(M115) Such was the conclusion of a war, one of the longest mentioned in

history, since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. The

obstinacy, in disputing for empire, was equal on either side: the same

resolution, the same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing

of projects, being conspicuous on both sides. The Carthaginians had the

superiority in their acquaintance with naval affairs; in their skill in

the construction of their vessels; the working of them; the experience and

capacity of their pilots; the knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and

winds; and in the inexhaustible fund of wealth, which furnished all the

expenses of so long and obstinate a war. The Romans had none of these

advantages; but their courage, zeal for the public good, love of their

country, and a noble emulation of glory, supplied all other deficiencies.

We are astonished to see a nation, so raw and inexperienced in naval

affairs, not only making head against a people who were better skilled in

them, and more powerful than any that had ever been before; but even

gaining several victories over them at sea. No difficulties or calamities

could discourage them. They certainly would not have thought of peace, in

the circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it. One

unfortunate campaign dispirits the latter; whereas the Romans are not

shaken by a succession of them.

As to soldiers, there was no comparison between those of Rome and

Carthage, the former being infinitely superior in point of courage. Among

the generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was,

doubtless, the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence.

_The Libyan War; or against the Mercenaries._(698)—The war which the

Carthaginians waged against the Romans, was succeeded immediately by

another,(699) which, though of much shorter continuance, was infinitely

more dangerous; as it was carried on in the very heart of the republic,

and attended with such cruelty and barbarity, as is scarce to be

paralleled in history; I mean the war which the Carthaginians were obliged

to sustain against their mercenary troops, who had served under them in

Sicily, and which is commonly called the African or Libyan war.(700) It

continued only three years and a half, but was a very bloody one. The

occasion of it was this:

As soon as the treaty was concluded with the Romans,(701) Hamilcar, having

carried to Lilybæum the forces which were in Eryx, resigned his

commission; and left to Gisgo, governor of the place, the care of

transporting these forces into Africa. Gisgo, as though he had foreseen

what would happen, did not ship them all off at once, but in small and

separate parties, in order that those who came first might be paid off,

and sent home, before the arrival of the rest. This conduct evinced great

forecast and wisdom, but was not seconded equally at Carthage. As the

republic had been exhausted by the expense of a long war, and the payment

of near one hundred and thirty thousand pounds to the Romans on signing

the peace, the forces were not paid off in proportion as they arrived; but

it was thought proper to wait for the rest, in the hopes of obtaining from

them (when they should be all together) a remission of some part of their

arrears. This was the first oversight.

Here we discover the genius of a state composed of merchants, who know the

full value of money, but are little acquainted with that of the services

of soldiers; who bargain for blood, as though it were an article of trade,

and always go to the cheapest market. In such a republic, when an exigency

is once answered, the merit of services is no longer remembered.

These soldiers, most of whom came to Carthage, having been long accustomed

to a licentious life, caused great disturbances in the city; to remedy

which, it was proposed to their officers, to march them all to a little

neighbouring town called Sicca, and there supply them with whatever was

necessary for their subsistence, till the arrival of the rest of their

companions; and that then they should all be paid off, and sent home. This

was a second oversight.

A third was, the refusing to let them leave their baggage, their wives,

and children in Carthage, as they desired; and the forcing them to remove

these to Sicca; whereas, had they staid in Carthage, they would have been

in a manner so many hostages.

Being all met together at Sicca, they began (having little else to do) to

compute the arrears of their pay, which they made amount to much more than

was really due to them. To this computation, they added the mighty

promises which had been made them, at different times, as an encouragement

for them to do their duty; and pretended that these likewise ought to be

brought into the account. Hanno, who was then governor of Africa, and had

been sent to them from the magistrates of Carthage, proposed to them to

consent to some abatement of their arrears; and to content themselves with

receiving a part, in consideration of the great distress to which the

commonwealth was reduced, and its present unhappy circumstances. The

reader will easily guess how such a proposal was received. Complaints,

murmurs, seditious and insolent clamours, were every where heard. These

troops being composed of different nations, who were strangers to one

another’s language, were incapable of hearing reason when they once

mutinied. Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; inhabitants of the Balearic isles;

Greeks, the greatest part of them slaves or deserters, and a very great

number of Africans, composed these mercenary forces. Transported with

rage, they immediately break up, march towards Carthage, (being upwards of

twenty thousand,) and encamp at Tunis, not far from that metropolis.

The Carthaginians discovered too late their error. There was no

compliance, how grovelling soever, to which they did not stoop, to soothe

these exasperated soldiers: who, on their side, practised every knavish

art which could be thought of, in order to extort money from them. When

one point was gained, they immediately had recourse to a new artifice, on

which to ground some new demand. Was their pay settled beyond the

agreement made with them, they still would be reimbursed for the losses

which they pretended to have sustained, either by the death of their

horses, by the excessive price which, at certain times, they had paid for

bread-corn; and still insisted on the recompense which had been promised

them. As nothing could be fixed, the Carthaginians, with great difficulty,

prevailed on them to refer themselves to the opinion of some general who

had commanded in Sicily. Accordingly they pitched upon Gisgo, who had

always been very acceptable to them. This general harangued them in a mild

and insinuating manner; recalled to their memories the long time they had

been in the Carthaginian service; the considerable sums they had received

from the republic; and granted almost all their demands.

The treaty was upon the point of being concluded, when two mutineers

occasioned a tumult in every part of the camp. One of those was Spendius a

Capuan, who had been a slave at Rome, and had fled to the Carthaginians.

He was tall and bold. The fear he was under, of falling into the hands of

his former master, by whom he was sure to be hanged, (as was the custom,)

prompted him to break off the agreement. He was seconded by one

Matho,(702) who had been very active in forming the conspiracy. These two

represented to the Africans, that the instant after their companions

should be discharged and sent home, they, being thus left alone in their

own country, would fall a sacrifice to the rage of the Carthaginians, who

would take vengeance upon them for the common rebellion. This was

sufficient to raise them to fury. They immediately made choice of Spendius

and Matho for their chiefs. No remonstrances were heard; and whoever

offered to make any, was immediately put to death. They ran to Gisgo’s

tent, plundered it of the money designed for the payment of the forces:

dragged that general himself to prison, with all his attendants; after

having treated them with the utmost indignities. All the cities of Africa,

to whom they had sent deputies to exhort them to recover their liberty,

came over to them, Utica and Hippacra excepted, which they therefore

immediately besieged.

Carthage had never been before exposed to such imminent danger. The

citizens individually drew each his subsistence from the rents or revenues

of their lands, and the public expenses from the tribute paid by Africa.

But all this was stopped at once; and (a much worse circumstance) was

turned against them. They found themselves destitute of arms and forces,

either for sea or land; of all necessary preparations either for the

sustaining of a siege, or the equipping of a fleet; and, to complete their

misfortunes, without any hopes of foreign assistance, either from their

friends or allies.

They might, in some sense, impute to themselves the distress to which they

were reduced. During the last war, they had treated the African nations

with the utmost rigour, by imposing excessive tributes on them, in the

exaction of which no allowance was made for poverty and extreme misery;

and governors, such as Hanno, were treated with the greater respect, the

more severe they had been in levying those tributes. So that no great

efforts were necessary to prevail upon the Africans to engage in this

rebellion. At the very first signal that was made, it broke out, and in a

moment became general. The women, who had often, with the deepest

affliction, seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison for

non-payment, were more exasperated than the men; and with pleasure gave up

all their ornaments towards the expenses of the war; so that the chiefs of

the rebels, after paying all they had promised the soldiers, found

themselves still in the midst of plenty: an instructive lesson, says

Polybius, to ministers, how a people should be treated; as it teaches them

to look, not only to the present occasion, but to extend their views to

futurity.

The Carthaginians, notwithstanding their present distress, did not

despond, but made the most extraordinary efforts. The command of the army

was given to Hanno. Troops were levied by land and sea; horse as well as

foot. All citizens, capable of bearing arms, were mustered; mercenaries

were invited from all parts; and all the ships which the republic had left

were refitted.

The rebels discovered no less ardour. We related before, that they had

formed the siege of the two only cities which refused to join them. Their

army was now increased to seventy thousand men. After detachments had been

drawn from it to carry on those sieges, they pitched their camp at Tunis;

and thereby held Carthage in a kind of blockade, filling it with perpetual

alarms, and frequently advancing up to its very walls by day as well as by

night.

Hanno had marched to the relief of Utica, and gained a considerable

advantage, which, had he made a proper use of it, might have proved

decisive: but entering the city, and only diverting himself there, the

mercenaries, who had retreated to a neighbouring hill covered with trees,

hearing how careless the enemy were, poured down upon them; found the

soldiers straggling in all parts; took and plundered the camp, and seized

upon all the supplies that had been brought from Carthage for the relief

of the besieged. Nor was this the only error committed by Hanno; and

errors, in such critical junctures, are much the most fatal. Hamilcar,

surnamed Barca, was therefore appointed to succeed him. This general

answered the idea which had been entertained of him; and his first success

was the obliging the rebels to raise the siege of Utica. He then marched

against their army which was encamped near Carthage; defeated part of it,

and seized almost all their advantageous posts. These successes revived

the courage of the Carthaginians.

The arrival of a young Numidian nobleman, Naravasus by name, who, out of

esteem for the person and merit of Barca, joined him with two thousand

Numidians, was of great service to that general. Animated by this

reinforcement, he fell upon the rebels, who had cooped him up in a valley;

killed ten thousand of them, and took four thousand prisoners. The young

Numidian distinguished himself greatly in this battle. Barca took into his

troops as many of the prisoners as were desirous of being enlisted, and

gave the rest free liberty to go wherever they pleased, on condition that

they should never take up arms any more against the Carthaginians;

otherwise, that every man of them, if taken, should be put to death. This

conduct proves the wisdom of that general. He thought this a better

expedient than extreme severity. And indeed where a multitude of mutineers

are concerned, the greatest part of whom have been drawn in by the

persuasions of the most hotheaded, or through fear of the most furious,

clemency seldom fails of being successful.

Spendius, the chief of the rebels, fearing that this affected lenity of

Barca might occasion a defection among his troops, thought the only

expedient left him to prevent it, would be, to strike some signal blow,

which would deprive them of all hopes of being ever reconciled to the

enemy. With this view, after having read to them some fictitious letters,

by which advice was given him, of a secret design concerted betwixt some

of their comrades and Gisgo for rescuing him out of prison, where he had

been so long detained; he brought them to the barbarous resolution of

murdering him and all the rest of the prisoners; and any man, who durst

offer any milder counsel, was immediately sacrificed to their fury.

Accordingly, this unfortunate general, and seven hundred prisoners who

were confined with him, were brought out to the front of the camp, where

Gisgo fell the first sacrifice, and afterwards all the rest. Their hands

were cut off, their thighs broken, and their bodies, still breathing, were

thrown into a hole. The Carthaginians sent a herald to demand their

remains, in order to pay them the last sad office, but were refused; and

the herald was further told, that whoever presumed to come upon the like

errand, should meet with Gisgo’s fate. And, indeed, the rebels immediately

came to the unanimous resolution, of treating all such Carthaginians as

should fall into their hands in the same barbarous manner; and decreed

farther, that if any of their allies were taken, they should, after their

hands were cut off, be sent back to Carthage. This bloody resolution was

but too punctually executed.

The Carthaginians were now just beginning to breathe, as it were, and

recover their spirits, when a number of unlucky accidents plunged them

again into fresh dangers. A division arose among their generals; and the

provisions, of which they were in extreme necessity, coming to them by

sea, were all cast away in a storm. But the misfortune which they most

keenly felt, was, the sudden defection of the two only cities which till

then had preserved their allegiance, and in all times adhered inviolably

to the commonwealth. These were Utica and Hippacra. These cities, without

the least reason, or even so much as a pretence, went over at once to the

rebels; and, transported with the like rage and fury, murdered the

governor, with the garrison sent to their relief; and carried their

inhumanity so far, as to refuse their dead bodies to the Carthaginians,

who demanded them back in order for burial.

The rebels, animated by so much success, laid siege to Carthage, but were

obliged immediately to raise it. They nevertheless continued the war.

Having drawn together, into one body, all their own troops and those of

the allies, (making upwards of fifty thousand men in all,) they watched

the motions of Hamilcar’s army, but carefully kept their own on the hills;

and avoided coming down into the plains, because the enemy would there

have had too great an advantage over them, on account of their elephants

and cavalry. Hamilcar, more skilful in the art of war than they, never

exposed himself to any of their attacks; but taking advantage of their

oversights, often dispossessed them of their posts, if their soldiers

straggled but ever so little; and harassed them a thousand ways. Such of

them as fell into his hands, were thrown to wild beasts. At last, he

surprised them at a time when they least expected it, and shut them up in

a post which was so situated, that it was impossible for them to get out

of it. Not daring to venture a battle, and being unable to get off, they

began to fortify their camp, and surrounded it with ditches and

intrenchments. But an enemy among themselves, and which was much more

formidable, had reduced them to the greatest extremity: this was hunger,

which was so raging, that they at last ate one another; Divine Providence,

says Polybius, thus revenging upon themselves the barbarous cruelty they

had exercised on others. They now had no resource left; and knew but too

well the punishments which would be inflicted on them, in case they should

fall alive into the hands of the enemy. After such bloody scenes as had

been acted by them, they did not so much as think of peace, or of coming

to an accommodation. They had sent to their forces encamped at Tunis for

assistance, but with no success. In the mean time the famine increased

daily. They had first eaten their prisoners, then their slaves; and now

their fellow-citizens only were left. Their chiefs, now no longer able to

resist the complaints and cries of the multitude, who threatened to

massacre them if they did not surrender, went themselves to Hamilcar,

after having obtained a safe conduct from him. The conditions of the

treaty were, that the Carthaginians should select any ten of the rebels,

to treat them as they should think fit, and that the rest should be

dismissed with only one suit of clothes for each. When the treaty was

signed, the chiefs themselves were arrested and detained by the

Carthaginians, who plainly showed, on this occasion, that they did not

pride themselves upon their good faith and sincerity. The rebels, hearing

that their chiefs were seized, and knowing nothing of the convention,

suspected that they were betrayed, and thereupon immediately took up arms.

But Hamilcar, having surrounded them, brought forward his elephants; and

either trod them all under foot, or cut them to pieces, they being upwards

of forty thousand.

The consequence of this victory was, the reduction of almost all the

cities of Africa, which immediately returned to their allegiance.

Hamilcar, without loss of time, marched against Tunis, which, ever since

the beginning of the war, had been the asylum of the rebels, and their

place of arms. He invested it on one side, whilst Hannibal, who was joined

in the command with him, besieged it on the other. Then advancing near the

walls, and ordering crosses to be set up, he hung Spendius on one of them,

and his companions who had been seized with him on the rest, where they

all expired. Matho, the other chief, who commanded in the city, saw

plainly by this what he himself might expect; and for that reason was much

more attentive to his own defence. Perceiving that Hannibal, as being

confident of success, was very negligent in all his motions, he made a

sally, attacked his quarters, killed many of his men, took several

prisoners, among whom was Hannibal himself, and plundered his camp. Then

taking Spendius from the cross, he put Hannibal in his place, after having

made him suffer inexpressible torments; and sacrificed round the body of

Spendius thirty citizens of the first quality in Carthage, as so many

victims of his vengeance. One would conclude, that there had been a mutual

emulation betwixt the contending parties, which of them should outdo the

other in acts of the most barbarous cruelty.

Barca being at that time at a distance, it was long before the news of his

colleague’s misfortune reached him; and besides, the road lying betwixt

the two camps being impassable, it was impossible for him to advance

hastily to his assistance. This disastrous accident caused a great

consternation in Carthage. The reader may have observed, in the course of

this war, a continual vicissitude of prosperity and adversity, of security

and fear, of joy and grief; so various and inconstant were the events on

either side.

In Carthage it was thought advisable to make one bold effort. Accordingly,

all the youth capable of bearing arms were pressed into the service. Hanno

was sent to join Hamilcar; and thirty senators were deputed to conjure

those generals, in the name of the republic, to forget past quarrels, and

sacrifice their resentments to their country’s welfare. This was

immediately complied with; they mutually embraced, and were reconciled

sincerely to one another.

From this time, the Carthaginians were successful in all things; and

Matho, who in every attempt after this came off with disadvantage, at last

thought himself obliged to hazard a battle; and this was just what the

Carthaginians wanted. The leaders on both sides animated their troops, as

going to fight a battle which would for ever decide their fate. An

engagement ensued. Victory was not long in suspense; for the rebels every

where giving ground, the Africans were almost all slain, and the rest

surrendered. Matho was taken alive and carried to Carthage. All Africa

returned immediately to its allegiance, except the two perfidious cities

which had lately revolted; however, they were soon forced to surrender at

discretion.

And now the victorious army returned to Carthage, and was there received

with shouts of joy, and the congratulations of the whole city. Matho and

his soldiers, after having adorned the public triumph, were led to

execution; and finished, by a painful and ignominious death, a life that

had been polluted with the blackest treasons and unparalleled barbarities.

Such was the conclusion of the war against the mercenaries, after having

lasted three years and four months. It furnished, says Polybius, an

ever-memorable lesson to all nations, not to employ in their armies a

greater number of mercenaries than citizens; nor to rely, for the defence

of their state, on a body of men who are not attached to it either by

interest or affection.

I have hitherto purposely deferred taking notice of such transactions in

Sardinia, as passed at the time I have been speaking of, and which were,

in some measure, dependent on, and resulting from, the war waged in Africa

against the mercenaries. They exhibit the same violent methods to promote

rebellion; the same excesses of cruelty; as if the wind had carried the

same spirit of discord and fury from Africa into Sardinia.

When the news was brought there of what Spendius and Matho were doing in

Africa, the mercenaries in that island also shook off the yoke, in

imitation of these incendiaries. They began by the murder of Bostar their

general, and of all the Carthaginians under him. A successor was sent; but

all the forces which he carried with him went over to the rebels; hung the

general on a cross; and, throughout the whole island, put all the

Carthaginians to the sword, after having made them suffer inexpressible

torments. They then besieged all the cities one after another, and soon

got possession of the whole country. But feuds arising between them and

the natives, the mercenaries were driven entirely out of the island, and

took refuge in Italy. Thus the Carthaginians lost Sardinia, an island of

great importance to them, on account of its extent, its fertility, and the

great number of its inhabitants.

The Romans, ever since their treaty with the Carthaginians, had behaved

towards them with great justice and moderation. A slight quarrel, on

account of some Roman merchants who were seized at Carthage for having

supplied the enemy with provisions, had embroiled them a little. But these

merchants being restored on the first complaint made to the senate of

Carthage; the Romans, who prided themselves upon their justice and

generosity on all occasions, made the Carthaginians a return of their

former friendship; served them to the utmost of their power; forbade their

merchants to furnish any other nation with provisions; and even refused to

listen to the proposals made by the Sardinian rebels, when invited by them

to take possession of the island.

But these scruples and delicacy wore off by degrees; and Cæsar’s

advantageous testimony (in Sallust) of their honesty and plain-dealing,

could not with any propriety be applied here:(703) “Although,” says he,

“in all the Punic wars, the Carthaginians, both in peace and during

truces, had committed a number of detestable actions, the Romans could

never (how inviting soever the opportunity might be) be prevailed upon to

retaliate such usage; being more attentive to their own glory, than to the

revenge they might have justly taken on such perfidious enemies.”

(M116) The mercenaries, who, as was observed, had retired into Italy,

brought the Romans at last to the resolution of sailing over into

Sardinia, to render themselves masters of it. The Carthaginians were

deeply afflicted at the news, upon pretence that they had a more just

title to Sardinia than the Romans; they therefore put themselves in a

posture to take a speedy and just revenge on those who had excited the

people of that island to take up arms against them. But the Romans,

pretending that these preparations were made not against Sardinia but

their state, declared war against the Carthaginians. The latter, quite

exhausted in every respect, and scarce beginning to breathe, were in no

condition to sustain a war. The necessity of the times was therefore to be

complied with, and they were forced to yield to a more powerful rival. A

fresh treaty was thereupon made, by which they gave up Sardinia to the

Romans; and obliged themselves to a new payment of twelve hundred talents,

to keep off the war with which they were menaced. This injustice of the

Romans was the true cause of the second Punic war, as will appear in the

sequel.

_The second Punic War._(704)—The second Punic war, which I am now going to

relate, is one of the most memorable recorded in history, and most worthy

the attention of an inquisitive reader; whether we consider the boldness

of the enterprises; the wisdom employed in the execution; the obstinate

efforts of two rival nations, and the ready resources they found in their

lowest ebb of fortune; the variety of uncommon events, and the uncertain

issue of so long and bloody a war; or lastly, the assemblage of the most

perfect models in every kind of merit; and the most instructive lessons

that occur in history, either with regard to war, policy, or government.

Never did two more powerful, or at least more warlike, states or nations

make war against each other; and never had these in question seen

themselves raised to a more exalted pitch of power and glory. Rome and

Carthage were, doubtless, at that time, the two first states of the world.

Having already tried their strength in the first Punic war, and thereby

made an essay of each other’s power, they knew perfectly well what either

could do. In this second war, the fate of arms was so equally balanced,

and the success so intermixed with vicissitudes and varieties, that that

party triumphed which had been most in danger of being ruined. Great as

the forces of these two nations were, it may almost be said, that their

mutual hatred was still greater. The Romans, on one side, could not

without indignation see the vanquished presuming to attack them; and the

Carthaginians, on the other, were exasperated at the equally rapacious and

harsh treatment which they pretended to have received from the victor.

The plan which I have laid down does not permit me to enter into an exact

detail of this war, whereof Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Africa, were the

several seats; and which has a still closer connection with the Roman

history than with that I am now writing. I shall confine myself therefore,

principally, to such transactions as relate to the Carthaginians: and

endeavour, as far as I am able, to give my reader an idea of the genius

and character of Hannibal, who perhaps was the greatest warrior that

antiquity has to boast of.

_The remote and more immediate Causes of the second Punic War._—Before I

come to speak of the declaration of war betwixt the Romans and

Carthaginians, I think it necessary to explain the true causes of it; and

to point out by what steps this rupture, betwixt these two nations, was so

long preparing, before it openly broke out.

That man would be grossly mistaken, says Polybius,(705) who should look

upon the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the true cause of the second

Punic war. The regret of the Carthaginians for having so tamely given up

Sicily, by the treaty which terminated the first Punic war; the injustice

and violence of the Romans, who took advantage of the troubles excited in

Africa, to dispossess the Carthaginians of Sardinia, and to impose a new

tribute on them; and the success and conquests of the latter in Spain;

these were the true causes of the violation of the treaty, as Livy(706)

(agreeing here with Polybius) insinuates in few words, in the beginning of

his history of the second Punic war.

And indeed Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was highly exasperated on account of

the last treaty, which the necessity of the times had compelled the

Carthaginians to submit to; and he therefore meditated the design of

taking just, though distant measures, for breaking it on the first

favourable opportunity that should offer.

When the troubles of Africa were appeased, he was sent upon an expedition

against the Numidians;(707) in which, giving fresh proofs of his courage

and abilities, his merit raised him to the command of the army which was

to act in Spain. Hannibal, his son, at that time but nine years of age,

begged with the utmost importunity to attend him on this occasion;(708)

and for that purpose employed all the soothing arts so common to children

of his age, and which have so much power over a tender father. Hamilcar

could not refuse him; and after having made him swear upon the altars,

that he would declare himself an enemy to the Romans as soon as age would

allow him to do it, he took his son with him.

Hamilcar possessed all the qualities which constitute the great general.

To an invincible courage, and the most consummate prudence, he added a

most engaging and insinuating behaviour. He subdued, in a very short time,

the greatest part of the nations of Spain, either by the terror of his

arms or his engaging conduct; and after enjoying the command there nine

years, came to an end worthy his exalted character, dying gloriously in

arms for the cause of his country.

(M117) The Carthaginians appointed Asdrubal, his son-in-law, to succeed

him.(709) This general, to strengthen his footing in the country, built a

city, which, by the advantage of its situation, the commodiousness of its

harbour, its fortifications, and opulence occasioned by its great

commerce, became one of the most considerable cities in the world. It was

called New Carthage, and is at this day known by the name of Carthagena.

From the several steps of these two great generals, it was easy to

perceive that they were meditating some mighty design which they had

always in view, and laid their schemes at a great distance for the putting

it in execution. The Romans were sensible of this, and reproached

themselves for their indolence and torpor, which had thrown them into a

kind of lethargy; at a time that the enemy were rapidly pursuing their

victories in Spain, which might one day be turned against them. They would

have been very well pleased to attack them by open force, and to wrest

their conquests out of their hands; but the fear of another (not less

formidable) enemy, the Gauls, whom they expected shortly to see at their

very gates, kept them from showing their resentment. They therefore had

recourse to negotiations; and concluded a treaty with Asdrubal, in which,

without taking any notice of the rest of Spain, they contented themselves

with introducing an article, by which the Carthaginians were not allowed

to make any conquests beyond the Iberus.

Asdrubal, in the mean time, still pushed on his conquests;(710) still,

however, taking care not to pass beyond the limits stipulated by the

treaty; but by sparing no endeavours to win the chiefs of the several

nations by a courteous and engaging behaviour, he furthered the interests

of Carthage still more by persuasive methods than force of arms. But

unhappily, after having governed Spain eight years, he was treacherously

murdered by a Gaul, who took so barbarous a revenge for a private grudge

he bore him.(711)

(M118) Three years before his death, he had written to Carthage, to desire

that Hannibal, then twenty-two years of age, might be sent to him.(712)

The proposal met with some difficulty, as the senate was divided betwixt

two powerful factions, which, from Hamilcar’s time, had began to follow

opposite views in the administration and affairs of the state. One faction

was headed by Hanno, whose birth, merit, and zeal for the public welfare,

gave him great influence in the public deliberations. This faction

proposed, on every occasion, the concluding of a safe peace, and the

preserving the conquests in Spain, as being preferable to the uncertain

events of an expensive war, which they foresaw would one day occasion the

ruin of Carthage. The other, called the Barcinian faction, because it

supported the interests of Barca and his family, had, to the credit and

influence which it had long enjoyed in the city, added the reputation

which the signal exploits of Hamilcar and Asdrubal had given it; and

declared openly for war. When therefore Asdrubal’s demand came to be

debated in the senate, Hanno represented the danger of sending so early

into the field a young man, who already possessed all the haughtiness and

imperious temper of his father; and who ought, therefore, rather to be

kept a long time, and very carefully, under the eye of the magistrates and

the power of the laws, that he might learn obedience, and a modesty which

should teach him not to think himself superior to all other men. He

concluded with saying, that he feared this spark, which was then kindling,

would one day rise to a conflagration. His remonstrances were not heard,

so that the Barcinian faction had the superiority, and Hannibal set out

for Spain.

The moment of his arrival there, he drew upon himself the eyes of the

whole army, who fancied they saw Hamilcar his father revive in him. He

seemed to dart the same fire from his eyes; the same martial vigour

displayed itself in the air of his countenance, with the same features and

engaging carriage. But his personal qualities endeared him still more. He

possessed almost every talent that constitutes the great man. His patience

in labour was invincible, his temperance was surprising, his courage in

the greatest dangers intrepid, and his presence of mind in the heat of

battle admirable; and, a still more wonderful circumstance, his

disposition and cast of mind were so flexible, that nature had formed him

equally for commanding or obeying; so that it was doubtful whether he was

dearer to the soldiers or the generals. He served three campaigns under

Asdrubal.

(M119) Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and

people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.(713) I know

not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic,

to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its

Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred

upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos(714) that we have borrowed this

circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on

Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace,

says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated

king.(715)

The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy had been allotted

to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans,

turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear

of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In

Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and

although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces,

(their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose

his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After

this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore

laying siege to Saguntum,(716) carefully avoiding every occasion of a

rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he

judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice

given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the

affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by

generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the

enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:(717) a wise

step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.

The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were

threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal’s

conquests.(718) Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and

ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the

spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if

it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice,

that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same

complaints.

In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great

advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded,

that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in

Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that

as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more secure and

unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of

his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with

greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that,

lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the

favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege

with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was

present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.

News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans,

instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and

in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman

deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired

to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction

having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the

remonstrances of Hanno.

During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with

great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and

in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the

conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines

could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their

final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and

that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire

lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it

themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by

the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians

entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and

cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But

notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty.

Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his

victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises.

Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service

to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the

rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it

reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage to Hannibal, by the large

presents he made to them out of the spoils.

Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the

melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at

Rome.(719) Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed

to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the

Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised

by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at

their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that

during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to

come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of

their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which

fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity(720) to the Romans, and had

been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When

they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and

war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.

_War proclaimed._—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to

Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the

republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been

undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should

be delivered up to the Romans.(721) The deputies perceiving that the

senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the

folded lappet of his robe, “I bring here,” says he, in a haughty tone,

“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.” The senate

answering, that they left the choice to him: “I give you war then,” says

he, unfolding his robe. “And we,” replied the Carthaginians, with the same

haughtiness, “as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with

the same cheerfulness.” Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.

If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the

whole blame, says Polybius,(722) lies upon the Carthaginians, who could

not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance

with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either

party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of

this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the

Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new

tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed,

continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely

unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and

injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to

ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon

these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war

against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their

side.

The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the

second Punic war, was twenty-four years.

(M120) _The Beginning of the Second Punic War._—When war was resolved

upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or

twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought

it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.(723)

With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so

that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was

prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a

distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and

more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each

other’s fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about

forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain

were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred

and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his

brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts;

and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct,

whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should

attack him.

Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this expedition,

went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and

that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war

he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,(724) in few words, a very clear

idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to

march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the

Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.(725)(726) From

the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from

the Gauls, according to Strabo,(727) were sixteen hundred furlongs.(728)

From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred

furlongs.(729) From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred

furlongs.(730) From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred

furlongs.(731) Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight

thousand furlongs.(732)

Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting

himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was

to pass;(733) of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of

winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his

bounty to them;(734) and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity

of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not

ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great

difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was

enough for his purpose.

Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he

had wintered.(735) His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand

men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty

elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations

which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army

in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country lying between

the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were

appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He

dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective

countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want

recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be

allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean

hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty

thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so

from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it;

troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war,

under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.

_Passage of the Rhone._—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days’

march from the mouth of the Rhone,(736) attempted to cross it, because the

river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.(737) He

bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of

which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He

likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little

vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the

opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no

possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a

considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son

of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his

march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to

set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they

passed the river(738) the next day without the least opposition.

They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night

they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals

agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part

of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their

riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest of the

horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man

held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either

on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only

the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great

boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break

the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the

small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according

to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their

bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of

darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great

noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves

attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save

themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective

villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly,

and without any opposition.

The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted

over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was

thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was

fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with

earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought

themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a

second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long,

and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female

elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and

when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first,

and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this,

it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the

water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was

drowned.

_The March after the Battle of the Rhone._—The two Roman consuls had, in

the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;(739)

P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand

foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for

Sicily, with a hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand

foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion

consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse.

Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town

in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio

was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and

make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on

his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon

the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three

hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached

five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of

his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.

At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to

one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who

assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his

arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him,

and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army

through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of

provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his

troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with

just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and

exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The

soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their

hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead

the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after

offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of

his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would

take the necessary refreshments.

Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and

charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the

slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred

and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two

hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to the

Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle.

This first action was interpreted as an omen(740) of the fate of the whole

war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same

time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those

who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in

reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they

had discovered.

Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through

the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way

to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his

meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of

marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a

battle.

Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the

place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had

set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his

fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of

the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent

his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make

head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with

intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of

Hannibal.

The latter, after four days’ march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by

the conflux(741) of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place.

Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right

to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army

with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the

Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the

district of Geneva,(742) Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much

interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the

foot of the Alps without any opposition.

_The Passage of the Alps._—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed

to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared

to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the

sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost

perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this

spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had

raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.(743) When they

began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon

the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They

therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only

lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal’s troops to entangle

themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden,

the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being

informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them

in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning

early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the

enemy’s hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up

those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march,

and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the

same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of

the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the

greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with

the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls,

which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded

by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them

headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal,

being sensible that the loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy

his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed;

and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without

molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important

fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the

neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and

cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.

After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new

danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their

neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal’s

troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him

provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of

their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The

elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with

the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at

length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an

eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a

sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon

them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had

not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them

out of this difficulty.

At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the

army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue,

after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great

quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which

caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much.

Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a

prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains(744) watered by

the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but

one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to

them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and

enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the

Roman empire. This speech, filled with such pleasing hopes, and enforced

by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour

and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was

more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent,

the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and

slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon

their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false

step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.

They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This

was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more

so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful

precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short.

Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it

really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for

making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon

the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen

that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it,

found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading

of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on

nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and

where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save

themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to

catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet

forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them

out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek

some other expedient.

Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days’

rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after

they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as

the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards

ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on

with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the

trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which

fire was set to them. The wind, by good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce

flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with

which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for

Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar

to be poured on the rock,(745) which piercing into the veins of it, that

were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened

it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the

descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free

passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days

were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying

with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under

eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which

yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the

soldiers.

_Hannibal enters Italy._—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was

not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted

to near sixty thousand men.(746) It had sustained great losses during the

march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of

rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of

thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over

the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now

remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and

six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a

pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half

since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he

employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the

plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.

His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much

wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for action, the inhabitants

of the territories of Turin(747) refusing to conclude an alliance with

him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three

days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck

the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and

surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same,

had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now

approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that

it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great

exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to

join him with confidence.

The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and

caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was

ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P.

Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy,

crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.(748)

_Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus._—The armies being now in sight,

the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they

engaged.(749) Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of

their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that

victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with

Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as

forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be

almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of

the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest

of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before

lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted

by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was

sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of

ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary,

not only to secure Italy, but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present

battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose

the enemy.

Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude

minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their

ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has

first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners

whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and

two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their

liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged

upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his

soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving

them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity

either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils

prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the

Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward, _viz._ the

conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome;

an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the

Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle

such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules,

through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his

own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six

months’ standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in

the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the

inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps

themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the

Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken

Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy

against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined

that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws

to the whole world.

After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown

a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops over it. Two ill

omens(750) had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the

Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal

animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of

the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head

in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had

promised them.

Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons,

and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the

confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole

cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with

bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on(751) the wings, in order to surround

the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge

ensues. At the first onset, Scipio’s light-armed soldiers had scarcely

discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which

came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the

horses’ feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the

squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many

troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on

between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians

surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at

first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their

horses’ feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with

great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of

the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the

Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the

consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However,

this general was rescued out of the enemy’s hands by the bravery of his

son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with

the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.

The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was

conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms

and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the

Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge,

whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.

It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it

was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted

in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to

avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.

Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls

seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish

him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has

observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general,

notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a

battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility

of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a

battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the

only refuge he then had left.

_Battle of the Trebia._—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had

received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.(752) From

thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which

falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to

those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from

which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near

one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which

Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a

party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very

much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his

own merit.

This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted

his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his

colleague had been defeated, and that he thereby had revived the courage

of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as

possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency’s sake,

to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from

himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for

disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter

for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally

fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from

Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might

be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he

besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.

These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw

himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand

allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a

complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the

enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely

favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and

soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he

observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for

that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued

Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him?

What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that

a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were

the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about

Scipio’s tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near,

Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end

to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take

advantage of his colleague’s illness, to secure the whole honour of the

victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper

for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he

could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to

prepare for battle.

This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that

a general who has entered a foreign country, or one possessed by the

enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than

continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh

exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with

new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage

of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and

of Scipio’s absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in

the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand

men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet

which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes

that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open

country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a

spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of

Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of

day as far as the very barriers of the enemy’s camp, in order to provoke

them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw

the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The

fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the

Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon

followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon

which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia

without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade

up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the

torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It

was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to

snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left

their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas

the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal’s order, eaten and drunk plentifully in

their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with

oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.

They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended

themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent

with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and

put to flight by that of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in

numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The

soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden

upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand

men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom

they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their

friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the

Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to

Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river,

being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped,

went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired

also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their

loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were

destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their

elephants, they saved but one only.

In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following

campaign;(753) for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river

Iberus,(754) defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.

Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to

refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.(755) For this

purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the

allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war

upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting

them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries,

without requiring the least ransom.

The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,(756)

whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid

the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were

tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories;

and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had

engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their

common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the

reputation of his arms in the minds of all the inhabitants of Italy, by

carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate

his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy’s lands.

But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm,

which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and

hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the

Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful

than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia,

where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on

both sides was very nearly equal.

Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true

Carthaginian stratagem.(757) He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant

nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent

date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and,

consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure

himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age.

Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself

so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his

intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.

(M121) At Rome, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius had been appointed

consuls.(758) Hannibal having advice that the latter was advanced already

as far as Arretium, a town of Tuscany, resolved to go and engage him as

soon as possible. Two ways being shown him, he chose the shortest, though

the most troublesome, nay, almost impassable, by reason of a fen which he

was forced to go through. Here the army suffered incredible hardships.

During four days and three nights they marched halfway up the leg in

water, and, consequently, could not get a moment’s sleep. Hannibal

himself, who rode upon the only elephant he had left, could hardly get

through. His long want of sleep, and the thick vapours which exhaled from

that marshy place, together with the unhealthiness of the season, cost him

one of his eyes.

_Battle of Thrasymenus._(_759_)—Hannibal being thus got, almost

unexpectedly, out of this dangerous situation, and having refreshed his

troops, marched and pitched his camp between Arretium and Fesulæ, in the

richest and most fruitful part of Tuscany. His first endeavours were, to

discover the disposition of Flaminius, in order that he might take

advantage of his weak side, which, according to Polybius, ought to be the

chief study of a general. He was told, that Flaminius was greatly

conceited of his own merit, bold, enterprising, rash, and fond of glory.

To plunge him the deeper into these excesses, to which he was naturally

prone,(760) he inflamed his impetuous spirit, by laying waste and burning

the whole country in his sight.

Flaminius was not of a temper to continue inactive in his camp, even if

Hannibal had lain still. But when he saw the territories of his allies

laid waste before his eyes, he thought it would reflect dishonour upon

him, should he suffer Hannibal to ransack Italy without control, and even

advance to the very walls of Rome without meeting any resistance. He

rejected with scorn the prudent counsels of those who advised him to wait

the arrival of his colleague, and to be satisfied, for the present, with

putting a stop to the devastation of the enemy.

In the mean time, Hannibal was still advancing towards Rome, having

Cortona on the left hand, and the lake Thrasymenus on his right. When he

saw that the consul followed close after him, with design to give him

battle, in order to stop him in his march; having observed that the ground

was convenient for an engagement, he thought only of making preparations

for it. The lake Thrasymenus and the mountains of Cortona form a very

narrow defile, which leads into a large valley, lined on both sides with

hills of a considerable height, and closed, at the outlet, by a steep hill

of difficult access. On this hill, Hannibal, after having crossed the

valley, came and encamped with the main body of his army; posting his

light-armed infantry in ambuscade upon the hills on the right, and part of

his cavalry behind those on the left, as far almost as the entrance of the

defile, through which Flaminius was obliged to pass. Accordingly, this

general, who followed him very eagerly with the resolution to fight him,

being come to the defile near the lake, was forced to halt, because night

was coming on; but he entered it the next morning at daybreak.

Hannibal having permitted him to advance, with all his forces, above half

way through the valley, and seeing the Roman van-guard pretty near him,

gave the signal for the battle, and commanded his troops to come out of

their ambuscade, in order that he might attack the enemy at the same time

from all quarters. The reader may guess at the consternation with which

the Romans were seized.

They were not yet drawn up in order of battle, neither had they got their

arms in readiness, when they found themselves attacked in front, in rear,

and in flank. In a moment, all the ranks were put into disorder.

Flaminius, alone undaunted in so universal a consternation, animates his

soldiers both with his hand and voice, and exhorts them to cut themselves

a passage with their swords through the midst of the enemy. But the tumult

which reigned every where, the dreadful shouts of the enemy, and a fog

that was risen, prevented his being seen or heard. However, when the

Romans saw themselves surrounded on all sides, either by the enemy or the

lake, the impossibility of saving their lives by flight roused their

courage, and both parties began the fight with astonishing animosity.

Their fury was so great, that not a soldier in either army perceived an

earthquake which happened in that country, and buried whole cities in

ruins. In this confusion, Flaminius being slain by one of the Insubrian

Gauls, the Romans began to give ground, and at last fairly fled. Great

numbers, endeavouring to save themselves, leaped into the lake; whilst

others, directing their course towards the mountains, fell into the

enemy’s hands whom they strove to avoid. Six thousand only cut their way

through the conquerors, and retreated to a place of safety; but the next

day they were taken prisoners. In this battle fifteen thousand Romans were

killed, and about ten thousand escaped to Rome by different roads.

Hannibal sent back the Latins, who were allies of the Romans, into their

own country, without demanding the least ransom. He commanded search to be

made for the body of Flaminius, in order to give it burial; but it could

not be found. He afterwards put his troops into quarters of refreshment,

and solemnized the funerals of thirty of his chief officers who were

killed in the battle. He lost in all but fifteen hundred men, most of whom

were Gauls.

Immediately after, Hannibal despatched a courier to Carthage, with the

news of his good success hitherto in Italy. This caused the greatest joy

for the present, gave birth to the most promising hopes with regard to the

future, and revived the courage of all the citizens. They now prepared,

with incredible ardour, to send into Italy and Spain all necessary

succours.

Rome, on the contrary, was filled with universal grief and alarm, as soon

as the prætor had pronounced from the rostra the following words, “We have

lost a great battle.” The senate, studious of nothing but the public

welfare, thought that in so great a calamity and so imminent a danger,

recourse must be had to extraordinary remedies. They therefore appointed

Quintus Fabius dictator, a person as conspicuous for his wisdom as his

birth. It was the custom at Rome, that the moment a dictator was

nominated, all authority ceased, that of the tribunes of the people

excepted. M. Minucius was appointed his general of horse. We are now in

the second year of the war.

_Hannibal’s Conduct with respect to Fabius._(_761_)—Hannibal, after the

battle of Thrasymenus, not thinking it yet proper to march directly to

Rome, contented himself, in the mean time, with laying waste the country.

He crossed Umbria and Picenum; and after ten days’ march, arrived in the

territory of Adria.(762) He got a very considerable booty in this march.

Out of his implacable enmity to the Romans, he commanded, that all who

were able to bear arms, should be put to the sword; and meeting no

obstacle any where, he advanced as far as Apulia; plundering the countries

which lay in his way, and carrying desolation wherever he came, in order

to compel the nations to disengage themselves from their alliance with the

Romans; and to show all Italy, that Rome itself, now quite dispirited,

yielded him the victory.

Fabius, followed by Minucius and four legions, had marched from Rome in

quest of the enemy, but with a firm resolution not to let him take the

least advantage, nor to advance one step till he had first reconnoitred

every place; nor hazard a battle till he should be sure of success.

As soon as both armies were in sight, Hannibal, to terrify the Roman

forces, offered them battle, by advancing almost to the very entrenchments

of their camp. But finding every thing quiet there, he retired; blaming,

in appearance, the cowardice of the enemy, whom he upbraided with having

at last lost that valour so natural to their ancestors; but fretted

inwardly, to find he had to do with a general of so different a

disposition from Sempronius and Flaminius; and that the Romans, instructed

by their defeat, had at last made choice of a commander capable of

opposing Hannibal.

From this moment he perceived that the dictator would not be formidable to

him by the boldness of his attacks, but by the prudence and regularity of

his conduct, which might perplex and embarrass him very much. The only

circumstance he now wanted to know, was, whether the new general had

firmness enough to pursue steadily the plan he seemed to have laid down.

He endeavoured, therefore, to shake his resolution by the different

movements which he made, by laying waste the lands, plundering the cities,

and burning the villages and towns. He, at one time, would raise his camp

with the utmost precipitation; and, at another, stop short in some valley

out of the common route, to try whether he could not surprise him in the

plain. However, Fabius still kept his troops on the hills, but without

losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching near enough to come to an

engagement; nor yet keeping at such a distance, as might give him an

opportunity of escaping him. He never suffered his soldiers to stir out of

the camp, except to forage, nor ever on those occasions without a numerous

convoy. If ever he engaged, it was only in slight skirmishes, and so very

cautiously, that his troops had always the advantage. By this conduct he

revived, by insensible degrees, the courage of the soldiers, which the

loss of three battles had entirely damped; and enabled them to rely, as

they had formerly done, on their valour and good fortune.

Hannibal, having got an immense booty in Campania, where he had resided a

considerable time, left that country, in order that he might not consume

the provisions he had laid up, and which he reserved for the winter

season. Besides, he could no longer continue in a country of gardens and

vineyards, which were more agreeable to the eye than useful for the

subsistence of an army; a country where he would have been forced to take

up his winter quarters among marshes, rocks, and sands; while the Romans

would have drawn plentiful supplies from Capua, and the richest parts of

Italy. He therefore resolved to settle elsewhere.

Fabius naturally supposed, that Hannibal would be obliged to return the

same way he came, and that he might easily annoy him during his march. He

began by throwing a considerable body of troops into Casilinum, and

thereby securing that small town, situated on the Vulturnus, which

separated the territories of Falernum from those of Capua: he afterwards

detached four thousand men, to seize the only pass through which Hannibal

could come out; and then, according to his usual custom, posted himself

with the remainder of the army on the hills adjoining to the road.

The Carthaginians arrive, and encamp in the plain at the foot of the

mountains. And now the crafty Carthaginian falls into the same snare he

had laid for Flaminius at the defile of Thrasymenus; and it seemed

impossible for him ever to extricate himself out of this difficulty, there

being but one outlet, of which the Romans were possessed. Fabius, fancying

himself sure of his prey, was only contriving how to seize it. He

flattered himself, and not without the appearance of probability, with the

hopes of putting an end to the war by this single battle. Nevertheless, he

thought fit to defer the attack till the next day.

Hannibal perceived, that his own artifices were now employed against

him.(763) It is in such junctures as these, that a general has need of

unusual presence of mind and fortitude, to view danger in its utmost

extent, without being dismayed; and to find out sure and instant

expedients without deliberating. Immediately, the Carthaginian general

caused two thousand oxen to be got together, and ordered small bundles of

vine-branches to be tied to their horns. Towards the dead of night, having

commanded the branches to be set on fire, he caused the oxen to be driven

with violence to the top of the hills where the Romans were encamped. As

soon as these creatures felt the flame, the pain rendering them furious,

they flew up and down on all sides, and set fire to the shrubs and bushes

they met in their way. This squadron, of a new kind, was sustained by a

good number of light-armed soldiers, who had orders to seize upon the

summit of the mountain, and to charge the enemy, in case they should meet

them. All things happened as Hannibal had foreseen. The Romans who guarded

the defile, seeing the fires spread over the hills which were above them,

and imagining that it was Hannibal making his escape by torch-light, quit

their post, and run up to the mountains to oppose his passage. The main

body of the army not knowing what to think of all this tumult, and Fabius

himself not daring to stir, while it was dark, for fear of a surprise,

wait for the return of the day. Hannibal seizes this opportunity, marches

his troops and the spoils through the defile, which was now unguarded, and

rescues his army out of a snare in which, had Fabius been but a little

more vigorous, it would either have been destroyed, or at least very much

weakened. It is glorious for a man to turn his very errors to his

advantage, and make them subservient to his reputation.

The Carthaginian army returned to Apulia, still pursued and harassed by

the Romans. The dictator, being obliged to take a journey to Rome on

account of some religious ceremonies, earnestly entreated his general of

horse, before his departure, not to fight during his absence. However,

Minucius did not regard either his advice or his entreaties; but the very

first opportunity he had, whilst part of Hannibal’s troops were foraging,

he charged the rest, and gained some advantage. He immediately sent advice

of this to Rome, as if he had obtained a considerable victory. The news of

this, with what had just before happened at the passage of the defile,

raised complaints and murmurs against the slow and timorous circumspection

of Fabius. In a word, matters were carried so far, that the Roman people

gave his general of horse an equal authority with him; a thing unheard-of

before. The dictator was upon the road when he received advice of this:

for he had left Rome, in order that he might not be an eye-witness of what

was contriving against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was

very sensible, that though his authority in the command was divided, yet

his skill in the art of war was not so.(764) This soon became manifest.

Minucius, grown arrogant at the advantage he had gained over his

colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a

longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed

the whole army to danger whilst under the command of Minucius. He

therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his

power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share.

Hannibal, fully informed of all that passed in the Roman camp, was

overjoyed to hear of this dissension between the two commanders. He

therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged

headlong into it; and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an

ambuscade was concealed. But his troops being soon put into disorder, were

just upon the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the

sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers: “Let us

hasten to the assistance of Minucius: let us fly and snatch the victory

from the enemy, and extort from our fellow-citizens a confession of their

fault.” This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound

a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, “That the cloud which had

been long hovering on the summit of the mountain, had at last burst with a

loud crack, and caused a mighty storm.” So important and seasonable a

service done by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly

acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience,

and showed, that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a

fault, than not to have committed it.

_The state of Affairs in Spain._(_765_)—In the beginning of this campaign,

Cn. Scipio, having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by

Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twenty-five ships, with a great quantity

of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible, that they ought to

be particularly attentive to the affairs of Spain, because Hannibal could

draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country.

Accordingly, they sent a fleet thither, the command whereof was given to

P. Scipio, who, after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did

the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never

ventured beyond the Ebro. They had been satisfied with having gained the

friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and

confirming it by alliances: but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and

carried their arms much further up into the country.

The circumstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was, the

treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Hannibal had left there the children

of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as

hostages. Abelox, for so this Spaniard was called, persuaded Bostar, the

governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in

order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the

Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission. But he

carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their

relations, and, by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity.

(M122) _The Battle of Cannæ._(_766_)—The next spring, C. Terentius Varro

and L. Æmilius Paulus were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which

was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been

practised before, that is, they composed the army of eight legions, each

consisting of five thousand men, exclusive of the allies. For, as we have

already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which

consisted of about four thousand foot, and three hundred horse.(767) They

never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of five

thousand of the one, and four hundred of the other. As for the troops of

the allies, their infantry was equal to that of the legions, but they had

three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the

troops of the allies, with two legions, in order for them to act

separately; and it was very seldom that all these forces were used at the

same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four,

but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate

even thought fit, that the two consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius

and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could

not go into the field, by reason of his great age.

Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly, that he would

fall upon the enemy the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war;

adding, that it would never be terminated, so long as men such as Fabius

should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained

over the Carthaginians, of whom near seventeen hundred were killed,

greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he

considered this loss as a real advantage; being persuaded that it would

serve as a bait to the consul’s rashness, and prompt him on to a battles

which he wanted extremely. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was

reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have

subsisted ten days longer. The Spaniards were already meditating to leave

him. So that there would have been an end of Hannibal and his army, if his

good fortune had not thrown a Varro in in his way.

Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of

each other near Cannæ, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river

Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry

much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to

engage in such a place. He wished to draw the enemy into a spot, where the

infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague,

who was unexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the

inconveniency of a divided command; jealousy, a disparity of tempers, or a

diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissension between the two

generals.

The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with slight

skirmishes. But, at last, one day, when Varro had the command, (for the

two consuls took it by turns,) preparations were made on both sides for

battle. Æmilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely

disapproved the conduct of his colleague, as it was not in his power to

prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost.

Hannibal, after having made his soldiers observe, that, being superior in

cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for

fighting, had it been left to their choice: “Return, then,” says he,

“thanks to the gods for having brought the enemy hither, that you may

triumph over them; and thank me also, for having reduced the Romans to a

necessity of coming to an engagement. After three great successive

victories, is not the remembrance of your own actions sufficient to

inspire you with courage? By the former battles, you are become masters of

the open country; but this will put you in possession of all the cities,

and, I presume to say it, of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is

not words that we want, but action. I trust in the gods, that you shall

soon see my promises verified.”

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including

the allies, amounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little above six

thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty

thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius

commanded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one

of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who

had the art of turning every incident to advantage, had posted himself, so

as that the wind Vulturnus,(768) which rises at certain stated times,

should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight, and

cover them with dust; then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and

posting his cavalry in the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish

and Gaulish infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African

heavy-armed foot on their right, and half on their left, on the same line

with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head

of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry; and having drawn them out of the

line, advanced to give battle, rounding his front as he drew nearer the

enemy; and extending his flanks in the shape of a half moon, in order that

he might leave no interval between his main body and the rest of the line,

which consisted of the heavy-armed infantry, who had not moved from their

posts.

The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing

their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank.

Hannibal’s main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves

furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by numbers;

and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the line.

The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two wings

of the African infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order,

wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans, who

were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder; and attacked

them vigorously on both sides, without allowing them time to recover

themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the two

wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were much

inferior to them, and having left in the pursuit of the broken and

scattered squadrons, only as many forces as were necessary to keep them

from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry, which

being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy’s horse and foot was

all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery. Æmilius

being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was afterwards

killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known; and with him two

quæstors; one and twenty military tribunes; many who had been either

consuls or prætors; Servilius, one of the last year’s consuls; Minucius,

the late general of horse to Fabius; and fourscore senators. Above seventy

thousand men fell in this battle;(769) and the Carthaginians, so great was

their fury,(770) did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in the

very heat of it, called out to them several times; “Stop, soldiers, spare

the vanquished.” Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camp,

surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro the consul

retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men

escaped into the neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of the

field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former

victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans. He

lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two

hundred horse.

Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march

without loss of time directly to Rome, promising him, that within five

days they should sup in the Capitol. Hannibal answering, that it was an

affair which required mature deliberation; “I see,” replies Maharbal,

“that the gods have not endowed the same man with all talents. You,

Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a

victory.”(771)

It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors,

and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal, on this occasion, as being

guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for

condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who in the rest

of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the

best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They,

besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or

at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable

consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were

firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first

assault; but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been

effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and

defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the

least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in

not attempting to put it in execution.

And indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that

according to the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is

certain, that Hannibal’s whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but

to forty thousand men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the

action, and doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could remain

but six or seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number

was not sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river

running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither

engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a

siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus,

miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum;(772) and soon after the battle of

Cannæ, was forced to raise the siege of a little city,(773) of no note,

and of no great strength. It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried

on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected but that he

must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of

this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those

times. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly

well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion.

Soon after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago

to Carthage, with the news of his victory, and at the same time to demand

succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war.(774)

Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he

extolled his brother’s exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had

gained over the Romans. And, to give a more lively idea of the greatness

of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out, in

the middle of the senate, a bushel(775) of gold rings, which had been

taken from the fingers of such of the Roman nobility as had fallen in the

battle of Cannæ. He concluded with demanding money, provisions, and fresh

troops. All the spectators were struck with an extraordinary joy; upon

which Imilcon, a great stickler for Hannibal, fancying he had now a fair

opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the contrary faction, asked him,

whether he was still dissatisfied with the war they were carrying on

against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal delivered up to them?

Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied, that he was still

of the same mind; and that the victories of which they so much boasted

(supposing them real) could not give him joy, but only in proportion as

they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace: he then

undertook to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted so

much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. “I have cut to pieces,” says

he (continuing Mago’s speech,) “the Roman armies: send me some

troops.—What more could you ask had you been conquered? I have twice

seized upon the enemy’s camp, full (no doubt) of provisions of every

kind.—Send me provisions and money.—Could you have talked otherwise had

you lost your camp?” He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin nations

had come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him any

proposals of peace? To this Mago answering in the negative: “I then

perceive,” replied Hanno, “that we are no farther advanced, than when

Hannibal first landed in Italy.” The inference he drew from hence was,

that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal’s faction

prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno’s remonstrances,

which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and jealousy; and,

accordingly, orders were given for levying, without delay, the supplies of

men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately for Spain,

to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse in that

country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent to another

quarter; so eager was the contrary faction to oppose the designs of a

general whom they utterly abhorred. While in Rome, a consul,(776) who had

fled, was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth; at

Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal, for being victorious.

But Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in this

war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus being

more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of his

country, and a greater enemy to the Carthaginian general than to the

Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future success, and to

render of no avail that which had been already gained.

_Hannibal takes up his Winter Quarters in Capua._(_777_)—The battle of

Cannæ subjected the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal, drew over

to his interest Græcia Magna,(778) with the city of Tarentum; and thus

wrested from the Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans

held the first rank. This city, by the fertility of its soil, its

advantageous situation, and the blessings of a long peace, had risen to

great wealth and power. Luxury, and a fondness for pleasure, (the usual

attendants on wealth,) had corrupted the minds of all its citizens, who,

from their natural inclination, were but too much inclined to

voluptuousness and excess.

Hannibal(779) made choice of this city for his winter quarters. Here it

was that those soldiers, who had sustained the most grievous toils, and

braved the most formidable dangers, were overthrown by abundance and a

profusion of luxuries, into which they plunged with the greater eagerness,

as they, till then, had been strangers to them. Their courage was so

greatly enervated in this bewitching retirement, that all their after

efforts were owing rather to the fame and splendour of their former

victories than to their present strength. When Hannibal marched his forces

out of the city, one would have taken them for other men, and the reverse

of those who had so lately marched into it. Accustomed, during the winter

season, to commodious lodgings, to ease and plenty, they were no longer

able to bear hunger, thirst, long marches, watchings, and the other toils

of war; not to mention that all obedience, all discipline, were entirely

laid aside.

I only transcribe on this occasion from Livy. If we are to adopt his

opinion on this subject, Hannibal’s stay at Capua was a capital blemish in

his conduct; and he pretends, that this general was guilty of an

infinitely greater error, than when he neglected to march directly to Rome

after the battle of Cannæ. For this delay,(780) says Livy, might seem only

to have retarded his victory; whereas this last misconduct rendered him

absolutely incapable of ever defeating the enemy. In a word, as Marcellus

observed judiciously afterwards, Capua was to the Carthaginians and their

general, what Cannæ(781) had been to the Romans. There their martial

genius, their love of discipline, were lost: there their former fame, and

their almost certain hopes of future glory, vanished at once. And, indeed,

from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal advanced to their decline by

swift steps; fortune declared in favour of prudence, and victory seemed

now reconciled to the Romans.

I know not whether Livy has just ground to impute all these fatal

consequences to the delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all

the circumstances of this history, we shall scarce be able to persuade

ourselves, that the little progress which was afterwards made by the arms

of Hannibal, ought to be ascribed to his wintering at Capua. It might,

indeed, have been one cause, but a very inconsiderable one: and the

bravery with which the forces of Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies

of consuls and prætors; the towns they took even in sight of the Romans;

their maintaining their conquests so vigorously, and staying fourteen

years after this in Italy, in spite of the Romans: all these circumstances

may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too great a stress on the

delights of Capua.

The real cause of the decline of Hannibal’s affairs, was owing to his want

of necessary recruits and succours from Carthage. After Mago’s speech, the

Carthaginian senate had judged it necessary,(782) in order for the

carrying on the conquests in Italy, to send thither a considerable

reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty elephants, and a thousand talents;

and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, to

reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, Mago could obtain

an order but for twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred

horse:(783) and even when he was just going to march to Italy with this

reinforcement, so much inferior to that which had been promised him, he

was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal, after these mighty

promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money sent him;

but was left to depend upon his own personal resources. His army was now

reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How could it

be possible for him, with so inconsiderable an army, to seize, in an

enemy’s country, on all the advantageous posts; to awe his new allies; to

preserve his old conquests and form new ones; and to keep the field, with

advantage, against two armies of the Romans which were recruited every

year? This was the true cause of the declension of Hannibal’s affairs, and

of the ruin of those of Carthage. Was the part where Polybius treated this

subject extant, we doubtless should find, that he lays a greater stress on

this cause, than on the luxurious delights of Capua.

(M123) _Transactions relating to Spain and Sardinia._(_784_)—The two

Scipios still continued in the command of Spain, and their arms were

making a considerable progress there, when Asdrubal, who alone seemed able

to cope with them, received orders from Carthage to march into Italy to

the relief of his brother. Before he left Spain, he writ to the senate, to

convince them of the absolute necessity of their sending a general in his

stead, who was capable of making head against the Romans. Imilcon was

therefore sent thither with an army; and Asdrubal set out upon his march

with his, in order to go and join his brother. The news of his departure

was no sooner known, than the greatest part of Spain was subjected by the

Scipios. These two generals, animated by such signal success, resolved to

prevent him, if possible, from leaving Spain. They considered the danger

to which the Romans would be exposed, if, being scarce able to resist

Hannibal alone, they should be attacked by the two brothers, at the head

of two powerful armies. They therefore pursued Asdrubal, and, coming up

with that general, forced him to fight against his inclination. Asdrubal

was overcome; and, so far from being able to continue his march for Italy,

he found that it would be impossible for him to continue with any safety

in Spain.

The Carthaginians had no better success in Sardinia. Designing to take

advantage of some rebellions which they had fomented in that country, they

lost twelve thousand men in a battle fought against the Romans, who took a

still greater number of prisoners, among whom were Asdrubal, surnamed

Calvus, Hanno, and Mago,(785) who were distinguished by their birth as

well as military exploits.

(M124) _The ill Success of Hannibal. The Sieges of Capua and

Rome._(_786_)—From the time of Hannibal’s abode in Capua, the Carthaginian

affairs in Italy no longer supported their former reputation. M.

Marcellus, first as prætor, and afterwards as consul, had contributed very

much to this revolution. He harassed Hannibal’s army on every occasion,

seized upon his quarters, forced him to raise sieges, and even defeated

him in several engagements; so that he was called the Sword of Rome, as

Fabius had before been named its Buckler.

(M125) But what most affected the Carthaginian general, was, to see Capua

besieged by the Romans. In order, therefore, to preserve his reputation

among his allies, by a vigorous support of those who held the chief rank

as such, he flew to the relief of that city, brought forward his forces,

attacked the Romans, and fought several battles to oblige them to raise

the siege. (M126) At last, seeing all his measures defeated, he marched

hastily towards Rome, in order to make a powerful diversion. He was not

without hope of being able, in case he could have an opportunity, in the

first consternation, to storm some part of the city, of drawing the Roman

generals with all their forces from the siege of Capua, to the relief of

their capital; at least he flattered himself, that if, for the sake of

continuing the siege, they should divide their forces, their weakness

might then offer an occasion, either to the Capuans or himself, of

engaging and defeating them. Rome was surprised, but not confounded. A

proposal being made by one of the senators, to recall all the armies to

succour Rome; Fabius(787) declared, that it would be shameful in them to

be terrified, and forced to change their measures upon every motion of

Hannibal. They therefore contented themselves with only recalling part of

the army, and one of the generals, Q. Fulvius the proconsul, from the

siege. Hannibal, after making some devastations, drew up his army in order

of battle before the city, and the consul did the same. Both sides were

preparing to signalize themselves in a battle, of which Rome was to be the

recompense, when a violent storm obliged them to separate. They were no

sooner returned to their respective camps, than the face of the heavens

grew calm and serene. The same incident happened frequently afterwards;

insomuch that Hannibal, believing that there was something supernatural in

the event, said, according to Livy, that sometimes(788) his own will, and

sometimes fortune, would not suffer him to take Rome.

But the circumstance which most surprised and intimidated him, was the

news, that, whilst he lay encamped at one of the gates of Rome, the Romans

had sent out recruits for the army in Spain at another gate; and that the

ground, whereon his camp was pitched, had been sold, notwithstanding that

circumstance, for its full value. So barefaced a contempt stung Hannibal

to the quick; he, therefore, on the other side, put up to auction the

shops of the goldsmiths round the Forum. After this bravado he retired,

and, in his march, plundered the rich temple of the goddess Feronia.(789)

Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little longer. After that

such of its senators as had the chief hand in the revolt, and consequently

could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put themselves to a

truly tragical death,(790) the city surrendered at discretion. The success

of this siege, which, by the happy consequences wherewith it was attended,

proved decisive, and fully restored to the Romans their superiority over

the Carthaginians; displayed, at the same time, how formidable the power

of the Romans was,(791) when they undertook to punish their perfidious

allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could afford his friends

at a time when they most wanted it.

(M127) _The Defeat and Death of the two Scipios in Spain._(_792_)—The face

of affairs was very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three

armies in that country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo; the

second by Asdrubal, son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had

joined the first Asdrubal. The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for

dividing their forces, and attacking the enemy separately, which was the

cause of their ruin. They agreed that Cneus, with a small number of

Romans, and thirty thousand Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal,

the son of Hamilcar; whilst Publius, with the remainder of the forces,

composed of Romans and the Italian allies, should advance against the

other two generals.

Publius was vanquished first. To the two leaders whom he had to oppose,

Masinissa, elate with the victories he had lately gained over Syphax,

joined himself; and was to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful

Spanish prince. The armies came to an engagement. The Romans, being thus

attacked on all sides at once, made a brave resistance as long as they had

their general at their head; but the moment he fell, the few troops which

had escaped the slaughter, secured themselves by flight.

The three victorious armies marched immediately in quest of Cneus, in

order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He was already more than

half vanquished by the desertion of his allies, who all forsook him; and

left to the Roman generals this important instruction;(793) _viz._ never

to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of foreigners. He

guessed that his brother was slain, and his army defeated, upon seeing

such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a short time,

being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally lamented

by their citizens and allies; and Spain deeply felt their loss, because of

the justice and moderation of their conduct.

These extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of L.

Marcius,(794) a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them to

the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither, who

severely revenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored the

affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flourishing condition.

(M128) _The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal._(_795_)—One unforeseen defeat

ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard

to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the eleventh of the second

Punic war, (for I pass over several events for brevity’s sake,) were C.

Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for his province, the

Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was

preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the

Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and

was there making head against Hannibal.

The passage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his

brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to

receive him. Some time after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but

they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was

hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important

a nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself

at liberty to dispense with the established rules(796) of his duty, for

the welfare of his country. In consequence of this, it was his opinion,

that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be

capable of striking terror into the enemy; by marching to join his

colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with

their united forces. This design, if the several circumstances of it are

thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged with imprudence. To

prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state.

Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of

the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two

thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which

indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same time, a very

inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was

advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be supposed

that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended by

thirty-five thousand men?

Nero set out without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design.

When he had advanced so far, as that it might be communicated without any

danger, he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory: that,

in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their

arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that

the whole honour of this battle would fall to them.

They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in

the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose upon the

enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius. The

army of Porcius the prætor was encamped near that of the consul, and in

the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it

would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves; but

Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch

only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy,

as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly

the signal for battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost

ranks, discovered, by several circumstances, that fresh troops were

arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul.

This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a considerable

loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to his

assistance.

After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded, and his

army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his

guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at random,

along the banks of the river Metaurus,(797) and was preparing to cross it,

when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he

saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and

therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of

mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and

drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of

posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a manner,

that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and of

giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After

this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and

was the first to march to attack the enemy’s left wing; well knowing that

all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle

lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both parties.

Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new

glory to that he had already acquired by a series of shining actions. He

led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy

superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his

words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces,

endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that

victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of

so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his fortune,

he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a

manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.

This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had fought during this

war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter

made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a reprisal for

the battle of Cannæ. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,(798)

and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand.

These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius, that he

might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: “It

is fit,” says he, “that some should survive, in order that they may carry

the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians.”

Nero set out upon his march, on the very night which followed the

engagement. Through every place where he passed, in his return, shouts of

joy and loud acclamations welcomed him, instead of those fears and

uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the

sixth day. Asdrubal’s head being thrown into the camp of the

Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother’s unhappy fate. Hannibal

perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: “All is over,”

says he,(799) “I shall no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In

losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune.” He

afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians,

where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to

subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage.

(M129) _Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and sails into

Africa. Hannibal is recalled._(_800_)—The fate of arms was not more

propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of young

Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former

flourishing state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before done in

Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco,

Hanno, and Mago, having been defeated with their numerous armies by the

Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain,

and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that

Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans, and

Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.

(M130) Scipio, at his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then

thirty years of age. He had P. Licinius Crassus for his colleague. Sicily

was allotted to Scipio, with permission for him to cross into Africa, if

he found it convenient. He set out with all imaginable expedition for his

province; whilst his colleague was to command in the country whither

Hannibal was retired.

The taking of New Carthage, where Scipio had displayed all the prudence,

the courage, and capacity which could have been expected from the greatest

generals, and the conquest of all Spain, were more than sufficient to

immortalize his name: but he had considered these only as so many steps by

which he was to climb to a nobler enterprise: this was the conquest of

Africa. Accordingly, he crossed over thither, and made it the seat of the

war.

The devastation of the country, the siege of Utica, one of the strongest

cities of Africa; the entire defeat of the two armies under Syphax and

Asdrubal, whose camp was burnt by Scipio; and afterwards the taking Syphax

himself prisoner, who was the most powerful resource the Carthaginians had

left; all these things forced them at last to turn their thoughts to

peace. For this purpose they deputed thirty of their principal senators,

who were selected from that powerful body at Carthage, called the _council

of the hundred_. Being introduced into the Roman general’s tent, they all

threw themselves prostrate on the earth, (such was the custom of their

country,) spoke to him in terms of great submission, accusing Hannibal as

the author of all their calamities, and promising, in the name of the

senate, an implicit obedience to whatever the Romans should please to

ordain. Scipio answered, that though he was come into Africa not for

peace, but conquest, he would however grant them a peace, upon condition

that they should deliver up all the prisoners and deserters to the Romans;

that they should recall their armies out of Italy and Gaul; should never

set foot again in Spain; should retire out of all the islands between

Italy and Africa; should deliver up all their ships, twenty excepted, to

the victor; should give to the Romans five hundred thousand bushels of

wheat, three hundred thousand of barley, and pay fifteen thousand talents:

that in case they were pleased with these conditions, they then, he said,

might send ambassadors to the senate. The Carthaginians feigned a

compliance, but this was only to gain time, till Hannibal should be

returned. A truce was then granted to the Carthaginians, who immediately

sent deputies to Rome, and at the same time an express to Hannibal, to

order his return into Africa.