THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY
The doubt and anxiety of public opinion in 1912 were not allayed when
the strength and composition of the British Army came to be considered.
Leaving out of account those troops which were recruited and maintained
in India, the Dominions, and the Dependencies, the actual number of
British regulars employed in garrison duty abroad was in round figures
125,000 men. The number in the United Kingdom was approximately the
same; but by no means the whole of these were fit to take the field.
The total strength of the _Regular Army_ in 1912-1913 might therefore
be taken at somewhere between 250,000 and 254,000 men,[1] of whom half
were permanently out of this country, while from 25,000 to 50,000 could
not be reckoned on as available in case of war, for the reason that
they were either recent recruits or 'immatures.'[2]
{318}
The reserves and additional troops which would be called out in the
event of a serious war were so different in character that it was
impossible simply to throw them into a single total, and draw
conclusions therefrom according to the rules of arithmetic. For when
people spoke of the _Army Reserve_, the _Special Reserve_, and the
_Territorial Army_, they were talking of three things, the values of
which were not at all comparable. The first were fully trained
fighting soldiers; the second were lads with a mere smattering of their
trade; while the third were little more than an organised schedule of
human material--mainly excellent--which would become available for
training only at the outbreak of war, and whose liability for service
was limited to home defence. The sum-total of these reserves and
additional troops was roughly 450,000 men; but this row of figures was
entirely meaningless, or else misleading, until the significance of its
various factors was grasped.[3]
[Sidenote: THE THREE RESERVES]
The first of these categories, the _Army Reserve_, was the only one
which could justly claim to rank as a true reserve--that is, as a
fighting force, from the outbreak of war equal in calibre to the
Continental {319} troops against which, it would be called upon to take
the field.
The _Army Reserve_ consisted of men who had served their full time in
the _Regular Army_. They were therefore thoroughly trained and
disciplined, needing only a few days--or at most weeks--to rub the rust
off them.[4] Nominally their numbers were 137,000[5] men; but as over
8000 of these were living out of the United Kingdom the net remainder
had to be taken at something under 130,000. Moreover, as the _Army
Reserve_ depended automatically upon the strength of the _Regular
Army_, and as the strength of this had recently been reduced, it seemed
necessarily to follow that ultimately there would be a considerable
diminution.
The second category to which the name of a reserve was given was the
_Special Reserve_. This, however, was no true reserve like the first,
for it was wholly unfit to take the field upon the outbreak of
hostilities. It was the modern substitute for the Militia, and was
under obligation to serve abroad in time of war. The term of
enlistment was six years, and the training nominally consisted of six
months in the first year, and one month in camp in each of the
succeeding years. But in practice these conditions had been greatly
relaxed. It was believed that, upon the average, the term of training
amounted to even less than the proposals of the National Service {320}
League,[6] which had been criticised from the official
standpoint--severely and not altogether unjustly--on the ground that
they would not provide soldiers fit to be drafted immediately into the
fighting line.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of its military education, this _Special
Reserve_ was relied upon in some measure for making up the numbers of
our Expeditionary Force[7] at the commencement of war, and individuals
from it, and even in some cases units, would therefore have been sent
out to meet the conscript armies of the Continent, to which they were
inferior, not only in length and thoroughness of training, but also in
age. It was important also to bear in mind that they would be led by
comparatively inexperienced and untrained officers. The strength of
the _Special Reserve_ was approximately 58,000[8] men, or lads. Under
the most favourable view it was a corps of apprentices whose previous
service had been of a very meagre and desultory character.
The third category was the _Territorial Army_, whose term of service
was four years and whose military training, even nominally, only
consisted of fifteen days in camp each year, twenty drills the first
year, and ten drills each year after that. In reality this training
had, on the average, consisted of very much less. This force was not
liable for service abroad, but only for home defence.
The minimum strength of the _Territorial Army_ {321} was estimated
beforehand by Lord Haldane at 316,000 men; but these numbers had never
been reached. The approximate strength was only 260,000 men, of whom
only about half had qualified, both by doing fifteen days in camp, and
by passing an elementary test in musketry.[9] These numbers had
recently shown a tendency to shrink rather than swell.[10]
[Sidenote: THEIR VALUES AND TRAINING]
The value of the _Territorial Army_, therefore, was that of excellent,
though in certain cases immature, material, available for training upon
the outbreak of war. But in spite of its high and patriotic spirit it
was wholly unfit to take the field against trained troops until it had
undergone the necessary training.
In the event of war we could not safely reckon upon being able to
withdraw our garrisons from abroad.[11] Consequently, in the first
instance, and until the _Special Reserve_ and the _Territorial Army_
had been made efficient, all we could reasonably depend upon for
serious military operations, either at home or abroad, were that part
of the _Regular Army_ which was in the United Kingdom, and the _Army
Reserve_.
In round figures therefore our soldiers immediately available for a
European war (_i.e._ that portion of the _Regular Army_ which was
stationed at home and the _Army Reserve_) amounted on mobilisation to
something much under 250,000 men. Our apprentice troops (the _Special
Reserve_), who were really considerably less than _half_-made, numbered
something {322} under 60,000 men. Our _un_made raw material (the
_Territorial Army_), excellent in quality and immediately available for
training, might be taken at 260,000 men.
The main consideration arising out of this analysis was of course the
inadequacy of the British Army to make good the numerical deficiency of
the Triple Entente in the Western theatre during the _onset_ and the
_grip_ of war. Supposing England to be involved in a European war,
which ran its course and was brought to a conclusion with the same
swiftness which had characterised every other European war within the
last half century, how were our _half_-made and our _un_made troops to
be rendered efficient in time to effect the result in any way
whatsoever?
[Sidenote: SCARCITY OF OFFICERS]
There was yet another consideration of great gravity. If our full
Expeditionary Force were sent abroad we should have to strain our
resources to the utmost to bring it up to its full nominal strength and
keep it there. The wastage of war would necessarily be very severe in
the case of so small a force; especially heavy in the matter of
officers. Consequently, from the moment when this force set sail,
there would be a dearth of officers in the United Kingdom competent to
train the _Special Reserve_, the _Territorial Army_, and the raw
recruits. Every regular and reserve officer in the country would be
required in order to mobilise the Expeditionary Force, and keep it up
to its full strength during the first six months. As things then stood
there was a certainty--in case of war--of a very serious shortage of
officers of suitable experience and age to undertake the duties, which
{323} were required under our recently devised military system.[12]
Half-made soldiers and raw material alike would therefore be left to
the instruction of amateur or hastily improvised officers--zealous and
intelligent men without a doubt; but unqualified, owing to their own
lack of experience, for training raw troops, so as to place them
rapidly on an equality with the armies to which they would find
themselves opposed. What the British system contemplated, was as if
you were to send away the headmaster, and the assistant-masters, and
the under-masters, leaving the school in charge of pupil-teachers.
In no profession is the direct personal influence of teaching and
command more essential than in the soldier's. In none are good
teachers and leaders more able to shorten and make smooth the road to
confidence and efficiency. Seeing that we had chosen to depend so
largely upon training our army after war began, it might have been
supposed, that at least we should have taken care to provide ourselves
with a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned officers,
under whose guidance the course of education would be made as thorough
and as short as possible. This was not the case. Indeed the reverse
was the case. Instead of possessing a large number of officers and
non-commissioned officers, beyond those actually required at the
outbreak of war for the purpose of {324} starting with, and repairing
the wastage in the Expeditionary Force, we were actually faced, as
things then stood, with a serious initial shortage of the officers
required for this one purpose alone.
Lord Haldane in framing the army system which is associated with his
name chose to place his trust in a small, highly-trained expeditionary
force for immediate purposes, to be supplemented at a later date--if
war were obliging enough to continue for so long--by a new army of
which the _Territorials_ formed the nucleus, and which would not begin
its real training until after the outbreak of hostilities. Under the
most favourable view this plan was a great gamble; for it assumed that
in the war which was contemplated, the _onset_ and the _grip_ periods
would be passed through without crushing disaster, and that England
would, in due course, have an opportunity of making her great strength
felt in the _drag_. It will be said that Lord Haldane's assumption has
been justified by recent events, and in a sense this is true; but by
what merest hair-breadth escape, by what sacrifices on the part of our
Allies, at what cost in British lives, with what reproach to our
national good name, we have not yet had time fully to realise.
But crediting Lord Haldane's system, if we may, with an assumption
which has been proved correct, we have reason to complain that he did
not act boldly on this assumption and make his scheme, such as it was,
complete and effective. For remember, it was contemplated that the
great new army, which was to defend the existence of the British Empire
in the final round of war, should be raised and trained upon the
voluntary principle--upon a wave of patriotic enthusiasm--after war
broke out. This new army {325} would have to be organised, clothed,
equipped, armed, and supplied with ammunition. The 'voluntary
principle' did not apply to matters of this kind. It might therefore
have been expected that stores would be accumulated, and plans worked
out upon the strictest business principles, with philosophic
thoroughness, and in readiness for an emergency which might occur at
any moment.
[Sidenote: WANT OF STORES AND PLANS]
Moral considerations which precluded 'conscription' did not, and could
not, apply to inanimate material of war, or to plans and schedules of
army corps and camps, or to a body of officers enlisted of their own
free will. It may have been true that to impose compulsory training
would have offended the consciences of free-born Britons; but it was
manifestly absurd to pretend that the accumulation of adequate stores
of artillery and small arms, of shells and cartridges, of clothing and
equipment, could offend the most tender conscience--could offend
anything indeed except the desire of the tax-payer to pay as few taxes
as possible.
If the British nation chose to bank on the assumption, that it would
have the opportunity given it of 'making good' during the _drag_ of
war, it should have been made to understand what this entailed in the
matter of supplies; and most of all in reserve of officers. All
existing forces should at least have been armed with the most modern
weapons. There should have been arms and equipment ready for the
recruits who would be required, and who were relied upon to respond to
a national emergency. There should have been ample stores of every
kind, including artillery, and artillery ammunition, for that
Expeditionary Force upon which, during the first {326} six months we
had decided to risk our national safety.
But, in fact, we were provided fully in none of these respects. And
least of all were we provided in the matter of officers. There was no
case of conscience at stake; but only the question of a vote in the
House of Commons. We could have increased our establishment of
officers by a vote; we could have laid in stores of ammunition, of
clothing, of equipment by a vote. But the vote was not asked for--it
might have been unpopular--and therefore Lord Haldane's scheme--in its
inception a gamble of the most hazardous character--was reduced to a
mere make-believe, for the reason that its originator lacked confidence
to back his own 'fancy.'
Looking back at the Agadir incident, it seemed plain enough, from a
soldier's point of view, that the British Expeditionary Force was
inadequate, in a purely military sense, to redress the adverse balance
against the French, and beat back a German invasion. The moral effect,
however, of our assistance would undoubtedly have been very great, in
encouraging France and Belgium by our comradeship in arms, and in
discouraging Germany, by making clear to her the firmness of the Triple
Entente.
But by the summer of 1914--three years later--this position had
undergone a serious change. In a purely military sense, the value of
such aid as it had been in our power to send three years earlier, was
greatly diminished. The increase in the German striking force over
that of France, which had taken effect since 1911, was considerably
greater than the total numbers of the army which we held prepared {327}
for foreign service. This was fully understood abroad; and the
knowledge of it would obviously diminish the moral as well as the
material effect of our co-operation.
[Sidenote: COST OF FULL INSURANCE]
In order that the combined forces of France and England might have a
reasonable chance of holding their own[13] against Germany, until
Russian pressure began to tell, the smallest army which we ought to
have been able to put in the field, and maintain there for six months,
was not less than twice that of the existing Expeditionary Force. From
a soldier's point of view 320,000 men instead of 160,000 was the very
minimum with which there might be a hope of withstanding the German
onset; and for the purpose of bringing victory within sight it would
have been necessary to double the larger of these figures. In order to
reach the end in view, Britain ought to have possessed a striking force
at least half as large as that of France, in round figures between
600,000 and 750,000 men.
This was how the matter appeared in 1912, viewed from the standpoint of
a soldier who found himself asked to provide a force sufficient, not
for conquest--not for the purpose of changing the map of Europe to the
advantage of the Triple Entente--but merely in order to safeguard the
independence of Belgium and Holland, to prevent France from being
crushed by Germany,[14] and to preserve the security of the British
Empire.
{328}
The political question which presented itself to the minds of enquirers
was this--If the British nation were told frankly the whole truth about
the Army, would it not conceivably decide that complete insurance was a
better bargain than half measures? What force ought we to be prepared
to send to France during the first fortnight of war in order to make it
a moral certainty that Germany would under no circumstances venture to
attack France?
To questions of this sort it is obviously impossible to give certain
and dogmatic answers. There are occasions when national feeling runs
away with policy and overbears considerations of military prudence.
The effects of sudden panic, of a sense of bitter injustice, of blind
pride or overweening confidence, are incalculable upon any mathematical
basis. But regarding the matter from the point of view of the Kaiser's
general staff, whose opinion is usually assumed to be a determining
factor in German enterprises, a British Expeditionary Force, amounting
to something over 600,000 men, would have been sufficient to prevent
the occurrence of a coolly calculated war. And in the event of war
arising out of some uncontrollable popular impulse, a British Army of
this size would have been enough, used with promptitude and under good
leadership, to secure the defeat of the aggressor.
An Expeditionary Force of 320,000 men would mean fully trained reserves
of something over 210,000 in order to make good the wastage of war
during a campaign of six months. Similarly an Expeditionary Force of
600,000 would mean reserves of 400,000. In the former case a total of
530,000 trained soldiers, {329} and in the latter a total of 1,000,000,
would therefore have been required.[15]
Even the smaller of these proposed increases in the Expeditionary Force
would have meant doubling the number of trained soldiers in the British
Army; the larger would have meant multiplying it by four. Under what
system would it be possible to achieve these results if public opinion
should decide that either of them was necessary to national security?
The answer was as easy to give as the thing itself seemed hard to carry
out.
[Sidenote: LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT]
It had become clear a good deal earlier than the year 1914 that the
limit of voluntary enlistment, under existing conditions, had already
been reached for the Regular as well as the _Territorial_ Army. If,
therefore, greater numbers were required they could only be provided by
some form of compulsory service. There was no getting away from this
hard fact which lay at the very basis of the situation.
If security were the object of British policy, the Expeditionary Force
must be fully trained before war broke out. It would not serve the
purpose for which it was intended, if any part of it, or of its
reserves, needed to be taught their trade after war began.
Thoroughness of training--which must under ordinary circumstances[16]
be measured by length of {330} training--appeared to be a factor of
vital importance. Given anything like equality in equipment,
generalship, and position, men who had undergone a full two years'
course--like the conscript armies of the Continent--ought to have no
difficulty in defeating a much larger force which had less discipline
and experience.
The lessons of the South African War were in many ways very useful; but
the praise lavishly, and justly, given to volunteer battalions by Lord
Roberts and other distinguished commanders, needed to be studied in the
light of the circumstances, and these were of a peculiar character.
For one thing our antagonists, the Boers, were not trained troops, and
moreover, their policy to a large extent was to weary us out, by
declining decisive action and engaging us in tedious pursuits. Our
volunteers, for the most part, were picked men. Although only
half-trained--perhaps in the majority of cases wholly
untrained--circumstances in this case permitted of their being given
the time necessary for gaining experience in the field before being
required to fight. This was an entirely different state of affairs
from what might be looked for in a European war, in a densely peopled
country, covered with a close network of roads and railways--a war in
which great masses of highly disciplined soldiers would be hurled
against one another systematically, upon a settled plan, until at last
superiority at one point or another should succeed in breaking down
resistance. The South African war and a European war were two things
not in the least comparable.
[Sidenote: THE PEOPLE HAD A RIGHT TO KNOW]
Before the nation could be expected to come to a final decision with
regard to the insurance premium {331} which it was prepared to pay, it
would require to be fully informed upon a variety of subordinate points
of much importance. Cost was a matter which could not be put lightly
on one side; our peculiar obligations in regard to foreign garrisons
was another; the nature of our industrial system was a third; and there
were many besides. But the main and governing consideration, if we
wished to retain our independence as a nation, was--what provisions
were adequate to security? The people wanted to know, and had a right
to know, the facts. And in the end, with all due regard for our
governors, and for the self-importance of political parties, it was not
either for ministers or partisans to decide this question on behalf of
the people; it was for the people, on full and honest information, to
decide it for themselves.
[1] These rough totals were approximately the same in the autumn of
1912, and at the outbreak of war in July 1914.
[2] The exact number of men who could remain in the units when
mobilised was difficult to assess, for the reason that it varied
considerably according to the trooping season, which begins in August
and ends in February. February was therefore the most unfavourable
month for comparison, and it is probably not far from the truth to say
that at that date 50,000 men out of our nominal home army were
unavailable in case of war. Under the extreme stress of circumstances,
it had recently been decided that boys of nineteen might serve in
Europe in the event of war, so that a good many 'immatures' were now
nominally 'mature.' Only nominally, however, for even a war minister
could not alter the course of nature by a stroke of the pen.
[3] Without wearying the reader too much with figures the German
strength may be briefly indicated. That country has a population
roughly half as large again as our own (65 millions against 45). The
total of fully trained men whom the German Government could mobilise at
the declaration of war was something over 4,500,000. Of these some
2,400,000 composed the 'striking force'; the remaining 2,100,000 or
thereabouts, the reserve for making good wastage of war. But in
addition, Germany had scheduled and inscribed in her Ersatz, or
recruiting reserve, and in the Landsturm, fully 5,000,000 untrained and
partially trained men, with ample equipment and military instructors
for them all. A large proportion of these would be enrolled on
mobilisation, and would undertake garrison and other duties, for which
they would be fitted after a short period of service, thus freeing all
fully trained men for service in the field.
[4] For purposes of immediate mobilisation, however, Continental
reservists are superior to our own, because in the British Army they
lose touch with their regiments, and in case of war will in many cases
be serving with officers and comrades whom they know nothing about;
whereas in Germany (for example) they come up for periods of training
with the regiments to which they belong. Also, at the outset, the
proportion of reservists to serving soldiers will be much greater in
our case.
[5] This was in 1912. Their numbers appear to have increased somewhat.
In July 1914 they were something over 146,000.
[6] Viz. four months for infantry and six for cavalry.
[7] Twenty-seven battalions of the Special Reserve were scheduled to go
out as complete units for duty on lines of communication, etc. The
report on recruiting for 1912 says that the great majority of recruits
for the Special Reserve join between the ages of seventeen and
nineteen. It is hardly necessary to point out the folly of putting
boys of this age in a situation where they will be peculiarly liable to
disease. Continental nations employ their oldest classes of reserves
for these duties.
[8] In July 1914 about 61,000.
[9] _I.e._ in the autumn of 1912. They were, therefore, 56,000 short
of Lord Haldane's estimate.
[10] Latterly there was a slight improvement in recruiting. In July
1914 the numbers (including permanent staff) were a little over
268,000--48,000 short of Lord Haldane's estimate.
[11] The fact that in certain cases we did so withdraw our garrisons in
1914-1915 without disaster does not invalidate this calculation.
[12] The experience of the past few months makes this criticism appear
absurd--in its _under_statement. But of course what was contemplated
in 1912-13 was not anything upon the gigantic scale of our present 'New
Army'; but only (a) the _Special Reserve_, (b) the _Territorial Army_,
possibly doubled in numbers during the first six months, and (c) fresh
recruits for the _Regular Army_ upon a very considerably enhanced
scale. But even for these purposes which were foreseen, the provision
of officers was quite inadequate; so inadequate indeed as to appear
from the soldier's point of view in the light of a parliamentary farce.
[13] _I.e._ of holding the Germans at the French frontier and keeping
them out of Belgium should they attempt to invade that country.
[14] At the time these totals were worked out the results appeared very
startling to the lay mind. Recent experience, however, has proved that
the soldiers who worked them out were right when they described them as
'modest estimates.'
[15] In this calculation the wastage of war during the first six months
has been taken at two-thirds. With the smaller force of 160,000 men,
practically the whole army would be in the fighting line all the time,
and the wastage consequently would be heavier. It could not wisely be
assumed at less than three-fourths for the same period.
[16] Obviously the better and more experienced the officers, the higher
the quality of the recruits, and the keener their spirit, the more
quickly the desired result will be achieved. The last two have been
very potent factors in the rapid education of our present 'New Army.'
In a time of abnormal patriotic impulse, the length of time required
will be much shortened. Since August 1914 the lack of experienced
officers has been the great difficulty.
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