THE LAW OF REFLUX
The mind, after traversing its course of progress, after rising from
sensation successively to the imaginative and the rational universal
and from violence to equity, is bound in conformity with its eternal
nature to re-traverse the course, to relapse into violence and
sensation, and thence to renew its upward movement, to commence a
reflux.
This is the philosophical meaning of Vico's "reflux," but not the exact
manner in which we find it expressed in his writings, where the eternal
circle is considered almost exclusively as exemplified in the history
of nations, as a reflux in the civil affairs of man. Civilisation
comes to an end in the "barbarism of reflection," which is worse than
the primitive barbarism of sensation; for while the latter was not
without a wild nobility, the former is contemptible, untrustworthy
and treacherous; and thus it is necessary that this evil subtlety of
malicious intellect should rust away through the long centuries of a
new barbarism of sensation. We must however withdraw and purge the
conception of "reflux" from historical facts and the sociological
scheme, not only to explain the absolute and eternal character
which Vico attributes to it, but also to justify the historical
representation and sociological law founded upon it, and drawing their
cogency primarily from it.
The laws of flux and reflux, laid down by the philosophers and
politicians of Greece and of the Italian Renaissance, were founded no
less than Vico's upon a philosophy, but upon a very superficial one;
they assumed their object to possess external and empty political
forms, and endeavoured to fix the succession of these forms upon data
of experience or by vague reasonings. But Vico's object is the forms of
culture, including in themselves all the activities of life, economy
and law, religion and art, science and language, and referring them
back to their inmost source, the human mind, he establishes their
succession "according to the rhythm of the elementary forms of the
mind." Thus all the learning which has been expended in comparing the
Vician reflux with the theories of Plato or Polybius, Machiavelli or
Campanella, is practically wasted: the more so that Vico (who, as we
know, though often misunderstanding his predecessors cannot be accused
of wishing to pass them over: in fact, where he thought he found
parallel or identical ideas in them, he was apt to boast of the fact)
felt no need of mentioning this point, or thought it unimportant. The
"circular movement" (ἀνακύκλωσις) of Polybius, the economy of nature
by which states alter, change and return to the same point, has been
thought almost an anticipation of the eternal ideal history; but Vico
sets Polybius with the others, when he asks the reader to consider "how
(little) philosophers have thought with knowledge upon their principles
of civil government, and with what (little) truth Polybius has reasoned
upon its changes." Campanella connected his historical cycles with
astrological laws; and Machiavelli conceives the catastrophe which
opens the reflux thus: "When human craft and malignity have gone as far
as they can go, it happens of necessity that the world purifies itself
by one of the three methods (pestilence, famine and deluge, beside
the human methods of new religions and languages) in order that men,
having become few and chastened, may live more conveniently and become
better." The one precedent to which Vico refers, but only to interpret
it in a way altogether his own and in fact to give it a totally new
content, is the ancient Egyptian tradition of the three successive ages
of gods, heroes and men.
If the philosophy lying at its root gives strength to Vico's
sociological theory of reflux, the historical element with which it is
leavened to some degree weakens it. Vico was especially versed in and
attached to Roman history, which had been the first of his historical
studies and the object of many years' devotion. The history of Rome
accordingly, whether because of his deeper study of it or because of
its complexity, impressiveness and long duration, came to stand in
Vico's mind as the typical or normal history, to serve as a standard
for all others, and be confused with the law of flux and reflux itself.
Rome showed him the asylum of Romulus, that is, the transition from the
state of nature to the political organism: aristocracies, monarchical
at first in appearance only, later not even in appearance: democracy,
issuing from its struggle with aristocracy and ending in real monarchy,
the perfect form of civil life; thence by a process of degeneration,
the barbarism of reflection or civilisation, incomparably worse than
the primitive noble barbarism, and following in its train a second
condition of wandering in a state of nature and a new barbarism, a new
youth, the Middle Ages. It is the history of Rome hardly generalised
at all and supplemented here and there by that of Greece, that appears
in the Vician aphorisms formulating the laws of social dynamics. Men
first feel the prick of necessity, then the attraction of utility:
next they become aware of convenience, and after that take delight in
pleasure; then dissipate themselves in luxury and finally fall victims
to the madness of abusing their resources. There must at first be men
of brute strength like Polyphemus, that man may obey man in the state
of family life, and to induce him to obey the law in the future state
of civil life. There must be noble and proud men like Achilles, not
inclined by nature to yield to their equals, in order to establish
over the family the aristocratic type of republic. Then valiant and
just men like Aristides and Scipio Africanus are necessary, to open
the path to popular liberty. After this arise men of great apparent
virtues accompanied by faults no less great, like Alexander or Caesar,
acquiring immense popular reputations and introducing monarchy. Later
still there must be serious reflective natures like Tiberius to
consolidate the monarchy; and lastly wild, dissolute and shameless
characters like Caligula, Nero and Domitian to overthrow it.
Owing to this rarefaction of Roman history into typical history, and
the simultaneous consolidation of typical history into the history of
Rome, Vico's law of reflux is riddled with exceptions, much more common
and serious than those of the corresponding empirical laws; so that if
as he believes his empirical science is identical with the ideal laws
of the mind, its alleged permanency throughout all eternity and the
whole universe seems the merest irony. He says that Carthage, Capua and
Numantia, the three cities which threatened to dispute with Rome the
empire of the world, failed to accomplish the ordained course of human
affairs: since the Carthaginians were thwarted by the acuteness of the
native African temperament, which by maritime commerce they increased
still further: the Capuans by the soft climate and fertility of rich
Campania: and the Numantines by their suppression in the first burst
of heroism at the hands of Rome, led by Scipio Africanus the conqueror
of Carthage, and aided by the forces of the world. And passing from
ancient to modern times, America would now be traversing the path of
human affairs but for its discovery by Europeans: Poland and England
are still aristocratic, but would have arrived at perfect monarchy had
not the natural course of civil affairs been hindered by extraordinary
causes. As for the Middle Ages, they cannot be considered as in Vico's
estimation a true return to the state of nature, if they open with
the establishment of Christianity, the religion of the true God; nor
in any case does the return to the state of nature and to barbarism
seem the only path open to a nation that has attained its ἀκμή, its
culmination. The alternative is that a decadent nation should lose
its independence and fall under the rule of a better. Nor, lastly, is
decadence inevitable if statesmen and philosophers working in harmony
can preserve the perfection that has been reached and check the
threatened destruction, and if in point of fact, as he observes, the
aristocratic republics which survived his own day as remnants of the
Middle Ages succeeded in preserving themselves by arts of "superfine
wisdom." His own time Vico thought to be one of high civilisation.
A complete humanity, he says, seems to be scattered to-day over
all nations. A few great monarchs rule the world of nations, and
those barbarian monarchs who still exist do so either owing to the
persistence of the "common wisdom" of imaginative and cruel religions,
or because of the natural temperaments of their respective peoples. The
nations which form the empire of the Czar of Russia are of a sluggish
disposition; those of the Khan of Tartary are an effeminate race; the
subjects of the Negus of Ethiopia and the King of Fez and of Morocco
are few and weak. In the temperate zone Japan maintains a heroic
character not unlike that of Rome in the period of the Punic wars;
her people are warlike, her language resembling Latin, her religion
a fierce one of terrible gods all loaded with formidable weapons.
The Chinese on the other hand, whose religion is mild, cultivate
literature and are humane in the highest degree: the peoples of the
Indies are also humane and practise the arts of peace; the Persians
and Turks mingle the rude doctrine of their religion with an Asiatic
softness, the Turks especially tempering their arrogance with pomp,
magnificence, liberality and gratitude. Europe is above all humane,
composed as it is of great monarchies and universally professing the
Christian faith which inculcates an infinitely pure and perfect idea
of God and commands charity to the whole human race. Vico fixed his
attention upon the confederacy of the Swiss cantons and the united
provinces of Holland, which reminded him of the Aetolian and Achaean
leagues, and on the composition of the German Empire, a system of free
states and sovereign princes, which seemed to him a kind of attempt
in the direction of a great aristocratic state; the most perfect
of all, and the ultimate form of civil life, since no other can be
conceived superior to it, reproducing as it does the earliest form, the
aristocracy of patricians each supreme in his own family and all united
in the ruling class of the first state; but reproducing it in a form
not of barbarism but of the highest civilisation. Such is the humanity
by which Europe is on every hand distinguished, that it abounds with
every element contributory to human happiness, mental pleasures no
less than bodily comforts, and all this in virtue of the Christian
religion, teaching as it does sublime truths, supported by the most
learned philosophers of the Gentile races and of the three greatest
languages of the world, Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and thus uniting the
wisdom of authority with that of reason, the choicest philosophical
doctrine with the most highly developed philological learning. Can this
lofty civilisation, safeguarded as it is by Christianity, be moving,
or ever likely to move towards a new state of nature? It is difficult
to discover Vico's real opinion on this point. Among his verses there
is a poem of a profoundly pessimistic tone, but this is a youthful
effusion, and in any case refers to the end of the world as imminent,
rather than to a future social decadence. In his letters there is a
melancholy picture of the condition of learning in his time: but it
applies to this restricted field only, not to the sphere of social and
political life. On the other hand, in his last philosophical work, the
_De mente heroica,_ referring to those who declared that all things
were now perfect and that no new tasks could arise, he says that the
tide of progress is flowing at its strongest. "The world is still
young: for only in the last seven hundred years, four hundred of which
were spent in barbarism, how many new discoveries have been made! How
many new arts have arisen! How many new sciences have been developed!"
(_Mundus iuvenescit adhuc; nam septingentis non ultra abhinc annis,
quorum tamen quadringentos barbaries percurrit, quot nova inventa! quot
novae artes! quot novae scientiae excogitatae!_) But we may observe
that the _De mente heroica_ is an official oration, and that Vico may
on that account have suppressed for the occasion his doubts or his
deepest convictions. In any case, how can we reconcile the prophecy of
an imminent collapse with the rise of that creation of providence, the
New Science, shedding upon the life of nations a light which rendered
possible the diagnosis and cure of their ailments? On the whole it is
probable that the difficulty of determining Vico's opinion as to the
fate of contemporary society is due to the fact that he had really no
settled conviction on the subject, and was led hither and thither in
various and contrary directions by the influence of hopes and fears.
If it had not been disturbed by the scheme of Roman history, the
empirical theory of the reflux would never have been forced to admit
so many and serious exceptions; nor would it have fallen into such
painful confusions. It would have accommodated its author's historical
observations with greater ease, and its general characteristics would
have been much simpler and more general. It would have consisted
primarily in the determination and illustration of the connexion
between predominantly imaginative and predominantly intellectual,
spontaneous and reflective, periods, the latter periods issuing out
of the former by an increase of energy, and returning to them by
degeneration and decomposition. Political history shows over and
over again the spectacle of aristocracies declining from their first
strength to a debased and contemptible state and yielding before the
onset of classes less refined or even absolutely uncultured, but of
stouter moral fibre; while these again, after becoming civilised in
their turn and attaining the highest development of the historical
idea whose germ they bear within themselves, enter upon a new period
of decay and fermentation, from which issues a new ruling class in the
vigour of a youthful barbarism. The history of philosophy again shows
positive and speculative periods; philosophical solutions congeal into
scholastic theory and dogma, the mind reverts to the mere unthinking
observation of particular fact, and the speculative process arises once
more. Literary history, too, speaks of periods of realism and idealism,
romantic and classical periods: of a corrupt classicism, Alexandrian or
decadent art, and of a romantic barbarism which arises from it. These
are true cases of Vico's reflux. But since the nature of the mind which
underlies these cycles is outside time and therefore exists in every
moment of time, we must not exaggerate the difference of the periods:
and if on the one hand the outline of the law must be distinct, it
must on the other hand not lose a certain elasticity. We must never
forget that at every period, aristocratic or democratic, romantic or
classical, positive or speculative, and even in every individual and
every fact, moments both aristocratic and democratic, romantic and
classical, positive and speculative can be observed; and that these
distinctions are to a great extent quantitative and made for the sake
of convenience. These facts should lead us to avoid alike maintaining
the law at all costs and so falling into artificiality, and rejecting
it entirely and so refusing the help which may be derived from general
and approximative views.
Thus understood and amended, not only is the theory free from the
great and striking exceptions which are necessary when it is modelled
upon the history and final catastrophe of Rome, but the accusations of
undue uniformity lodged against Vico disappear. Vincenzo Cuoco, one
of the first, if not the first intelligent student of Vico's works,
remarks concerning and in criticism of the law of reflux, that "nature
never resembles itself; it is man who by compounding his observations
forms classes and names." This is perfectly true; but if applied to
this case it would be an argument not against the Vician reflux but
against every sort of empirical human science. Others accused Vico
of overlooking groups of causes of great historical weight, such as
climate, racial and national character, and exceptional occurrences.
But, omitting the fact that he often mentions these things, for he
connects national character and climate with the forms and changes
of states, and mentions events and circumstances which upset the
natural and ordinary course of national history, for example in his
discussion of Greek history, the truth is that he was bound to ignore
them and could not waste time over such things, since his concern was
with uniformities and not with divergences, or rather with certain
uniformities and not with certain others which compared with the
former were negligible divergences. Similarly--the parallel is an
obvious one, and indeed is more than a parallel--any one who attempts
to trace the general characteristics of the different periods of
life, infancy, childhood, adolescence and so forth, will ignore the
comparative rapidity and slowness of development due to differences
of climate, race or accidental circumstances. Another of these
true but irrelevant charges is that Vico denied the communication
and interpenetration of civilisations, and insisted that they arise
separately in different nations without any mutual knowledge and
therefore without reciprocal imitation. This charge has been met by the
observation that Vico does not fail to record cases of the influence
of one people upon another and of the transmission of civilisations
and their products; the transmission for example of alphabetic writing
from the Chaldaeans to the Phoenicians and from them to the Egyptians;
and that in any case his law is not empirical but philosophical and
refers to the spontaneous creative activity of the human mind. The
point at issue is however precisely the empirical aspect of this law,
not the philosophical: and the true reply seems to us to be, as we have
already suggested, that Vico could not take and ought not to have taken
other circumstances into account, just as--to recall one instance--any
one who in studying the various phases of life describes the first
manifestations of the sexual craving in the vague imaginations and
similar phenomena of puberty, does not take into account the ways in
which the less experienced may be initiated into love by the more
experienced, since he is setting out to deal not with the social laws
of imitation but with the physiological laws of organic development.
If it is said that even without imitation or sophistication the sexual
craving arises no less and demands satisfaction, such a statement
doubtless merely asserts the incontrovertible truth of a certain very
ancient Eastern tale included by Boccaccio in the _Decameron_: but at
the same time it supplies the most complete parallel to the famous and
much controverted aphorism of Vico.
Nor is the Vician law of reflux necessarily opposed, as has often been
thought, to the conception of social progress. It would be so opposed
if instead of being a law of mere uniformity it were one of identity,
in agreement with the idea of an unending cyclical repetition of single
individual facts which has been adopted by certain extravagant minds
of both ancient and modern times. The reflux of history, the eternal
cycle of the mind, can and must be conceived, even if Vico does not
so express it, as not merely diverse in its uniform movements, but
as perpetually increasing in richness and outgrowing itself, so that
the new period of sense is in reality enriched by all the intellect
and all the development that preceded it, and the same is true of the
new period of the imagination or of the developed mind. The return of
barbarism in the Middle Ages was in some respects uniform with ancient
barbarism; but it must not for that reason be considered as identical
with it, since it contains in itself Christianity, which summarises and
transcends ancient thought.
Whether the conception of progress is formulated and thrown into relief
by Vico is quite another question. Vico does not deny progress; he
even refers to it in speaking of the conditions of his own time as an
actual fact: but he has no conception of it and still less does he
throw such a conception into relief. His philosophy, while it attains
the lofty vision of the process of mind in obedience to its own laws,
nevertheless retains by reason of this failure to apprehend the
progressive enrichment of reality an element of sadness and desolation.
The individual character of men and events is obliterated in Vico;
individuals and events are represented merely as particular cases of
one aspect of the mind or of one phase of civilisation. Hence we always
find Aristides alongside of Scipio and Alexander alongside of Caesar:
never Aristides simply as Aristides, Scipio as Scipio, and Alexander
and Caesar as Alexander and as Caesar. Progress implies that each fact
and each individual has its own unique function; each makes its own
contribution, for which no other can be substituted, to the poem of
history; and each responds with a deeper voice to the one that went
before.
But the reason why Vico was bound to miss the idea of progress and
why his studies in history were inevitably one-sided can be clearly
perceived only after a review of his metaphysics.