LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS
Lord Roberts addressed many meetings in favour of National Service
during the years which followed his return from South Africa in 1905;
but the first of his speeches to arrest widespread popular attention
was delivered in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester, on October 22,
1912. A popular audience filled the building to overflowing, listened
with respect, and appeared to accept his conclusions with enthusiasm.
His words carried far beyond the walls of the meeting-place, and caused
something approaching a sensation, or, as some thought, a scandal, in
political circles.
Of the commentators upon this speech the greater part were Liberals,
and these condemned his utterances with unanimity in somewhat violent
language. Official Unionism was dubious, uncomfortable, and
disapproving: it remained for the most part dumb. A few voices were
raised from this quarter in open reprobation; a few others proclaimed
their independence of party discipline and hastened to approve his
sentiments.
There was no doubt of one thing--Lord Roberts's speech had at last
aroused public interest. For the first time during the National
Service agitation {333} blood had been drawn. This was mainly due to
the object-lesson in the consequences of military unpreparedness, which
the first Balkan War was just then unfolding before the astonished eyes
of Europe. In addition, those people, who for a year past had been
puzzling their heads over the true meaning of the Agadir crisis, had
become impressed with the urgent need for arriving at a clear decision
with regard to the adequacy of our national defences.
[Sidenote: NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE]
The speech was a lucid and forcible statement of the need for
compulsory military training. It was interesting reading at the time
it was delivered, and in some respects it is even more interesting
to-day. It was compactly put together, not a thing of patches. A man
who read any part of it would read it all. Yet in accordance with
custom, controversy raged around three isolated passages.
The _first_ of these runs as follows: "In the year 1912, our German
friends, I am well aware, do not--at least in sensible circles--assert
dogmatically that a war with Great Britain will take place this year or
next; but in their heart of hearts they know, every man of them,
that--just as in 1866 and just as in 1870--war will take place the
instant the German forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at
every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can
be made certain. Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. That
is the time-honoured policy of her Foreign Office. That was the policy
relentlessly pursued by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870. It has
been her policy decade by decade since that date. It is her policy at
the present hour."
{334}
The _second_ passage followed upon the first: "It is an excellent
policy. It is or should be the policy of every nation prepared to play
a great part in history. Under that policy Germany has, within the
last ten years, sprung, as at a bound, from one of the weakest of naval
powers to the greatest naval power, save one, upon this globe."
The _third_ passage came later: "Such, gentlemen, is the origin, and
such the considerations which have fostered in me the growth of this
conviction--the conviction that in some form of National Service is the
only salvation of this Nation and this Empire. The Territorial Force
is now an acknowledged failure--a failure in discipline, a failure in
numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy."[1]
The accuracy of the _first_ and _third_ of these statements now stands
beyond need of proof. It was not truer that Germany would strike so
soon as her rulers were of opinion that the propitious hour had struck,
than it was that, when the British Government came to take stock of
their resources at the outbreak of war, they would find the Territorial
Army to be lacking in the numbers, equipment, training, and discipline,
which alone could have fitted it for its appointed task--the defence of
our shores against invasion. Slowly, and under great difficulties, and
amid the gravest anxieties these defects had subsequently to be made
good, hampering the while our military operations in the critical
sphere.
The _second_ statement was of a different character, and taken by
itself, without reference to the context, lent itself readily to
misconception as well as {335} misconstruction. A certain number of
critics, no doubt, actually believed, a still larger number affected to
believe, that Lord Roberts was here advocating the creation of a
British army, for the purpose of attacking Germany, without a shred of
justification, and at the first favourable moment.
The whole tenor of this speech, however, from the first line to the
last, made it abundantly clear that in Lord Roberts's opinion Britain
could have neither motive nor object for attacking Germany; that the
sole concern of England and of the British Empire with regard to
Germany was, how we might defend our possessions and secure ourselves
against her schemes of aggression.
[Sidenote: POINTS OF CRITICISM]
Lord Roberts, however, had in fact pronounced the intentions which he
attributed to Germany to be 'an excellent policy,' and had thereby
seemed to approve, and recommend for imitation, a system which was
revolting to the conscience of a Christian community.
The idea that Lord Roberts could have had any such thoughts in his mind
seemed merely absurd to any one who knew him; nay, it must also have
seemed inconceivable to any one who had taken the trouble to read the
speech itself in an unprejudiced mood. To an ordinary man of sense it
did not need Lord Roberts's subsequent letter of explanation[2] to set
his opinions in their true light. It was clear that his object, in
this 'peccant passage,' had merely been to avoid a pharisaical
condemnation of German methods and ambitions, and to treat that country
as a worthy, as well as a formidable, antagonist. Being a soldier,
{336} however,--not a practised platform orator alive to the dangers of
too-generous concession--he went too far. The words were unfortunately
chosen, seeing that so many critics were on the watch, not to discover
the true meaning of the speech, but to pounce on any slip which might
be turned to the disadvantage of the speaker.
At first there was an attempt on the part of certain London[3] Liberal
journals to boycott this speech. Very speedily, however, it seemed to
dawn upon them that they had greater advantages to gain by denouncing
it. A few days later, accordingly, the torrent of condemnation was
running free. The ablest attack appeared in the _Nation_,[4] and as
this pronouncement by the leading Radical weekly was quoted with
approval by the greater part of the ministerial press throughout the
country, it may fairly be taken as representing the general view of the
party.
[Sidenote: A RADICAL ATTACK]
The article was headed _A Diabolical Speech_, and its contents
fulfilled the promise of the title. "There ought," said the writer,
"to be some means of bringing to book a soldier, in the receipt of
money from the State, who speaks of a friendly Power as Lord Roberts
spoke of Germany." He was accused roundly of predicting and
encouraging a vast and 'hideous conflict' between the two countries.
Lord Roberts was a 'successful'[5] {337} soldier; but 'without training
in statesmanship.' He 'had never shown any gift for it.' His was 'an
average Tory intellect.' He was a 'complete contrast to Wellington,
who possessed two great qualities; for "he set a high value on peace,
and he knew how to estimate and bow to the governing forces of national
policy.... Lord Roberts possesses neither of these attributes. He is
a mere jingo in opinion and character, and he interprets the life and
interests of this nation and this Empire by the crude lusts and fears
which haunt the unimaginative soldier's brain."
We may pause at this breathing-place to take note of the healing
influences of time. Radical journalists of 1832, and thereabouts, were
wont to say very much the same hard things of the Duke of Wellington,
as those of 1912 saw fit to apply to Earl Roberts.... We may also
remark in passing, upon the errors to which even the most brilliant of
contemporary judgments are liable. There has never been a man in our
time who set a higher value on peace than Lord Roberts did. He
realised, however, not only the intrinsic value of peace, but its
market cost. His real crime, in the eyes of pacifists, was that he
stated publicly, as often as he had the chance, what price we must be
prepared to pay, if we wanted peace and not war. It was in this sense,
no doubt, that he did not know 'how to estimate and bow to the
governing forces of national policy.' His blunt warnings broke in
rudely and crudely upon the comfortable discourse of the three
counsellors--_Simple_, _Sloth_, and _Presumption_, who, better than any
others, were skilled in estimating the 'governing forces,' and the
advantages to be gained by bowing to them.
{338}
The writer in the _Nation_ then proceeded to riddle Lord Roberts's
theories of defence. "He desires us to remain a 'free nation' in the
same breath that he invites us to come under the yoke of
conscription"--intolerable, indeed, that the citizens of a free nation
should be ordered to fit themselves for defending their common
freedom--"conscription, if you please, for the unheard-of purpose of
overseas service in India and elsewhere...." This invitation does not
seem to be contained in this, or any other of Lord Roberts's speeches;
but supposing it to have been given, it was not altogether
'unheard-of,' seeing that, under the law of conscription prevalent (for
example) in Germany, conscript soldiers can be sent to Palestine, or
tropical Africa as lawfully as into Luxemburg, Poland, or France.
According to the _Nation_, the true theory of defence was Sea Power;
but this, it appeared, could not be relied on for all time.... "While
our naval monopoly--like our commercial monopoly--cannot exist for
ever, our sea power and our national security depend on our ability to
crush an enemy's fleet.... We were never so amply insured--so
over-insured--against naval disaster as we are to-day."
[Sidenote: A LIBERAL ATTACK]
"Lord Roberts's proposition, therefore," the writer continued, "is
merely foolish; it is his way of commending it, which is merely wicked.
He speaks of war as certain to take place 'the instant' the German
forces are assured of 'superiority at every point,' and he discovers
that the motto of German foreign policy is that _Germany strikes when
Germany's hour has struck_. Germany does not happen to have struck
anybody since 1870, and she struck then to secure national unity, and
to put an end to {339} the standing menace of French imperialism.
Since then she has remained the most peaceful and the most
self-contained, though doubtless not the most sympathetic, member of
the European family.... Germany, the target of every cheap dealer in
historic slapdash, is in substance the Germany of 1870" (_i.e._ in
extent of territory), "with a great industrial dominion superadded by
the force of science and commercial enterprise. That is the story
across which Lord Roberts scrawls his ignorant libel.... By direct
implication he invites us to do to Germany what he falsely asserts she
is preparing to do to us. These are the morals, fitter for a wolf-pack
than for a society of Christian men, commended as 'excellent policy' to
the British nation in the presence of a Bishop of the Anglican Church."
This was very vigorous writing; nor was there the slightest reason to
suspect its sincerity. In the nature of man there is a craving to
believe; and if a man happens to have his dwelling-place in a world of
illusion and unreality, it is not wonderful that he should believe in
phantoms. The credulity of the _Nation_ might appear to many people to
amount to fanaticism; but its views were fully shared, though less
tersely stated, by the whole Liberal party, by the greater proportion
of the British people, and not inconceivably by the bulk of the
Unionist opposition as well. The Government alone, who had learned the
true facts from Lord Haldane eight months earlier, knew how near Lord
Roberts's warnings came to the mark.
This article set the tone of criticism. The _Manchester Guardian_
protested against the "insinuation that the German Government's views
of international {340} policy are less scrupulous and more cynical than
those of other Governments." Germany has never been accused with
justice "of breaking her word, of disloyalty to her engagements, or of
insincerity. Prussia's character among nations is, in fact, not very
different from the character which Lancashire men give to themselves as
compared with other Englishmen. It is blunt, straightforward, and
unsentimental...." How foolish, moreover, are our fears of Germany
when we come to analyse them. "We have no territory that she could
take, except, in tropical Africa, which no sane man would go to war
about. Our self-governing colonies could not in any case be held by
force; and Canada is protected in addition by the Monroe doctrine.
Egypt is not ours to cede. Malta could not be had without war with
Italy nor India without war with Russia."[6]
This was a proud statement of the basis of British security, and one
which must have warmed the hearts, and made the blood of Cromwell and
Chatham tingle in the shades. Egypt, which we had rescued from a chaos
of civil war, bankruptcy, and corruption, which during more than thirty
years we had administered as just stewards for the benefit of her
people, which we had saved from conquest and absorption by savage
hordes--Egypt was not ours to cede. For the rest our dependencies were
not worth taking from us, while our 'colonies' could defend themselves.
By the grace of Italy's protection we should be secured in the
possession of Malta. India would be preserved to us by the goodwill of
Russia, and Canada by the strong arm of the United States.... {341}
Such at that time were the views of the Liberal journal foremost in
character and ability.
[Sidenote: A UNIONIST ATTACK]
Somewhat later the _Daily News_ took the field, making up for lost time
by an exuberance of misconstruction.... "The whole movement as
represented by the National Service League is definitely unmasked as an
attempt to get up, not defence, but an invasion of German territory.
This discovery, which for years has been suspected, is most valuable as
showing up the real object of the League, with its glib talk about
military calisthenics. Lord Roberts may have been indiscreet, but at
least he has made it clear that what the League wants is war."[7]
On the same day, in order that the Liberals might not have a monopoly
of reprobation, the _Evening Standard_, in an article entitled _A Word
with Lord Roberts_, rated him soundly for having "made an attack upon
Germany and an attack upon the Territorial Force...." "It is mere
wanton mischief-making for a man with Lord Roberts's unequalled
prestige to use words which must drive every German who reads them to
exasperation." And yet no signs whatsoever were forthcoming that so
much as a single Teuton had been rendered desperate, or had taken the
words as in the least degree uncomplimentary. Up to the day of his
death--and indeed after his death[8]--Lord Roberts was almost the only
Englishman of his time of whom Germans spoke with consistent
respect.... "Do not," continues this lofty and sapient mentor, "Do not
let us talk as if the Kaiser could play the part of a Genghis Khan or
an Attila, ravening round the world at the head of armed {342} hordes
to devour empires and kingdoms."[9] And yet how otherwise has the
whole British Press been talking ever since the middle of August 1914?
If during this period of nine months, the _Evening Standard_ has kept
all reference to Attila and his Huns out of its columns, its continence
is unique.
It would serve no useful purpose to set out further items of criticism
and abuse from the leader and correspondence columns of newspapers, or
from the speeches of shocked politicians. The _Nation_, the
_Manchester Guardian_, and the _Daily News_ are entitled, between them,
to speak for the Liberal party; and if it cannot be said that the
_Evening Standard_ is quite similarly qualified in respect of the
Unionists, there is still no doubt that the views which it expressed
with so much vigour, prescience, and felicity were held by many
orthodox members of its party.
Colonel Bromley-Davenport, for example, who had been Financial
Secretary to the War Office in the late Unionist Government, spoke out
strongly against Lord Roberts's comments upon the efficiency of the
Territorial Force. 'Compulsory service,' in his opinion, 'was not
necessary....' And then, with a burst of illuminating candour--"Which
of the great parties in the state would take up compulsory service and
fight a general election upon it? The answer was that neither of the
parties would; and to ask for compulsory military service was like
crying for the moon."[10] The power of any proposal for winning
elections was to be the touchstone of its truth. It would be
impossible to state more concisely the attitude of the orthodox
politician. {343} Which party, indeed, we may well ask, would have
fought a general election on anything, however needful, unless it hoped
to win on it?
[Sidenote: MINISTERIAL ATTACKS]
The attitude of Ministers, however, with regard to Lord Roberts's
speech is much more worthy of remark than that of independent
journalists and members of Parliament. For the Government knew several
very important things which, at that time, were still hidden from the
eyes of ordinary men.
It was eight months since Lord Haldane had returned from Germany,
concealing, under a smiling countenance and insouciant manner, a great
burden of care at his heart. If on his return he spoke cheerily on
public platforms about the kindness of his entertainment at Berlin, and
of the greatness and goodness of those with whom he had there walked
and talked, this was merely in order that his fellow-countrymen might
not be plunged in panic or despondency. He had learned the mind of
Germany, and it was no light lesson. He had imparted his dreadful
secret to his colleagues, and we have learned lately from Mr. Asquith
himself what that secret was.... The rulers of Germany, 'to put it
quite plainly,' had asked us for a free hand to overbear and dominate
the European world, whenever they deemed the opportunity favourable.
They had demanded this of the astounded British emissary, "at a time
when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and
defensive resources, and especially upon the sea." To such a demand
but one answer was possible, and that answer the British Government had
promptly given--so we are led to infer--in clear and ringing tones of
scorn.[11]
{344}
The Government knew for certain what nobody else did. They knew what
the aims of Germany were, and consequently they knew that Lord Roberts
had spoken nothing but the truth.
And yet, strange to relate, within a few days we find Mr. Runciman, a
member of the Cabinet, administering a severe castigation to Lord
Roberts. The Manchester speech was "not only deplorable and
pernicious,' but likewise 'dangerous.' If it was resented in Germany,
Mr. Runciman 'would like Germany to know that it is resented no less in
England...." Lord Roberts had been a great organiser of the National
Service League, the object of which was 'practically conscription'; but
"he knows little of England, and certainly little of the North of
England, if he imagines we are ever likely to submit to
conscription"--not even apparently (for there are no reservations) as
an alternative to conquest; or as a security against murder, arson, and
rape.... "War is only inevitable when statesmen cannot find a way
round, or through, difficulties that may arise; or are so wicked that
they prefer the hellish method of war to any other method of solution;
or are so weak as to allow soldiers, armament makers, or scaremongers
to direct their policy."[12] Lord Roberts was not, of course, an
armament maker, but he was a scaremonger and a soldier, and as such had
no right to state his views as to how peace might be kept.
When Sir Edward Grey was asked if any representation had been addressed
by Germany to the {345} Foreign Office with reference to Lord Roberts's
utterances, he deprecated, with frigid discretion, the idea that either
Government should make official representation to the other about
'unwise or provocative speeches.'[13] When Sir William Byles plied the
Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely, with questions as to the
revocability of Lord Roberts's pension, the answer was solemn and
oracular, but no rebuke was administered to the interrogator.[14]
[Sidenote: MR. ACLAND'S PERSISTENCY]
But perhaps the most puzzling thing of all, is the persistency with
which Mr. Acland (Sir Edward Grey's Under-Secretary) pursued Lord
Roberts for some three weeks after the rest were finished with him. It
might have been expected that Mr. Acland's chief, who knew 'the
dreadful secret,' would have curbed his subordinate's excess of zeal.
Mr. Acland distorted the Manchester speech into an appeal to the
British people to put themselves "in a position to strike at the
Germans, and to smash them in a time of profound peace, and without
cause." And this fanciful gloss he rightly denounces, in accents which
remind us not a little of the Reverend Robert Spalding, as 'nothing
less than a wicked proposal.'[15] ... For England to adopt compulsory
military service would be "an utterly criminal and provocative
proceeding against other countries of the world...." Here, indeed, is
much food for wonder. What single country of the world would have
regarded the adoption of national service by England as 'provocative'?
What single country, except Germany, would even have objected to it?
And what more right would Germany have had to object {346} to our
possessing a formidable army, than we had right to object to her
possessing a formidable navy?
When some days later Mr. Acland is reproached with having
misrepresented Lord Roberts's original statement, he replies loftily
that he "was justified at the time in supposing that this was his real
meaning."[16] One wonders why. Lord Roberts had said nothing which
any careful reader of his whole speech--an Under-Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, for example, quoting and speaking with a due sense of his
great responsibilities--could conceivably have understood to bear this
interpretation.
A fortnight later Mr. Acland returns to the charge once more. "Lord
Roberts," he says courteously, "has since explained that he did not
mean what his words seemed so plainly to mean"--that is, the smashing
of Germany in time of profound peace and without any cause.... Danger
to peace, the representative of the Foreign Office assures his
audience, "does not come from any action of His Majesty's Government.
It arises, if at all, from irresponsible utterances such as those which
we heard from Lord Roberts. I very much regret that harm must have
been done between the two countries by Lord Roberts's speech."[17]
Although an under-secretary does not always enjoy the full confidence
of his official superior, he would presumably obey orders--even an
order to hold his tongue--if any were given. Consequently, although
Lord Haldane's dreadful secret may have been kept from Mr. Acland, as
unfit for his innocent {347} and youthful ears, it is surprising that
he was never warned of the dangers of the path in which he was so
boldly treading. The discourtesies of youth to age are not easily
forgiven, especially where they are founded upon misrepresentation, and
when, as in this case, the older man was right and the younger wrong as
to the facts.
[Sidenote: LORD ROBERTS WAS RIGHT]
It will be said--it has indeed been already said--by way of excuse for
the reticence of the Government with regard to the intentions, which
German statesmen revealed to Lord Haldane, at Berlin, in February
1912--that by keeping back from the country the knowledge which members
of the Cabinet possessed, they thereby prevented an outbreak of passion
and panic which might have precipitated war. This may be true or
untrue; it can neither be proved nor controverted; but at any rate it
was not in accordance with the principle of trusting the people; nor
would it have prevented the Government and their supporters--when war
broke out--from making amends to Lord Roberts and others whom, on
grounds of high policy, they had felt themselves obliged, in the past
to rebuke unjustly and to discredit without warrant in the facts. This
course was not impossible. Peel, a very proud man, made amends to
Cobden, and his memory does not stand any the lower for it.
With regard to those journalists and private politicians whose mistakes
were not altogether their own fault--being due in part at least, to the
concealment of the true facts which the Government had practised--it
would not have been in the least wounding to their honour to express
regret, that they had been unwittingly the means of misleading the
people, and traducing those who were endeavouring to lead {348} it
right. In their patriotic indignation some of these same journalists
and politicians had overstepped the limits of what is justifiable in
party polemics. They had attacked the teaching at the Military
Colleges, because it sought to face the European situation frankly, and
to work out in the lecture-room the strategical and tactical
consequences which, in case of war, might be forced upon us by our
relations with France and Russia. It would have done these high-minded
journalists no harm in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, had they
acknowledged frankly that when in former days they had denounced the
words of Lord Roberts as 'wicked' and his interpretation of the
situation as inspired by "the crude lusts and fears which haunt the
unimaginative soldier's brain"--when they had publicly denounced as 'a
Staff College Cabal' teachers who were only doing their duty--they had
unwittingly been guilty of a cruel misjudgment.
[Sidenote: FAILURE TO MAKE AMENDS]
It is not a little remarkable that in 1912--indeed from 1905 to
1914--Lord Roberts, who, according to the Nation, possessed but 'an
average Tory intellect,' should have trusted the people, while a
democratic Government could not bring itself to do so. The Cabinet,
which knew the full measure of the danger, concealed it out of a
mistaken notion of policy. Their henchmen on the platform and in the
press did not know the full measure of the danger. They acted either
from natural prejudice, or official inspiration--possibly from a
mixture of both--when they made light of the danger and held up to
scorn any one who called attention to it. The whole body of
respectable, word-worshipping, well-to-do Liberals and Conservatives,
whom nothing could stir out of {349} their indifference and scepticism,
disapproved most strongly of having the word 'danger' so much as
mentioned in their presence. The country would to-day forgive all of
these their past errors more easily if, when the crisis came, they had
acted a manly part and had expressed regret. But never a word of the
sort from any of these great public characters!
[1] Manchester, October 22, 1912. Quoted from _Lord Roberts's Message
to the Nation_ (Murray), pp. 4-6 and p. 12. The date, however, is
there given wrongly as October 25.
[2] _Manchester Guardian_, November 5, 1912.
[3] This was not so, however, with the Liberal newspaper of greatest
influence in the United Kingdom--the _Manchester Guardian_--which gave
a full and prominent report of Lord Roberts's meeting. This journal is
honourably free from any suspicion of using the suppression of news as
a political weapon.
[4] October 26, 1912. Like the _Manchester Guardian_, the _Nation_
made no attempt to boycott the speech.
[5] 'Successful,' not 'distinguished' or 'able' is the word. The
amiable stress would appear to be on luck rather than merit.
[6] _Manchester Guardian_, October 28, 1912.
[7] _Daily News_, October 30, 1912.
[8] See Preface.
[9] _Evening Standard_, October 30, 1912.
[10] _Morning Post_, October 30, 1912.
[11] Mr. Asquith at Cardiff, October 2, 1914.
[12] Mr. Runciman at Elland, _Manchester Guardian_, October 26, 1912.
Sir Walter Runciman, the father of this speaker, appears to be made of
sterner stuff. After the Scarborough raid he denounced the Germans as
"heinous polecats."
[13] _Times_, Parliamentary Report, October 30, 1912.
[14] _Ibid_. November 1, 1912.
[15] Mr. Acland at Taunton, the _Times_, November 5, 1912.
[16] Letter in the _Times_, November 11, 1912.
[17] Mr. Acland at Rochdale, the _Times_, November 25, 1912.
{350}