LETTER XLVIII.

_Middlesex Election.—Nottingham Election.—Seats in Parliament how

obtained.—Modes of Bribery.—Aylesbury.—Ilchester.—Contested

Elections.—Marriages at Bristol.—Want of Talent in the English

Government accounted for._

During my travels I have missed the sight of a popular election. That

for Middlesex has been carried on with uncommon asperity; it is the only

instance wherein the ministry have exerted their influence; for,

contrary to the custom of all their predecessors, they have fairly

trusted themselves to the opinion of the people. Here, however, they

have taken a part,—and here they have been beaten, because they stood

upon the very worst ground which they could possibly have chosen.

The English have a law called the _habeas corpus_, which they regard,

with good reason, as the main pillar of their freedom. By this law it is

the right of every person who is arrested upon a criminal charge, to be

tried at the first sessions after his arrest; so that, while this law

continues in force, no person can be wrongfully detained in prison, but

his guilt or innocence must be fairly proved. It was thought expedient

to suspend this statute during the late revolutionary ferment. The place

chosen for the suspected persons was a prison in the immediate suburb of

the metropolis; being one of the new buildings upon the fashionable

plan. Complaints were made by the prisoners of cruel usage, and Sir

Francis Burdett, a young man who has warmly espoused the popular party,

brought the business forward in parliament. A wise minister would have

listened to the complaint, examined into it, and redressed the

grievance, even ostentatiously; for the object of government being to

secure these men, and it being also notorious that there was no legal

proof of guilt against them, as if there had they would have been

brought to trial, all rigour not absolutely necessary for the purposes

of confinement, appeared like a determination to punish them in every

way they could, and consequently as an act of arbitrary and cruel power.

But pride and obstinacy are the predominant parts of Mr Pitt's

character; right or wrong he never yields; and he now chose to show his

power by protecting the gaoler in defiance of public opinion. Repeated

complaints were made; and it was affirmed upon oath that a Colonel

Despard, one of these prisoners, had been confined there in a cell

without windows, and without fire, till his feet were ulcered with the

frost. At length a deputation was named to inspect the prison:—it

consisted chiefly of persons disposed to see every thing with favourable

eyes; and, as you may well suppose, the prison was prepared for their

visitation. When they came into the cell where a sailor was confined who

had been concerned in the great mutiny, one of the deputies noticed a

bird which hopped about him, and said how tame it was. "Aye, sir," said

the man, "this place will tame any thing!" and though a hardy English

sailor, he burst into tears. The report was in favour of the prison.

Complaints, however, were still continued. The place acquired the name

of the Bastille; and merely upon the ground of having raised his voice

in parliament against this new species of punishment, Sir Francis

Burdett has become the most popular man in England. He offered himself

as candidate for Middlesex. The ministry acted unwisely in opposing him;

and still more unwisely in supporting against him a man who had no other

possible claim to their support, than that he was implicated in the

charges against the management of the prison, because he was one of the

magistrates whose duty it was to inspect it, and he had given it his

full approbation. By this impolicy they made the question of the

Middlesex election to be this,—whether this system of imprisonment was

approved of by the people or not; and the answer has been most

undeniably given against them.

Electioneering, as they call it, is a game at which every kind of deceit

seems to be considered lawful. On these occasions, men, who at other

times regard it as a duty to speak truth, and think their honour

implicated in their word, scruple not at asserting the grossest and most

impudent falsehoods, if thereby they can obtain a momentary advantage

over the hostile party. A striking instance of this has occurred with

respect to the election for Nottingham, a considerable town in the

middle of England, where the contest has been violent, because

party-spirit has always been carried to a high degree there. Some years

ago the mob ducked those who were most obnoxious to them, and killed

some of them in the operation. This was not forgotten. The opposite

party had the ascendancy now, and those who were noted as having been

active in this outrageous cruelty were severely handled. In such cases

of summary justice the innocent are liable to suffer with the guilty,

and the rabble, when they had got the power, abused it. Whoever voted

for the obnoxious candidate had the skirts of his coat cut off, and it

was well if he escaped without further injury. It might have been

thought that the plain statement of these facts would have sufficed to

show that the election was not a fair one; but instead of being

satisfied with a plain tale, a gentleman comes forward as the advocate

of the unsuccessful party, accuses all the other party of the most

violent jacobinism, and asserts that at the triumph of the winning

candidate the tree of liberty was carried before him, and that a naked

woman walked in the procession as the Goddess of Reason. The history of

the tree is, that as the candidate's name happened to be Birch, a birch

bough was borne in his honour: the other falsehood is so apparent that

no person supposes this writer can possibly believe it himself. It is a

pious fraud to answer a party purpose, and on such occasions no frauds,

pious or impious, are scrupled.

Any thing like election, in the plain sense of the word, is unknown in

England. Members are never chosen for parliament as deputies were for a

Cortes, because they are the fittest persons to be deputed. Some seats

are private property;—that is, the right of voting belongs to a few

householders, sometimes not more than half a dozen, and of course these

votes are commanded by the owner of the estate. The fewer they are, the

more easily they are managed. Great part of a borough in the west of

England was consumed some years ago by fire, and the lord of the manor

would not suffer the houses to be rebuilt for this reason. If such an

estate be to be sold, it is publicly advertised as carrying with it the

power of returning two members; sometimes that power is veiled under the

modest phrase of _a valuable appendage to the estate_, or _the desirable

privilege of nominating to seats in a certain assembly_. Government hold

many of these boroughs, and individuals buy in at others. The price is

as well known as the value of land, or of stock, and it is not uncommon

to see a seat in a certain house advertised for in the public

newspapers. In this manner are a majority of the members returned. You

will see then that the house of commons must necessarily be a manageable

body. This is as it should be;[13] the people have all the forms of

freedom, and the crown governs them while they believe they govern

themselves. Burleigh foresaw this, and said that to govern _through_ a

parliament was the securest method of exercising power.

In other places, where the number of voters is something greater, so as

to be too many for this kind of quiet and absolute control, the business

is more difficult, and sometimes more expensive. The candidate then,

instead of paying a settled sum to the lord of the borough, must deal

individually with the constituents, who sell themselves to the highest

bidder. Remember that an oath against bribery is required! A common mode

of evading the letter of the oath is to lay a wager. "I will bet so

much," says the agent of the candidate, "that you do not vote for us."

"Done," says the voter freeman,—goes to the hustings, gives his voice,

and returns to receive the money, not as the price of his suffrage, but

as the bet which he has won. As all this is in direct violation of law,

though both parties use the same means, the losing one never scruples to

accuse his successful opponent of bribery, if he thinks he can establish

the charge; and thus the mystery of iniquity is brought to light. It is

said that at Aylesbury a punch-bowl full of guineas stood upon the table

in the committee-room, and the voters were helped out of it. The price

of votes varies according to their number. In some places it is as low

as forty shillings, in others, at Ilchester for instance, it is thirty

pounds. "Thirty pounds," said the apothecary of the place on his

examination, "is the price of an Ilchester voter." When he was asked how

he came to know the sum so accurately, he replied, that he attended the

families of the voters professionally, and his bills were paid at

election times with the money. A set of such constituents once waited

upon the member whom they had chosen, to request that he would vote

against the minister. "D—mn you!" was his answer: "What! have I not

bought you? And do you think I will not sell you?"

It is only in large cities that any trial of public opinion is made,—for

in the counties the contest, if any there be, lies between the great

families, and a sort of hereditary influence is maintained, which is

perhaps unobjectionable. But in large cities public opinion and faction

have their full scope. Every resource of violence and of cunning is here

brought into play. A great proportion of the inferior voters are

necessarily under the absolute control of their employers; but there are

always many who are to be influenced by weighty arguments applied to the

palm of the hand; and the struggle for these, when the parties happen to

be well balanced, leads to a thousand devices. The moment one party can

lay hold on a voter of this description, they endeavour to keep him

constantly drunk till the time of election, and never to lose sight of

him. If the others can catch him, and overbid them, they, on their part,

are afraid of a rescue, carry their prize out of town, and coop him in

some barn or outhouse, where they stuff him day and night with meat and

drink till they bring him up to the place of polling, oftentimes so

intoxicated that the fellow must be led between two others, one to hold

him up as he gives his voice, while the other shows him a card in the

palm of his hand, with the name of the candidate written in large

letters, lest he should forget for whom he is to vote.

The qualification for voting differs at different places. At Bristol a

freeman's daughter conveys it by marriage. Women enter into the heat of

party even more eagerly than men, and, when the mob is more than usually

mischievous, are sure to be at the head of it. In one election for that

city, which was violently disputed, it was common for the same woman to

marry several men. The mode of divorce was, that as soon as the ceremony

was over, and the parties came out of church, they went into the

church-yard, and shaking hands over a grave, cried, "Now death us do

part;"—away then went the man to vote with his new qualification, and

the woman to qualify another husband at another church.

Such tricks are well understood, and practised by all parties: but if an

appeal be made against a return as having been thus obtained by illegal

means, the cause is tried in the house[14] of commons, and these are

perhaps the only subjects which are decided there with strict

impartiality. Bribery is punished in him who gives, by the loss of his

seat, and he may be prosecuted for heavy fines: he who receives, falls

under the penal law—the heaviest punishment ought to fall upon the

tempter; and as government in England is made a trade, it seems hard

that the poor should not get something by it once in seven years, when

they are to pay so much for it all the rest of the time.

These abuses are not necessarily inherent in the nature of popular

election; they would effectually be precluded by the use of the ballot.

The popular party call loudly for reform, but they are divided among

themselves as to what reform they would have; and the aristocracy of the

country, as they have every thing in their own hands, will never consent

to any which would destroy their own influence.

One evil consequence results from this mode of representation, which

affects the rulers as well as the people. The house of commons has not,

and cannot have, its proportion of talents: its members are wholly

chosen from among persons of great fortune. The more limited the number

out of which they are chosen, the less must be the chance of finding

able men: there is, therefore, a natural unfitness in having a

legislative body composed wholly of the rich. It is known both at

schools and at universities, that the students of the privileged classes

are generally remiss in their studies, and inferior in information for

that reason to their contemporaries;—there is, therefore, less chance of

finding a due proportion of knowledge among them. Being rich, and

associating wholly with the rich, they have no knowledge of the real

state of the great body for whom they are to legislate, and little

sympathy for distresses which they have never felt: a legislature

composed wholly of the rich, is therefore liable to lay the public

burthens oppressively upon the inferior ranks.

There are two ways in which men of talents, who are not men of fortune,

find their way into parliament. The minister sometimes picks out a few

promising plants from the university, and forces them in his hot-bed.

They are chosen so young that they cannot by any possibility have

acquired information to fit them for their situations; they are so

flattered by the choice that they are puffed up with conceit, and so

fettered by it that they must be at the beck of their patron. The other

method is by way of the law. But men who make their way up by legal

practice, learn, in the course of that practice, to disregard right and

wrong, and to consider themselves entirely as pleaders on the one side.

They continue to be pleaders and partisans in the legislature, and never

become statesmen.

From these causes it is, that, while the English people are held in

admiration by all the world, the English government is regarded in so

very different a light; and hence it is, that the councils of England

have been directed by such a succession of weak ministers, and marked by

such a series of political errors. An absolute monarch looks for talents

wherever they are to be found, and the French negotiators have always

recovered whatever the English fleets have won.

Long peace is not more unfavourable to the skill of an army, than long

security to the wisdom of a government. In times of internal commotion,

all stirring spirits come forward; the whole intellect of a nation is

called forth; good men sacrifice the comforts of a wise privacy to serve

their country; bad men press on to advance themselves; the good fall a

sacrifice, and the government is resigned into the hands of able

villains. When, on the contrary, every thing has long been safe, as is

the case in England, politics become an established trade; to which a

certain cast are regularly born and bred. They are bred to it as others

are to the navy, to the law, or to the church; with this wide

difference, that no predisposing aptitude of talents has been consulted,

and no study of the profession is required. It is fine weather; the ship

is heavy laden; she has a double and treble allowance of officers and

supernumeraries,—men enough on board, but no seamen; still it is fine

weather, and as long as it continues so the ship sails smoothly, and

every thing goes on as well as if Christopher Columbus himself had the

command. Changes are made in the equipage; the doctor and the pilot take

each other's places; the gunner is made cook, and the cook gunner; it

may happen, indeed, that he may charge the guns with peas, and shot them

with potatoes,—what matters it while there is no enemy at hand?

[13] Spaniard! But is he wishing to recommend a Cortes, by insinuating

that it would strengthen the power of the crown?—TR.

[14] A committee chosen from the house of commons.—TR.

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