For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by the _same

undeniable_ evidence, as he shews the _creation_ to be his work; if he

can make himself as visible in a _particular extraordinary_ manner, as

he is by his _general_ and _ordinary_ providence; then, tho’ we are as

unqualified to judge of the mysteries of a _revelation_, as we are to

judge of the mysteries in _creation_ and _providence_; yet we may be as

fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation

to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as

for denying a general providence.

_Adam_, _Noah_, _Abraham_, and _Moses_, were very incompetent judges,

of the reasons on which the particular revelations made to them were

founded; but this did not hinder their sufficient assurance, that such

revelations came from God, because they were proved to come from God in

the same manner, as the creation is proved to be the work of God.

And as _Adam_ and _Noah_ must see every thing wonderful, mysterious,

and above their comprehensions, in those new worlds into which they

were introduced by God; so they could no more expect, that he should

require nothing of them, but what they would enjoin themselves, than

that their own _frame_, the _nature_ of the creation, the _providence_

of God, or the _state_ of human life, should be exactly as they would

have it.

And if their posterity will let no _messages_ from heaven, no

_prophesies_ and _miracles_ persuade them, that God can call them to

any duties, but such as they must enjoin themselves; or to the belief

of any doctrines, but such as their own minds can suggest; nor to any

methods of changing their present state of weakness and disorder for

a happy immortality, but such as suit their own _taste_, _temper_,

and way of reasoning; it is because they are grown senseless of the

mysteries of creation and providence with which they are surrounded,

and forget the awful prerogative of infinite wisdom, over the weakest,

lowest rank of intelligent beings.

* And as we can only know what is worthy of God in creation, by knowing

what he has created; so we can no other way know what is worthy of God

to be revealed, but by a revelation. And he that pretends independently

of any relation, to shew _how_, and in what manner God ought to make

a revelation worthy of himself, is as great a _visionary_, as he that

should pretend independently of the creation, or without learning any

thing from it, to shew how God ought to have proceeded in it, to make

it worthy of himself. For as God alone, knows how to create worthy of

himself, and nothing can possibly be proved to be worthy to be created

by him, but because he has already created it; so God alone knows

what is worthy of himself in a revelation, and nothing can possibly

be proved worthy to be revealed by him, but because he has already

revealed it.

Hence we may see how little this _writer_ is governed by the _reason_

and _nature_ of things, who proceeds upon this as an undeniable

principle, that we could not know a revelation to be divine, unless we

knew, antecedently to revelation, what God could teach or require of

us by it. Thus, says he, “Were we not capable by our own reason of

knowing what the divine goodness could command, or forbid his creatures,

antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the

true instituted religion, from the _many_ false ones.”¹

¹ Page 66.

Just as wild and visionary, as if it was said, Were we not capable

by our reason of knowing what kind or orders of beings God _ought_

to create _independently_ of any thing we learn from the creation, we

could never prove this or that creation to proceed from him. Did we

not, antecedently to facts and experience, know by our own reason what

ought to be the method and manner of divine providence, we could never

prove that the providence which governs nations and persons is a divine

providence.

Again, He proceeds to shew, that a revelation from God cannot contain

any thing, but what human reason can prove from the nature of things;

because if God could require any thing more of us, than what our own

reason could thus prove, he must require _without_ reason, and then

there is an end of all religion.

Now this argument proceeds thus; If God does not act according to

the _measure_ of _human_ reason, he cannot act according to _reason

itself_. If he requires any more of us, than what we _think_ the nature

of things requires of us, then he cannot act according to the nature

of things. If his wisdom is in any matters of revelation _greater_ than

ours; if it is not in every thing he reveals _measurable_ by ours, it

cannot be wisdom at all, much less can it be infinite wisdom.

That is, if he is _more powerful_ than we are, he cannot be

_omnipotent_; if he is _more perfect_ than we are, he cannot be

_all perfection_; if he acts upon _greater_, or _higher_, or _more_

reasonable motives than we do, he cannot be a _reasonable_ being.

Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common

understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if

they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against

Christianity, and first principle of his _rational religion_, is in

the same state of undeniable absurdity.

Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow

from the reason and the nature of things.”¹ That is, natural religion

takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from

the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says

he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from

that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the

nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure,

otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”²

¹ Page 114.

² Page 16.

Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are ♦expressly

contained in this argument, God is all _humour_ and _caprice_, if

his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human

reason. That is, he is _without_ wisdom, _without_ reason, if his

wisdom and reason exceed ours. He has _no reason_, nor _wisdom_, if

his reason and wisdom are _infinite_.

♦ “expresly” replaced with “expressly” for consistency

_Secondly_, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly to

_atheism_. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any

thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by

human reason, then neither _creation_ nor _providence_ can be proved to

be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian

revelation.

And if every thing is _arbitrary_, whose _fitness and experience_

human reason cannot _prove_ and _explain_, then surely an _invisible

over-ruling providence_ that orders all things in a manner, and for

reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human

affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid

designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence;

that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong;

that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous;

surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.

And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly

to _atheism_, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting

divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting

a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God

cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any

thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he

cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules

our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness

prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in a _secret_ and _invisible_

manner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.

* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian

revelation, as there is in that _invisible_ providence, which all must

hold that believe a God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence,

to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often

been a rock of _atheism_ to those, who make their own reason the

measure of wisdom.

Again, Tho’ the _creation_ plainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and

goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose

fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend,

than are to be found in scripture.

If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things

in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not

others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of

a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood,

how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without)

be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹ _If, I say, this is

the right reasoning, then it may be said_, “If there are things in the

creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the

whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being

of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not

being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove

that it is the work of God?”

¹ First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.

Thus does this argument tend wholly to _atheism_, and concludes with

the same force against _creation_ and _providence_, as it does against

revelation.

Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation,

whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s

providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness

and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or

else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.

The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human

reason, rests wholly upon _such external_ evidence, as is a sufficient

proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external

evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting so _peculiar_ to

himself, as to be a _sufficient_ proof to human reason of his action;

then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external

revelation from God.

I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity

is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And

shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this

kind of proof.

1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove a _false_, or _bad_

doctrine, to be _true_ and _good_; therefore miracles, _as such_,

cannot prove the truth of any revelation.

But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good;

yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as

true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such

miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things

revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that

which he reveals.

But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.

“If, _says he_, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as

strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation

of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus

impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and

goodness?”

This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of

the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that

power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection

is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that

power which evil spirits may have; yet if we know _enough_ of it to

affirm, that the _creation_ is not the work of evil spirits; if we

can securely appeal to the creation, as _a sufficient proof_ of God’s

action and ♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as

a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.

♦ “opperation” replaced with “operation”

For, if the creation must be allowed to be the work of God,

notwithstanding any _unknown degree_ of power in evil spirits; if we

can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were no _such_ spirits;

then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if

there were no such spirits in being.

I do not ask, Whether the _same divine_ perfection is necessary

to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such

miracles as are there related, as is necessary to _create_? I do not

ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask,

Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God?

Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of

that creation? Or, Whether we are in _doubt_ or _uncertainty_ about it,

because we do not know the _degree_ of power, that may belong to evil

spirits.

For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God,

notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may

belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that the

_prophecies_ and _miracles_ recorded in scripture, are to be ascribed

to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits.

For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason

for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument

against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God,

is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being the

work of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case

than in the other.

For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by

reason of their power over it, no _miracles_ can prove the operation

of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation

itself.

For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it

can be proved that God _still presides_ over it.

And if _all that_ which is extraordinary and miraculous may be

accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is

ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof

of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that

which is _ordinary_ shall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has

been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.

Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles,

which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is

ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if

nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God’s action, nothing

created can be a proof of it.

The matter therefore stands thus: There are, and may be miracles, that

cannot be ascribed to evil spirits, without ascribing the creation to

them; and which can no more be doubted to come from God, than we can

doubt of his being the Creator of the world. There may be miracles

therefore, which, are as full a proof of the _truth_ of that which they

attest, as the creation is of the _fitness_ of that which is created.

And though the _matter_ of a revelation is to be attended to, that

we may fully understand it, and be rightly affected with it; yet the

reason of our receiving it, must rest upon that _external authority_,

which shews it to be of God.

And the authority of miracles, sufficiently plain and apparent, are of

themselves a full reason for receiving a revelation, which both as to

its _matter_ and _manner_, would not be approved by us without them.

The history of magical wonders, and extraordinary things done by evil

spirits, is no objection against the sufficiency of that proof, that

arises from miracles. For the question is not, whether nothing that

is extraordinary can be done by evil spirits, but whether nothing that

is miraculous can, be a proof of its being done by God. For these two

cases are very consistent. It may be very possible for evil spirits, to

do things extraordinary in _some circumstances_, as ♦where people enter

into contracts with them, and resign themselves up to their power, and

yet that miracle may in _other circumstances_, be a sufficient proof of

their being done by God.

♦ “were” replaced with “where”

And as miracles are the highest and most undeniable evidence of the

truth and divinity of any external revelation; so Christianity stands

fully distinguished from all other religions, by the highest and most

undeniable evidences; since it has all the proof that the _highest

state_ of miracles can give, and every other religion is without any

support from them.

And though this writer, with a boldness worthy of himself, often

puts all _traditional religion_ upon a level; yet he might have shewn

himself as much a friend to truth as sobriety, by asserting, that all

_arguments_ are equally conclusive, all _tempers_ equally virtuous,

all _designs_ equally honest, and all _histories_ and _fables_ equally

supported by evidences of fact.

To give you one instance more of this writer’s extravagant and

inconsistent notions.

He makes _reason_, or _natural religion_, to be God’s _internal

revelation_, differing _only_ from _external revelation in the manner

of its being communicated_. He rejects _external revelation_ as

unworthy of God, because it has not been sufficiently made known at

_all times_, and in _all places_; yet he sets up an internal revelation,

as worthy of God, which has never been made known to any _one man_ of

any _time_ or _place_ in the world. For what one man ever knew that

_reason_ was God’s _internal revelation_, to which nothing could be

added by any external revelation?

It is a mighty complaint with our author against Christianity, that

so much happiness should be deferred till the time of _Tiberius_, and

that it should be communicated to no greater a part of the world, than

Christianity hath been. But is not this a _judicious_ complaint in

the mouth of a person, that is setting up a religion, that has been

communicated to no body but himself.

I know nothing that can be said for our author, in excuse of so much

confusion and self-contradiction, unless it be the particular hardships

of his _sect_. The _free-thinking few_, he says, _are forced into

an outward compliance_; and that which _forces_ a man into a state

of hypocrisy, may force him into a great deal of confusion and

self-contradiction.

To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the

several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that

it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of

the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of

us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of

reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.

CHAPTER IV.

_Of the state and nature of reason, as it is in man; and how its

perfection in matters of religion is to be known._

THIS writer and others, who take to themselves the names of

_free-thinkers_, make their court to the world, by pretending to

vindicate the right that all men have, to judge and act according to

their own reason. Though, I think, the world has no more to thank them

for on this account, than if they had pretended to assert the right

that every man has, to see _only_ with his _own eyes_, or to hear

_only_ with his _own ears_.

For their own reason always did, does, and ever will, govern rational

creatures, in every thing they determine, either in speculation or

practice. It is not a matter of _duty_ for men to use their own reason,

but of _necessity_: and it is as impossible to do otherwise, as for a

being that cannot act but from choice, to act without choice.

Man is under the same necessity of acting from his own choice, that

_matter_ is of not acting at all; and a being, whose principle of

action is reason and choice, can no more act without it, or contrary

to it, than an extended being can be without extension.

All men therefore are equally reasonable in this respect, that they are,

and must be, by a _necessity_ of nature, equally directed and governed

by their own reason and choice.

* The dispute therefore betwixt Christians and _unbelievers_,

concerning reason, is not, whether men are to use their _own reason_,

any more than whether they are to see with their _own eyes_; but

whether every man’s reason must needs guide him, by its _own light_, or

must cease to guide him, as soon as it guides him by a light borrowed

from revelation? This is the true state of the question, not whether

reason is to be followed, but when it is _best_ followed? Not whether

it is to be our guide, but how it may be made our _safest guide_?

* The _free-thinkers_, therefore, rather appeal to the passions, than

reason of the people, when they represent the clergy and Christianity

as enemies to reason, and themselves as friends and advocates for the

use of reason.

* For Christians oppose unbelievers, not because they _reason_, but

because they reason _ill_. They receive revelation, not to suppress the

natural power, but to give new and heavenly light to their reason; not

to take away their right of judging for themselves, but to secure them

from false judgments.

Christians therefore do not differ from unbelievers in the _constant

use_ of their reason, but in the _manner_ of using it: as _virtuous_

men differ from _rakes_, not in their desire of happiness, but in their

manner of seeking it.

It appears from what has been said, that every man’s own reason is

his only principle of action, and that he must judge according to it,

whether he receives, or rejects revelation.

Now although every man is to judge according to the light of his own

reason, yet his reason has very little light that can be called its

own. For, as we derive our nature from our parents, so that which

we generally call _natural knowledge_, or the light of nature, is a

knowledge and light that is made natural to us, by the same authority,

which makes a certain language, certain customs, and modes of behaviour,

natural to us.

Nothing seems to be our own, but a bare capacity to be instructed, a

nature fitted for any impressions; as liable to be made a _Hottentot_,

by being born among Hottentots, as to be a _Christian_, by being born

among Christians.

It is not my intention by this to signify, that there is not a good and

evil, right and wrong founded in the nature of things: but only to shew,

that we find out this right and wrong, not by any inward strength, that

our natural reason of itself affords, but by such external means, as

people are taught articulate language, or the rules of civil life.

Men do not prefer virtue to vice, from a philosophical contemplation of

the fitness of the one, and the unfitness of the other; but because it

is a judgment as early in their minds, as their knowledge of the words,

virtue and vice.

And it can no more be reasonably affirmed, that our knowledge of God

and divine things, our opinions of the excellency of this, or that

virtue, and of the immortality of our souls, are the effects of our

natural light; than it can be reasonably affirmed, that our living in

society, and our articulate language are owing to the light of nature.

For, as all mankind find themselves in this state before any reasoning

about it; as education, and human authority have taught us language,

and accustomed us to the rules and manners of a social life: so

education, and the same authority, have planted in our minds, certain

notions of God and divine things, and formed us to a belief of our

soul’s immortality, and the expectation of another life.

And mankind are no more left to find out a God, or the fitness of

virtue, by their own reason, than they are left by their own reason, to

find out who are their parents, to find out the fitness of speaking an

articulate language.

Now if this is the state of reason, as it is in man; if this is all the

light that we have from our own nature, a bare capacity of receiving

good or bad impressions, right or wrong opinions and sentiments,

according to the state of the world we fall into; then we are but

poorly furnished, to assert the _absolute perfection_ of our own reason.

If our light is little more than the opinions and customs of those

amongst whom we live, and it be so hard for a man to arrive at a

greater wisdom, than the common wisdom of the _country_ which gave him

birth and education; how unreasonably do we appeal to the perfection

of our reason, against the _necessity_ and _advantage_ of divine

revelation?

* If we are nothing without the assistance of men; if we are a kind of

foolish, helpless animals, ’till education and experience have revealed

to us the wisdom and knowledge of our fellow-creatures; shall we think

ourselves too wise and full of our own light, to be farther enlightened

with a wisdom revealed to us by God himself?

This gentleman, speaking of education, saith, “Education is justly

esteemed a second nature; and its force is so strong, that few can

wholly shake off its prejudices, even in things unreasonable and

unnatural.”

All that I shall add to this account, is, that we are by the condition

of human life, necessarily subjected to this _second nature_, and

cannot avoid coming under its power.

And here let me ask this pleader for the sufficiency of the light of

nature, how those that resign themselves up to the light of their _own

nature_, shall know, whether it is their _first_, or their _second_

nature that directs them?

Here are, it seems, _two natures_; they may be as different as good and

evil; yet as they are both _natures_, both _internal light_, how shall

a man know which he follows? He does not know which was first, or why

he should call one first, and the other second; they are both internal,

and without any thing to distinguish them. And as he is not to resist

the motions of nature, or stifle its directions; so he must be as

obedient to the directions of the second, as of the first nature,

because he does not perceive their difference, nor has any means to

distinguish their operations.

He therefore that asserts the light of nature to be a sufficient

unerring guide in divine matters, ought either to shew, that our

_second_ nature is as _safe_ a guide as the first; or that though it

is nature, yet it has no _natural powers_ over us.

For since every man is _necessitated_ to take upon him a second nature,

which he does not _know_ to be a second, or _when_ it began, or _how

far_ it has proceeded, or how _contrary_ it is to his first nature; he

that would prove the light of nature to be so perfect, that nothing can

be added to it, is obliged to prove, that our second nature, which we

receive by education, has the same degree of perfection. For so far as

our second nature is different from the first, so far it has changed

the first; and if we are to follow nature exclusive of revelation,

we may take _revenge_, _self-murder_, _incontinence_, _sensuality_,

_pride_, _self-conceit_, and a _contempt_ of all things sacred, to be

the true dictates of nature.

For it often happens to people, to be thus educated; so if education

is a second nature, and nature is to be esteemed a _true_ and _perfect_

guide; a man thus educated, has all his vices made so many glorious

laws of nature; and thro’ the strength of his natural light, he

condemns humility, self-denial, and devotion, as foolish bigotry.

This writer says, “Natural religion, _that is, the religion of nature_,

is a perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as

the highest capacities, and carries its own evidence with it, those

internal, inseparable marks of truth.¹ _But if education is a |second

nature|, and, as this writer affirms, |has the force of a second nature

even in things unreasonable and unnatural|; then this second nature

has not only its natural religion, which is also |a perpetual standing

rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highest capacities; which

carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of

truth|; but it may also have a natural religion, both |unreasonable and

unnatural|; since education has the force of nature even in things of

this kind._”

¹ Page 243.

Again: If education has this force of nature even in things

unreasonable and unnatural; if it is also absolutely necessary for all

men to come under the power of some second nature; what can be more

vain, than to pretend to state the light, or rectitude of human nature,

since it must be for the most part in every man, as the uncertainty,

variety, happiness or unhappiness of education has rendered it?

And our author can no more tell, what man would be without education,

or what nature would do for those who had no foreign instruction, than

he can tell what sort of beings dwell in the moon. And yet he that does

not know this, how can he know what the light of nature is in itself?

* Again to declare the light of nature so perfect, as to be

incapable of all improvement even by divine revelation, is no less an

extravagance, than to declare the education of mankind to be perfect in

the same degree.

* For if nature not only wants, but cannot possibly avoid education;

if this necessary unavoidable education becomes another nature,

undiscernible from the first; then nothing can possibly be affirmed of

the perfection of the light of nature, but what must be affirmed in the

same degree of the perfection of education. And he that affirms that

mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the

same sufficient, perfect light of nature, must affirm, that mankind

have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same

perfect, unerring education.

* When therefore it is just, for all people to abide by the absolute

perfection of their education, the infallible light of their second

nature, as the unerring standard, of all that is moral, religious, and

divine; then it may be just to appeal to the natural light of all men,

of all ages, and all places, as a sufficient teacher of all that ought,

or ought not to be a matter of religion.

* For till it can be shewn, that men are not liable to a second nature

from education; the state of nature must differ all over the world,

and in every age of the world, just as the light, and advantages of

education, have differed in the several parts, and ages of the world.

* In a word, the religious and moral light of our first nature, is just

as great as the first strength of infants; and the religious and moral

light of our second nature, is just as perfect as our education, and

as much of our own growth, as the first language that we are taught to

speak.

May not therefore one justly wonder, what it is that could lead any

people into an imagination of the absolute perfection of human reason?

There seems no more in the state of mankind, to betray a man into this

fancy, than to persuade him, that the reason of infants is absolutely

perfect. For sense and experience, are as full and strong a proof

against one, as against the other.

But it must be said for these writers, that they decline all arguments

from facts and experience, to give a better account of human nature;

but with the same justice, as if a man was to lay aside the authority

of history, to give you a truer account of the life of _Alexander_.

Their objection against revelation is founded upon the pretended

sufficiency and perfection of human reason, to teach all men all that

is wise, and holy, and divine, in religion. But how do they prove this

perfection of human reason? Do they appeal to mankind as proofs of it?

Do they produce any body of men in this or any other age, that without

any assistance from revelation, have attained to this perfection of

religious knowledge? This is not so much as pretended to; the history

of such men is entirely wanting. And yet the want of such a fact

as this, has even the force of demonstration against this pretended

sufficiency of natural reason.

Because it is a matter not capable of any other kind of proof, but

must be admitted as certainly true, or rejected as certainly false,

according as fact and experience bear witness for or against it.

* For an enquiry about the light, and strength, and sufficiency of

reason, to guide and preserve men in the knowledge and practice of

true religion, is a question, as _solely_ to be resolved by _fact and

experience_, as if the enquiry was about the _shape_ of man’s body,

or the _number_ of his senses. And to talk of a light and strength of

reason, natural to man, which fact and experience have never yet proved,

is as egregious nonsense, as to talk of natural senses, or faculties of

his body, which fact and experience have never yet discovered.

From the bare consideration of a rational soul in union with a body,

and bodily passions, we can neither prove man to be _strong_ nor _weak_,

_good_ nor _bad_, _sickly_ nor _sound_, _mortal_ nor _immortal_: all

these qualities must discover themselves, as the _eye_ discovers its

degree of _sight_, the _hand_ its degree of _strength_.

To enquire therefore, whether men have by nature light sufficient to

guide, and keep them in the true religion; is the same appeal to fact

and experience, as to enquire, whether men are _mortal_, _sickly_, or

_sound_: or how far they can _see_ and _hear_.

* As therefore these gentlemen are, in this debate, without any proof,

or even pretence of proof, from experience, so their cause ought to be

looked upon to be as vain and romantic, as if they had asserted, that

men have senses naturally fitted to hear sounds, and see objects at all

distances, tho’ experience has, from the creation to this time, proved

the quite contrary.

For he that asserts the sufficiency of reason, to guide men in matters

of religion, is not only without any positive proof from experience on

his side, but has the history of all ages, for near six thousand years,

fully demonstrating the quite contrary.

If some other enquirers into human nature, should affirm, that there is

in mankind a _natural instinct_, sufficient to make every man, at all

times, love every other man, with the _same degree_ of affection, as he

loves himself; I suppose such an opinion would be thought too absurd to

need any confutation. And yet all the absurdity of it would lie in this,

that it affirmed something of the _sufficiency_ of a natural quality in

man, which could not be supported by a single instance of any one man,

and was contrary to the experience and history of every age of the

world.

Now this is exactly the case of these gentlemen: their opinion

has neither more or less absurdity in it: they only affirm such a

sufficiency of reason to be natural to all men, as cannot be supported

by a single instance of any one man, that ever lived, and is fully

contradicted by the experience and history of every age since the

creation of the world.

By what has been said, I hope the reader will observe, that this

enquiry about the perfection or imperfection, the strength or weakness,

of reason in man, as to matters of religion, rests _wholly_ upon fact

and experience; and that therefore all speculative reasonings upon

it, are as idle and visionary, as a sick man’s dreams about health;

and are as wholly to be rejected, as any speculative arguments that

should pretend to prove, in spite of all facts and experience, the

_immortality_, and _unalterable_ state of human bodies.

Our author himself seems sensible, that the argument drawn from facts

and experience, pressed hard upon his cause; and therefore has given

the best answer to it, he can yet think of.

“It cannot, _says he_, be imputed to any defect in the light of nature,

that the _Pagan_ world ran into idolatry; but to their being entirely

governed by priests, who pretended communication with their gods, and

to have thence their revelations, which they imposed upon the credulous,

as divine oracles.”

The justness of this assertion will fully appear by the following

illustration.

“It cannot be imputed to any defect in the health and soundness of

man’s natural constitution, that the world has, in all ages, been

over-run with distempers; but to their being entirely governed by

physicians, who pretended to I know not what secret knowledge of

medicines, which they imposed upon the sickly, as infallible remedies.”

For, as a perfect state of health, conscious to itself of a sufficiency

of natural strength to keep clear of all diseases, seems to be out

of all danger from physicians; so had mankind been ever conscious

to themselves, of a sufficient natural knowledge of what is true or

false in religion; such _as enabled men of the meanest capacity to

distinguish between religion and superstition_,¹ what _room_ had there

been for frauds and impostures herein?

¹ Page 3.

“Can the superstition of the _Pagans_ be imputed to any defect or

insufficiency in the light of reason, when it was wholly owing to

their abandoning that divine light; and in defiance of it, running into

senseless traditions?”¹

¹ Page 37.

But how came it, that they ran into senseless traditions? What was

it that admitted these traditions as just and good? Why, it was that

faculty which judges of every thing, and which this writer recommends

as an unerring guide. And to say, a man’s superstition is not owing to

any defect or weakness of his reason, but to his admitting senseless

traditions, is as vain, as to say, a man’s false reasoning is not owing

to any weakness of his reason, but to his proceeding upon foolish and

absurd arguments.

He proceeds thus: “It is certainly no good argument against the

sufficiency of the divine light of nature, that men could not err,

except they left it, and followed vain traditions.”¹

¹ Second Address, page 39.

This observation has just the same sense and acuteness in it, as

if it had been said, _It is certainly no good argument against_ the

sufficiency of the divine healthfulness _of human nature, that men

could not be sickly, except they left it_, and _fell into various

distempers: or, against the_ sufficiency of the divine strength of

natural courage, that men could not be timorous, till they left it, and

followed vain fears. For, to prove that reason is sufficient, because

every thing that is absurd, is contrary to reason, is like proving our

healthfulness to be sufficient, because all distempers are contrary to

it: or our courage to be sufficient, because fears and cowardice are

contrary to it.

Besides, how is it that men leave their reason? Why, just as ignorant

men leave their knowledge; as dull people leave their wit, or cowards

leave their courage. The first part of this paragraph tells you of a

sufficiency of the divine light of nature: well; What has this divine

light of nature done? What sufficient effects has it had? Why, it has

covered all the world with darkness.

Again: Supposing that all mankind, even the wisest nations, have for

this six thousand years been thus imposed upon, not knowing how to

distinguish idle tales and senseless traditions from true religion; is

not this a noble foundation for this writer to build the _sufficiency

of the divine light of nature upon_? For supposing it had been in the

greatest degree insufficient, what other effect could have followed

from it, but only this, that _all mankind_, even the _wisest nations_,

should have been over-run with error? And is it not strange, that

effects should bear no proportion to their causes; that the same things

should follow from the _sufficiency_ of the divine light of nature,

which must have followed from its _greatest insufficiency_?

* And must not the enemies of _reason_ and _free-thinking_ be forced to

confess, that this writer hath chosen an excellent guide for himself;

since he so fully acknowledges, that no one yet has been rightly guided

by it? Must not his present undertaking be granted to be the effect of

cool and sober deliberation, since it only calls people of _all_, even

the _meanest capacities_, to such an use of their reason, as the wisest

of men and nations have always been strangers to?

CHAPTER V.

_Shewing that all the |mutability| of our tempers, the |disorders|

of our passions, the |corruption| of our hearts, all the

|reveries| of the imagination, all the |contradictions| and

|absurdities| that are to be found in human life, and human

opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption,

and absurdities of |human reason|._

IT is the intent of this chapter to shew, that altho’ common language

ascribes a variety of faculties and principles to the soul, imputing

this action to the blindness of our _passions_, that to the inconstancy

of our _tempers_; one thing to the heat of our _imagination_, another

to the coolness of our _reason_; yet, in strictness of truth, every

thing that is done by us, is the action and operation of our reason,

and is to be ascribed to it, as the sole principle from whence it

proceeded, and by which it is governed and effected.

And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different

degrees of love and aversion; as the different degrees of wit, parts,

good nature, or ill nature, are in man.

And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all

men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as

different in reason, as they are in these qualities.

As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as

hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences;

so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences.

And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but

frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating

under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the

reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange

inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another.

So that when we talk of _human reason_, or a reason _common_ to mankind,

we talk of as _various_, _uncertain_, and _unmeasurable_ a thing,

as when we talk of a _love_, an _aversion_, a _good nature_, or _ill

nature_, common to mankind; for these qualities admit of no variation,

uncertainty, or mutability, but such as they directly receive from the

_reason_ of mankind.

For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and

makes them to be just what they are, as it is the reason of man that

demonstrates a mathematical proposition.

Was our reason steady, there would be just the same steadiness and

regularity in our tempers; did not reason fall into follies and

absurdities, we should have nothing foolish or absurd in our love

or aversion. For every humour, every kind of love or aversion, is as

strictly the _action_ or _operation_ of our reason, as judgment is the

act of our reason.

And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers

and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason

of man.

So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our

reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to

be imputed to it.

A laudable good nature, or a laudable aversion, is only reason acting

in a _certain manner_: a criminal good nature, or a criminal aversion,

is nothing else but reason acting in another certain manner.

But still it is reason, or our understanding that is the _only

agent_ in our bad passions, as well as good passions; and as much the

_sole agent_ in all our passions and tempers, as in things of mere

speculation.

So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the

state of human tempers and passions; and right reason in morality, is

nothing else but right love, and right aversion.

All _that_ therefore which we commonly call the weakness, blindness,

and disorder of our _passions_, is in reality the weakness, blindness,

and disorder of our _reason_. For a right love, or wrong love, denotes

only reason acting in a _certain, particular_ manner.

So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill

nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common

to mankind.

For the distinction of our reason from our passions, is only a

distinction in language, made at pleasure; and is no more real than the

_desire_ and _inclination_ are really different from the _will_. All

therefore that is weak and foolish in our passions, is the weakness and

folly of our reason; all the inconstancy and caprice of our humours and

tempers, is the caprice and inconstancy of our reason.

It is not properly _avarice_ that makes men sordid; it is not

_ambition_ that makes them restless; it is not _bribery_ that makes

men sell their consciences; it is not _interest_ that makes them lye,

and cheat, and perjure themselves. What is it therefore? Why it is

that _absolutely perfect_ faculty, which our author sets up as the

_unerring_ standard of all that is _wise_, _holy_, and _good_; it is

_reason_, the _use of reason, human reason_, that does all this.

For whether any thing be fit to be done, it is as he says, “reason

alone which must judge; as the eye is the sole judge of what is visible,

the ear of what is audible, so reason of what is reasonable.”

Every thing therefore that is done, every thing that is chosen in human

life before any thing else, is as strictly chosen by reason, as every

thing that is seen, is seen by the eye; and every thing that is heard,

is heard by the ear.

To suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by passions or

tempers, but is not the _immediate agent_ of all that is done by them,

is as absurd, as to suppose that reason permits itself to be governed

by the _hand_ when it is writing falsly, or the _tongue_, when it is

talking profanely, but it is not the immediate, direct agent of all

that is written and spoken by them.

* _Brutes_ are incapable of immorality, because none of their actions

are the actions of _reason_: every thing therefore that is immorality,

baseness, or villainy in us, must be the act of our reason, otherwise

it could no more be immoral, than the actions of brutes.

* If therefore, as this author often saith, reason be the only faculty

that distinguisheth us from brutes; it necessarily follows, that those

irregularities, whether of humour, passions, or tempers, which cannot

be imputed to brutes, must be solely attributed to that faculty by

which we are distinguished from brutes; and consequently, every thing

that is foolish, vain, shameful, false, treacherous, and base, must be

the acts of our reason; since if they were the acts of any thing else,

they could have no more vanity, falseness, or baseness, than hunger and

thirst.

It is not my intent to condemn our common language, which talks of

reason and the passions, as if they were as different as a _governor_

and his _subjects_.

These forms of speech are very intelligible and useful, and give great

life and ornament to all discourses upon morality.

But when persons ascribe to reason, as a _distinct faculty_ of human

nature, I know not what _absolute perfection_, making it as immutable,

and incapable of any addition or improvement, as God himself: it is

necessary to consider reason, not as it is represented in common

language, but as it is in reality in itself.

Notwithstanding therefore in common language, our passions, and the

effects of them, are usefully distinguished from our reason, I have

here ventured to shew, that all the disorders of human nature, are in

effect the disorders of human reason, and that all the perfection or

imperfection of our passions is the perfection or imperfection of our

reason.

Our follies and absurdities of every kind are as necessarily to be

ascribed to our reason, as the _first immediate_ cause of them, as our

wisdom and discretion are to be ascribed to it in that degree.

The difference between reason assenting to the properties of a _square_,

and reason acting in motions of desire or aversion, is only this, that

in the latter case, it is reason acting under a sense of its own good

or evil, in the former case, it is reason acting under a sense of

_magnitude_.

And as the relations of magnitude, as they are the objects of our

reason, are only the objects of its assent or dissent; so good and evil,

as they are objects of our reason, are only the objects of its _desire_

or _aversion_: and as the assent or dissent, in matters of speculation,

whether right or wrong, is solely the act of our reason; so desire or

aversion, in human life, whether right or wrong, is equally the act of

our reason.

We often say, that our passions deceive us, or persuade us; but this

is no more strictly so, than when we say, our _interest_ deceived, or

a bribe blinded us. For bribes and interest are not active principles,

nor have any power of deception; it is only our reason that gives them

a false value, and prefers them to a greater good.

It is just so in what we call the deceit of our passions: they meddle

with us no more than bribes meddle with us; but that pleasurable

perception, which is to be found in certain enjoyments, is by our

reason preferred to that better good, which we might expect from

self-denial.

We say again, that our passions paint things in false colours, and

present to our minds vain appearances of happiness.

But this is no more strictly true, than when we say, ♦our _imagination_

forms castles in the air. For the imagination signifies no distinct

faculty from our reason, but only reason acting upon our _own ideas_.

♦ “out” replaced with “our”

So when our passions are said to give false colours to things, or

present vain appearances of happiness, it is only our reason acting

upon its own ideas of _good_ and _evil_, just as it acts upon its own

ideas of _architecture_, in forming castles in the air.

So that all _that_ which we call different faculties, tempers, and

passions, strictly speaking, means nothing else, but the various acts

of one and the same rational principle, which has different names,

according to the objects that it acts upon, and the manner of its

acting.

In some things it is called speculative, in others it is called

practical reason. And we may as justly think our speculative reason is

a different faculty from our practical reason, as that our aversions,

or likings, are not as fully to be ascribed to our reason, as

syllogisms and demonstrations.

* It was truly reason that made _Medea_ kill her children, that made

_Cato_ kill himself, that made Pagans offer human sacrifices to idols;

that made _Epicurus_ deny a providence, _Mahomet_ pretend a revelation;

that made some men sceptics, others bigots; some enthusiasts, others

profane; that made _Hobbes_ assert all religion to be human invention,

and _Spinosa_ to declare trees, and stones, and animals to be parts

of God; that makes free-thinkers deny freedom of will, and fatalists

exhort to a reformation of manners; that made _Vaux_ a conspirator, and

_Ludlow_ a regicide; that made _Muggleton_ a fanatic; and _Rochester_

a libertine. It was as truly reason that did all these things, as it is

reason that demonstrates mathematical propositions.

_Medea_ and _Cato_ acted as truly according to the judgment of their

reason at that time, as the confessor that chuses rather to suffer,

than deny his faith.

Had not _Medea_ and _Cato_ thought it best to do what they did, at the

time they did it, they would no more have done it than the _confessor_

would chuse to suffer rather than deny his faith, unless he had judged

best so to do.

And when we say reason governs the passions, it means no more,

than that reason governs itself; that it acts with deliberation and

attention, does not yield to its first judgments, but uses second, and

third thoughts.

So that guarding against the passions, is only guarding against its own

first judgments and opinions; that is guarding against itself.

To all this may, perhaps, be objected, that our passions arise from

bodily motions, and depend upon the state of our blood and animal

spirits, and therefore what we do under their commotions, cannot be

attributed to our reason.

It is readily granted, that the body has this share in our passions

and tempers: but then the same thing must be granted of the body,

in all the acts and operations of the mind. So that if our desires

and aversions cannot be imputed to our reason, because of the joint

operation of the animal spirits in them; no more can syllogisms and

demonstrations be attributed to our reason, because the operation of

bodily spirits concurreth in the forming of them.

For the most abstract thought, and speculation of the mind, has as

truly the _conjunct_ operation of bodily spirits, as our strongest

desires or aversions. And it is as much owing to the state of the body,

that such speculations are what they are, as it is owing to the state

of the body, that such passions are what they are.

For the motions of the bodily spirits are inseparable from, and

according to, the state and action of the mind: when reason is in

speculation of a trifle, they concur but weakly; when reason speculates

intensely, their operation is increased. And sometimes the attention of

the mind is so great, and has so engaged and called in all the animal

spirits to its assistance, that the operations of our senses are

suspended, and we neither see, nor feel, till the attention of the mind

has let the spirits return to all the parts of the body.

Now will any one say, that these intense thoughts are less the acts of

the mind, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits,

than when it is acting with indifference, and so has a lesser quantity

of bodily spirits?

Yet this might as well be said, as to say, that the assent or dissent,

in speculation, is the act of our reason; but liking or disliking,

loving or hating, are not the acts of our reason, because they have a

greater concurrence of bodily spirits.

For, as the mind is in a different state when it desires good, or

fears evil, from what it is when it only compares two triangles; so

the motions of the bodily spirits, have only _such_ a difference, as

is _correspondent_ to these two states of the mind. They act and join

as much in comparing the triangles, as in the desire of good, or fear

of evil. And the mind is just as much governed by the body, in its

passions, as in its calmest contemplations.

For as the gentle operation of the animal spirits is then correspondent

to the state and action of the mind; so in all our passions, the strong

and increased motion of the animal spirits, is equally correspondent

thereto.

So that reason is no more the agent, in our tempers and passions, than

in our dry and sedate speculations.

It may happen, that a man may have as great an eagerness in solving

a mathematical problem, as another hath to obtain any great good, or

avoid any great evil.

But may it therefore be said, that it is not reason that solves the

problem, because the bodily spirits are so active in it?

To draw now some plain consequences from the foregoing account.

_First_, If reason be the _universal agent_ in the natural man; if all

the difference among _such_ men, is only such a difference as reason

makes, then nothing can be more extravagant, than to affirm any thing

concerning the degree of perfection, or imperfection of reason, as

_common_ to man. It is as wild and romantic, as to pretend to state the

measure of folly and wisdom, of fear and courage, of pride and humility,

of good humour and ill-humour, _common_ to mankind: for as these

states of the mind, are only so many different states of reason; so no

uncertainty belongs to them, but what, in the _same degree_, belongs to

_reason_.

_Secondly_, Granting that all matters of religion must be agreeable

to _right, unprejudiced_ reason; yet this could be no ground for

receiving nothing in religion, but what _human_ reason could prove

to be necessary; for _human_ reason is no more _right, unprejudiced_

reason, than a sinner is _sinless_, or a man an _angel_.

Granting again, that a man may go a great way towards rectifying his

reason, and laying aside its prejudices; yet no particular man can be a

_better judge_ of the rectitude of his _own reason_, than he is of the

rectitude of his own _self-love_, the brightness of his own _parts_,

and the depth of his own _judgment_.

For there is nothing to deceive him in _self-love_, in the opinion of

his _own merit_, _wit_, and _judgment_, but what has the same power to

deceive him, in the opinion of his own reason. And if, as our author

says, “It be the fate of most sects to be the fondest of their ugliest

brats.”¹ None seem so inevitably exposed to this fatality, as those

whose religion is to have no form, but such as it receives from their

own hearts.

¹ Page 184.

_Thirdly_, A man that has his religion to chuse, and with this precious

privilege, that he need not allow any thing to be matter of religion,

but what his own reason can prove to be so, is in as fair a way to be

governed by his _passions_, as he that has his _condition_ of life to

chuse, with the liberty of taking that which his own reason directs him

to.

Does any one suppose, that nothing but _reason_ would direct him in

the choice of his condition? Or that he would make the better choice,

because he proceeded upon this maxim, that nothing could be right, but

that which was agreeable to his _own reason_? Or that his tempers, his

prejudices, his self-love, his passions, his partiality, would have no

influence upon his choice, because he had resigned himself up to his

_own reason_?

Now it is just the same in the choice of a religion, as in the choice

of a condition of life: as it is not a matter of speculation, but

of _good_ and _evil_; so if it is left to be determined by our _own

reason_, it rather appeals to our _tempers_, than employs our reason;

and to resign ourselves up to our own reason, to tell us what ought, or

ought not to be a matter of religion, is only resigning ourselves up to

our tempers, ♦to take what we _like_, and refuse what we _dislike_ in

religion.

♦ removed duplicate “to”

* In a word; when _self-love_ is a proper arbitrator betwixt a man and

his adversary; when _revenge_ is a just judge of meekness; when _pride_

is a true lover of humility; when _falshood_ is a teacher of truth;

when lust is a fast friend of chastity; when the _flesh_ leads to the

spirit; when _sensuality_ delights in self-denial; when _partiality_

is a promoter of equity; when the _palate_ can taste the difference

between sin and holiness; when the _hand_ can feel the truth of a

proposition; then may _human reason_ be a proper arbitrator between God

and man, the sole, final, just judge of all that ought, or ought not to

be a matter of a _holy_, _divine_, and _heavenly_ religion.

_Lastly_, If this be the state of reason, then to pretend, that our

reason, is too perfect to be governed by any thing but its own light,

is the same extravagance, as to pretend, that our love is too pure to

be governed by any thing but its own inclinations, our hatred too just

to be governed by any thing but its own motions. For if all that is

base and criminal in love, all that is unjust and wicked in hatred, is

to be imputed to our reason; then no perfection can be ascribed to our

reason, but such as is to be ascribed to our love and hatred.

An Extract from Mr. LAW’s

SERIOUS ANSWER

To Dr. TRAPP’s Four Sermons,

On the Sin, Folly, and Danger of being righteous over-much.

1. * MIGHT I follow the _bent_ of my own mind, I should be wholly

employed in setting forth the infinite love of God to mankind in

Christ Jesus, and endeavouring to draw all men to the belief and

acknowledgment of it. This _one great mercy_ of God, which makes the

_one_ happiness of all mankind, so justly deserves all our thoughts

and meditations, so highly enlightens, and improves every mind that

is attentive to it, so removes all the evils of this present world, so

sweetens every state of life, so inflames the heart with the love of

every divine and human virtue, that he is no small loser, whose mind is,

either by writing or reading, detained from the view and contemplation

of it.

2. When the mystery of divine love was first manifested to the world,

it produced its proper effects. It put an end to all _selfishness and

division; for all that believed were of one heart and one spirit, and

had all things common_.¹ And indeed, under the real influence and full

belief of this great mystery of divine love, there seems to be no room

left for any thing else amongst Christians, but returns of love to God,

and flowing out of love towards one another.

¹ Acts ii. 44.

3. * It is so difficult to enter into controversy without being, or at

least seeming in some degree unkind to the person one opposes, that it

is with great reluctance I have entered upon my present undertaking;

having nothing more deeply riveted in my heart, than an universal love

and kindness for all men, and more especially for those whom God has

called to be my fellow-labourers, in promoting the salvation of mankind.

But however unwilling, yet I find myself obliged to consider and lay

open many grievous faults in the Doctor’s discourse; and to shew to

all Christians, that the dearest interests of their souls are much

endangered by it.

4. * And this I must do with great plainness and sincerity in the love

of truth, and under the direction of charity, saying nothing in the

spirit of an _adversary_, sparing nothing thro’ _respect of persons_,

sacrificing nothing to the taste or temper of the world, but setting

every thing in that naked light, in which the Spirit of God represents

it to my own mind.

5. The Doctor undertakes to stir up, and alarm mankind with the _sin_,

_folly_ and _danger_ of being _righteous over-much_. The text from

which he has the title of his discourses is very unhappily chosen,

and must be looked upon rather as a severe reproach, than any kind of

justification of it. The text is indeed in the writings of _Solomon_,

and as it stands there, has no hurt in it; because as the royal

preacher sometimes introduces fools, and sometimes infidels making

their speeches, so there is a necessity of supposing that to be the

case in the Doctor’s text; not only from the context which plainly

shews there are two persons introduced, the one _for_, the other

_against_ righteousness; but because the words, otherwise, cannot

be taken in a sense that is tolerable, or consistent with the common

_notions_ of piety.

6. Is it not therefore strange, that the Doctor should think it right,

to limit, explain, and model both the letter and spirit of the gospel

by such a saying in the writings of _Solomon_ as must be ascribed to

the spirit and mouth of an infidel? Is it not stranger, that such a

text, so offensive to piety, should have not only been so long dwelt

upon in the Doctor’s three churches, but sent abroad into the world, as

a proper key to all the practical sayings, parables, and doctrines of

Jesus Christ?

7. Supported by this text, the Doctor endeavours to deter and fright

Christians from the sin, folly and danger of being righteous over-much,

and from what he calls the baneful plague of enthusiasm. But then it is

matter of just complaint, that he does all this, without ever shewing

in any part of his discourse, wherein true righteousness, or the right

and sober spirit of piety consists. And if he supposed all his readers

to be already well acquainted with the nature, and extent of Christian

holiness, there would then have been little occasion for his present

undertaking.

8. But the Doctor overlooks this important matter. He neither supposes

them to have this knowledge, nor endeavours to help them to it; but in

a flow of zeal, reflects at large upon all attempts towards a piety,

that is not _modern, common_, and according to the present fashion of

religion in the world. Thus, you every where find severe reflections

cast upon pretenders to piety, pretended spiritualists; great

accusations of excesses, extraordinaries and by-paths; but no where a

word or a hint, in favour of those, who would only be so extraordinary,

and so much out of the _common_ paths, as the blessed saints and

martyrs of the primitive church were. No where are _such people_ told,

that he wishes them _God speed_, that _their zeal_ is much wanted both

amongst _clergy_ and _laity_, and that the gospel suffers because we

know not where to find living examples of its purity and perfection.

No where are they told, that he writes not against them, that he loves

their spirit, and should be glad to add new fervours to it: nor what

Christian perfection is, what a holiness of body, soul and spirit it

requires; how powerfully all are called to it, how earnestly all ought

to aspire after it, and how sadly mistaken, what enemies to themselves

they are, who for the sake of any, or all the things in the world, die

less purified and perfect, than they might have been.

9. If we had to do with _one single_ person sincerely good, yet seeming

to carry matters too high in some part of his duty, and intended

privately to dissuade him from such heights; yet even this, thus

privately done and to a person of piety, would be exceeding _dangerous_

and _unjustifiable_; unless we took the utmost care at the same time,

to _keep up_ the pious zeal of his mind, to shew him wherein true

perfection consisted, and to encourage his utmost endeavours after it.

But if this caution, instruction and encouragement, cannot be omitted

without great hurt to religion, when we speak only to a person of piety,

and in private, about any religious _extremes_, what must be said of

the Doctor’s conduct? Who to the world dead in trespasses and sin,

preaches up the _sin_, _folly_ and _danger_ of _being_ righteous

over-much? To the world _eating and drinking and rising up to play_, he

harangues temperance, abstinence, mortification and severity of life!

To the world asleep, insensible, and careless, not only of the purity

and perfection, but of the first principles of the gospel, he boldly

and rashly approaches all appearances of holiness, that are uncommon

and extraordinary! To _no_ part of the world does he represent or

propose the _perfection_ of the gospel, or recommend it as that, which

deserves all that they can do, or suffer for the sake of it.

This, therefore, I am obliged to point out, as a _fundamental defect_

in the Doctor’s discourse, and such as renders it an evil _temptation_,

a dangerous _snare_, and fatal _delusion_ to all those who do not read

it with a full, and thorough dislike.

10. * Coldness, indifference, and a lifeless, outward compliance

with the duties of religion: a slavery to ease, softness, and

sensual pleasures: a criminal conformity to the spirit, fashions, and

corruptions of the world; unmortified passions; conniving at favourite

sin; deep roots of pride, partiality, and self-love: an unawakened

conscience; an insensibility of their corrupt, unreformed, unregenerate

state: a proneness to be content and satisfied with poor beginnings,

names and appearances of virtue; is perhaps the state of more than two

_thirds_ of those that are looked upon to be the religious amongst us.

Now the Doctor’s discourse has a direct and natural fitness to lull

all these people asleep, to ♦suppress all stirring and intentions of

amendment, to keep up and nourish every disorder of their hearts, to

increase their blindness, and awaken nothing in them, but a _hurtful

zeal_ to censure and condemn all those that are endeavouring to

practise the _uncommon_ piety of the gospel.

♦ The first line on page 144 “upon the madness, danger, and

folly of too much” appears to be extraneous and inconsistent

with the text flow, so has been removed. The catchword from

the previous page appears at the start of line two.

There is scarce a reader amongst this number of people, whether he be

_layman_ or _clergyman_, but will find this effect from the Doctor’s

instructions; he will begin to take _fresh comfort_ in his state,

to think himself _happy_ for having had no aspirings after high

improvements in piety; he will not only be content with his corruptions,

but be fixed and hardened against all _inward_ and _outward_ calls to

a solid piety; he will approve of the deadness and insensibility of his

own heart, and acquiesce in it, as his just security, from the _sin_

and _folly_ and _danger_ of being _righteous over-much_.

11. Again, others there are, I make no doubt in all parts of the

kingdom, both amongst clergy and laity, men and women, rich and poor,

whose consciences are greatly awakened, who see the general apostacy

from the religion of the gospel, whose souls are wanting and wishing

nothing so much, as to know how all that they _are_, all that they

_have_, and all that they _do_, may be one continual sacrifice, and

service of love unto God; to know how, and in what manner, and to what

extent, and by what means, they may and ought to _be perfect, even as

their Father which is in heaven is perfect_.

Now, who can help looking with _love_ and _compassion_ upon those poor

souls, longing for that which has been so long lost; asking after that,

which scarce any one will tell them any thing of, and wanting to enter

upon paths where there are few or no footsteps to be seen, nor any

travellers in motion?

Had these awakened souls lived in the first ages of the church, nay, I

may say in almost any till these very last ages of it, their zeal had

not been in vain: they could have been at no loss to know _how_ they

were to proceed in their heavenly purpose; because they would have

been immediately directed to some living examples of the perfect spirit

of the gospel, who were publicly known and acknowledged by all to be

such, who had the same undisputed right, to point out the Christian

profession, as _John_ the Baptist had to preach up _mortification_

and _self-denial_. Every age, and every sex, priests and people of all

conditions, had their known standards to resort to, where every one was

sure to be guided, assisted, and encouraged to live up to that height

of holiness.

12. But now how does the Doctor deal with this sort of people? What

_love_, _assistance_, and _encouragement_ does he reach out to them?

Why, truly, he considers them as a _deluded_, _weak_, or _hypocritical_,

or _half-thinking_ people, that disturb the Christian church with their

projects; who are to be set right by returning to the instructions of

common sense. He ridicules every step they must take in their intended

progress, by adding absurdities of his own invention to it. There is

nothing for such people throughout his whole discourse, but reproaches,

and discouragement.

Are they desirous of all that _self-denial_, all such _mortification_

of bodily appetites and sensual passions, as may best fit them to

be temples of the Holy Spirit? He ridicules them, as holding the

sinfulness of _smelling a rose_.

Do they begin to discover the _deep corruption_ of their nature,

the superficialness and weakness of their virtues, and to fear they

have as yet scarce come up to the righteousness of the _Scribes_

and _Pharisees_? He tells them “The great enemy of souls adapts his

temptations to all sorts of tempers and dispositions.” Those who are

disposed to be good and virtuous, if he cannot prevail with them to

be vicious, commonly so called, he labours to make them over virtuous,

that is vicious, tho’ not commonly so called; and so involves them in

dangers and mischiefs.

Are they such as are desirous of reforming their own lives, by bringing

all their actions to the standard of the gospel, and wholly intent upon

their own advancement in merely _practical piety_?

To these he shews, that they are in the very paths that lead, and

always did lead to _fanatic madness_.

Thus says he, “To what a height of _fanatic madness_ in _doctrines_,

as well as practice are some advanced, who set out at first with the

appearance of more than ordinary sanctity in _practice only_?” And

again, “I do say that in all ages enthusiasts have been _righteous

over-much_; they began with the last mentioned, and ended with the

other; _and is it not so now_?”

13. Further, are there others, who begin to feel the _mystery_ of

their redemption discovered in their own souls, so that they hunger

and thirst after the manifestation of the divine life in them, desiring

that Christ may be wholly formed and revealed in them, that they

may _put on_ Christ, _be_ in him _new creatures_, led by his spirit,

_growing_ in him as branches in the vine, hearing the word of God

written and spoken in their hearts, in his light _seeing_ light, and

_tasting_ in the inward man _the powers of the world to come_?

* For such as these, the Doctor has this instruction: “That there is,

says he, such a thing as the operation of the Holy Spirit upon our

souls, tho’ we cannot distinguish it from the operations of our own

minds, is not only granted, but insisted upon by all sincere and sober

Christians. But what _reason_, what _scripture_, is there for this

inward _seeing_, _hearing_, _feeling_?”

* According therefore to the Doctor’s divinity both reason and

scripture require, that the true Christian be _inwardly blind_,

inwardly _deaf_, and void of all inward _feeling_. For if neither

scripture nor reason will allow of any inward senses, then they must

both of them require an _inward insensibility_. But as scripture

from _Genesis_ to the _Revelation_, is full of proofs of these inward

senses, I shall not now produce them: I shall here only observe that

_hardness of heart_ is a well known phrase of scripture, and every

where _signifies_ some degree of _blindness_, _deafness_, and loss of

_feeling_. I suppose it will not be said that it signifies blindness,

or loss of _outward eyes_ and _ears_, or feeling: neither does it

signify a want of _human reason_, or natural _sagacity_; for _learned_,

_polite_, and _ingenious_ men, are full as subject as others to this

hardness of heart. Therefore the scripture is as open, as plain and

express in declaring _for inward senses_, as it is in declaring against

such a thing, as _hardness_ of _heart_. Hardness of heart is that to

the _inward_ senses, which a deep, or as we call it, _dead sleep_, is

to the _outward_. It keeps our inward eyes, and ears, and feeling all

locked up.

14. A broken and a contrite heart unlocks our inward senses, and makes

us see, and hear, and feel the things, which could no more be seen,

heard or felt before, than a man in a deep sleep can hear, and see, and

feel the things, that are said and done about him.

Water frozen into a rock of ice, is very different from the same water

melted, warmed, and moving under the influence of the sun and the air.

Now this difference between water _flowing_, full of _light_ and _air_,

and the same water frozen into a dark, hard rock of ice, is but a small

resemblance of the difference between a _hardened_ heart, and the _same

heart_ become broken.

15. But I return to the Doctor. His further instruction to this sort of

people stands thus. They are told by him, “that their high notions of

spiritual improvements have this effect: on the one hand, they lead to

_presumption_, on the other to _desperation_.” “He has been told, _he

says_, that some have been actually thrown into despair. They have been

made stark mad, and received into _Bedlam_ as such. _And then he cries

out_, Was the religion of Jesus Christ intended to make people mad? Is

this for the honour of Christianity?”

* I shall not here question the Doctor’s information. I shall only

observe, that when our Saviour was upon earth, there were two sorts

of _mad_ people about him; the _one sort_ ran about in disorder, tore

their cloaths and cut their own flesh; the other sort raved in malice,

threw dust into the air, stopped their ears, and cried out _crucify him,

crucify him_.

* It may be asked, which of these two sorts of state? Whose madness was

the most shocking, that of the lunatics, or that of the _High Priests_,

_Scribes_, and _Pharisees_? Those who only mangled their own bodies, or

those that thirsted after the blood of Christ, and would have no rest

till they saw his body nailed to the cross? To me the _lunatics_, seem

to be in a _less degree_ of disorder; and the reason is this, because I

see that our Saviour could heal them, but not the Priests, Scribes, and

Pharisees.

Now is it reasonable, on account of the _madness_ of these Priests,

Scribes and Doctors of the law, to say, “Is this for the honour of the

_Jewish law_? Were the _law and the prophets intended to make people

mad_?” If the Doctor knows how to excuse the law and the prophets,

tho’ these great students of them were in such a desperate state of

_madness_, then Christianity may be blameless; tho’ here and there a

Christian (so called) may be fit for _Bedlam_.

16. Again, are there others, who desire to bring the whole form of

their lives under rules of religion, to let the spirit of the gospel

give laws to the most ordinary, indifferent, innocent and lawful things

and enjoyments; so that, as the apostle speaks, _whether they eat or

drink, or whatever they do_, they may _do all to the glory of God_?

These people are told by the Doctor, that “Wholly abstaining from

things indifferent and innocent in themselves, as forbidden and

unlawful, people were in the most disordered and distempered is a

signal instance of being righteous over-much; and so on the other hand,

is making things indifferent to be necessary, and matters of duty.”

What is here said has some truth in it, and might be useful in its

proper place, and under right limitations. But as it here stands, it

is a grievous _snare_ and _deceit_ to the reader. For it is to signify

to him, that _wholly abstaining from_ things in themselves indifferent,

cannot be made a _matter_ of true religious advancement; but is a

blameable instance of excess. If the Doctor had meant only to teach,

that we should not abstain from things indifferent, as if they were in

_themselves unlawful_, he should have told his readers that he meant

no more. He should have told them, that such things might be abstained

from justly, upon a better principle, and so become very expedient and

edifying; and that he did not condemn the abstaining from such things,

when it was done upon a motive of piety, or for the better fulfilling

any duty; but only when it was done from superstitious notion, of the

things being in themselves sin.

Had he done this, he had prevented the _snare_ and _deceit_ that is

now in his assertion: but then he would at the same time have made it

useless, and insignificant to the design of his discourse, and would

have left a door open for such advances in piety, as he is now opposing.

17. It might easily be shewn, if this was the place for it, that no one

can truly fulfil the two first and greatest of all laws, that of loving

God with all our heart, and that of loving our neighbour as ourselves,

unless he be willing and glad, in many instances, _wholly_ to _abstain_

from things in themselves indifferent and innocent.

St. _Paul_’s doctrine is this: _All things are lawful for me, but all

things are not expedient._ This sets the matter right on both sides.

It leaves things in their own state of indifference, and yet carries

us to a higher rule of acting. It directs us wholly to abstain from,

some things innocent in themselves, and to do things because they are

_expedient_; because by so doing, we shew a higher love of God, and a

greater desire of doing every thing to his glory; because we thereby

attain a greater conquest over all our inward and outward enemies, and

in a greater degree help forward the edification of our neighbour.

18. Let us look at St. _Paul_’s doctrine and examples in the two

following remarkable instances.

First where he declares it to be _lawful_ for those that preach the

gospel to live by the gospel, and yet makes it matter of the greatest

_comfort_ and joy to himself, that he wholly abstained from this

_lawful_ thing: and declares, it were better for him to die, than that

this _rejoicing_ should be taken from him. He appeals to his daily

and nightly labouring with his own hands, that so he might preach the

gospel freely, and not be chargeable to those that heard him. And this

he said he did, not for want of authority to do otherwise, but that he

might make himself an example unto them who followed him.

* What awakening instructions are here given to us of the clergy, in

a matter of the greatest moment! How ought every one to be frighted at

the thought of desiring or seeking a second living, or of rejoicing at

great pay where there is but little duty, when the apostle’s rejoicing

consisted in this, that he had passed thro’ all the fatigues and perils

of preaching the gospel without any pay at all! How _cautious_, nay,

how _fearful_ ought we to be, of going so far as the _secular_ laws

permit us, when the apostle thought it more desirable to lose his life,

than to go so far as the general laws of the gospel would have suffered

him!

* It is _looked upon_ as _lawful_, to get several preferments, and

to make a gain of the gospel, by hiring others to do duty for us at

a lower rate.――It is looked upon as lawful, to quit a cure of souls

of a small income, for no other reason but because we can get another

of a greater.――It is looked upon as lawful, for a clergyman to apply

the revenue of a church, which he serves, to his own use, tho’ he has

more than a sufficient competency of his _own_, and much more than

the apostle could get by his labour.――It is looked upon as lawful, for

the clergy to live in state and equipage, to buy purple and fine linen

out of the revenue of the church.――It is looked upon as lawful, for

clergymen to enrich their families, and bring up their children in the

fashionable vanities of a worldly and expensive life, by money got by

preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ.

* But now _supposing_ all these to be _lawful_, what _comfort_ and

_joy_ might we treasure up for ourselves, what benefit and edification

should we give to our neighbour, if we wholly abstained from all these

things, not by working day and night with our hands, as the great

apostle did, but by limiting our wants and desires according to the

plain demands of nature, and a religious self-denial?

The other instance of the apostle’s I appeal to is that, where he says,

it is good neither to eat “flesh, nor drink wine, nor any thing whereby

thy brother stumbleth and is offended. And again, if meat make my

brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, that

I may not offend my brother.” Hence it appears, that to abstain from

things indifferent, as if they were in themselves sinful, is wrong; but

to _abstain_ from them upon other motives, may be matter of necessary

duty and edification. But since the Doctor has not looked at this

matter in the twofold view in which only it can be justly apprehended,

he cannot well be excused from that _half thinking_, which he so much

reproaches in others.

19. But I must further observe, that there is yet more of _snare_ and

_deception_, in what the Doctor has here said of this matter. For the

reader may thereby be easily brought into a belief, that things in

themselves indifferent, are not _proper subjects_ of religion, or means

of advancing in piety; and that he need not bring himself under _any

laws_ of religion, concerning such things.

Whereas nothing can be more contrary to truth, or more hurtful to piety

than such a belief. “Eating, drinking, sleeping, dressing, resting,

labour, conversation, trade, diversion, and money, are in themselves

indifferent.”

But it is in the religious, or irreligious use of these that some

people _live_ up to the spirit of the gospel, and others _wholly die_

to it. And it is from strict laws of religion, made concerning these

indifferent things, that the spiritual life of every one is to be built

up.

And it is for want of religious laws in the use of these things, that

the spirit of the gospel cannot get possession of our hearts. For our

souls may receive an infinite hurt, and be rendered incapable of all

true virtue, merely by the use of innocent and lawful things.

* What is more innocent than rest and retirement? And yet what more

dangerous than sloth and idleness? How lawful is the care of a family?

And yet how are many people rendered incapable of all virtue, by a

♦worldly, sollicitous temper? How lawful is it for us, to eat and drink

in such quantity and quality, as may render the body healthful, and

useful to the soul? And yet what danger is there in eating and drinking

if we are not under this strict law of religion, to seek _only_ health;

and not the pleasure of various tastes in our food? What _sensuality_

of discourse shall we not every day fall into, unless it be a fixed

law to us, to speak of no other joy in our food, but that which is

expressed by our grace before, and after our meals?

♦ “wordly” replaced with “worldly”

How indifferent a thing, and innocent in itself, is _dress_? And

yet what more hurtful and abounding with sin? It reaches and affects

the heart and soul both of the wearer and beholder. Its evils are

innumerable; it has destroyed, and does destroy like a pestilence.

Now how can all these evils, which arise from the use of these things

indifferent and lawful in themselves be avoided, but by making every

thing in our _common_ and _ordinary_ life to be matter of conscience,

which is to have its _rule_ and _measure_ and _end_ from the spirit of

religion? And indeed what other end is there in religion, but to govern

every motion, and desire of our hearts? To make all the actions of our

common life pure and holy, by being done in strict conformity to the

will of God, and under the light and guidance of his Holy Spirit? So

that the very outward _form_ of our lives, and the _whole manner_ of

our living in the world, whether in estate, shops, or farms, whether in

eating, drinking, or dressing, may make it known to all the world, that

we do every thing in the name of Jesus Christ, suitably to that high

vocation wherewith we are called.

20. No folly of life whatever can be rightly removed but by being thus

wholly cut up by the roots, by making every thing subject to the spirit

of religion.

That which is to direct our _prayers_, and govern us at church, must

with the same strictness direct our conversation, and govern our

dealings in common life. We must dress with the same spirit that we

give _alms_, or go to _prayers_; that is, we must no more dress to be

seen and admired by others, than we must give alms, or make prayers for

the same reasons.

And when religion has its seat in our hearts, and is the work of God’s

spirit in us, this acting according to its direction in _all things_,

will be so far from seeming to be a hard lesson, that it would be a

pain to act otherwise. It is no hardship to a _miser_ to do _every_

thing suitably to the greedy desires of his heart. The ambitious man

is not troubled with acting always agreeable to his ambition. If these

persons are in trouble or distress, or under any dejection, you can

only comfort the one with honour and power, and the other with filthy

lucre and gain.

21. Yet the Doctor complains of the _Treatise upon Christian

Perfection_, because Christians in _sickness, distress, and dejection_

of _spirit_, are there directed to seek for comfort and refreshment in

God alone! Our blessed Lord is very short and yet very full upon this

article. He only says, _Be of good comfort, I have overcome the world._

And the Doctor might as well be angry at the gospel for having made no

mention of worldly amusements proper for sick and distressed Christians,

as at the treatise of Christian Perfection, for not having done the

same.

If I should see a sick man smelling a rose, I should not reprove him.

But if he wanted comfort in his state, I would no more direct him to

_any thing_, but the great and solid comforts that are to be found

in the love, and goodness of God, than I would direct him to another

Saviour, than Jesus Christ.

* For to tell Christians that in _some kinds_ of trouble, they might

justly seek for relief in reading a _play_, or wanton _Bucolic_,

instead of the _gospel_; would be the same absurdity, as to have told

people in our Saviour’s time, that in some sorts of distress, they

might justly have recourse to _Simon Magus_, instead of Jesus Christ.

22. But now to look back a little. I have considered the bulk of those

Christians that are the most likely to be the Doctor’s readers, under

two characters. The one as living some way or other in a partial, false,

superficial, or half state of piety; the other as an awakened people,

called by the Spirit of God to come out of the common corruption of

the times. I have shewn that the Doctor’s discourse (where it is not

disliked) must do great hurt, and have dreadful effects upon those two

sorts of people; the one sort it seals up in a false security, sleeping

in the chambers of death, without any oil in their vessels; the other

it frightens, and discourages from their pious intentions of trimming

their lamps with all diligence, and living upon the watch for the

midnight call of the bridegroom’s voice.

That I may therefore do all the good I can to both these sorts

of people, that I may awaken the one from their false security in

their form of godliness, and encourage the other to proceed with all

earnestness, after every degree of Christian holiness; I shall before I

proceed any further, lay down a short account of the whole _ground_ of

the Christian religion, that every one may clearly see, why we want the

Christian religion to save us, what it is to do for us; and how it is

done.

23. [1] Man was created a living image of the Holy Trinity, Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost.

“2. This whole visible world, as far as the stars, or any corporeal

being reaches, takes up that extent of space, where _Lucifer_ and his

angels before their fall, had their glorious kingdom. So far as this

visible frame of nature extends, so far was the extent of that kingdom.¹

¹ N. B. This, with several of the particulars that follow are

probable, but not supported by scripture. This is the theory

of _Jacob Behme_, ingenious, but quite incapable of proof.

“3. That the _place_ or _extent_ of this world, was the place or extent

of their kingdom, is probable from the two following reasons: first,

because the place of this world is now their habitation. For we must

by no means suppose that God brought them from some other region into

this world, only to tempt man. No: but they are here _now_, because

they were created to dwell _here_. For fallen angels do not leave

the _place_ of their sin and fall: they live in the _defilements_

and _disorders_ of their spoiled kingdom; and in that place they find

their hell and torments, where they extinguished their light and joy.

Secondly, because the whole extent of the world, and every thing in it,

_sun_, _moon_, _stars_, _fire_, _air_, _water_, and _earth_, _stones_,

_minerals_, must all be _dissolved_, and pass thro’ a _purifying fire_.

Therefore all these things are polluted, and have in them some disorder

from the fall of the angels; and we may see _how far_ the place of

their kingdom extended, by the extent of those things that are to be

_dissolved_ and _purified_.

“4. When the angels had, by their rebellion, lost the divine life

within themselves, and brought their _whole outward_ kingdom into

darkness and disorder, so that as _Moses_ speaketh: ‘Darkness was

upon the face of the deep;’ that is, the whole extent of the place

of this world; then in the place where they were fallen, and out of

the _materials_ of their ruined, angelical kingdom, did God begin the

_creation_ of this present, material, temporary, visible world.

“5. ‘In the beginning, saith _Moses_, God created the heaven and the

earth.’ Here, at this _instant_, ended the devil’s power, over the

place or kingdom in which he was created. As soon as the whole of his

outward, disordered kingdom was thus divided into a _created heaven and

earth_, all was taken out of his hands, he was shut out of every thing,

and he and all his host became _poor prisoners_ in their lost kingdom,

that could only _wander about_ in chains of darkness, looking with

impotent rage at the _created heaven and earth_, which was sprung up in

their own place of habitation.

“6. Thus was this _outward kingdom_, of the whole extent of this world,

taken out of the hands of _Lucifer_ and his angels. All its darkness,

disharmony, and disorder, was by the _creation_ restored to a low

resemblance of its first state, and put into that form of sun, stars,

fire, air, light, water, and earth, in which we now see it.

“7. Into this world thus created out of the _ruins_ of the kingdom of

the fallen angels, was man introduced on the sixth day of the creation,

to take his place as lord and prince of it; to have power over all

outward things, to discover and manifest the wonders of this new

created world, and to bring forth such an _holy offspring_, as might

fill up the place of the fallen angels. And when certain periods of

time had produced these great effects, then this _whole frame_ was by

the last _purifying fire_, to have been raised from its paradisaical

state, into that _first heavenly_ brightness and glory, in which it

stood before the fall of _Lucifer_.

“8. But the first man, thus created to be a prince of a new, angelical

kingdom, stood not out his trial.

“9. He came into this world in that _same glorious_ body in which after

the resurrection, he shall _be like the angels in heaven_. For no other

body, but that which was at _first_ created shall rise in Jesus Christ.

He only restores that which was lost. The resurrection will only take

away what _sin_ and _death_, and _earth_, had added to the _first

created_ body.

“10. In this glorious body, did the first man stand in this world,

incapable of receiving any hurt, or _knowing_ evil from outward nature.

The _Holy Ghost_ was the _light_ that illuminated all both within and

without him.

“11. Had he fixed his will to be _eternally_ what he was, had he

desired only to eat of the tree of life, to live by the word of God, he

had been established and confirmed an eternal angel, or divine man.

“12. But his imagination wandered after the secrets of this outward

world, after the knowledge of such good and evil, as wrought an entire

change in his nature.

“He turned from the tree of life to the forbidden fruit. And so he fell

as deep into an _earthly life_, and the miseries of the earth, as the

devil fell into a _hellish life_, and the miseries of hell.

“13. And here we may see as in a glass, what it is that earthly desires

_now do_ to every son of _Adam_. They do all that which they did to the

first man. They carry on, keep up, and continue that _same_ death in us

which he died in paradise.

“14. Thus it was, that _Adam_ lost the _light_ of the Son of God, and

the breath of the Holy Spirit. And this was the _immediate death_ that

he died in paradise, a death much more grievous than that which is to

bring us all to our graves. It was a death that extinguished all that

was divine and holy in human nature, just as the sin of angels turned

them into devils. Now in looking at _this death_, we have the clearest

view, of what our regeneration by the _second Adam_ means. For what

can it be, but the restoration of that divine life which was lost in

_Adam_ the _first_? For will any one say, that Christ is not in as high

a degree, the _restorer_ of our nature, as _Adam_ was the _destroyer_

of it? Now tho’ this great truth, seated in the very heart of the

Christian religion, speaks at once the whole nature of regeneration;

yet many learned men either not seeing or not _loving_, or being afraid

_to own_ it, have been forced, not only to mistake, but wholly to

sink the most glorious article of the Christian faith? And instead of

telling us the height and depth of the blessing of having the nature

and life of Christ derived into us, they can only teach us, what kind

of word regeneration is――that it is a figurative expression――and that

our Saviour may be justified, for having made use of it. What learned

pains do people take, to root up the belief of our having a new life in

Christ? They run from _book_ to _book_, from _language_ to _language_;

they consult all ♦critics, search all lexicons, to shew us, that

according to the rules of true criticism, regeneration _need signify_

no more than the _federal_ rite of baptism. Nay, what is still worse,

they appeal to the poor notions of the blind, infatuated Jews! They

produce the opinions which they had of a regeneration talked of, and a

baptism used amongst them, when they rejected and crucified our Saviour,

to teach us, what we are to understand by our divine birth in Christ

Jesus! But if this be the use of learning among ourselves, we need not

look at _Rome_, or the ancient Rabbies of the _Jewish Sanhedrim_, to

see what miserable work learning can make with the holy scriptures. For

it is sure the true Messiah is not _rightly owned_, nor the Christian

religion _truly known_, till the soul is all love, and faith, and

hunger, and thirst after this new _life_, and real formation of Jesus

Christ in it: till without fear of _enthusiasm_ it seeks, and expects

all its redemption from it. But to return.

♦ “criticks” replaced with “critics” for consistency

“15. Man, thus dead to the divine life, thus destitute of the Son, and

_Holy Spirit_, thus fallen into an _earthly nature_, under the dominion

of an earthly world, which would afford him for a while a miserable

life, and then leave him to a more miserable death; could do no more

to replace himself in paradise, or to regain his first nature, than the

devil could do to restore himself to his lost glory.

“16. But in this state the _infinite mercy_ of God met him. That love

which at _first breathed_, a holy and divine soul into him, now again

breathed a spark, or ray of divine light into him in the declaration

of a _serpent bruiser_: which spark of life should in time do all

that which _Adam_ should have done; that is, should bring forth

a _generation_ of men, that should become _Sons of God_, and take

possession of that kingdom from which the angels had fallen.

“17. Here began the merciful mystery of man’s redemption; for this seed

of divine life, was the Holy Jesus, who from that time, stood in the

place of the first man.

And from that time it may be said in a true sense that the

_incarnation_ of the Son of God began; because he was from that time

entered again into the human nature, as a seed of its salvation, tho’

not made manifest, till he was born in the Holy Virgin _Mary_. And in

this sense St. _John_ says of him, _that he was the true light, which

lighteth every man, that cometh into the world_. Because every man has

from him this light, which if it is duly attended to, is our certain

guide to Christ, born in the fulness of time, and sacrificed for us

upon the cross.

“18. What we want from Christ, as our Redeemer, is manifest by that

which he gives to us, namely a redemption from the _hell_ that is in

our souls, and from the death and corruption that is in our bodies.

“19. We are no more created to be in the sorrows, and anguish of an

_earthly life_, than the angels were created to be in the _darkness_

of hell. It is as contrary to the _will_ of God towards us, that we

are out of paradise, as it is contrary to the design of God towards the

angels, that some of them are _out_ of heaven, prisoners of darkness.

“The sickness, pain and corruption of our bodies, is brought upon us by

ourselves, in the same manner as the dark, hideous forms of the devils

are brought upon them. * How absurd, and even blasphemous would it

be, to say, with the scripture and the church, that we are by _nature,

children of wrath, and born in sin_, if we had that nature which God

at first gave us? What a reproach upon God to say, that this world is

a _valley of misery_, a shadow of death, an habitation of _disorders_,

_snares_, _evils_, and _temptations_, if this was an original

creation, or that state of things in which God created us? Is it not

as consistent with the goodness of God, to speak of the _misery_ and

_disorder_ that holy angels find above, and of the vanity, emptiness

and sorrow of the _heavenly state_, as to speak of the misery of _men_,

and the sorrows of _this world_, if man and the world were in that

order, in which God at first had placed them?

“20. But by the mercy of God in Christ, this prison of an earthly life,

is turned into a state of purification. It is made a time and place of

putting off our _filthy_ garments, and of _staying_ and _sacrificing_

that man of sin that is hid under them. And God suffers the sun to

shine upon us, and the elements to afford us nourishment, for no other

end, but that we may all have time and opportunity to hear the call of

the Son of God, to be _born again_, to be renewed by the _Holy Spirit_,

and be made capable of that kingdom, from which _Lucifer_ and his

angels fell.”

♦ Paragraph numbers 21‒23 skipped

24. Look at our Saviour’s sermon on the _mount_, and indeed at all his

instructions, and you will find them pointing at nothing else on our

_side_, but a _denial_ of ourselves, and a _renunciation_ of the world.

And indeed how could it be otherwise! For if we want a Redeemer, only

because we have _wandered_ out of paradise, and could not get back to

it ourselves; if we are overcome by this world, only because our first

father _sought_ after it, what wonder is it that he who is to replace

us in paradise, should call us to a _renunciation_ of the world?

25. * Vain man, taken with the _sound_ of heavenly things, and

_prospects_ of future glory, yet at the same time a _fast friend_

to the interests of flesh and blood, would fain compound matters

between God and mammon. He is very willing to acknowledge a _Saviour_,

that died on the cross to save him. He is ready to receive outward

_ordinances_ and _forms_ of worship, and to contend with zeal for

the observance of them. He likes heaven, and future glory on these

conditions. He is also ready to put on _outward morality_, to let

religion polish his manners, that he may have the credit and ornament

of a _prudential piety_, and a _decency_ of life. This does no hurt.

But to lay the axe to the _whole root_ of our disease, to cut all those

_silken cords_ asunder, which tie us to the world, and the world to

us, to deny every temper and passion that cannot be made holy, wise and

heavenly; to die to every gratification which keeps up, and strengthens

the folly, vanity, pride, and blindness of our _fallen nature_; to

leave no little morsels of sensuality, avarice and ambition for the

_old man_ to feed upon, however well-covered under his mantle; this,

tho’ it be the very essence of religion, is what he flies from with

as much aversion as from _heresy_ and _schism_. Here he makes learned

appeals to reason and common sense to judge betwixt him, and the gospel;

which is just as wise, as to ask the learned _Greek_, and the worldly

_Jew_, whether the _cross_ of Christ be not foolishness, and a just

rock of offence: or to appeal to flesh and blood about the narrow way

to that kingdom of heaven, into which itself cannot possibly have an

entrance.

26. * To seek for any thing in religion, but a _new nature_ fitted for

a new world, is knowing neither it, nor ourselves. _To be born again_,

is to be fit for Paradise in whatever part of the universe we live.

_Not to be born again_, is continuing where the sin and death of _Adam_

left us, whatever church, or sect of religion we have fellowship with.

All ways and opinions, all forms and modes of worship, stand on the

outside of religion. They certainly are helps to the kingdom of God,

when we consider them only as the _gate_ to that _inward life_, which

we want. But this is unquestionably true, that our _salvation_ consists

wholly in our inward renewal by the Holy Ghost. When this begins, our

salvation begins; as this goes on, our salvation goes on; when this is

finished, our salvation is finished. This alone saves the soul, because

this alone restores the first paradisaical, divine nature, which is the

true image of God, and which alone can enter into the kingdom of heaven.

27. If we had only a _notional knowledge_ that our first father had

sinned, and knew no more of his _sinful condition_ than history tells

us of it; if we had only _instituted types_ and _figures_ to keep up

the remembrance of it in our minds, we should be never the worse for

his sins. We should have no hurt by _owning_ ourselves to be children

of a sinful father, if his nature, _life_ and _spirit_ were not

propagated in us. So, if we have only a _notional belief_ that Jesus is

become the _second Adam_, to redeem, and regenerate the fallen nature;

if we know this only in the _notion_ and history kept up in our minds

by _outward_ figures and _ordinances_: tho’ we contend ever so much

for this belief of a Saviour, and write _volumes_ in defence of it; yet

he is not our Saviour, till his nature, life and spirit, be in us. If

there be any man in the world, in whom the _nature_ of _Adam_ is not,

he has no _sin_ from _Adam_. If there be any man in whom the life of

Jesus is not, he has no _righteousness_ from him. We must have life and

righteousness in the same _truth_ and _reality_ in us from the second

_Adam_, as we have sin and death in us from the first.

28. The whole matter is this: Christ, by the overshadowing of the

Holy Spirit, became in the _Virgin Mary_, of the same nature with

that _first man_, which was created in Paradise; who according to the

_purpose_ of God, was to have been the father of an holy _race_ of men.

But seeing the first _Adam_ failed in this _design_ of God, the wisdom

of God provided a _second Adam_, who was born in the _same degree_

of perfection, in which the first man was created. To this holy

paradisaical human nature the _Son_ of God was personally united. And

thus Christ the second _Adam_, took the place of the first, and stands

as the second father of all the sons of _Adam_. Now as we are _earthly_,

corrupt, and _worldly_ men, by having the _nature_ and _life_ of the

first _Adam_ propagated in us, so we must become _holy_ and heavenly

men, by having the life and nature of the second _Adam_ derived into

us; or as the scripture speaks, by being _born again_. Jesus Christ

therefore helps us by a _second_ birth, to such an _holy_, and

_undefiled_ nature, as he himself received in the _blessed Virgin_, and

which we should have received in _Paradise_ from our _first father_.

Thus by faith in Christ we put _on Christ_, he is formed in us; we eat

his _flesh_ and drink _his blood_, and have his _nature_ and _life_ in

us.

Thus we are real members, living branches, and new born children of God.

29. * Look now at _yourselves_, at the _world_, at _religion_, in

this true light, and surely you must see the desirable nature of every

virtue, and every degree of it, which the gospel sets before you.

Surely you must awake into a strong abhorrence of every thing that the

fall has brought upon you; whether it be in your _souls_, your _bodies_,

or the state of the world into which you are fallen. To renounce the

poor interests of a worldly life, to be content with a _pilgrim’s fare_

in it, to live looking and longing after that which you have lost;

to have no more of covetousness, of pride, of vanity and ambition,

than _John_ the Baptist had; to live unto God in your _shops_, your

_employments_ and estates, with such thoughts and desires of going

to your heavenly Father, as the lost son had when he saw his poor

condition, eating _husks_ among _swine_, is only a proof that you are,

like him, come to yourselves, that you begin to see _what_, and how,

and where you are. Surely you can need no exhortations to run to your

Redeemer, to beseech him to do every thing in you and for you that your

corrupted heart, and polluted body are in need of. He now stands as

near you, as full of love to you, as he did to _Lazarus_ when he raised

him from the dead. He is no farther from your call than he was from the

call of blind _Bartimæus_.