CHAPTER II

THE ORANGE FREE STATE

The young State, almost before it was fledged, found itself engaged

in military operations with the Basutos, and an arbitrator nominated

by the British Government was appointed. But the good offices of the

commissioner were to no purpose; despite the defining of boundaries

and the laying down of landmarks, the natives broke out afresh. An

engagement followed, and the Basutos were defeated. As a

consequence, a large tract of land (the conquered territory) was

annexed by the Free State, yet even this was insufficient to quell

the fury of the farmer's inveterate foes, and later on they broke

out afresh, only to be again overthrown. In the year 1861 they

appealed for help to the Governor of the Cape and were declared

British subjects. It was then that a definite boundary line between

Basutoland and the Orange Free State was laid down. The population

of Basutoland is estimated at about 130,000. The people are by

nature warlike and energetic. Some authorities declare them to be

the most intelligent of the Kaffir tribes. They are a branch of the

Bechuana race who were formed by their chiefs, Motlune and Moshesh,

and held their country--the Switzerland of South Africa--against

both Zulu and Boer. This aggressive and ferocious tribe was devoted

to plunder, and remained well-nigh exempt from punishment in

consequence of its mountain fastnesses, which were almost

impregnable. The Basutos formed a continual menace to the Boers of

the Free State until Great Britain assumed their direct control in

1884. It is now governed by a Resident Commissioner under the High

Commissioner for South Africa. It is divided into seven districts,

and subdivided into wards, presided over by hereditary chiefs allied

to the Moshesh family. Laws are made by proclamation of the High

Commissioner, and administered by native chiefs. Europeans are not

allowed to settle there.

But to return to 1854. The relations between the two Boer States

soon became strained. Jealousy commenced and continued to simmer.

Then the Boers, alarmed lest the Government would again follow them

up, and lest their treatment of the natives should be investigated

and stopped, began to discourage the presence of visitors across the

Vaal. Of course missionaries were the most unwelcome of all.

With the terms of the Sand River Convention they had soon become

impatient, and to help to an understanding of this impatience some

of the Articles of the Convention may be quoted:--

_Article 1._--"The Assistant-Commissioners guarantee in the fullest

manner on the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers

beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs, and to

govern themselves according to their own laws, without any

interference on the part of the British Government, and that no

encroachment shall be made by the said Government on the territory

beyond, to the north of the Vaal River; with the further assurance

that the warmest wish of the British Government is to promote peace,

free trade, and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers now

inhabiting, or who hereafter may inhabit that country, it being

understood that this system of non-interference is binding upon both

parties."

_Article 2_ arranges, in case of misunderstanding, for a subsequent

delimitation of boundaries.

_Article 3._--"Her Majesty's Assistant-Commissioners hereby disclaim

all alliances whatever, and with whomsoever of the coloured nations,

to the north of the Vaal River."

_Article 4._--"It is agreed that no slavery is or shall be permitted

or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the

emigrant farmers."

_Article 5_ provides for mutual facilities and liberty to traders

and travellers on both sides of the Vaal River.

_Article 6_ allows the "emigrant Boers" to obtain ammunition in

British colonies and possessions, "it being mutually understood that

all trade in ammunition with the native tribes is prohibited both by

the British Government and the emigrant farmers on both sides of the

Vaal River."

_Article 7_ stipulates for the mutual extradition, "as far as

possible," of criminals, and mutual access to courts of justice.

_Article 8_ validates, for purposes of inheritance in British

possessions, certificates of marriage issued by the proper

authorities of the emigrant farmers.

_Article 9_ allows free movement of all persons, except criminals

and absconding debtors, between the British and the Boer

territories.

As we see, the Convention had declared that slavery would not be

practised in the Transvaal, but though the original declaration may

have been made in all good faith, the Boer by degrees, and after the

lapse of years, found it expedient to acquire native "apprentices,"

who could not change master nor task without permission. They began

to fear that these natives could not be dealt with, as they were in

the habit of dealing with them, without fear of comment from such

British visitors as came across them; and they therefore attempted

to block up the path of travellers, refusing them a passage through

the Republic, and in some instances ordering the expulsion of

visitors across the Vaal. About this time one of the most gruesome

of all the many massacres in which the Boers were concerned took

place. One Potgieter (not the Potgieter who was the rival of

Pretorius), in charge of a small party of thirty men, women, and

children, went forth to barter ivory unlawfully with Makapau, a

Kaffir chief. The Kaffirs, owing the Boers a grudge for many a day,

pounced on the whole party, leaving not one behind to give an

account of the awful tragedy. The chief Potgieter was flayed alive,

and his skin made into a kaross or cloak. The Boers were swift to

revenge. President Pretorius, with an army of some four hundred, set

himself to track down the assassins. The Kaffirs fled at the

approach of the enemy, enclosing themselves in a huge cave, where

they hoped to escape detection. This cave was blockaded by the

Boers. Here the unhappy blacks went through all the horrors of

famine and thirst, and when their agony became unbearable, and they

sallied forth in desperation in search of water, they were

remorselessly shot down one by one. Nine hundred in all were killed

outside the cave. Within was more than double that number who had

perished in the frightful agonies of starvation. President Kruger

himself was a witness of the terrible scene, and took an active

share in his countrymen's revenge. And this was not the first nor

the last time in which he figured conspicuously in the bloody

records of his country's history. It was only on the occasion of the

Jameson Raid that Oom Paul awakened to sentimental qualms regarding

the spilling of blood.

[Illustration: BLOEMFONTEIN FROM THE SOUTH.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

THE GRONDWET

To thoroughly grasp the methods of the New South African Republic,

it may be interesting to study some of "the Articles" of a Grondwet

or Constitution, which superseded those originally adopted by the

Potchefstroom Raad. The Grondwet was started in 1857, and was framed

entirely to suit the then condition of the Boer community. The

ordinary idea of a written constitution was at that time unknown,

and the meaning of such words as "rigid" or "elastic" was, of

course, beyond their comprehension. These only developed a

significance when the judicial crisis of 1897 put a fresh face on

Republican affairs.

_Article 4_ states that "the people desire no extension of

territory, except only on principles of justice, whenever the

interests of the Republic render it advisable."

_Article 6._--"Its territory is open to every stranger who submits

himself to the laws of the Republic; all persons who happen to be

within the territory of this Republic have equal claim to protection

of person and property."

_Article 8._--"The people claim as much social freedom as possible

(_de meest mogelyke maatschappelyke vryheid_), and expect to attain

it by upholding their religion, fulfilling their obligations,

submitting to law, order, and justice, and maintaining the same. The

people permit the spread of the Gospel among the heathen, subject to

prescribed provisions against the practice of fraud and deception."

_Article 9._--"The people will not allow of any equality between

coloured and white inhabitants, either in Church or in State."

_Article 10._--"The people will not brook any dealing in slaves or

slavery in this Republic (_will geen slavenhandel, noch slaverny in

deze Republick dulden_)."

Before passing on to other sections, Article 10 calls for attention.

In spite of its terms, the Boers of that period had a practice which

might be described as sailing very near the wind. The "apprenticeship"

of children taken prisoners in the native wars was uncommonly like

slave-owning. They were called "orphans"--sometimes they had been made

orphans by the conquerors--and they were then "apprenticed" to the

Boer farmers till grown up. Though opinions differ on this point, it

has been asserted by those who know that there was a curious system of

"transfer" connected with these so-called apprentices, and that even

when grown they seldom gained their liberty save by escape.

Further articles entrust legislation to a Volksraad chosen by vote

of the burghers, providing at the same time that the people shall be

allowed three months' grace for intimating to the Raad their views

on any prospective law, "those laws, however, which admit of no

delay excepted." Others constitute an Executive Council, "which

shall also recommend to the Raad all officers for the public

service"; others refer to the liberty of the press; restrict

membership of the Volksraad to members of the Dutch Reformed

Congregations; state that "the people do not desire to allow amongst

them any Roman Catholic Churches, nor any other Protestant Churches

except those in which such tenets of the Christian belief are taught

as are prescribed in the Heidelberg Catechism"; and give the

Volksraad the power of making treaties, save in time of war or of

imminent danger.

The members of the Raad were to be twelve in number at least, and

were to be between the ages of thirty and sixty. They must be

burghers of the Dutch Reformed Church, residents, and owners of

landed property in the Republic; no native nor bastard was to be

admitted to the Raad. At the age of twenty-one every burgher,

provided he belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church, was entitled to

the franchise. The election of the President to a five years' term

of office was in the hands of the burghers, and in this office he

was to be supported by an Executive Council consisting of the

Commandant-General, two burghers qualified to vote, and a Secretary.

All the able-bodied men of the Republic, and if necessary natives,

were liable to military service.

No sooner was the Grondwet arranged than Marthinus Wessels

Pretorius, the son of the chief Andries Pretorius,--who died in

1853--was elected President of the South African Republic. The next

few years were spent in internal dissension, consequent on the

ambition of the President and the jealousy of his political rivals.

Finally Lydenburg, which had struggled to proclaim itself an

independent Republic, yielded, and affairs relating to the

government of the country seemed to be mending. Still there were

always Messrs. Kruger and Schoeman, two adventurous politicians, who

kept things lively in the councils of the State. On the retirement

of Pretorius from the Free State Presidency in 1864, and his

re-election to that of the South African Republic, Mr. Kruger was

appointed Commandant-General, and for the time being his ambitious

longings were appeased.

At that period the white population consisted of merely about thirty

thousand all told. The native community almost trebled the Dutch.

Mr. Bryce, in his "Impressions on South Africa," describes the then

state of the affairs of the Republic as anything but satisfactory:

"There were hundreds of thousands of natives, a few of whom were

living as servants under a system of enforced labour which was

sometimes hardly distinguishable from slavery, while the vast

majority were ruled by their own chiefs, some as tributaries of the

Republic, some practically independent of it. With the latter wars

were frequently raging--wars in which shocking cruelties were

perpetrated on both sides, the Kaffirs massacring the white families

whom they surprised, the Boer commandos taking a savage vengeance

upon the tribes when they captured a kraal or mountain stronghold.

It was the sight of these wars which drove Dr. Livingstone to begin

his famous explorations to the north. The farmers were too few to

reduce the natives to submission, though always able to defeat them

in the field, and, while they relished an expedition, they had an

invincible dislike to any protracted operations which cost money.

Taxes they would not pay. They lived in a sort of rude plenty among

their sheep and cattle, but they had hardly any coined money,

conducting their transactions by barter, and they were too rude to

value the benefits which government secures to a civilised people."

TRANSVAAL DISSENSIONS

Among other things an attempt was made on the part of the Boers to

annex the Orange Free State. President Pretorius crossed the Vaal in

1857, at the head of a large commando, with the intention of seizing

on the neighbouring territory. He was doomed to disappointment,

however, for his intended raid was stopped by the timely resistance

of the forewarned President of the Orange Free State. An encounter

was happily avoided through the intervention of Mr. Kruger, and

finally the two Republics decided to mutually recognise each other's

independent States.

But the ambitions of Pretorius merely smouldered. He still kept a

greedy eye on the Orange Free State, and machinated for the union of

the two States into a gigantic whole. He therefore refused the

Presidency of the Transvaal for that of the Free State, in the hope

of gathering into his own hands the reins of both governments. He

was again disappointed, however, and in 1864 he returned and was

re-elected President of the Transvaal.

The return of Pretorius was the signal for temporary peace. During

his second Presidency, however, the little rift within the lute--the

rift of insolvency, which eventually wrecked South African

independence--began to be observable.

Mr. Nixon, who took great pains to acquaint himself with the true

state of the country, says "that the intestine disturbances and the

incessant Kaffir wars had well-nigh exhausted the finances of the

Republic. The exchequer was only tardily replenished under a loose

system of taxation. The Boers have never been good taxpayers, and no

Government has been able to enforce the proper payment of taxes due

to the State. A decade after its establishment the Republic was

practically insolvent. Even as early as 1857 the Government was

compelled to issue _mandaten_, or bills, wherewith to raise money to

buy ammunition, and to pay its servants. In 1866 a regular issue of

paper money was sanctioned by the Volksraad. This was followed by

further issues, until, in 1867, a Finance Commission found that

there were more notes in circulation than had been authorised by the

Volksraad. Nevertheless, the financial requirements of the State

became so pressing that still more issues had to be made, and in

1870 there were over L73,000 worth of notes in circulation. The

notes were declared a legal tender, but the Government were unable

to keep up their value by artificial methods. They fell to a low

ebb, and passed from hand to hand at a discount of about 75 per

cent, from their nominal value."

In 1867 occurred two events which served to change the whole

political and financial outlook of the Transvaal. Diamonds were

discovered in the district of Kimberley. Gold was unearthed in

Lydenburg. From that hour a procession of European miners began

slowly to march north from the Cape. A highway was opened up between

the two promising districts, and diggers of every race, pioneers

bent on the propagation of modern ideas, teachers, missionaries, and

traders of all kinds, attracted by the promise of wealth, flocked to

the scene and settled themselves among the trekkers.

ZULU DISTURBANCES

After this period, when, as stated before, small but promising

quantities of gold had been unearthed, it was no longer possible to

prevent parties of miners and speculators from trickling into the

Transvaal, to the annoyance of its inhabitants. Outside, too, there

were troubles, disputes, and skirmishes with the Zulus, and further

north was waged a fierce fight between the Boers and the chief of

the Bapedi, one Sekukuni, whose father had signed away his

independence to the Boers, and who refused in his turn to abide by

the conditions of the compact. In this fight Sekukuni was

successful, and the Boers, worsted and discontented, and believing

that the Almighty was displeased with them and with their President,

Mr. Burgers, retired from the campaign. At the same time, in the

south, Cetchwayo was itching to be on the warpath, and the general

state of affairs suggested a possible annihilation of the Transvaal

by an uncontrollable horde of natives. Things went from bad to

worse, and in October 1876 Lord Carnarvon remonstrated with the

President of the South African Republic regarding the unprovoked

barbarity of the Sekukuni war, which had again been renewed. The

reason for the interference of Lord Carnarvon is to be found in the

following despatch, forwarded by Sir Henry Barkly, the then Governor

of the Cape:--

"As Von Schlickman has since fallen fighting bravely, it is not

without reluctance that I join in affixing this dark stain on his

memory, but truth compels me to add the following extract from a

letter which I have since received from one whose name (which I

communicate to your lordship privately) forbids disbelief:--

"'There is no longer the slightest doubt as to the murder of the two

women and the child at Steelpoort by the direct order of Schlickman,

and in the attack on the kraal near which these women were captured

(or some attack about that period) he ordered his men to cut the

throats of all the wounded! This is no mere report; it is

positively true." And in a subsequent letter the same writer informs

me that the statements are based on the evidence, not alone of

Kaffirs, but of whites who were present.

"'As regards the even more serious accusations brought against Abel

Erasmus' (the Kruger's Post field-cornet), 'as specially alluded to

in my letter to President Burgers, on the 28th ult.' (viz. of

treacherously killing forty or fifty friendly natives, men and

women, and carrying off the children), I beg to invite your

lordship's attention to an account derived, I am assured, from a

respectable Boer who accompanied the expedition, and protested

against the slaughter and robbery of friendly Kaffirs, committed by

order of the above-named field-cornet.

"'Should I not shortly receive such a reply from the President to my

letters of last month, as to convince me that his Honour has taken

effectual steps to check such outrages and punish the perpetrators,

I will enter another protest, if only for form's sake.

"'Seeing, however, that Aylward, who is said to boast, whether truly

or not, that he took part with his brother Fenians in the murder of

the police constable at Manchester, as well as in the attempt to

blow up the Clerkenwell prison, had succeeded Schlickman in the

command of the Steelpoort Volunteers, I question whether the

Government of the South African Republic has the power, even

supposing it to have the will, to put a stop to further atrocities

on the part of this band of "Filibusters," as they are commonly

styled in the newspapers.

"'In my opinion it will be requisite to call in the aid of British

troops before this can be done, and I am not without hope that one

of the results of the mission on which Sir T. Shepstone is about to

start, will be a petition from persons of education and property

throughout the country for such an intervention on the part of her

Majesty's Government as will terminate this wanton and useless

bloodshed, and prevent the recurrence of the scenes of injustice,

cruelty, and rapine, which abundant evidence is every day

forthcoming to prove, have rarely ceased to disgrace the Republics

beyond the Vaal ever since they first sprang into existence.'"

Von Schlickman was an ex-Russian officer, commanding a force of

filibusters which had been engaged by the Transvaal Government, and

his men being unpaid, were allowed to reimburse themselves by cattle

or land seized from the natives.

As a natural consequence, the war assumed a character of

unrestrained ferocity. On receiving this information Lord Carnarvon

wrote that his Government "could not view passively, and with

indifference, the engagement of the Republic in foreign military

operations the object or the necessity of which had not been made

apparent."

The quarrel with the chief had originated, as stated, in a Boer

claim to his land, and the Boer President in replying urged the

natural right of the Boers to all the land of the Transvaal. The

chief magistrate at that time was President Burgers, a man who, if

report may be believed, was far superior to those with whom he

associated. This man, a Cape Dutchman, and sometime minister of the

Reformed Church, had been called to the onerous post of President of

the South African Republic in 1872. He was bent on the advancement

of his nation, and his intelligence was remarkable. He was a man of

sterling character, fanciful, enthusiastic, an idealist even, with a

horror of slaveholding, and a hankering for the pure life of the

humanist. In a measure he was too much in advance of the people with

whom he was connected. To them he was something of a Freethinker, a

man too ready to judge for himself while the Gospel was at hand to

judge for him. Such liberal views were not in accord with peasant

limitations. His desire to raise his country to the level of other

nations, to bring commerce and railways within touch of his people,

savoured of heresy. The appreciation for civilisation was so strong

within him that he is even said to have carried it to extremes, to

have favoured the prompt and regular payment of taxes, and to have

executed an elaborate design for an international coat-of-arms! Now

this reformer, like most reformers, was not appreciated among his

own people. He had no police to support him, no means of putting

pressure on those who should have served his cause. The Conservative

party, with Mr. Kruger at their head, did their best to circumvent

every innovation and to save themselves and the country from what

they believed to be the dangerous inorthodoxy of their President.

Mr. Burgers in his posthumous "Vindication" outlines some strange

hints regarding the character of his compatriots, which outlines may

now be readily filled in by personal experience. He therein asserts

that had he chosen to publish to the world a faithful description of

the Transvaal Boers, they would have forfeited the appreciation

gained from the Liberal party in Europe. Mr. Burgers' reserve is

much to be regretted, as a few sidelights thrown on the Boer

character at that period might have helped to educate the Liberal

party of whom he spoke, and thereby saved much of the vacillation of

policy for which the country now has to suffer.

[Illustration: SERGEANT-MAJOR of the 2nd DRAGOONS.

(ROYAL SCOTS GREYS.)

Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]

THE POLITICAL WEB

Before going further, we must examine the situation between the

Governor of the Cape, the President of the South African Republic,

and the Home Government.

When we look back at Boer history, we find the details of annexation

and restoration repeating themselves with the consistency of the

chorus of a nursery rhyme. What the Government of the Cape

accomplished the Government at home proceeded promptly to undo, till

the problems connected with Boer liberty and British rights became

so tangled and so intricate that they could only be solved by the

sword.

It may be remembered that in 1854 Sir George Grey, the then Governor

of the Cape, applied himself to the puzzle. He started with the best

hopes. He saw before him a vista of labour, of argument, of

contradiction, but the tangles, he believed, could eventually be

smoothed out. In the anxiety to avoid trouble and responsibility,

and possibly in an amiable desire to conciliate the parties at home,

the Imperial Government had conceded territories and alienated

subjects without having made an effort to discover the wishes of the

people, or to try a free form of government suited to South Africa.

He was in favour of a Federal Union wherein the separate Colonies

and States, each with its local government and legislature, should

be combined under one general representative legislature, led by a

responsible Ministry, specially charged with the duty of providing

for common defence. This plan of Federal Union seemed to appeal to

the Burghers of the Orange Free State, for the Volksraad decided

that "a union of alliance with the Cape Colony, either on the plan

of federation or otherwise, is desirable." Sir George Grey was not

permitted to pursue his policy, for the British Government decided

against the resumption of British sovereignty over the Orange Free

State. The same forward and backward movement, the same sort of

political _chase et croise_, was again carried on from 1876 and 1877

to 1881. It was decided that a Federal Union should be created

between such African Colonies as were willing to join. To further

this scheme Sir Bartle Frere, after a long and arduous career in

India, was appointed Governor and High Commissioner by Lord

Carnarvon, the then Colonial Secretary. But Sir Bartle was too late.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had been sent out to the Transvaal on

Special Commission to confer with the President on the question of

Confederation, had already annexed the Transvaal. The reasons for

the annexation were many and excellent. Firstly, the Transvaal

Republic, vulgarly speaking, was out at elbows. It was bankrupt,

helpless, languishing. The sorry sum of 12s. 6d. represented the

entire wealth of the Treasury. The Zulu chief Cetchwayo was waiting

to "eat up" the Boers, and the Boers were unceasing in their efforts

to encroach on Zulu territory. But the deplorable state of affairs

is better described by quoting Sir T. Shepstone's letter on the

subject.

"It was patent to every observer," writes Sir T. Shepstone, "that

the Government (of the Transvaal) was powerless to control either

its white citizens or its native subjects; that it was incapable of

enforcing its laws or of collecting its taxes; that the Treasury was

empty; that the salaries of officials had been and are months in

arrear; that sums payable for the ordinary and necessary expenditure

of government cannot be had, and that such services as postal

contracts were long and hopelessly overdue; that the white

inhabitants had become split into factions; that the large native

populations within the boundaries of the State ignore its authority

and laws; and that the powerful Zulu king, Cetchwayo, is anxious to

seize upon the first opportunity of attacking a country the conduct

of whose warriors has convinced him that it can be easily conquered

by his clamouring regiments." He again writes: "I think it necessary

to explain, more at length than I was able to do in my last

despatch, the circumstances which seem to me to forbid all hope that

the Transvaal Republic is capable of maintaining the show even of

independent existence any longer, which induced me to consider it my

duty to assume this position in my communications with the President

and Executive Council, and which have convinced me that, if I were

to leave the country in its present condition, I should but expose

the inhabitants to anarchy among themselves, and to attack from the

natives, that would prove not only fatal to the Republic, but in the

highest degree dangerous to her Majesty's possessions and subjects

in South Africa."

The proclamation of the annexation of the Transvaal was issued on

the 12th of April 1876, and on the previous day Sir T. Shepstone

wrote: "There will be a protest against my act of annexation issued

by the Government, but they will at the same time call upon the

people to submit quietly, pending the issue. You need not be

disquieted by such action, because it is taken merely to save

appearances, and the members of the Government from the violence of

a faction that seems for years to have held Pretoria in terror when

any act of the Government displeased it. You will better understand

this when I tell you privately that the President has from the first

fully acquiesced in the necessity for the change, and that most of

the members of the Government have expressed themselves anxious for

it--but none of them have had the courage openly to express their

opinions, so I have had to act apparently against them, and this I

felt bound to do, knowing the state and danger of the country, and

that three-fourths of the people will be thankful for the change

when once it is made."

As a matter of fact the annexation was received with rejoicing all

over the country. "God save the Queen" was sung, and special

thanksgiving services were held in many of the churches. The Union

Jack was run up, the Republican flag hauled down without a

dissentient voice. The arrival of British troops--the first

battalion of the 13th Regiment--was hailed with curiosity and

pleasure, the Boers with their women and children turning out to

meet it and hear the band play. The financial effects of the new

departure were magical. Credit and commerce were at once restored.

Valueless railway bonds rose to par, and the price of landed

property was nearly doubled. On the Queen's birthday, the first

after the annexation, the 24th of May 1877, the native chiefs were

invited to attend, and the Union Jack was formally hoisted to the

strains of the National Anthem. This same flag was within a few

years ignobly hauled down during the signing of the Convention at

Pretoria, and formally buried by a party of Englishmen and loyal

natives. But for the time being all seemed pleased with the new

state of affairs. As Mr. Haggard says, it is difficult to reconcile

the enthusiasm of a great number of the inhabitants of the Transvaal

for English rule and the quiet acquiescence of the remainder at this

time, with the decidedly antagonistic attitude subsequently assumed.

His description of the situation in "The Last Boer War" seems to be

more near the truth than any forthcoming: "The Transvaal, when we

annexed it, was in the position of a man with a knife at his throat,

who is suddenly rescued by some one stronger than he, on certain

conditions which at the time he gladly accepts, but afterwards, when

the danger is passed, wishes to repudiate. In the same way the

inhabitants of the South African Republic were in the time of need

very thankful for our aid, but after a while, when the recollection

of their difficulties had grown faint, when their debts had been

paid and their enemies had been defeated, they began to think that

they would like to get rid of us again, and start fresh on their own

account with a clean sheet."

In the management of affairs it appears that Mr. Burgers began to

set an example of the policy which Mr. Kruger has since followed:

the policy of trying to sit on either side of the fence. Mr. Kruger

has struggled more and more violently to accomplish this feat as the

years advance and he advances in years. He has tried to grab the

advantages attendant upon the possession of gold mines and schemed

to acquire a great financial status, and yet at the same time to

keep up his affectation of piety and to maintain his pristine

condition of bucolic irresponsibility. Brought face to face with Sir

T. Shepstone's scheme for annexation, Mr. Burger privately

encouraged the proposed action of the Government--he and his

colleagues even stipulating for pension and office--while publicly

he lifted up his protest against the innovation.

The Boer, with his usual craft, had decided that the British

Government should set him financially on his feet, which feet he

meant promptly to use for running away from his responsibilities.

Some declare that the policy of Sir T. Shepstone was premature, that

he should have waited until the Boer had soaked further in the

slough of insolvency into which he was fast sinking. But Sekukuni

was threatening, and on the south-eastern frontier Cetchwayo, with a

force some thirty thousand strong, was waiting his opportunity. The

promise of the future was a general holocaust, in which Boer men,

women, and children, farms and flocks would be annihilated. Sir T.

Shepstone, had he been other than a Briton, might have stayed his

hand and waited till the Boers were effectually swept away, but

being a Briton he acted as such, doubtless arguing that,

"As we under Heaven are supreme head,

So, under him, that great supremacy,

Where we do reign, we will alone uphold."

THE WEB THICKENING

It must be remembered that between the Zulus and the Boers no

boundary line had ever been fixed, and that for over a dozen years

the Zulu chiefs had repeatedly implored the British Governor in

Natal for advice and help in their dealings with these aggressors.

It had been part of the Dutch policy--if policy it may be called--to

force the Zulu gradually to edge further and further from the rich

pasture lands sloping eastward of the Drakensberg Mountains, and

spreading to right and left into the north and west of Zululand.

Little notice had been taken of their petitions, and the Zulus had

determined to take the law into their own hands. Cetchwayo,

therefore, when the news of our annexation of the Transvaal reached

him, was like a wild beast baulked of its prey. He was anxious for

an occasion for his young warriors "to wash their spears" in the

gore of his enemies, and was naturally disappointed to find them

under the protection of the white man. The Natal Government

attempted to soothe him--to promote peace. He remained sullen and

simmered. He vented his spleen by putting several young women to

death for having refused to marry his soldiers. On being

remonstrated with by the Natal Government, he expressed himself with

engaging candour. His own words, without comment, describe the

character with which we had to deal.

"Did I ever tell Mr. Shepstone," his Majesty cried, "that I would

not kill? Did Mr. Shepstone tell the white people I made such an

arrangement? Because if he did he deceived them. I do kill; but I do

not consider that I have done anything yet in the way of killing.

Why do the white people start at nothing? I have not yet begun. I

have yet to kill. It is the custom of our nation, and I will not

depart from it. Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about my

laws? I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, and by so

doing throw the large kraal which I govern into the water. My people

will not listen unless they are killed, and while wishing to be

friends with the English I do not agree to give my people over to be

governed by laws sent to me by them. Have I not asked the English to

allow me to wash my spears since the death of my father, Upandi, and

they have kept playing with me all the time, treating me as a

child?" ... A good deal more followed in this strain. Since his

accession the gallant Cetchwayo had decided to "wash his spears" in

the blood of his neighbours, and whatever the British might have to

say in the matter, wash them he would. It was obvious, therefore,

that a ruffian of this kind, backed by a bloodthirsty following, was

a permanent danger to our Colony of Natal and to its white

inhabitants. Something must be done to remove the disquiet caused by

the utterances of the savage. Sir Henry Bulwer (the Governor of

Natal)--to conciliate the king and to allay his fears lest his

territory, like that of the Boers, should be annexed--proposed that

a commission should investigate the rival claims of Boers and Zulus

on border questions, and settle them by arbitration. But what Sir H.

Bulwer proposed Sir Bartle Frere, High Commissioner in South Africa,

disapproved. He felt that Cetchwayo and his host would be a standing

menace to the borders of Natal. Nevertheless he agreed to a

discussion of the vexed boundary question between Boer and Zulu, in

which the commissioners declared unanimously against the claims of

the former. Certain land only to west of the Blood River, held by

the Boers and unchallenged by the Zulus, was confirmed to the Dutch

settlers in their occupation of the same. But to this decision Sir

Bartle Frere considered it expedient to add some saving clauses.

These demanded, first, that Cetchwayo should adhere to the

guarantees he had given and not permit indiscriminate shedding of

blood; second, that he should institute from his existing military

system the form of tribal quotas; third, that he should accept the

presence of a British Resident; fourth, that he should protect the

missionaries and their converts; and lastly, that he should

surrender certain criminals and pay certain fines. His Zulu Majesty

was given thirty days to consider the subject. Instead of

considering he flouted it. The result was war.

THE ZULU WAR

According to the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere there was, and for a

long time had been, a growing desire on the part of the great chiefs

to make this war into a simultaneous rising of Kaffirdom against

white civilisation. A spirit of mutiny had been in the air since the

terrible events in India in 1857, and there was a general conviction

among the native tribes that the authority of Great Britain would

eventually be overthrown. Now the most powerful of all the native

tribes in South Africa were the Zulus, whose military organisation

had long been celebrated, and who had earned a great reputation

since the days of Gaika, and more especially in the time that

followed when Chaka, who was a born warrior, brought the gigantic

army into a state of marvellous efficiency.

A few words regarding the career of this great chieftain may be

found interesting, for to him is accorded the credit of the

indubitably warlike and brave disposition of his countrymen. This

man, who has been at times called the Attila and the Napoleon of

South Africa, was born in 1783. He became chief officer to

Dingiswayo, a man of remarkable ability, who studied European

military systems and modelled on their principle a highly efficient

army. Chaka, heir to a chieftainship of the Amazulu tribe (the Zulus

proper), took the fancy of Dingiswayo, who elevated him first to a

post of high command, and eventually to the vacant Zulu

chieftainship. On the death in battle of Dingiswayo, Chaka assumed

the command of both tribes, to which he gave his name. The already

excellent army he proceeded to improve till it became one of the

most efficient military organisations ever originated in an

uncivilised country. The whole kingdom was ordered on a military

footing, and expanded so wondrously that the original two tribes at

first commanded by Chaka became an hundred, each tribe having been

defeated in warfare and incorporated in the Zulu nationality. His

policy, unlike that of Cetchwayo later on, was not to destroy but to

subdue, and thus he soon ruled with undisputed sway over a complete

empire covering the desolated regions of Natal, Zululand, and the

modern Boer States. His methods of military training were entirely

Spartan; his discipline was a discipline of iron. Disobedience was

met with the penalty of death. To tread out a roaring bush-fire, or

capture alive a wild beast, were some of the tasks imposed as daily

training for his would-be warriors. An order was an order, and this,

however dangerous or seemingly impossible, had to be obeyed by

individual or regiment on pain of the most horrible forms of death.

It may easily be imagined that this stern regime was calculated to

create a military following of the most brave and adventurous order.

Naturally enough, all the other Kaffir tribes looked to the Zulus as

their leaders and champions in the contest. Captain Hamilton Parr

tells a tale of an old Galeka warrior who said to a native

magistrate, "Yes, you have beaten us--you have beaten us well; but

there," pointing eastward, "there are the Amazulu warriors. Can you

beat them? They say not. Go and try. Don't trouble any more about

us, but go and beat _them_ and we shall be quiet enough." This

anecdote serves to describe the general sentiment of disdain for

British authority which Sir Bartle Frere detected almost immediately

after his arrival among the natives, and to account in a measure for

what has been declared to be his high-handed policy. He was

convinced that we could never expect peace among the chiefs until we

had satisfied them who was master. A lesson was necessary to show

that the British Government could govern and meant to govern, and

that lesson he felt must be taught sooner or later. For a long time

Cetchwayo had been instigating rebellion and preparing for war. As

may be seen from Lord Carnarvon's letter of the 24th of January 1878

to Sir Bartle Frere, the Government was fully conscious of the

existing necessity to protect the Transvaal and to maintain British

prestige in South Africa. The despatch runs: "It seems certain that

the Zulu king has derived from his messengers the unfortunate idea

that the Kaffirs are able to cope with the Colony on more than equal

terms, and this belief has, as was inevitable, produced a very

threatening change in his language and conduct towards the Transvaal

Government. It is only too probable that a savage chief such as

Cetchwayo, supported by a powerful army already excited by the

recent successes of a neighbouring tribe over the late Government of

the Transvaal, may now become fired with the idea of victory over

her Majesty's forces, and that a deliberate attempt upon her

Majesty's territories may ensue. Should this unfortunately happen,

you must understand that at whatever sacrifice it is imperatively

necessary that her Majesty's forces in Natal and the Transvaal must

be reinforced by the immediate despatch of the military and naval

contingents now operating in the Cape, or such portion of them as

may be required. This is necessary not only for the safety of the

Transvaal, for the defence of which her Majesty's Government are

immediately concerned, but also in the interest of the Cape, since

a defeat of the Zulu king would act more powerfully than any other

means in disheartening the native races of South Africa."

On this subject Sir H. Bulwer wrote: "There has been for the last

eight or nine months a danger of collision with the Zulus at any

moment." And in November 1878 he said: "The system of government in

the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement seems hopeless. We

should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetchwayo."

Consequently, Sir Bartle Frere was not surprised when all efforts to

reduce Cetchwayo to yield to British demand failed. As time went by

it became clear that enforcement of these demands must be placed in

the hands of Lord Chelmsford and the military authorities, and

accordingly, on the 10th of January 1879, the Commander-in-Chief of

the forces of South Africa crossed the frontier.

As the frontier extended for some two hundred miles, to assume a

purely defensive attitude would have been impossible. Our forces so

placed would not have been sufficiently strong to resist an attack

made at their own time and place by a horde of some ten to twenty

thousand Zulus. Lord Chelmsford had no alternative, therefore, but

to invade Zululand.

ISANDLWANA

The force under Lord Chelmsford's command was divided into four columns.

These were composed partly of British soldiers, partly of Colonists, and

partly of blacks. The first column, under Colonel Pearson, crossed the

Lower Tugela; the second, under Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E.,

consisting of native troops and Natal Volunteers, was to act in concert

with column three; the third, under Colonel Glyn--but directed by the

General, who assumed all responsibility--crossed the Buffalo River; and

the fourth, under Colonel Evelyn Wood, entered Zululand from near

Newcastle on the north-west. The plan was for the four columns to

converge upon Ulundi, in the neighbourhood of the king's kraal, where

fighting might be expected to begin.

[Illustration: MAP OF ZULULAND AND ADJOINING PORTIONS OF NATAL.]

The crossing of the Buffalo River was effected without difficulty or

resistance, and ten days after the central column formed a camp at

the foot of the hill Isandlwana (the Little Hand). On the morning of

the 22nd the Commander-in-Chief advanced at daybreak, for the

purpose of attacking a kraal some miles distant. The camp at

Isandlwana was left in charge of a force of some eight hundred mixed

troops--regulars, volunteers, and natives. Strict orders to defend

and not to leave the camp were given, but in spite of these orders

portions of the force became detached. Suddenly, unobserved by them,

there appeared a dense impi of some twenty thousand Zulus. The

savage horde rushed shouting upon the small British detachments,

rushed with the swiftness of cavalry, attacked them before they

could unite, and swooping down with tremendous velocity, seized the

camp and separated the British troops from their reserves of

ammunition. In face of this warrior multitude our troops were

defenceless. A few moments of wild despairing energy, a hand-to-hand

struggle for life between the white man and the bloodthirsty savage,

groans of wounded and yells of victory, and all was over. Of the six

companies of the 24th, consisting of more than half the infantry

engaged, but six souls escaped. The rest died where they fell, with

no kindly hand to give them succour, no British voice to breathe a

burial prayer. But some before they dropped managed to cut their way

through the ring of Zulu spears. Two gallant fellows, Lieutenants

Melvill and Coghill, almost succeeded in saving the colours of the

first battalion of the 24th Regiment. They made a bold rush, but

merely reached the Natal bank of the Buffalo to be struck down. The

colours, wrapped round Melvill's body, were discovered in the river

some days afterwards.

The Zulu plan of fighting, in this case so successful, is curious.

The formation of their attacks represents the figure of a beast with

horns, chest, and loins. While making a feint with one horn, the

other, unperceived in long grass or bush, swoops round and closes in

on the enemy. The chest then advances to attack. The loins are kept

at a distance, and simply join in pursuit.

The news of the disaster spread fast. Sir Bartle Frere, on the

morning of the 24th, was awakened by the arrival of two almost

distraught and wholly unintelligible messengers. Their report, when

it could be at last comprehended, seemed too horrible for belief.

That they had escaped some terrible ordeal was evident; that they

were members of the company of naval volunteers that formed part of

the General's army, their uniform proclaimed. But of the General

they could say nothing--he might be dead, he might be missing--all

they knew was of their own miraculous escape from a scene of

slaughter. Colonel Pulleine they declared was dead, but further news

had to be awaited with anxious hearts.

Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford had heard the horrible news. The camp had

been seen in the possession of the Zulus. Worn and weary with heavy

marching in a baking sun, he and his troops began to retreat. At

nightfall, thoroughly jaded, they returned to a grim scene. All

around lay the still silent dead--the corpses of the comrades they

had parted with but a few hours before. There, amid the pathetic

wreckage, were they forced to lay them down to rest!

Fortunately the Zulus, having plundered the camp, had made off, and

the British force was able the next day to proceed to the relief of

Rorke's Drift. At Rorke's Drift the now world-celebrated defence of

Lieutenant Bromhead, of the 24th, and Lieutenant Chard, R.E., took

place. These young officers had been left with one hundred and four

soldiers to take charge of a small depot of provisions and an

hospital, and to keep open the communication with Natal. Some hours

after the disaster of Isandlwana their post was attacked by

Dabulamanzi (brother of Cetchwayo) and over three thousand of his

finest warriors. The little garrison had made for themselves a

laager of sacks of maize and biscuit-boxes, and behind these they

defended themselves so stubbornly and so heroically throughout the

night of the 23rd, that the Zulu chieftain, discomfited and

harassed, eventually retired. For their magnificent pluck the two

young officers received the Victoria Cross. Their action had saved

Natal from invasion by the enemy. Of the little garrison seventeen

fell and ten were wounded. The loss of the Zulus was about three

hundred.

[Illustration: THE DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT, 22nd to 23rd JANUARY

1879.

Painted by Alphonse de Neuville, Etched by L. Flameng.

Reproduced by special arrangement with the Fine Art Society,

London.]

Colonel Pearson's column, as we said, crossed the Lower Tugela near

the sea, with the intention of joining the other columns at Ulundi.

On the way thither he was attacked by a Zulu force at Inyesani. This

force, though it more than doubled the strength of his own, he drove

back with heavy loss, and marched to the Norwegian Mission station,

Eshowe. On his arrival there on the 23rd of January, he learnt the

awful news of the disaster, and instantly sent his cavalry back to

Natal, fortified his station, and waited there the arrival of

reinforcements.

The third column, commanded by Colonel Evelyn Wood (consisting of

1700 British soldiers, 50 farmers under Commandant Pieter Uys, and

some 300 blacks), reached Kambula in safety, and fortified a post

there. Colonel Wood harassed the enemy by frequent sallies, however,

and on one occasion the attack on the Zlobane Mountain lost about

ninety-six of his men. Among these were Colonel Weatherley, his

young son, and Commandant Uys. The following day the British laager

was attacked by a horde of Zulus, who were routed. In this

engagement Colonel Wood, Colonel Buller, and Captain Woodgate

especially distinguished themselves.

Lord Chelmsford, with a force of soldiers and sailors, marched in

April from Natal to the relief of Colonel Pearson at Eshowe. He

arrived there in safety, after having encountered and beaten back

the Zulus at Ginginlova: yet it was not until the 4th of July that

the troops eventually reached Ulundi, where the final battle and

victory took place. But of this later.

AFFAIRS AT HOME

Two days after the arrival of the news of the disaster at

Isandlwana, Parliament met. The reverse in Zululand naturally

engrossed all thoughts. Questions innumerable were addressed to

Government, as to the strength of reinforcements to be sent out--as

to the further necessity for war at all--as to the so-called

high-handed action of Sir Bartle Frere, and the so-called blunders

of Lord Chelmsford. Scapegoats were wanted, and, as a natural

consequence, the two most energetic and hard-worked of the Queen's

servants were attacked.

A political pitched battle was imminent. The Ministers declined to

withdraw their confidence from the Lord High Commissioner, though

they passed on him censure for his hasty and independent

proceedings. That the members of Government had a high appreciation

of his great experience, ability, and energy was apparent, for they

declared they had "no desire to withdraw in the present crisis of

affairs the confidence hitherto reposed in him, the continuance of

which was now more than ever needed to conduct our difficulties in

South Africa to a successful termination." On the 19th of March 1879

the Secretary of the Colonies wrote to Sir Bartle Frere, to the

effect that Ministers were unable to find, on the documents placed

before them, "that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action

which alone would justify him in taking, without their full

knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war."

The day for discussion of South African affairs in the Upper House

arrived.

Lord Lansdowne moved, on the 11th of March, "That this House, while

willing to support her Majesty's Government in all necessary

measures for defending the possessions of her Majesty in South

Africa, regrets that the _ultimatum_, which was calculated to

produce immediate war, should have been presented to the Zulu king

without authority from the responsible advisers of the Crown, and

that an offensive war should have been commenced without imperative

and pressing necessity or adequate preparation; and the House

regrets that, after the censure passed upon the High Commissioner by

her Majesty's Government, in the despatch of March 19, 1879, the

conduct of affairs in South Africa should be retained in his hands."

A keen debate ensued. The Opposition clamoured for the recall of Sir

Bartle Frere, as the example of independent action set by him might

be followed by other and more distant representatives of the Crown.

The war was ascribed to Lord Carnarvon's impatience for South

African confederation and his "incurable greed" for extending the

limits of the Colonies, and the annexation of the Transvaal was

declared to be a mistake, unless the Government was prepared to send

out a large military force to South Africa.

The Government combated these arguments. They denied they had

censured Sir Bartle Frere, and stated that they had passed no

opinion on his policy, but merely asserted as a principle that "Her

Majesty's advisers, and they only, must decide the grave issues of

peace and war."

It was argued that war with Cetchwayo was inevitable sooner or

later, and that the Lord High Commissioner had thought it advisable

to be prompt in the matter. His conduct, it was true, had not the

entire approval of the Ministry, but every one knew it was unwise to

change horses in crossing a stream, and his action had not been such

as to outweigh the many considerations which required the

continuance of his service in South Africa.

Lord Beaconsfield, addressing the House, defended Sir Bartle Frere,

and expressed opinions on the policy of confederation as opposed to

that of annexation, opinions which afford so much instruction in

regard to our relations with the Transvaal that they are best

repeated in their entirety.

"I generally find," he said, "there is one advantage at the end of a

debate, besides the relief which is afforded by its termination, and

that is that both sides of the House seem pretty well agreed as to

the particular point that really is at issue; but the rich humour of

the noble duke (Duke of Somerset) has again diverted us from the

consideration of the motion really before the House. If the noble

duke and his friends were desirous of knowing what was the policy

which her Majesty's Government were prepared generally to pursue in

South Africa, if they were prepared to challenge the policy of Sir

Bartle Frere in all its details, I should have thought they would

have produced a very different motion from that which is now lying

on your lordships' table; for that is a motion of a most limited

character, and, according to the strict rules of parliamentary

discussion, precludes you from most of the subjects which have

lately been introduced to our consideration, and which principally

have emanated from noble lords opposite. We have not been summoned

here to-day to consider the policy of the acquisition of the

Transvaal. These are subjects on which I am sure the Government

would be prepared to address your lordships, if their conduct were

clearly and fairly impugned. And with regard to the annexation of

the province, which has certainly very much filled the mouths of men

of late, I can easily conceive that that would have been a subject

for fair discussion in this House, and we should have heard, as we

have heard to-night, though in a manner somewhat unexpected, from

the nature of the resolution before us, from the noble lord who was

recently the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the principal

reasons which induced the Government to sanction that policy--a

policy which I believe can be defended, but which has not been

impugned to-night in any formal manner.

"What has been impugned to-night is the conduct of the Government in

sanctioning, not the policy of Sir Bartle Frere, but his taking a

most important step without consulting them, which on such subjects

is the usual practice with all Governments. But the noble lord

opposite who introduced the subject does not even impugn the policy

of the Lord High Commissioner; and it was left to the noble duke who

has just addressed us, and who ought to have brought forward this

question if his views are so strongly entertained by him on the

matter, not in supporting a resolution such as now lies on your

lordships' table, but one which would have involved a discussion of

the policy of the Government and that of the high officer who is

particularly interested in it.

"My noble friend, the noble marquis (Lord Salisbury), who very

recently addressed the House, touched the real question which is

before us, and it is a very important question, although it is not

of the expansive character of the one which would have been

justified by the comments of the noble lords opposite. What we have

to decide to-night is this--whether her Majesty's Government shall

have the power of recommending to the sovereign the employment of a

high officer to fulfil duties of the utmost importance, or whether

that exercise of the prerogative, on their advice, shall be

successfully impugned, and that appointment superseded by noble

lords opposite. That course is perfectly constitutional, if they are

prepared to take the consequences. But let it be understood what the

issue is. It is this--that a censure upon the Government is called

for, because they have selected the individual who, on the whole,

they think is the best qualified successfully to fulfil the duties

of High Commissioner. The noble lords opposite made that

proposition, and if they succeed they will succeed in that which has

hitherto been considered one of the most difficult tasks of the

executive Government; that is to say, they will supersede the

individual whom the sovereign, in the exercise of her prerogative,

under the advice of her Ministers, has selected for an important

post. I cannot agree in the general remark made by the noble duke,

that because an individual has committed an error, and even a

considerable error, for that reason, without any reference either to

his past services or his present qualifications, immediately a

change should be recommended, and he should be recalled from the

scene of his duties.

"I remember myself a case not altogether different from the present

one," continued Lord Beaconsfield, alluding to Sir James Hudson, who,

when Minister at Turin, had been charged with having expressed himself

unguardedly upon the subject of Italian nationality. "It happened some

years ago, when I was in the other House. Then a very high official--a

diplomatist of great eminence, a member of the Liberal party--had

committed what was deemed a great indiscretion by several members of his

own party; and the Government were asked in a formal manner, by a

Liberal member, whether that distinguished diplomatist had been in

consequence recalled. But the person who was then responsible for the

conduct of public affairs in that House--the humble individual who is

now addressing your lordships, made this answer, with the full

concurrence of his colleagues--denied that that distinguished

diplomatist was recalled, and said that _great services are not

cancelled by one act or one single error however it may be regretted at

the moment_. That is what I said then, with regard to Sir James Hudson,

and what I say now with regard to Sir Bartle Frere. But I do not wish

to rest on that. I confess that, so keen is my sense of responsibility,

and that of my colleagues, and I am sure also that of noble lords

opposite, that we would not allow our decisions in such matters to be

unduly influenced by personal considerations of any kind. What we had to

determine is this, Was it wise that such an act on the part of Sir

Bartle Frere as, in fact, commencing war without consulting the

Government at home, and without their sanction, should be passed

unnoticed? Ought it not to be noticed in a manner which should convey to

that eminent person a clear conviction of the feelings of her Majesty's

Government; and at the same time was it not their duty to consider, were

he superseded, whether they could place in his position an individual

equally qualified to fulfil the great duties and responsibilities

resting on him? That is what we had to consider. We considered it

entirely with reference to the public interest, and the public interest

alone; and we arrived at the conviction that on the whole the retention

of Sir Bartle Frere in that position was our duty, notwithstanding the

inconvenient observations and criticisms to which we were, of course,

conscious it might subject us. And, that being our conviction, we have

acted upon it. It is a very easy thing for a Government to make a

scapegoat; but that is conduct which I hope no gentleman on this side,

and I believe no gentleman sitting opposite, would easily adopt. If Sir

Bartle Frere had been recalled--if he had been recalled in deference to

the panic, the thoughtless panic of the hour, in deference to those who

have no responsibility in the matter, and who have not weighed well and

deeply investigated all the circumstances and all the arguments which

can be brought forward, and which must be appealed to to influence our

opinions on such questions--no doubt a certain degree of odium might

have been diverted from the heads of her Majesty's Ministers, and the

world would have been delighted, as it always is, to find a victim. That

was not the course which we pursued, and it is one which I trust no

British Government ever will pursue. We had but one object in view, and

that was to take care that at this most critical period the affairs of

her Majesty in South Africa should be directed by one not only qualified

to direct them, but who was superior to any other individual whom we

could have selected for that purpose. The sole question that we really

have to decide to-night is, Was it the duty of her Majesty's Government

to recall Sir Bartle Frere in consequence of his having declared war

without our consent? We did not think it our duty to take that course,

and we do not think it our duty to take that course now. Whether we are

right in the determination at which we have arrived is the sole question

which the House has to determine upon the motion before it.

"The noble duke opposite (the Duke of Somerset) has told us that he

should not be contented without being made acquainted with the whole

policy which her Majesty's Government are prepared to pursue in

South Africa. If the noble duke will introduce that subject we shall

be happy to discuss it with him. No one could introduce it in a more

interesting, and, indeed, in a more entertaining manner than the

noble duke, who possesses that sarcastic faculty that so well

qualifies him to express his opinion on such a matter. I think,

however, that we ought to have had rather longer notice before we

were called upon to discuss so large a theme, which has now been

brought suddenly before us. If the noble marquis who introduced this

subject had given us notice of a motion of this character, we should

not have hesitated for a moment to meet it. I have, however, no

desire to avoid discussing the subject of our future policy in South

Africa, even on so general a notice as we have in reference to it

from the noble duke. Sir Bartle Frere was selected by the noble lord

(Lord Carnarvon), who formerly occupied the position of Secretary to

the Colonies, chiefly to secure one great end--namely, to carry out

that policy of confederation in South Africa which the noble lord

had successfully carried out on a previous occasion with regard to

the North American Colonies.

"If there is any policy which, in my mind, is opposed to the policy

of annexation, it is that of confederation. By pursuing the policy

of confederation we bind States together, we consolidate their

resources, and we enable them to establish a strong frontier; and

where we have a strong frontier, that is the best security against

annexation. I myself regard a policy of annexation with great

distrust. I believe that the reasons of State which induced us to

annex the Transvaal were not, on the whole, perfectly sound. But

what were the circumstances under which that annexation was

effected? The Transvaal was a territory which was no longer defended

by its occupiers. The noble lord opposite (Lord Kimberley), who

formerly had the Colonies under his management, spoke of the conduct

of Sir Theophilus Shepstone as though he had not taken due

precautions to effect the annexation of that province, and said that

he was not justified in concealing that he had not successfully

consummated his object. The noble lord said he had not assembled

troops enough in the province to carry out properly the policy of

annexation. But Sir Theophilus Shepstone particularly refers to the

very fact to show, that so unanimous and so united was the sentiment

in the province in favour of annexation, that it was unnecessary to

send any large force there to bring it about. _The annexation of

that province was a necessity--a geographical necessity._"

[Illustration: Sir HENRY BARTLE FRERE, Bart.

Photo by Maull & Fox. London.]

TOWARDS ULUNDI

It may be remembered that Lord Chelmsford's original idea had been

for Colonel Pearson's column to march from Eshowe to the chief's

kraal at Ulundi. In consequence of the disaster, however, Colonel

Pearson decided to remain where he was. He constructed a fort for

the protection of the garrison against an army of some 20,000 Zulus

lying in wait between Eshowe and Tugela. On the 30th of January all

the troops came within this embryo fort, and as tents were

forbidden, officers and men had to make the best of what shelter the

waggons afforded. The troops spent the time in completing the fort

and cutting roads, and early in February excellent defences were

completed. Though in hourly expectation of attack they seem to have

kept up their spirits, for an officer in Eshowe wrote:--

"The troops inside consisted of three companies of the 99th

Regiment, five companies of the second battalion of the 3rd Buffs,

one company of Royal Engineers, one company of the Pioneers, the

Naval Brigade, a body of Artillery, and nineteen of the Native

Contingent, amongst them being several non-commissioned officers,

whom we found exceedingly useful, two of them being at once selected

as butchers, whilst two were 'promoted' to the rank of 'bakers to

the troops.' Others attended to the sanitary arrangements of the

garrison, and altogether they were found to be also exceedingly

useful. As a portion of the column, the company of Pioneers under

the command of Captain Beddoes did a great deal of very important

work. This company was composed of ninety-eight natives, one

captain, and three lieutenants, and their proceedings in connection

with the making of the new road were watched with much interest.

They worked with the Naval Brigade, about three companies of

soldiers, and several men of the Royal Artillery. This road was

found useless, in consequence of the numerous swampy places at the

foot of each of the numerous hills which occurred along the route.

Very thick bush had to be cut through, and at first but slow

progress was made. The road, as is generally known, took a direction

towards the Inyezane. Whilst out on one occasion, the road party saw

a torpedo explosion which took place about three miles from where

the party was working. It had been accidentally fired by Kaffirs,

who were unaware of the clangers connected with the implement, and

it is believed that several of them were killed. The road was

altogether a bad one. The relief column used it on their way up, but

only the Pioneers and the mounted men went by that route on the way

back. In fact, it would have been useless to have attempted to use

it for the passage of waggons. Whenever the road party went out they

were fired on by Kaffirs, but of course shots were returned, and

many a Zulu warrior was knocked over whilst the work was being

proceeded with. Everything in camp was conducted in a most orderly

manner. We were roused at half-past five sharp, and at eight

o'clock, sharp, lights were out. For one month we existed very

comfortably on full rations, but at the end of that time we were put

on short rations, made up as follows:--One pound and a quarter of

trek-oxen beef, six ounces of meal, one ounce and a quarter of

sugar, third of an ounce of coffee, one sixth of an ounce of tea,

one ninth of an ounce of pepper, and a quarter of an ounce of salt.

"Life of course was very monotonous. The bands of the two regiments

played on alternate afternoons, and every morning they were to be

heard practising outside the entrenchment. The most pleasant part of

the day was just after six o'clock, when we used to be enlivened in

the cool of the evening by the fife and drum band playing the

'Retreat.' The water with which we were supplied was indeed

excellent, and the bathing places, I need not say, were very

extensively patronised. The grazing was not nearly sufficient for

the cattle, and from the first they must have suffered very much

from want of nourishment. You will have heard of the fate of the

eleven hundred head of oxen and the span of donkeys which we sent

away from the camp in expectation of their reaching the Lower

Tugela. They left us in charge of nineteen Kaffirs, but at the

Inyezane they were attacked by a large body of Kaffirs. The natives

in charge of the cattle decamped and reached the fort in safety, and

the enemy got possession of the whole of the cattle, which they

drove off. The donkeys were all killed with the exception of one,

and this sagacious animal surprised everybody in camp by returning

soon after the Kaffirs had come back."

The prices of food at this time were scarcely in keeping with those

of the London market. A bottle of pickles fetched 25s., and a ham

L7, 10s.! Milk was purchasable for 23s. a tin, and sardines for 12s.

As may be imagined, the arrival of Lord Chelmsford at Eshowe was a

matter for general thanksgiving. One who was present records in

_Blackwood's Magazine_ the joy on the arrival of the first

outsiders: "On the afternoon of the 3rd of April, the column

detailed on the 31st of March (about 500 whites and 50 blacks, and

the mounted infantry, with one gun) left the fort under General

Pearson, to meet the relief column.... A solitary horseman was seen

towards 5 P.M. galloping up the new road to the fort. He had an

officer's coat on, and we could see a sword dangling from his side.

Who is he?... He proved to be the correspondent of the _Standard_.

'First in Eshowe,' he said, 'proud to shake hands with an Eshowian.'

A second horseman appeared approaching the fort, his horse

apparently much blown, Who is he?... The correspondent of the

_Argus_ (Cape Town). They had a race who would be first at Eshowe,

the _Standard_ winning by five minutes!" Thus ended happily the

crushing anxiety under which Colonel Pearson and his party had

lived, and the foretaste of the future triumph seemed already to

remove the memory of many weeks of bitterness.

Serious differences of opinion soon arose between Lord Chelmsford

and Sir Henry Bulwer, the Governor of Natal, but on the intricacies

of these it is unnecessary to dwell; suffice it to say, that they

were in a measure the cause of Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival on the

scene somewhat later, as Sir Garnet united in his own person both

supreme civil and supreme military power.

A complete account of the movements of the various columns during

the dreary months that elapsed before the final victory at Ulundi on

the 4th of July cannot be attempted here. The history of skirmishes

and raids, of daring sorties, of captures of cattle, and gallantry

of troops, of hopes and disappointments, of successes and scares, of

hardships and horrors, would fill many pages that must be otherwise

occupied.

Yet one tragic and memorable event of the war cannot be passed over,

for we lost a gallant volunteer whose young life was full of promise

and distinction. At the beginning of June the Prince Imperial of

France, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, having studied at the Military

College at Woolwich, and desiring to see war in all its reality, was

attached to the Quartermaster-General's department at General

Newdigate's camp. He set out with a reconnoitring party consisting

of Lieutenant Carey of the 98th Regiment, six men of Bellington's

Horse, and a Kaffir. The place they intended to reach was situated

between the camps of Lord Chelmsford and General Wood. Having gained

a picturesque spot near a brook which forms a tributary to the

Tlyotyozi River, the Prince decided to sketch. He was a clever

draughtsman, and had some ability in recognising the capabilities of

positions. The party afterwards moved on, examining various empty

kraals by the way. At one of these they halted, and the Prince gave

orders to "off-saddle" for an hour. The place seemed deserted; there

were remains of a recent cooking fire, and a stray dog or two

sniffed suspiciously at the strangers. Round this spot near the

river tambookie grass about six feet in height formed a screen. The

officers made coffee, turned out their horses to graze, and lay for

a short rest in the peaceful security of a complete, or seemingly

complete, desolation.

But unknown to them, fifty Zulus, tiger-like, had crawled from

ambush and were preparing to spring. It was from the cover of the

river vegetation that they eventually burst forth. A hurried order

to remount, and the crash of rifles at a distance of twenty yards

followed. The tragic scene is well described by Mr. A. Wilmot in his

"History of the Zulu War":--

"At this time the party were standing in a line close to their

horses, with their backs to the kraal and their faces turned

eastward, the Prince being in front and nearest to the Zulus. Then

with a tremendous cry, 'Usutu!' and 'Lo, the English cowards!' the

savages rushed on. The horses immediately swerved, and some broke

away. An undoubted panic seized the party; every one who could

spring on his horse mounted and galloped for his life. There was no

thought, no idea of standing fast and resisting this sudden attack.

The Prince was unwounded, but unable to mount his charger, which was

sixteen hands high and always difficult to mount. On this occasion

the horse became so frightened by the firing and sudden stampeding

as to rear and prance in such a manner as to make it impossible for

the Prince to gain the saddle. Many of the others saw the

difficulty, but none waited or tried to give the least assistance.

One by one they rushed their horses past, Private le Tocq exclaiming

as he went by, lying across his saddle, 'Depechez-vous, s'il vous

plait, monsieur!' The Prince, making no reply, strained every nerve,

but, alas! in vain, to gain the back of his horse, holding his

stirrup-leather with his left hand and the saddle with his right.

With the help of the holster he made one desperate effort, but the

holster partially gave way, and it must have been then that the

horse trod upon him and galloped off, leaving his master prostrate

on the ground. The Prince then regained his feet and ran after his

friends, who were far in advance. Twelve or thirteen Zulus were at

this time only a few feet behind him. The Prince then turned round,

and, sword in hand, faced his pursuers. From the first he had never

called for help, and now died bravely with his face to the foes,

fighting courageously to the last.

"It is thought that the Zulus hurled their assegais at him, and that

he quickly fell dead, pierced through the eye by a mortal wound."

There is a certain sad satisfaction in remembering that this noble

youth, the hope of France, the worthy descendant of a great name,

should have died as a soldier and without more than a moment's

suffering.

The rest of the party had galloped off at full speed, thinking each

was engaged in the business of getting away. Lieutenant Carey, who

has been blamed for not having stood by the Prince in his perilous

position, shouted orders and imagined they were followed, and in his

hasty retreat had not time to do more than believe the whole party

thus surprised were galloping away together.

Arguments regarding this deplorable affair have been so many that it

is best to quote the evidence taken at the court-martial and the

statement of Lieutenant Carey:--

"The Court is of opinion that Lieutenant Carey did not understand

the position in which he stood towards the Prince, and, as a

consequence, failed to estimate aright the responsibility which fell

to his lot. Colonel Harrison states that the senior combatant

officer, Lieutenant Carey, D.A.Q.M.G., was, as a matter of course,

in charge of the party, whilst, on the other hand, Carey says, when

alluding to the escort, 'I did not consider I had any authority over

it after the precise and careful instructions of Lord Chelmsford as

to the position the Prince held.' As to his being invariably

accompanied by an escort in charge of an officer, the Court

considers that the possibility of such a difference of opinion

should not have existed between two officers of the same department.

The Court is of opinion that Carey is much to blame for having

proceeded on the duty in question with a portion only of the escort

detailed by Colonel Harrison. The Court cannot admit the

irresponsibility for this on the part of Carey, inasmuch as he took

steps to obtain the escort and failed in so doing. Moreover, the

fact that Harrison was present upon the Itelezi range gave him the

opportunity of consulting him on the matter, of which he failed to

avail himself. The Court, having examined the ground, is of opinion

that the selection of the kraal, where a halt was made and the

horses off-saddled, surrounded as it was by cover for the enemy, and

adjacent to difficult ground, showed a lamentable want of military

prudence. The Court deeply regrets that no effort was made after the

attack to rally the escort, and to show a front to the enemy,

whereby the possibility of aiding those who had failed to make good

their retreat might have been ascertained.--Signed by General

MARSHALL; Colonel MALTHUS, 94th Regiment; Major LE GRICE, R.A."

On this report a court-martial was summoned by Lord Chelmsford for

the trial of Lieutenant Carey for having misbehaved before the enemy

on the 1st June 1879, when in command of an escort in attendance on

the Prince, who was making reconnaissances in Zululand; in having,

when the Prince and escort were attacked by the enemy, galloped

away, and in not having attempted to rally them or otherwise defend

the Prince. The Court, under the presidency of Colonel Glyn,

consisted of Colonels Whitehead, Courtney, Harness, Major Bouverie,

and Major Anstruther.

Judge-Advocate Brander prosecuted, and Captain Crookenden, R.A., was

for the defence.

When the Court opened the plan of the ground was proved.

Corporal Grubb said the Prince gave the order "Off saddle" at the

kraal, and "Prepare to mount." The Prince mounted. After the volley

he saw Carey putting spurs to his horse, and he did the same. He saw

Abel fall, and Rogers trying to get a shot at the Zulus. Le Tocq

passed him and said, "Put spurs to your horse, boy; the Prince is

down!" He looked round and saw the Prince under his horse. A short

time after the Prince's horse came up, and he (Grubb) caught it. No

orders were given to rally.

Le Tocq was called and said: The Prince told the natives to search

the kraals, and finding no one there they off saddled. At the volley

he mounted, but, dropping his carbine, stopped to pick it up. In

remounting he could not get his leg over the saddle. He passed the

Prince, and said in French, "Hasten to mount your horse." The Prince

did not answer. He saw the Prince's horse treading on his leg. The

Prince was in command of the party. He believed Carey and the Prince

would have passed on different sides of a hut in fast flight, and it

was possible that Carey might have failed to see that the Prince was

in difficulties. It was 250 yards from where he saw the Prince down

to the spot where he died.

Trooper Cochrane was called and said: The Prince was not in the

saddle at the time of mounting. He saw about fifty yards off the

Prince running down the donga with fourteen Zulus in close pursuit.

Nothing was done to help him. He heard no orders given, and did not

tell Carey what he had seen until some time after. He was an old

soldier. He did not think any rally could have been made.

The Court then adjourned to the next day. On reassembling, the first

witness called was

Sergeant Willis, who stated that he had seen Trooper Rogers lying on

the ground by the side of his horse, close to the kraal, as he left

the spot. He thought he saw the Prince wounded at the same time that

Trooper Abel threw up his arms. He thought the Prince might have

been dragged to the place where he was found after death, and that a

rally might have been made twenty yards beyond the donga.

Colonel Harrison being called, stated that Carey was senior

combatant officer, and must therefore have been in command of the

party. Carey volunteered to go on the reconnaissance to verify

certain points of his sketch. The Prince was ordered to go to

report more fully on the ground. He had given the Prince into

Carey's charge.

Examined by the Court, Colonel Harrison stated that when the Prince

was attached to his department he was not told to treat him as a

royal personage in the matter of escort, but as any other officer,

taking due precaution against any possible danger.

Dr. Scott (the Prince's medical attendant) was then called, and

stated that the Prince was killed by eighteen assegai wounds, any

five of which would have been fatal. There were no bullet wounds.

The Prince died where the body was found.

This closed the case for the prosecution.

The defence called again Colonel Harrison, who testified to Carey's

abilities as a staff officer, and said he had every confidence in

him.

Colonel Bellairs was also called, and stated that it was in

consequence of the occurrence of the 1st June that Carey had been

deposed from his staff appointment the day previous to his trial.

Lieutenant Carey here submitted that his case had been pre-judged,

and that he had been punished before his trial.

The following is Lieutenant Carey's statement:--

"On the 31st May I was informed by Colonel Harrison, A.Q.M.G., that

the Prince Imperial was to start on the 1st June to ride over the

road selected by me for the advance of the column, for the purpose

of selecting a camping-ground for the 2nd June. I suggested at once

that I should be allowed to go with him, as I knew the road and

wanted to go over it again for the purpose of verifying certain

points. To this Colonel Harrison consented, reminding me that the

Prince was going at his own request to do this work, and that I was

not to interfere with him in any way. For our escort, six Europeans

of Bettington's Horse and six Basutos were ordered. Bettington's men

were paraded at 9 A.M., but owing to some misunderstanding the

Basutos did not turn up, and, the Prince being desirous of

proceeding at once, we went without them. On arriving at the ridge

between Itelezi and Incenci, I suggested waiting for them, but the

Prince replied, 'Oh no; we are quite strong enough,' or words to

that effect. We proceeded on our reconnaissance from there, halting

about half-an-hour on a high hill overlooking the Ityotyozi for the

Prince to sketch. From here the country was visible for miles, and

no sign of the enemy could be discovered. We then descended into the

valley, and, entering a kraal, off saddled, knee-haltering our

horses. We had seen the deserted appearance of the country, and,

though the kraal was to the right, surrounded by mealies, we thought

there was no danger in encamping. If any blame is attributable to

any one for this, it is to me, as I agreed with the Prince that we

were perfectly safe. I had been over this ground twice before and

seen no one, and the brigade-major of the cavalry brigade had ridden

over it with only two or three men, and laughed at me for taking so

large an escort. We had with us a friendly Zulu, who, in answer to

my inquiries, said no Zulus were about. I trusted him, but still

kept a sharp look-out, telescope in hand. In about an hour--that is,

3.40 P.M.--the Prince ordered us to saddle up. We went into the

mealies to catch our horses, but took at least ten minutes saddling.

While doing so, the Zulu guide informed us he had seen a Zulu in the

distance, but as he did not appear concerned, I saw no danger. The

Prince was saddled up first, and, seeing him ready, I mounted, the

men not being quite ready. The Prince then asked if they were all

ready; they answered in the affirmative, and he gave the word,

'Prepare to mount.' At this moment I turned round, and saw the

Prince with his foot in the stirrup, looking at the men. Presently I

heard him say, 'Mount,' and turning to the men saw them vault into

their saddles. At this moment my eyes fell on about twenty black

faces in the mealies, twenty to thirty yards off, and I saw puffs of

smoke and heard a rattling volley, followed by a rush, with shouts

of 'Usutu!' There was at once a stampede. Two men rushed past me,

and as every one appeared to be mounted, I dug the spurs into my

horse, which had already started of his own accord. I felt sure no

one was wounded by the volley, as I heard no cry, and I shouted out,

'Keep to the left, and cross the donga, and rally behind it!' At the

same time I saw more Zulus in the mealies on our left flank, cutting

off our retreat. I crossed the donga behind two or three men, but

could only get beyond one man, the others having ridden off. Riding

a few hundred yards on to the rise, I stopped and looked round. I

could see the Zulus after us, and saw that the men were escaping to

the right, and that no one appeared on the other side of the donga.

The man beside me then drew my attention to the Prince's horse,

which was galloping away on the other side of the donga, saying, 'I

fear the Prince is killed, sir!' I immediately said, 'Do you think

it is any use going back?' The trooper pointed to the mealies on our

left, which appeared full of Kaffirs, and said, 'He is dead long

ago, sir; they assegai wounded men at once.' I considered he had

fallen near the kraal, as his horse was going from that direction,

and it was useless to sacrifice more lives. I had but one man near

me, the others being some 200 yards down the valley. I accordingly

shouted to them to close to the left, and rode on to gain a drift

over the Tombokala River, saying to the man at my side, 'We will

keep back towards General Wood's camp, not returning the same way

we came, and then come back with some dragoons to get the bodies.'

We reached camp about 6.30 P.M. When we were attacked our carbines

were unloaded, and, to the best of my belief, no shots were fired. I

did not see the Prince after I saw him mounting, but he was mounted

on a swift horse, and I thought he was close to me. Besides the

Prince, we lost two troopers, as well as the friendly Zulu. Two

troopers have been found between the donga and the kraal, covered

with assegai wounds. They must have fallen in the retreat and been

assegaied at once, as I saw no fighting when I looked round."

The court-martial condemned Lieutenant Carey, and he was sent home

under arrest. But eventually, owing to the intervention of the

bereaved Empress, and many sympathetic friends, the unfortunate

officer was released. The news of the calamity was received with

profound grief throughout the country. Some mourned the death of a

Prince, some sighed over the extinction of Napoleonic hopes,

officers regretted the loss of a promising comrade, and mothers

spent tears of sympathy for the great lady, Empress and mother, who

had thus been bereft of her only child.

THE VICTORY

To return to the progress of the war. On the 26th of June the

long-expected junction of the columns was on the eve of being

effected. Cetchwayo was pretending to make overtures for peace,

though at the same time his people were endeavouring to enter into

alliance with rebellious Boers. He even sent the sword of the Prince

Imperial as a peace-offering. On the envelope, however, his

amanuensis, one Cornelius Vjin (a Dutchman), pencilled the fact that

the king had 20,000 men with him. The reply of Lord Chelmsford was

as follows:----

"If the Induna, Mundula, brings with him the 1000 rifles taken at

Isandlwana, I will not insist on 1000 men coming in to lay down

their arms, if the Zulus are afraid to come. He must bring the two

guns and the remainder of the cattle. I will then be willing to

negotiate. As he has caused me to advance by the great delay he has

made, I must now go to the Umvolosi to enable my men to drink. I

will consent, pending negotiations, to halt on the further bank of

the river, and will not burn any kraals until the 3rd of July,

provided no opposition is made to my advance to the position on the

Umvolosi, by which day, the 3rd of July, at noon, the conditions

must be complied with. If my force is fired on, I shall consider

negotiations are at an end, and to avoid any chance of this, it is

best that Mundula come to my camp at daybreak or to-night, and that

the Zulus should withdraw from the neighbourhood of the river to

Ulundi. I cannot stop the general in command of the coast army until

these conditions are complied with."

Of course nothing was seen of Mundula, and preparations were made

for the reception of the enemy. Newdigate and Wood laagered their

waggons and prepared for the arrival of an impi of some 20,000 Zulus

advancing from Ulundi. On the following day a large force under

Colonel Buller advanced to Nodwengu kraal, and some stragglers were

killed. One of these was struck by Lord William Beresford, who, in

the sporting manner characteristic of him, cried, "First spear, by

Jove!"

On the morning of the memorable 4th of July the army, crossing

Umvolosi River, marched to a higher plateau--where once the Zulus

had vanquished the Boers--there to prepare for battle. The Zulus,

some 20,000 strong, after many war dances and cries, were marshalled

forth by their king to an open plain between the Nodwengu and Ulundi

kraals. Our troops were formed up in a hollow parallelogram, in the

centre being the native contingent with ammunition waggons. The four

sides of this parallelogram were formed of eight companies of the

13th Regiment, five of the 80th Regiment, the 90th, 58th, and 34th

Regiments, together with the 17th Lancers and the mounted

irregulars. At the corners and centre artillery was placed.

The Zulus advanced steadily, in horn fashion, with their

characteristic coolness and courage. The deadly fusillade from our

guns had no perceptible effect. On and on they came, surging in a

dense brown crescent, till within twenty yards of the British lines,

when, with the hail and storm of bullets crashing and blinding them,

they hesitated! That moment's hesitation was fatal--their one chance

slipped! A few warriors rushed onwards, many wavered, and gradually

the powerful horns were broken and disorganised. Then our Lancers

with a gallant charge dashed into the fray, plunging into the black

swarm that still met fury with fury. Captain Edgell was killed, and

many other officers had miraculous escapes. Once the enemy strove to

rally, but the effort was hopeless, and the magnificent Zulu

warriors were forced at last to turn and flee. Their defeat was

signal. Though the enemy numbered 20,000 to 5000 of our troops, the

Lancers with the Irregular Horse did splendid work, and ere all was

over 1000 Zulus bit the dust.

Then came the final march to Ulundi. This place, wholly deserted,

was fired, and while the sky glowed with red and gold reflections of

the conflagration, the victorious forces, worn out yet triumphant,

returned to the laagered camp they had left at daybreak.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF ULUNDI--FINAL RUSH OF THE ZULUS. THE

BRITISH SQUARE IN THE DISTANCE.

Drawing by R. Caton Woodville.]

The first news of the victory was carried to the Colony by Mr.

Archibald Forbes, the war correspondent of the _Daily News_, who was

himself wounded in the struggle. Starting instantly after the

decisive battle, in fourteen hours he rode a distance of 110 miles

to the nearest telegraph station at Landman's Drift, on the Buffalo

River. In thus exposing his life in the interests not only of his

journal but his country, he for ever associated himself with one of

the most interesting and thrilling campaigns of the century.

Lord Chelmsford's despatch gives a concise description of the day's

work:--

"Cetchwayo, not having complied with my demands by noon yesterday,

July 3, and having fired heavily on the troops at the water, I

returned the 114 cattle he had sent in and ordered a reconnaissance

to be made by the mounted force under Colonel Buller. This was

effectually made, and caused the Zulu army to advance and show

fight.

"This morning a force under my command, consisting of the second

division, under Major-General Newdigate, numbering 1870 Europeans,

530 natives, and eight guns, and the flying columns under

Brigadier-General Wood, numbering 2192 Europeans, 573 natives, four

guns, and two Gatlings, crossed the Umvolosi River at 6.15, and

marching in a hollow square, with the ammunition and entrenching

tool carts and bearer company in its centre, reached an excellent

position between Nodwengu and Ulundi, about half-past 8 A.M. This

had been observed by Colonel Buller the day before.

"Our fortified camp on the right bank of the Umvolosi River was left

with a garrison of about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, and one Gatling

gun, under Colonel Bellairs. Soon after half-past seven the Zulu

army was seen leaving its bivouacs and advancing on every side."

"The engagement was shortly afterwards commenced by the mounted men.

By nine o'clock the attack was fully developed. At half-past nine

the enemy wavered; the 17th Lancers, followed by the remainder of

the mounted men, attacked them, and a general rout ensued.

"The prisoners state that Cetchwayo was personally commanding and

had made all the arrangements himself, and that he witnessed the

fight from Gikarzi kraal, and that twelve regiments took part in it.

If so, 20,000 men attacked us.

"It is impossible to estimate with any correctness the loss of the

enemy, owing to the extent of country over which they attacked and

retreated, but it could not have been less, I consider, than 1000

killed. By noon Ulundi was in flames, and during the day all

military kraals of the Zulu army and in the valley of the Umvolosi

were destroyed. At 2 P.M. the return march to the camp of the

column commenced. The behaviour of the troops under my command was

extremely satisfactory; their steadiness under a complete belt of

fire was remarkable. The dash and enterprise of the mounted branches

was all that could be wished, and the fire of the artillery very

good. A portion of the Zulu force approached our fortified camp, and

at one time threatened to attack it. The native contingent, forming

a part of the garrison, were sent out after the action, and assisted

in the pursuit.

"As I have fully accomplished the object for which I advanced, I

consider I shall now be best carrying out Sir Garnet Wolseley's

instructions by moving at once to Entonganini, and thence to

Kmamagaza. I shall send back a portion of this force with empty

waggons for supplies, which are now ready at Fort Marshall."

All were rejoiced that Lord Chelmsford should have been able to gain

this victory before the arrival on the scene of Sir Garnet Wolseley,

and there were many among his friends who regretted when he

resigned.

The following quotation from the _London Gazette_ explains the most

conspicuous of the brave deeds that were done during this campaign,

though there were many more which came near to rivalling them, so

many, indeed, that it would have been impossible to have given

honours to all who deserved them:--

"WAR OFFICE, _June 17_.

"The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify her intention to

confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned

officers and soldier of her Majesty's army, whose claims have been

submitted for her Majesty's approval for their gallant conduct

during the recent operations in South Africa, as recorded against

their names, viz.:--

"Captain and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers H. Buller, C.B., 60th

Rifles, for his gallant conduct at the retreat at Zlobane on the

28th of March 1879, in having assisted, while hotly pursued, by

Zulus, in rescuing Captain C. D'Arcy, of the Frontier Light Horse,

who was retiring on foot, and carrying him on his horse until he

overtook the rear-guard; also for having on the same date and under

the same circumstances conveyed Lieutenant C. Everitt of the

Frontier Light Horse, whose horse had been killed under him, to a

place of safety. Later on Colonel Buller, in the same manner, saved

a trooper of the Frontier Light Horse, whose horse was completely

exhausted, and who otherwise would have been killed by the Zulus,

who were within eighty yards of him.

"Major William K. Leet, first battalion 13th Regiment, for his

gallant conduct on the 28th of March 1879, in rescuing from the

Zulus Lieutenant A. M. Smith of the Frontier Light Horse, during the

retreat from Zlobane. Lieutenant Smith while on foot, his horse

having been shot, was closely pursued by the Zulus, and would have

been killed had not Major Leet taken him upon his horse and rode

with him, under the fire of the enemy, to a place of safety.

"Surgeon-Major James Henry Reynolds, Army Medical Department, for

the conspicuous bravery during the attack at Rorke's Drift on the

22nd and 23rd of January 1879, which he exhibited in his attention

to the wounded under fire, and in his voluntarily conveying

ammunition from the store to the defenders of the hospital, whereby

he exposed himself to a cross fire from the enemy both in going and

returning.

"Lieutenant Edward S. Browne, first battalion 24th Regiment, for his

gallant conduct on the 29th March 1879, when the Mounted Infantry

were being driven in by the enemy at Zlobane, in galloping back and

twice assisting on his horse, under heavy fire and within a few

yards of the enemy, one of the mounted men, who must otherwise have

fallen into the enemy's hands.

"Private Wassell, 80th Regiment, for his gallant conduct in having,

at the imminent risk of his own life, saved that of Private Westwood

of the same regiment. On the 22nd of January 1879, when the camp at

Isandlwana was taken by the enemy, Private Wassell retreated towards

the Buffalo River, in which he saw a comrade struggling and

apparently drowning. He rode to the bank, dismounted, leaving his

horse on the Zulu side, rescued the man from the stream, and again

mounted his horse, dragging Private Westwood across the river, under

a heavy shower of bullets."