=Source.=--Hobbes, _Leviathan_, 1651. P. 108.
But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of
themselves thereby, have made an Artificial Man, which we call a
Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificial Chains, called civil
laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at
one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have
given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears.
These Bonds, in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made
to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty, of breaking
them.
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
_Liberty_ of _Subjects_. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the
world, wherein there be rules enough set down, for the regulating of
all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:)
it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws
prætermitted, men have the Liberty of doing what their own reasons
shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if we take
Liberty in the proper sense, for corporal Liberty; that is to say,
freedom from chains and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor
as they do, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we
take Liberty for an exemption from Laws, it is no less absurd for men
to demand, as they do, that Liberty, by which all other men may be
masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they
demand; not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them,
without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to
be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject lieth therefore only in
those things which, in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath
prætermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own
diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they
themselves think fit; and the like.
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Sovereign Power of life and death is either abolished or limited. For
it has been already shewn, that nothing the Sovereign Representative
can do to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every subject is author of every act
the Sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing,
otherwise than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby
to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often
happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death by the
command of the Sovereign Power; and yet neither do the other wrong:
As when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and
the like cases, he that so dieth had Liberty to do the action, for
which he is neverthelesse without injury put to death. And the same
holdeth also in a Sovereign Prince, that putteth to death an innocent
subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as
being contrary to Equity, (as was the killing of Uriah by David;) yet
it was not an injury to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the
right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself. And yet
to God, because David was God's Subject; and prohibited all iniquity
by the law of Nature. Which distinction David himself, when he
repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, _To Thee only have I
sinned_.