THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR
HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.
The oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens, installed in the
senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July
of the same year, after four or five months of danger and distraction
such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has
now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what
attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to
the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly
contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above
described.
It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of
ninety-four triremes,[132] having remained not less than eighty days
idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March;
with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a
portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for
some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress.
The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from
effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard
a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly
by the delusions, of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out
both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the
point of bringing up the Phenician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had
in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for coöperation
with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally
unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the
Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the
Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos
and the neighboring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with
Milêtus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens
to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days
afterwards, by the neighboring town of Lampsakus.
[132] Thucyd. viii, 44, 45.
It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force
in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in
a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidês,
the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. Though the
Chians—driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of
relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to
thirty-six triremes against the Athenian thirty-two, by the arrival
of twelve ships under Leon, obtained from Milêtus during the absence
of Astyochus at Rhodes—had sallied out and fought an obstinate
naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage,[133] yet
Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away twenty-four
triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont.
Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea to provision
themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post
still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall
Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his
main fleet.[134]
[133] Thucyd. viii, 61, 62 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες means a certain
success, not very decisive.
[134] Thucyd. viii, 63.
The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical
party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their
plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian
generals were divided in opinion, Charmînus siding with this party,
Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprized of the reigning dissension,
Astyochus thought it a favorable opportunity for sailing with
his whole fleet up to the harbor of Samos, and offering battle;
but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbor. He
accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive,
in expectation, real or pretended, of the arrival of the Phenician
ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan
contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured
at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of
disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy
of Tissaphernês in thus frittering away their strength without
result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings
by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which
caused serious distress. To appease their clamors, Astyochus was
compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of
which was pronounced in favor of immediate battle. He accordingly
sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve
triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite
Samos, ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by
land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only
eighty-two sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored
near Glaukê on the mainland of Mykalê; but the public decision just
taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they
retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior
numbers.[135]
[135] Thucyd. viii, 78, 79.
It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the
part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their
attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which attempt brought
about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and
solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament, coupled with the
nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in
high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy, and Strombichidês
had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against
the main enemy at Milêtus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus,
but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.[136] Having established
a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet
at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to one hundred and
eight sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet
was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalê the next morning. It
consisted of one hundred and twelve ships, and was therefore still
superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learned both the
arrival of Strombichidês, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity
of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to
persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to
Milêtus, to the mouth of which harbor the Athenians sailed, and had
the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.[137]
[136] Thucyd. viii, 62.
[137] Thucyd. viii, 79.
Such confession of inferiority was well calculated to embitter still
farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus.
Tissaphernês had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing
pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiadês to Samos, which
happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent
intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that
the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them in the
interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived
from Pharnabazus, soliciting the coöperation of the fleet at the
Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus,
who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta, for the
express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to
execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea
of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet,
which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly, Klearchus was
sent with forty triremes from Milêtus to the Hellespont, yet with
instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos, by first stretching
out westward into the Ægean. Encountering severe storms, he was
forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at
Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milêtus,
from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his
triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm
and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment
unguarded, since Strombichidês seems to have brought back all his
squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and
Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached
him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward
news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance
the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of
guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even
attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes
afterwards proceeded from Milêtus to the Hellespont and Abydos,
thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as
the Bosphorus and Byzantium,[138] and even to ravage the Thracian
Chersonese.
[138] Thucyd. viii, 80-99.
Meanwhile, the discontents of the fleet at Milêtus broke out into
open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernês. Unpaid, and only
half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their
grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own
profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament
under the inspirations of Alkibiadês. Even some of the officers,
whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same
language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable,
and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above
all, the incorruptible Hermokratês of Syracuse, and Dorieus the
Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen,
who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of
the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud
complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian
general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting
up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their
cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward
to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took refuge, however, on a
neighboring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.[139]
[139] Thucyd. viii, 83, 84.
Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet.
The Milesians, also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which
Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of
attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the
armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap,
sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas
censured it severely, and intimated to the Milesians that they, as
well as the other Greeks in the king’s territory, were bound to
be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits, and
even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should
be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters
also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of
the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him
vehemently,[140] and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness,
they refused permission to bury him in the spot—probably some place
of honor—which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas
in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his
treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of
acquiring autonomy, according to the general promises of Sparta, were
now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected
them against Persia much better than Sparta.
[140] Thucyd. viii, 84. Ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη
τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν
τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ
θῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι᾽
ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα, etc.
The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an
end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede
Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both
Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this
opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints
against Tissaphernês; while the latter on his part sent thither an
envoy named Gaulites, a Karian, brought up in equal familiarity
with the Greek and Karian languages, both to defend himself against
the often-repeated charges of Hermokratês, that he had been
treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadês
and the Athenians, and to denounce the Milesians on his own side,
as having wrongfully demolished his fort.[141] At the same time he
thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose
of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing
the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral
Mindarus. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of
arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to
meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to
coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany
him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his
absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.[142]
[141] Thucyd. viii, 85.
[142] Thucyd. viii, 87.
Mindarus, a new commander, without any experience of the mendacity
of Tissaphernês, was imposed upon by this plausible assurance, and
even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement.
He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the
Triopian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.
Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while
Tissaphernês was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some
time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found
the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of
hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed
that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay
and delusion. The Phenician ships were one hundred and forty-seven
in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime
war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to
think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the
Great King; who had commanded a fleet of three hundred sail to be
fitted out for the service.[143] He waited for some time in pretended
expectation that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the
remonstrances of the Lacedæmonian officers.
[143] Thucyd. viii, 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês
pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by
Diodorus at three hundred sail. Thucydidês does not assign any
precise number (Diodor. xiii, 38, 42, 46).
On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet
as intended to be augmented to a total of three hundred sail
(Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of
standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.
Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadês, with thirteen Athenian
triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap.
He too had made use of this approaching Phenician fleet to delude
his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernês at
Aspendus, and to determine him, if possible, to send the fleet to the
assistance of Athens, but at the very least, _not_ to send it to the
aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently
safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernês had no intention of applying
the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled
to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of
diverting this formidable reinforcement from the enemy.
Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês,
partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible
pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number, at length
satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of
deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprized Mindarus—not
without indignant abuse of the satrap—that nothing was to be hoped
from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernês,
indeed, in bringing up the Phenicians to that place, and still
withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every
one’s eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it
with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phenicians themselves,
as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that
they actually were. But Thucydidês supposes that he had no other
motive than that which had determined his behavior during the last
year, to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by
setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and
thus procure so much delay.[144] The historian is doubtless right:
but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe,
that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconsiderable
a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing
this large fleet from Phenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away
unemployed.
[144] Thucyd. viii, 87, 88, 99.
Having at length lost all hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus
resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernês;
the more so, as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left
ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with
greater irregularity than ever, and to conduct his fleet to the
Hellespont into coöperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his
promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet[145]—seventy-three
triremes strong, after deducting thirteen which had been sent under
Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes—having been carefully
prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no
previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having
been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached
Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed,
with fifty-five triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus
between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that
Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts
both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios,
in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the
part of the enemy’s fleet.[146] Meanwhile he employed his Athenian
force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately
prevailed on to revolt by a body of three hundred assailants from
Kymê under the Theban Anaxander, partly Methymnæan exiles, with some
political sympathizers, partly mercenary foreigners, who succeeded in
carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus
found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under
Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall
the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined by two
triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that
his entire fleet reached the number of sixty-seven triremes, with
which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for
timely warning, in case the enemy’s fleet should move northward.
[145] Diodor. xiii, 38.
[146] Thucyd. viii, 100. Αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν ~τῇ Χίῳ~ εἴη, καὶ
νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν ~αὐτοῦ~, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ
Λέσβῳ, καὶ ~ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ~, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες,
ὅπως μὴ λάθοιεν, etc.
I construe τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, as meaning the mainland opposite
_Chios_, not opposite _Lesbos_. The words may admit either
sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτοῦ follow so immediately before: and the
situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the
northern portion of _Chios_.
The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take,
was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates
the northeastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the
Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus
on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the
Hellespont, though it might also go round on the eastern side between
Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian
scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet, if it
either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos.
But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch, and reaching the
Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two
days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians
three tesserakosts, a Chian coin of unknown value, for each man among
his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a
southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or
sea-side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios,
he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left
hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbor called
Karterii, in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew
their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the gulf of Kymê to
the little islets called Arginusæ, close on the Asiatic continent
opposite Mitylênê, where he again halted for supper. Continuing his
voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatûs, on
the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna, by the
next day’s morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short
halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and passed
Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight;
where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other
neighboring places.[147]
[147] Thucyd. viii, 101. The latter portion of this voyage is
sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it
in the text differently from all the best and most recent editors
of Thucydidês; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as
they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting
the negative οὐ _on pure conjecture_, without the authority
of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of
criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger
recommending it, and Haack, Göller, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M.
Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydidês;
without even following the caution of Bekker in his small
edition, who admonishes the reader, by inclosing the word in
brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, “_This
correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows
the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long
since._”
The words of Thucydidês, _without_ this correction, and as they
stood universally before Haack’s edition (even in Bekker’s
edition of 1821), are:—
Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες
ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυσῖν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς
τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ~ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ
τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν,
ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον~.
Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα, καὶ
ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν
Ἀργενούσαις τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μιτυλήνης, etc.
Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist
that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and
that it is indispensable to insert οὐ before πελάγιαι; so that
the sentence stands in their editions ~ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ
πελάγιαι~. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus
as sailing from the town of Chios _northward_, and going out at
the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough,
that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because
Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not
away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction
would be disputable. But the word πελάγιος, when applied to ships
departing from Chios,—though it may perhaps mean that they round
the northeastern corner of the island and then strike west round
Lesbos,—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to
announce them as _departing by the outer sea_, or sailing _on the
sea-side_ (round the southern and western coast) _of the island_.
Accept _this meaning_, and the old words construe perfectly well.
Ἀπαίρειν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος is the natural and proper phrase
for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west
coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could
have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which
same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii, 80) the
squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a long circuit
out to sea. If it be supposed, which those who read ~οὐ~ πελάγιαι
must suppose, that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait
between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east
towards Phokæa, this would have been the course which Thrasyllus
expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain
why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the
Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself.
Whereas, by taking the circuitous route round the southern and
western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other:
and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of
the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly
course, _with Lesbos on his left hand_, but at a sufficient
distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. Ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκ
τῆς Χίου πελάγιος (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 17), means to strike into
the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does
not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the southeast
or the northeast corner of the island.
We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the
Chians per head _three Chian tessarakostæ_. Now this is a small
Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to
find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified
by Thucydidês, contrasted with the different manner in which
Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen
(Hellen. i, 6, 12; ii, 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round
the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He
must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation
(perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and
this Chian coin, which probably had no circulation out of
the island, served each man to buy provisions at the Chian
landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard
_more_ provisions in kind, at the town of Chios; because he had
already aboard a stock of provisions for two days, the subsequent
portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigeium, during
which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where
indeed the territory was not friendly.
It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydidês
will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this
conjectural ~οὐ~. But I can show more: for this negative actually
renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least,
if not inadmissible. Surely, ἀπαίρουσιν οὐ πελάγιαι, ἀλλὰ, ought
to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging
to the same verb ἀπαίρουσιν: yet if we take ἔχοντες as such
correlative participle, how are we to construe ἔπλεον? In order
to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to
have different words, such as: οὐκ ἄπῃραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀριστέρᾳ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον.
Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow
the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we understand
the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is
perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to
the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. “_The
fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but
when it came to have Lesbos on the left hand, it sailed straight
to the continent._”
I hope that I am not too late to make good my γραφὴν ξενίας, or
protest, against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship
which the recent editors have conferred upon this word ~οὐ~, in
c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or, if these
editors maintain their views, they ought at least to inclose the
word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydidês, published at
Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still
correctly printed, without the negative.
By this well-laid course and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian
fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and reached
the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprized
of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at Harmatûs, however,
opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at
Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it
advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated
everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and
beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.
These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible,
to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the
Hellespont: eighteen Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, sixteen
Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former it was
destruction, to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow
channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the
night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course
close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards
Elæûs at the southern extremity of that peninsular, so as to have
the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But
they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at
Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest
orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps
even before he left Milêtus, that, if he should attempt the start,
they were to keep a vigilant and special look-out for his coming, and
reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in
case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced
the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos could
not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet
might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous
orders, holding themselves in reserve in their station at Abydos,
until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed.
They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape
from Sestos to Elæûs.[148]
[148] Thucyd. viii, 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ, ...
ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον, καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ
ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ
Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς, ὡς εἶχον τάχους,
ὑπομίξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι
ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. ~Καὶ τὰς μὲν
ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ
ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι~· τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ
Μινδάρου ἅμα ἕῳ κατιδόντες, etc.
Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed
the commentators, and which I venture to translate, as it stands
in my text, differently from all of them. The words, προειρημένης
φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι,
are explained by the Scholiast to mean: “Although watch had been
enjoined to them (i.e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at
Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that
they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case
the latter should sail out.”
Dr. Arnold, Göller, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this
construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and
confused. The former says: “This again is most strangely intended
to mean, προειρημένου αὐτοῖς ~ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων~
φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολεμίους.”
To construe τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ as equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων
φίλων, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very
glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves
another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable.
He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word ~καίτοι~, _although_,
from his own imagination. There is no indication of _although_,
either express or implied, in the text of Thucydidês; and it
appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive
a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when
annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually
denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of
cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification, not something
opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an _although_; if
this latter be intended, then the word _although_ is expressed,
not left to be understood. After Thucydidês has told us that
the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at
Abydos, when he next goes on to add something under the genitive
absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains
why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us,
far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary
(such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to
watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact
by an express particle, such as _although_ or _notwithstanding_:
“The Athenians escaped, _although_ the Peloponnesians had
received the strictest orders to watch them and block them up.”
As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle
_although_ is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a
high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.
Differing from the commentators, I think that these words,
προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν,
ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, _do_ assign the reason for the fact which had been
immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary;
namely, that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos,
and escape from Sestos to Elæûs. That reason was, that the
Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders
from Mindarus, _to concentrate its attention and watchfulness
upon his approaching squadron_; hence it arose that they left the
Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.
The words τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ are equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ,
and the pronoun ~αὐτῶν~, which immediately follows, refers
to ~φίλων~ (_the approaching fleet of Mindarus_), not to the
Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators
construe it. This mistake about the reference of αὐτῶν seems to
me to have put them all wrong.
That τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ must be construed as equivalent to τῷ τῶν
φίλων ἐπίπλῳ is certain; but it is not equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων; nor is it possible to construe the words as
the Scholiast would understand them: “_orders had been previously
given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends_;” whereby we
should turn ὁ ἐπίπλους into an acting and commanding personality.
The “approach of their friends” is an event, which may properly
be said “to have produced an effect,” but which cannot be said
“to have given previous orders.” It appears to me that τῷ φιλίῳ
ἐπίπλῳ is the dative case, governed by φυλακῆς; “_a look-out
for the arrival of the Peloponnesians_,” having been enjoined
upon these guardships at Abydos: “_They had been ordered to
watch for the approaching voyage of their friends._” The English
preposition _for_, expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek
dative; that is, the _object, purpose, or persons whose benefit
is referred to_.
The words immediately succeeding, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς
ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, are an expansion of consequences intended
to follow from φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ. “They shall watch for the
approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special
and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start.”
For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἔχειν, compare Herodot. i, 24; viii, 109.
Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: ~ἀνακῶς~, φυλακτῶς, προνοητικῶς,
ἐπιμελῶς, the notes of Arnold and Göller here; and Kühner, Gr.
Gr. sect. 533, ἀνακῶς ἔχειν τινός, for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. The words
ἀνακῶς ἔχειν express the anxious and special vigilance which the
Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the
arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt
and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty
of that squadron as respects the opposite Athenian squadron at
Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was
besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.
Lastly, the words ἢν ἐκπλέωσι refer _to Mindarus and his fleet
about to start from Chios, as their subject_, not to the
Athenians at Sestos.
The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the
peculiarities of Thucydidês, and express the meaning in common
Greek: Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἔλαθον·
προείρητο γὰρ (ἐκείναις ταῖς ναῦσιν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν
φίλων, ὅπως ~αὐτῶν~ (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι.
The verb φυλάσσειν here, and of course the abstract substantive
φυλακὴ which represents it, signifies to _watch_ for, or _wait_
for: like Thucyd. ii, 3. φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ
περίορθρον; also viii, 41, ἐφύλασσε.
If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect
harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That
admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont,
but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is
difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy
of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders
beforehand from Chios, perhaps even from Milêtus, before he
quitted that place, to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the
Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that
Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and
perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or
bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad, which would
indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile
fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios. Now the orders sent
forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they
are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the
captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming
Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus; whether to remain on
guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave
the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on
Mindarus, and come forth to help him. “Let your first thought be
to insure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont,
and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its
route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave
the Hellespont for a time unguarded.” Mindarus could not tell
beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios, nor
was it, indeed, absolutely certain that he would start at all,
if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent,
_conditional_ upon his being able to get off (~ἢν ἐκπλέωσι~).
But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage,
to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The
Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his
special orders, when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was
approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to
lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the Athenians
opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they
could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could
learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could
render aid.
We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what
manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian
squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the
Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.
On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese,
these Athenians were descried by the fleet of Mindarus, which
had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and
Rhœteium. The latter immediately gave chase: but the Athenians, now
in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not
without the loss, however, of four triremes, one even captured with
all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Elæûs: the
crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by
the squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six triremes
strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæûs. Failing in
this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive
there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Eresus, much
disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations
baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous
than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He
waited at Elæûs the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from
Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in
number, for a general action.
After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to
battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by
single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the
European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus,
stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossêma, or the Dog’s
Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen
Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron
under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the
strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought
into action eighty-six triremes, ten more than Thrasyllus in total
number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore;
the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to
Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the
left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatæ or maritime hoplites on
board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the
Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and
nautical manœuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle
tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the
glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor
would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval
battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the
aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying
to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them
up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the
other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate
this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and
weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the
left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossêma. Thus
unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled
by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against
the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory
against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central
Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and
Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently
victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy.
Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away
the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian
fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river
Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade
either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless, eight Chian
ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Bœotian, and
from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellênê, and Leukas, one each, fell into the
hands of the Athenian admirals; who, however, on their own side lost
fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossêma,
near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of
burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the
customary request for truce.[149]
[149] Thucyd. viii, 105, 106; Diodor. xiii, 39, 40.
The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even
in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydidês.
It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from
Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority
of the Athenian pilots and the Peloponnesian epibatæ. He states
that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the
middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favor:
this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent
conflict a few months afterwards.
We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of
Hecuba on the headland of Kynossêma.
A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued
by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition.
But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other
misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis, with
the revolt of Eubœa, their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that
the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossêma,
seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the
utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide
had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favor,
holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece
of good fortune soon happened, to strengthen this belief. Mindarus
was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending
Hippokratês and Epiklês to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now
acting at Eubœa.[150] This was in itself an important relief to
Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still
further enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of this fleet, which,
in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was
overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss
of life among the crews; so that a remnant only, under Hippokratês,
survived to join Mindarus.[151]
[150] Thucyd. viii, 107; Diodor. xiii, 41.
[151] Diodor. xiii, 41. It is probable that this fleet was in
great part Bœotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck
commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of
Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by
Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the
words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were
the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But
we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived, and that he
was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i,
1, 23).
But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on
the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet
were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had
passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants of Chalkis and the
other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed
themselves jointly with the Bœotians, whose interest in the case
was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular
character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the
narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided
from Bœotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded
at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate
opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered
by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenês,
with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of
this undertaking. The Eubœans and Bœotians both prosecuted it in
such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to
completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to
Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether
independent of her, even though it should please fortune to
reëstablish her maritime power.[152]
[152] Diodor. xiii, 47. He places this event a year later, but
I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little
delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers,
Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; note, p. 66).
See Colonel Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, for a description
of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii,
ch. xiv, pp. 259-265.
I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth
of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching
two hundred feet (x, p. 400). But there must have been material
alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time
of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x, p. 447). The bridge here
described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for
one ship, could scarcely have been more than twenty feet broad;
for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The
ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think
that Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read, in Diodorus, xiii,
47, οὐ in place of ὁ.
The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences
except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the
action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it,
the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place
to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little
difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover, in the
voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing,
off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian
triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt
of Byzantium. But, on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet
had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæûs,
and there recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma,
which the Athenians had there deposited, except some of them which
were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elæûs set them on
fire.[153]
[153] Thucyd. viii, 107.
But that which now began to constitute a far more important element
of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês
and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from
the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernês, while
furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his
treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings
for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the
belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set
himself to strengthen them strenuously, by men as well as by money,
and who labored hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find
him laboring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about
its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes
a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main—first, through the
hands of Pharnabazus, next, through those of the younger Cyrus—the
determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians
are for the most part well paid, out of the Persian treasury, the
Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely
on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without
established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even
the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this,
at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedæmonian
Teleutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by
telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by
means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the
foreigner;[154] and probably the Athenian generals, during these
previous years of struggle, tried similar appeals to the generosity
of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new
constant paymaster now introduced, gave fearful odds to the Spartan
cause.
[154] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 1, 17. Compare a like exclamation, under
nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph.
Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.
The good pay and hearty coöperation which the Peloponnesians now
enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at
the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this
sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in
expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had
recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence
of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at
Adramyttium: he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as
allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded,
shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was
more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighboring
Antandrians, who invited a body of Peloponnesian hoplites from
Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, by whose aid Antandrus was
liberated from the Persians.[155]
[155] Thucyd. viii, 108; Diodor. xiii, 42.
In Milêtus, as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already
experienced the like humiliation:[156] Lichas was no longer alive
to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result
from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these
circumstances, he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of
enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, nor was he without
jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus.
The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had
openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available
to any useful purpose. Accordingly, he dismissed the Phenician fleet
to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the
Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and
Egypt;[157] while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as
well as to go forward to the Hellespont, for the purpose of renewing
personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished,
while trying again to excuse his own treachery about the Phenician
fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings
at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some assurance against any
repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to
have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks
by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.[158] Having quitted
Aspendus, as far as we can make out, about the beginning of August
(411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of
November.[159]
[156] Thucyd. viii, 109.
[157] Diodor. xiii, 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and
seems probable enough, though he makes a strange confusion
in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of
Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name
of Pharnabazus.
[158] Thucyd. viii, 109. It is at this point that we have to part
company with the historian Thucydidês, whose work not only closes
without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks
off, as we possess it, in the middle of a sentence.
The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived,
except by those who have been called upon to study his work with
the profound and minute attention required from an historian of
Greece. To pass from Thucydidês to the Hellenica of Xenophon,
is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian
history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even
so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical
purposes and conceptions of Thucydidês, as set forth by himself
in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree
altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no preëxisting
models before him from which to derive them; nor are the eight
books of his work, in spite of the unfinished condition of the
last, unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or
in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the
harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his
full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional
force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every
attentive reader.
During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent
occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition
of Thucydidês, most generally on points where I dissented from
him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold’s
edition is in most frequent use among all English readers of
Thucydidês, partly because of the high esteem which I entertain
for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgment, which
pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold
deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be
bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving
and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely
as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are
continually adopted by Göller in the second edition of his
Thucydidês, and to a great degree also by Poppo. Desiring, as I
do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its preëminence
among English students of Thucydidês, I have thought it my
duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which
his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history
different from my own.
[159] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9.
As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadês returned
with his thirteen triremes from Phasêlis to Samos. He too, like
Tissaphernês, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his
own: he took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the
good-will of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of
Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of
bringing up the Phenician fleet.[160] At this time Dorieus was at
Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus,
before his departure from Milêtus, in order to stifle the growth
of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of
this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and
Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadês going to these places from
Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen.
He erected fortifications at the town of Kos, and planted in it an
Athenian officer and garrison: from Halikarnassus he levied large
contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of
money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he
returned to Samos.[161]
[160] Thucyd. viii, 108. Diodorus (xiii, 38) talks of this
influence of Alkibiadês over the satrap as if it were real.
Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.
[161] Thucyd. viii, 108. πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον. Haack and Sievers
(see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this
as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in
the year.
At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of
Kynossêma by the squadron from Eubœa, at least by that portion of
it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of
the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the Athenians also to
send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the
opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action,
wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage;
yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly,
that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin
Mindarus at the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the
strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a
little way from the entrance, near Rhœteium; and the Athenian scouts
instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were
despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety
by hauling his vessel ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The
Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced
to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this
scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athênê, on
the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where
he fitted out his whole fleet of eighty-four triremes, Pharnabazus
coöperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the
ships of Dorieus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian
fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and
Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two
fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue;
at length, towards the evening, twenty fresh triremes were seen
approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadês sailing
from Samos: having probably heard of the rejunction of the squadron
of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his
own counter-balancing reinforcement.[162] As soon as his purple flag
or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with
redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action
so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to
Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up
their success, and endeavored to tow them all off. But the Persian
land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost
in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his
horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved;
yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying
off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had
themselves lost in the two preceding actions.[163]
[162] Diodorus (xiii, 46) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 27) speak of
his coming to the Hellespont by accident, κατὰ τύχην, which is
certainly very improbable.
[163] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 6, 7.
Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during the
winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to
solicit reinforcements: in the mean time, he engaged jointly with
Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies
on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead
of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were
compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons,
for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while
Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask
for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were
sent out under Theramenês; who first endeavored without success to
impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia,
and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of
collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents
upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various
parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt,
among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy
established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still
subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised
it, establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to
Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay of
Archelaus, king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the
siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians
besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter,
Theramenês was summoned away before its capture, to join the main
Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus, however, took Pydna not long
afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the
seaboard to a distance more than two miles inland.[164] We trace
in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of
money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and
interference with their allies, such as they had never committed
during the earlier years of the war.
[164] Diodor. xiii, 47-49.
It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine
commotion in Korkyra, less stained, however, with savage enormities
than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that
the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment
nearly destroyed at that period, had since gained strength, and was
encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the
island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders,
apprized of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian
admiral Konon. He came, with a detachment of six hundred Messenians,
by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the
market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a
thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that
they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon
the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent,
came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance
of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took
place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise
and by the restoration of the exiles.[165] We know nothing about the
particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely
drawn up and faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Korkyra
until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is
then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation
and prosperity.[166] Doubtless the emancipation of slaves and the
admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed
to this result.
[165] Diodor. xiii, 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen.
p. 12; and p. 65, note 58) controverts the reality of these
tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned
in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks,
by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv, 48, ὅσα γε
κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich
(Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 95-99), has properly
explained this phrase of Thucydidês as meaning, in the place here
cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the
surprise of Platæa and the Peace of Nikias.
I see no reason to call in question the truth of these
disturbances in Korkyra, here alluded to by Diodorus.
[166] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 25.
Meanwhile Tissaphernês, having completed his measures in Ionia,
arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos,
seemingly about November, 411 B.C. He was anxious to regain some
credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon
presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet
at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory, bringing
the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent
him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he
had the Great King’s express orders for carrying on war with the
Athenians.[167] Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês,
respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet
these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a
renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy
enabled him to sustain and justify.
[167] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 27.
Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of
Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so
great,—partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by
the former, partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying
squadrons from want of pay,—that the Athenians no longer dared to
maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the
southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia, on
the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the
commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had
found means to escape from Sardis, along with Mantitheus, another
Athenian prisoner, first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he
collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons
of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate,
Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from
Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number
to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with
his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in
the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian
land-force.
His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the
Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do
it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elæûs at the south
of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by
night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian
guardships at Abydos.[168]
[168] Diodor. xiii, 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact,
which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of
Mindarus could not have been accomplished.
Resting at Prokonnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the
island, in order that their movements might be kept secret,
Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for
a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. “We have
no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great
King.” Neither zeal in the men nor contrivance in the commanders
was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the
territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion;
after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under
Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing
near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of
Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to
a distance from the harbor; while the other Athenian divisions,
assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his
retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighboring
mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on
shipboard, partly ashore,—at one time unpromising to the Athenians,
in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in
its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities,—both
the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land
were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire
fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of
Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself
surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution,
being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was
abundant and valuable. The numbers of the triremes thus captured or
destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at
sixty, the highest at eighty.[169]
[169] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 14-20; Diodor. xiii, 50, 51.
The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the
events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, Commentat.
in Xenoph. Hellen. note, 62, pp. 65, 66, _seq._
This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês
and his two colleagues, about April 410 B.C., changed sensibly the
relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now
no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained
a small squadron at the station of Milêtus; while the Athenian
fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the
defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by
Hippokratês, secretary of the late admiral Mindarus, to the ephors
at Sparta: “All honor and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is
slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do.[170]” The
ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one
witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having
been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view
which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy,
with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather
perhaps Endius—ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadês, who had
already been at Athens as envoy before—was allowed to come thither
now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal
manner, which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came
of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this
embassy: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in
questioning the reality of the event,—which is stated by Diodorus,
perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in
itself,—nevertheless, leads me to doubt whether the ephors themselves
admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is
to be remembered that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to
her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special
convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.
[170] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ κᾶλα· Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα·
πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.
Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.
According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the
Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on
the following terms: That each party should stand just as they were;
that the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn; that prisoners
should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius
insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing
to the other by prolonging the war; but he contended that Athens was
by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest
in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the Great
King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the
garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed: all her
power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta
could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.[171]
[171] Diodor. xiii, 52.
If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in
Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only
the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up
the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed
it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence,
enlarged upon the splendor of the recent victory, and upon the new
chances of success now opening to them: insomuch that the assembly
ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.[172]
[172] Diodor. xiii, 53.
It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and
the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the
stock denunciations against an insane people, misled by a corrupt
demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close
of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition, even assuming
it to have been formal and authorized, as well as the time at which
it was made, we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have
been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection.
In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance
of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to
show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of
that character[173]. They were essentially unwarlike men, and had
quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state
of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon, during the
last years of the war, since the financial posture of Athens was
then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted
to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for
political peculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising
contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so
inclined; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such
gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides even if
Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war,
yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was
certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his
position, but of his life also.
[173] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. liv, p. 455.
So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question
whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of.
Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect
that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated,
and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokratês to the ephors,
divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was
at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand,
the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory,
had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public
thanksgiving, at Athens:[174] nor can we doubt that Alkibiadês and
his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the
recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of
the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a
great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from
Endius? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both
parties to stand in their actual position; to withdraw garrisons;
to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would
have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have
withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved
from the garrison of Dekeleia; such an exchange would have been a
considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising
from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important.
[174] Diodor. xiii, 52.
Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklês would have
advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of
concession, immediately after the great victory of Kyzikus, and
the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that
he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of
a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the
interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for
them to build a new fleet.[175] Sparta could not pledge herself
either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates; indeed,
past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By
accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have
obtained relief from the entire burden of war; but would merely
have blunted the ardor and tied up the hands of her own troops, at
a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success.
By the armament, most certainly,—and by the generals, Alkibiadês,
Theramenês, and Thrasybulus,—the acceptance of such terms at such a
moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked
them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably,
anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence
from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have
inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain
to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing
upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very
distant future, when the moment favorable to her enemies should have
arrived.
[175] Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears
to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as
insincerely meant: Λακεδαιμονίων πρεσβευσαμένων περὶ εἰρήνης
~ἀπιστήσαντες~ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκαντο; compare also Schol. ad
Eurip. Orest. 772, Philochori Fragment.
If, therefore, passing from the vague accusation that it was the
demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of
peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he
induced his countrymen to reject, we shall find that he had very
strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice.
Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible,
to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and
lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would
have succeeded, even if they had been made; yet a statesman like
Periklês would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was
carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink
her. A mere opposition speaker, like Kleophon, even when taking what
was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him,
did not look so far forward into the future.
Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its
two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the
ardor and generosity of Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance
and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but
also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those
captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months,
and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at
the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the
abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting
new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which, at a place
called Aspaneus, the Idæan wood was chiefly exported.[176]
[176] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii, p. 606.
Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at
Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their
first operation after the victory, had been to sail to Perinthus and
Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former,
intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself
to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed
itself from attack for the present, by the payment of a pecuniary
fine. Alkibiadês then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to
Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be
masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was
a point of first-rate moment to Athens; first, because it enabled
her to secure the arrival of the corn ships from the Euxine, for her
own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a
tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through, not unlike
the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound, even down to the present
time. For the opposite reasons, of course, the importance of the
position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring
of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both
the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April,
411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus
(about June, 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and
her supplies drained during the last few months could only have come
through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had
the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly, it is
highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the
autumn of 411 B.C., had been comparatively restricted.
Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out
against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its
unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite
Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with
a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing-port
for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.[177] The
Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium,
until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of
revenue: it was now reëstablished under the auspices of Alkibiadês.
In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for
sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in
the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty
triremes under Theramenês, were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this
levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve
as annoyance to the enemy.
[177] See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1,
22. καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσοπόλει), καὶ ~τὴν
δεκάτην~ ἐξέλεγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv, 8, 27;
and v, 1, 28; also Diodor. xiii, 64.
The expression, τὴν δεκάτην, implies that this tithe was
something known and preëstablished.
Polybius (iv, 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the
first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is
evidence that it was practised long before, even anterior to the
Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see
Herodot. vi, 5).
See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens
of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii, cont.
Ergokl. sect. 6.
The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to
Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians
already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus,
especially,[178] the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the
Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted
Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollected that
this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred
conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and
established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the
allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved
from her democratical institutions. All the calculations of these
oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from
the first: the Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party
had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their
disaffected exiles,[179] under whose auspices a Laconian garrison and
harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused
the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the
expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês; an accusation which seems
improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly
banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new
admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already
begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.[180]
[178] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48,
c. 14, p. 474.
[179] Thucyd. viii, 64.
[180] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32.
The tone at Athens since the late naval victories, had become more
hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though
the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on
approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with
spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the
Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia,
the abundant influx into the Peiræus of corn-ships from the Euxine,
again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C. since the occupation of the
Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadês. For the safe reception of
these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed
that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of
Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them.
Accordingly, he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small
squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus
to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the
Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries
intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during
the ensuing winter (B.C. 410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety,
though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine
Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.[181]
[181] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of
Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont,
fled first to _Sestos_, and afterwards to Byzantium. But _Sestos_
was the _Athenian_ station. The name must surely be put by
inadvertence for _Abydos_, the Peloponnesian station.
In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at
the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded fifty
triremes, one thousand of the regular hoplites, one hundred horsemen,
and five thousand seamen, with the means of arming these latter as
peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes.[182]
Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a
descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of
Kolophon, with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but
that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had
summoned, under proclamation “to go and succor the goddess Artemis;”
as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian
triremes recently arrived.[183] From these enemies, Thrasyllus
sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost three hundred men, and
was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying
his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On their
way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of
Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing
by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked
them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased the
remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken
were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the
stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment
of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse; they contrived, however,
during the ensuing winter, to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia.
Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiadês, the Athenian, cousin
and fellow-exile of the Athenian general of the same name, whom
Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to
Athens.[184]
[182] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 34; i, 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii, 64)
confounds Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus.
[183] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these
twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τῶν προτέρων εἴκοσι νεῶν,
and then αἱ ἕτεραι πέντε, αἱ νεωστὶ ἥκουσαι. But it appears to
me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come
to Asia since the battle of Kyzikus, though the five may have
been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan
ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems
impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty
Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Milêtus in addition to those which
he took with him to the Hellespont.
[184] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 8-15.
After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament
to the Hellespont and joined the force of Alkibiadês at Sestos. Their
joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement
of autumn, to Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait; which
place they fortified and made their head-quarters for the autumn and
winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions, throughout
the neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn,
however, that when Alkibiadês was proceeding to marshal them all
together,—the hoplites, according to Athenian custom, taking rank
according to their tribes,—his own soldiers, never yet beaten,
refused to fraternize with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so
recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until
after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus presenting
himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve
that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the
Athenians present took part. The honor of the hoplites of Thrasyllus
was now held to be reëstablished, so that the fusion of ranks was
admitted without farther difficulty.[185] Even the entire army,
however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the
Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on
the Hellespont.
[185] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.
Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large
armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home
were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an
expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylos,
which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted
Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenês, in B.C.
425. The place was vigorously attacked, both by sea and by land,
and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the
Athenians sent to its relief thirty triremes under Anytus, who,
however, came back without even reaching the place, having been
prevented by stormy weather or unfavorable winds from doubling Cape
Malea. Pylos was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison
departing on terms of capitulation.[186] But Anytus, on his return,
encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on
his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to
fulfil, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved
himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, and that he was
the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.[187]
Whether he could really have reached Pylos, and whether the obstacles
which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have
overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be
true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove,
however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of
condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to
account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never
before attempted.
[186] Diodor. xiii, 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon
(Hellen. i, 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylos, as a mere
retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea, as well as his
employment of the name _Koryphasion_, and not of _Pylos_, prove
how much he wrote after Lacedæmionian informants.
[187] Diodor. xiii, 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.
Aristotle, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, ap. Harpokration, v. Δεκάζων, and
in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72, ed. Didot
(Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 127).
It was about the same time, also, that the Megarians recovered by
surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian
garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to recover it,
but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.[188]
[188] Diodor. xiii, 65.
Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409, and even the joint force
of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês during the autumn of the same year, seem
to have effected less than might have been expected from so large
a force: indeed, it must have been at some period during this year
that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his fifteen Megarian ships,
penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only
by nine Athenian triremes.[189] But the operations of 408 B.C. were
more important. The entire force under Alkibiadês and the other
commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkêdon and Byzantium.
The Chalkêdonians, having notice of the project, deposited their
movable property for safety in the hand of their neighbors the
Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and
confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual
hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between
Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.[190] But the precaution
was frustrated by Alkibiadês, who entered the territory of the
Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects
confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden
wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the
continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by
some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading
wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army
for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion,
or temple of Heraklês, belonging to the Chalkêdonians. Profiting by
his approach, Hippokratês, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town,
made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of
Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him; so
that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back
within the walls of the town, and Hippokratês himself killed.[191]
[189] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.
[190] Polyb. iv, 44-45.
[191] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5-7; Diodor. xiii, 66.
The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadês
departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together
forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence,
Theramenês and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the
capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again
become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute
as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent
period should be paid up. Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged
to pay to the Athenians twenty talents on behalf of the town, and
also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to
submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those
envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from
hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.[192] Oaths to this
effect were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadês
from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete
the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadês should
be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great
individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in
finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly
sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of
Alkibiadês, while two relatives of Alkibiadês came to Chalkêdon as
witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath
shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadês took a special covenant of
personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received
from him the like.
[192] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 9. Ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Καλχηδονίους
Ἀθηναίοις ὅσονπερ εἰώθεσαν, καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι·
Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν ~Καλχηδονίοις~, ἕως ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα
πρέσβεις ἔλθωσιν.
This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former
chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realize their
project of commuting the tribute, imposed upon the dependent
allies, for an _ad valorem_ duty of five per cent. on imports
and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydidês (vii,
28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out,
in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the
Chalkêdonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was
the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at
the time of the revolt of the latter.
Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider, in his note
upon the passage, Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν ~Καλχηδονίοις~. He
notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch, τὴν
Φαρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly
far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Καλχηδονίοις,
he proposes to read Φαρναβάζῳ. At any rate, this is the meaning.
Alkibiadês had employed his period of absence in capturing Selymbria,
from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a
large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium.
That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation
of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of
circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made
by missiles and battering engines. These, however, the Lacedæmonian
garrison, under the harmost Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under
Helixus, and Bœotians under Kœratadas, was perfectly competent to
repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After
the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so
that Klearchus, strict and harsh, even under ordinary circumstances,
became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxiety for the
subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food
while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him.
Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth
from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together,
if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert
the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Kœratadas
and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much
compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta,
whatever might be their suffering. But the favorable terms recently
granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine,
induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and
admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square
called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprized of this attack
only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all
sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender
at discretion: they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas
contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus.
Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its
position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up
its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.[193]
[193] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii, 67; Plutarch,
Alkib. c. 31.
The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium,
which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and
probable. It does not consist with the complicated stratagem
described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii,
xi, 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i, 48, 2.
So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction
of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter
place surrendering about the beginning of winter.[194] Both of them,
however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making
her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her
two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement
which the summer had operated in her position. The accommodation
just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value,
and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown
weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the
Peloponnesians, and that he was well disposed to assist the Athenians
in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his
hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it,
was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved.
The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians,—all, probably, sent for
from Athens, which accounts for some delay,—were directed, after the
siege of Chalkêdon, to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian
envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned
and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort,
and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress
was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium
in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their track into the interior
at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son
of king Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part
of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, Bœotius and others, were
travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission
at the Persian court.[195]
[194] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 1.
[195] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 2-3.