The first awakening came when the firing, which had been

till then in single shots, poured upwards in volleys. From the sound

it was evident that the enemy was much nearer than had been

supposed. The Highlanders, who were facing this unexpected

fusillade, were soon reinforced by the reserves which had been

ordered to their assistance.

[Illustration: TOP OF MAJUBA]

The 58th, 92nd, and Naval Brigade disappeared over the ridge to meet

the enemy, and vigorously returned their fire. For one moment that

of the Boers appeared to slacken; then suddenly there came a

precipitate retreat of our men, the officers shouting, "Rally on the

right! rally on the right!" This order was obeyed, the troops

describing a semicircle and coming back to the ridge to a point at

left of that from which they had been so suddenly driven. But the

momentary retreat had been demoralising. At this standpoint the men

had become hopelessly mixed up--sailors, Highlanders, and 58th men

all in a wild melee. Over this heterogeneous mass the officers had

lost their personal influence. While order was being restored the

Boer firing ceased. The pause was just sufficient to allow breathing

time, for they almost instantaneously reopened with redoubled

vigour. Their shooting was scarcely successful, but a hail of lead

from the upturned muzzles of rifles continued to traverse the thirty

yards which now separated the foes. The enemy numbered only about

200, but they hoped by rapidity of fire to hold the British in check

till their comrades should come to the rescue. Mr. Carter thus

graphically describes what was really the last despairing effort of

our men:--

"The order was given in our lines, 'Fix bayonets,' and immediately

the steel rang from the scabbard of every man, and flashed in the

bright sunlight the next second on the muzzle of every rifle.

'That's right!' cheerily called Major Fraser. 'Now, men of the 92nd,

don't forget your bayonets!' he added, with marked emphasis on the

word bayonets. It was the bayonet or nothing now, and the officer's

words sent quite a pleasant thrill through all. Colonel Stewart

immediately added, 'And the men of the 58th!' 'And the Naval

Brigade!' sang out another officer, Captain MacGregor, I think.

'Show them the cold steel, men! that will check them,' continued

Fraser, whilst volley after volley came pouring in, and volley after

volley went in the direction of the enemy. But why this delay? The

time we were at this point I cannot judge, except by personally

recalling incidents in succession. When the bayonets rang into the

rifle-sockets simultaneously with the reopening of the Boers'

volleys, I felt convinced that in two minutes that murderous fire

would be silenced, and our men driving the foe helter-skelter down

hill. After the bayonets had been drawn and fixed, and remained

fixed, our men still firing for at least four or five minutes, and

no order came to 'charge,' I changed my opinion suddenly."

Here we may imagine the agony--hope, doubt, suspense--that passed

like a lightning flash through the minds of all who were present.

The uproar at this time grew appalling. Commands of the officers,

the crash of shot, the shrieks of the wounded, all helped to

aggravate the din. Boers were fast climbing the mountain sides, and

the troops, worn out and almost expended, were beginning to lose the

spirit of discipline that hitherto had sustained them. The officers

stepped forward boldly, sword in one hand and revolver in the other,

but to no purpose. Only an insignificant number of men now responded

to the command.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF MAJUBA HILL.

Drawn by R. Caton Woodville, from Notes supplied by Officers

present.

The officer to the left, with the glass in his hand, is General

Colley, who, to facilitate his ascent of the hill, took off his

boots, and, during the engagement, wore only socks and slippers. He,

with others, is urging the soldiers to maintain their position. The

Highlander with the bandage on his face was wounded, but bravely

continued to fight. The Highlander on the right, apparently asleep,

was shot dead while taking aim. The officer in the immediate

foreground towards the right, to whom the doctor is offering a

flask, is Major L. C. Singleton, of the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, who

died of his wounds. The figure pressing forward on the extreme left

of the picture is the Special Correspondent of the _Standard_

newspaper.]

Mr. Carter declares that when Lieutenant Hamilton of the 92nd asked

Sir George Colley's permission to charge with the bayonet, he

replied, "Wait a while." Such humanity was almost inhumanity, for

waiting placed at stake many lives that might have been saved. The

correspondent says:--

"Evidently Sir George Colley allowed his feelings of humanity to

stand in the way of the request of the young officer. We were forty

yards at the farthest from the enemy's main attacking party. In

traversing these forty yards our men would have been terribly

mauled, no doubt, by the first volley, but the ground sloped gently

to the edge of the terrace along which the enemy were lying, and the

intervening space would be covered in twenty seconds--at all events,

so rapidly by the survivors of the first volley, that the Boers,

mostly armed with the Westley-Richards cap rifle, would not have had

time to reload before our men were on them. I am not sure that the

first rush of the infantry would not have demoralised the enemy,

and that their volley would have been less destructive than some

imagined. If only a score of our men had thrust home, the enemy must

have been routed. At a close-quarter conflict, what use would their

empty rifles have been against the bayonets of our men, who would

have had the additional advantage of the higher ground? If the

bayonet charge was impracticable at that moment, then, as an

offensive weapon, the bayonet is a useless one, and the sooner it is

discarded as unnecessary lumber to a soldier's equipment the better.

It was our last chance now, though a desperate one, because these

withering volleys were laying our men prostrate; slowly in

comparison with the number of shots fired, but surely, despite our

shelter. Some out of the hail of bullets found exposed victims. In a

few seconds our left flank, now practically undefended, and

perfectly open to the Boers scaling the side of the mountain in that

direction, would be attacked with the same fury as our front.

"Looking to the spot Cameron had indicated as the one where the

General stood, I saw his Excellency standing within ten paces

directing some men to extend to the right. It was the last time I

saw him alive."

It is unnecessary to dwell further on the tragic events of that

unlucky battle. After midday our troops retreated, and the retreat

soon became a rout. At this time Sir George Colley was shot. Dismay

seized all hearts, followed by panic. The British soldiers rushed

helter-skelter down the precipitous steeps they had so cheerfully

climbed the night before, many of them losing their lives in their

efforts to escape from the ceaseless fire of the now triumphant

enemy.

[Illustration: WHERE COLLEY FELL.

ROUGH CAIRN OF STONES ON MAJUBA HILL.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

Before leaving this sad subject, it may be interesting to note a

Boer account of the day's doings which is related by Mr. Rider

Haggard in his useful book on "The Last Boer War":--

"A couple of months after the storming of Majuba, I, together with a

friend, had a conversation with a Boer, a volunteer from the Free

State in the late war, and one of the detachment that stormed

Majuba, who gave us a circumstantial account of the attack with the

greatest willingness. He said that when it was discovered that the

English had possession of the mountain, he thought that the game was

up, but after a while bolder counsels prevailed, and volunteers were

called for to storm the hill. Only seventy men could be found to

perform the duty, of whom he was one. They started up the mountain

in fear and trembling, but soon found that every shot passed over

their heads, and went on with greater boldness. Only three men, he

declared, were hit on the Boer side; one was killed, one was hit in

the arm, and he himself was the third, getting his face grazed by a

bullet, of which he showed us the scar. He stated that the first to

reach the top ridge was a boy of twelve, and that as soon as the

troops saw them they fled, when, he said, he paid them out for

having nearly killed him, knocking them over one after another 'like

bucks' as they ran down the hill, adding that it was 'alter lecker'

(very nice)."

A complete and reliable narrative of affairs on that fateful day in

the ridge below Majuba was given in the _Army and Navy Gazette_. It

is here reproduced, as it shows the finale from the point of view of

an eye-witness of one of the most lamentable fights known in British

history. The correspondent says:--

"As our mysterious march on the night of the 26th February began,

two companies of the 60th Rifles, under the command of Captains C.

H. Smith and R. Henley, were detached from General Colley's small

column, and left on the Imquela Mountain. These companies received

_no orders_, beyond that they were to remain there. The rest of the

column then marched into the dark night on their unknown mission,

our destination being guessed at, but not announced. The road was

rough, and at some places little better than a beaten track, and

the men found it hard to pick their steps among the loose stones

and earth mounds. But all were cheerful and ready for their work.

The ridge at the foot of the heights was reached at about midnight,

and here the column made a brief halt, to allow of one company of

the 92nd (which had lost its touch) coming up. Here one company of

the 92nd Highlanders, under Captain P. F. Robertson, was detailed

to proceed with Major Fraser, R.E., to a spot about one hundred

yards distant, General Colley himself giving the order that they

were to remain there, 'to dig as good a trench as time would permit

of,' and further to select a good position to afford cover for the

horses and ammunition, &c., that were to be left in charge of the

detachment. They were also desired to throw out sentries in the

direction of the camp, also a patrol of four men, with a

non-commissioned officer, to watch the beaten track along which we

had just come, and to act as guides for a company of the 60th

Rifles expected from camp to reinforce the Highlanders on the

ridge. These orders having been given, the column again moved off,

leaving the Highlanders to make their arrangements.

"The men had a brief rest after their walk, and then, assisted by

their officers--Captain P. F. Robertson and Lieutenant G.

Staunton--began the work of making their entrenchments. At about 5

A.M. the expected company of the 60th Rifles arrived, under the

command of Captain E. Thurlow and Second Lieutenants C. B. Pigott

and H. G. L. Howard. Surgeon-Major Cornish also accompanied this

detachment, with some mules laden with hospital requirements.

Captain Thurlow, who had received _no orders_, and who had brought

out his men without either their greatcoats or their rations,

joined the Highlanders in their entrenchments. They had to work

hard, so as to complete their work rapidly, and consequently the

men had little or no rest that night. At about 6 A.M. we were

visited by Commissariat-General J. W. Elmes, who was returning to

the camp, and promised to send out the 60th their rations. Shortly

afterwards a conductor named Field arrived with a led mule, laden

with stores, &c., for the staff. He was hurrying on to try and

reach the summit of the hill before day. Doubts were expressed as

to the advisability of his going on alone; but he had his orders,

he said (about the only man who had that day!), and so he went on

his way. About an hour afterwards a shot was heard, and we

afterwards learnt that the conductor had been wounded, and he and

his mule taken prisoners! By this time the day had quite broken,

the heavy curtain of the night had rolled away, and disclosed

before us the rugged and precipitous ascent to the Majuba Mountain,

which stood directly in front of us, about 1400 yards distant. It

stood out in bold relief against a blue-grey sky, and on the

summit, and against the sky, the figures of men could be distinctly

seen passing to and fro. These were only discernible with the aid

of field-glasses, and at that time no great certainty was felt as

to their being our own men.

"Away to the south of us, in the direction of the camp, sloped the

Imquela Mountain. The glasses were brought to bear on this spot

also, where a man was detected signalling with a flag. The officer

commanding our party (Captain Robertson, 92nd) then signalled the

question, 'Who are you?' and the answer returned was, 'We are two

companies of the 60th Rifles, who have been left here all night.' A

second message was then sent, asking what their orders were, and

the reply returned was, 'None.' Their position was consequently

much the same as ours. All the morning our sentries heard

occasional shots, and from time to time were seen small bodies of

mounted Boers galloping to and fro near our entrenchments,

seemingly to reconnoitre our position. At about eleven o'clock we

were joined by a troop of the 15th Hussars, who had just come from

the camp, bringing with them the rations for the 60th Rifles. This

troop was commanded by Captain G. D. F. Sulivan, and accompanied by

Second Lieutenant Pocklington and Lieutenant H. C. Hopkins, 9th

Lancers, attached. Captain Sulivan, having received no orders,

remained with our party, dismounting his men, and placing them

under cover on the slope, just in rear of our entrenchment. For an

hour or two afterwards all remained perfectly quiet. The distant

figures on the summit of the Majuba Hill could still be seen

passing and repassing against the grey sky. We had come to the

definite conclusion that they were our own men, entrenching

themselves on the top of the mountain. They had gained by strategy

a strong position; but could they hold it? Even then the question

was mooted. All at once, while we were quietly waiting, a

continuous and heavy firing broke out on the mountain. We saw the

blue smoke rolling across the still sky; we saw an evident stir and

excitement among the party on the hill. What was it? Were they

attacked, or attacking? Volley after volley rolled forth; it was a

heavy and continuous fire, never ceasing for a moment. All glasses

were brought to bear on the mountain, and every eye was strained to

catch a sight of what was going on. After a few minutes the figure

of a man hurrying down towards us was visible--a wounded man, no

doubt--and a mounted Hussar was sent out to bring him in. He proved

to be a wounded man of the 58th, and from him we learnt something

of the disaster which had befallen our column. The General was

dead, lying on his back, with a bullet through his head. Our men

were nearly all either wounded or taken prisoners. The hilltop was

covered with the bodies of the brave fellows, who had fought to the

last. Even while he spoke we could see the desperate retreat had

begun, and a few desperate figures were seen struggling down among

the stones and boulders. Our men were flying, there was no doubt

about that now. In a few minutes the enemy would be upon us, but we

were prepared for them. I never saw men steadier or more prepared

to fight, although, as I glanced round, I felt how hopeless such a

fight would be. My fear, however, did not seem to be participated

in by either officers or men, for Captain Robertson (the officer in

command) at once began his preparation for a determined resistance.

The ammunition boxes were opened, and placed at equal convenient

distances all round the entrenchment. Half the entrenchment was

manned by the Highlanders, and the other half by Rifles. These

preparations were quietly and promptly made. The men were silent,

but steady. Looking round, every face was set with a grave

determination 'to do,' and there was not a word audible as the

orders were spoken and the commands obeyed. The low (and to an

experienced eye) fragile turf walls that were to offer shelter

seemed but poor defences, now that they were to be tried. They were

only about four feet high by two feet thick, with one exit at the

rear, and could never have stood before a fire such as was even now

pouring down the slope of Majuba. The wounded were now being

brought in rapidly by our mounted Hussars, who did their work

steadily. Some of the poor fellows were terribly wounded, and

though Surgeon-Major Cornish did his best for them unassisted, many

had to lie unattended to in their suffering. All brought the same

bitter news of defeat and annihilation, not very reassuring to our

little force, which was now about to take its part in the day's

engagement. As suddenly as it began, the firing as suddenly ceased;

and we knew that the dreadful task of clearing the heights was

done, and our resistance about to begin. We could see the Boers

clustering like a swarm of bees at the edge of our ridge. Every

moment we expected a rush and an attack. But they hesitated. They

were waiting--waiting for the party of some 600 or 700 mounted

Boers, who presently appeared upon our left flank. Our entrenchment

was now almost surrounded. The mounted Boers were the first to

attack us on our left flank, and their fire was spiritedly replied

to by the Rifles. At this moment, and while we were actually

engaging our enemy, the order came from the camp desiring Captain

Robertson to retreat his force without delay. No such easy matter

now, for the order came almost too late; the Boers were within easy

range of us, and determined to attack. Nevertheless, in the same

orderly and steady manner in which the preparations for defence had

been made, the preparations for retreat were begun. Much credit is

due to Captains Robertson and Thurlow for the energetic manner in

which they helped to load the mules, securing a safe retreat for

the ammunition and stores, and then assisting Surgeon-Major Cornish

to get off the wounded. All this time we were under fire, and it

was while retreating that poor Cornish was killed. When our little

entrenchment had been cleared of its stores, the real retreat

began, made under a murderous fire, which followed us as we hurried

down the steep slope into the ravine below. Captain Sulivan, with

his troop of Hussars, was placed on the right flank to try and

cover the retreat in that direction. By this time the Boers had

partially occupied our entrenchment, having broken down its

defences easily enough. And we had scarcely retreated down the

steep slope and into the ravine before they occupied the ridge

above us in hundreds, sending volley after volley after our

retreating men. It was a case now of _sauve qui peut_, and to me

the only marvel is how we lost so few under the circumstances. Our

casualties were four killed (including Surgeon-Major Cornish),

eleven wounded, and twenty-two prisoners. The Highlanders suffered

the most. The officers were the last to leave the ridge. I saw

Captain Robertson standing on the crest of the slope giving some

final directions just a moment before the ridge was entirely

covered by the Boers, and his escape consequently was almost a

miraculous one. I was in the ravine before I heard our artillery

open fire upon the Boers. Second-Lieutenant Staunton, 92nd

Highlanders, was taken prisoner. We were never joined by the two

companies of the Rifles who were left on the Imquela Mountain the

night before, nor did I see them under fire at any part of the day.

Thus ended our brief battle, and only those who took part in it can

tell the bitterness of having to retreat, utterly routed and

defeated as we were."

THE SIEGE OF PRETORIA

As may be remembered, Sir Owen Lanyon's proclamation announcing

martial law was read, and the town handed over to the military

government. Colonel Gildea (introduced by Colonel Bellairs) acted as

Commandant of the Garrison, Major F. Mesurier, R.E., was in charge

of the Infantry Volunteers, and Captain Campbell, 94th Regiment,

filled the post of Provost-Marshal. Sympathisers with the Boers were

ordered to leave the place on pain of being handed over to the

Provost-Marshal to be dealt with by military law.

It was decided to evacuate the town, and form two laagers, one at

the camp, and one between the Roman Catholic church and the jail. In

the camp the women and children were to be placed, while the

Infantry Volunteers garrisoned the convent laager. Within the

convent, women and children were packed tightly as sardines, while

the nuns turned out on errands of mercy. All night and all day,

scarcely stopping to eat a mouthful, men worked, sandbagging windows

and doors--building barricades and defences of various kinds.

Waggons were sent round to gather all families within the shelter of

the camp. Rich and poor, good and bad, some 4000 souls, were herded

together in tents for their protection. Here they remained for three

months, enduring hardships of the most variegated and worrying kind,

and loyally waiting for the relieving column that never came.

Descriptions of the rations served out to each man daily are not

appetising: Bread, 1-1/4 lb., or biscuit, 1 lb.; coffee, 2/3 oz.;

sugar, 2-1/2 oz.; meat, 1-1/4 lb.; tea, 1/6 oz.; and salt, 1/2 oz.

These were reduced as the siege proceeded. The meat was _trek_ beef,

a leathery substitute for steak, and the biscuits were veterans,

having "served" in the Zulu and Sekukuni campaigns, and now being

nothing better than a swarm of weevils. Life in Pretoria was

enlivened by occasional sorties against the Boer laagers, where the

enemy was supposed to number some 800 strong. The laagers were

distributed at distances of four and eight miles from the town, and

were connected by a system of patrolling, which rendered

communication from within or without almost impossible. A few

messengers (natives) occasionally came into the town, but these

were mostly charged with the delivery of delusive messages invented

for special purposes by the Boers. There was an ever-present

difficulty--that of keeping the natives in check. Many examples of

Boer cruelty to these poor blacks are recorded, and they naturally

shuddered at the prospect of once more being delivered over to the

rule of the sjambok.

Mr. H. Shepstone, the Secretary for native affairs, took immense

pains to keep things quiet among the various chiefs. He said he had

but to lift his little finger, and the Boers would not hold the

field for a couple of days. Almost every native he knew would be in

arms, and by sheer weight of numbers would overpower the Boers.

Several of the chiefs sheltered refugees, and Montsiwe gathered his

force in the hope that he would be allowed to come to the relief of

Potchefstroom. Government reports regarding the loyalty of the

natives were numerous, and the natives' longing to come to the

assistance of the British in fighting their ancient oppressors was

obvious. The subsequent desertion of these people whom Great Britain

had taken under her wing, is one of the most grievous of the many

grievous things that accrued from the exercise of British

"magnanimity." Sir Morrison Barlow and Sir Evelyn Wood both agreed

that the natives were "British to a man!" They were thoroughly sick

of Boer cruelty, and the Kaffirs and Basutos had learnt to look to

Great Britain for a reign of peace. Rather than again be ruled by

the Boer despots, they were ready to spill the last drop of their

blood, and only the high principled, almost quixotic action of the

British officials prevented the utilisation in extremity of this

massive and effective weapon of defence. Besides the garrison in

Pretoria there were other forts defended by soldiers and loyalists,

forts which were none of them taken by the enemy. These were

Potchefstroom, Rustenburg, Sydenburg, Marabastad, and Wakkerstroom.

The fort of Potchefstroom was surrendered during the armistice by

fraudulent representations on the part of the Boers.

The absorbing topic of the time was naturally the future of the

Transvaal. Hope warmed all hearts and helped every one to keep up a

fictitious air of cheerfulness. All thought that the rebellion would

serve to strengthen the British in their determination to establish

an effectual Government in the country and promote an enduring

peace. The suspicion that the territory would be given back would

have come on these hoping, waiting, and longing sufferers like a

blast from the pole. Fortunately it was not given to them to foresee

the humiliating end of their staunch endurance. Anathemas long and

deep were sounded at the mention of Dr. Jorissen, who was looked

upon as the fuse which set alight the rebellious temper of the

Boers.

[Illustration: General Sir EVELYN WOOD, G.C.B., V.C.

Photo by Maull & Fox, London.]

The enemy, however, never directly attacked the town. They contented

themselves with attempting to steal cattle and skirmishing, and

generally harassing those within. Such fights as these were mainly due

to British initiative, and these were not fraught with success to us. Of

this period it is pitiful to write. British valour and endurance were

exhibited to the uttermost, and many gallant actions at different

sorties might be recorded. So also might be given, did space allow, many

instances of Boer cunning and Boer treachery--notably the acts of firing

on the flag of truce, and on ambulance waggons. There can be no doubt

that the firing on the flag of truce by the Boers was intentional. Their

own explanation of the cause of this uncivilised proceeding may be taken

for what it is worth. It appears that their troops were divided in

opinion--that one party wished to continue fighting while another wished

to surrender. Hence the exhibition of double-dealing which had so

confounding an effect on their enemies, and so convenient a one for

themselves. The Boers on the Majuba Hill fired on a flag of truce, the

attack at Bronker's Spruit was made under cover of the white flag, and

delay at Ingogo, to cover their movement from shelter, was gained by

means of the same vile expedient.

When the news of the British reverses at Laing's Nek and Majuba

reached Pretoria there was general consternation. But, as yet, none

knew of the crushing blow that was still in store. On the 28th, 102

days after the hoisting of the Republican flag at Heidelberg, there

came the almost incredible news that a peace had been concluded

involving the surrender of the Transvaal to the Boers. At first it

seemed impossible that the British Government could have consented

to leave its loyal supporters in the terrible position in which they

now found themselves. All who had sat patiently through trouble and

trial, working with might and main, suffering from endless ills, in

peril of their lives, and deprived of property and home, now joined

in one heartrending wail of woe and disappointment. The

consternation that followed the announcement of the ignoble

surrender is thus described by Mr. Nixon, who was an eye-witness and

sharer of the general grief and humiliation:--

"The scene which ensued baffles description. The men hoisted the

colours half-mast high. The Union Jack was pulled down and dragged

through the mud. The distinctive ribbons worn round the hats of the

men as badges were pulled off and trampled underfoot. I saw men

crying like children with shame and despair. Some went raving up and

down that they were Englishmen no longer; others, with flushed and

indignant faces, sat contemplating their impending ruin, 'refusing

to be comforted.' It was a painful, distressing, and humiliating

scene, and such as I hope never to witness again. While I write,

the remembrance of it comes vividly before me; and as I recall to

mind the weeping men and women, the infuriated volunteers, and the

despairing farmers and storekeepers, half crazy with the sense of

wounded national honour, and the prospect of loss and ruin before

them, my blood boils within me, and I cannot trust myself to commit

to paper what I think. The lapse of two years has but deepened the

feeling which I then experienced. The subject may perhaps be only

unpleasant to people at home, but to me personally, who have seen

the ruin and dismay brought upon the too credulous loyalists, the

recollections it stirs up are more bitterly mortifying than words

can describe."

Mr. Rider Haggard, who at this time was at Newcastle, has also

recorded his experiences on the unhappy occasion. He says:--"Every

hotel and bar was crowded with refugees who were trying to relieve

their feelings by cursing the name of Gladstone with a vigour,

originality, and earnestness that I have never heard equalled; and

declaring in ironical terms how proud they were to be citizens of

England--a country that always kept its word. Then they set to work

with many demonstrations of contempt to burn the effigy of the right

honourable gentleman at the head of her Majesty's Government, an

example, by the way, that was followed throughout South Africa."

Talking of the loyal inhabitants in the Transvaal on whom the news

burst 'like a thunderbolt,' he explains that they did not say

much--because there was nothing to be said! They simply packed up

their portable goods and chattels, and made haste to leave the

country, "which they well knew would henceforth be utterly untenable

for Englishmen and English sympathisers." Here was another great

trek--a pathetic exodus of British loyalists whom Great Britain had

betrayed. Away they went, these poor believing and deceived people,

to try and make new homes and new fortunes, for as soon as the

Queen's sovereignty was withdrawn houses and land were not worth a

song, and their chances of earning a living were now entirely over,

on account of their mistaken loyalty.

The condition of the town is thus described in a journal of the

period:--

"The streets grown over with rank vegetation; the water-furrows

unclean and unattended, emitting offensive and unhealthy stenches;

the houses showing evident signs of dilapidation and decay; the side

paths, in many places, dangerous to pedestrians--in fact, everything

the eye can rest upon indicates the downfall which has overtaken

this once prosperous city. The visitor can, if he be so minded,

betake himself to the outskirts and suburbs, where he will perceive

the same sad evidences of neglect, public grounds unattended, roads

uncared for, mills and other public works crumbling into ruin.

These palpable signs of decay most strongly impress him. A blight

seems to have come over this lately fair and prosperous town.

Rapidly it is becoming a 'deserted village,' a 'city of the dead.'"

RETROCESSION

The Government, through the medium of the Queen's Speech, had

announced its intention of vindicating her Majesty's authority in

the Transvaal. This was in January 1881. About that time President

Brand, of the Orange Free State, formed himself into a species of

Board of Arbitration between the contending parties--Boers and

British. The reason for this intervention was threefold--first, he

genuinely desired to avoid further bloodshed; second, he as

genuinely hoped, under a mask of neutrality, to advance the Dutch

cause throughout South Africa; and third, he amicably wished to put

himself in the good graces of the British Government. Prior to

General Colley's death Mr. Brand had urged him to allow peace to be

made, and to guarantee the Boers not being treated as rebels if they

submitted. General Colley was no quibbler with words. He would give

no such assurance. He proposed, in a telegram to the Colonial

Secretary, to publish an amnesty on entering the Transvaal to all

peaceable persons--excepting one or two prominent rebels. On the 8th

of February (the day of the battle of the Ingogo), a telegram was

received from home, promising a settlement upon the Boers ceasing

from armed opposition. This showed that the Government had early

begun to put their foot on the first rung of the ladder of

disgrace--it can be called by no other term--and that the

"climb-down" policy was already coming into practice. An unfortunate

game at cross-purposes seems to have been going on, for Mr. Brand

was proposing to Lord Kimberley that Sir H. de Villiers--the

Chief-Justice of the Cape, should be appointed as Commissioner to go

to the Transvaal to arrange matters, while at the same time Sir

George Colley was telegraphing a plan to be adopted on entering the

Transvaal, a plan which should grant a complete amnesty only to

Boers who would sign a declaration of loyalty.

Lord Kimberley welcomed the suggestion of Mr. Brand, and agreed, if

only the Boers would disperse, to appoint a Commission with power to

"develop the permanent friendly scheme"; and "that, if this proposal

is accepted, you now are authorised to agree to suspension of

hostilities on our part." At the same time the War Office informed

General Colley that the Government did not bind his discretion, but

was anxious to avoid effusion of blood. Lord Kimberley's telegram

was forwarded to Colley and to Joubert. Colley was dumfounded. He

telegraphed back: "There can be no hostilities if no resistance is

made; but am I to leave Laing's Nek in Natal territory in Boer

occupation, and our garrisons isolated and short of provisions--or

occupy former and relieve latter?"

Lord Kimberley's reply was characteristically ambiguous. The

garrisons were to be left free to provision themselves, but Sir

George was not to march to the relief of garrisons or occupy Laing's

Nek if an arrangement were proceeding.

Meanwhile President Brand and Lord Kimberley held an unctuous

telegraphic palaver, which may diplomatically be viewed as the

beginning of the end. This humiliating end was hastened by the

fiasco of Majuba on the 27th of February, though before it came to

pass Sir Frederick Roberts was despatched with reinforcements to

Natal. Sir Evelyn Wood assumed temporary command of the forces after

Colley's death. Colonel Wood was asked by Lord Kimberley to obtain

from Kruger a reply to a letter General Colley had forwarded before

Majuba, requesting a reply in forty-eight hours. The reply, an

ingenuous one, came on the 7th of March. Kruger was glad to hear

that her Majesty's Government were inclined to cease hostilities,

and suggested a meeting on both sides. On the 12th of March Lord

Kimberley telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Wood, saying that if the Boers

would desist from armed opposition, a Commission would be appointed

to give the Transvaal complete internal self-government under

British suzerainty, with a British Resident to look after the

natives.

The Boers at the same time made a communication. They refused to

negotiate on the basis of Lord Kimberley's telegram of the 8th, as

it would be tantamount to an admission that they were in the wrong.

They would accept nothing short of the restoration of the Republic

with a British protectorate. This the Home Government accepted, and

thus the "climb down" was complete.

On the 23rd of March 1881, Sir Evelyn Wood, under orders from the

Ministry, signed a treaty on behalf of the British, while the Boer

leaders did the same on behalf of their constituents. By it, the

Boers engaged to accept her Majesty as Suzerain "of the Transvaal,

with a British Resident in the capital, but to allow the Republic

complete self-government, to operate in six months' time. The

Suzerain was to have control over the foreign relations of the

Transvaal, and a Royal Commission for the protection of the natives

and the decision of the boundary of the Republic would be appointed.

Persons guilty of acts contrary to laws of civilised warfare were to

be punished; and property captured by either party was to be

returned." In conclusion, it was arranged that all arms taken by

the British Government when they annexed the country were to be

handed back.

The Commission appointed by her Majesty's Government consisted of

Sir Hercules Robinson, who replaced Sir Bartle Frere at the Cape;

Sir Henry de Villiers, now Chief-Justice of Cape Colony; and Sir

Evelyn Wood; President Brand was present in a neutral capacity.

Though nominally under the control of the British Government, its

actions were pro-Boer. In justice to Sir Evelyn Wood, it is

necessary to state that he did no more than obey orders laid down by

his Government. Indeed it is said that when he was required to make

the disgraceful peace, he called his officers around him, and asked

them to witness that he was merely obeying orders, so that in days

to come he might not submit a tarnished name to posterity.

Sir Frederick Roberts, on his arrival at Cape Town, was therefore

informed that his services were no longer needed. Sir Evelyn Wood

retained a force of 12,000 men in Natal, but the Government had

decided on peace at any price, and peace was therefore restored.

THE BETRAYED LOYALISTS

Of the sufferings of the loyalists we must say little. Suffice it to

picture the breaking up of homes gathered together with much

patience after years of steady labour; the insults daily endured

from a people who now held Great Britain in contempt; the

disappointment and indignation, the wretchedness and despair caused

to all who had faithfully adhered to the Crown.

A petition was drafted to the House of Commons, but signatures were

comparatively few. Many had no hope of redress from Great Britain,

others naturally feared further Boer oppression. Some passages of

the petition ran thus:--

"That your petitioners believe that the annexation was acquiesced in

by a majority of the inhabitants, and was looked upon as an act

calculated to create confidence and credit to the country, a belief

which is borne out by the fact that almost all the old officials

appointed by the former Government, or elected by the people,

remained in office under the new Government; and your petitioners

further believe, that if the promises expressed and implied in the

annexation proclamation had been carried out fully in the spirit of

the proclamation, the whole of the inhabitants would, in time, have

become loyal subjects of her Majesty.

"That the annexation was followed by an immediate accession of

confidence, and it marked the commencement of an era of progress

and advancement, which has steadily increased up to the present

time, despite the numerous drawbacks and disadvantages to which the

country has been subjected, and some of which have been the result

of Imperial action.

"That, notwithstanding the promises expressed and implied in the

annexation proclamation, the country has been governed as a Crown

Colony, and no opportunity has been afforded to the inhabitants of

controlling the policy which has regulated its administration, and

your petitioners are in no way responsible for the late lamentable

war, or for the disgraceful peace which has concluded it.

* * * * *

"That the value of property increased at least threefold during the

English occupation, and that the increase progressed in a ratio

corresponding with the reliance placed on the promises of English

officials. Indeed, some of your petitioners are prepared to state,

on oath if required, that they invested money immediately after or

in direct consequence of a statement by a Governor of the Transvaal

or a Minister of the British Crown.

"That the towns are almost exclusively inhabited by loyal subjects,

and English farmers and traders are scattered all over the country.

* * * * *

"That most of the loyal inhabitants intend to realise their

property, even at a sacrifice, and to leave the country, but that

those who are compelled by force of circumstances to remain in it

will be deprived of the protection and security afforded by English

rule, and they respectfully submit they have a right to ask that the

fullest and most substantial pledges be exacted from the

contemplated Boer Government for their safety, and for the exercise

of their privileges as British subjects."

In reference to the unfortunate natives, and the humiliating peace,

Mr. Rider Haggard, who had been Shepstone's private secretary, wrote

pathetically to Sir Bartle Frere from Newcastle, Natal:--

"_June 6, 1881._

"I do not believe that more than half of those engaged in the late

rebellion were free agents, though, once forced into committing

themselves, they fought as hard as the real malcontents.... The

natives are the real heirs to the soil, and should surely have some

protection and consideration, some voice in the settlement of their

fate. They outnumbered the Boers by twenty-five to one, taking their

numbers at a million and those of the Boers at forty thousand, a

fair estimate, I believe.... As the lash and the bullet have been

the lot of the wretched Transvaal Kaffir in the past, so they will

be his lot in the future.... After leading those hundreds of

thousands of men and women to believe that they were once and for

ever the subjects of her Majesty, safe from all violence, cruelty,

and oppression, we have handed them over without a word of warning

to the tender mercies of one, where natives are concerned, of the

cruellest white races in the world.

"Then comes the case of the loyal Boers, men who believed us and

fought for us, and are now, as a reward for their loyalty, left to

the vengeance of their countrymen--a vengeance that will most

certainly be wreaked, let the Royal Commission try to temper it as

they will.

"Lastly, there are the unfortunate English inhabitants, three

thousand of whom were gathered during the siege in Pretoria alone,

losing their lives in a forsaken cause. I can assure you, sir, that

you must see these people to learn how complete is their ruin. They

have been pouring through here, many of those who were well-to-do a

few months since, hardly knowing how to find food for their

families."

On this subject Colonel Lanyon, who since the first outbreak had

been shut up in Pretoria, also wrote tragically:--

"_March 29, 1881._

"Last night the saddest news I ever received in my life came in the

shape of a letter from Wood.... After three Secretaries of State,

three High Commissioners, and two Houses of Commons had said that

the country should not be given back, it seems a terrible want of

good faith to the loyals that this decision should have been arrived

at. The scene this morning was a heart-breaking one; the women, who

have behaved splendidly all through the siege, were crying and

wringing their hands in their great grief; the children were hushed

as if in a chamber of death; and the men were completely bowed down

in their sorrow. Well they might, for the news brought home ruin to

many, and great loss to all. I am ashamed to walk about, for I hear

nothing but reproaches and utterances from heretofore loyal men

which cut one to the very quick.... How I am to tell the natives I

know not, for they have trusted so implicitly to our promises and

assurances.... One man who has been most loyal to us (an Englishman)

told me to-day, 'Thank God my children are Afrikanders, and need not

be ashamed of their country!'"

The feelings described by Sir Owen were openly echoed by all

sensible men who knew anything of the country: they were certain

that it was not within the power of Boer comprehension to understand

"magnanimity" in an opponent. To the Boer, as to many an Englishman,

this long-sounding word seemed more neatly to be interpreted by the

more ugly but concise term "funk."

Sir Bartle Frere, writing of Sir George Colley in a letter to a

friend, expressed his opinion roundly:--

"_March 31, 1881._

"Let no one ever say that England lost prestige through Sir George

Colley. I do not like the word so much as 'character' or 'conduct'

which create it. But no country ever lost real prestige through

defeat. Nelson, wounded and repulsed at Teneriffe; Grenvil,

overpowered and dying on the deck of the _Revenge_, did as much for

England's prestige as Marlborough at Blenheim or Wellington at

Waterloo. Sir George Colley miscalculated his own and his enemy's

strength, but he had nothing to do with disgraceful surrender, and I

am sure had rather be where he now rests than sign a disgraceful

peace, which is the only thing that can injure England's prestige."

Mr. R. W. Murray, of the _Cape Times_, writing to Sir Bartle Frere,

thought bitterly indeed.

"Ask your English statesmen," he wrote, "if, in the history of the

world, there was ever such a cruel desertion of a dependency by the

parent State. How can England hope for loyalty from South Africans?

The moral of the Gladstone lesson is, that you may be anything in

South Africa but loyal Englishmen."

These letters, taken haphazard from volumes of correspondence on the

melancholy event of the time, serve better than the words of an

outsider to show the terrible position in which the "magnanimity" of

the British Ministers had placed their countrymen. One more extract

and we must pass on.

[Illustration: COLOUR-SERGEANT and PRIVATE, THE SCOTS GUARDS.

Photo by Gregory & Co. London.]

Colonel Lanyon, writing again to Sir Bartle Frere, said:--

"_April 26, 1881._

"The Boers are practically dictators, and have been ruling the

country in a manner which is simply humiliating to Englishmen.

Active persecution is going on everywhere, and consequently all that

can are leaving the country. Thirty families have left Pretoria

alone; B---- and M---- have left, having been frequently threatened

because of their having been members of the Executive, and those two

poor fellows J---- and H---- are completely ostracised for the

same reason. They are both ruined men, practically speaking, and all

because they trusted to England's assurances and good faith....

"But hard as these cases are, I feel that the natives have had the

cruellest measure meted out to them, and they feel it acutely. The

most touching and heart-breaking appeals have come from some of the

chiefs who live near enough to have heard the news. They ask why

they have been thrown over after showing their loyalty by paying

their taxes and resisting the demands made upon them by the Boers

during hostilities. They point out that we stopped them from helping

us, and that, had we not done so, the Boers would have been easily

put down. They say that, as we so hindered their action, it is a

cruel wrong for us now to hand them back to the care of a race which

is more embittered against them than ever, and who have already

begun to harass them because of their loyalty. These points are

unanswerable, and I do not see how we can reply to them."