THE defence of New Orleans resembled the defence of Washington
until the moment when in each case the British expedition came within
sight. Jackson was even slower than Winder to see the point of danger
or to concentrate his forces. At Washington, Winder took command July
1, and the British expedition arrived August 16; at Mobile, Jackson
took command August 16, and the British expedition arrived December
14. In neither case was the interval seriously employed for defence.
So much was Jackson misled that he collected no troops, and made no
inquiry as to the military means at his disposal at New Orleans. Had
he gone there September 1, he would have felt the want of arms and
equipment, and would have been able to supply them. During the summer,
while yet among the Creeks, he was said to have made requisition for
a quantity of war material to be sent to New Orleans;[502] but he
certainly showed no interest in its shipment or the causes for its
delay in arrival. The arms should have reached New Orleans in October,
when he would have had ample time to correct any failure or want
of supply. He could have used, in case of necessity, the steamboat
“Enterprise,” which was then regularly plying on the Mississippi, and
was not the only steamboat on those waters.[503] If New Orleans was
deficient in many articles of military necessity, the fault was not
wholly in the War Department.
A similar criticism applied to the political situation at New Orleans.
Governor Claiborne wanted authority to control the factions in his
legislature, and the legislature wanted an impulse sufficiently
energetic to overcome its inertia. Probably Jackson’s presence would
at any time have given authority to Claiborne and energy to the entire
State government. From the moment of his actual arrival, difficulties
of this kind seemed to cease. “It is hardly possible,” said the
military historian of the campaign,[504] “to form an idea of the change
which his arrival produced on the minds of the people.”
When the British expedition was once known to have appeared at the
entrance of Lake Borgne, Jackson’s task was perhaps simpler than
Winder’s, for Winder might doubt whether the British meant to attack
Washington, and in fact General Ross took the decision only at the
last moment; but no one could doubt that New Orleans was the object
of Pakenham’s expedition. Jackson had only to choose his positions
and collect his resources. These were small; but on the other hand
the British were opposed by natural difficulties much greater at
New Orleans than at Washington. Even their greater numbers were
a disadvantage when they were obliged to move in widely separated
detachments, in open boats, from a point far distant from their
column’s head, and toward a point easily fortified.
If until the moment of the enemy’s appearance Jackson showed no more
military capacity than was shown by Winder, his conduct thenceforward
offered a contrast the more striking because it proved how Washington
might have been saved. Winder lost his head when he saw an enemy.
Jackson needed to see his enemy in order to act; he thought rightly
only at the moment when he struck. At noon, December 23, New Orleans
was in greater danger than Washington on the afternoon of August 23,
when the British advanced from the Patuxent. Had Colonel Thornton
followed his impulses and marched directly on the city, he must have
reached it before a gun could have been fired by the Americans; his own
muskets would have given the first news of his arrival. Major-General
Keane, his commanding officer, preferred caution,[505] and his delay
gave a few hours time for Jackson to show his qualities.
News that a British column had reached the Villeré plantation was
brought to Jackson at headquarters in New Orleans, at about half-past
one o’clock, much as the news was brought to Winder, August 24, that
the British were marching on Bladensburg. The distances were about
the same. Winder and Jackson both allowed the enemy to approach within
seven miles before anything had been done for defence. In one respect
Jackson was more unfortunate than Winder, for his troops were not
ready to march; they were not even collected. Jackson sent orders to
the different corps, but several hours passed before the men could be
brought down and posted between the city and the British.
Fortunately Major Latour, chief-engineer in Military District No.
7, had been sent that morning to examine the approaches from Lake
Borgne, and as he rode down the road at noon he met persons flying
toward town with news that the British had penetrated through the
canal to Villeré’s house. Latour was a trained French engineer, whose
services were extremely valuable, not only during the campaign but
afterward; for he subsequently wrote a “History of the War in West
Florida and Louisiana,” which was far the best military work published
in the United States till long after that time, and furnished the
only accurate maps and documents of the campaign at New Orleans.[506]
On the morning of December 23 Latour approached within rifle-shot of
the British force, and judged their number accurately as sixteen or
eighteen hundred men.[507] Such exact information, which could not have
been gained from any ordinary scout, was invaluable. Latour hastened
to headquarters, and reported at two o’clock to Jackson the position
and numbers of the enemy. The general, on that information, decided to
attack.
For such a purpose Jackson’s resources were ample. Four miles above the
city his Tennessee militia were camped,--Carroll’s brigade numbering
probably about two thousand effectives, and the remnants of Coffee’s
mounted brigade numbering some seven hundred men in the field. The
Mississippi and New Orleans volunteers could be reckoned at about
seven hundred men,[508] besides three regiments of city militia. The
Seventh United States Infantry produced four hundred and sixty-five men
in the ranks; the Forty-fourth counted three hundred and thirty-one;
while a detachment of artillerists, twenty-two in number, with two
six-pound field-pieces, added greatly to the numerical strength of the
Infantry.[509] Against Thornton’s force, numbering one thousand six
hundred and eighty-eight rank-and-file, or about nineteen hundred men
all told, Jackson could oppose about five thousand Infantry with two
field-pieces.
Besides these land forces Jackson was provided with another resource.
In the river at New Orleans lay a war-schooner, the “Carolina,”
rated at fourteen guns, armed with one long twelve-pounder and
six twelve-pound carronades on a broadside.[510] A sixteen-gun
sloop-of-war, the “Louisiana,” was also at New Orleans, but not
ready for immediate use. The “Carolina” could be brought instantly
into action, and her broadside of seven twelve-pounders, added to the
field-battery of two six-pounders, gave Jackson immense advantage
over the British, who had no artillery except two three-pounders and
rockets, and whose lines must be enfiladed by the “Carolina’s” fire.
Jackson, aware of his superiority, expected with reason to destroy the
British detachment. He did not even think more than half his force
necessary for the purpose, but detached the whole of Carroll’s brigade
and the three regiments of city militia,--fully twenty-five hundred
men,--to guard the town against an apprehended attack from the north.
Without giving the reasons which led him to believe that the British
could approach on that side without ample warning, his report said,--
“Apprehending a double attack by the way of Chef Menteur, I left
General Carroll’s force and the militia of the city posted on
the Gentilly road, and at five o’clock P.M. marched
to meet the enemy, whom I was resolved to attack in his first
position, with Major Hind’s dragoons, General Coffee’s brigade,
parts of the Seventh and Forty-fourth regiments, the uniformed
companies of militia under the command of Major Plauché, two
hundred men of color chiefly from St. Domingo, raised by
Colonel Savary and acting under the command of Major Daquin,
and a detachment of artillery under the direction of Colonel
McRea, with two six-pounders under the command of Lieutenant
Spots,--not exceeding in all fifteen hundred.”
More exact returns showed that Jackson carried with him eight hundred
and eighty-four regular troops and two field-pieces, five hundred and
sixty-three mounted riflemen of Coffee’s brigade, five hundred and
fifty-nine Louisiana militia, one hundred and seven Mississippians, and
eighteen Choctaw Indians,--in all, twenty-one hundred and thirty-one
men and two guns, besides the “Carolina,” which dropped down the river
at four o’clock.[511]
Jackson did not, like Winder, pass the hours in looking at his enemy,
nor did he, like General Smith at Baltimore, send out militia under
militia officers, to stand in close order on an open field and wait
attack. His chief difficulty was due to the ground, which obliged him
to make his main assault in a narrow column along the road. To gain the
advantage of his numbers, he detached Coffee with seven hundred and
thirty-two men, mostly armed with rifles, to make a detour toward the
left and fall on the British flank and rear, while Jackson himself,
with fourteen hundred men and two guns, should strike the British
advance where it was posted on the levee.
[Illustration:
PLAN OF THE
Attack made by MAJ.-GEN. JACKSON
On a division of the British Army commanded
by
MAJOR-GEN. J. KEANE,
On the 23rd December, 1814, at 7 o’clock at night.
by MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR, principal Engineer in the
7th Military District U. S. Army.
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]
The signal for battle was to be given by the “Carolina’s” guns.
Commodore Patterson in the “Carolina” received his orders at half-past
six, and getting out sweeps, brought his vessel in a few minutes
abreast of the British camp, where he anchored close in shore and
began a heavy fire,[512] soon after seven o’clock. Ten minutes later,
Jackson, waiting about two miles above, ordered his men to advance,
and moving down the road with his regulars and New Orleans companies
struck the British outposts about a mile below his point of departure,
at a few minutes before eight o’clock. At the same time Coffee, as he
marched along the edge of the swamp, hearing the signal, wheeled to the
right, and moved toward the British flank.
Night had then fallen. The weary British troops had lain down, when
their sentries on the levee gave the alarm, and immediately afterward
the roar of seven cannon close beside them threw their camp into
confusion. About half an hour afterward, while the “Carolina” still
swept the camp with its shot, the British sentries on the levee a
mile above gave another alarm, and in a few moments the outposts were
sharply attacked.
The accounts of the battle fought along the levee, under the command
of Jackson in person, were both confused and contradictory. Thornton’s
brigade was composed of the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-fifth regiments, a
company of rocketeers, one hundred sappers and miners, and the Fourth
regiment as a support,--in all, sixteen hundred and eighty-eight
rank-and-file.[513] At the point where the fighting began the
British had merely an outpost, which was forced back by Jackson’s
attack, with some difficulty, about one hundred and fifty yards.[514]
Colonel Thornton ordered two of his regiments--the Eighty-fifth and
Ninety-fifth, eight hundred rank-and-file[515]--to support the outpost,
and their arrival checked Jackson’s advance. Indeed, the American line
was driven back and lost ground, until the two field-pieces were in
danger, and were hastily withdrawn.[516] Each party claimed that the
other first withdrew from fire; but the American report admitted that
the battle which began on the levee at eight ceased before nine, while
Jackson seemed not to regard his attack as successful. His first brief
report, written December 26,[517] said,--
“The heavy smoke occasioned by an excessive fire rendered it
necessary that I should draw off my troops, after a severe
conflict of upward of an hour.”
Jackson’s official report of December 27 said,[518]--
“There can be but little doubt that we should have succeeded on
that occasion with our inferior force in destroying or capturing
the enemy, had not a thick fog which arose about eight o’clock
occasioned some confusion among the different corps. Fearing
the consequences, under this circumstance, of the further
prosecution of a night attack with troops then acting together
for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field
that night.”
Although the battle was severest where Jackson commanded, it was most
successful where Coffee attacked. On hearing the “Carolina” open fire,
Coffee turning to the right advanced on the British flank, striking
it nearly opposite to the “Carolina’s” position. The British, thus
surrounded, were placed in a situation which none but the steadiest
troops could have maintained. So great was the confusion that no
organized corps opposed Coffee’s men. Squads of twenty or thirty
soldiers, collecting about any officer in their neighborhood, made head
as they best could against Coffee’s riflemen, and the whole British
position seemed encircled by the American fire. Forced back toward
the river, the British rallied behind an old levee which happened at
that point to run parallel with the new levee, at a distance of about
three hundred yards.[519] Knots of men, mixed in great disorder, here
advancing, there retreating, carried on a desultory battle over the
field, often fighting with clubbed weapons, knives, and fists. At last
the British centre, finding a strong protection in the old levee which
answered for an earthwork, held firm against Coffee’s further advance,
and were also sheltered by the new levee in their rear from the fire of
the “Carolina’s” guns. At about the same time several companies of the
Twenty-first and Ninety-third regiments arrived from Lake Borgne, and
raised the British force to two thousand and fifty rank-and-file.[520]
Coffee then despaired of further success, and withdrew his men from the
field.
“My brigade,” wrote Coffee immediately afterward,[521] “met the
enemy’s line near four hundred yards from the river. The fire on
both sides was kept up remarkably brisk until we drove them to
the river-bank, where they gave a long, heavy fire, and finally
the enemy fell behind the levee or river-bank that is thrown
up. The battle had now lasted near two and a half hours. The
regulars had ceased firing near one hour before I drew my men
back.”
The “Carolina” began firing soon after seven o’clock, and ceased at
nine.[522] Jackson’s attack with the regulars began at eight o’clock,
and his force ceased firing before nine. Coffee withdrew his men
at about half-past nine. The hope of destroying the British force
was disappointed; and brilliant as the affair was, its moral effect
was greater than the material injury it inflicted. Major-General
Keane officially reported his loss as forty-six killed, one hundred
and sixty-seven wounded, and sixty-four missing,--two hundred and
sixty-seven in all.[523] Jackson reported twenty-four killed, one
hundred and fifteen wounded, and seventy-four missing,--two hundred
and thirteen in all. The two regular regiments suffered most, losing
fifteen killed and fifty-four wounded. Coffee’s Tennesseeans lost nine
killed and forty-three wounded. The New Orleans volunteer corps and the
colored volunteers lost seventeen wounded.
Compared with the night battle at Lundy’s Lane, the night battle of
December 23 was not severe. Brown’s army, probably not more numerous
than Jackson’s, lost one hundred and seventy-one men killed, while
Jackson lost twenty-four. Brown lost five hundred and seventy-one
wounded, while Jackson lost one hundred and fifteen. Drummond at
Lundy’s Lane reported a British loss of eighty-four killed, while Keane
reported forty-six. Drummond reported five hundred and fifty-nine
wounded, while Keane reported one hundred and sixty-seven. The total
British loss at Lundy’s Lane was eight hundred and seventy-eight men;
that of December 23 was two hundred and sixty-seven. Jackson’s battle
was comparatively short, lasting an hour and a half, while the fighting
at Lundy’s Lane continued some five hours. Lundy’s Lane checked the
enemy only for a day or two, and the battle of December 23 could hardly
be expected to do more.
Conscious that the British army would advance as soon as its main body
arrived, Jackson, like Brown, hastened to place his men under cover of
works. Falling back the next morning about two miles, he took position
behind an old canal or ditch which crossed the strip of cultivated
ground where it was narrowest. The canal offered no serious obstacle to
an enemy, for although ten feet wide it was shallow and dry, and fully
three quarters of a mile long. Had the British been able to advance in
force at any time the next day, December 24, directing their attack
toward the skirts of the swamp to avoid the “Carolina’s” fire, they
might have forced Jackson back upon New Orleans; but they were in no
disposition to do on the 24th what they had not ventured to do on the
23d, when they possessed every advantage. Keane believed that Jackson’s
force in the night battle amounted to five thousand men.[524] Keane’s
troops, weary, cold, without food, and exposed to the “Carolina’s”
fire, which imprisoned them all day between the two levees,[525] were
glad to escape further attack, and entertained no idea of advance. The
day and night of December 24 were occupied by the British in hurrying
the main body of their troops from the Isle aux Poix across Lake Borgne
to the Bayou Bienvenu.
By very great efforts the boats of the fleet transported the whole
remaining force across the lake, until, on the morning of December 25,
all were concentrated at the Villeré plantation. With them arrived
Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham, and took command. Hitherto the
frequent British disasters at Plattsburg, Sackett’s Harbor, Fort Erie,
and the Moravian towns had been attributed to their generals. Sir
George Prevost, Major-Generals Drummond and Riall, and Major-General
Proctor were not officers of Wellington’s army. The British government,
in appointing Sir Edward Pakenham to command at New Orleans, meant
to send the ablest officer at their disposal. Pakenham was not only
one of Wellington’s best generals, but stood in the close relation
of his brother-in-law, Pakenham’s sister being Wellington’s wife. In
every military respect Sir Edward Pakenham might consider himself the
superior of Andrew Jackson. He was in the prime of life and strength,
thirty-eight years of age, while Jackson, nearly ten years older, was
broken in health and weak in strength. Pakenham had learned the art of
war from Wellington, in the best school in Europe. He was supported by
an efficient staff and a military system as perfect as experience and
expenditure could make it, and he commanded as fine an army as England
could produce, consisting largely of Peninsula veterans.
Their precise number, according to British authority, was five
thousand and forty rank-and-file, on Christmas Day, when Pakenham
took command.[526] Afterward many more arrived, until January 6, when
ten regiments were in camp at Villeré’s plantation,--Royal Artillery;
Fourteenth Light Dragoons; Fourth, Seventh, Twenty-first, Forty-third,
Forty-fourth, Eighty-fifth, Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth
Infantry,--numbering, with sappers and miners and staff-corps, five
thousand nine hundred and thirteen rank-and-file; or with a moderate
allowance of officers, an aggregate of at least sixty-five hundred
Europeans. Two West India regiments of black troops accompanied the
expedition, numbering ten hundred and forty-three rank-and-file.
The navy provided about twelve hundred marines and seamen, perhaps
the most efficient corps in the whole body. Deducting eight hundred
men for camp-duty, Pakenham, according to British official reports,
could put in the field a force of eight thousand disciplined troops,
well-officered, well-equipped, and confident both in themselves and in
their commander. More were on their way.
The Duke of Wellington believed such a force fully competent to
capture New Orleans, or to rout any American army he ever heard of;
and his confidence would have been, if possible, still stronger, had
he known his opponent’s resources, which were no greater and not very
much better than those so easily overcome by Ross at Bladensburg. The
principal difference was that Jackson commanded.
Jackson’s difficulties were very great, and were overcome only by the
desperate energy which he infused even into the volatile creoles and
sluggish negroes. When he retired from the field of the night battle,
he withdrew, as has been told, only two miles. About five miles below
New Orleans he halted his troops. Between the river and the swamp,
the strip of open and cultivated land was there somewhat narrower than
elsewhere. A space of a thousand yards, or about three fifths of a
mile, alone required strong defence. A shallow, dry canal, or ditch,
ten feet wide, crossed the plain and opened into the river on one
side and the swamp on the other. All day the troops, with the negroes
of the neighborhood, worked, deepening the canal, and throwing up a
parapet behind it. The two six-pound field-pieces commanded the road
on the river-bank, and the “Louisiana” descended the river to a point
about two miles below Jackson’s line. A mile below the “Louisiana” the
“Carolina” remained in her old position, opposite the British camp.
By night-fall the new lines were already formidable, and afforded
complete protection from musketry. For further security the parapet
was continued five hundred yards, and turned well on the flank in the
swamp; but this task was not undertaken until December 28.[527]
The first act of Sir Edward Pakenham gave the Americans at least three
days for preparation. Even veteran soldiers, who were accustomed to
storming mountain fortresses held by French armies, were annoyed at
exposing their flank to the fire of fifteen or twenty heavy guns,
which hampered not only every military movement but also every motion
beyond cover of the bank. Pakenham sent instantly to the fleet for
cannon to drive the ships away. In reality he could not so relieve
himself, for the American commodore soon placed one twenty-four-pound
gun and two twelve-pounders in battery on the opposite bank of the
river, where they answered every purpose of annoyance, while the ships
after December 28 took little part in action.[528] Pakenham gained
nothing by waiting; but he would not advance without artillery, and
the sailors, with much labor, brought up a number of light guns,--nine
field-pieces, it was said,[529] two howitzers, and a mortar. Pakenham
passed two days, December 25 and 26, organizing his force and preparing
the battery. At daylight, December 27, the guns were ready. Five pieces
suddenly opened with hot shot and shell on the “Carolina,” and in half
an hour obliged the crew to abandon her.[530] The “Louisiana,” by
extreme exertion, was hauled beyond range while the British battery was
occupied in destroying the “Carolina.”
Nothing then prevented Pakenham’s advance, and the next morning,
December 28, the whole army moved forward.
“On we went,” said the Subaltern, “for about three miles,
without any halt or hindrance, either from man or inanimate
nature coming in our way. But all at once a spectacle was
presented to us, such indeed as we ought to have looked for, but
such as manifestly took our leaders by surprise. The enemy’s
army became visible. It was posted about forty yards in rear of
a canal, and covered, though most imperfectly, by an unfinished
breastwork.”
The British left, coming under the fire of the “Louisiana,” was
immediately halted and placed as far as possible under cover. The
skirmishers in the swamp were recalled. In the evening the whole army
was ordered to retire beyond cannon-shot and hut themselves.[531] They
obeyed; but “there was not a man among us who failed to experience both
shame and indignation.”[532]
Beyond doubt, such caution was not expected from Sir Edward Pakenham.
Sir George Prevost at Sackett’s Harbor and Plattsburg, and Colonel
Brooke at Baltimore had retired before American works; but those works
had been finished forts, strongly held and situated on elevated points.
Even with such excuses, and after suffering severe losses, Prevost was
discredited for his retreats. Pakenham did not live to make a report,
and his reasons remained unavowed; but Admiral Cochrane reported
that it was “thought necessary to bring heavy artillery against this
work, and also against the ship which had cannonaded the army when
advancing.”[533] The decision implied that Pakenham considered the
chances unfavorable for storming the American line.
In effect, Pakenham’s withdrawal December 28 was equivalent to
admitting weakness in his infantry, and to calling on the artillery as
his strongest arm. The experiment showed little self-confidence. Not
only must he sacrifice two or three days in establishing batteries, but
he must challenge a contest with cannon,--weapons which the Americans
were famous for using, both afloat and ashore, with especial skill.
Jackson could also mount heavy guns and allow Pakenham to batter
indefinite lines. Sooner or later Pakenham must storm, unless he could
turn the American position.
[Illustration: Sketch of the Position of the British and American
Forces
NEAR NEW ORLEANS, FROM THE 23rd OF DECEMBER TO THE 8th OF
JANUARY, 1815.
_From original by John Peddie, D. A. Q. M. Genl., endorsed
“Enclosure in M. Genl. Lambert’s of 29 Jany., 1815.”--British
Archives._
REFERENCES.
A. Enemy’s position on the night of the 23rd of December when he
attacked.
B. Bivouac of the troops for the 23rd of December.
C. Position on the night of the 23rd of December.
D. Position on the night of the 24th of December.
E. Position after the advance on the 28th of December.
F. Col. Thornton’s attack on the morning of the 8th of January.
G. Col. Thornton’s furthest advance.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Redoubt and batteries constructed after
the advance of the 28th.
H. The enemy retiring.]
The seamen were once more set to work, and “with incredible labor”
rowed their boats, laden with heavy guns, from the fleet to the
bayou, and dragged the guns through three miles of bog to the
British headquarters. The Americans also prepared batteries. From
the lines one thirty-two-pounder, three twenty-four-pounders, and
one eighteen-pounder commanded the plain in their front. Besides
these heavy guns, three twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, a
six-inch howitzer or mortar, and a brass carronade, useless from its
bad condition,[534]--in all, twelve or thirteen guns, capable of
replying to the British batteries, were mounted along the American
lines. On the west bank of the river, three quarters of a mile away,
Commodore Patterson established, December 30 and 31, a battery of
one twenty-four-pounder and two long twelve-pounders, which took the
British batteries in flank.[535] Thus the Americans possessed
fifteen effective guns, six of which were heavy pieces of long
range. They were worked partly by regular artillerists, partly by
sailors, partly by New Orleans militia, and partly by the “hellish
banditti” of Barataria, who to the number of twenty or thirty were
received by General Jackson into the service and given the care of two
twenty-four-pounders.
The number and position of the British guns were given in Lieutenant
Peddie’s sketch of the field. Before the reconnaissance of December
28, field-pieces had been placed in battery on the river-side to
destroy the “Carolina” and “Louisiana.” Canon Gleig said that “nine
field-pieces, two howitzers, and one mortar” were placed in battery
on the river-side during the night of December 25.[536] Captain
Henley of the “Carolina” reported that five guns opened upon him on
the morning of December 26.[537] Captain Peddie’s sketch marked seven
pieces mounted in battery on the river-side, bearing on Commodore
Patterson’s battery opposite, besides four pieces in two batteries
below. Their range was sufficient to destroy the “Carolina” and pierce
the breastwork across the river,[538] and therefore they were probably
twelve and nine pounders.
Besides these lighter long-range guns, the British constructed three
batteries in the night of December 31.
“Four eighteen-pounders,” reported Major Forrest,[539] British
assistant-quartermaster-general, “were placed in a battery
formed of hogsheads of sugar, on the main road, to fire upon
the ship if she dropped down. Preparations were also made to
establish batteries,--one of six eighteen-pounders, and one
of four twenty-four-pound carronades; also batteries for the
field-pieces and howitzers, the latter to keep the fire of
the enemy under, while the troops were to be moved forward in
readiness to storm the works as soon as a practicable breach was
effected.”
According to Peddie’s sketch the Battery No. 6, on the road or new
levee, contained not four but two guns. Battery No. 5, some fifty yards
from No. 6, contained six guns, as Major Forrest reported. Battery No.
4, to the left of the old levee, contained four guns, probably the
carronades. Battery No. 3, to the right of the old levee, contained
five guns, probably the field-pieces and howitzers. In all, seventeen
guns bore on the American lines,--besides seven, in Batteries No. 7 and
No. 8, bearing on Commodore Patterson’s three-gun battery across the
river. According to Gleig,[540] the British had thirty guns; but in
any case they used not less than twenty-four guns, throwing a heavier
weight of metal than was thrown by the fifteen pieces used by the
Americans. The British artillery was served by regular artillerists.
These details were particularly interesting, because the artillery
battle of Jan. 1, 1815, offered the best test furnished during the
war of relative skill in the use of that arm. The attack had every
advantage over the defence. The British could concentrate their fire
to effect a breach for their troops to enter; the Americans were
obliged to disperse their fire on eight points. The American platforms
being elevated, offered a better target than was afforded by the low
British batteries, and certainly were no better protected. Three of
the American guns were in battery across the river, three quarters of
a mile from the main British battery of six eighteen-pounders, while
the “Louisiana’s” carronades were beyond range, and the “Louisiana”
herself was not brought into action.[541] On the American side the
battle was fought entirely by the guns in Jackson’s lines and in
Patterson’s battery across the river,--one thirty-two-pounder, four
twenty-four-pounders, one eighteen-pounder, five twelve-pounders,
three six-pounders, and a howitzer,--fifteen American guns in all,
matched against ten British eighteen-pounders, four twenty-four-pound
carronades, and ten field-pieces and howitzers,--twenty-four guns in
all. If the British field-pieces were twelves and nines, the weight
of metal was at least three hundred and fifty pounds on the British
side against two hundred and twenty-four pounds on the American side,
besides two howitzers against one.
The main British batteries were about seven hundred yards distant from
Jackson’s line. Opposite to the battery of six eighteen-pounders were
the American thirty-two and three twenty-four-pounders. Behind the
British batteries the British army waited for the order to assault.
Toward eight o’clock on the morning of Jan. 1, 1815, the British opened
a hot fire accompanied by a shower of rockets. The American guns
answered, and the firing continued without intermission until toward
noon, when the British fire slackened, and at one o’clock the British
artillerists abandoned their batteries, leaving the guns deserted.
During the entire war, no other battle was fought in which the defeated
party had not some excuse to offer for inferiority. Usually the excuse
ascribed greater force to the victor than to the vanquished, or dwelt
upon some accident or oversight which affected the result. For the
defeat of the British artillery, Jan. 1, 1815, no excuse was ever
suggested.[542] The British army and navy frankly admitted that the
misfortune was due to American superiority in the use of artillery.
British evidence on that point was ample, for their surprise and
mortification were extreme; while the Americans seemed never fully to
appreciate the extraordinary character of the feat they performed. The
most detailed British account was also the most outspoken.
“Never was any failure more remarkable or unlooked-for than
this,” said Gleig....[543] “The sun, as if ashamed to shine upon
our disgrace, was slow of making its appearance; a heavy mist
obscured him, and the morning was far advanced before it cleared
away. At last, however, the American lines were visible, and
then began a fire from our batteries, so brisk and so steadily
kept up that we who were behind made not the smallest doubt
of its effect. It was answered for a while faintly, and with
seeming difficulty. By and by, however, the enemy’s salutation
became more spirited, till it gradually surpassed our own, both
in rapidity and precision. We were a good deal alarmed at this,
and the more that a rumor got abroad that our batteries were not
proof against the amazing force of the American shot. We had,
it may be stated, imprudently rolled into the parapets barrels
filled with sugar, under the impression that sugar would prove
as effectual as sand in checking the progress of cannon-balls.
But the event showed that we had been completely mistaken. The
enemy’s shot penetrated these sugar-hogsheads as if they had
been so many empty casks, dismounting our guns and killing our
artillery-men in the very centre of their works. There could be
small doubt, as soon as these facts were established, how the
cannonading would end. Our fire slackened every moment; that
of the Americans became every moment more terrible, till at
length, after not more than two hours and a half of firing, our
batteries were all silenced. The American works, on the other
hand, remained as little injured as ever, and we were completely
foiled.”
Admiral Codrington, writing from the British headquarters three days
after the battle, expressed equal astonishment and annoyance:[544]--
“On the 1st we had our batteries, by severe labor, ready in
situations from which the artillery people were, as a matter
of course, to destroy and silence the opposing batteries, and
give opportunity for a well-arranged storm. But instead of so
doing, not a gun of the enemy appeared to suffer, and our firing
too high was not made out until we had expended too much of our
hardly-collected ammunition to push the matter further. Such a
failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected, and I think
it a blot in the artillery escutcheon.”
Codrington somewhat under-estimated the effect of the British fire.
Three of the American guns, including the thirty-two-pounder, were more
or less damaged, and the cotton-bales which formed the cheeks of the
embrasures proved to be as little serviceable as the hogsheads of sugar
in the British river battery.[545] Two artillery caissons were exploded
by the British rockets. Thirty-four men were killed or wounded; while
the British reported a loss of seventy-six killed and wounded between
Jan. 1 and 5, 1815, most of whom fell in the artillery battle.[546]
The British official reports said less, but their silence was equally
significant.
“Our batteries made little impression upon the enemy’s parapet,”
wrote Major Forrest.[547] “The order for the assault was
therefore not carried into effect. The troops remained in this
advanced position, and orders were given to retire the guns in
the night. The evening changed to wet, and the ground became in
consequence so deep that it required the exertions of the whole
army as a working-party, aided by the seamen, to retire the guns
a short distance before daylight. The army then fell back to the
position it occupied on the 31st.”
Admiral Cochrane’s official report was still more brief, and best
understood by the comments already quoted from his friend Admiral
Codrington:--
“On the 1st instant batteries were opened; but our fire not
having the desired effect, the attack was deferred until the
arrival of the troops under Major-General Lambert, which was
daily expected.”
If the Subaltern was right, the British defeat resulted in the loss of
several guns.
“The enemy having made no attempt to carry off our heavy
guns, which we abandoned to their fate,” continued Gleig, “it
was judged advisable to bring them into the camp as soon as
circumstances would allow; and for this purpose working parties
were again sent out as soon as the darkness screened them. It
was my fortune to accompany them. The labor of dragging a number
of huge ship’s guns out of the soft soil into which they had
sunk, crippled too as most of them were in their carriages, was
more extreme by far than any one expected to find it. Indeed,
it was not till four o’clock in the morning that our task came
to a conclusion, and even then it had been very imperfectly
performed. Five guns were eventually left behind. These were
rendered useless, it is true, by breaking their trunnions; but
it cannot be said that in the course of the late operations the
British army came off without the loss of some of its artillery.”
[Illustration:
PLAN
OF THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF THE
AMERICAN LINES
Below New Orleans, on the 8th January, 1815.
By MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR, principal Engineer 7th
Military District, U. S. Army, 1815.
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]