I must here go some steps back:

Ninthly, If the nullity of the burden depended on the equality with which

it should be divided, and if this equality should depend on an addition

to the supposed burden, might it not be expected (not from the tricks of

customary seduction, or from the shorter method of authority, but from

all the means calculated to enforce conviction) that the nation would

find herself less aggrieved by an additional tax, which would tend to

equalise the weight, than she could be by an increase of taxes laid for

the purpose of effecting a reimbursement, which, upon a second thought,

no one can wish for?

Tenthly, Before the regulation alluded to, wheat was, in _France_, one

third or one half cheaper than it is at this day; the rest of the other

productions of the earth stood in the same proportion: in _England_, at

that very time, the price of wheat differed very little from what it now

is. How could _England then_ maintain a competition—a combat, as it were,

of exportation, against her _natural_ enemy (the _French_ industry), so

lightly, so advantageously armed by the low price of the commodities in

_France_?—If the maxim is as just as it is held _sacred_, surely _France_

must have derived a prodigious benefit from the barricadoes by which the

exportation of wheat was prevented, even from one Province to another,

in order that it should be in all at the lowest possible price:—it

follows also that _England_, already compelled by her taxes, her internal

monopoly, and her riches, to raise the price of her wheat at home, must

have undergone dreadful inconveniences, by availing herself, as she has

ever done, of the least dearth abroad, to make that very wheat dearer in

_England_, whilst she was going to diminish its price wherever scarcity

had made it excessive.

Eleventhly, If _France_ has obtained such wonderful advantages from

her internal as well as external barriers, it is not in respect to her

agriculture; her agriculture has clearly lost, not only that part of

the value in her productions, of which she was daily deprived by this

barrier, but also the encouragement which a gradual increase in the price

of the productions would have occasioned, to increase their quantity: it

is therefore by the exportation of the products of her industry, which,

being sold at a price below that of all other nations, have procured her

in money that prodigious balance of exported goods, _which the wretched

state of the national cultivator did not permit him to pay for_:—but

observe, that the _French_ exportation, carried on with that advantage

(pretended to be so very considerable) of the low price of national

commodities, brought no more money to _France_, than that which she

wanted for the five articles I have mentioned before, when treating of

the balance of _England_. This matter I hope I shall set in the fullest

blaze of evidence.—But, on the other hand, observe also that _England_,

by an exportation carried on with the utmost regularity, under the

supposed disadvantage of her commodities being rated much higher than

those of her competitors, a rate which she even increased herself, by

the exportation of wheat, which she encouraged by premiums—_by premiums,

destructive of the sacred maxim_; observe, I say, that under that

disadvantage, in spite of those inconsistencies, as fortunate as they are

real and palpable, _England_, nevertheless, has not failed to procure the

money wanted for the five articles, the only ones that can give any value

to money.—Shall it be said that _France_ would have obtained a balance

in money much less considerable, if she had not kept her prices so low,

if she had acted with less respect to the maxim?—Shall it be said, that

the balance in money would have been far more favourable to _England_,

had not the price of her commodities been so high at home; if she had

more consistently acted upon the maxim; if, above all, she had prohibited

the exportation of wheat, which is so often lamented, and even sometimes

so loudly complained of by her manufacturers?—This indeed would be to

appropriate great merit to the resource of hiding money under ground,

when we cannot flatter ourselves with the thoughts of having too much of

it, but at the expence of agriculture: but no matter; let us see whether

the inference be just.

Twelfthly, Had _France_ been indebted to the disparagement in the prices

of her commodities, for the advantage of procuring the money wanted for

the five articles before mentioned, she would have found herself in the

impossibility of answering that want, as soon as, by the new regulation,

those commodities were restored to their natural value, as soon as the

liberty of exporting wheat had raised its price almost to the level of

that which it bore in _England_.—Now will it be said, that ever since

the landed revenue in _France_ has risen from 40 to 50 _per cent._ by

an advance in the price of commodities, less bullion has been spent by

the _French_ in plate, in gilding, and other articles of luxury?—Will

it be said that _France_ stood in need of the money necessary to

settle in cash with her foreign correspondents, when this resource

from circumstances became preferable to the mode of paying in bills of

exchange?—Will it be said that she fell short of it for all those Jewish

and miserable operations, or for that reciprocally beneficial smuggling

with her neighbours?—Will it be said, that her circulation, which,

beyond any doubt, required a more considerable mass of money, as soon as

her revenue had tertiated, has suffered by that necessity of a higher

balance, become impossible (according to the maxim) as soon as it grew

indispensable?—Will it be said, that her industry has lingered away as

soon as her agriculture has been more able to enliven it?—Yet all these

absurdities must be admitted, or it must be acknowledged that the price

of commodities may be tertiated, or doubled in a nation, not only without

injuring industry, whose business it is to keep within the kingdom all

the money wanted for circulation, but even with securing to the nation

a more considerable balance in money, since it must become so whenever

the price of every thing is raised one third, and perhaps more than

one half.—The _sacred maxim_ therefore has not even common sense, _when

applied to the internal trade of the State_.

Thirteenthly, If _France_, who has not the assistance of paper-money,

did actually procure so clearly to herself an annual balance more

considerable in money, as soon as she had tertiated her revenue, it

follows that _England_ must, really, have experienced a competition much

more disagreeable, from that very circumstance from which, _according

to the maxim_, she had less reason to fear it; for whilst the price

of commodities was below _par_ in _France_, it is clear that having

no _national vortex_, she required less money for the circulation of

a revenue of 100 than for one of 150: it was therefore more to the

advantage of _England_, _in spite of the maxim_, that the commodities

should be at a low price in _France_, than to have them raised 50 _per

cent._ The _sacred maxim_ then is destitute of common sense, _when

applied to foreign trade, to the competition abroad_.

Fourteenthly, But if the circumstance which drove _France_ to the

necessity of acquiring a greater balance in real cash, stood at a

very small distance from another circumstance by which _England_

was compelled to procure one still more considerable, for a general

re-coining of her guineas; and if _France_ and _England_ have done each

other no material injury in this kind of competition, (this is proved

by the fact, since both nations have equally and certainly, ever since,

procured the annual balance which they wanted); may it not be fairly

concluded, that _England_ has been no loser, by a revolution in the price

of wheat, which enriched _France_ by tertiating her revenue, and forced

her to receive annually, in cash, a balance far greater than she did

previous to that revolution?

Fifteenthly, Now if _England_, since the revolution in the _French_

prices, has obtained as much bullion as she wished for, or rather

all that which she could lay out on the five articles of her common

expenditure, and for the additional circumstance of a re-coinage, whilst

on the other hand _France_ had all her wants supplied with the greater

ease, may it not be inferred that _England_ could have gained nothing,

even upon the supposition that the annual supply of money, become

necessary to _France_, had been less considerable, that is to say,

even if the _French_ commodities had remained in their former state of

disparagement?

Sixteenthly, If that increase of prices in the landed revenue has not

been restrained to _France_; if it be a fact, as all travellers pretend

to have observed, that all the other parts of _Europe_ have experienced

the same revolution, the same encouragement, the same success, except the

difference produced in some places by the singularity of certain laws;

may it not be concluded, that although _England_ has lost nothing by the

revolution, although _France_ has proved a gainer by it, other nations

have also enriched themselves, namely, one tenth, those where the prices

have been advanced a tenth; a ninth, those where the prices have been

raised one quarter; one half, those where the prices have risen one half,

&c. independently of an increase still more essential, _viz._ that of the

quantity of the productions of the earth, _which always closely follows

that of their prices_.

Seventeenthly, Were one to reflect, that this increase in the prices, in

regard to the productions of the earth, is always followed by a similar

increase with respect to the products of industry, which thereby receives

the same encouragement; if, after examination, no one can harbour any

doubt of the fact; would it be an easy matter, even with the help of

the _sacred maxim_, to persuade any nation, whose prices have been

doubled, to reduce the nominal of her revenue from 20 to 18, in order

to get the advantage in the competition with another nation who, by

some disagreeable circumstances, should have been obliged to raise her

products from 20 to 22, as _England_ is compelled to do? Would not one,

on the contrary, conjecture that every wise nation will follow the advice

of the _American_ of _Philadelphia_, _i. e._ that she will not hesitate

to raise equally her own products from 20 to 22, certain, as she will

be by this means, to give fresh encouragement both to her agriculture

and her industry, and not to hurt in the least the interest of the

nation whom those disagreeable circumstances should have compelled that

rise from 20 to 22; compelled, I say, without procuring for her that

encouragement which cannot spring from such a rise, _but in as much as it

is not necessitated by taxes_?

Eighteenthly, Is it not even probable that every wise nation will be

sensible that there is but one way to carry on, without being constantly

duped, a commerce with another nation, obliged to raise the price of her

goods; _viz._ to raise, in the same proportion, those which are given in

exchange?—This, some will say, is an indirect advice which I take upon

me to give to industry; nothing more useless, will they add; industry

in all countries never fails making that calculation.—I do not assume

the liberty of advising industry;—Industry is far better acquainted,

than I am, with her own interest: it is to agriculture I presume to give

advice; and this I have an incontestable right to do, since I myself

am a cultivator, an _American_ cultivator, and that my fortune cannot

increase, nor even stand as it is, but with that of my brethren, the

cultivators throughout all _Europe_, whose consumption is as essential

to me, in regard to sugars, cottons, coffee, indigo, &c. as mine is

essential to them, with respect to wines, flour, oils, hemp, iron, &c.

How is it possible to charge them with an advanced price on the goods

they purchase, without diminishing their means of buying, _unless they

raise their own commodities equally with the above goods_?—How can one

diminish their power of buying, without diminishing also my resources

for a sale?—How can one diminish my resources for a sale, without

diminishing my means of production?—And how is it possible to put a stop

to the productions of _America_, without crushing in the very bud all the

_European_ productions, _which are to pay for them_?—There is not the

least doubt, but that, between merchant and merchant, alien or native,

there never is any difficulty: nothing more candid than their respective

conduct; never a word about prices; each fixes his own, and it often

happens that a bale of goods has been sold ten times upon the invoice,

and never opened:—But when a merchant, no matter of what nation, says to

his customer, no matter of what country; _English goods have increased

in price from 20 to 22, I cannot have them for less_; it is essential

for every land proprietor, from Pole to Pole, to know that he must not

hesitate to answer: _You cannot come down to me, give me leave to get up

to you_; or, in other words, _I also advance my prices from 20 to 22,

so that every thing is in its due order, and the cock of the balance

stands still in its place_. On this principle, clearly evident and of an

irrefragable necessity, I maintain that it is _England_, successively

compelled, as well by her wealth, as by her taxes and monopoly, to

increase her prices at home,—_England_, trading to all parts of _Europe_,

more largely than any other country,—it is _England_, I say, who, to

this day, has raised the prices of every thing all over _Europe_; and I

insist, that _England_, once more obliged to carry those prices still

higher, once more will compel _Europe_ to follow her example, and that

all _Europe_ will grow richer by her means, (as has been the case

hitherto) on account of the encouragement which this increase will give

in all countries, where _England_ may think fit to continue or extend her

trade on fair and equitable principles.

It is certain, that one cannot, without some reflexion, comprehend that

chain composed of so many incoherent, so widely distant links, that

union, that mutual dependance of interests, in appearance so opposite

to each other; and that, even with the assistance of a few _hypotheses_

sufficient to give an idea of the whole, the only confession subscribed

to by the reader, will be, that they imply no palpable contradiction,

but that they are nevertheless the mere offspring of imagination, and

ought to be ranked amongst non-entities. Yet the two _hypotheses_ of

which _Rome_ seemed to be the subject, were no more, if we except the

paper-currency, than the type of the revolution which took place in

_France_ at the time of the regulation I have spoken of,—a regulation,

which in less than two years increased the wealth of that nation from 16

to 24, 50 _per cent._; as if the _French_ had been at last made sensible,

that _England_ could not work for herself without working for them, and

that consequently they had a right to say with my _Roman_: _~England~

is rich to the amount of 24, only because she denominates 24 that same

quantity of wheat which our barricadoes and barriers have obliged us to

call only 16 in our country; the only thing to be done therefore, is to

set fire to our barricadoes, and break down our barriers, that henceforth

the same 16 may be denominated 24, and all at once we shall be in fact as

rich as ~England~, without having been so judiciously at work._

Another advantage that would accrue from that uniformity, nearly general,

in all prices, if one would lend an helping hand to Nature, after having

been convinced of the impossibility of reaping any other benefit from

the obstacles thrown in her way, but the sad advantage of retarding her

progress;—another advantage, I say, that would accrue from that kind

of uniformity in prices, which undergoes no alteration, but from the

wants and demands, is, that all that monstrous system of prohibitions

or equivalent restrictions, must crumble of itself: for, with what face

could a national manufacturer solicit the means and privilege of making

his own countrymen pay 10 _per cent._ dearer for those goods, which

another nation tenders to them at 10 _per cent._ cheaper, notwithstanding

the expence of exportation? What reasons could he urge when, instead of

answering, a cultivator should rise in the national council, and ask,

for the exportation of corn, an absurd premium which would instantly

enhance its price 25 _per cent._?—But the game of imports and exports to

which this last observation alludes, requires to be treated in a separate

article which it is not yet time to enter upon; all we have now to do

is to think on the means of giving a free circulation to the revenue of

all _Europe_, supposed to be increased in the proportion of 20 to 22, on

account of the same increase necessary in _England_ to pay three millions

interest, without any one being the poorer for it. I shall say nothing of

the facility of paper-currency, when the inutility of a national robbery

shall be once generally acknowledged.

Nineteenthly and lastly, If we are frightened by the necessity of a

balance in money, every where more considerable, in order to circulate

every where, a revenue increased from 20 to 22, to face the indispensable

rise in the prices of _England_, who trades to all parts of the globe;

(when we consider besides, that _France_ and _England_ are by the same

reason obliged to add to their respective balance already so loaded,)

it appears to me, that, after a retrospective view of what has passed,

one may readily be convinced, that whenever money becomes necessary for

circulation, wherever nothing more is required to circulate and balance

objects really existing, and equal to each other, there are always

people enough ready to carry money thither; and that this operation, _as

all those that are beneficial to society_, is generally effected when

it is neither counteracted nor encouraged, _without any one perceiving

it_.—Nevertheless it must be confessed, that the pretentions set up by

_France_, in regard to a balance, are as terrible, as formidable, as

those of _England_, due regard being paid to the difference between the

exports of both; I shall examine these pretensions as I have done those

of _England_, and bring them besides closer to each other, that they may

be more properly estimated.

_The pretended Balance of ~France~ in point of Trade._

The Work of Mr. _Necker_ on the _French_ finances, is in my judgement,

for that nation, the most precious work that this age has produced;

it is a sword hanging over the head of whoever shall fill up that

department during the reign of the present King, and of all those of his

successors whom God shall bless with a soul like his. That work would

still be precious, though it should serve only to expose the knavery or

the incapacity of those who pretended that _France_, preparing for a

war which required the creation of a navy, without which she could not

carry it on, forced to have recourse to new loans proportionate to such

an undertaking, and weighed down, as it was said, by the load of the old

taxes imposed for discharging the interest of her former debts, was again

on the eve of laying new imposts, in spite of herself, and perhaps of

having recourse to those degrading reductions, so lightly, yet so often

practised before. The first public operation of Mr. _Necker_ (his _Compte

rendu_) inspired every one with the enthusiastic spirit of an unbounded

confidence, wherever nothing was foreseen but the discouragement arising

from discredit. He did not create anything, it is true; but he dispelled

the clouds which had hitherto concealed what really existed; he restored

order where confusion reigned before, and treated the mechanical part

of the finances, like a merchant willing at all times to have it in

his power to compare his undertakings with his means, his plans with

his resources. No other step could be taken at first. I have no kind

of connexion with Mr. _Necker_, neither direct nor indirect; nor am I

bound to him by the ties of friendship, interest, or gratitude; and,

besides, it is not my intention either to praise, or to censure; yet I

cannot forbear to observe, that Mr. _Necker_, entirely circumscribed by

the circumstances of the time, charged with the triple load of clearing

up what was passed, supplying present wants, and guarding against future

events, could only loosely survey, regret, and prepare, what a situation

so critical did not permit him to undertake. His being displaced, left

him no other advantage than that of informing the public of what he

intended to do; and the manner in which the nation has received the

work wherein he recorded his projects, is at the same time a tribute

of the national esteem for the man who planned them, and a pledge of

the national gratitude, even for any one of his successors, who should

confine himself to carry them into execution.

Whatever I have hitherto said, whatever may drop from my pen in the

sequel, in contradiction to some of Mr. _Necker_’s opinions, was written

long before the publication of his work, and in no degree detracts from

the solidity of his views. What he devised was perhaps the best that

could possibly be imagined in the actual state of things, and according

to the received system:—But is that system the best?—I subscribe to

his principle concerning the precautions to be taken, and the slowness

of the march necessary even through all the paths that may lead to _the

best_; but that best, what is it? _France_ cannot boast of having found

it—read the work of Mr. _Necker_; _England_ cannot boast of having found

it—read the debates of both Houses of Parliament:—And do I dare to offer

my thoughts!—Yes:—two children, it is said, found what it was necessary

to find, in order to the discovery of immense bodies of light, at a

distance where nothing was suspected but the limits of creation.—Were my

thoughts only plausible, they ought to be thoroughly investigated; they

concern the State, they concern mankind at large:—if they prove just, to

say that they are impracticable on account of the shackles with which

our forefathers have loaded us, is to say nothing but with regard to the

fleeting moment in which I speak, _already so far off from us_; but to

feel then that we should not add new shackles to those we endure already,

would be a great point gained; to scrutinise afterwards the ancient

opinions, without exception; to analyse the principles on which pretended

impossibilities are founded; to expect nothing from seduction or from

authority; to desire nothing but from general conviction; to spare no

pains to make the people sensible of, and familiar with the truths that

might be discovered, would perhaps be a second step towards that very

mark to which we should probably direct our course, were it not for the

pretended impossibility, the mere supposition of which casts a ridicule

upon the very thought of looking up to it.

It is upon this plan, and under this point of view, that I purpose to

examine the supposed balance of _France_, in regard to trade:—and I

begin by asking, whether there exists a nation in _Europe_, which, upon

perusing what Mr. _Necker_ says to the present purpose, and the use made

almost generally in _England_ of the work of Sir _Charles Whitworth_,

much more explicit with regard to the balance of _Great Britain_, would

hesitate an instant to break off all commercial connexions with _England_

and _France_, if only one half should prove real in the prejudices of the

two nations, on the object, which at present seems to determine all the

others?

I would, in the next place, propose, for examination, whether those two

nations are not indebted to these prejudices, for the greatest part of

their mistakes, and of the obstacles which they have found, which they

still find, and which they will ever find, in the measures that other

nations think themselves obliged to adopt, in order to guard against

the effects of those prejudices, till their fallacy is universally

acknowledged, as well as their insufficiency to produce their boasted

effect, _even in favour of those who would obstinately refuse to give

them up_.

Every year, say the prejudices of both nations, more than seven millions

sterling are required for their two _terrible_ balances;—but not above

six millions are brought over from _America_:—if _Spain_ and _Portugal_

be allowed to come in for one sixth (indeed it would be but just), the

other parts of _Europe_ must settle it amongst themselves to find the two

millions sterling, which without that assessment would be deficient in

the balances necessary to _France_ and _England_.—Whence does _Europe_

take those two millions? Whence have they been taken hitherto? I know

not: but it is a stubborn fact: you may consult the work of Mr. _Necker_

for the balance of _France_, and for that of _England_ the statements of

Sir _Charles Whitworth_; the former amounts annually to 70 millions of

_livres_, about 3 millions sterling; and the latter to 83,678,818_l._

in the space of 20 years, from 1754 to 1773; it is, one year with

another, more than 4,180,000_l._ _per annum_. But above all, let it not

escape your observation, what is said in _France_, that the decline of

that Empire will begin, when this balance of 70 millions of _livres_

shall begin to decline, and that it is the opinion in _England_, that,

were the _favourable balance_ to be below 2 or 3 millions sterling, a

national bankruptcy must indispensably follow. What is most _miraculous_

(and indeed consolatory for those who are obliged to think of their

elevation, before they dream of a bankruptcy, or even of their decline)

is, that whilst _France_ and _England_ have received annually, the one

4, the other 3 millions sterling, that is to say, one sixth more than

_America_ has to share amongst all the _European_ nations, the other

countries in _Europe_ have nevertheless increased their mass of money, by

all that was necessary to keep up their luxury, and the circulation of a

revenue which has almost doubled in the course of a century. These are

prodigies which will cease to be so, even if we admit the facts on which

they are founded, if we take the trouble of adding thereto a few other

facts rather less questionable; and if it be acknowledged at last, that

there are yet others, concerning which the most expert calculator cannot

flatter himself that he shall even come near the truth, and which give

to those who will be at the trouble of reflecting, all the latitude they

may want, to conclude that the two supposed balances are as inadmissible

when subjected to the discussion of reason alone, as they are afterwards

demonstrated to be false, by facts which cannot be controverted.

The quantity of money required for circulation, depends neither on

the speculations of a Minister of finances, nor on the blind cupidity

of trade, which, luckily, is always counteracted by the clear-sighted

cupidity of every trader: it depends on the quantity of articles to be

circulated, on their price, and on the method adopted for circulation:—it

is evident that less cash is required in _England_ than in _France_

to circulate the same mass of revenue, trade, and transactions of all

kinds; the reasons are obvious: but the sum wanted for the circulation

being once found, every addition thereto is soon, notwithstanding all

ministerial machinations, transferred to some hundred leagues distance,

if that surplus should be wanted there: now, when this necessary sum

for circulation is once ascertained, we shall see how useless it is to

despoil, how absurd it is to suppose that they do despoil the rest of

_Europe_ of her money, in order to keep up that circulation.

What is the real amount of the cash circulating in _England_? Some say

25, others 30 millions sterling. It is probable that 25 millions are

sufficient, with the help of credit and paper-currency, even in the

supposition that _France_ should stand in want of 2 _milliards_ of

_livres_ in hard cash to give circulation to a revenue, double to that

of _England_, because there is in _France_ no paper-money, and much less

credit than would be obtained, were it not, _too often yet_, so easy to

avoid, by another kind of credit, the payment of the most lawful debts:

but we must argue from an incontrovertible fact, and assent, in their

fullest scope, to the consequences that may be deduced therefrom. The

following is the fact:

Of all the coin circulating in _England_, 18 months ago there was only

a sixth, and there is now much less than a sixth part, in pieces struck

before the present reign. Now, in 1780, it appears that the money coined

at the Mint, in the present reign, amounted only to 30,457,805_l._

It is impossible to suppose, that in the space of 18 years there should

have been carried out of the kingdom, either to _Ireland_, or in support

of the smuggling trade, or for other purposes, less than the amount

of the coin struck since that period. Let us add to the 30 millions

coined from the beginning of this reign down to the year 1780, the

5 millions for the sixth part in old specie remaining of the former

reigns (that sixth supposed, rather than acknowledged, to be actually in

circulation), the total will be 35 millions; to which must be added, the

value of silver plate, toys, &c. Admit, that all these articles together,

circulation and silver wrought, amount to 50 millions sterling;—to those

who may think that the sum of 15 millions, at which I rate the wrought

silver of all kinds, is too trifling, I would recommend to observe,

first, that these 15 millions constitute nearly the tenth part of the

general revenue, both of the land and industry; secondly, that the third

part of that revenue belongs to the peasants and mechanics, who have no

such costly furniture; and thirdly, that as to the rest of the nation, if

there exist a man who possesses the equivalent of one half of his revenue

in plate, there are scores who are not possessed of so much as one tenth

part.—Shall it be insisted upon, however, that, by adding the amount of

plate and the mass in circulation to that which _must_ correspond with

the demands that may be made upon the Bank, the whole amounts to 60

millions sterling?—Be it so;—but _England_ was certainly in possession

of 20 millions at least, in cash and wrought silver, before the time at

which Sir _Charles Whitworth_ began his Statements; for there existed

then much less credit, and no paper to answer the purposes of cash:—forty

millions, then, constitute the whole of what _England_ chose (I call it

strictly a choice) to reserve, out of so many millions imported from

_America_, which really went through her hands, in the space of 90

years.—I am fully persuaded that I could meet with some thousands of

persons, even in _England_, who, from the sketch I have given, would

think that I make a present to _England_ of 10 millions. It matters not,

I shall be equally generous in regard to _France_, whose accounts I am

about to lay open; and yet I shall have gold and silver enough left to

extend my liberality all over _Europe_.

Mr. _Necker_ has but two reasons to suppose that there exists in the

_French_ circulation a sum of 2,200,000,000 livres _tournois_. The first

is the indubitable fact, that since, and including the general re-coining

of the _French_ specie in 1726 to 1783, there have been struck, in the

different mints of that kingdom, 2,500,000,000 of the same specie (the

only one that is current in that country:) and, in the next place, the

very questionable fact, that _France_ has preserved the whole, except 3

or 400 millions _tournois_, which may have passed into foreign hands,

from the quantity of _French_ specie which must have been carried abroad,

to answer her commercial and political purposes.

Say only 2000 millions of livres in the _French_ circulation, that I

may not be troubled with 100 millions, which can neither weaken nor

strengthen my reasonings.

When that general re-coinage of the year 1726 took place in _France_,

there must have existed, at that time, 1000 millions _tournois_, to

impart a proper circulation to a revenue, which, we may suppose, was

less by one half than what it is at this time. _France_, therefore, had

occasion to increase her specie, only by the additional thousand of

millions, of which she is now in possession, even upon a supposition that

she has now 2000 millions; and this want has been supplied in the space

of 57 years, at the rate of 18 millions only, one year with another.

Let it be granted, now, that the annual wants, the personal wants of

_France_, in articles of luxury, plate, gold and silver lace, trinkets,

&c. amounted to 7 millions _tournois_, upon an average, in the course

of the above 57 years.—By adding thereto the 18 millions I have spoken

of, I can find but 25 millions overplus, one year with another, saved by

_France_ upon all the treasures of _America_, which certainly must have

passed through her hands from 1726 to 1783.

The reader must be sensible, that there is no occasion to speak of the

sums annually exported to _India_, it matters not by whom; they no longer

exist for _Europe_; and I have proved nothing hitherto, if it be still

doubted that _Europe_ has lost nothing in that respect but the trifling

advance in her prices, which 100 or 150 thousand pounds sterling, added

annually to her general specie, would have given to all the productions,

both of agriculture and industry. The return of those 150,000_l._ in

_India_ goods has produced yearly to _Europe_ all the labour necessary

to repay them; for it must be observed, that _labour pays every thing_,

and that nothing is paid but by _labour_. The 150,000_l._ exported to

_India_, are not lost therefore, as to their essential effect, as would

be the case of sums laid up in the coffers of a Sovereign, who might be

unacquainted, even at this day, with what was known to Queen _Elizabeth_

above 200 years ago, that _the Prince’s treasures are well placed no

where, but in the hands of his subjects_, that is, of _such_ amongst his

subjects _who do not lock them up in their own chests_.

I join together the two balances of _France_ and _England_, which

probably fall much below, and which cannot be above, what I have stated

them to be; and I see that those two formidable bugbears, after having

annually devoured, according to their own account, 7 millions sterling,

have, in the end, and very fortunately too, only digested something less

than 2 millions, viz. the bugbear of _France_, 12 or 1300 thousand pounds

sterling; and the bugbear of _England_, about 5, 6, or 700 thousand.

Thank Heaven then, there remains, after _England_ and _France_ have been

fully saturated, (including the general exportation to _India_) about

4 millions sterling, which the other States of _Europe_ have received,

one year with another, partly in plate, partly in gold and silver-lace,

partly in ingots, partly in guineas, and partly in louis-d’ors, of which

those who gave them still think themselves in possession, and which those

who received them do not think they possess.

But, it will be said, the louis d’ors, which are spent in _Germany_

during a war, revert to _France_ soon after a peace; the plenty in

which they flow back, is known to every one who has the least concern

in trade.—No doubt of it; when the _German_ circulation is overloaded,

it must re-flow where it is beneath its level: the coin carried by the

_French_ into _Germany_, in the time of war, was then indispensable there

to supply the wants of those who carried the money into that country,

and to increase the means of the ordinary circulation, _an increase

occasioned by a circumstance that tertiated the price of every thing_.

The circumstance subsiding, every thing takes its usual course; prices

are reduced; the greatest part of the money which had been carried there,

becomes useless on account of that reduction:—it is sent back; and why is

it taken then by _France_? Because it is become necessary there;—for you

must observe, that the money in question was useless in _France_, as soon

as it was wanted in _Germany_.—During the war the commerce of _France_

was at a stand; her granaries overstocked with corn, her cellars with

wine, her warehouses with goods, waited only for peace, to set a value

on that corn, that wine, those goods, and of course, on that idol Money,

which, during the war, could not, in regard to the _French_, be of any

value, but on the very spot where the _French_ had themselves carried it.

Observe, above all, that _England_, who pretends to have the largest

balance in money, is the very nation who, with respect to the

extensiveness of her commerce and the mass of her industry, keeps the

least part of that balance at home, and constantly preserves as little

of it, as if she had been no less convinced than I am myself, of the

futility of any other balance in bullion, but that which is necessary for

the five articles above mentioned. What results now from the reduction of

those two frightful _colossi_ to their proper dimensions?

It results, First, that every system of balance, founded on the

supposition which served as a basis to the two balances I have spoken

of, is as chimerical, as it would be pernicious to the nation who should

regulate herself by it, and to such other nations as might be unfortunate

enough to correspond with her:

Secondly, That the private interest of every merchant always militates,

in this respect, against the pernicious dreams of trade in general:

Thirdly, That the case between nation and nation trading together, is

similar to that which subsists between citizen and citizen; as there is

but one way for a man to prevent the last penny of his wealth from being

useful to some other member of his community; and that way is, _to bury

under ground (as soon as he has received it) that last penny, the utility

of which he grudges to share with other men_: in like manner, a nation

can no otherwise prevent the surplus of her money being carried into

another country when this latter is in want of it, than _by burying her

balance as soon as she has received it_:

Fourthly, That the superiority of industry, activity, and _capitals_,

in a nation, gives her no other advantage, than that of supplying those

countries with which she trades, with further means of increasing their

own industry and activity: Now,

Fifthly, The more you increase industry and activity amongst other

nations, the more you increase their want of those signs which are to

represent the products; the more you increase their want of those signs

which you long to possess exclusively, if it were possible: Therefore,

Sixthly, If it be true, that money ought to be the only aim of commerce

and exportation, all the favourite ideas on the pretended balance,

being entirely destroyed by facts, even at the time when the world was

more fully persuaded of the truth of those ideas, and of the wisdom of

the measures which were to have perpetuated that balance, it would be

necessary henceforth to resolve to hide money under ground, as fast as

it comes in.—Would it not be better to question the principle itself,

and seek for fresh information on the utility as well as the object of

exportation?

_Exportations and Importations considered as a Game. Such a Game is as

rational as any other, to whosoever will not content himself with playing

at Cards, or with his own ~Thoughts~._

A world of unanswerable arguments start up at once, tending to

demonstrate the superiority of civilization over the wild state of

nature. Yet, methinks, a savage may overturn them all by these few

words: _I know nothing of what you say, and I am not inquisitive_.—I

readily confess at least, that I do not see what reply can be made to

such an answer, more than I did with regard to the four questions put

in the Upper House to the manufacturer of whom I have spoken; yet this

manufacturer was not stronger in argument on all that was foreign to the

essential point of the four questions, than I might be to convince my

savage of that delight, which a man fully persuaded of the excellence of

his own conceits, and of the happiness there is in making them known to

all the world, feels, without allay, without interruption, in staining

some reams of paper, scribbling sometimes an hypothesis, sometimes a

comedy, a romance, a ballad, &c.; for it is very true, that the work I

now lay before the public, has, in the space of 12 or 15 years, undergone

all those metamorphoses in my hands, and that during that time my heart

rankled with the ambition of being read in antichambers, given for

premiums in colleges, tolerated in nunneries, mentioned in the _boudoirs_

of the fair, noticed in the memory of Ministers, revolved in the hearts

of Sovereigns, and every day sung about the streets and in cottages,

through which all princes must sometimes pass, if they wish to discover

some decisive difference between the interesting illusions of humanity

and the deep speculations of politics. Yet with all that stock of words,

if not of reasons, that I must have acquired beforehand, to justify, in

some measure, the extravagance of such an ambition, I own that I should

be confounded by the answer of my savage.—But this could not be the

case, if a civilised man, after having convinced me, that the advantage

of commerce between man and man, as well as between nation and nation,

consists in supplying each other’s wants, when it is possible to effect

it by an exchange of surplusses, would next undertake to prove to me,

that the advantage of a State, which is nothing else but a nation, an

aggregation of men, consists in keeping as much as possible of that

money which they have in too great abundance, though the inevitable

consequence would be, that they would procure to themselves so much less

of some article in which they might be deficient, but which it would at

the same time be very convenient to them to possess.—It is hard that the

compendium of prohibitions, restrictions, &c. so much commended, and

which have kept so many great men so long on the watch, dwindles finally

into the assertion of the two contradictory propositions which I have

just now dated.

Two articles are necessary and sufficient to man—bread and water; let not

meat be called in as a third; it is too well known, that three fourths

of _Europe_ seldom eat any, and doubtless no one will contend that

three fourths of a whole are less valuable than the fourth remaining,

in the eyes of Him who created that whole, and who probably takes some

concern in its preservation. Exchanges of any other articles besides

bread and water, are therefore, strictly speaking, _exchanges of mere

superfluities_. Now, what inconvenience can there be in bartering one

superfluity against another?

I shall first of all, display in their full force, the most solid

reasonings that can possibly be adduced, in order to demonstrate, that

_the choice and price of all superfluities must be left to the discretion

of one set of men only_. The chymist is not to blame if he can extract

nothing but a fetid oil from the matter which he undertakes to decompound.

That set of men, as estimable, as worthy as any in the world, will

perhaps wonder when they see the analysis of those ideas, which,

probably, they never submitted but to a superficial examination.

_Prohibitory Laws against Exportation._

_Query._ Why do you solicit a prohibitory law against the exporting of

such an article of national product?

_Answer._ That I may get it _cheaper_.

_Q._ Can you buy it _cheaper_, without wronging the man who might sell it

_dearer_?

_A._ No.

_Q._ As it is impossible to prove that such a conduct is equitable, how

will you be able to prove it to be advantageous to the State?

_A._ It is advantageous to the State, that all its internal productions

should receive at home, all such forms and preparations as may increase

their value.

_Q._ Is the quantity of productions useful to the State?

_A._ The question is almost ridiculous.

_Q._ If the _productor_ be discouraged by the low price set upon his

productions, and take proper measures to produce _less_, in order to save

the expence attending a _greater_ production, and in the mean time to

gain by producing _less_ as much as he could gain by producing _more_,

will you not then be guilty of having wronged the State of all the

productions which you crush in the very bud, by the prohibition you sue

for?

_A._ No; Smuggling will give to the parties injured by the prohibitory

law, a fully sufficient means of extricating themselves.

_Q._ Your hopes then are, that Smuggling will make up for the injuries

you propose to do to the _productors_; but how will you compensate to

the State for the loss it sustains by a clandestine exportation?

_A._ Our only business is to mind our own interest; besides, the State

may easily procure, by means of a land-tax, what it may lose by the

clandestine exportation: and we are so far from expecting that Smuggling

should turn out to our advantage, that we petition it may be made a

capital offence, and prohibited under pain of mutilation, the galleys, or

at least the entire ruin of the smuggler.

_Q._ But the law will either succeed, or fail in its effect. If the

law succeed, will you not be the author of that diminution of the

products, which the low price you intend to set upon those products

must unavoidably occasion? And if the law fail in its effect, do you

not uselessly deprive the State, 1st, of the produce of the smuggler’s

labour, whom you hope to see hanged, or at best, mutilated; and, 2dly,

of the produce of that labour which would have been performed by that

army, partly composed of rogues, partly of idle fellows, now to be

set upon the watch to detect and apprehend the smuggler, keep him in

close confinement, and lead him finally to the _gallows_, or to the

_galleys_?—Who is to pay those rogues and idle fellows?

_A._ The State, to be sure.

_Q._ What are the essential parts of the State?

_A._ Industry that goes in search of money, and Agriculture in as much as

she feeds Industry _at the cheapest rate_.

Agriculture, impoverished by your prohibitory law, will then lose, not

only what she should get by being at liberty to export, but also what

she must find to assist you in procuring her impoverishment, by paying

the land-tax necessary to pay those very rogues and idle fellows, whose

business it is to destroy her only remaining resource against your

cupidity—SMUGGLING.

_Prohibitory Laws against, or excessive Duties imposed upon Importation._

_Q._ Why do you petition against the liberty of importing such or such

another article?

_A._ Because we manufacture it, and wish to sell it dearer to the

national consumers.

_Q._ Of how many orders of men is the class of national consumers

composed?

_A._ Of two, the land proprietor, and all persons not wholly destitute of

money.

_Q._ That is to say, _in all cases_, of the whole kingdom, against the

small number of individuals who humbly petition for the prohibition of an

article;—be it so. Have you devised any means to increase in the consumer

the ability of purchasing, whilst you advance the price of your goods?

_A._ Not we;—on the contrary, it is our intention to have as much as we

can of his commodities and money, for as little of our goods as possible.

_Q._ How can men of probity and knowledge be blind to the iniquity of

such a scheme?—Will not at least its execution be somewhat impeded by the

greatest part of those who follow the same trade?

_A._ No—that is impossible: our _corporations_ have already provided

against the inconvenience you allude to: not one of their members would

dare to sell his merchandise below the price fixed by his _corporation_:

and we have made, as it were, the _impossibility_ of any such measure,

_doubly_ so, by the difficulties we have devised to prevent a ready

admittance into our _corporations_; all our bye-laws tend to reduce our

associates to the smallest number possible. But one single expedient

is now wanted to put the finishing hand to that grand work; it is the

absolute prohibition of importing all those commodities which foreign

nations might offer at a cheaper rate, than we are determined to sell

them at.

_Q._ So then, if you succeed in your plan—if by means of the solicited

prohibition, the legislature enable you to extort, with your 16 in

merchandise, the goods and money, which, in the case of a foreign

competition, you could not have procured with less than 20, what do you

intend to do with the remaining part of what you shall have extorted?

_A._ We shall send it abroad.

_Q._ With what view?

_A._ Of increasing the balance in money.

_Q._ Have you hitherto acted confidently with that idea?

_A._ We have—and it is known to all the world that it is the dearest idea

of an _Englishman_—an idea which the nation holds (if properly attended

to) as the only bulwark against a national bankruptcy.

_Q._ What have you got by that idea, if it be probable that there is not

above 25 or 30 millions in specie within the kingdom, and if it be proved

evidently that it is impossible you should have more than 35?

_A._ The reason is, no doubt, that foreign importation has been too

freely permitted; a criminal, a traiterous indulgence which we are

incessantly at work to remove: and it is on that account, that besides

the absolute prohibition we now pray for in regard to such and such

articles, we also petition that the duties be laid double and treble on

all other foreign articles which are not yet totally prohibited.

_Q._ Do you not fear that foreigners, whose merchandise you would cause

to be prohibited, should play the same trick with yours? Do you not fear

that those on whose goods you mean to increase the duties, should in

their turn overload those which they will receive from you?—For this is

all the conjuration requisite to counteract and balance the effect of

those sublime regulations which you petition for.

_A._ We shall carry on a smuggling trade in their country, and they will

pay dearer for our goods; they cannot do without them.

_Q._ They will, no doubt, follow your example: therefore new recruits

will be wanted for that army of rogues and idlers, designed to lay hold

of, and ruin whoever should dare to oppose your ransoming the owners of

lands, and proprietors of some money; but be it so:—you will besides be

equally successful in obliging the poor ransomed individuals, to pay

for the additional and necessary reinforcement of your standing army of

rogues and idlers, and for those light troops of informers so well fitted

for the noble purpose you are carrying on;—be it so again.—But, after

all, what are you to do with that immense balance in money?—Shall you

bury it under ground?

_A._ Aye—and with all our hearts and souls, if, when thus buried, it

could bring to us the same benefit as when it is rendered useful to

some one else; but alas! that secret is not yet found out: it might be

possible, however, to pray for an Act of Parliament, compelling the

nation to pay the interest of all the sums thus interred by us; and the

wisdom of such an Act would be the more conspicuous, as it would keep

within the reach, under the very hand of the nation, all the money

she might have occasion for, whenever she should think it expedient

to declare war against _France, our natural enemy_. Till such an Act

is framed, we shall follow the example of _Holland_; we shall keep on

the carrying trade, by which the _Dutch_ have gained so much money

notwithstanding our Navigation Act, which we fondly hoped was calculated

to effect their ruin: we shall carry from _Russia_ to _Sicily_, from

_Constantinople_ to _Poland_, from _Stockholm_ to _Cadiz_, from _Lisbon_

to _Venice_, whatever may be carried from one place to the other, and

this we shall do at the lowest prices, in order to get the preference

of the _Dutch_. It is a great pity that this cannot be effected without

benefiting the land-owners, and the proprietors of some money, in all the

countries where we may stand in competition for that carrying trade, not

only with the _Dutch_, but with all the national monopolists who shall

not have as yet been dexterous enough to force from their legislature,

laws as _favourable to commerce_ as those we have obtained; but in fact,

what matters it to us whom we serve, provided we get a good profit from

the service?

_Q._ Will you add further: _And provided also that the service done,

falls not on the land-owner, or on the proprietor of some money within

your nation_?—Yet thus far would you finally be led by that system of

prohibitions and restrictions, almost equally extravagant, to which you

are so devoutly attached.—But such a plan can succeed only to a certain

degree: be pleased to observe, that hitherto you can boast of no other

advantage but that of the first attack.—Sole and absolute arbiters as you

are of your own prices by the monopoly you have obtained, if agriculture

had not advanced those of her products in the same proportion, would

not your land-owners be compelled to seek abroad for a country where

monopoly should not be so obligingly countenanced? For you do not,

I presume, flatter yourselves that you shall be able to induce your

Parliament, in the age we live in, doubly to tax the property of those

who might look abroad for a remedy against your extortions:—the many laws

of that kind consigned to your annals, (and which you would not fail to

quote as a precedent,) must seek in the ignorance and barbarity of the

age that gave them birth, an apology for their establishment; but at

this present time!—Such shades in the picture of the Land of Liberty,

instead of setting off the beauties of its other parts, would annihilate

the very idea of that liberty. _It is by justice and freedom that we

are attracted and retained; it is by injustice and restraint that we

are expelled, and kept at a distance._ Be pleased then, in fine, to

observe that nothing can result from those plans, the iniquity of which

you have no more searched into than you have thoroughly examined their

consequences,—from those prohibitions and restrictions, the effects of

which must be counterbalanced by contradictory regulations,—except the

pitiful advantage of having perverted the nature of the prices on every

article. _What is necessary to counteract the effect of an injury done to

the generality, will always mechanically be brought about by that very

generality._ Would it not be more advantageous for men, to agree amongst

themselves, like intelligent beings, on some plans accounted equitable by

all,—on plans the analysis of which the projector might bear without a

blush?—Were a few points agreed upon, it would not perhaps be difficult

to settle all the others.

Let the dead bodies be wrapped up in woollen instead of linen cloth;

linen coming from abroad, wool being a staple commodity, and the dead

caring little whether their winding-sheet be made of woollen or linen:

it is a point of economy which it would be rather too severe to condemn,

although it is probable enough that in the North they would exchange

with pleasure, for your _buried woollen_, linen cloth in sufficient

quantity to wrap up your dead; a circumstance which might prove very

beneficial to some of the living, both in _England_ and _Silesia_. But

will you attempt to persuade, that it is advantageous to the State,

under any aspect, to compel a man who calls himself free, to wear

manufactured buttons, when his inclination would lead him to have them

made of remnants of stuff? Will you attempt to persuade, that it is

advantageous to the State, to make him pay a penalty of 3 or 4 pounds,

besides cost, if he is surprised _flagrante delicto_? Will you attempt to

persuade, that it is advantageous to the State, to encourage the infamous

trade of informing, by a reward in favour of an informer, against a

man guilty of _such a crime_? Will you attempt to persuade, that it is

advantageous to the State, to withdraw from their useful occupations a

swarm of fellows, _become capable of any dirty work_, by having turned

informers on account of the stipulated recompense, and who, waiting for

an opportunity of doing worse, leave their work-shops as soon as such

a law is passed, in search of a prey the seisure of which will enable

them to live in riot and intoxication for a whole week together, without

being obliged to return to their work? This is not all; for, in fine, if

all the branches of industry have the same right to the protection of

Government, does not a law, the immediate effect of which is to enhance

the price of buttons by occasioning a greater demand for that article,

destroy all idea of that protection equally due to the other branches of

industry, by infallibly depriving some of them, both of the amount of the

cash they might have received from those who will now be forced, against

their inclination, to purchase manufactured buttons, and of the amount

of cash which the advanced price of manufactured buttons, will unjustly

wrest from those who, by the effect of the law, are obliged to pay dearer

for what they might have procured at a cheaper rate? Would not the

least facility granted for the importation of some foreign merchandise,

have occasioned abroad a greater consumption, either of buttons, or

of some other _English_ goods, than such a law can procure at home in

the manufactory unjustly favoured? But, above all, will you attempt to

persuade, that it is advantageous for the State, to acquire a thousand

more button-makers, when that acquisition is obtained by the loss of a

thousand artificers employed in manufacturing some other articles, the

consumption of which would have been _free_, that is, analogous to the

situation of those who boast of their being so?

Let us seek for such points, as it may be possible to agree upon.

The State is composed of three orders of men, all equally precious, and

whose rights are equally sacred; _viz._ the landed _capitalist_, the

_capitalist_ of industry, and the proprietor of money, whether he be

considered as a _capitalist_ in this last respect, or only as a dependent

on either of the two former _capitalists_. Each of these three orders has

its interest.

First, It is the highest interest of the landed _capitalist_, that there

be the greatest plenty and variety of the best products of industry, and

the greatest consumption of the productions of the earth.

Secondly, It is the highest interest of the _capitalist_ of industry,

that there be the greatest plenty and variety of the best productions of

the earth, and the greatest consumption of the products of industry.

Thirdly, It is the highest interest of the money proprietor, that there

be the largest quantity and variety of the best products both of industry

and agriculture, in order that he may be able to support the value

of his capital by the quantity of objects on which he will have it in

his power to lay it out, and the value of his interest by the greatest

possible consumption, not at the lowest price, which, supposed lasting,

is as chimerical as the pretended balance, _constantly favourable_, but

at the most equitable rate, that is to say, the highest the seller can

hope for, and the lowest to which the purchaser can pretend.

But if it be true, that the combined interest of the three orders be

centered within the three points I have stated, namely, the greatest

possible quantity and variety of the best productions of the earth,

the greatest quantity and variety of the best products of industry,

and the greatest as well as most unconfined consumption of both at an

equitable price; it is equally true, that it must be a matter of perfect

indifference to agriculture, in what part of the world, and by whom her

productions are consumed, provided they be paid to her in any products

whatever, at her option equivalent to those she has parted with. It is no

less true, that it is a matter of perfect indifference to industry, in

what part of the world, and by whom, her products are consumed, provided

she be paid for them in any products whatever, at her option, equivalent

to those she gives. It is equally true, that the money-proprietor must

view, with the same indifference, his property giving life to this or

that branch of industry or agriculture, provided, that in the hour

of need or fancy, he finds at hand, on the most equitable terms, the

greatest quantity and variety of the best products of agriculture and

industry, which the interest of his money, or the amount of the salaries

he enjoys, gives him A RIGHT to expect.

There remains, it is true, a fourth interest, that of the _Fisc_, or

public revenue; but if this revenue be nothing more than the produce of

the taxes, this fourth interest consists of course, as the three former,

in the largest quantity of products, and the greatest consumption. Now

are there any other means to obtain those two objects, besides the freest

and most extensive exchange, not of goods for money, but of goods for

goods? Is it not perceivable, that all the four interests united, as well

as each of them separately, require that no more be imported in bullion

or money than the quantity necessary to facilitate those exchanges?

Is not a surplus of money not only useless, but even detrimental, in

diminishing our enjoyments, our possible profits, and _that consumption

which produces the public revenue_?

The Navigation Act was, if you will have it so, the last effort of the

human mind, at a time when every notion relative to commerce, was nearly

confined to _England_ alone; but I question much whether the _Opposition_

the most warm in invoking that tutelary God, against the Minister who

dares to offer the least encroachment upon its worship, would not be

very much pleased to see it destroyed before they themselves should come

into office: it is an old idol, to which incense is offered through mere

policy, and for which a veneration is kept up in the minds of the people,

for the sole purpose of making it subservient to the downfall of the

man who might be courageous enough to attempt its destruction. I shall

pass over in silence the obstacles which that famous Act daily opposes

to regulations as well adapted to the present state of things, as those

it contains were to the circumstances that gave it birth; but, to the

intoxication produced by its success, I shall be bold enough to impute

one of the most mistaken notions on the true aim of national commerce:

it is a very fatal error, to imagine that money ought to be the _object_

of those operations of which it is only the _means_. This chimera, it

is true, has never been realised; the wisdom of private cupidities has

always triumphed over the folly of general cupidity: nothing more clear

than the exactness with which the treasures of _America_ have been

shared amongst all the nations of _Europe_, each in proportion to her

agriculture and her industry, that is, according to her wants: at least

it appears to me, that the two balances of _England_ and _France_, which

I have produced, are incontrovertible proofs of what I here advance,

though they have been imagined and received as proofs of the very

contrary; nevertheless, the prejudice concerning these two _formidable

balances_ still subsists, and it is this prejudice which daily gives

life to new prohibitions, and new restrictions: there is not perhaps in

all _Europe_, a single modern regulation of that kind which does not owe

its establishment to this prejudice, and to the power it derives from

the veneration paid to it in the place where it was first conceived. The

nation who takes the lead in point of commercial knowledge, is every

where carefully watched. On the least of her operations, other nations

make use of the light she has held forth; her principles are studied,

her maxims adopted, her examples followed; every where they are on their

guard against her pretensions, pretensions openly avowed, prosecuted

without mystery, and crowned, as it is supposed, with success; and when

they see, that within the course of a twelvemonth, she has really

received more gold and silver than she was wont to receive in three

years; when they see the intoxication of her inhabitants on the arrival

of those treasures which obey her call from all parts of _Europe_;

when they hear the complaints of her news-paper writers against the

untractableness of the _Americans_, in not suffering themselves to be

entirely stripped of their specie; when they attend to her invectives

on the combinations of the _American_ merchants to prevent those of

_England_ from taking away that trifling sum in specie which the _United

States_ want, to give more consistency to their paper-money;—_then_,

indeed, _then_ it is possible to forget every thing else; it is possible

not to remark, that, with the same excess of avowed cupidity, _England_,

nevertheless, has not received, in the course of a whole century, (_a

period sufficient to determine an experiment_) _England_, I say, during

a whole century, has disdained to receive her dividend of the treasures

imported into _Europe_; the paper-money circulating in _England_ stands

evidently in lieu of a great part of the sum it represents, _and which

it was at her own option to procure_. It is also very pardonable not to

reflect _then_, that it is impossible for _England_ to keep long in her

hands without hurting herself, more than any other nation, any money

above what is necessary for her. No one takes the trouble of arguing long

on causes, when the effect is instantaneously and powerfully felt: _Not

~Europe~ alone, but the ~United States~ of ~America~, are stript of their

money by ~England~; ~England~ therefore wants not any longer to import

foreign goods, or when she advances the price of her own merchandise, she

refuses paying dearer for that of other nations._ The other nations do

not hesitate—_English_ goods are instantly prohibited.

The following principles are such as, I think, can never mislead.

There is not a single nation that cannot boast some palpable advantage

over another; nay, there is not a nation, a single province, that has

not received some peculiar favour from nature, which the same soil to

all appearance, the same temperature, the same exposure, refuse to yield

any where else but _with double the labour, and double the expence_,

and which, even with such additional aids, they yield at last only in a

state of degradation. Now, that portion of such peculiar favours, which

the proprietor of the land does not chuse to consume, belongs only to

the greatest quantity of other favours that it is possible to procure

in exchange. The more the proprietor procures of such other favours in

exchange, the more is he encouraged to increase the quantity of articles

which have enabled him to procure those favours; on the contrary, the

more he is restrained with regard to those exchanges which he might

procure, the more he is circumscribed, even in his means of production.

Every restriction therefore tending to diminish either the production

or the price of any article whatever, is a theft committed upon the

proprietor of the land, upon the province blessed with that favour which

is peculiar to it, upon the nation whose general revenue is decreased by

the whole amount of the productions stifled in the very bud, upon the

exchequer of that nation which would receive a duty on those productions;

and finally upon every one capable of presenting the nation with another

exchangeable commodity, or waiting only to see those productions, in

order to create an equivalent to pay for them.—Does it signify in what

part of the world? Must it not, at last, reach the original proprietor,

if he be not paid?

What is said of the productions of agriculture, may be applied to those

of industry. It is a gross mistake to imagine, that all things can be

equally well manufactured every where: how many fabrics, the perfection

of which depends on the quality of the water, and other local causes for

which it is impossible to account! How many more derive their perfection

from the bent of national genius, from the general dispositions, the

natural qualities of the inhabitants! Can we expect from the vivacity

of the _Frenchman_, who desires only to consume, what we may expect

from the patience of the _Englishman_, who labours only to enjoy? This

latter will always, and in spite of himself, give to his work a solidity

which will increase its price as well as its value; the other, in spite

of himself, will be busy about the forms best calculated to procure a

quick sale: objects of real comfort will always belong to the former, the

latter will ever lead the fashions. To hope that the one will produce,

without difficulty, what costs little or nothing to the other, would be

attempting to give to the wines of hot countries the pleasing acidity

proper to the wines of _Germany_; to these, the restorative and balsamic

qualities of the _Spanish_ and _Italian_ wines in the places where they

understand how to make them; to the wines of _Italy_ and _Germany_, that

native generosity proper to the wine of _Bordeaux_; to all of them,

the flavour of _Burgundy_ and the sprightliness of _Champaign_. It is

possible, say they, to imitate every thing;—say rather, to adulterate, to

corrupt, nay even to poison every thing, if Art can find no other way to

counterfeit Nature: _and these are the blessed effects of restrictions

and prohibitions_. It is a strange idea, to think of doing without

others; as if that did not lead them to think of doing without us; as if

the savage, of whom I have spoken, had not the same reason to prefer his

state to that of civilisation.

Nor would it be less strange to persist in setting the interest of the

people in opposition to that of the Exchequer, if it were possible to

reconcile them together, _instead of rendering, almost on every object at

present, the infamous trade of informers more lucrative than labour_.

Smuggling is hurtful to the State; it deprives government of the duties

on the articles smuggled into or out of the kingdom; but is it so very

advantageous to succeed in the measures adopted to prevent it, if by

bartering a great number of honest smugglers against a great number of

informers and a great number of custom-house imps, you make so many

thieves of the first, so many much more contemptible wretches of the

second, a rabble almost equally vile as the third; and succeed, at the

same time, in debasing in the hands of several manufacturers and landed

proprietors, the value of all those articles, which were before taken

from them by the smugglers to their mutual benefit?

_England_, it is true, suffered no damage, when a prodigious quantity

of _English_ goods, which are not comprehended in the _modest_ balance

with _France_, as stated by Sir _Charles Whitworth_, because they were

introduced into _France_ by smugglers, were sold nevertheless, without

much ado, all over that kingdom, and particularly in _Paris_, publicly

advertised on the shop-boards, in large gold letters;—but had not

_France_ some reason to think herself ill used, when an equal quantity of

_French_ goods, introduced also by smugglers into _England_, without any

information given to Sir _Charles_, ceased to pay the value of the goods

smuggled from _England_, and sold publicly all over _France_, and when,

instead of a small balance, sometimes given, sometimes received, _France_

found herself obliged to remit to _London_ an enormous sum in hard cash,

for payments which she had hitherto discharged in merchandise?

It is a pitiful policy on the part of _France_, (as remarked very justly

in all the _English_ papers after the first of _August_, 1785) to deprive

herself of a thousand _English_ luxuries which she is so fond of, and

which she is so able to procure;—but is _English_ policy much better, in

rejecting thousands of _French_ luxuries, which she finds so pleasing,

and which she is so able to pay for?

Smuggling is but a very poor corrective, a partial corrective, of the

iniquity ever attendant on Monopoly;—a feeble compensation for the

restrictions and prohibitions obtained in its favour: Smuggling, duly

considered in this light, is but too just; and it is shocking to be

obliged to punish so barbarously the unhappy men who gain a living by it.

But will not this necessity be removed, together with smuggling itself,

at the very moment that to those absurd regulations which encourage

that practice, shall be substituted a system of bartering, equally

advantageous to the nations which now find a benefit in smuggling?—a

system, which would mutually furnish to all parties interested, all

the means of introducing and procuring, in the best condition, at the

cheapest rate, with the least risk, and with the greatest advantage to

the Treasury, every article which before was introduced and procured at

a greater risk, almost always dearer, of the worst quality, and to the

detriment of the public revenue.

Let me ask whether that mass of prohibitions and restrictions, which

_legally_ establishes monopoly in _England_, be any thing more than a

mass of privileges granted to a chosen few, to the prejudice of the whole

community? Were we to look at every particular regulation, and consider

it distinctly, is there one which would not find the whole nation against

it, _except the humble Petitioners who share in the benefit_? And must it

not be very strange to imagine, very absurd to say, and above human power

to effect, that a system of regulations, not one of which favours above

one man against thousands, should, upon the whole, be serviceable to the

State?

Independent of the advantages which would arise from a truly free and

judicious system of commerce, viz. 1st, That of procuring what we

have not, by means of some article which we have in abundance, and

which our neighbours want;—2dly, The bartering of the superfluity of

our best articles in one kind, for the superfluity of what is best in

a different kind;—3dly, Not to barter what we can make cheaper than

others, except for goods which would cost us more were we to manufacture

them;—independent, I say, of these three, advantages, where would be

the inconvenience, though our bartering should be confined merely to the

innocent folly of exchanging one toy for another, or one rag for another?

The great, the true, the only advantage, of an exchange of property,

would not even in this case be lost to mankind; the man who is employed

only in marking the game, while two persons are amusing themselves,

whole days, in tossing a ball from one to the other in a tennis-court,

is nevertheless supported at the expence of the players. And are not the

owner of the court, his wife and children, maintained likewise at their

cost? If, having considered the Exchequer metaphorically, under the type

of the Keeper of the Tennis Court, we afterwards, without a metaphor,

consider this Keeper as a poor man who chooses this way of subsistence,

do not the players pay this tax (which they impose on themselves) in

favour of the poor, with more pleasure, though the tax may be greater,

than a certain other tax, which perhaps becomes necessary, only from

the difficulties with which we embarrass both the game of passing from

one parish to another, and the game of imports and exports, which is as

innocent, and more lucrative than that of tennis?

_The nominal Value of the generality of Exports, considered in different

Periods, and with respect to its Effect on foreign Correspondence._

When a manufacturer is compelled, by the general augmentation of prices,

arising from taxation, to pay his workmen and materials ten _per cent._

I suppose, dearer than usual, and he exports 1000 hats, _upon each of

which_ a draw-back of 6 shillings, I will suppose, is allowed him on

exportation, he does not reflect on the difference of 10 _per cent._

diffused through the general run of prices, by the mechanical reaction of

the total of the taxes on all that is not taxed; he remembers well the

effect of this reaction in the account which he makes out for himself,

to know at what rate he must in future sell his hats in foreign markets;

he only considers the draw-back, the remittance of the 6 shillings duty,

and concludes that it puts him in a situation to deal with foreigners

on the same terms as he did previous to the taxes, which have increased

every thing to the amount of 10 _per cent_. Nevertheless, the thousand

hats, with which, previous to the taxes, he furnished his foreign friends

for 1000_l._ I will suppose, are now raised to 1200_l._—Point out this

circumstance to him, he will tell you he cannot sell his hats cheaper,

and that foreigners must pay 1200_l._ instead of 1000_l._ since the

foreigner wants them. “Besides, (says he) what is the sum of two hundred

pounds more, divided among a thousand persons, who will purchase the

hats from the merchant abroad, to whom he sells them?” The manufacturer

does not want to look further; and the writer who from the nature of his

subject, or his manner of considering it, wants only to reflect a little

more, will only add, _Thus it is that foreigners pay our taxes, and never

suspect that they do so_. This is the truth, but not the whole truth. I

shall endeavour to find it out.

The general trade of _England_ with the rest of _Europe_ is not confined

to some thousands of pounds sterling, to be settled once for all; it

is an immense sum, _which must_ be renewed every year. Let us begin by

being thoroughly convinced of this necessity, in order to submit to its

consequences: we shall find moreover that these consequences are not

destructive.

The annual exports of _England_ amount to about a fifth of the products

of her industry, and consequently represent about a fifth of the labour

of her artificers.

If the taxes, after the war of 1755, had raised the price of every thing

at the rate of 10 _per cent._ (I can err but by a little more or less)

the total of her exports, which, before that war, amounted, on a medium

of ten years, (see Sir _Charles Whitworth_) only to a sum of 12,776,614

pounds sterling, let us say 13 millions, amounted, after the peace, to 14

millions 300 thousand.

Let us now suppose the trade of _England_ exhibiting to its foreign

correspondents, in the year 1762, this total in exports of 13 millions

(at the old prices) under the name of 14 millions 300 thousand pounds,

(a price rendered unavoidable by the advance in the prices of all

commodities, on account of the taxes); and let us suppose these

correspondents to have, really and annually, no more to pay them than

13 millions of their own manufactures, indicated by this modest number,

because they had not the honour to support, during seven years, a war

the most brilliant and successful in the memory of man, in _Germany_,

_America_, and _India_. I think one of the three following consequences

must be the result:

_Either_

That the total of _English_ exports must have been reduced from 14

millions 300 thousand pounds to 13 millions, for want of means in our

foreign buyers to pay the whole amount of _English_ exports at their

advanced price:

_Or_,

That _England_ must have been complaisant enough to call 13 millions, in

a foreign market, the amount of her exports, which the effects of her new

taxes obliged her to call 14 millions 300 thousand pounds at home:

_Or_,

That _England_ must have allowed her foreign connexions to call 14

millions 300 thousand pounds the same quantity and quality of their

manufactures, which, before the effect of _English_ taxation, they called

only 13 millions, and which, _till then_, had made the balance of what

they imported from _England_.

In the first case, the _English_ manufactories, which furnish the

exports, would have been necessarily reduced one tenth; upon which it

is necessary to observe, that the tenth of the _English_ exportation

makes a fiftieth of the total value of the product of her industry, and

that the inutility of the fiftieth of those products, occasioned by

the impossibility of their being purchased by foreigners at the price

occasioned by the _English_ new taxes, must have deprived of subsistence,

as well as of employment, a fiftieth of the _English_ artisans, and

rendered useless a fiftieth of the capitals appropriated to exportation.

In the second case, the prices of commodities would not be perceptibly

increased any where else but in _England_; the prices of her

correspondents would have been, ten years after the peace, almost as they

were in 1754.

In the third case, the prices would have increased, among the foreign

correspondents of the _English_, nearly in the same proportion as in

_England_.

The first case is evidently false, since Sir _Charles Whitworth_’s

_Statements_ prove that the exports of _England_, which amounted, as we

have before observed, upon a medium of 10 years before the war, only to

12 millions 776,614 pounds sterling, amounted, upon a medium of 10 years

after the peace, to 14 millions 921,067 pounds sterling, and even to 15

millions 11,211 pounds sterling, if we take a medium of 12 years from the

peace to 1773, at which period Sir _Charles Whitworth_’s _Statements_

conclude; (which exhibits, _independently of the nominal augmentation

supposed to have been occasioned by the taxes_, a _real_ augmentation of

about a 17th, notwithstanding _the real vacuum owing to the loss of those

men who would have increased this exportation, if they had not perished

in ~Germany~, ~India~, ~America~, and at sea_.)

The second case is more universally acknowledged to be false, since

there is not a single country in _Europe_ where the price of every thing

has not, upon a medium, increased at least 10 _per cent._ from 1754 to

1770;—which proves the truth of the third case:—thus it happens that

foreigners have paid the old taxes of _England_, without suspecting it;

as _England_ does not, in the least, suspect that those taxes are no

longer paid either in _England_ or elsewhere, although their produce

returns nevertheless to the public creditor.

Let us consider, however, whether this general increase of prices could

finally prove prejudicial to _England_, or to her connexions abroad.

It could not prove so to _England_, because she was obliged to submit

to this increase, or else to give up the manufacturing of a tenth of

the commodities she exported to foreign countries (_where she exports

nothing of what she can sell at home_), and because a deficiency of a

10th of her exports would have inevitably deprived a 50th of her artisans

of sustenance, and rendered useless a 50th of the capitals devoted to

exportation. Besides, considering this object in another light, what

loss would _England_ sustain by receiving, under the denomination of

14, I suppose, the same commodities which before were furnished for 13,

while she gave for the purchase, only 13 (old prices) which the effect of

taxation made her call 14?

It could not prejudice her foreign connexions, because this increase

of prices, which _abroad was not owing to taxation_, was only an

encouragement to labour, which must in general have increased its

products, always entitled to a profit over and above the price paid for

that labour.

A circumstance which was necessary for _England_, without doing her the

least harm, has, then, proved useful to the rest of _Europe_.⸺

But let up remark two very essential points:

The first is, that it is impossible in the nature of things, to keep

up foreign consumption, _upon which depends the continuation of our

exports_, without giving foreigners leave to increase the price of

theirs, by so much as the commodities carried to them must be increased

by our taxes;—in the same manner as it is impossible in the nature of

things, to keep up interior consumption, national consumption, _upon

which depends the payment of taxes_, without a general interior increase

in the price of labour, as well as in the price of its products, when the

wants of the State require new contributions.

The second observation which I deem equally essential, is, that such

a work, (_a work of an utility which may be called universal_) has

been brought about, consummated, without the Ministers of any State

whatsoever being entitled to any glory from the event, except that of

having facilitated the operation, if they have favoured the general

liberty of communication in all articles of trade; and without their

having deserved any other blame but that of retarding it, if their zeal,

their greediness for the _favourable balance_, has suggested to them

any _device_ to attract and overthrow it in the only country entrusted

to their management. We must universally ruin Credit, Trade, Commerce,

and the Banking business, if we pretend to prevent Wealth from extending

itself universally, a little sooner or later. _The owner of any kind of

riches whatever, has it not in his power to do any thing else, but to

choose the place, the object, and the time, of giving the first motion_;

all the rest is merely the effect of a stone cast into the water:

observe how the undulations succeed one another, how they are renewed

and extended;—can you fix the point where they shall stop?—We pretend

to direct them!—_Scilicet is superûm labor est?_ ... _Istæne animia

cœlestibus curæ?_—Indeed, indeed, too many cares occupy the minds of our

Gods!