A
DETAILED ACCOUNT
OF THE
BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ
BY THE
AUSTRIAN MAJOR-GENERAL,
STUTTERHEIM.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
BY
MAJOR PINE COFFIN,
ASSISTANT QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISH ARMY,
Tout cela, prouve, qu'il y a beaucoup d'hommes, capables de faire
manœuvrer, quinze a vingt mille hommes, et qu'il en est peu, qui
puissent tirer tout le parti possible, d'une armée de quatre-vingt
mille hommes.
Note par un officier François.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. GODDARD, MILITARY BOOKSELLER,
NO. 1, PALL-MALL, CORNER OF THE HAYMARKET.
1807.
W. Marchant, Printer, 3, Greville-street, Holborn.
TO THE PUBLIC.
The fatal consequences that resulted from the battle of Austerlitz,
to the cause of Europe, and of humanity, render it an object of too
deep an interest with the statesman and the soldier to make an apology
requisite for introducing to the public, what may be considered as the
Austrian official account of that action. It is hardly probable, that,
under a government so constituted as that of Austria, a general officer
would have ventured to publish the particulars of an action, in which
he himself bore a conspicuous part, (at least with his name attached to
it,) unless he felt himself sanctioned by the _highest authority_ in so
doing.
However that may be, the work bears evident internal marks of
authenticity, while the events daily passing under our eyes, with such
dazzling, and unprecedented rapidity, give an additional interest to
the _cause_ which has been productive of such direful _effects_.
Scarcely have twelve months elapsed since this disastrous battle
was fought, and already have we seen new dynasties created, and the
proudest empires levelled in the dust.
We have seen one of the most powerful monarchies of Europe, whether it
be considered as to its military resources, or its well replenished
treasury; as to its well disciplined army, or the glorious recollection
of its past achievements: we have seen the armies of Prussia, which
were wont to be considered as the patterns of military excellence,
dissipated and annihilated, like chaff before the wind, by the
well-trained legions of the modern Alexander.
The present state of Europe affords ample scope to the reflections of
the statesman. For, though the soldier may account for the loss of a
battle, by reasoning on what was done, and what was left undone, the
subjugation of states is to be looked for in causes far remote from the
scene of action. These are times which not only require superiority
of intellect in those who govern, but the conviction on the part of
the _governed_, that they are not mere spectators of the fray; that
it is not a mere squabble for power; but that the happiness of each
individual, that the preservation of all he holds most dear, in short,
that the _liberties of his country_ are at stake, and depend upon the
issue of the contest.
Has this been, or _could it be_, the feeling of those nations of the
Continent we have seen overrun?
In the answer to this simple question, we may perhaps find the _real_
cause of all the disasters of the coalition, and subject of much
contemplation for ourselves. The cloud which has been long gathering
over Europe has begun to burst; we have seen the storm fall where least
expected, and bury whole empires, and their people, in one common ruin.
When the demon of destruction is abroad, let us not be unmindful of
ourselves. Are we better prepared than our neighbours? Have we more
skilful generals, or less intriguing politicians? I fear not. It is
then only to the people we can look in the day of trial; and I trust
there is yet enough left of the genuine spirit of the constitution, and
of the native valour of Britons, to make every man feel his country
is worth contending for. _The moment that ceases to be the case, our
independence as a nation is virtually gone_; and, though our empire
may drag on a precarious existence for a few years, it will fall,
inevitably fall, at no distant period.
I have been inadvertently led into a train of reflection, which some
persons may think not quite compatible with the character of a soldier.
Against this opinion, I beg leave to enter my protest. I have always
considered the superiority of the French troops over those of the
continent, as the result of their individual intelligence; arising in
a great degree from the habit of every Frenchman, to discuss whatever
topic comes under his notice; and it is quite unnecessary for me
to remark, that the powers of the mind only develope themselves in
proportion as they are called into action. Let us hear no more then
of soldiers being mere machines. The absurdity of the doctrine is too
palpable to need refutation.
I ought perhaps to assign some reason for having undertaken a labour,
to which I may appear so very unequal. It was to relieve my mind
from constantly dwelling on a subject of disappointment, which still
weighs but too heavily on my spirits; and which I hoped to alleviate,
though it cannot be removed by occupation. Personal vanity had no
share whatever in it, and if I have not concealed my name, it has been
because I hoped to disarm the severity of criticism by avowing it. Much
will not be expected from one, who embraced the profession of arms at a
very early period, and whose ambition, from a child, has been military
and not literary reputation. All that I can flatter myself with having
succeeded in, is, the rendering the sense of the author, in terms
plain and intelligible. For elegance of style, and flowing periods, the
public may look to a Hutchinson, but not to soldiers in general.
JOHN PINE COFFIN.
P.S. It was my original intention to have annexed a good map to this
work, on which the reader might be enabled satisfactorily to follow
the operations with his eye;--but having in vain ransacked the shops
of London, without being able to procure a map of Moravia on a scale
sufficiently large to make it of any use; and, in fact, without finding
any that was better than Chauchards, which is woefully deficient, both
in the names of villages, and in geographical accuracy; I have been
induced to publish the Battle of Austerlitz without this advantage. My
principal motive for so doing has been the persuasion, that a bad map
could be of very little use; and that it would enhance the expense to
such a degree, as to place the work beyond the reach of many military
men; while others may be already in possession of as good, or better
information than I could furnish them with. To those, however, who do
not already possess a map of Moravia, I would recommend that published
by Covens and Mortier, at Amsterdam; not as the best possible map, but
as the least defective I have seen. But, I have great doubts whether
this is to be procured in England.
TO THE
AUSTRIAN ARMY.
_This account of what passed under my own observation at the Battle of
Austerlitz, and of the result of my researches on that memorable event,
I here dedicate to my brethren in arms. The desire of being read by
all the military men in Europe has induced me to write in a language
more generally known than that of Germany, and which there are few
among you who do not understand. Those who, like myself, have borne
a part in this disastrous day of the 2d December, will be enabled to
bear testimony to the truth of this narration. I have prided myself on
using the greatest impartiality; on having stifled all prepossession,
all passion, and every feeling, that could tend to lead my judgment
astray. It is to your approbation, my brother soldiers, that I look
forward, as the most delightful recompense of all my labours._
INTRODUCTION.
The imperfect accounts which have reached the public, as to the details
of the Battle of Austerlitz, are so contradictory to each other, and so
little satisfactory to military men, that it has been thought proper to
lay the following relation before them, in order to fix their ideas as
to this memorable epoch.
In all ages, as in all countries, nations and armies have been the
slaves of opinion. Hence it has ever been the policy of governments to
heighten, by those means best calculated to excite national enthusiasm,
the splendour of even the greatest victories; as well as to give a
specious colouring to those reverses of fortune, which are too public
to be passed over in silence.
The soldier, who here gives the relation of what he himself saw,
neither wishes to flatter a government, nor to gain the good opinion of
an army. His object will be, to detail, with truth, what he has either
seen or been able to discover from others; and, forgetting the part
he himself acted, he will speak with candour and impartiality of the
events that passed under his own observation, without the slightest
tincture of prejudice, or passion. Of these events, posterity must be
the judge.
Nothing will be found here, but the simple recital, without commentary,
naked, and devoid of art, of one of the most famous epochs of history.
To attempt to reason on the operations of wars that have passed in our
times would be giving too much scope to self-love, which always adopts
or rejects, as suits our own opinions.
It is not the strength of the respective armies opposed to each other
at the battle of Austerlitz, or the losses they sustained, which
particularly distinguishes it, from many of those which took place in
the first campaigns of the French Revolution, and the seven years war.
We have heretofore often seen 150,000 men in the field, and 30,000
slain. But it is the consequences of the action of the 2d of December,
1805; it is the epoch when it decided the fate of war; it is the
_moment_ in which it was fought, which makes it worthy of attention,
and which will assign it a marked place in history.
It was the wish to gain personal information that induced the author
to collect materials, which may become useful to a better pen: and he
avails himself of a leisure moment to offer them to such as have the
talent to make use of them.
In order that the past may serve to elucidate the future, it becomes
requisite to recur to the circumstances that led to this decisive day;
which proved how scrupulously accurate it is necessary to be, in making
the calculations and combinations, to which the existing circumstances
and the knowledge of human nature give rise.
The battles of Crems, and of Hollabrunn, are already well known.
This is not intended as a history of the late campaign, but merely
of a part of it, into which the account of those two affairs does
not enter. It was after they had taken place, that M. de Koutousoff
directed his retreat upon Brunn, and effected it from that moment,
without much annoyance from the enemy. This first Russian army had
orders carefully to avoid a serious engagement, and to hasten its
retreat, for the purpose of forming a junction with that under M. de
Buxhoevden, who was advancing rapidly to its support. M. de Koutousoff
executed a difficult retreat from the river Inn, upon Moravia, which
commenced on the 14th October, and lasted till the 18th November; and,
although very inferior to the enemy in point of numbers, this Russian
army effected its junction without much loss. The farther the grand
French army advanced, the more its combinations became multiplied,
and the more it was obliged to detach its force. The Russian general
had the advantage of being enabled to concentrate during his retreat,
which he also effected in good order: for this he was principally
indebted to Prince Bagration, who conducted the rear-guard with much
courage. The two Russian armies formed their junction at Wischau,
on the 18th of November; from which time they became one, under the
command of the General in Chief, Koutousoff. Its strength consisted of
104 Battalions, 20 of which were Austrians; and 159 squadrons, 54 of
which were Austrians, and 40 Cosacks. The Austrian corps was commanded
by Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein: his infantry was
composed of the 6th Battalion, recruited, armed, and organized about
a month before; M. de Kienmayer, with the remains of his corps, (very
much weakened by the movement of M. de Merveldt on Styria,) formed a
part of the corps under Prince John de Liechtenstein. The Archduke
Ferdinand, with the wreck of the army from Ulm, and some Battalions,
also newly raised, was in Bohemia, and thereby covered the right of the
combined army; which might at this time be computed at about 72,000
men. The corps under the Archduke Ferdinand was composed of from 18 to
20,000 men.
The grand French army, after passing the Danube, had advanced into
Moravia, being composed of the corps under Prince Murat, Marshals
Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte. The last of these was then opposed to
the Archduke Ferdinand, and was advancing upon Iglau. Marshal Davoust,
after having followed M. de Merveldt into Styria, moved from Vienna
upon Presbourgh. The corps of Marmont marched upon Carinthia, and
then upon Styria; in the first instance, to open the communication
between the grand army and that of Italy; and afterwards, to oppose the
junction of the Archduke Charles with the army under M. de Koutousoff;
but the movements of this prince were so well calculated, and his force
so well concentrated, that he did not allow time for the French to
establish themselves at Gratz. Marshal Ney, after the passage of the
Inn, took his direction on the Tyrol, by Scharnitz.
At the time of the junction of the two Russian armies near Wischau,
they had only opposed to them, the corps of Prince Murat, part of which
formed the advanced guard, those of Marshals Soult and Lannes, the
imperial guards, under Marshal Bessiéres, and a corps of grenadiers,
drawn from these different troops, forming a reserve of 15,000 men,
under General Duroc. This army, when near Brunn, was composed of eight
divisions, each of which was about 7000 strong. The Russian army was so
much fatigued with the continual marches it had been making, whether to
fall back on the support, or the support to get forward in time, that
it was decided at Wischau to take up the position of Olmutz, to give
some days rest to the troops.
Opinions were at that time much divided. The Russian advanced posts had
no sort of information as to the position and force of the enemy; at
one time, even Prince Bagration was ignorant of the situation occupied
by the French advanced guard. The Austrians also, notwithstanding the
facility they ought to have possessed of procuring intelligence in the
country, had only _very vague data_ to act upon.
By _this_ information, however, it appeared, that the French forces
were collected only in small numbers near Brunn; and _some_ generals
of the combined army gave their opinion at Wischau, for _immediately_
resuming the offensive. It is possible, _this moment_ might have been
more fortunate than that which was afterwards chosen. The strength of
the coalesced army was, from the 19th of November, superior to that of
the enemy, who was yet uninformed that the junction of the two Russian
armies was effected, and therefore could not expect an offensive
movement,[1] such as a manœuvre on either of his flanks would have
been. The army was then too near him to admit of his receiving
reinforcements near Brunn. But this very diversity of opinion, perhaps
rendered the movement on Olmutz necessary, because those in command
did not possess that decision, which can only be the result of a
military eye.
The Austrian general Weyrother, had been sent into Galicia, for the
purpose of conducting the army of Buxhoevden through the hereditary
states. He was an officer of reputation, who did not want for talent,
and who had inspired the Russians with confidence. As soon as the
two armies became united, he filled the situation of Quarter-master
general. The court of Vienna had previously selected General Schmidt
for this important trust; but that officer, a man of superior merit,
and who, with a talent for the profoundest calculation, possessed that
tranquil wisdom, which gives reason and deliberation in counsel; after
having shewn himself, at Crems, to be worthy of the confidence that
was placed in him, lost his life there, and was thus snatched from the
hopes of his sovereign, and of his brother soldiers. His loss was the
more sensibly felt, and the more regretted, because his successor,
neither possessed his calmness, his prudence, or his firmness. The army
marched, the 21st of November, from Wischau, and arrived the next day
but one, in the position in front of Olmutz, whither we will follow it,
for the purpose of detailing the operations.
_March of the Combined Army into the Position of Olmutz._
It was on the 23d of November, the army arrived in this position, and
was posted in rear of the village of Ollschan. Its left rested on the
river March; its right extended to the heights in rear of Tobolau. In
this manner it lay upon its arms, in three lines; while the Austrian
corps, under Prince John de Liechtenstein, formed the reserve of
the army, on the heights in rear of Schnabelin, and was principally
intended to secure, in case of a check, the passage across the March.
With this view, several bridges were constructed across that river,
between Nimlau and Olmutz, to facilitate the operation. The ground
occupied by the army in this position, offered great advantages. It
was so commanding, throughout its whole extent, from the heights near
Nimlau, to the right of the position, as to discover nearly a league
in its front, all the enemy's movements in case of attack; while
the slope of the hills in its immediate front was so gentle, as to
resemble a glacis. In its rear, spacious ravines, only of sufficient
depth to conceal large columns of troops from the enemy, which might
unexpectedly be brought into action, facilitated the means, in this
_defensive_ position, of manœuvring _offensively_, under cover of
the heights. Along their summit, there were commanding points, which
mutually defended each other; and on which, the numerous artillery,
with which this army was provided, might be employed with great
success. A morass covered the right, and a part of the centre; the
Blata ran at the foot of these heights, on which heavy batteries might
have been constructed: this little stream, although insignificant in
itself, became an additional obstacle, under the fire of grape. To
sum up all, the ground offered the means of delaying the enemy, in
his attempt to overcome these obstacles, and to open out. The General
Bagration, with his advanced guard, was at Prosnitz. General Kienmayer,
with his, upon the left, at Kralitz, pushed on detachments upon
Klenowitz. The out-posts were at Predlitz. An Austrian partisan was
sent along the March, on Tobitschau, Kogetein, and Kremsir, to observe
that country. The French army had also sent a partisan, from Goeding on
Hradisch, and Kremsir; but the latter was repulsed, and the Austrian
detachments remained masters of the March. It will not escape the
observation of intelligent military men, that this was an advantage
which gave the allies the means of manœuvring by their left, while
their right (which would then have rested on the March) was secured;
and would have masked this movement, so as to give them, at least two
days march in advance. The good understanding, at that time subsisting
with Prussia, appears to have been such, as to have made it expedient
for the allied army, to think of establishing a communication with the
Archduke Charles. But, in determining on offensive movements, nothing
appears to have been thought of, but going straight forward.
M. de Koutousoff had also sent some Austrian partisans, on his right
flank, who marched upon Tribau and Zwittau, whither the Archduke
Ferdinand, who was at Czaslau, had sent some parties of light troops,
to keep up the chain of communication.
Prince Murat arrived, on the 18th of November, at Brunn. His advanced
guard, under general Sebastiani, pushed forward in the first instance,
to Rausnitz, and afterwards entered Wischau, after Prince Bagration had
evacuated it. The Emperor Napoleon, established himself, on the 20th
November, at Brunn, and placed his army in concentrated cantonments, in
the following manner:
The corps of guards, the grenadiers of the reserve, and the troops
under Marshal Lannes, in Brunn and its vicinity. The cavalry under
Prince Murat, on the right and left of the great road, between Brunn
and Posorsitz. Marshal Soult, at Austerlitz; and the three divisions,
of which his army was composed, were divided, between that place,
Butschowitz, Neuwieslitz, Stanitz, and the road to Hungary. At Gaja,
was a strong detachment, which kept open the communication with that
which observed the river March, in order to secure the right of the
army.[2]
The 25th November, the Grand Duke Constantine arrived at Olmutz, with
the corps of guards, of which he had the command. After a long and
forced march from St. Petersburgh, this fine body of men was in the
best order.
This corps was composed of ten battalions, and eighteen squadrons, the
whole amounting to 10,000 men; of whom, however, there were only 8,500
under arms. At this moment, the army, under M. de Koutousoff may be
computed to have amounted, in all, to above 80,000 men, as will be seen
hereafter, in detail.
A reinforcement of 10,000 men was still expected, under General Essen;
which, accordingly, arrived near Olmutz, at the moment when the allied
army commenced its offensive operations. The corps of Essen was at
Kremsir, the day of the battle of Austerlitz, and was of no kind of
use. The army under M. de Koutousoff, was certainly stronger than the
one opposed to it; but while the _latter_ was concentrated towards a
single point, and formed into masses, the _former_ diffused its force
as it advanced. It is not in numbers that the only, and, indeed, the
_principal_ strength of an army consists; but there are emergencies,
and occasions, in which it is absolutely necessary to profit by that
advantage; and the present was an instance of the kind. The allied army
was under the necessity of advancing, for the reasons hereafter to be
detailed. Had it commenced its movement from the day when the Grand
Duke Constantine arrived with his reinforcement, forming the reserve
of the centre. If, at this epoch, it had manœuvred with rapidity, and
calculation; if the reserve, under the Grand Duke, had been augmented
by the corps under General Essen; if less importance had been attached
to the resting an army, which, after some days inactivity, could no
longer be fatigued; there might, perhaps, have been found means,
without risking a battle, to oblige the French to abandon their
position, by turning one of its flanks; which, by giving this army some
uneasiness, as to its communications, would have induced it to move
upon Vienna, or Bohemia. The former step would have been attended with
danger. The corps of Bernadotte, which came from Iglau to reinforce the
army in front of Brunn, the evening before the battle of Austerlitz,
would not then have had time to make this movement, which was followed
by such fatal consequences to the allies.[3] It was only by means
such as these, had the allies acted with prudence and vigour, that
they could have hoped to make the French fall into their combinations:
combinations which should have been calmly conceived, and vigorously
executed. But the Quarter-master general, it has before been mentioned,
though an officer of great personal courage, had not that confidence
in himself which could enable him to give advice at the head-quarters,
where the greatest degree of wisdom was requisite. Without regarding
the difficulties thrown in his way, this officer, too easily, abandoned
his own opinions, to adopt those of other people.
The astonishing rapidity with which the unfortunate events, of this
disastrous war, succeeded each other; the excessive folly of Mack,
which was only to be surpassed by his disgrace; and in which originated
that succession of guilty errors, which astonished Europe, and
calumniated a brave army; that folly of never anticipating a check,
and of not establishing magazines in the rear, as a consequence of
that presumption. To these circumstances it was owing, that the army,
while in the position of Olmutz, was almost destitute of provisions.
It had only been there one day, before it was obliged to have recourse
to forced requisitions; a violent expedient, which, by the disorderly
manner in which it was executed, had much influence on the discipline
of the army, into which a spirit of licentiousness began to insinuate
itself from that day forwards. In the then state of politics, the
gaining time was, at that moment, nearly of equal importance with the
gaining a battle: and, the instant it was decided, not to manœuvre,
it became of the highest importance to be enabled to subsist in the
position of Olmutz, for the purpose of maintaining it. There still
remained countries, from whence it would have been possible to draw
provisions; but they were at a distance, and the convoys were obliged
to make a long circuit. To this it was necessary to apply a speedy
remedy. The officers of the commissariat received orders, incessantly
repeated, but never sufficiently urgent, to establish convoys of
provisions, with all possible dispatch, upon the different roads; but
_some_ of this department wanted both activity and inclination; their
systematic conception of things not allowing them to feel the extent of
the emergency; while _others_ experienced great embarrassment, from the
detention, by the Russians, of a great part of the horses belonging to
the country, which were employed in the transport of provisions, and
were, in consequence, at a loss for the means of conveyance. The bread
was plundered on the road, both by the detachments appointed for its
escort, and by a number of marauders who followed the army. The strict
discipline, that ought to have existed, was not vigourously maintained,
under the pretext, that the army was starving. Relaxation of discipline
is always succeeded by excesses; and the licentiousness, attendant upon
it, gives full latitude to the disaffected, and to all those who have
not courage to support the numerous privations attendant upon modern
warfare. It was thought impossible to subsist the army in the position
in front of Olmutz, and it was resolved to abandon it, for the purpose
of attacking the enemy.
_Offensive Movements of the Allied Army._
We have already seen the uncertainty in which M. de Koutousoff found
himself, as to the movements and force of the enemy, at the moment when
it was decided to resume the offensive. The accounts derived from the
people of the country were contradictory; and the out-posts gave no
information whatever. The first disposition made for the advance, was
not then founded upon an exact knowledge both of the position of the
enemy and the numbers to be contended with, but was solely adapted to
the nature of the ground, between Olmutz and Wischau. This disposition
was given to the generals, the 24th November. The 25th was the day on
which it was fixed to march; but it was necessary to take two days
provisions; and these provisions could not arrive till the day after.
When _that_ day came, some of the generals had not sufficiently
studied their dispositions; and thus, another day was lost. The enemy
profited by this time. The evening before the battle, as has been
already mentioned, Marshal Bernadotte, as well as part of the corps
of Marshal Davoust, reinforced the Emperor Napoleon. It was necessary
to recall the attention to these facts, on which we shall yet have
occasion still further to remark.
The 27th November, at eight o'clock in the morning, the army was put
in motion, in five columns, to approach nearer the advanced guard,
under Prince Bagration, who, on that day, made no movement whatever,
in order that the manœuvre might be concealed from the enemy. This was
done with a view to concentrating the troops, which, however, in the
end, were diffused afresh. The five roads, by which the army advanced,
were parallel to each other. The two right columns marched along the
foot of the mountains, to the right of the causeway, and were composed
of infantry only. That of the centre was on the great road to Prosnitz;
the fourth to the left of this, and very little distant from it; the
fifth, composed entirely of cavalry, was in sight of the fourth. In
front of this last, the country was entirely open.
Here follows the detail of the march.
RIGHT WING.
The General of Infantry, Buxhoevden.
FIRST COLUMN.
Lieutenant General Wimpfen.
Major Generals Muller, Sclichow, and Strick.
18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers.
2-1/2 squadrons of Cosacks.
8,320 men. 250 horses.
SECOND COLUMN.
Lieutenant General Langeron.
Major Generals Kaminsky, Alsufieu.
18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers.
2-1/2 squadrons of Cosacks.
11,420 men. 250 horses.
CENTRE.
The General in Chief, Koutousoff.
THIRD COLUMN.
Lieutenant General Przybyszewsky.
Major Generals Orosow, Lieders, Lewis.
24 battalions of Russians.
2 companies of reserve artillery.
13,800 men.
LEFT WING.
The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein.
FOURTH COLUMN.
The Austrian Lieutenant General Kollowrath.
The Russian Lieutenant Generals Essen and Miloradowich.
The Russian Major Generals Szepelow and Repninsky.
The Austrian Major Generals Carneville, Rottermund, and Jurezeck.
32 battalions, of which 20 were Austrians.
1 company of reserve artillery.
5 companies of pioneers.
30 squadrons of Russians, of which 8 were Cosacks.
22,400 men. 3000 horses.
FIFTH COLUMN.
The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince Hohenlohe.
The Russian Lieutenant General Ouwarow.
The Austrian Major Generals Stutterheim, Weber, and Caramelli.
The Russian Major General Piritzky.
70 squadrons, of which 40 were Austrian, but very weak.
2 companies of light artillery.
4600 horses.
THE RESERVE.
The Grand Duke Constantine.
Lieutenant Generals Kollagriwoff and Malutin.
Major Generals Jankewitz and Depleradowich.
10 battalions of guards, 4 companies.
18 squadrons.
8,500 men.
RECAPITULATION.
1st and 2nd columns, 36 bat. 2 comp. 5 squad. 19,740
3d do. 24 ---- 2 ----- -------- 13,800
4th and 5th do. 32 ---- 8 ----- 100 ------ 27,000
Reserve 10 ---- 4 ----- 18 ------ 8,500
Advanced corps under
Prince Bagration 12 ---- ----- 40[4] --- 12,000
General Kienmayer ------- ----- 14 ------ 1,000
--------------------------------------
114 ---- 16 ----- 177 ---[5] 82,040
The first column assembled at Nebotin, and marched upon Trzebschein,
Blumenau, and Kobelnizeck, where it formed in two lines.
The second column assembled at Ollschan, and marched upon Studnitz,
Czechowitz, and Ottaslowitz, where it formed, with its right supported
by the left of the first column.
The third column assembled on the high road to Prosnitz, on which it
marched, and formed in line with the two right columns.
The fourth column[6] assembled at Nedwriss, and marched upon
Wrahowitz, and Dobrochow, where it formed, and established its
communication with the centre column.
The fifth column assembled at Schabelin, and marched upon Kralitz, and
Brzesowitz, where it formed in two lines.
This last column, not being covered by the out-posts on the left, had
an advanced guard of its own, commanded by General Stutterheim, which
communicated with the detachments observing the river March.
The army advanced with much precaution, because it was ignorant of
the enemy's movements. It had orders to refuse the left, and to allow
the right, which moved along the mountains, to gain ground, in order
to turn the enemy's left, in case of meeting with it. The corps under
the Grand Duke marched upon Prosnitz, (where the two emperors and the
head-quarters were established) and formed the reserve. After four
hours march, the army arrived on its different points of formation
without any obstacle.
Information was received that the enemy had made no movement whatever,
and that his advanced guard at Wischau had neither been reinforced
or diminished. Preparations were in consequence made for its attack
the next morning, and Prince Bagration received orders to put it in
execution. The army was to follow, in the same order as before, the
route that should be opened for it by this general. On the 28th, at
day-break, Prince Bagration put his corps in motion, in three columns;
that of the centre remained on the causeway; the two others, on the
right and left, turned the town of Wischau; in which the enemy had
a regiment of hussars, and one of chasseurs. Two other regiments of
cavalry were posted in reserve, in rear of the town; while General
Sebastiani was at Huluboschan with a regiment of dragoons. As soon as
the Russians, with the cavalry under General Kienmayer (composed of the
hussars of Szechler and Hesse Hombourg) on their left, appeared before
Wischau, and on the heights of Brindlitz, the French cavalry, with the
exception of about 100 men, precipitately abandoned the town.
The Adjutant General Dolgorucky, took possession of the town with two
Battalions of Infantry, and made four officers and 100 men prisoners.
The Enemy's Cavalry received considerable reinforcements in retiring
upon Rausnitz, where was a strong Reserve. In the first instance, they
were pursued by four squadrons of Russian Hussars, and two of Cosacks;
but afterwards all the cavalry under Prince Bagration, reinforced by
that of the fourth column, under the command of Lieutenant General
Essen, (under whose orders were placed ten squadrons of Hulans, five
of Cuirassiers, five of Dragoons, and eight of Cosacks) passed through
Wischau, to support the attack of the advanced guard. To cover his
right during this movement, Prince Bagration had received orders
to send a regiment of chasseurs, and one of cavalry, to the right
of Drissitz by Bustomirz and Dietitz, upon Habrowan. This general
prosecuted his march as far as the heights of Rausnitz, where he took
up his position. The enemy was still master of this little town, and
began to cannonade; but the Russian artillery, which was more numerous,
soon silenced the fire. In the evening, two Russian Battalions took
possession of Rausnitz, in front of which were placed the out-posts.
M. de Kienmayer, who, with his cavalry, had supported the Russian
advanced guard on the left, took his direction upon Drasowitz, and
there established his communication with Prince Bagration.
The army, on the 28th, moved, as before, in five columns, and followed
up the movement of the advanced guard, in the following manner:
The first column, from Kobelnizeck, by Ratzlawitz, upon Lutsch, where
it took up its position, posting six Battalions of Infantry and
Chasseurs, in the wood between Nemajam and Pistomirtz.
The second column, from Ottaslowitz, by Dietitz, upon Nosalowitz, where
it formed in second line.
The third column, marched as before, along the causeway, to beyond
Noska: one brigade was posted in the first, and the two others in
second line.
The fourth column, from Dobrochow, by Krzizanowitz, and Brindlitz, upon
the heights of Noska, where two regiments[7] formed in first line; and
the two others in second line. The Austrian infantry attached to this
column was formed in two lines, on the left of the Russians.
The fifth column, from Brzesowitz, by Ewanowitz, upon Topolan: its
advanced guard marched upon Kutscherau, and communicated with that at
Drasowitz.
Upon these movements of the allies, the French quitted their
cantonments. By a signal made from Austerlitz, Marshal Soult collected
his corps there, which evacuated the villages it had before occupied.
The allies flattered themselves that the enemy would not risk the fate
of a battle in front of Brunn. After the 28th, this _hope_ became the
prevailing _opinion_ at head-quarters. Then, instead of hastening their
movements, they wished to manœuvre, at a period, when too much had been
risked, to enable them to avoid a decisive action; if, contrary to the
opinion of those who thought the French would not fight, they still
persisted in not retiring.
We have, hitherto, seen M. de Koutousoff advancing his right, and
refusing his left, with the view of turning the enemy's flank by the
mountains; for which purpose he had disposed the greater part of his
infantry on the right wing. At Wischau this disposition was changed.
He wished to manœuvre on the right of the enemy. A march to the left
was undertaken, which both lost time, and the ground that might have
been gained to the front. The 29th November, the combined army moved
from Lultsch, and the heights of Noska, upon those of Huluboschan and
Kutscherau. It was not till the 1st December that Marshals Bernadotte
and Davoust joined the Emperor Napoleon; and, on the 29th, M. de
Koutousoff might have been at Austerlitz. After having passed Wischau,
the allied army could no longer manœuvre with impunity. The time it
then lost, in making movements, which did not lead it directly towards
the enemy, while it discovered its intentions to the French army, gave
it also the means of receiving such reinforcements as were within
reach. A _short_ flank movement could not answer the end proposed;
while one that was _longer_, would have afforded the enemy an
opportunity of attacking on the march.
While the army was moving on the heights of Kutscherau, Prince
Bagration pushed on his advanced posts towards Posorsitz: General
Kienmayer marched upon Austerlitz, which the enemy had evacuated at
ten o'clock,[8] on the morning of the 29th; and General Stutterheim
arrived at Butschowitz, from whence he kept up the communication by
Stanitz, with a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scheither, who had
driven the enemy's detachments from Gaja. The French army concentrated
its forces, the same day, between Turas and Brunn: it occupied the
villages of Menitz, Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, Kobelnitz, and Schlapanitz,
which covered its front, and placed its out-posts at Aujest, on the
heights of Girshikowitz, and near Krug. The 30th November, the combined
army, in consequence of its new plan, again marched to its left, in the
following manner:
The first column, from Kutscherau, by Lettonitz, upon Niemschan, which
was the appuy for the right; its left was at Hodiegitz, and it was
disposed in two lines.
The second column, by Lettonitz, to Hodiegitz, where it formed on the
left of the first column.
The third column, upon Malkowitz, by Butschowitz, and Krzizanowitz,
where it was posted in reserve, in rear of the first column.
The fourth column, by Schardiska, Tschertschein, Krzizanowitz, upon
Herspitz, where it formed in reserve to the second column.
The fifth column, by Neuwieslitz, followed the march of the third, and
was posted in the valley, in front of Marhoefen.
The Reserve, under the Archduke Constantine, marched to Butschowitz;
the advanced corps, under Prince Bagration, to Posorsitz; and pushed
on its out-posts upon the causeway, and upon Krug. M. de Kienmayer
remained at Austerlitz, and was reinforced by the brigade under General
Stutterheim. A little affair of out-posts took place that day; the
enemy was employed in reconnoitring, and a few cannon shots were
ineffectually exchanged. The head-quarters of M. de Koutousoff were at
Hodiegitz; those of the two Emperors at Krzizanowitz, near Austerlitz.
It is here necessary to remark, that during these offensive movements
the Archduke Ferdinand had received orders to advance also, to make
a diversion and occupy the enemy; and that this prince, quitting
Czaslau, after having driven the Bavarians, first from Steinsdorff
and afterwards from Deutschbrod, was advancing upon Iglau, where the
Bavarian general, De Wrede, had the command.
On the 1st December, there was a good deal of firing, the whole of
the morning, along the entire chain of out-posts. The enemy, from
day-break in the morning, was continually reconnoitring along the
heights in front of Pratzen and Krug. He also, for the like purpose,
pushed parties from his left to beyond the high road. M. de Kienmayer's
out-posts, on the left, were at Satchan: and he had a post near Menitz,
a village which the French abandoned. Five Battalions of frontier
troops, under Major-general Carneville, being a part of the Austrian
infantry, arrived in the evening to reinforce M. de Kienmayer.
The combined army, the left of which was commanded by General
Buxhoevden, and the centre by the general-in-chief, after having dined,
moved forwards, in five columns, in the following manner:
The first column, under Lieutenant-General Dochtorow, composed of
twenty-four Battalions of Russians, marched by its left on Herspitz,
Wachan, Klein-Hostieradeck, and took up a position in two lines, on the
heights where this village is situated. A regiment of Chasseurs was
posted at Aujest, a village between the foot of the mountain and the
lakes of Menitz.
The second column, commanded by Lieutenant-general Langeron, composed
of eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched by Austerlitz, Krzenowitz,
and took up a position on the heights of Pratzen; also in two lines on
the right of the first column.
The third column, commanded by Lieutenant-General Przybyszewsky,
composed of eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched on the right of
Austerlitz, took its direction upon Pratzen, and its position on the
heights, to the right of this village.
The fourth column, commanded by the Austrian Lieutenant-general
Kollowrath, was composed of twelve Battalions of Russians, under
Lieutenant-general Miloradowitsch, and of fifteen of Austrians, who
were in the rear of this column. This latter marched by its right, near
Niemschan, intersected the high road from Austerlitz to Brunn, and took
post in two lines, in rear of the third column.
The fifth column, composed of cavalry, under the orders of
Lieutenant-general Prince John, of Liechtenstein, was composed of
eighty-two squadrons, marched by its left, and followed the direction
of the third column, behind which it took post under the heights.
The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, composed of
ten Battalions, and eighteen squadrons of guards, passed by Austerlitz,
and posted itself on the heights in front, with its left towards
Krzenowitz, and its right towards the high road from Austerlitz to
Brunn.
The advanced corps, under Prince Bagration, extended by its left beyond
Holubitz and Blasowitz, in order to facilitate the march of the third
and fourth columns upon their points of formation.
Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the columns arrived on the
heights, in front of Austerlitz and Krzenowitz, where his troops were
posted, marched by Pratzen, in front of Aujest, where he arrived at
nine o'clock at night: his corps was then composed of twenty-two
squadrons of Austrians, ten of Cosacks, and five Battalions of Croats.
The head-quarters were at Krzenowitz. The enemy did not interrupt
this movement, and even withdrew his out-posts as far as Tellnitz,
Sokolnitz and Schlapanitz. The second column having arrived late on
its point of formation, had no out-posts in its front. _During the
whole night there was no chain of out-posts established in front of the
position occupied by the combined army._
At one moment during the night, the enemy evacuated the village of
Tellnitz, in which out-posts were placed by a half squadron of Austrian
light cavalry of the regiment of O'Reilly: but two hours after, the
French returned in force, and posted a regiment of infantry in this
village, from the division of Legrand, forming a part of the right
of Marshal Soult. The out-posts on the left of the allies sent,
continually, patroles during the night, to their right, in order to
establish a communication with the Russian advanced posts, but could
never fall in with them.
This offensive movement had been made by the army in open day, and in
sight of the enemy, who, from the heights of Schlapanitz, and in front
of Kobelnitz, had been able to remark it at his ease. The position
occupied by the allies, at the moment when they crowned the heights
between Aujest, Pratzen, and Holubitz, was a strong one. The enemy, had
he been well observed, would have found it difficult to advance for
the purpose of attacking these heights;[9] The defiles of Tellnitz,
Sokolnitz, and Schlapanitz, which separated the two armies, offered
the means of delay; and the very elevated points of these heights
afforded strong means of defence. Here, as in the position, in front of
Olmutz, the army was posted on a curtain, behind which massive columns
might be posted, ready to act offensively. Its left was secured by
the lakes of Menitz and Aujest, while the right was refused. But the
taking advantage of this position was never thought of, any more than
the possibility of being _attacked_ on these heights, or of finding
the enemy on this side the defile. The French emperor took advantage,
in a masterly manner, of the faults that were committed. He kept his
troops concentrated in massive columns, ready to act according to
circumstances. Marshal Bernadotte (who had joined the Emperor Napoleon
the day on which the allies shewed themselves on the heights of
Pratzen), had been posted in the first instance to the left of the high
road. In the night the Emperor caused his corps to pass this road, and
posted it in rear of the village of Girschikowitz, which was occupied
in force. This corps, composed of the divisions of Rivaux and Drouet,
formed the centre of the French army. Prince Murat's cavalry was in
rear of Marshal Bernadotte, and on his left. Marshal Lannes formed
the left wing with the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli; this last
was connected with the left of Prince Murat. The right of the army,
commanded by Marshal Soult, was placed between Kobelnitz and Sokolnitz;
the division of Legrand forming the extreme right, was posted between
Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and occupied these villages with strong
detachments of Infantry. The division of Vandamme was on the left, and
the division of St. Hilaire in the centre of Marshal Soult's corps.
The reserve of the army, composed of ten Battalions of the imperial
guard, and of ten Battalions of General Oudinot's corps, the whole
commanded by General Duroc, was near Turas. The division of Friant,
belonging to the corps under Marshal Davoust, which had just arrived
from Presburg, was sent to the convent of Reygern, on the Schwartza,
to observe and keep the enemy in check, should he approach by the
route of Auspitz. The division of General Gudin (also arrived from
Presburg), with some dragoons belonging to Marshal Davoust's corps,
advanced from Nickolsbourg, on the right of the French army, to keep
in check the corps of M. de Merveldt, who had penetrated through
Hungary to Lundenbourg. This general had with him his own regiment of
Hulans, and the Emperor's hussars, much weakened by the losses they had
sustained during a difficult retreat; and six Battalions of infantry,
also very weak; the whole amounting to little more than 4,000 men. A
detachment of O'Reilly's light cavalry, and some Cossacks, were sent to
Gros-Niemschitz to observe that point.
We have now given the position of both armies, during the night
between the 1st and 2nd December, which immediately preceded this
ever-memorable day.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: _Note by a French officer._--A general, whose movements
are not so combined as to enable him to oppose another manœuvre to that
of his enemy, whatever it may be, is a general devoid of talent, and
ignorant of the art of war.
If the Russians had assumed the offensive at Wischau, it would have
been previous to the arrival of the corps under the Grand Duke
Constantine, which would have weakened their army by 10,000 chosen men.
The French army would not only have had Marshal Bernadotte with them,
who was then at Znaim, but also the corps of Marshal Davoust, whose
divisions were in echelons, on Nicolsburgh.