A DESPATCH from Lord Bathurst, marked “most secret,” and dated
July 30, 1814, informed Major-General Ross that, after finishing his
operations in Chesapeake Bay, he was to sail with his whole force to
Jamaica, where he would join an expedition then preparing in England
to rendezvous at Cape Negril on the west coast of Jamaica about
November 20. Lieutenant-General Lord Hill was to command the combined
land-forces.[438] These orders were given before the arrival of a long
report from Vice-Admiral Cochrane concerning the military condition
of the American territories on the Gulf of Mexico, which Cochrane
considered such “that he had no doubt in his mind that three thousand
British troops landed at Mobile, where they would be joined by all the
Indians, with the disaffected French and Spaniards, would drive the
Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas.”[439]
Circumstances induced the British government to defer sending Lord
Hill, with a large force, to the Gulf; and Cochrane was informed by
a despatch, dated August 10, that Major-General Ross was directed to
carry out the Vice-Admiral’s plans, which required fewer men.[440]
Orders were sent to Ross, of the same date, informing him that
reinforcements amounting to more than twenty-one hundred rank-and-file
were preparing to sail from England, which with the Fifth West India
regiment and two hundred black pioneers from Jamaica would enable Ross
to carry more than five thousand effective rank-and-file to the theatre
of his operations.[441]
Ross’s detailed instructions were dated September 6.[442] They began
by recounting the force which was intended to act against New Orleans.
The brigade from the Gironde which Ross took to the Chesapeake was
estimated at about twenty-three hundred effectives, and a battalion
which he had taken from Bermuda was supposed to have raised his
rank-and-file to thirty-four hundred men. In addition to this force,
a brigade under Major-General Keane, numbering twenty-one hundred and
fifty men, was under orders for Jamaica, which with the black troops
would enable Ross to proceed to his destination “with near six thousand
men, exclusive of the marines and seamen.... About the same time you
will be joined by the First West India regiment from Guadeloupe.”
The objects which rendered the success of the expedition “extremely
important” were two: first, the command of the mouth of the
Mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of America of their
communication with the sea; second, “to occupy some important and
valuable possession by the restoration of which we may improve the
conditions of peace, or which may entitle us to exact its cession as
the price of peace.”
The point of attack was left to the discretion of Cochrane and Ross.
They might proceed directly against New Orleans, or move in the
first instance into the back parts of Georgia and the country of the
friendly Indians. In either case, the second object in view could not
be attained against the will of the inhabitants. “With their favor and
co-operation, on the other hand, we may expect to rescue the whole
province of Louisiana from the United States.”
“If therefore you shall find in the inhabitants a general and
decided disposition to withdraw from their recent connection
with the United States, either with the view of establishing
themselves as an independent people or of returning under the
dominion of the Spanish Crown, you will give them every support
in your power; you will furnish them with arms and clothing, and
assist in forming and disciplining the several levies, provided
you are fully satisfied of the loyalty of their intentions,
which will be best evinced by their committing themselves in
some act of decided hostility against the United States....
You will discountenance any proposition of the inhabitants to
place themselves under the dominion of Great Britain; and
you will direct their disposition toward returning under the
protection of the Spanish Crown rather than to the attempting
to maintain what it will be much more difficult to secure
substantially,--their independence as a separate State; and you
must give them clearly to understand that Great Britain cannot
pledge herself to make the independence of Louisiana, or its
restoration to the Spanish Crown, a _sine qua non_ of peace
with the United States.”
After occupying New Orleans, Ross and Cochrane were to decide whether
any further military operations could be carried on; and if nothing
of material importance could be attempted, they were to send the
disposable part of their force to Bermuda.
Ross’s report of the capture of Washington reached Lord Bathurst
September 27, and caused so much satisfaction that the British
government decided to show its approval by placing another
major-general, Lambert, with a brigade numbering twenty-two hundred
rank-and-file, under Ross’s command, to be used without restriction,
either in the Middle or the Southern States.[443] The Prince Regent
highly applauded the ability with which Ross had conducted the capture
of Washington, “an enterprise so creditable to his Majesty’s arms,
and so well calculated to humble the presumption of the American
government, which contrary to the real interests, and as it is believed
contrary to the prevailing wish, of the nation has involved that
country in an unnecessary and unjust war against his Majesty.”[444]
Only in one respect did Bathurst hint a criticism on the course pursued
by Ross. While informing him, September 29, that reinforcements were
on their way which would place upward of ten thousand men under his
command, to be used very much at his discretion, Bathurst added,[445]--
“You and your troops have gained great credit in the discipline
you observed at Washington. It is no disparagement of your
merit to say that it was prudent as well as merciful to show
such forbearance. If, however, you should attack Baltimore, and
could, consistent with that discipline _which it is essential
for you not to relax_, make its inhabitants _feel_
a little more the effects of your visit than what has been
experienced at Washington, you would make that portion of the
American people experience the consequences of the war who have
most contributed to its existence.”
When this despatch was written, Ross had made his attack on Baltimore,
and had failed. The report of his failure and death was received by the
War Department in London October 17, and Bathurst as soon as possible
selected a new commander for the expedition to New Orleans. Orders,
dated October 24, were sent to Major-Generals Sir Edward Pakenham and
Gibbs to join Vice-Admiral Cochrane forthwith, detailing the force at
their command. Pakenham was to follow the instructions already given
to Ross, and was especially enjoined to conciliate the people of
Louisiana:--
“You will for that purpose cause the force under your command
to observe the strictest discipline; to respect the lives and
the property of all those who are inclined to a peaceable
deportment, and by no means to excite the black population to
rise against their masters.”
The “Statira” received orders, October 28, to convey Major-Generals
Pakenham and Gibbs to the rendezvous at Negril Bay in Jamaica, whither
the large force intended for New Orleans was already moving from
several distant quarters. The day for beginning the movement on New
Orleans was already fixed for November 20, and Pakenham could at that
season hardly expect to reach Jamaica in time to sail with his troops.
Meanwhile the English press talked openly of the expedition and its
object.
Military District No. 7, in which New Orleans and Mobile were
situated, had not been neglected by the United States government.
The regular force assigned by Secretary Armstrong for its defence
consisted of five regiments of United States Infantry,--the Second,
Third, Seventh, Thirty-ninth, and Forty-fourth, with three hundred
and fifty artillerists,--an aggregate of two thousand three hundred
and seventy-eight men. The provision was relatively liberal. District
No. 5, on Chesapeake Bay, contained an aggregate of two thousand two
hundred and eight regular troops; District No. 6, including North and
South Carolina and Georgia, was allotted two thousand two hundred and
forty-four men. One half the regular army was employed in such garrison
duty, and a greater number could not have been allotted consistently
with retaining an army in the field. Indeed, the only means by which
Armstrong could provide so strong a defence, aggregating nearly eight
thousand men, for the Southern States was by stripping Massachusetts.
District No. 1, including Massachusetts and Maine, contained only
six hundred and fifty-five regular troops; and District No. 2,
including Rhode Island and Connecticut, contained only seven hundred
and fourteen. Besides the regular troops, New Orleans enjoyed the
protection of gunboats and one or two larger armed vessels. The city
needed only an efficient commander to defy any ordinary attack.
Armstrong supplied a commander who might, as he believed, be safely
considered efficient. In the month of May Andrew Jackson was appointed
to the command of Military District No. 7, with headquarters at
Mobile. At that moment Jackson, having finished the Creek war, was
about to make the necessary arrangements for the future control of the
Creek nation, and he did not take immediate command of his district.
No occasion for haste existed. During the summer of 1814 no British
force of consequence approached the Gulf of Mexico, or was likely to
approach it until the frosts began. Jackson was detained in the centre
of Alabama, undisturbed by fears for New Orleans, until the so-called
Treaty or Capitulation of August 9 with the Creeks released him from
further duties in that region. He left the Creek country August 11,
with his regular troops, going by water down the Alabama River, and
arriving at Mobile about August 15.
At the same moment government was brought to a stand-still at
Washington by the appearance of General Ross’s army in the Patuxent,
and the raids on Washington and Baltimore. Between August 20 and
September 25 the War Department could do little more than attend to
its own pressing dangers. Jackson was left independent, substantially
dictator over the Southwest. If New England carried out its intentions,
and the government sank, as seemed probable, into helplessness, his
dictatorship was likely to be permanent.
When Jackson arrived at Mobile, August 15, the defence of New Orleans
was not in his mind. The people of Tennessee and Georgia had long
been bent on the seizure of the Floridas, and Jackson had been one of
the most ardent in favoring the step. The Creek war and the escape of
the hostile Creeks to East Florida strengthened his conviction that
the Spaniards must be expelled. He had begun the war with the idea
of pushing his army directly through the Creek country to Pensacola,
which he meant to hold.[446] The instant he succeeded in destroying
the military power of the Creeks, he began preparations for invading
Florida. As early as July he wrote to the War Department suggesting an
attack on Pensacola:--
“Will you only say to me, Raise a few hundred militia (which
can be quickly done), and with such a regular force as can be
conveniently collected, make a descent upon Pensacola and reduce
it?”[447]
At the same time Jackson entered, July 12, into an angry correspondence
with the Spanish governor of Pensacola, and requested him to deliver
up the Creek warriors who had taken refuge in East Florida,--a demand
with which he knew that the Spaniard had no means of complying. August
10 he wrote to Armstrong announcing that he had given orders for the
reoccupation of Mobile Point. “The United States in possession of
Pensacola and Mobile, well defended, our whole coast and country in
this quarter would be secure.”[448] A direct attack by the British on
New Orleans had not occurred to his mind.
Although Jackson received no answer from Washington to his suggestion,
he came to Mobile, August 15, determined to pursue his object;
and his decision was confirmed by the eccentric conduct of Major
Nicholls, an Irish officer, who was sent to Pensacola, July 23, with
the sloops-of-war “Hermes” and “Carron,” with four officers, eleven
non-commissioned officers, and ninety-seven privates of the Royal
Marines, taking two howitzers, a field-piece, a thousand stand of
arms, and three hundred suits of clothing for the Creek warriors.[449]
Nicholls landed his marines, seized Fort Barrancas, disembarked arms,
and began to collect the fugitive Creeks, commonly known as Red Sticks,
with a view to invading Louisiana, while he spread extravagant stories
of his plans.
Had the British government sent Nicholls to Pensacola expressly to
divert Jackson’s attention from New Orleans, he could not have used
his means more successfully for his purpose. Jackson at Mobile, some
sixty miles away, learned within forty-eight hours what Nicholls was
doing at Pensacola, and wrote instantly, August 27, to Governor Blount
of Tennessee,[450] calling out the whole quota of Tennessee militia,
twenty-five hundred men, who were to march instantly to Mobile. “It is
currently reported in Pensacola,” he added, “that the Emperor of Russia
has offered his Britannic Majesty fifty thousand of his best troops for
the conquest of Louisiana, and that this territory will fall a prey to
the enemy before the expiration of one month.”
During the next three months Nicholls with a mere handful of men
distracted Jackson’s whole attention. From Pensacola, August 29,
Nicholls issued a proclamation calling on the natives of Louisiana
to assist him “in liberating from a faithless, imbecile government”
their paternal soil.[451] A few days afterward, September 3, a British
sloop-of-war, the “Sophie,” appeared at Barataria, forty miles
south of New Orleans. There for several years smugglers and pirates
had established a station, to the scandal of society and with its
connivance.[452] Three Frenchmen, the brothers Laffite,--Jean, Pierre,
and Dominique,--ruled over this community, and plundered impartially
the commerce of England and Spain, while defying the laws of the United
States and the power of the national government.[453] The British
sloop-of-war brought to Jean Laffite a letter from Major Nicholls
asking him and his men, with their vessels, to enter into British
service, under penalty of destruction to their establishment.[454]
Laffite, preferring to make terms with the United States, and knowing
that the authorities at New Orleans were about to break up his
establishment in any case, sent to Governor Claiborne the letters he
received from Captain Lockyer of the “Sophie,” and offered his services
to defend Barataria.
Nothing in these demonstrations suggested a direct attack on New
Orleans. Nicholls constantly gave out that he meant to attack Mobile,
and from there “push for New Orleans;”[455] but his force was wholly
inadequate, and his rank was much too low, to warrant the belief that
he intended a serious campaign. Yet such noisy and insulting conduct
was adapted to irritate a man of Jackson’s temper, and to keep his
attention fixed on Mobile and Pensacola. Nicholls even undertook to
annoy Jackson in his headquarters.
On a bare sand-point at the entrance of Mobile Bay, General Wilkinson,
on taking possession of Mobile in April, 1818, established a battery
which he armed with Spanish cannon. The redoubt, which was called
Fort Bowyer, could not hold against a land attack properly supported,
and offered a temptation to the enemy; but in the absence of a land
force competent to besiege it, the fortification was useful to close
the entrance of Mobile Bay against marauders. In Fort Bowyer Jackson
placed one hundred and sixty men of the Second United States Infantry,
commanded by Major William Lawrence. Twenty guns were mounted on the
platforms, but according to the American account only two twenty-four
pounders and six twelve-pounders were likely to prove serviceable.[456]
[Illustration:
PLAN
Shewing the Attack made by a
BRITISH SQUADRON
ON
Fort Bowyer at Mobile Pt.
ON THE 15 SEPTR., 1815.
By MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR,
Principal Engineer 7th Military Dist., U.S. Army, 1815.]
The British force at Pensacola consisted chiefly of four sloops,
commanded by Captain W. H. Percy,--the “Hermes,” twenty-two guns, the
“Carron,” twenty, and the “Sophie” and “Childers” of eighteen guns
each. The usual armament of such vessels consisted of thirty-two-pound
carronades, with two long-nines or sixes. Apparently the British
squadron threw thirty-four thirty-two-pound shot, and four nine
or six pound balls at a broadside. Whether the armament was greater
or smaller mattered little, for Captain Percy was unable to use with
effect the batteries of either the “Carron” or the “Childers.” With
much difficulty, owing to the shoals, he brought his squadron within
range of Fort Bowyer, and with more gallantry than discretion prepared
for the attack.
According to the British account, the land force at Percy’s command
consisted of sixty marines and one hundred and twenty Indians, with
one five-and-a-half-inch howitzer. According to the American account,
a twelve-pound field-piece was placed ashore in battery with the
howitzer. Such a force was insufficient to do more than intercept the
garrison if it should be driven out of the fort. The brunt of the
action fell on the ships, and experience did not warrant Percy in
believing that his sloops, with their carronades, could silence a work
like Fort Bowyer.
Nevertheless Percy gallantly made the attempt. At half-past four of
the afternoon of September 15, he brought the “Hermes” close in, and
opened fire within musket-shot of the fort. The “Sophie” came to anchor
some distance astern, but within range. The “Carron” and the “Childers”
anchored so far out that their carronades were useless, and apparently
even the American twenty-four-pounders did not touch them. The “Hermes”
and the “Sophie” alone sustained injury,[457] but their experience was
decisive. After an hour’s action, the cable of the “Hermes” being
cut, she became unmanageable, and at last grounded and was abandoned.
Captain Percy set her on fire, and carried his crew, including the
wounded, with much difficulty to his other vessels. The “Sophie”
withdrew from fire, and the squadron returned at once to Pensacola.
Assuming that Captain Percy could use with effect only the twenty guns
of the broadsides of the “Hermes” and “Sophie” against the twenty
guns of the fort, the American gunnery was evidently superior to the
British. The “Hermes” lost twenty-five men killed and twenty-four
wounded,--a very severe loss in a crew which could not much have
exceeded one hundred and fifty men. A better test of marksmanship was
offered by the “Sophie,” which received comparatively little attention
from the fort, but lost six killed and sixteen wounded. The whole
American loss was reported as four killed and five wounded,[458] under
the combined fire of both ships at close range, the fort having no
casemates, and parapets only on the front and flanks.[459] Three guns
were dismounted.
Greatly pleased by this success, Jackson issued a
counter-proclamation[460] to the people of Louisiana, somewhat in the
style of that which Nicholls had issued three weeks before.
“The base, the perfidious Britons,” it began, “have attempted
to invade your country. They had the temerity to attack Fort
Bowyer with their incongruous horde of Indians and negro
assassins.... The proud, vain-glorious boaster Colonel Nicholls,
when he addressed you, Louisianians and Kentuckians, had
forgotten that you were the votaries of freedom.... I ask you,
Louisianians, can we place any confidence in the honor of men
who have courted an alliance with pirates and robbers? Have not
these noble Britons, these honorable men, Colonel Nicholls and
the honorable Captain W. H. Percy, the true representatives of
their royal master, done this? Have they not made offers to the
pirates of Barataria to join them and their holy cause? And have
they not dared to insult you by calling on you to associate as
brethren with them and this hellish banditti?”
With the exception of this proclamation and another[461] of the same
date to the free negroes of Louisiana, Jackson paid no attention to the
defence of New Orleans, but left it entirely to Governor Claiborne.
He disregarded a memorial from the citizens, dated September 18,
urging his personal attention and presence. “My whole force would not
satisfy the demands they make,” he wrote to the War Department, October
10.[462] “As soon as security is given to this section of my district,
which is first indispensably necessary, I shall hasten to New Orleans,”
he wrote from Mobile, October 14.[463] He entertained no doubt that
at Mobile he stood between the British and their object. “Unless
Pensacola were reduced,” said his confidential biographer[464] ten
years afterward, “it was vain to think of defending the country.... The
attack on Mobile Point was a confirmation of his previous conjectures
as to the views of the enemy.”
The Government at Washington became alarmed. While Jackson waited at
Mobile for the arrival of General Coffee with his Tennesseeans to
attack Pensacola, Monroe at Washington received warnings from Europe,
Halifax, and Bermuda that the British force which had just laid
Washington in ashes was but a division of a larger army on its way to
attack New Orleans. He wrote to Jackson, September 25,[465]--
“There is great cause to believe that the enemy have set on
foot an expedition against Louisiana, through the Mobile, in
the expectation that while so strong a pressure was made from
Canada and in this quarter, whereby the force of the country and
attention of the government would be much engaged, a favorable
opportunity would be afforded them to take possession of the
lower part of that State, and of all the country along the
Mobile.”
The President, he continued, had ordered five thousand additional
troops from Tennessee to march to Jackson’s aid, and had directed
the governor of Georgia to hold twenty-five hundred more subject to
Jackson’s orders. He had also sent one hundred thousand dollars in
Treasury notes to Governor Blount of Tennessee, to be applied to the
necessary expenses of the campaign, and Jackson could draw on him for
the necessary funds. The orders to the governor of Tennessee were sent
the same day, September 25. A week later, October 3, Monroe wrote to
Governor Shelby of Kentucky, requesting him to send twenty-five hundred
men to Jackson. Again, October 10, Monroe wrote to Jackson, informing
him that not less than twelve thousand five hundred men were already
subject to his orders, from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia:
“There is strong reason to presume, from intelligence just
received from our ministers at Ghent, that a British force
consisting of twelve or fifteen thousand men sailed from
Ireland early in September for New Orleans and the Mobile, with
intention to take possession of that city and of the country
through which the great rivers on which the whole of the United
States westward of the Alleghany Mountains so essentially
depends.”
When Monroe received a letter from Jackson, dated September 9,
indicating his intention of attacking Pensacola, the secretary replied
October 21,[466] forbidding the step. “I hasten to communicate to
you the directions of the President that you should at present take
no measures which would involve this government in a contest with
Spain.” He reiterated the warning that British forces would probably
be directed against Louisiana; but he did not order Jackson to New
Orleans, nor did he notify him that arms would be sent there. Not until
November 2 were orders given that four thousand stand of arms should be
sent from Pittsburg, and only November 11 and 15 were the arms shipped,
not by steamer but by the ordinary flatboat.[467] Even then the arms
were in advance of the men. The governor of Tennessee could not appoint
an earlier day than November 13 for mustering the new levies, and on
that day three thousand men assembled at Nashville, while two thousand
collected at Knoxville. Not till November 20 did the Nashville division
start down the river, to arrive a month later at New Orleans.
Jackson quietly waited at Mobile for the twenty-five hundred men he
had summoned from Tennessee by his letter of August 27. Two months
were consumed in this manner. The Tennessee brigade, under command
of General Coffee, marched promptly, and passing through the Indian
country arrived October 25 at Mobile. Coffee brought with him somewhat
more than the number of men required by the call. His force was about
twenty-eight hundred.[468] Jackson held at Mobile the Second, Third,
Thirty-ninth, and Forty-fourth United States Infantry, besides some
Mississippi troops and Choctaw Indians.[469] With the Tennesseeans he
could dispose of more than four thousand troops.
Notwithstanding Monroe’s warning letter of September 25, Jackson still
paid no immediate attention to New Orleans. October 28 he wrote to
Monroe, acknowledging a letter from him of September 27, and announcing
that he was then organizing an attack on Pensacola. Having no authority
for the act, and aware that the Government was anxious about New
Orleans, he added: “I hope in a few weeks to place this quarter in
perfect security, and to be able to move to New Orleans with General
Coffee’s mounted men.”[470] October 31 Jackson wrote, apparently for
the first time, that he needed arms, and that half the arms of the
militia were not fit for use.[471]
Taking four thousand one hundred men,[472] without trains, Jackson
marched November 3 against Pensacola, which he occupied, November 7,
with little resistance, although “Spanish treachery,” he said,[473]
“kept us out of possession of the fort until nearly twelve o’clock at
night.” The next morning the British blew up Fort Barrancas, six miles
below, where they had established themselves, and Colonel Nicholls
sailed away no farther than the Appalachicola River, leaving Jackson
to do what he pleased with Pensacola, a position of no value to either
party.
Even Armstrong, who favored Jackson against what he thought the
ill-will of Madison and Monroe, afterward condemned the movement
against Pensacola. “The general’s attack and capture of the town on the
7th of November, 1814, was to say the least of it decidedly ill-judged,
involving at once an offence to a neutral power, and a probable
misapplication of both time and force as regarded the defence of New
Orleans.”[474] Jackson remained only two days at the place, and then
returned to Mobile, where he arrived November 11 and remained until
November 22, as though still in doubt. He detached Major Blue of the
Thirty-ninth United States Infantry, with a thousand mounted men, to
the Appalachicola to break up the depot established there for supplying
assistance to the Red Stick Indians.[475] Nothing indicated that he
felt anxiety for the safety of New Orleans, although the British
expedition, comprising some fifty vessels, was then at Jamaica, and
November 26 actually sailed for the Mississippi.[476]
Jackson’s conduct greatly alarmed the President and the Secretary of
War. When the despatches arrived at Washington announcing what was
taking place at Mobile and Pensacola, Monroe hastened to order General
Gaines to Mobile. He wrote to Jackson, December 7,[477]--
“General Gaines is ordered to join you and act under you in
the defence of New Orleans and of the district under your
command. Full confidence is entertained that this appointment
of an officer of his merit will afford to you a very acceptable
aid in the discharge of your highly important duties.... Much
anxiety is felt lest you should remain too long on the Mobile.
The city [New Orleans], it is presumed, is the principal
object of the enemy, and it cannot be defended on either of
the passes by which it may be approached,--one by the river
Mississippi itself, another by the Fourche, the third by Lake
Pontchartrain,--without occupying the ground bearing on these
passes.”
Three days afterward, December 10, Monroe wrote again in stronger
terms:[478]--
“It is hoped that you will have long since taken a suitable position
on the river to afford complete protection to that city. Mobile is
a comparatively trifling object with the British government. Your
presence at such a point on the river with the main body of your troops
will be of vital importance.”
Jackson left Mobile November 22, four days before the British
expedition under Sir Edward Pakenham sailed from Jamaica. Both Jackson
and Pakenham were moving to New Orleans at the same time. Pakenham
brought with him an immense fleet and a large army. Jackson, instead
of taking, as Monroe hoped, “the main body” of his troops, left at
Mobile the main body, consisting of the Second, Third, and Thirty-ninth
regiments, about a thousand or twelve hundred men.
According to his friend’s biography, probably founded on his own
information, Jackson’s “principal fears at present were that
Mobile might fall, the left bank of the Mississippi be gained, all
communication with the Western States cut off, and New Orleans be thus
unavoidably reduced.”[479] That the British should advance against the
Mississippi by way of Mobile was improbable, as Monroe pointed out; but
they could have taken no course which better suited the resources of
Jackson. A march of near two hundred miles, through a barren and wooded
country, with Jackson’s whole force concentrated in their front, was an
undertaking that promised little success.
Leaving at Mobile three regular regiments, Jackson ordered the
Forty-fourth regiment to New Orleans, and directed Coffee with two
thousand of his mounted brigade to march to Baton Rouge. He was himself
ill and suffering, and made no excessive haste. “I leave this for New
Orleans on the 22d instant,” he wrote to Monroe, November 20,[480] “and
if my health permits, shall reach there in twelve days. I travel by
land, to have a view of the points at which the enemy might effect a
landing.” Starting from Mobile November 22, he arrived at New Orleans,
about one hundred and twenty-five miles, on December 2.[481] His troops
were then much scattered. The main body was at Mobile. The Forty-fourth
regiment was in march from Mobile to New Orleans, where the Seventh
regiment was already stationed. A thousand volunteer horsemen, part
of Coffee’s brigade, under Major Blue of the Thirty-ninth Infantry,
were scouring the Escambia, Yellow Water, and other remote Florida
recesses. The remainder of Coffee’s brigade was at Baton Rouge December
4, greatly reduced by various causes, and numbering only twelve hundred
men.[482] A few Mississippi dragoons were near them. A division of
Tennessee militia, twenty-five hundred strong, under General Carroll,
had started from Nashville November 20, and might be expected at
New Orleans about December 20. A division of Kentucky militia, also
twenty-five hundred strong, was on its way, and might arrive about
the new year. Meanwhile the British expedition was sailing, with much
deliberation, past the shores of Cuba, toward Florida.[483]
At New Orleans nothing had yet been done for defence; but inaction
was not the worst. Jackson found the people despondent and
distrustful.[484] The legislature showed incompetence and, as
Jackson believed, indifference. The whole population of Louisiana
was but small, containing certainly not more than fifty thousand
white inhabitants; while the city of New Orleans probably numbered
hardly more than twenty thousand persons including slaves. The State
government supplied one thousand militia under the general requisition
of the President.[485] The city raised a battalion of volunteers nearly
three hundred strong, a rifle company numbering sixty-two men when in
the field, and a battalion of free mulattoes, chiefly refugees from St.
Domingo, which produced two hundred and ten men,--in all, between five
and six hundred troops. Jackson immediately reviewed the companies,
December 2, and could expect no further aid from these sources. No arms
were in store, even if men could be found, and none of the necessary
supplies of an army had been provided.
Jackson’s first act after arriving at New Orleans showed no
consciousness of danger. Armstrong, criticising his measures, afterward
said:[486] “Had the general been better acquainted with military
history, he would not have suffered a single day of the twenty he had
for preparation to have passed without forming one or more intrenched
camps for the protection of the city.” Instead of doing this, Jackson
did what had been done by Armstrong and Winder at Washington in
August. Having arrived in the city December 2, he started two days
afterward to inspect Fort St. Philip on the river sixty miles below. He
returned to New Orleans December 11,[487] believing that the British
would approach by the river, and prepared works to arrest their
advance.[488] He then rode out to Chef Menteur and Lake Pontchartrain
on the north, which he thought the next probable point of attack. He
was still absent, December 15, examining the situation of different
works northward of the city, when the British expedition struck its
first blow.[489]
Six American gunboats, the whole force on the lakes, watched the
entrance of Lake Borgne through which the British must pass if they
attacked New Orleans by way of the lakes. They were stationed for
observation rather than for resistance,--although for observation a few
fishermen’s boats would have been more useful. The British expedition,
upward of fifty sail, made land December 10,[490] and was seen by the
gunboats, which retired within the lake. The British land-forces were
transferred from the heavy ships into the lighter vessels, and under
convoy of sloops-of-war entered Lake Borgne December 13. The boats of
the squadron, carrying about a thousand seamen and marines,[491] left
the ships during the night of December 12 in search of the American
gunboats, which tried to escape, but were becalmed and obliged by the
tide to anchor. After a tedious row of thirty-six hours the British
boats overtook the gunboat flotilla December 14, and after a sharp
struggle succeeded in capturing the whole, with a loss of seventeen men
killed and seventy-seven wounded.[492] The American crews numbered one
hundred and eighty-two men, and lost six killed and thirty-five wounded.
News of the capture of the gunboats, which occurred at noon December
14 about forty miles to the eastward of New Orleans, arrived on the
evening of December 15, and produced the utmost consternation.[493]
Jackson hurried back to the city, where his presence was no longer a
matter of choice but necessity. Instantly on hearing the news he sent
expresses to Coffee at Baton Rouge, and to Carroll and Thomas, wherever
they might be found on the river, urging them to hasten with all
possible speed to New Orleans. He issued a proclamation to the people
of the city, in which he threatened them with punishment if they were
not unanimous,[494] and at the same time he recommended the legislature
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Finding the legislature hesitate,
Jackson declared martial law by proclamation[495] the same day,
December 16, and assumed dictatorial powers.
[Illustration:
MAP
SHEWING THE LANDING OF THE
BRITISH ARMY
_its several Encampments and fortifications
on the Mississippi and the works
they erected on their Retreat; also the
different posts Encampments and fortifications
made by the several Corps of the
American Army during the whole campaign._
By Major A. LACARRIERE LATOUR,
Late principal Engineer 7th Military District, U. S.
Army, 1815.
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.]
Feverish activity followed. General Coffee above Baton Rouge received
Jackson’s summons on the evening of December 17, and marched the next
morning with twelve hundred and fifty men. In two days he made one
hundred and twenty miles, camping on the night of December 19 within
fifteen miles of New Orleans, with eight hundred men.[496] Carroll,
with the Tennessee brigade which left Nashville November 27, arrived
at New Orleans December 21, and a squadron of mounted Mississippi
volunteers hurried down. The British also lost no time. Their advance
disembarked on the Isle aux Poix in Lake Borgne on the night of
December 14, and during the following week all the boats and seamen
of the fleet were occupied in transporting seven thousand men, with
their equipment, thirty miles from the fleet to the island. During the
night of December 18 two British officers reconnoitred the head of Lake
Borgne.[497] At the mouth of Bayou Bienvenu, not fifteen miles from
New Orleans, was a fishermen’s village. The fishermen were Spaniards,
with no love for the United States, and ready to accept British pay.
They received the two British officers, and conveyed them in a canoe
up the bayou to the Villeré plantation on the bank of the Mississippi
only six miles from New Orleans.[498] There, at their leisure,
Lieutenant Peddie of the quartermaster’s department and Captain Spencer
of the “Carron” selected the line of advance for the British army, and
returned, unmolested and unseen, through the bayou to the lake and the
Isle aux Poix.
Only December 21, two days after the British reconnaissance, was an
American picket of eight men and a sergeant placed at the fishermen’s
village,[499] where they remained thirty-six hours without learning
that British officers had been on the spot, or that the fishermen
were all away, acting as pilots for the approaching British boats.
Meanwhile the troops at Isle aux Poix were ready to move almost as soon
as Lieutenant Peddie could return to show them the way. At ten o’clock
on the morning of December 22 the light brigade--sixteen hundred and
eighty-eight rank-and-file,[500] under Colonel Thornton, who had led
the advance at Bladensburg--embarked in boats, and after a day on
the lake arrived the next morning, December 23, at daylight, without
giving alarm, at the fishermen’s village, where they surprised and
captured the picket, and then passing up the bayou five miles, landed
at a point about three miles from the Mississippi River. No attempt
at concealment was made.[501] The troops were formed in column, and
found no obstacles to their march except the soft ground and the
ditches. Through reeds and cypress swamp they made their way about
three miles, when their advance suddenly entered open fields skirted
by an orange-grove, with the broad Mississippi beyond. They were on
the Villeré plantation; and they surprised and captured Major Villeré
and his militia company, in his own house at noon-day, after a march
of three miles with sixteen hundred men, from a point which had been
recognized by Jackson as one of two or three necessary avenues of
approach.
The record of American generalship offered many examples of misfortune,
but none so complete as this. Neither Hull nor Harrison, neither Winder
nor Samuel Smith, had allowed a large British army, heralded long in
advance, to arrive within seven miles unseen and unsuspected, and
without so much as an earthwork, a man, or a gun between them and their
object. The disaster was unprecedented, and could be repaired only by
desperate measures.