THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
Birth of the German Empire and the French Republic
Causes of Hostile Relations—Discontent in France—War with Prussia
Declared—Self deception of the French—First Meeting of the Armies—The
Stronghold of Metz—Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte—Napoleon III at
Sedan—The Emperor a Captive; France a Republic—Bismarck Refuses
Intervention—Fall of the Fortresses—Paris is Besieged—Defiant Spirit of
the French—The Struggle Continued—Operations Before Paris—Fighting in
the South—The War at an End
In 1866 the war between the two great powers of Germany, in which most
of the smaller powers were concerned, led to more decided measures, in
the absorption by Prussia of the weaker states, the formation of a
North German League among the remaining states of the north, and the
offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia of the south German
states. By the treaty of peace with Austria, that power was excluded
from the German League, and Prussia remained the dominant power in
Germany. A constitution for the League was adopted in 1867, providing
for a Diet, or legislative council of the League, elected by the direct
votes of the people, and an army, which was to be under the command of
the Prussian king and subject to the military laws of Prussia. Each
state in the League bound itself to supply a specified sum for the
support of the army.
Here was a union with a backbone—an army and a budget—and Bismarck had
done more in the five years of his ministry in forming a united Germany
than his predecessors had done in fifty years. But the idea of union
and alliance between kindred states was then widely in the air. Such a
union had been practically completed in Italy, and Hungary in 1867
regained her ancient rights, which had been taken from her in 1849,
being given a separate government, with Francis Joseph, the emperor of
Austria,
as its king. It was natural that the common blood of the Germans should
lead them to a political confederation, and equally natural that
Prussia, which so overshadowed the smaller states in strength, should
be the leading element in the alliance.
Yet, though Prussia had concluded military agreements with the states
of southern Germany and held them also by means of the Zollverein, this
was far from bringing about a peaceful realization of unity. The
southern states, not merely the sovereigns only, but the peoples, have
always had little taste for Prussian leadership, and after 1866 this
feeling was very visible. For this reason Bismarck felt it important to
instigate a war against France. Union against the foreigner was to
complete political unity. This subject has been dealt with in the
preceding chapter, and we need here merely to repeat that warlike
sentiments were in the air in 1867, in regard to the desire of Napoleon
III to add to his empire the little duchy of Luxembourg and Bismarck’s
opposition to this desire. France was not then in a favorable condition
for war, and the matter was finally settled by declaring Luxembourg a
neutral state and ordering the walls around its capital to be
destroyed.
CAUSES OF HOSTILE RELATIONS
In spite of this settlement, it remained certain to everybody that a
conflict would break out in a short time between France and Prussia. We
have seen what reasons Bismarck had for such a war. Napoleon III’s
government, justly censured by opinion for the weakness which it had
shown in 1866, was eager to retrieve the fault it had then committed.
Yet the weakness of the administration continued and prevented it from
adopting the indispensable military measures that it should have done.
The enemies of power were declaiming against standing armies, which
they declared useless. The government deputies were afraid to
dissatisfy their constituents by aggravating the burdens of the
service. Marshal Niel, minister of war, tried indeed to adopt measures
with a view to the seemingly inevitable conflict. He caused to be
elaborated a plan of campaign, a system of transportation by railway,
an arrangement for the chief places of the east to be armed with rifled
cannon. But the Chamber grudged him the appropriations for the increase
of the army, asking him if “he wished to make France a vast barracks.”
“Take care,” he answered the opposition, “lest you make it a vast
cemetery.” Accordingly, when the mobile national guard had been
created, made up of all the young men who had not been drawn by lot,
organization was given to it only on paper, and it was never drilled.
Leboeuf, who succeeded Niel in August, 1869, abandoned, moreover, most
of his predecessor’s plans. He even neglected to do anything towards
carrying out on the eastern frontier any of the works of defense
already recommended as urgent by the generals of the restoration.
And thus time passed on until the eventful year 1870. By that year
Prussia had completed its work among the north German states and was
ready for the issue of hostilities, if this should be necessary. On the
other hand, Napoleon, who had found his prestige in France from various
causes decreasing, felt obliged in 1870 to depart from his policy of
personal rule and give that country a constitutional government. This
proposal was submitted to a vote of the people and was sustained by an
immense majority. He also took occasion to state that “peace was never
more assured than at the present time.” This assurance gave
satisfaction to the world, yet it was a false one, for war was probably
at that moment assured.
DISCONTENT IN FRANCE
There were alarming signs in France. The opposition to Napoleonism was
steadily gaining power. A bad harvest was threatened—a serious source
of discontent. The parliament was discussing the reversal of the
sentence of banishment against the Orleans family. These indications of
a change in public sentiment appeared to call for some act that would
aid in restoring the popularity of the emperor. And of all the acts
that could be devised a national war seemed the most promising. If the
Rhine frontier, which every Frenchman regarded as the natural boundary
of the empire, could be regained by the arms of the nation, discontent
and opposition would vanish, the name of Napoleon would win back its
old prestige, and the reign of Bonapartism would be firmly established.
Acts speak louder than words, and the acts of Napoleon were not in
accord with his assurances of peace. Extensive military preparations
began, and the forces of the empire were strengthened by land and sea,
while great trust was placed in a new weapon, of murderous powers,
called the Mitrailleuse, the predecessor of the machine gun, and
capable of discharging twenty-five balls at once.
CAUSES OF HOSTILE RELATIONS
On the other hand, there were abundant indications of discontent in
Germany, where a variety of parties inveighed against the rapacious
policy of Prussia, and where Bismarck had sown a deep crop of hate. It
was believed in France that the minor states would not support Prussia
in a war. In Austria the defeat of 1866 rankled, and hostilities
against Prussia on the part of France seemed certain to win sympathy
and support in that composite empire. Colonel Stoffel, the French
military envoy at Berlin, declared that Prussia would be found
abundantly prepared for a struggle; but his warnings went unheeded in
the French Cabinet, and the warlike preparations continued.
Napoleon did not have to go far for an excuse for the war upon which he
was resolved. One was prepared for him in that potent source of
trouble, the succession to the throne of Spain. In that country there
had for years been no end of trouble, revolts, Carlist risings, wars
and rumors of wars. The government of Queen Isabella, with its endless
intrigues, plots and alternation of despotism and anarchy, and the
pronounced immorality of the queen, had become so distasteful to the
people that finally, after several years of revolts and armed risings,
she was driven from her throne by a revolution, and for a time Spain
was without a monarch and was ruled on the republican principles.
But this arrangement did not prove satisfactory. The party in
opposition looked around for a king, and negotiations began with a
distant relative of the Prussian royal family, Leopold of Hohenzollern.
Prince Leopold accepted the offer, and informed the king of Prussia of
his decision.
The news of this event caused great excitement in Paris, and the
Prussian government was advised of the painful feeling to which the
incident had given rise. The answer from Berlin that the Prussian
government had no concern in the matter, and that Prince Leopold was
free to act on his own account, did not allay the excitement. The
demand for war grew violent and clamorous, the voices of the feeble
opposition in the Chambers were drowned, and the journalists and war
partisans were confident of a short and glorious campaign and a
triumphant march to Berlin.
The hostile feeling was reduced when King William of Prussia, though he
declined to prohibit Prince Leopold from accepting the crown, expressed
his concurrence with the decision of the prince when he withdrew his
acceptance of the dangerous offer. This decision was regarded as
sufficient, even in Paris; but it did not seem to be so in the palace,
where an excuse for a declaration of war was ardently desired. The
emperor’s purpose was enhanced by the influence of the empress, and it
was finally declared that the Prussian king had aggrieved France in
permitting the prince to become a candidate for the throne without
consulting the French Cabinet.
WAR WITH PRUSSIA DECLARED
Satisfaction for this shadowy source of offense was demanded, but King
William firmly refused to say any more on the subject and declined to
stand in the way of Prince Leopold if he should again accept the offer
of the Spanish throne. This refusal was declared to be an offense to
the honor and a threat to the safety of France. The war party was so
strongly in the ascendant that all opposition was now looked upon as
lack of patriotism, and on the 15th of July the Prime Minister Ollivier
announced that the reserves were to be called out and the necessary
measures taken to secure the honor and security of France. When the
declaration of war was hurled against Prussia the whole nation seemed
in harmony with it and public opinion appeared for once to have become
a unit throughout France.
Rarely in the history of the world has so trivial a cause given rise to
such stupendous military and political events as took place in France
in a brief interval following this blind leap into hostilities. Instead
of a triumphant march to Berlin and the dictation of peace from its
palace, France was to find itself in two months’ time without an
emperor or an army, and in a few months more completely subdued and
occupied by foreign troops, while Paris had been made the scene of a
terrible siege and a frightful communistic riot, and a republic had
succeeded the empire. It was such a series of events as have seldom
been compressed within the short interval of half a year.
In truth Napoleon and his advisers were blinded by their hopes to the
true state of affairs. The army on which they depended, and which they
assumed to be in a high state of efficiency and discipline, was lacking
in almost every requisite of an efficient force. The first Napoleon had
been his own minister of war. The third Napoleon, when told by his war
minister that “not a single button was wanted on a single gaiter,” took
the words for the fact, and hurled an army without supplies and
organization against the most thoroughly organized army the world had
ever known. That the French were as brave as the Germans goes without
saying; they fought desperately, but from the first confusion reigned
in their movements, while military science of the highest kind
dominated those of the Germans.
Napoleon was equally mistaken as to the state of affairs in Germany.
The disunion upon which he counted vanished at the first threat of war.
All Germany felt itself threatened and joined hands in defense. The
declaration of war was received there with as deep an enthusiasm as in
France and excited a fervent eagerness for the struggle. The new
popular song, DIE WACHT AM RHEIN (“The Watch on the Rhine”), spread
rapidly from end to end of the country, and indicated the resolution of
the German people to defend to the death the frontier stream of their
country.
SELF-DECEPTION OF THE FRENCH
The French looked for a parade march to Berlin, even fixing the day of
their entrance into that city—August 15th, the emperor’s birthday. On
the contrary, they failed to set their foot on German territory, and
soon found themselves engaged in a death struggle with the invaders of
their own land. In truth, while the Prussian diplomacy was conducted by
Bismarck, the ablest statesman Prussia had ever known, the movements of
the army were directed by far the best tactician Europe then possessed,
the famous Von Moltke, to whose strategy the rapid success of the war
against Austria had been due. In the war with France Von Moltke, though
too old to lead the armies in person, was virtually commander-in-chief,
and arranged those masterly combinations which overthrew all the power
of France in so remarkably brief a period. Under his directions, from
the moment war was declared everything worked with clock-like
precision. It was said that Von Moltke had only to touch a bell and all
went forward. As it was, the Crown Prince Frederick fell upon the
French while still unprepared, won the first battle, and steadily held
the advantage to the end, the French being beaten by the strategy that
kept the Germans in superior strength at all decisive points.
But to return to the events of war. On July 23, 1870, the Emperor
Napoleon, after making his wife, Eugenie regent of France, set out with
his son at the head of the army, full of high hopes of victory and
triumph. By the end of July King William had also set out from Berlin
to join the armies that were then in rapid motion, towards the
frontier.
The emperor made his way to Metz, where was stationed his main army,
about 200,000 strong, under Marshals Bazaine and Canrobert and General
Bourgaki. Further east, under Marshal MacMahon, the hero of Magenta,
was the southern army, of about 100,000 men. A third army occupied the
camp at Chalons, while a well-manned fleet set sail for the Baltic, to
blockade the harbors and assail the coast of Germany. The German army
was likewise in three divisions, the first, of 61,000 men, under
General Steinmetz; the second, of 206,000 men, under Prince Frederick
Charles; and the third, of 180,000 men, under the crown prince and
General Blumenthal. The king, commander-in-chief of the whole, was in
the center, and with him the general staff under the guidance of the
alert von Moltke. Bismarck and the minister of war Von Roon were also
present, and so rapid was the movement of these great forces that in
two weeks after the order to march was given 300,000 armed Germans
stood in rank along the Rhine.
FIRST MEETING OF THE ARMIES
The two armies first came together on August 2d, near Saarbruck, on the
frontier line of the hostile kingdoms. It was the one success of the
French, for the Prussians, after a fight in which both sides lost
equally, retired in good order. This was proclaimed by the French
papers as a brilliant victory, and filled the people with undue hopes
of glory. It was the last favorable report, for they were quickly
overwhelmed with tidings of defeat and disaster.
Weissenburg, on the borders of Rhenish Bavaria, had been invested by a
division of MacMahon’s army. On August 4th the right wing of the army
of the Crown Prince Frederick attacked and repulsed this investing
force after a hot engagement, in which its leader, General Douay, was
killed, and the loss on both sides was heavy. Two days later occurred a
battle which decided the fate of the whole war, that of
Worth-Reideshofen, where the army of the crown prince met that of
MacMahon, and after a desperate struggle, which continued for fifteen
hours, completely defeated him, with very heavy losses on both sides.
MacMahon retreated in haste towards the army at Chalons, while the
crown prince took possession of Alsace, and prepared for the reduction
of the fortresses on the Rhine, from Strasburg to Belfort. On the same
day as that of the battle of Worth, General Steinmetz stormed the
heights of Spicheren, and, though at great loss of life, drove Frossard
from those heights and back upon Metz.
The occupation of Alsace was followed by that of Lorraine, by the
Prussian army under King William, who took possession of Nancy and the
country surrounding on August 11th. These two provinces had at one time
belonged to Germany, and it was the aim of the Prussians to retain them
as the chief anticipated prize of the war. Meanwhile the world looked
on in amazement at the extraordinary rapidity of the German success,
which, in two weeks after Napoleon left Paris, had brought his power to
the verge of overthrow.
THE STRONGHOLD OF METZ
Towards the Moselle River and the strongly fortified town of Metz, 180
miles northeast of Paris, around which was concentrated the main French
force, all the divisions of the German army now advanced, and on the
14th of August they gained a victory at Colombey-Nouilly which drove
their opponents back from the open field towards the fortified city.
It was Moltke’s opinion that the French proposed to make their stand
before this impregnable fortress, and fight there desperately for
victory. But, finding less resistance than he expected, he concluded,
on the 15th, that Bazaine, in fear of being cooped up within the
fortress, meant to march towards Verdun, there to join his forces with
those of MacMahon and give battle to the Germans in the plain.
The astute tactician at once determined to make every effort to prevent
such a concentration of his opponents, and by the evening of the 15th a
cavalry division had crossed the Moselle and reached the village of
Mars-la-Tour, where it bivouacked for the night. It had seen troops in
motion towards Metz, hut did not know whether these formed the
rear-guard of the French army or its vanguard in its march towards
Verdun.
In fact, Bazaine had not yet got away with his army. All the roads from
Metz were blocked with heavy baggage, and it was impossible to move so
large an army with expedition. The time thus lost by Bazaine was
diligently improved by Frederick Charles, and on the morning of the
16th the Brandenburg army corps, one of the best and bravest in the
German army, had followed the cavalry and come within sight of the
Verdun road. It was quickly perceived that a French force was before
them, and some preliminary skirmishing developed the enemy in such
strength as to convince the leader of the corps that he had in his
front the whole or the greater part of Bazaine’s army, and that its
escape from Metz had not been achieved.
They were desperate odds with which the brave Brandenburgers had to
contend, but they had been sent to hold the French until reinforcements
could arrive, and they were determined to resist to the death. For
nearly six hours they resisted, with unsurpassed courage, the fierce
onslaughts of the French, though at a cost of life that perilously
depleted the gallant corps. Then, about four o’clock in the afternoon,
Prince Frederick Charles came up with reinforcements to their support
and the desperate contest became more even.
MARS-LA-TOUR AND GRAVELOTTE
Gradually fortune decided in favor of the Germans, and by the time
night had come they were practically victorious, the field of
Mars-la-Tour, after the day’s struggle, remaining in their hands. But
they were utterly exhausted, their horses were worn out, and most of
their ammunition was spent, and though their impetuous commander forced
them to a new attack, it led to a useless loss of life, for their
powers of fighting were gone. They had achieved a fearful loss,
amounting to about 16,000 men on each side. “The battle of Vionville
(Mars-la-Tour) is without a parallel in military history,” said Emperor
William, “seeing that a single army corps, about 20,000 men strong,
hung on to and repulsed an enemy more than five times as numerous and
well equipped. Such was the glorious deed done by the Brandenburgers,
and the Hohenzollerns will never forget the debt they owe to their
devotion.”
Two days afterwards (August 16th) at Gravelotte, a village somewhat
nearer to Metz, the armies, somewhat recovered from the terrible
struggle of the 14th, met again, the whole German army being now
brought up, so that over 100,000 men faced the 140,000 of the French.
It was the great battle of the war. For four hours the two armies stood
fighting face to face, without any special result, neither being able
to drive back the other. The French held their ground and died. The
Prussians dashed upon them and died. Only late in the evening was the
right wing of the French army broken, and the victory, which at five
o’clock remained uncertain, was decided in favor of the Germans. More
than 40,000 men lay dead and wounded upon the field, the terrible
harvest of those nine hours of conflict. That night Bazaine withdrew
his army behind the fortifications at Metz. His effort to join MacMahon
had ended in failure.
It was the fixed purpose of the Prussians to detain him in that
stronghold, and thus render practically useless to France its largest
army. A siege was to be prosecuted, and an army of 150,000 men was
extended around the town. The fortifications were far too strong to be
taken by assault, and all depended on a close blockade. On August 31st
Bazaine made an effort to break through the German lines, but was
repulsed. It became now a question of how long the provisions of the
French would hold out.
NAPOLEON III AT SEDAN
The French emperor, who had been with Bazaine, had left his army before
the battle of Mars-la-Tour, and was now with MacMahon at Chalons. Here
lay an army of 125,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. On it the Germans
were advancing, in doubt as to what movement it would make, whether
back towards Paris or towards Metz for the relief of Bazaine. They
sought to place themselves in a position to check either. The latter
movement was determined on by the French, but was carried out in a
dubious and uncertain manner, the time lost giving abundant opportunity
to the Germans to learn what was afoot and to prepare to prevent it. As
soon as they were aware of MacMahon’s intention of proceeding to Metz
they made speedy preparations to prevent his relieving Bazaine. By the
last days of August the army of the crown prince had reached the right
bank of the Aisne, and the fourth division gained possession of the
line of the Meuse. On August 30th the French under General de Failly
were attacked by the Germans at Beaumont and put to flight with heavy
loss. It was evident that the hope of reaching Metz was at an end, and
MacMahon, abandoning the attempt, concentrated his army around the
frontier fortress of Sedan.
This old town stands on the right bank of the Meuse, in an angle of
territory between Luxembourg and Belgium, and is surrounded by meadows,
gardens, ravines, ditches and cultivated fields; the castle rising on a
cliff-like eminence to the southwest of the place. MacMahon had stopped
here to give his weary men a rest, not to fight, but von Moltke
decided, on observing the situation, that Sedan should be the
grave-yard of the French army. “The trap is now closed, and the mouse
in it,” he said, with a chuckle of satisfaction.
Such proved to be the case. On September 1st the Bavarians won the
village of Bazeille, after hours of bloody and desperate struggle.
During this severe fight Marshal MacMahon was so seriously wounded that
he was obliged to surrender the chief command, first to Duerot, and
then to General Wimpffen, a man of recognized bravery and cold
calculation.
Fortune soon showed itself in favor of the Germans. To the northwest of
the town, the North German troops invested the exits from St. Meuges
and Fleigneux, and directed a fearful fire of artillery against the
French forces, which, before noon, were so hemmed in the valley that
only two insufficient outlets to the south and north remained open. But
General Wimpffen hesitated to seize either of these routes, the open
way to Illy was soon closed by the Prussian guard corps, and a
murderous fire was now directed from all sides upon the French, so
that, after a last energetic struggle, they gave up all attempts to
force a passage, and in the afternoon beat a retreat towards Sedan. In
this small town the whole army of MacMahon was collected by evening,
and there prevailed in the streets and houses an unprecedented disorder
and confusion, which was still further increased when the German troops
from the surrounding heights began to shoot down upon the fortress, and
the town took fire in several places.
SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON’S ARMY
That an end might be put to the prevailing misery, Napoleon now
commanded General Wimpffen to capitulate. The flag of truce already
waved on the gates of Sedan when Colonel Bronsart appeared, and in the
name of the king of Prussia demanded the surrender of the army and
fortress. He soon returned to headquarters, accompanied by the French
General Reille, who presented to the king a written message from
Napoleon: “As I may not die in the midst of my army, I lay my sword in
the hands of your majesty.” King William accepted it with an expression
of sympathy for the hard fate of the emperor and of the French army
which had fought so bravely under his own eyes. The conclusion of the
treaty of capitulation was placed in the hands of Wimpffen, who,
accompanied by General Castelnau, set out for Donchery to negotiate
with Moltke and Bismarck. No attempts, however, availed to move Moltke
from his stipulation for the surrender of the whole army at discretion;
he granted a short respite, but if this expired without surrender, the
bombardment of the town was to begin anew.
At six o’clock in the morning the capitulation was signed and was
ratified by the king at his headquarters at Vendresse (2d September).
Thus the world beheld the incredible spectacle of an army of 83,000 men
surrendering themselves and their weapons to the victor, and being
carried off as prisoners of war to Germany. Only the officers who gave
their written word of honor to take no further part in the present war
with Germany were permitted to retain their arms and personal property.
Probably the assurance of Napoleon, the he had sought death on the
battle-field but had not found it, was literally true; at any rate, the
fate of the unhappy man, bowed down as he was both by physical and
mental suffering, was so solemn and tragic that there was no room for
hypocrisy, and that he had exposed himself to personal danger was
admitted on all sides. Accompanied by Count Bismarck, he stopped at a
small and mean-looking laborer’s inn on the road to Donchery, where,
sitting down on a stone seat before the door, with Count Bismarck, he
declared that he had not desired the war, but had been driven to it
through the force of public opinion; and afterwards the two proceeded
to the little castle of Bellevue, near Frenois, to join King William
and the crown prince. A telegram to Queen Augusta thus describes the
interview: “What an impressive moment was the meeting with Napoleon! He
was cast down, but dignified in his bearing. I have granted him
Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel, as his residence. Our meeting took place in
a little castle before the western glacis of Sedan.
THE EMPEROR A CAPTIVE; FRANCE A REPUBLIC
The locking up of Bazaine in Metz and the capture of MacMahon’s army at
Sedan were events fatal to France. The struggle continued for months,
but it was a fight against hope. The subsequent events of the war
consisted of a double siege, that of Metz and that of Paris, with
various minor sieges, and a desperate but hopeless effort of France in
the field. As for the empire of Napoleon III, it was at an end. The
tidings of the terrible catastrophe at Sedan filled the people with a
fury that soon became revolutionary. While Jules Favre, the republican
deputy, was offering a motion in the Assembly that the emperor had
forfeited the crown, and that a provisional government should be
established, the people were thronging the streets of Paris with cries
of “Deposition! Republic!” On the 4th of September the Assembly had its
final meeting. Two of its prominent members, Jules Favre and Gambetta,
sustained the motion for deposition of the emperor, and it was carried
after a stormy session. They then made their way to the senate-chamber,
where, before a thronging audience, they proclaimed a republic and
named a government for the national defense. At its head was General
Trochu, military commandant at Paris. Favre was made minister of
foreign affairs; Gambetta, minister of the interior; and other
prominent members of te Assembly filled the remaining cabinet posts.
The legislature was dissolved, the Palais de Bourbon was closed, and
the Empress Eugenie quitted the Tuileries and made her escape with a
few attendants to Belgium, whence she sought a refuge in England.
Prince Louis Napoleon made his way to Italy, and the swarm of courtiers
scattered in all directions; some faithful followers of the deposed
monarch seeking the castle of Wilhelmshohe, where the unhappy Louis
Napoleon occupied as a prison the same beautiful palace and park in
which his uncle Jerome Bonaparte had once passed six years in a life of
pleasure. The second French Empire was at an end; the third French
Republic had begun—one that had to pass through many changes and escape
many dangers before it would be firmly established.
“Not a foot’s breadth of our country nor a stone of our fortresses
shall be surrendered,” was Jules Favre’s defiant proclamation to the
invaders, and the remainder of the soldiers in the field were collected
in Paris, and strengthened with all available reinforcements. Every
person capable of bearing arms was enrolled in the national army, which
soon numbered 400,000 men. There was need of haste, for the victors at
Sedan were already marching upon the capital, inspired with high hopes
from their previous astonishing success. They knew that Paris was
strongly fortified, being encircled by powerful lines of defense, but
they trusted that hunger would soon bring its garrison to terms. The
same result was looked for at Metz, and at Strasbourg, which was also
besieged.
Thus began at three main points and several minor ones a military siege
the difficulties, dangers, and hardships of which surpassed even those
of the winter campaign in the Crimea. Exposed at the fore-posts to the
enemy’s balls, chained to arduous labor in the trenches and redoubts,
and suffering from the effects of bad weather, and insufficient food
and clothing, the German soldiers were compelled to undergo great
privations and sufferings before the fortifications; while many fell in
the frequent skirmishes and sallies, many succumbed to typhus and
epidemic disease.
No less painful and distressing was the condition of the besieged.
While the garrison soldiers on guard were constantly compelled to face
death in nocturnal sallies, or led a pitiable existence in damp huts,
having inevitable surrender constantly before their eyes, and
disarmament and imprisonment as the reward of all their struggles and
exertions, the citizens in the towns, the women and children, were in
constant danger of being shivered to atoms by the fearful shells, or of
being buried under falling walls and roofs; and the poorer part of the
population saw with dismay the gradual diminution of the necessaries of
life, and were often compelled to pacify their hunger with the flesh of
horses, and disgusting and unwholesome food.
BISMARCK REFUSES INTERVENTION
The republican government possessed only a usurped power, and none but
a freely elected national assembly could decide as to the fate of the
French nation. Such an assembly was therefore summoned for the 16th of
October. Three members of the government—Cremieux, Fourichon, and
Glais-Bizoin—were despatched before the entire blockade of the city had
been effected, to Tours, to maintain communication with the provinces.
An attempt was also made at the same time to induce the great Powers
which had not taken part in the war to organize an intervention, as
hitherto only America, Switzerland and Spain had sent official
recognition. For this important and delicate mission the old statesman
and historian Thiers was selected, and, in spite of his
three-and-seventy years, immediately set out on the journey to London,
St. Petersburg, Vienna and Florence. Count Bismarck, however, in the
name of Prussia, refused any intervention in internal affairs. In two
despatches to the ambassadors of foreign courts, the chancellor
declared that the war, begun by the Emperor Napoleon, had been approved
by the representatives of the nation, and that thus all France was
answerable for the result. Germany was obliged, therefore, to demand
guarantees which should secure her in future against attack, or, at any
rate, render attack more difficult. Thus a cession of territory on the
part of France was laid down as the basis of a treaty of peace. The
neutral powers were also led to the belief that if they fostered in the
French any hope of intervention, peace would only be delayed. The
mission of Thiers, therefore, yielded no useful result, while the
direct negotiation which Jules Favre conducted with Bismarck proved
equally unavailing.
FALL OF THE FORTRESSES
Soon the beleaguered fortresses began to fall. On the 23d of September
the ancient town of Toul, in Lorraine, was forced to capitulate, after
a fearful bombardment; and on the 27th Strasbourg, in danger of the
terrible results of a storming, after the havoc of a dreadful artillery
fire, hoisted the white flag, and surrendered on the following day. The
supposed impregnable fortress of Metz held out little longer. Hunger
did what cannon were incapable of doing. The successive sallies made by
Bazaine proved unavailing, though, on October 7th his soldiers fought
with desperate energy, and for hours the air was full of the roar of
cannon and mitrailleuse and the rattle of musketry. But the Germans
withstood the attack unmoved, and the French were forced to withdraw
into the town.
Bazaine then sought to negotiate with the German leaders at Versailles,
offering to take no part in the war for three months if permitted to
withdraw. But Bismarck and Moltke would listen to no terms other than
unconditional surrender, and these terms were finally accepted, the
besieged army having reached the brink of starvation. It was with
horror and despair that France learned on the 30th of October, that the
citadel of Metz, with its fortifications and arms of defense, had been
yielded to the Germans, and its army of more than 150,000 men had
surrendered as prisoners of war.
This hasty surrender at Metz, a still greater disaster to France than
that of Sedan, was not emulated at Paris, which for four months held
out against all the efforts of the Germans. On the investment of the
great city, King William removed his headquarters to the historic
palace of Versailles, setting up his homely camp-bed in the same
apartments from which Lois XIV had once issued his despotic edicts and
commands. Here Count Bismarck conducted his diplomatic labors and
Moltke issued his directions for the siege, which, protracted from week
to week and month to month, gradually transformed the beautiful
neighborhood, with its prosperous villages, superb country houses, and
enchanting parks and gardens, into a scene of sadness and desolation.
PARIS IS BESIEGED
In spite of the vigorous efforts made by the commander-in-chief Trochu,
both by continuous firing from the forts and by repeated sallies, to
prevent Paris from being surrounded, and to force a way through the
trenches, his enterprises were rendered fruitless by the watchfulness
and strength of the Germans. The blockade was completely accomplished;
Paris was surrounded and cut off from the outer world; even the
underground telegraphs, through which communication was for a time
secretly maintained with the provinces, were by degrees discovered and
destroyed. But to the great astonishment of Europe, which looked on
with keenly pitched excitement at the mighty struggle, the siege
continued for months without any special progress being observable from
without or any lessening of resistance from within. On account of the
extension of the forts, the Germans were compelled to remain at such a
distance that a bombardment of the town at first appeared impossible; a
storming of the outer works would, moreover, be attended with such
sacrifices that the humane temper of the king revolted from such a
proceeding. The guns of greater force and carrying power which were
needed from Germany, could only be procured after long delay on account
of the broken lines of railway. Probably also there was some hesitation
on the German side to expose the beautiful city, regarded by so many as
the “metropolis of civilization,” to the risk of a bombardment, in
which works of art, science, and a historical past would meet
destruction. Nevertheless, the declamations of the French at the
vandalism of the northern barbarians met with assent and sympathy from
most of the foreign Powers.
Determination and courage falsified the calculations at Versailles of a
quick cessation of the resistance. The republic offered a far more
energetic and determined opposition to the Prussian arms than the
empire had done. The government of the national defense still declaimed
with stern reiteration: “Not a foot’s breadth of our country; not a
stone of our fortresses!” and positively rejected all proposals of
treaty based on territorial concessions. Faith in the invincibility of
the republic was rooted as an indisputable dogma in the hearts of the
French people. The victories and the commanding position of France from
1792 to 1799 were regarded as so entirely the necessary result of the
Revolution, that a conviction prevailed that the formation of a
republic, with a national army for its defense, would have an especial
effect on the rest of Europe. Therefore, instead of summoning a
constituent Assembly, which, in the opinion of Prussia and the other
foreign Powers, would alone be capable of offering security for a
lasting peace, it was decided to continue the revolutionary movements,
and to follow the same course which, in the years 1792 and 1793, had
saved France from the coalition of the European Powers. It was held
that a revolutionary dictatorship such as had once been exercised by
the Convention and the members of the Committee of Public Safety, must
again be revived, and a youthful and hot-blooded leader was alone
needed to stir up popular feeling and set it in motion.
To fill such a part no one was better adapted than the advocate
Gambetta, who emulated the career of the leaders of the Revolution, and
whose soul glowed with a passionate ardor of patriotism. In order to
create for himself a free sphere of action, and to initiate some
vigorous measure in place of the well-rounded phrases and eloquent
proclamations of his colleagues Trochu and Jules Favre, he quitted the
capital in an air-balloon and entered into communication with the
government delegation at Tours, which through him soon obtained a fresh
impetus. His next most important task was the liberation of the capital
from the besieging German army, and the expulsion of the enemy from the
“sacred” soil of France. For this purpose he summoned, with the
authority of a minister of war, all persons capable of bearing arms up
to forty years of age to take active service, and despatched them into
the field; he imposed war-taxes, and terrified the tardy and refractory
with threats of punishment. Every force was put in motion; all France
was transformed into a great camp.
A popular war was now to take the place of a soldier’s war, and what
the soldiers had failed to effect must be accomplished by the people;
France must be saved, and the world freed from despotism. To promote
this object, the whole of France, with the exception of Paris, was
divided into four general governments, the headquarters of the
different governors being Lille, Le Mans, Bourges, and Besancon. Two
armies, from the Loire and from the Somme, were to march simultaneously
towards Paris, and aided by the sallies of Trochu and his troops, were
to drive the enemy from the country. Energetic attacks were now
attempted from time to time, in the hope that when the armies of relief
arrived from the provinces, it might be possible to effect a coalition;
but all these efforts were constantly repulsed after a hot struggle by
the besieging German troops. At the same time, during the month of
October, the territory between the Oise and the Lower Seine was scoured
by reconnoitering troops, under Prince Albrecht, the southeast district
was protected by a Wurtemberg detachment through the successful battle
near Nogent on the Seine, while a division of the third army advanced
towards the south accompanied by two cavalry divisions. A more
unfortunate circumstance, however, for the Parisians was the cutting
off of all communication with the outer world, for the Germans had
destroyed the telegraphs. But even this obstacle was overcome by the
inventive genius of the French. By means of pigeon letter-carriers and
air-balloons, they were always able to maintain a partial though
one-sided and imperfect communication with the provinces, and the
aerostatic art was developed and brought to perfection on this occasion
in a manner which had never before been considered possible.
DEFIANT SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH
The whole of France, and especially the capital, was already in a state
of intense excitement when the news of the capitulation of Metz came to
add fresh fuel to the flame. Outside the walls Gambetta was using
heroic efforts to increase his forces, bringing Bedouin horsemen from
Africa and inducing the stern old revolutionist Garibaldi to come to
his aid; and Thiers was opening fresh negotiations for a truce. Inside
the walls the Red Republic raised the banners of insurrection and
attempted to drive the government of national defense from power.
This effort of the dregs of revolution to inaugurate a reign of terror
failed, and the provisional government felt so elated with its victory
that it determined to continue at the head of affairs and to oppose the
calling of a chamber of national representatives. The members
proclaimed oblivion for what had passed, broke off the negotiations for
a truce begun by Thiers, and demanded a vote of confidence. The
indomitable spirit shown by the French people did not, on the other
hand, inspire the Germans with a very lenient or conciliatory temper.
Bismarck declared in a despatch the reasons why the negotiations had
failed: “The incredible demand that we should surrender the fruits of
all our efforts during the last two months, and should go back to the
conditions which existed at the beginning of the blockade of Paris,
only affords fresh proof that in Paris pretexts are sought for refusing
the nation the right of election.” Thiers mournfully declared the
failure of his undertaking, but in Paris the popular voting resulted in
a ten-fold majority in favor of the government and the policy of
postponement.
After the breaking off of the negotiations, the world anticipated some
energetic action towards the besieged city. The efforts of the enemy
were, however, principally directed to drawing the iron girdle still
tighter, enclosing the giant city more and more closely, and cutting
off every means of communication, so that at last a surrender might be
brought about by the stern necessity of starvation. That this object
would not be accomplished as speedily as at Metz, that the city of
pleasure, enjoyment, and luxury would withstand a siege of four months,
had never been contemplated for a moment. It is true that, as time went
on, all fresh meat disappeared from the market, with the exception of
horse-flesh; that white bread, on which Parisians place such value, was
replaced by a baked compound of meal and bran; that the stores of dried
and salted food began to decline, until at last rats, dogs, cats, and
even animals from the zoological gardens were prepared for consumption
at restaurants.
Yet, to the amazement of the world, all these miseries, hardships, and
sufferings were courageously borne, nocturnal watch was kept, sallies
were undertaken, and cold, hunger, and wretchedness of all kinds were
endured with an indomitable steadfastness and heroism. The courage of
the besieged Parisians was also animated by the hope that the military
forces in the provinces would hasten to the aid of the hard-pressed
capital, and that therefore an energetic resistance would afford the
rest of France sufficient time for rallying all its forces, and at the
same time exhibit an elevating example. In the carrying out of this
plan, neither Trochu nor Gambetta was wanting in the requisite energy
and circumspection. The former organized sallies from time to time, in
order to reconnoiter and discover whether the army of relief was on its
way from the provinces; the latter exerted all his powers to bring the
Loire army up to the Seine. But both erred in undervaluing the German
war forces; they did not believe that the hostile army would be able to
keep Paris in a state of blockade, and at the same time engage the
armies on the south and north, east and west. They had no conception of
the hidden, inexhaustible strength of the Prussian army organization—of
a nation in arms which could send forth constant reinforcements of
battalions and recruits, and fresh bodies of disciplined troops to fill
the gaps left in the ranks by the wounded and fallen. There could be no
doubt as to the termination of this terrible war, or the final victory
of German energy and discipline.
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED
Throughout the last months of the eventful year 1870, the northern part
of France, from the Jura to the Channel, from the Belgian frontier to
the Loire, presented the aspect of a wide battlefield. Of the troops
that had been set free by the capitulation of Metz, a part remained
behind in garrison, another division marched northwards in order to
invest the provinces of Picardy and Normandy, to restore communication
with the sea, and to bar the road to Paris, and a third division joined
the second army whose commander-in-chief, Prince Frederick Charles, set
up his headquarters at Troyes. Different detachments were despatched
against the northern fortresses, and by degrees Soissons, Verdun,
Thionville, Ham, where Napoleon had once been a prisoner, Pfalzburg and
Montmedy, all fell into the hands of the Prussians, thus opening to
them a free road for the supplies of provisions. The garrison troops
were all carried off as prisoners to Germany; the towns—most of them in
a miserable condition—fell into the enemy’s hands; many houses were
mere heaps of ruins and ashes, and the larger part of the inhabitants
were suffering severely from poverty, hunger and disease.
The greatest obstacles were encountered in the northern part of Alsace
and the mountainous districts of the Vosges and the Jura, where
irregular warfare, under Garibaldi and other leaders, developed to a
dangerous extent, while the fortress of Langres afforded a safe retreat
to the guerilla bands. Lyons and the neighboring town of St. Etienne
became hotbeds of excitement, the red flag being raised and a despotism
of terror and violence established. Although many divergent elements
made up this army of the east, all were united in hatred of the
Germans.
Thus, during the cold days of November and December, when General Von
Treskow began the siege of the important fortress of Belfort, there
burst forth a war around Gray and Dijon marked by the greatest
hardships, perils and privations to the invaders. Here the Germans had
to contend with an enemy much superior in number, and to defend
themselves against continuous firing from houses, cellars, woods and
thickets, while the impoverished soil yielded a miserable subsistence,
and the broken railroads cut off freedom of communication and of
reinforcement.
The whole of the Jura district, intersected by hilly roads as far as
the plateau of Langres, where, in the days of Caesar, the Romans and
Gauls were wont to measure their strength with each other, formed
during November and December the scene of action of numerous encounters
which, in conjunction with sallies from the garrison at Belfort,
inflicted severe injury on Werder’s troops. Dijon had repeatedly to be
evacuated; and the nocturnal attack at Chattillon, 20th November, by
Garibaldians, when one hundred seventy horses were lost, affording a
striking proof of the dangers to which the German army was exposed in
this hostile country; although the revolutionary excesses of the
turbulent population of the south diverted to a certain extent the
attention of the National Guard, who were compelled to turn their
weapons against an internal enemy.
By means of the revolutionary dictatorship of Gambetta the whole French
nation was drawn into the struggle, the annihilation of the enemy being
represented as a national duty, and the war assuming a steadily more
violent character. The indefatigable patriot continued his exertions to
increase the army and unite the whole south and west against the enemy,
hoping to bring the army of the Loire to such dimensions that it would
be able to expel the invaders from the soil of France. But these raw
recruits were poorly fitted to cope with the highly disciplined
Germans, and their early successes were soon followed by defeat and
discouragement, while the hopes entertained by the Paris garrison of
succor from the south vanished as news of the steady progress of the
Germans was received.
OPERATIONS BEFORE PARIS
During these events the war operations before Paris continued
uninterruptedly. Moltke had succeeded, in spite of the difficulties of
transport, in procuring an immense quantity of ammunition, and the
long-delayed bombardment of Paris was ready to begin. Having stationed
with all secrecy twelve batteries with seventy-six guns around Mont
Avron, on Christmas-day the firing was directed with such success
against the fortified eminences, that even in the second night the
French, after great losses, evacuated the important position, the “key
of Paris,” which was immediately taken possession of by the Saxons.
Terror and dismay spread through the distracted city when the eastern
forts, Rosny, Nogent and Noisy, were stormed amid a tremendous volley
of firing. Vainly did Trochu endeavor to rouse the failing courage of
the National Guard; vainly did he assert that the government of the
national defense would never consent to the humiliation of a
capitulation; his own authority had already waned; the newspapers
already accused him of incapacity and treachery, and began to cast
every aspersion on the men who had presumptuously seized the
government, and yet were not in a position to effect the defense of the
capital and the country. After the new year the bombardment of the
southern forts began, and the terror in the city daily increased though
the violence of the radical journals kept in check any hint of
surrender or negotiation. Yet in spite of fog and snow storms the
bombardment was systematically continued, and with every day the
destructive effect of the terrible missiles grew more pronounced.
Trochu was blamed for having undertaken only small sallies, which could
have no result. The commander-in-chief ventured no opposition to the
party of action. With the consent of the mayors of the twenty
ARRONDISSEMENTS of Paris a council of war was held. The threatening
famine, the firing of the enemy, and the excitement prevailing among
the adherents of the red republic rendered a decisive step necessary.
Consequently, on the 19th of January, a great sally was decided on, and
the entire armed forces of the capital were summoned to arms. Early in
the morning a body of 100,000 men marched in the direction of Meudon,
Sevres and St. Cloud for the decisive conflict. The left wing was
commanded by General Vinoy, the right by Ducrot, while Trochu from the
watch-tower directed the entire struggle. With great courage Vinoy
dashed forward with his column of attack towards the fifth army corps
of General Kirchbach, and succeeded in capturing the Montretout
entrenchment, through the superior number of his troops, and in holding
it for a time. But when Ducrot, delayed by the barricades in the
streets, failed to come to his assistance at the appointed time, the
attack was driven back after seven hours’ fierce fighting by the
besieging troops. Having lost 7,000 dead and wounded, the French in the
evening beat a retreat, which almost resembled a flight. On the
following day Trochu demanded a truce, that the fallen National Guards,
whose bodies strewed the battlefield, might be interred. The victors,
too, had to render the last rites to many a brave soldier. Thirty-nine
officers and six hundred and sixteen soldiers were given in the list of
the slain.
Entire confidence had been placed by the Parisians in the great sally.
When the defeat, therefore, became known in its full significance, when
the number of the fallen was found to be far greater even than had been
stated in the first accounts, a dull despair took possession of the
famished city, which next broke forth into violent abuse against
Trochu, “the traitor.” Capitulation now seemed imminent; but as the
commander-in-chief had declared that he would never countenance such a
disgrace, he resigned his post to Vinoy. Threatened by bombardment from
without, terrified within by the pale specter of famine, paralyzed and
distracted by the violent dissensions among the people, and without
prospect of effective aid from the provinces, what remained to the
proud capital but to desist from a conflict the continuation of which
only increased the unspeakable misery, without the smallest hope of
deliverance? Gradually, therefore, there grew up a resolution to enter
into negotiations with the enemy; and it was the minister, Jules Favre,
who had been foremost with the cry of “no surrender” four months
before, who was now compelled to take the first step to deliver his
country from complete ruin. It was probably the bitterest hour in the
life of the brave man, who loved France and liberty with such a sincere
affection, when he was conducted through the German outposts to his
interview with Bismarck at Versailles. He brought the proposal for a
convention, on the strength of which the garrison was to be permitted
to retire with military honors to a part of France not hitherto
invested, on promising to abstain for several months from taking part
in the struggle. But such conditions were positively refused at the
Prussian headquarters, and a surrender was demanded as at Sedan and
Metz. Completely defeated, the minister returned to Paris. At a second
meeting on the following day, it was agreed that from the 27th, at
twelve o’clock at night, the firing on both sides should be
discontinued. This was the preliminary to the conclusion of a three
weeks’ truce, to await the summons of a National Assembly, with which
peace might be negotiated.
FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH
The war was at an end so far as Paris was concerned. But it continued
in the south, where frequent defeat failed to depress Gambetta’s
indomitable energy, and where new troops constantly replaced those put
to rout. Garibaldi, at Dijon, succeeded in doing what the French had
not done during the war, in capturing a Prussian banner. But the
progress of the Germans soon rendered his position untenable, and,
finding his exertions unavailing, he resigned his command and retired
to his island of Caprera. Two disasters completed the overthrow of
France. Bourbaki’s army, 85,000 strong, became shut in, with scanty
food and ammunition, among the snow-covered valleys of the Jura, and to
save the disgrace of capitulation it took refuge on the neutral soil of
Switzerland; and the strong fortress of Belfort, which had been
defended with the utmost courage against its besiegers, finally
yielded, with the stipulation that the brave garrison should march out
with the honors of war. Nothing now stood in the way of an extension of
the truce. On the suggestion of Jules Favre, the National Assembly
elected a commission of fifteen members, which was to aid the chief of
the executive and his ministers, Picard and Favre, in the negotiations
for peace. That cessions of territory and indemnity of war expenses
would have to be conceded had long been acknowledged in principle; but
protracted and excited discussions took place as to the extent of the
former and the amount of the latter, while the demanded entry of the
German troops into Paris met with vehement opposition. But Count
Bismarck resolutely insisted on the cession of Alsace and German
Lorraine, including Metz and Diedenhofen. Only with difficulty were the
Germans persuaded to separate Belfort from the rest of Loraine, and
leave it still in the possession of the French. In respect to the
expenses of the war, the sum of five milliards of francs
($1,000,000,000) was agreed upon, of which the first milliard was to be
paid in the year 1871, and the rest in a stated period. The stipulated
entry into Paris also—so bitter to the French national pride—was only
partially carried out; the western side only of the city was to be
traversed in the march of the Prussian troops, and again evacuated in
two days. On the basis of these conditions, the preliminaries of the
Peace of Versailles were concluded on the 26th of February between the
Imperial Chancellor and Jules Favre. Intense excitement prevailed when
the terms of the treaty became known; they were dark days in the annals
of French history. But in spite of the opposition of the extreme
Republican party, led by Quinet and Victor Hugo, the Assembly
recognized by an overpowering majority the necessity for the Peace, and
the preliminaries were accepted by 546 to 107 votes. Thus ended the
mighty war between France and Germany—a war which has had few equals in
the history of the world.
THE WAR AT AN END
Had King William received no indemnity in cash or territory from
France, he must still have felt himself amply repaid for the cost of
the brief but sanguinary war, for it brought him a power and prestige
with which the astute diplomatist Bismarck had long been seeking to
invest his name. Political changes move slowly in times of peace,
rapidly in times of war. The whole of Germany, with the exception of
Austria, had sent troops to the conquest of France, and every state,
north and south alike, shared in the pride and glory of the result.
South and North Germany had marched side by side to the battle-field,
every difference of race or creed forgotten, and the honor of the
German fatherland the sole watchword. The time seemed to have arrived
to close the breach between north and south, and obliterate the line of
the Main, which had divided the two sections. North Germany was united
under the leadership of Prussia, and the honor in which all alike
shared now brought South Germany into line for a similar union.
The first appeal in this direction came from Baden. Later in the year
plenipotentiaries sought Versailles from the kingdoms of Bavaria and
Wurtemberg and the grand duchies of Baden and Hesse, their purpose
being to arrange for and define the conditions of union between the
South and the North German states. For weeks, this momentous question
filled all Germany with excitement and public opinion was in a state of
high tension. The scheme of union was by no means universally approved,
there being a large party in opposition, but the majority in its favor
in Chambers proved sufficient to enable Bismarck to carry out his plan.