the capital of Moravia without a battle. It was well known that Brunn
was a fortified town, that there was much artillery, large magazines of
powder, and warlike stores of all kinds in it: its possession seemed to
merit an action, and it was expected. Although the arrival of General
Buxhoevden was not positively known, yet spies had reported it, and all
the information received as to the march of that army in Poland, and
the two Galicias, rendered it so probable, that all the calculations of
the French army were founded on the supposition of this junction.
The 19th November, Prince Charles had not passed Goritz; he therefore
could not enter into the most remote calculation relative to the war in
Moravia. The whole French army was collected, so that, if the Russian
army had wished to maintain the important point of Brunn, and to defend
the magazines in that place, it would two days after have been attacked
by Prince Murat, by the corps of Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Davoust,
and by part of that under Marshal Mortier. The Russians would have had
10,000 chosen men less than at Austerlitz, and the French 30,000 men
more: and if it is asked, why, at Austerlitz, the French had not these
30,000 men more, it is, because the Emperor Napoleon, being informed
that the Russian army was retiring from Wischau, and falling back on
Olmutz, conjectured that the Russians were waiting for the third army
under Michelson, in order to resume the offensive; or meant to take up
a position under the guns of Olmutz, and so wait till Prince Charles
approached nearer to the theatre of operation.
Obliged to oppose both these armies; the emperor had detached Marshal
Davoust to Presbourgh, and Marshal Ney into Carinthia. The corps under
these two Marshals would have supported General Marmont, and have
had the corps of Marshal Mortier as their reserve; and above 90,000
men would have attacked Prince Charles, before he could approach the
Danube: and, _vice versa_, if the third Russian army, under Michelson,
and the combined army, under Olmutz, (which were calculated by their
junction to amount to 120,000 men) should resume the offensive; whether
they advanced by Kremsir, or direct upon Brunn, the calculation had
been made so as to be joined in a short time, by Marshal Bernadotte,
who had made two days march upon Iglau; by Marshal Davoust, one of
whose divisions was only two, and the other four marches distant;
and lastly, by Marshal Mortier, who would also have arrived in four
marches, and who, under this supposition, would have been replaced at
Vienna by one of the Generals, Marmont or Ney.
These were skilful dispositions; the object of which was, to oppose
equal force to the enemy, although in reality superior in numbers to
the French army.
When the Russians assumed the offensive, it was known that Michelson
had not joined them. The Emperor Napoleon was of course astonished, and
immediately saw how ill combined was the system of the allies. It was
not till after the battle of Austerlitz, and by reports from Galicia,
that it became known that Michelson had no army; that he was only the
Inspector of the two other corps; and that the Russians, after the
arrival of the Grand Duke Constantine, had nothing more to receive.
As soon as he learnt the offensive movement of the Russians, the
emperor recalled Marshal Bernadotte, the remainder of the corps of
Marshal Davoust and General Marmont. If he gave battle at Austerlitz,
without having been rejoined by the last divisions of Marshal Davoust,
and those of Marshal Mortier, it was because he saw so favourable an
opportunity, that he not only was persuaded he should gain the battle
without these reinforcements, but even had he 30,000 men less.
The allies then did well to wait the arrival of their reinforcements
before they resumed the offensive. They calculated rightly, in letting
the emperor be the first to make his movements, and must have conceived
the hope of afterwards gaining by it, when they should themselves come
to act upon their own plans.]
[Footnote 2: _Note by a French officer._--This disposition, of which
the Austrian officer makes mention, and which is accurate, shews that
the emperor had foreseen, that the enemy might manœuvre on the line of
operation from Olmutz, along the March; in this case, the Russian army
must pass at Shadish, whence it was farther distant than Marshal Soult,
who had some infantry at Gaja, and detachments of cavalry, observing
all the route, necessary to this movement.
Whenever the enemy's movement had been known, they would have been
allowed to advance. The corps of Marshals Mortier and Davoust, would
have been at Goeding, and the enemy would have had 30,000 men to
contend with more than at Austerlitz.
In all the enemy's manœuvres upon Vienna, he moved upon the wings of
the French army, which, by calling in all its detachments, concentrated
itself, and opposed its whole force to that of the enemy.
It is more particularly in discussing, what it was possible for the
enemy to have done, that we are convinced of the science, and deep
calculation shewn by the emperor, in a country so new, and so little
known. We see that all his dispositions, even those which appeared to
be the most trivial, and to have had no other object in view than the
subsistence of the troops, were the result of premeditated design, the
chances of which had been already calculated.]
[Footnote 3: _Note by a French Officer._--There is here the mistake
of a day. Marshal Bernadotte arrived _two_ days before the battle of
Austerlitz.]
[Footnote 4: 15 of these were Cosacks.]
[Footnote 5: _Note by a French officer._--It is evident that the author
here diminishes the real strength of the combined army, by one-_fifth_.]
[Footnote 6: _Note by the Austrian general._--The Austrian battalions,
of which this column was partly composed, were extremely weak, in
consequence of the new formation introduced by M. Mack, who, from three
battalions to each regiment, made five: and, as before stated, they
were new levies, with the exception of the regiment of Salzbourg, and
the frontier troops. This corps of infantry was composed as follows:
2 bat. 1st reg. of Szeckler.
2 do. 2d do.
1 do. Brooder.
6 do. Salzbourg.
1 do. Auersperg.
1 do. Kaunitz.
1 bat. reg. of Lindenau.
1 ------------ Kerpen.
1 ------------ Beaulieu.
1 ------------ Wurtembourg.
1 ------------ Reuss. Graitz.
1 ------------ Czartorisky.
1 ------------ Kaiser.
--
20
]
[Footnote 7: I am inclined to think the word, _regiment_ has here been,
inadvertently, substituted for _brigade_. Translator.]
[Footnote 8: _Note by a French officer._--The corps under Marshal Soult
had evacuated Austerlitz at three o'clock in the morning; and was
posted at seven o'clock in rear of Puntowitz and Schlapanitz. There
are some inaccuracies in the detail of the movements, and the partial
attacks; but the narrative is generally correct, and well told.]
[Footnote 9: _Note by a French officer._--There is no foundation for
the remark here made by the Austrian officer; since the Emperor, who
intended to act upon the centre of the enemy, had an interest in
remaining master of these defiles, that no obstacle might be opposed to
the bringing his army into action: it was with this view he occupied
the fine position of the Santon, situated in front of all the small
streams: besides, the Emperor had posts upon these rivulets two days
before; and the left of the French army was between the Santon and the
village of Girshikowitz, which was the rendezvous of almost the whole
cavalry; consequently, from that moment, it was no longer necessary to
pass the defiles in order to attack the heights.
This observation of the Austrian officer, only serves to mark more
strongly to every French officer, who was a witness of the affair, both
the prudence and military eye of their general. He made the Santon, the
point of appuy, for his left flank; not because it was a fine defensive
position; there were others in the rear equally good; but, _because
it was the key to all offensive operations_. If, on the contrary, the
French general had neglected the Santon, the whole of the left wing of
the French army would have been prevented from resuming the offensive,
unless they passed the defiles.
Eight days before the battle, the Emperor returning from Wischau,
ascended the Santon, notwithstanding the extreme cold; and said to the
officers about him: "Examine this position well; it will probably play
a conspicuous part before two months are over our heads."
The Emperor having always had it in view, during the campaign in
Moravia, not to allow his left to be turned, and to abandon his right;
that alone would have been a sufficient reason for resting his left
on a position not defensive, but offensive, such as was that of the
Santon. The fact is, the more we discuss the plan of the campaign,
the more we perceive the judgment and military eye of a master in the
science of war.]
BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.
The disposition for the attack of the French army was delivered to
the general officers of the Austro-Russian army, soon after midnight,
on the morning of the 2nd December. But the imperfect knowledge that
was possessed of their position, although scarcely out of range of
the enemy's musketry, naturally made the suppositions upon which the
disposition of attack was founded also very indefinite. Some movements
had been remarked, the evening before, on the enemy's left, but it was
not known to be occasioned by the arrival of the corps under Marshal
Bernadotte.[10] It was supposed that the French army was weakening its
centre to reinforce its left. Several lines of smoke, which had also
been perceived the evening before, between Turas and the lakes in rear
of Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, and some others near Czernowitz, caused
the belief that the French army had made these lakes the point of
appuy for their right, and had placed a reserve in the rear. The left
of the combined army outflanked the right of the French army. It was
supposed, that by passing the defile of Sokolnitz, and of Kobelnitz,
their right would be turned, and that the attack might afterwards
be continued in the plain, between Schlapanitz and the wood of Turas,
thus avoiding the defiles of Schlapanitz and Bellowitz, which, it was
believed, covered the front of the enemy's position. The French army
was then to be attacked by its right flank, upon which it was intended
to move down large bodies of troops; this movement was to be executed
with celerity and vigour; the valley between Tellnitz and Sokolnitz
was to be passed with rapidity; the right of the allies (on which was
the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and the advanced corps
under Prince Bagration) was to cover this movement.--The first of these
generals on the plain between Krug and Schlapanitz, on each side of
the causeway; and the other by protecting the cavalry, and occupying
the heights situated between Dwaroschna and the Inn of Lesch, with his
artillery.[11] For this purpose, the five columns, composed as before,
received orders to advance in the following manner:
1st. Column. Lieut.-general Dochtorow, with 24 Battalions of Russians,
from the heights of Hostieradeck, by Aujest, upon Tellnitz. After
having passed the village and defile, the column was to move forward
to the right upon the lakes, till its head became parallel with that
of the 2d column.
2nd Column. Lieut.-general Langeron, with 18 Battalions of Russians,
marching like the former column, by his left from the heights of
Pratzen, was to force the valley between Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and
then dress by the 1st column.
3rd Column. Lieut.-general Przybyszewsky, with 18 Battalions of
Russians, was also to move by his left, from the heights to the right
of Pratzen, close by the castle of Sokolnitz; from whence the heads
of the three columns were to move forward, between Sokolnitz and the
lakes situated behind it, as far as the lakes of Kobelnitz.
4th Column. Lieut.-general Kollowrath, with 27 Battalions, 15 of
which were Austrian, moving forward by his left, from the heights in
rear of the 3d column, was to pass the same valley, and the lakes of
Kobelnitz, and bring the head of his column parallel with that of the
three former.
The advanced corps under M. Kienmayer, was to protect, with its
infantry, the movements of the 1st column, so that this last was, in
fact, reinforced by five Austrian Battalions, and composed altogether
of 29 Battalions. The heads of these four columns of infantry were to
present a large front, and four Battalions of the 1st column were to
occupy the wood of Turas. The remainder, and all the other columns,
were then to move forward between this wood and Schlapanitz, and to
attack the right of the enemy with strong bodies of infantry, while
three Battalions of the fourth column should be occupied in carrying
the village of Schlapanitz.
5th Column. Lieut.-general Prince John de Liechtenstein, with 82
squadrons, was first of all to move from the foot of the hill, in rear
of the 3d column, between Blasowitz and Krug, to protect the formation
and march of the columns on the right, and afterwards to advance upon
the plain on the right and left of the causeway, between Krug and the
Inn of Lesch, as was before mentioned.
The advanced corps, under Lieutenant-general Prince Bagration,
consisting of twelve Battalions and forty squadrons, was to maintain
its position, and gain the heights between Dwaroschna, and the Inn of
Lesch, in order to place strong batteries of cannon upon them.
The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, consisting of
ten Battalions and eighteen squadrons, was to move from the heights in
front of Austerlitz to the rear of Blasowitz and Krug; he was to serve
as a support to the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and to
the corps under Prince Bagration.
The fortune of this day was made to depend upon the rapidity of the
attack on our left, and on the driving back the enemy's right upon
_his_ left. It was imagined the battle would not be decisive if Prince
Bagration was not enabled to oppose an obstinate resistance to the
attacks the French might make upon him; and orders were given to the
cavalry, under Prince John de Liechtenstein, to attack the enemy in any
movement he might make, with a view to engaging this Russian general.
The cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the first
column should have passed the defile of Tellnitz, was destined to cover
the left of the column, and to march between Turas and the Schwarza;
observing well the convent of Reygern.
It was settled in the disposition, that in case the four columns were
fortunate enough to advance as far as the causeway between Lattein and
Bellowitz, and to drive the enemy back into the mountains, the Wood of
Turas was _still_ to remain occupied by the four Battalions destined
to this purpose, in order to preserve the facility of manœuvring round
it, and the means of retiring, if necessary, by Kobelnitz and Puntowitz
into the position of Pratzen; which retreat was, in case of the worst,
to be continued as far as the position of Hodiegitz, Niemtschen, and
Herspitz.
If the attack made by the left proved successful, then Prince Bagration
was to move against the enemy's left, and to establish a communication
with the four columns of infantry; after which it was intended to
unite the army in front of the village of Lattein, between Lesch and
Nennowitz. The defiles of Schalapanitz, Bellowitz and Kritschen, being
thus cleared, the cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein was to
pass them with rapidity, in order to support the infantry; and, in
case of success, to pursue the enemy between Brunn and Czernowitz.
The general-in-chief, Koutousoff, was in the centre with the fourth
column.
The general of infantry, Buxhoevden, commanded the left of the army,
and marched with the first column.
Having thus given the plan of attack, concerted by the allies, we
are now about to see the manner in which it was deranged, and how it
happened that the faults in the conception were not compensated for by
the success of the execution.
At seven o'clock in the morning the combined army was put in motion,
and quitted the heights of Pratzen to advance upon its given points.
Each of the four columns of infantry was perfectly in view of the
enemy, who could not but perceive that the direction of their march
caused considerable intervals between them, in proportion as the
heads of the columns approached the valleys of Tellnitz, Sokolnitz and
Kobelnitz. The action began on the left wing of the allies. The corps
of General Kienmayer, posted in front of Aujest, as before mentioned,
was nearest the enemy, and destined to force the defile of Tellnitz,
to open the route for the first column, which had a great circuit to
make after having passed this defile, in order to arrive at the point
which would bring it in a line with the second column; this made
it necessary to carry the village of Tellnitz as soon as possible.
Between Aujest and Tellnitz is a considerable plain, on which some
squadrons of hussars were advanced, between seven and eight o'clock, to
reconnoitre the enemy. On a hill, in front of the village, were posted
several companies of infantry, who defended its approach, while some
detachments of cavalry were on the right, having the lake of Menitz as
their appuy.
M. de Kienmayer ordered a detachment of cavalry to advance against
their right, and a Battalion[12] of the first regiment of Szeckler
infantry to attack the hill on which the French infantry was posted.
The latter was reinforced, and a fire of musketry commenced, which
became pretty warm. The French defended themselves with obstinacy; and
the Austrians, who had been supported by another Battalion, attacked
with spirit. The hussars of Hesse Hombourg, on the right, under Major
General Nostitz, and those of Szeckler on the left, under Major General
Prince Maurice Liechtenstein, took post on the flanks of this infantry,
to check the enemy's cavalry, (which was perceived on the farther side
of the defile of Tellnitz) should it attempt to pass for the purpose of
attacking these Austrian Battalions. The Hussars suffered severely from
the enemy's sharp shooters, who took advantage of the ground, which all
round the village was covered with vineyards, and full of ditches; but
they could not succeed in keeping off the cavalry. The second Battalion
of the regiment of Szeckler infantry had arrived to reinforce the
first, which was attacking the hill, and which had lost more than half
its strength. Twice the Austrians were repulsed; and twice they again
advanced to the foot of the hill, which it was necessary to carry, in
order to arrive at the village. At length General Stutterheim succeeded
in getting possession of it with these two Battalions.
The enemy's third regiment of the line, and two Battalions of sharp
shooters, were in possession of Tellnitz and the vineyards round
the village. These troops defended their post with valour. M. de
Kienmayer ordered General Carneville to advance with the remainder of
his infantry (consisting of three other Battalions) to the support of
the two which were on the hill, and were fighting with great courage.
A destructive fire of musketry ensued. The village was situated in
a natural entrenchment, the vineyards being surrounded by a deep
ditch, of which the French kept possession: however, the Austrians
succeeded at one time in penetrating as far as the village; but were
again repulsed, and had some difficulty in maintaining possession of
the hill they had before carried. The regiment of Szeckler infantry
fought with the greatest obstinacy; above two-thirds of them being
killed or wounded. This action had already lasted above an hour, and
yet the head of the first column, with which was M. de Buxhoevden, had
not yet made its appearance. The French had more troops belonging to
Legrand's division on the farther side of the defile; and the Austrians
engaged in so unequal a contest (since they were without support),
continued to make fresh efforts, which they momentarily expected would
become useless. At length, M. de Buxhoevden, with the first column,
appeared from Aujest, and sent a Battalion of the seventh regiment of
light infantry to support the Austrians, and a brigade of Russians
to form the reserve. Two Austrian Battalions, with this Battalion of
light infantry, which charged the enemy with impetuosity, attacked the
village, gained possession of it, and were followed by the remainder.
The French, on the approach of such superior numbers, evacuated the
defile, and drew up on the farther side in order of battle. M. de
Buxhoevden, before he moved forward, waited to see the head of the
second column (which was not advancing) appear in the plain, between
the foot of the hills and Sokolnitz.
Towards nine o'clock the enemy received a reinforcement of 4,000 men
from the corps under General Davoust. These troops arrived from the
convent of Reygern; the French then taking advantage of a thick fog
which suddenly darkened the whole valley, again got possession of the
village, and even penetrated as far as the hill beyond it. At this
moment General Nostitz made a rapid charge, with two squadrons of the
hussars of Hesse Hombourg, for the purpose of checking them.
The Russian light infantry, and an Austrian Battalion, which had been
posted in Tellnitz, had fallen back in disorder: the Russian regiment
of New Ingermannland ought to have supported them; but retreated in
a manner, which, combined with the fog, threw a part of the column
into confusion. The charge made by the hussars had checked the French
infantry, some hundreds of whom were made prisoners. The fog having
dispersed, the troops again moved forwards, and the enemy abandoned
the village. The first column made a deployment in several lines upon
the hill, and Tellnitz was retaken. A cannonade took place; and as
soon as the French entirely withdrew from this point, the defile was
passed, without opposition, by the brigades of cavalry under Prince
Maurice Liechtenstein and General Stutterheim, who drew up in order
of battle on the farther side. Tellnitz and the defile were occupied
by some Battalions provided with artillery. The enemy then entirely
abandoned the plain between Tellnitz and Turas; but he was not followed
up, because the communication with the second column was not yet
established. The Austrian cavalry consequently avoided the snare laid
for it, by the retreat of the right of the French army. During this
action, near Tellnitz, the second and third column had quitted the
heights of Pratzen, and had approached towards Sokolnitz, which was
occupied by two Battalions from the division of Legrand. These two
Battalions opposed some resistance to the Russian light infantry as
they advanced at the head of these columns. The French had placed some
cannon on a hill between Sokolnitz and Kobelnitz; (the latter village
was occupied by the enemy's reserve) a pretty heavy cannonade was
opened upon Sokolnitz, which destroyed the village. These two Russian
columns, without concerning themselves as to the fourth column,
without any direct communication with it, and without being deterred
by the offensive movements of the enemy, thought of nothing but the
first disposition, and continued their movements upon Sokolnitz; which
village they took possession of without much resistance, after a long
and useless cannonade. General Muller, of the Russian light infantry,
was wounded and afterwards taken prisoner beyond Sokolnitz. In passing
this village, the two columns crossed upon each other, and some
confusion ensued.