FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR, DOWN TO THE
BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ.
The advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia
Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be
called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.
He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus
by the cruel queen Parysatis, and was now sent down by his father
as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kappadokia, as well
as general of all that military division of which the muster-place
was Kastôlus. His command did not at this time comprise the Greek
cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernês and
Pharnabazus.[196] But he nevertheless brought down with him a
strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian
feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into
act. Whatever this young man willed, he willed strongly; his bodily
activity, rising superior to those temptations of sensual indulgence
which often enervated the Persian grandees, provoked the admiration
even of Spartans:[197] and his energetic character was combined with
a certain measure of ability. Though he had not as yet conceived that
deliberate plan for mounting the Persian throne which afterwards
absorbed his whole mind, and was so near succeeding by the help of
the Ten Thousand Greeks, yet he seems to have had from the beginning
the sentiment and ambition of a king in prospect, not those of a
satrap. He came down, well aware that Athens was the efficient
enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the
insular Greeks kept out of the sight of a Persian ship, and even the
continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated, for the last
sixty years. He therefore brought down with him a strenuous desire
to put down the Athenian power, very different from the treacherous
balancing of Tissaphernês, and much more formidable even than the
straightforward enmity of Pharnabazus, who had less money, less favor
at court, and less of youthful ardor. Moreover, Pharnabazus, after
having heartily espoused the cause of the Peloponnesians for the
last three years, had now become weary of the allies whom he had so
long kept in pay. Instead of expelling Athenian influence from his
coasts with little difficulty, as he had expected to do, he found
his satrapy plundered, his revenues impaired or absorbed, and an
Athenian fleet all-powerful in the Propontis and Hellespont; while
the Lacedæmonian fleet, which he had taken so much pains to invite,
was destroyed. Decidedly sick of the Peloponnesian cause, he was even
leaning towards Athens; and the envoys whom he was escorting to Susa
might perhaps have laid the foundation of an altered Persian policy
in Asia Minor, when the journey of Cyrus down to the coast overthrew
all such calculations. The young prince brought with him a fresh,
hearty, and youthful antipathy against Athens, a power inferior only
to that of the Great King himself, and an energetic determination to
use it without reserve in insuring victory to the Peloponnesians.
[196] The Anabasis of Xenophon (i, 1, 6-8; i, 9, 7-9) is better
authority, and speaks more exactly, than the Hellenica, i, 4, 3.
[197] See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lysander in Xenoph. Œconom.
iv, 21-23.
From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus,
their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Bœotius, and
the other Lacedæmonian envoys travelling along with the young prince,
made extravagant boasts of having obtained all that they asked for at
Susa; and Cyrus himself announced his powers as unlimited in extent
over the whole coast, all for the purpose of prosecuting vigorous
war in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus, on hearing
this intelligence, and seeing the Great King’s seal to the words,
“I send down Cyrus, as lord of all those who muster at Kastôlus,”
not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was
even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince, who insisted
that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained
for some time in the interior, in order that no information might
be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these
requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed
the second, detaining them in Kappadokia for no less than three
years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender,
after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to
the sea-coast.[198]
[198] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 3-8. The words here employed
respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years’
detention, ὅθεν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀπέπλευσαν, appear to
me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in
the spring of 404 B.C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the
surrender of the city took place in April 404 B.C. Xenophon
incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when
the envoys departed, still continued at their return.
This arrival of Cyrus, overruling the treachery of Tissaphernês as
well as the weariness of Pharnabazus, and supplying the enemies of
Athens with a double flow of Persian gold at a moment when the stream
would otherwise have dried up, was a paramount item in that sum of
causes which concurred to determine the result of the war.[199] But
important as the event was in itself, it was rendered still more
important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with
whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.
[199] The words of Thucydidês (ii, 65) imply this as his opinion,
Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, etc.
Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas, about December,
408 B.C., or January, 407 B.C.[200] He was the last, after Brasidas
and Gylippus, of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the
capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long
war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of
that class called mothakes, being only enabled by the aid of richer
men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place
in the constant drill and discipline. He was not only an excellent
officer,[201] thoroughly competent to the duties of military
command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue, and for
organizing a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined
movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or
of pleasure,[202] and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which
he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of
ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His family,
poor as it was, enjoyed a dignified position at Sparta, belonging to
the gens of the Herakleidæ, not connected by any near relationship
with the kings: moreover, his personal reputation as a Spartan was
excellent, since his observance of the rules of discipline had been
rigorous and exemplary. The habits of self-constraint thus acquired,
served him in good stead when it became necessary to his ambition to
court the favor of the great. His recklessness about falsehood and
perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him;
such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice; men, by
means of oaths.[203] A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of
his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to,
his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his career. In
this main quality, he agreed with Alkibiadês; in reckless immorality
of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel; an
attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alkibiadês.
On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and
ostentation, which counted for so much in Alkibiadês, was quite
unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan,
tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in
the love of command and influence,—not Athenian, which tended to the
development of many and diversified impulses; ambition being one, but
only one, among the number.
[200] The commencement of Lysander’s navarchy, or year of
maritime command, appears to me established for this winter. He
had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived
at Sardis: Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ~
Κρατησιππίδᾳ τῆς ναυαρχίας παρεληλυθυίας, Λύσανδρον ἐξέπεμψαν
ναύαρχον. Ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ῥόδον καὶ ναῦς ἐκεῖθεν λαβών, ἐς Κῶ
καὶ Μίλητον ἔπλευσεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Ἔφεσον· καὶ ~ἐκεῖ ἔμεινε~,
ναῦς ἔχων ἑβδομήκοντα, ~μέχρις οὗ Κῦρος ἐς Σάρδεις ἀφίκετο~
(Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 1).
Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 B.C.) has, I presume,
been misled by the first words of this passage, πρότερον τούτων
οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, when he says: “During the stay of Alcibiadês at
Athens, Lysander is sent as ναύαρχος, Xen. Hell. i, 5, 1. Then
followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Alcibiadês,
and the substitution of ἄλλους δέκα, between September 407 _and
September 406, when Callicratidas succeeded Lysander_.”
Now Alkibiadês came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or
about the end of May, 407, and stayed there till the beginning
of September, 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alkibiadês
reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post
before Cyrus arrived; so that Lysander was not sent out “during
the stay of Alcibiadês at Athens,” but some months before. Still
less is it correct to say that Kallikratidas succeeded Lysander
in September, 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein Kallikratidas
perished, was fought about August, 406, after he had been
admiral for several months. The words πρότερον τούτων, when
construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently
be understood in a large sense; “_these events_,” mean the
general series of events which begins i, 4, 8; the proceedings of
Alkibiadês, from the beginning of the spring of 407.
[201] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Athenæus, vi, p. 271. The assertion
that Lysander belonged to the class of mothakes is given by
Athenæus as coming from Phylarchus, and I see no reason for
calling it in question. Ælian states the same thing respecting
Gylippus and Kallikratidas, also; I do not know on what authority.
[202] Theopompus, Fragm. 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30.
[203] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 8.
Kratesippidas, the predecessor of Lysander, seems to have enjoyed
the maritime command for more than the usual yearly period, having
superseded Pasippidas during the middle of the year of the latter.
But the maritime power of Sparta was then so weak, having not yet
recovered from the ruinous defeat at Kyzikus, that he achieved little
or nothing. We hear of him only as furthering, for his own profit,
a political revolution at Chios. Bribed by a party of Chian exiles,
he took possession of the acropolis, reinstated them in the island,
and aided them in deposing and expelling the party then in office, to
the number of six hundred. It is plain that this is not a question
between democracy and oligarchy, but between two oligarchical
parties, the one of which succeeded in purchasing the factious agency
of the Spartan admiral. The exiles whom he expelled took possession
of Atarneus, a strong post belonging to the Chians on the mainland
opposite Lesbos. From hence they made war, as well as they could,
upon their rivals now in possession of the island, and also upon
other parts of Ionia; not without some success and profit, as will
appear by their condition about ten years afterwards.[204]
[204] Diodor. xiii, 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 11. I presume
that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact glanced at by
Isokratês de Pace, sect. 128, p. 240, ed. Bekk.
The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities,
thus begun by Kratesippidas, was extended and brought to a system by
Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised,
but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with
a squadron, he reinforced it at Rhodes, and then sailed onward to
Kos—an Athenian island, so that he could only have touched there—and
Milêtus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point
to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his
coming, augmented his fleet to the number of seventy triremes. As
soon as Cyrus reached Sardis, about April or May 407 B.C., Lysander
went to pay his court to him, along with some Lacedæmonian envoys,
and found himself welcomed with every mark of favor. Preferring
bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernês,—whom
they accused of having frustrated the king’s orders, and sacrificed
the interests of the empire, under the seductions of Alkibiadês,—they
intreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute the stipulations
of the treaty, by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the
common enemy. Cyrus replied, that these were the express orders which
he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil
them with all his might. He had brought with him, he said, five
hundred talents, which should be at once devoted to the cause: if
these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which
his father had given him; and if more still were needed, he would
coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.[205]
[205] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 3-4; Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch,
Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favorite metaphor,
either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees;
we have already had it, a little before, from the mouth of
Tissaphernês.
Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these
magnificent promises, which were not likely to prove empty words from
the lips of a vehement youth like Cyrus. So sanguine were the hopes
which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments,
that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one
full Attic drachma per head for the seamen; which had been the rate
promised by Tissaphernês through his envoys at Sparta, when he first
invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean, and when it was doubtful
whether they would come, but actually paid only for the first month,
and then reduced to half a drachma, furnished in practice with
miserable irregularity. As a motive for granting this increase of
pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine the Athenian seamen
to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and
of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying
that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king’s express
orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart
from it.[206] In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The
envoys were treated with distinction, and feasted at a banquet;
after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him
to declare what favor he could do to gratify him most. “To grant an
additional obolus per head for each seaman’s pay,” replied Lysander.
Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his
manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both
with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander
would ask some favor or present for himself, judging him not only
according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus
and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Milêtus, whose
corrupt subservience to Tissaphernês had probably been made known to
him. From such corruption, as well as from the mean carelessness of
Theramenês, the Spartan, respecting the condition of the seamen,[207]
Lysander’s conduct stood out in pointed and honorable contrast.
[206] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 5. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὕτως
ἐχούσας, τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἑκάστῃ νηῒ τοῦ μηνὸς διδόναι, ὁπόσας ἂν
βούλοιντο τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.
This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified
in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd.
viii, 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning,
matter of verbal understanding and promise; first, a drachma per
day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernês at Sparta; next,
the satrap himself, at Milêtus, cut down this drachma to half a
drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii, 29).
Mr. Mitford says: “Lysander proposed that an Attic drachma,
_which was eight oboli_, nearly tenpence sterling, should be
allowed for daily pay to every seaman.”
Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated _three oboli_ as
equal to not quite _fourpence_ sterling. Of course, therefore, it
is plain that he did not consider three oboli as the half of a
drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx, sect. i. vol. iv, p. 317, oct. ed.
1814).
That a drachma was equivalent to _six_ oboli, that is, an Æginæan
drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic
oboli, is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined
the word _eight_, in the first sentence here cited, to be a
misprint for _six_, if the sentence cited next had not clearly
demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to he
equal to _eight_ oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to
find.
[207] Thucyd. viii, 29.
The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the
Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli, instead of three,
per man, but also insured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and
confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I
have already remarked,[208] in reference to Periklês and Nikias,
that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare
as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the
most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man, even if
looked at only in regard to the durability of his own influence. If
the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the eyes
of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind
of Cyrus. With his Persian and princely ideas of winning adherents
by munificence,[209] a man who despised presents was a phenomenon
commanding the higher sentiment of wonder and respect. From this
time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary
confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war, and
even condescended to second his personal ambition to the detriment of
this object.[210]
[208] See the former volume vi, ch. li, p. 287.
[209] See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in
the Anabasis of Xenophon, i, 9, 22-28.
[210] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 13; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4-9.
Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, after such unexampled success in
his interview with Cyrus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good
to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for
a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and
to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest
satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But
the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and
parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly,
Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into
better order, procuring more complete tackle, and inviting picked
crews.[211] He took another step pregnant with important results.
Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from
each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs,
or factions, in correspondence with himself. He instigated these
clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens,
promising that, as soon as that war should be concluded, they should
be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of
their respective cities.[212] His newly established influence with
Cyrus, and the abundant supplies of which he was now master, added
double force to an invitation in itself but too seducing. And thus,
while infusing increased ardor into the joint warlike efforts of
these cities, he at the same time procured for himself an ubiquitous
correspondence, such as no successor could manage, rendering the
continuance of his own command almost essential to success. The
fruits of his factious manœuvres will be seen in the subsequent
dekadarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation
of Athens.
[211] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 10.
[212] Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.
While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring formidable efficacy
to their side of the contest, during the summer of 407 B.C., the
victorious exile Alkibiadês had accomplished the important and
delicate step of reëntering his native city for the first time.
According to the accommodation with Pharnabazus, concluded after
the reduction of Chalkêdon, the Athenian fleet was precluded from
assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence
elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in
Thrace, maintained them for the winter: in the spring (407 B.C.),
Alkibiadês brought them again to Samos; from whence he undertook an
expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the
extent of one hundred talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes,
went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdêra, and all those
towns which had revolted from Athens; Thasos being now in especial
distress from famine as well as from past seditions. A valuable
contribution for the support of the fleet was doubtless among the
fruits of this success. Thrasyllus at the same time conducted another
division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadês as
precursors of his own return.[213]
[213] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 8-10; Diodor. xiii, 72. The
chronology of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish,
deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.
Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested their
favorable disposition towards Alkibiadês by choosing him anew general
of the armament, along with Thrasybulus and Konon. Alkibiadês was now
tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him
all the contributions recently levied: he first stopped at Paros,
then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the harbor
of Gytheion in Laconia, where he had learned that thirty triremes
were preparing. The news which he received of his reëlection as
general, strengthened by the pressing invitations and encouragements
of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen
at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus on
a marked day, the festival of the Plyntêria, on the 25th of the
month Thargêlion, about the end of May, 407 B.C. This was a day
of melancholy solemnity, accounted unpropitious for any action of
importance. The statue of the goddess Athênê was stripped of all its
ornaments, covered up from every one’s gaze, and washed or cleansed
under a mysterious ceremonial, by the holy gens, called Praxiergidæ.
The goddess thus seemed to turn away her face, and refuse to
behold the returning exile. Such at least was the construction
of his enemies; and as the subsequent turn of events tended to
bear them out, it has been preserved; while the more auspicious
counter-interpretation, doubtless suggested by his friends, has been
forgotten.
The most extravagant representations, of the pomp and splendor of
this return of Alkibiadês to Athens, were given by some authors
of antiquity, especially by Duris of Samos, an author about two
generations later. It was said that he brought with him two hundred
prow-ornaments belonging to captive enemies’ ships, or, according
to some, even the two hundred captured ships themselves; that his
trireme was ornamented with gilt and silvered shields, and sailed
by purple sails; that Kallippidês, one of the most distinguished
actors of the day, performed the functions of keleustês, pronouncing
the chant or word of command to the rowers; that Chrysogonus,
a flute-player, who had gained the first prize at the Pythian
games, was also on board playing the air of return.[214] All these
details, invented with melancholy facility, to illustrate an ideal
of ostentation and insolence, are refuted by the more simple and
credible narrative of Xenophon. The reëntry of Alkibiadês was not
merely unostentatious, but even mistrustful and apprehensive. He had
with him only twenty triremes; and though encouraged, not merely
by the assurances of his friends, but also by the news that he had
just been reëlected general, he was, nevertheless, half afraid to
disembark, even at the instant when he made fast his ship to the
quay in Peiræus. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city
and the port, animated by curiosity, interest, and other emotions
of every kind, to see him arrive. But so little did he trust their
sentiments that he hesitated at first to step on shore, and stood
upon the deck looking about for his friends and kinsmen. Presently,
he saw Euryptolemus his cousin, and others, by whom he was heartily
welcomed, and in the midst of whom he landed. But they too were so
apprehensive of his numerous enemies, that they formed themselves
into a sort of body-guard, to surround and protect him against any
possible assault during his march from Peiræus to Athens.[215]
[214] Diodor. xiii, 68; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31; Athenæ. xii, p.
535.
[215] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 18, 19. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν
γῆν ὁρμισθεὶς, ἀπέβαινε μὲν οὐκ εὐθέως, φοβούμενος τοὺς
ἐχθρούς· ἐπαναστὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος, ἐσκόπει τοὺς
αὑτοῦ ἐπιτηδείους, εἰ παρείησαν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτόλεμον τὸν
Πεισιάνακτος, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ ἀνεψιὸν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ
φίλους μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, τότε ἀποβὰς ἀναβαίνει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν
παρεσκευασμένων, εἴ τις ἅπτοιτο, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.
No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies
attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition
when he made his defence before the senate and the public assembly.
Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the
impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of
his enemies, and gently, but pathetically, deplored the unkindness
of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So
strenuous, and so pronounced, was the sentiment in his favor, both of
the senate and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address
them in the contrary sense.[216] The sentence of condemnation passed
against him was cancelled: the Eumolpidæ were directed to revoke
the curse which they had pronounced upon his head: the record of
the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead upon which the
curse was engraven, thrown into the sea: his confiscated property
was restored: lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers,
and allowed to prepare an expedition of one hundred triremes,
fifteen hundred hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and one
hundred and fifty horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote,
amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends,
amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and
confident assurances, impressed by his friends on willing hearers,
that Alkibiadês was the only man competent to restore the empire and
grandeur of Athens. The general expectation, which he and his friends
took every possible pains to excite, was, that his victorious career
of the last three years was a preparation for yet greater triumphs
during the next.
[216] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 33; Diodor.
xiii, 69.
We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of
Alkibiadês on entering the Peiræus, and to the body-guard organized
by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted triumph
greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. It intoxicated him, and
led him to make light of enemies whom only just before he had so much
dreaded. This mistake, together with the carelessness and insolence
arising out of what seemed to be an unbounded ascendency, proved
the cause of his future ruin. But the truth is, that these enemies,
however they might remain silent, had not ceased to be formidable.
Alkibiadês had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415
B.C. to May 407 B.C. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for
his reputation, since his overbearing private demeanor had been
kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was
even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit
denial of the fact laid to his charge, and to dwell chiefly upon the
unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant
trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that
they might calumniate him during his absence. He was characterized
as a patriot animated by the noblest motives, who had brought both
first-rate endowments and large private wealth to the service of the
commonwealth, but had been ruined by a conspiracy of corrupt and
worthless speakers, every way inferior to him; men, whose only chance
of success with the people arose from expelling those who were better
than themselves, while he, Alkibiadês, far from having any interest
adverse to the democracy, was the natural and worthy favorite of a
democratical people.[217] So far as the old causes of unpopularity
were concerned, therefore, time and absence had done much to weaken
their effect, and to assist his friends in countervailing them by
pointing to the treacherous political manœuvres employed against him.
[217] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 14-16.
But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively
speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver
and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his
country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but actively
manifested, by stabs but too effectively aimed at her vitals. The
sending of Gylippus to Syracuse, the fortification of Dekeleia, the
revolts of Chios and Milêtus, the first origination of the conspiracy
of the Four Hundred, had all been emphatically the measures of
Alkibiadês. Even for these, the enthusiasm of the moment attempted
some excuse: it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his
country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been
compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested,
at the daily risk of his life.[218] But such pretences could not
really impose upon any one. The treason of Alkibiadês during the
period of his exile remained indefensible as well as undeniable, and
would have been more than sufficient as a theme for his enemies,
had their tongues been free. But his position was one altogether
singular: having first inflicted on his country immense mischief,
he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render
still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means
adequate to the previous mischief: nor had it indeed been rendered
exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong
not less to Theramenês and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadês:[219]
moreover, the peculiar present or capital which he had promised
to bring with him,—Persian alliance and pay to Athens,—had proved
a complete delusion. Still, the Athenian arms had been eminently
successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common
report, but even good judges, such as Thucydidês, ascribed this
result to his superior energy and management.
[218] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 15.
[219] This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by
Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6: “Quanquam Theramenês et
Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant.” And again, in the life
of Thrasybulus (c. 1). “Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic
(Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam rem sine hoc.”
Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to
comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before
the Athenian people in the summer of 407 B.C. The more distant past
exhibited him as among the worst of criminals; the recent past, as
a valuable servant and patriot: the future promised continuance in
this last character, so far as there were any positive indications to
judge by. Now this was a case in which discussion and recrimination
could not possibly answer any useful purpose. There was every
reason for reappointing Alkibiadês to his command; but this could
only be done under prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and
provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds, as justifying
the hope of yet better deeds to come. The popular instinct felt
this situation perfectly, and imposed absolute silence on his
enemies.[220] We are not to infer from hence that the people had
forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadês, or that they entertained
for him nothing but unqualified confidence and admiration. In their
present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined
that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better
career, if he chose; and that his enemies should be precluded from
reviving the mention of an irreparable past, so as to shut the
door against him. But what was thus interdicted to men’s lips as
unseasonable, was not effaced from their recollections; nor were the
enemies, though silenced for the moment, rendered powerless for the
future. All this train of combustible matter lay quiescent, ready
to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence, perhaps even by
blameless ill-success, on the part of Alkibiadês.
[220] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20. λεχθέντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων,
καὶ ~οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἂν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν~,
etc.
At a juncture when so much depended upon his future behavior, he
showed, as we shall see presently, that he completely misinterpreted
the temper of the people. Intoxicated by the unexpected triumph of
his reception, according to that fatal susceptibility so common among
distinguished Greeks, he forgot his own past history, and fancied
that the people had forgotten and forgiven it also; construing
their studied and well-advised silence into a proof of oblivion.
He conceived himself in assured possession of public confidence,
and looked upon his numerous enemies as if they no longer existed,
because they were not allowed to speak at a most unseasonable hour.
Without doubt, his exultation was shared by his friends, and this
sense of false security proved his future ruin.
Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadês himself, Adeimantus and
Aristokratês, were named by the people as generals of the hoplites
to go out with him, in case of operations ashore.[221] In less than
three months, his armament was ready; but he designedly deferred his
departure until that day of the month Boedromion, about the beginning
of September, when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when
the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont
to take place, along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven
successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia,
this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had
been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial
details. Alkibiadês, on this occasion, caused the land-march to be
renewed, in full pomp and solemnity; assembling all his troops in
arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia.
No such attack was hazarded; so that he had the satisfaction of
reviving the full regularity of this illustrious scene, and escorting
the numerous communicants out and home, without the smallest
interruption; an exploit gratifying to the religious feelings of the
people, and imparting an acceptable sense of undiminished Athenian
power; while in reference to his own reputation, it was especially
politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidæ and the Two
Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned.[222]
[221] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 21. Both Diodorus (xiii, 69) and
Cornelius Nepos (Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and
Adeimantus as his colleagues: both state also that his colleagues
were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the
names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as κατὰ γῆν
στρατηγοί.
[222] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 34. Neither
Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident
about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.
Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament. It
appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out
and attack Alkibiadês when posted to guard the Eleusinian procession,
had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He
shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large
force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Bœotia, and
attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he
expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given
in time, and the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their
posts to defend the walls. The assailants—said to have amounted to
twenty-eight thousand men, of whom half were hoplites, with twelve
hundred cavalry, nine hundred of them Bœotians—were seen on the
ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply
manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate
cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage
even over the Bœotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden
of Akadêmus; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered
battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order
of battle, but to have kept under the protection of the missiles
from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them.[223] We
may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had
been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the
Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently
with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had
received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants in defiance of
his neighborhood.
[223] Diodor. xiii, 72, 73.
The first exploit of Alkibiadês was to proceed to Andros, now
under a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison. Landing on the island,
he plundered the fields, defeated both the native troops and the
Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the
town; which he besieged for some days without avail, and then
proceeded onward to Samos, leaving Konon in a fortified post, with
twenty ships, to prosecute the siege.[224] At Samos, he first
ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus, the
influence acquired by Lysander over Cyrus, the strong anti-Athenian
dispositions of the young prince, and the ample rate of pay, put
down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now
in actual receipt. He now first became convinced of the failure
of those hopes which he had conceived, not without good reason,
in the preceding year,—and of which he had doubtless boasted at
Athens,—that the alliance of Persia might be neutralized at least,
if not won over, through the envoys escorted to Susa by Pharnabazus.
It was in vain that he prevailed upon Tissaphernês to mediate with
Cyrus, to introduce to him some Athenian envoys, and to inculcate
upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia; that is,
that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both
the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other. Such a
policy, uncongenial at all times to the vehement temper of Cyrus,
had become yet more repugnant to him since his intercourse with
Lysander. He would not consent even to see the envoys, nor was
he probably displeased to put a slight upon a neighbor and rival
satrap. Deep was the despondency among the Athenians at Samos, when
painfully convinced that all hopes from Persia must be abandoned for
themselves; and farther, that Persian pay was both more ample and
better assured, to their enemies, than ever it had been before.[225]
[224] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 22; i, 5, 18; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35;
Diodor. xiii, 69. The latter says that Thrasybulus was left at
Andros, which cannot be true.
[225] Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 9; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4. The
latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by
the desertion of the seamen; a careless exaggeration.
Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he
employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior
in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadês attempt to
provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest
of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they
were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions
wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless
he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining
the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this
cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phenician fleet to his
aid, which in his mouth was not intended to delude, as it had been
by Tissaphernês.[226] Unable to bring about a general battle, and
having no immediate or capital enterprise to constrain his attention,
Alkibiadês became careless, and abandoned himself partly to the love
of pleasure, partly to reckless predatory enterprises for the purpose
of getting money to pay his army. Thrasybulus had come from his post
on the Hellespont, and was now engaged in fortifying Phokæa, probably
for the purpose of establishing a post, to be enabled to pillage the
interior. Here he was joined by Alkibiadês, who sailed across with
a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos. He left it under the
command of his favorite pilot Antiochus, but with express orders on
no account to fight until his return.
[226] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. I venture to antedate the
statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from
Cyrus to Lysander.
While employed in this visit to Phokæa and Klazomenæ, Alkibiadês,
perhaps hard-pressed for money, conceived the unwarrantable project
of enriching his men by the plunder of the neighboring territory
of Kymê, an allied dependency of Athens. Landing on this territory
unexpectedly, after fabricating some frivolous calumnies against the
Kymæans, he at first seized much property and a considerable number
of prisoners. But the inhabitants assembled in arms, bravely defended
their possessions, and repelled his men to their ships; recovering
the plundered property, and lodging it in safety within their walls.
Stung with this miscarriage, Alkibiadês sent for a reinforcement of
hoplites from Mitylênê, and marched up to the walls of Kymê, where
he in vain challenged the citizens to come forth and fight. He then
ravaged the territory at pleasure: nor had the Kymæans any other
resource, except to send envoys to Athens, to complain of so gross
an outrage, inflicted by the Athenian general upon an unoffending
Athenian dependency.[227]
[227] Diodor. xiii, 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this
story about Kymê which he probably copied from the Kymæan
historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 7) briefly glances
at it.
Xenophon (Hellen. i, 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (Lysand. c. 5)
mention the visit of Alkibiadês to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They do
not name Kymê, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa
has no assignable purpose or consequences. But the plunder of
Kymê is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and
suitable to the occasion.
This was a grave charge, nor was it the only charge which Alkibiadês
had to meet at Athens. During his absence at Phokæa and Kymê,
Antiochus the pilot, whom he had left in command, disobeying the
express order pronounced against fighting a battle, first sailed
across from Samos to Notium, the harbor of Kolophon, and from thence
to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet
lay. Entering that harbor with his own ship and another, he passed
close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, insulting
them scornfully and defying them to combat. Lysander detached some
ships to pursue him, and an action gradually ensued, which was
exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were
all in disorder, and came into battle as each of them separately
could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well marshalled and kept in
hand; so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The
Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium, losing
fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus
himself was slain. Before retiring to Ephesus, Lysander had the
satisfaction of erecting his trophy on the shore of Notium; while the
Athenian fleet was carried back to its station at Samos.[228]
[228] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 12-15: Diodor. xiii, 71: Plutarch,
Alkib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.
It was in vain that Alkibiadês, hastening back to Samos, mustered the
entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus,
and there ranged his ships in battle order, challenging the enemy
to come forth. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping out
the late dishonor. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the
Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium;
the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for
the last three years in the island of Chios.[229]
[229] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 15; Diodor. xiii, 76.
I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske’s note, in
place of Eion, which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter,
however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander,
instead of to the year of Kallikratidas.
Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and
dissatisfactions had been growing up in the armament against
Alkibiadês. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior,
in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted
against Sicily, and under large promises, both from himself and
his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which
can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success
had been accomplished; while on the other side there was to be
reckoned the disappointment on the score of Persia, which had great
effect on the temper of the armament, and which, though not his
fault, was contrary to expectations which he had held out, the
disgraceful plunder of Kymê, and the defeat at Notium. It was true
that Alkibiadês had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to
fight, and that the battle had been hazarded in flagrant disobedience
to his injunctions. But this circumstance only raised new matter
for dissatisfaction of a graver character. If Antiochus had been
disobedient,—if, besides disobedience, he had displayed a childish
vanity and an utter neglect of all military precautions,—who was it
that had chosen him for deputy; and that too against all Athenian
precedent, putting the pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the
heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their
own cost? It was Alkibiadês who placed Antiochus in this grave and
responsible situation,—a personal favorite, an excellent convivial
companion, but destitute of all qualities befitting a commander.
And this turned attention on another point of the character of
Alkibiadês, his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissipation.
The loud murmurs of the camp charged him with neglecting the
interests of the service for enjoyments with jovial parties and
Ionian women, and with admitting to his confidence those who best
contributed to the amusement of these chosen hours.[230]
[230] Plutarch. Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter
of the same biography, an anecdote, describing the manner in
which Antiochus first won the favor of Alkibiadês, then a young
man, by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.
It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation against
Alkibiadês first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to
Athens, by the mouth of Thrasybulus son of Thrason,[231] not the
eminent Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, who has been already often spoken
of in this history, and will be so again. There came at the same time
to Athens the complaints from Kymê, against the unprovoked aggression
and plunder of that place by Alkibiadês; and seemingly complaints
from other places besides.[232] It was even urged as accusation
against him, that he was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to
Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided
three strong forts in the Chersonese to retire to, as soon as this
scheme should be ripe for execution.
[231] A person named _Thrason_ is mentioned in the Choiseul
Inscription (No. 147, pp. 221, 222, of the Corp. Inscr. of
Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiæ in the year 410 B.C. He is
described by his Deme as _Butades_; he is probably enough the
father of this Thrasybulus.
[232] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16-17. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς
καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, etc. Diodor. xiii, 73. ἐγένοντο δὲ
καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ, etc.
Plutarch Alkib. c. 36.
One of the remaining speeches of Lysias (Orat. xxi, Ἀπολογία
Δωροδοκίας) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board
of whose ship Alkibiadês himself chose to sail. This trierarch
complains of Alkibiadês as having been a most uncomfortable and
troublesome companion (sect. 7). His testimony on the point is
valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any
case against Alkibiadês. The trierarch notices the fact, that
Alkibiadês preferred _his_ trireme, simply as a proof that it
was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole
fleet. Archestratus and Erasinidês preferred it afterwards, for
the same reason.
Such grave and wide-spread accusations, coupled with the disaster
at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of
success, were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the
people of Athens towards Alkibiadês. He had no character to fall
back upon; or rather, he had a character worse than none, such as to
render the most criminal imputations of treason not intrinsically
improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly
excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens,
were now again set free; and all the adverse recollections of his
past life doubtless revived. The people had refused to listen to
these, in order that he might have a fair trial, and might verify
the title, claimed for him by his friends, to be judged only by his
subsequent exploits, achieved since the year 411 B.C. He had now had
his trial; he had been found wanting; and the popular confidence,
which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly
withdrawn.
It is not just to represent the Athenian people, however Plutarch and
Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture, as having indulged an
extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkibiadês in the month of
July, demanding of him more than man could perform, and as afterwards
in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from
confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible
expectations were not already realized. That the people entertained
large expectations, from so very considerable an armament, cannot
be doubted: the largest of all, probably, as in the instance of the
Sicilian expedition, were those entertained by Alkibiadês himself,
and promulgated by his friends. But we are not called upon to
determine what the people would have done, had Alkibiadês, after
performing all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising
commander, nevertheless failed, from obstacles beyond his own
control, in realizing their hopes and his own promises. No such case
occurred: that which did occur was materially different. Besides
the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and
reckless in his primary duties; he had exposed the Athenian arms to
defeat, by his disgraceful selection of an unworthy lieutenant;[233]
he had violated the territory and property of an allied dependency,
at a moment when Athens had a paramount interest in cultivating by
every means the attachment of her remaining allies. The truth is,
as I have before remarked, that he had really been spoiled by the
intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He
had mistaken a hopeful public, determined, even by forced silence as
to the past, to give him the full benefit of a meritorious future,
but requiring as condition from him, that that future should really
be meritorious, for a public of assured admirers, whose favor he had
already earned and might consider as his own. He became an altered
man after that visit, like Miltiadês after the battle of Marathon;
or, rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute and
insolent, broke loose from that restraint under which they had
before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of
Kyzikus, when Alkibiadês was laboring to regain the favor of his
injured countrymen, and was yet uncertain whether he should succeed,
he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet and
leaving it under the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If,
therefore, Athenian sentiment towards Alkibiadês underwent an entire
change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of
an alteration in _his_ character and behavior; an alteration for
the worse, just at the crisis when everything turned upon his good
conduct, and upon his deserving at least, if he could not command
success.
[233] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἠγγέλθη ἡ
ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, οἰόμενοι ~δι᾽ ἀμέλειάν τε
καὶ ἀκράτειαν~ ἀπολωλεκέναι τὰς ναῦς.
The expression which Thucydidês employs in reference to
Alkibiadês requires a few words of comment: (vi, 15) ~καὶ
δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου~, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς
ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες (the
Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.
The “strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business”
here ascribed to Alkibiadês, is true of all the period between
his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415
to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time,
he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very
effective in her service.
But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command,
which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than
partially true, at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth, for
the period before his exile.
We may, indeed, observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse,
and in reference to the coming of Gylippus, were far graver and more
mischievous than those of Alkibiadês during this turning season of
his career, and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least
equal. Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about
the dismissal and disgrace of Alkibiadês, they did not induce the
Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it, nor even
prevent them from sending him a second armament to be ruined along
with the first. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating
upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long the
most melancholy public incompetency could remain overlooked, when
covered by piety, decorum, good intentions, and high station;[234]
how short-lived was the ascendency of a man far superior in ability
and energy, besides an equal station, when his moral qualities
and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in
many, esteem from none. Yet, on the whole, Nikias, looking at him
as a public servant, was far more destructive to his country than
Alkibiadês. The mischief done to Athens by the latter was done in the
avowed service of her enemies.
[234] To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take
the converse of the judgment of Thucydidês respecting Alkibiadês,
cited in my last note, and to say: καὶ δημοσίᾳ ~κάκιστα~ διαθέντα
τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι ~τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντες~,
καὶ ~αυτῷ~ ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.
The reader will of course understand that these last Greek words
are _not_ an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual
words of Thucydidês, for the purpose of illustrating the contrast
between Alkibiadês and Nikias.
On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated
complaints against Alkibiadês, the Athenians simply voted that he
should be dismissed from his command; naming ten new generals to
replace him. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any
such step was proposed. Yet his proceedings at Kymê, if they happened
as we read them, richly deserved judicial animadversion; and the
people, had they so dealt with him, would only have acted up to the
estimable function ascribed to them by the oligarchical Phrynichus,
“of serving as refuge to their dependent allies, and chastising
the high-handed oppressions of the optimates against them.”[235]
In the perilous position of Athens, however, with reference to the
foreign war, such a political trial would have been productive of
much dissension and mischief. And Alkibiadês avoided the question
by not coming to Athens. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he
retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the
Chersonese.
[235] Thucyd. viii, 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν τε, of the allied
dependencies, καταφυγὴν, καὶ ἐκείνων, _i.e._ of the high persons
called καλοκἀγαθοὶ, or optimates σωφρονιστήν.
The ten new generals named were Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Periklês,
Erasinidês, Aristokratês, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus,
Aristogenês. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from
Andros with the twenty ships which he had there, to receive the fleet
from Alkibiadês; while Phanosthenês proceeded with four triremes to
replace Konon at Andros.[236]
[236] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 18; Diodor. xiii, 74.
In his way thither, Phanosthenês fell in with Dorieus the Rhodian
and two Thurian triremes, which he captured, with every man aboard.
The captives were sent to Athens, where all were placed in custody,
in case of future exchange, except Dorieus himself. The latter
had been condemned to death, and banished from his native city of
Rhodes, together with his kindred, probably on the score of political
disaffection, at the time when Rhodes was a member of the Athenian
alliance. Having since then become a citizen of Thurii, he had
served with distinction in the fleet of Mindarus, both at Milêtus
and the Hellespont. The Athenians now had so much compassion upon
him that they released him at once and unconditionally, without even
demanding a ransom or an equivalent. By what particular circumstance
their compassion was determined, forming a pleasing exception
to the melancholy habits which pervaded Grecian warfare in both
belligerents, we should never have learned from the meagre narrative
of Xenophon. But we ascertain from other sources, that Dorieus,
the son of Diagoras of Rhodes, was illustrious beyond all other
Greeks for his victories in the pankration at the Olympic, Isthmian,
and Nemean festivals; that he had gained the first prize at three
Olympic festivals in succession, of which Olympiad 88, or 428 B.C.
was the second, a distinction altogether without precedent, besides
eight Isthmian and seven Nemean prizes; that his father Diagoras,
his brothers, and his cousins, were all celebrated as successful
athletes; lastly, that the family were illustrious from old date
in their native island of Rhodes, and were even descended from the
Messenian hero Aristomenês. When the Athenians saw before them as
their prisoner a man doubtless of magnificent stature and presence,
as we may conclude from his athletic success, and surrounded by
such a halo of glory, impressive in the highest degree to Grecian
imagination, the feelings and usages of war were at once overruled.
Though Dorieus had been one of their most vehement enemies, they
could not bear either to touch his person, or to exact from him any
condition. Released by them on this occasion, he lived to be put to
death, about thirteen years afterwards, by the Lacedæmonians.[237]
[237] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausan. vi, 7, 2.
When Konon reached Samos to take the command, he found the armament
in a state of great despondency; not merely from the dishonorable
affair of Notium, but also from disappointed hopes connected with
Alkibiadês, and from difficulties in procuring regular pay. So
painfully was the last inconvenience felt, that the first measure
of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above one
hundred triremes to seventy; and to reserve for the diminished fleet
all the ablest seamen of the larger. With this fleet, he and his
colleagues roved about the enemies’ coasts to collect plunder and
pay.[238]
[238] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 20; compare i, 6, 16; Diodor. xiii,
77.
Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiadês,
that is, about December 407 B.C. or January 406 B.C., the year
of Lysander’s command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived from
Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised
dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedæmonians in the armament, by
the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the
full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which
Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out
the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard
of the impolicy of Sparta, in annually changing her admiral, both
Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties
in the way of the new successor.
Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates,[239] and
not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the
noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and
incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of
them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of
dealing, and a Pan-Hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted,
and merciful. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse;
having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession,
under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally.[240]
Moreover, on delivering up the fleet to Kallikratidas at Ephesus,
he made boast of delivering to him at the same time the mastery of
the sea, through the victory recently gained at Notium. “Conduct the
fleet from Ephesus along the coast of Samos, passing by the Athenian
station (replied Kallikratidas), and give it up to me at Milêtus: I
shall then believe in your mastery of the sea.” Lysander had nothing
else to say, except that he should give himself no farther trouble,
now that his command had been transferred to another.
[239] Virgil, Æneid, vi, 870.
Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra
Esse sinent.
[240] How completely this repayment was a manœuvre for the
purpose of crippling his successor,—and not an act of genuine
and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents
it,—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the
war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of
the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead
of giving them back to Cyrus (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8). This
obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of
the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and
when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business,
which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by
common efforts.
Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet,
gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at
his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures; upon which he
summoned them together, and said: “I, for my part, am quite content
to remain at home; and if Lysander, or any one else, pretends to be
a better admiral than I am, I have nothing to say against it. But
sent here as I am by the authorities at Sparta to command the fleet,
I have no choice except to execute their orders in the best way
that I can. You now know how far my ambition reaches;[241] you know
also the murmurs which are abroad against our common city (for her
frequent change of admirals). Look to it, and give me your opinion.
Shall I stay where I am, or shall I go home, and communicate what has
happened here?”
[241] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 5. ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὸς ἃ ἐγώ τε
φιλοτιμοῦμαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιάζεται (ἴστε γὰρ αὐτὰ, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐγὼ), ξυμβουλεύετε, etc.
This remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its
full effect. Every one replied, that it was his duty to stay and
undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment
discontinued.
His next embarrassments arose from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying
back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the
army was derived. Of course this step was admirably calculated to
make every one regret the alteration of command. Kallikratidas, who
had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted
supply from Sardis, now found himself compelled to go thither in
person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus, eager to
manifest in every way his partiality for the last admiral, deferred
receiving him, first for two days, then for a farther interval, until
the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis
in disgust without an interview. So intolerable to his feelings
was the humiliation of thus begging at the palace gates, that he
bitterly deplored those miserable dissensions among the Greeks which
constrained both parties to truckle to the foreigner for money;
swearing that, if he survived the year’s campaign, he would use
every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens
and Sparta.[242]
[242] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 6.
In the mean time, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some
other way, and thus get the fleet to sea; knowing well, that the way
to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was, to show that he could do
without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Milêtus, he despatched
from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected
poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the mean time he
convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the
mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply
until this money should arrive. He reminded them that the necessity
of this demand sprang altogether from the manœuvre of Lysander, in
paying back the funds in his hands; that he had already in vain
applied to Cyrus for farther money, meeting only with such insulting
neglect as could no longer be endured: that they, the Milesians,
dwelling amidst the Persians, and having already experienced the
maximum of ill-usage at their hands, ought now to be foremost in
the war, and to set an example of zeal to the other allies,[243] in
order to get clear the sooner from dependence upon such imperious
taskmasters. He promised that, when the remittance from Sparta and
the hour of success should arrive, he would richly requite their
forwardness. “Let us, with the aid of the gods, show these foreigners
(he concluded) that we can punish our enemies without worshipping
them.”
[243] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 9. ὑμᾶς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀξιῶ προθυμοτάτους
εἶναι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάροις πλεῖστα κακὰ
ἤδη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι.
The spectacle of this generous patriot, struggling against a
degrading dependence on the foreigner, which was now becoming
unhappily familiar to the leading Greeks of both sides, excites
our warm sympathy and admiration. We may add, that his language to
the Milesians, reminding them of the misery which they had endured
from the Persians as a motive to exertion in the war, is full of
instruction as to the new situation opened for the Asiatic Greeks
since the breaking-up of the Athenian power. No such evils had they
suffered while Athens was competent to protect them, and while they
were willing to receive protection from her, during the interval
of more than fifty years between the complete organization of the
confederacy of Delos and the disaster of Nikias before Syracuse.
The single-hearted energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all who heard
him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who
were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first
to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer
considerable sums from their own purses; an example probably soon
followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander
tried to couple their offers with conditions; demanding a warrant
for the destruction of their political enemies, and hoping thus to
compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such
guilty compliances.[244] He was soon able to collect at Milêtus
fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making
a fleet of one hundred and forty sail in all. The Chians having
furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman, equal
to ten days’ pay at the usual rate, he sailed with the whole fleet
northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which
had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were
Lacedæmonian;[245] while a considerable proportion, and among the
best equipped, were Bœotian and Eubœan.[246] In his voyage towards
Lesbos, Kallikratidas seems to have made himself master of Phokæa
and Kymê,[247] perhaps with the greater facility in consequence
of the recent ill-treatment of the Kymæans by Alkibiadês. He then
sailed to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos; a town
not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an
Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks
until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was
all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for
their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected
pursuant to ordinary custom, that the Methymnæan and Athenian
prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused
compliance, and set them all free the next day; declaring that, so
long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced
to slavery if he could prevent it.[248]
[244] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 222, C, Xenoph. Hellen.
i, 6, 12.
[245] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34.
[246] Diodor. xiii, 99.
[247] I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the
battle of Arginusæ, both these towns appear as adhering to the
Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadês they had
been both Athenian (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 11; i, 6, 33; Diodor.
xiii, 73-99).
[248] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 14. Καὶ κελευόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων
ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους, οὐκ ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα
Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοὐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.
Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to
the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less
emphatic, in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii, 6.
No one, who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian
warfare, can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of this proceeding,
which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It
is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free; as to this
point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is,
that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and
for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic
independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced
by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now
carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with
an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all
future cases. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance
to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very
imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore
it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend. There cannot be
any doubt that these allies felt personally wronged and indignant at
the loss, as well as confounded with the proposition of a rule of
duty so new, as respected the relations of belligerents in Greece;
against which too, let us add, their murmurs would not be without
some foundation: “If _we_ should come to be Konon’s prisoners, he
will not treat _us_ in this manner.” Reciprocity of dealing is
absolutely essential to constant moral observance, either public or
private; and doubtless Kallikratidas felt a well-grounded confidence,
that two or three conspicuous examples would sensibly modify the
future practice on both sides. But some one must begin by setting
such examples, and the man who does begin—having a position which
gives reasonable chance that others will follow—is the hero. An
admiral like Lysander would not only sympathize heartily with the
complaints of the allies, but also condemn the proceeding as a
dereliction of duty to Sparta; even men better than Lysander would
at first look coldly on it as a sort of Quixotism, in doubt whether
the example would be copied: while the Spartan ephors, though
probably tolerating it because they interfered very sparingly with
their admirals afloat, would certainly have little sympathy with the
feelings in which it originated. So much the rather is Kallikratidas
to be admired, as bringing out with him not only a Pan-Hellenic
patriotism,[249] rare either at Athens or Sparta, but also a force
of individual character and conscience yet rarer, enabling him to
brave unpopularity and break through routine, in the attempt to make
that patriotism fruitful and operative in practice. In his career, so
sadly and prematurely closed, there was at least this circumstance to
be envied; that the capture of Methymna afforded him the opportunity,
which he greedily seized, as if he had known that it would be the
last, of putting in act and evidence the full aspirations of his
magnanimous soul.
[249] The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of
Ἑλληνικώτατον πολίτευμα, far more than that of Nikias, to which
Plutarch applies those words (Compar. of Nikias and Crassus, c.
2).
Kallikratidas sent word by the released prisoners to Konon, that
he would presently put an end to his adulterous intercourse with
the sea;[250] which he now considered as his wife, and lawfully
appertaining to him, having one hundred and forty triremes against
the seventy triremes of Konon. That admiral, in spite of his inferior
numbers, had advanced near to Methymna, to try and relieve it; but
finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called
Hekatonnêsoi, off the continent bearing northeast from Lesbos.
Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna
at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and
immediately made all sail to try and cut him off from the southerly
course towards Samos. But Konon, having diminished the number of
his triremes from one hundred to seventy, had been able to preserve
all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and
entered first the harbor of Mitylênê. His pursuers, however, were
close behind, and even got into the harbor along with him, before it
could be closed and put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight
a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated; thirty of his
ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved
the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall.[251]
[250] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 15. Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν
μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν, etc. He could hardly _say this_ to Konon,
in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.
[251] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 17; Diodor. xiii, 78, 79.
Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend
these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in
a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable.
He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight
(the same in Polyænus, i, 482), whereby he was enabled to fight
with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest
came up: also, that he got into the harbor in time to put it into
a state of defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then
gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas
forced his way in.
The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies
that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for
defending the harbor.
The town of Mitylênê, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos,
had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself.
By this strait, whether bridged over or not we are not informed,
the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbors, one
opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward towards
the promontory of Kanê on the mainland.[252] Both these harbors
were undefended, and both now fell into the occupation of the
Peloponnesian fleet; at least all the outer portion of each, near
to the exit of the harbor, which Kallikratidas kept under strict
watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and
for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylênê by land
as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money
for the fleet, together with separate presents for himself, which he
declined receiving,[253] was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so
that his future operations became easy.
[252] Thucyd. viii, 6. τοὺς ἐφόρμους ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν
ἐποιοῦντο (Strabo, xiii, p. 617). Xenophon talks only of _the_
harbor, as if it were _one_; and possibly, in very inaccurate
language, it might be described as one harbor with two entrances.
It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the
locality.
Strabo speaks of the northern harbor as defended by a mole, the
southern harbor, as defended by triremes chained together. Such
defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably, after the
revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what
defences might have been before provided for the harbor.
[253] Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 222, E.
No preparations had been made at Mitylênê for a siege: no stock of
provisions had been accumulated, and the crowd within the walls
was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy
exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succor from Athens,
unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition; of which,
as he had not been able to do so, the Athenians remained altogether
ignorant. All his ingenuity was required to get a trireme safe out
of the harbor, in the face of the enemy’s guard. Putting afloat two
triremes, the best sailers in his fleet, and picking out the best
rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go
aboard before daylight, concealing the epibatæ, or maritime soldiers,
in the interior of the vessel, instead of the deck, which was their
usual place, with a moderate stock of provisions, and keeping the
vessel still covered with hides or sails, as was customary with
vessels hauled ashore, to protect them against the sun.[254] These
two triremes were thus made ready to depart at a moment’s notice,
without giving any indication to the enemy that they were so. They
were fully manned before daybreak, the crews remained in their
position all day, and after dark were taken out to repose. This
went on for four days successively, no favorable opportunity having
occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on
the fifth day, about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews
were ashore for their morning meal, and others were reposing, the
moment seemed favorable, the signal was given, and both the triremes
started at the same moment with their utmost speed; one to go out
at the southern entrance towards the sea, between Lesbos and Chios,
the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont.
Instantly, the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet: the
cables were cut, the men hastened aboard, and many triremes were
put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed
southward, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, was caught towards
evening and brought back with all her crew prisoners: that which went
towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos,
and got safe with the news to Athens; sending intelligence also,
seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.
[254] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 19. Καθελκύσας (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς
ἄριστα πλεούσας δύο, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸ ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἁπασῶν τῶν νεῶν
τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἐκλέξας, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας εἰς κοίλην ναῦν
μεταβιβάσας, καὶ τὰ ~παραῤῥύματα παραβαλών~.
The meaning of παραῤῥύματα is very uncertain. The commentators
give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing
is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (_infra_, ii, 1, 22).
We may be quite sure that the matters meant by παραῤῥύματα were
something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would
at least afford no indication that the trireme was intended
for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole
contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential
that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much
as possible like to the other triremes which still remained
hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect
any purpose of departure. I have endeavored in the text to give
a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the
explanations given by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber das
Attische Seewesen, ch. x, p. 159.
The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the
small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes.
The two harbors being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to
get access to Mitylênê through the Euripus, a strait which opens
on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake, or bay,
approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by
Kallikratidas, and his squadron all captured except two triremes, his
own and another; he himself had great difficulty in escaping.[255]
[255] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βοηθῶν Κόνωνι
πολιορκουμένῳ δώδεκα ναυσὶν ὡρμίσατο ἐς τὸν εὔριπον τὸν τῶν
Μυτιληναίων.
The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is
meant by the Euripus of Mitylênê, and the other Euripus of the
neighboring town of Pyrrha.
Diodorus (xiii, 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylênê with the
harbor of Mitylênê, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider
and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, Lesbiaca,
p. 15).
Athens was all in consternation at the news of the defeat of Konon
and the blockade of Mitylênê. The whole strength and energy of the
city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any
which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise
that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than
one hundred and ten triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus.
Every man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was
taken to form a good crew; not only freemen, but slaves, to whom
manumission was promised as reward: many also of the horsemen, or
knights,[256] and citizens of highest rank, went aboard as epibatæ,
hanging up their bridles like Kimon before the battle of Salamis.
The levy was in fact as democratical and as equalizing as it had
been on that memorable occasion. The fleet proceeded straight to
Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the
triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as
all the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes,
ten of them Samian, were assembled, and the whole fleet, one hundred
and fifty sail, went from Samos to the little islands called
Arginusæ, close on the mainland, opposite to Malea, the southeastern
cape of Lesbos.
[256] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 24-25; Diodor. xiii, 97.
Kallikratidas, apprized of the approach of the new fleet while it
was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from
Mitylênê, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the
blockade. Less than fifty probably would not have been sufficient,
inasmuch as two harbors were to be watched; but he was thus reduced
to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers, one hundred and
twenty triremes against one hundred and fifty. His fleet was off
Cape Malea, where the crews took their suppers, on the same evening
as the Athenians supped at the opposite islands of Arginusæ. It
was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the
night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared;
but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till
daylight. On the ensuing morning, both parties prepared for the
greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole
war. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to
retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenian
fleet had the advantage of thirty triremes over him in number.
He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be
no worse off, even if he should perish.[257] The answer was one
congenial to his chivalrous nature; and we may well conceive, that,
having for the last two or three months been lord and master of the
sea, he recollected his own haughty message to Konon, and thought
it dishonor to incur or deserve, by retiring, the like taunt upon
himself. We may remark too that the disparity of numbers, though
serious, was by no means such as to render the contest hopeless,
or to serve as a legitimate ground for retreat, to one who prided
himself on a full measure of Spartan courage.
[257] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 32; Diodor. xiii, 97, 98; the latter
reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.
The answer has been a memorable one, more than once adverted to,
Plutarch, Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832; Cicero, De Offic. i, 24.
The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was
placed in the two wings; in each of which there were sixty Athenian
ships, divided into four equal divisions, each division commanded
by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were
placed in front, two to support them in the rear. Aristokratês and
Diomedon commanded the two front squadrons of the left division,
Periklês and Erasinidês the two squadrons in the rear: on the right
division, Protomachus and Thrasyllus commanded the two in front,
Lysias and Aristogenês the two in the rear. The centre, wherein were
the Samians and other allies, was left weak, and all in single line:
it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of
Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left
of that isle. We read with some surprise that the whole Lacedæmonian
fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and
manœuvred better than the Athenians; who formed their right and left
divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the
enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the diekplus and the
periplus.[258] It would seem that the Athenian centre, having the
land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected
against an enemy “sailing through the line out to the rear, and
sailing round about,” than the other divisions, which were in the
open waters; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in
single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that, if
we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this
diekplus and periplus were the special manœuvres of the Athenian
navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse;
the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them
at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less
skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both
parties is reversed: the superiority of nautical skill has passed to
the Peloponnesians and their allies: the precautions whereby that
superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on
the Athenians. How astonished would the Athenian admiral Phormion
have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of
battle at Arginusæ!
[258] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 31. Οὕτω δ᾽ ἐτάχθησαν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι)
ἵνα μὴ διέκπλουν διδοῖεν· χεῖρον γὰρ ἔπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἦσαν ἅπασαι ἐπὶ μιᾶς, ὡς πρὸς
διέκπλουν καὶ περίπλουν παρεσκευασμέναι, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον πλεῖν.
Contrast this with Thucyd. ii, 84-89 (the speech of Phormion),
iv, 12; vii, 36.
Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the
right of his fleet: on the left were the Bœotians and Eubœans,
under the Bœotian admiral Thrasondas. The battle was long and
obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original
order; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships
mingled together and contending in individual combat. At length
the brave Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of
driving against the ship of an enemy, and he himself probably, like
Brasidas[259] at Pylos, had planted himself on the forecastle, to
be the first in boarding the enemy, or in preventing the enemy from
boarding him, when the shock arising from impact threw him off his
footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned.[260] In spite of
the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian
triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were
destroyed or disabled. At length the Athenians were victorious
in all parts: the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight
became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty
of their ships were destroyed over and above the nine Lacedæmonian,
seventy-seven in all; making a total loss of above the half of the
entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe, amounting to
twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle.[261]
[259] See Thucyd. iv, 11.
[260] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33. ~ἐπεὶ~ δὲ Καλλικρατίδας τε
ἐμβαλούσης τῆς νεὼς ἀποπεσὼν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἠφανίσθη, etc.
The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits
of Kallikratidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence.
See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv, 12, respecting
the description given by Diodorus of the conduct of Brasidas at
Pylos.
[261] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34; Diodor. xiii, 99, 100.