CHAPTER XIX.

_Of the excellency and greatness of a devout spirit._

1. I HAVE now finished what I intended in this treatise. I have

explained the nature of devotion, both as it signifies a life devoted

to God, and as it signifies a regular method of prayer. I have now

only to add a word or two in recommendation of a life governed by this

Spirit.

And because in this _polite_ age, we have so _lived away_ the spirit

of devotion, that many seem afraid even to be suspected of it,

imagining _great devotion_ to be great _bigotry_; that it is founded

in _ignorance_ and _poorness_ of spirit; and that _little_, _weak_, and

_dejected_ minds, are generally the greatest proficients in it.

It shall here be shewn, that great devotion is the _noblest_ temper of

the _greatest_ and _noblest_ souls; and that they who think it receives

any advantage from _ignorance_, are themselves entirely ignorant of the

nature of devotion, the nature of God, and the nature of themselves.

People of _fine parts_ and _learning_, or of great knowledge in

_worldly matters_, may perhaps think it hard to have their _want_ of

devotion charged upon their _ignorance_. But if they will be content

to be tried by reason and scripture, it may soon be made appear,

that a _want_ of devotion, wherever it is, either amongst the learned

or unlearned, is founded in _gross ignorance_, and the _greatest

blindness_ and _insensibility_ that can happen to a rational creature.

And that devotion is so far from being the effect of a _little_ and

_dejected_ mind, that it must and will be always _highest_ in the most

_perfect_ natures.

2. And _first_, Who reckons it a sign of a _poor, little_ mind, for a

man to be full of _reverence_ and _duty_ to his parents, to have the

truest _love_ and _honour_ for his _friend_, or to excel in the

_highest instances_ of gratitude to his benefactor?

Are not these tempers, in the _highest_ degree, in the most exalted and

perfect minds?

And yet what is _high devotion_, but the highest exercise of these

tempers, of _duty_, _reverence_, _love_, _honour_, and _gratitude_

to the amiable, glorious _parent_, _friend_, and _benefactor_ of all

mankind?

Is it a true greatness of mind, to reverence the authority of

your parents, to fear the displeasure of your friend, to dread the

reproaches of your benefactor; and must not this _fear_, and _dread_,

and _reverence_, be much more just, and reasonable, and honourable,

when they are in the _highest degree_ towards God?

So that as long as _duty_ to parents, _love_ to friends, and

_gratitude_ to benefactors, are thought great and honourable tempers,

devotion, which is nothing else but duty, love, and gratitude to God,

must have the highest place amongst our highest virtues.

If a _prince_, out of his _mere goodness_, should send you a pardon by

one of his _slaves_, would you think it a part of your duty to receive

the _slave_ with marks of _love_, _esteem_, and _gratitude_, for his

kindness of bringing you so great a gift, and at the same time think

it a _meanness_ and _poorness_ of spirit, to shew _love_, _esteem_, and

_gratitude_ to the prince, who of his own goodness freely sent you the

pardon?

And yet this would be as reasonable, as to suppose that love, esteem,

honour, and gratitude, are _noble tempers_, and instances of a _great

soul_, when they are paid to our fellow-creatures; but the effects of

a poor, ignorant mind, when they are paid to God.

3. Even that part of devotion which expresses itself in _sorrowful_

confessions, and _penitential_ tears of a broken and contrite heart,

is very far from being any sign of a _little_ and _ignorant_ mind.

For who does not acknowledge it an instance of an _ingenuous_,

_generous_, and _brave_ mind, to acknowledge a fault, and ask pardon

for any offence? And are not the _finest_ and _most improved_ minds,

the most remarkable for this excellent temper?

Is it not also allowed, that the _ingenuousness_ and _excellence_ of a

man’s spirit is much shewn, when his sorrow and indignation at himself

rises in proportion to the folly of his crime, and the _goodness_ and

_greatness_ of the person he has offended?

Now if things are thus, then the _greater_ any man’s mind is, the

more he _knows_ of God and himself, the more will he be disposed to

prostrate himself before God in all the _humblest acts_ and expressions

of repentance.

And the greater the _generosity_ and _penetration_ of his mind is,

the more will he indulge a _passionate, tender_ sense of God’s just

displeasure; and the more he knows of the greatness, the goodness, and

perfection of the divine nature, the fuller of shame and confusion will

he be at his own sins and ingratitude.

And on the other hand, the more _dull_ and _ignorant_ any soul is,

the more _base_ and _ungenerous_, the more _senseless_ it is of

the goodness of God, the more averse to _humble confession_ and

_repentance_.

Devotion therefore is so far from being best suited to _little,

ignorant_ minds, that a _true elevation_ of soul, a _lively sense_ of

honour, and _great knowledge_ of God and ourselves, are the greatest

helps that our devotion hath.

4. On the other hand, it shall be made appear, that _indevotion_ is

founded in the most excessive ignorance.

And, _first_, Our blessed Lord and his apostles were eminent instances

of great devotion. Now if we will grant, (as all Christians must grant)

that their great devotion was founded in a true knowledge of the nature

of devotion, the nature of God, and the nature of man, then it is plain,

that all those that are insensible of devotion, are in this excessive

state of ignorance; they neither know God, nor themselves, nor devotion.

Again, how comes it that most people have recourse to devotion, when

they are in sickness, distress, or fear of death? Is it not because

this state shews them _more_ of the want of God, and their own weakness,

than they perceive at other times? Is it not because their approaching

end, _convinces_ them of something which they did not _half perceive_

before?

Now if devotion, at these seasons, is the effect of a _better

knowledge_ of God and ourselves, then the neglect of devotion at other

times is owing to ignorance of God and ourselves.

5. Farther, as indevotion is ignorance, so it is the most _shameful_

ignorance, and such as is to be charged with the _greatest folly_.

This will fully appear to any one that considers by what rules we are

to judge of the excellency of any knowledge, or the shamefulness of any

ignorance.

Now _knowledge_ itself would be no _excellence_, nor ignorance any

_reproach_ to us, but that we are _rational_ creatures.

It follows plainly, that knowledge which is most _suitable_ to our

rational nature, and which most concerns us, as such, to know, is our

_highest, finest_ knowledge; and that ignorance which relates to things

that are most _essential_ to us, as rational creatures, and which we

are most concerned to know, is, of all others, the most _gross_ and

_shameful_ ignorance.

6. If a _gentleman_ should fancy that the _moon_ is no bigger than it

appears to the _eye_, that it shines with its _own light_, that all

the _stars_ are only so many spots of light; if after reading books of

_astronomy_, he should still continue in the same opinion, most people

would think he had but a poor apprehension.

But if the same person should think it better to provide for a _short

life_ here, than to prepare for a _glorious eternity_ hereafter;

that it was better to be _rich_, than to be _eminent_ in piety, his

_ignorance_ and _dulness_ would be too great to be compared to any

thing else.

That is the most clear and improved understanding, which _judges_ best

of the _value_ and _worth_ of things; all the rest is but the capacity

of an _animal_; it is but meer _seeing_ and _hearing_.

If a man had _eyes_ that could see beyond the _stars_, or pierce into

the heart of the earth, but could not see the things that were before

him, or discern any thing that was serviceable to him, we should reckon

that he had but a very _bad sight_.

If another had _ears_ that received sounds from the world in the _moon_,

but could hear nothing that was said or done upon earth, we should look

upon him to be as _bad_ as _deaf_.

In like manner, if a man has a _memory_ that can retain a great many

things, if he has a _wit_ that is _sharp_ and _acute_ in arts and

sciences, but has a _dull, poor_ apprehension of his _duty_ and

_relation_ to God, of the _value_ of piety, or the _worth_ of moral

virtue, he may very justly be reckoned to have a _bad understanding_.

He is but like the man that can only _see_ and _hear_ such things as

are of no benefit to him.

7. To proceed: We know how our blessed Lord acted in an human body;

it was _his meat and drink to do the will of his Father which is in

heaven_.

And if any number of heavenly spirits were to leave their habitations

in the light of God, and be for awhile united to human bodies, they

would certainly tend towards God in all their actions, and be as

heavenly as they could, in a state of flesh and blood.

They would certainly act in this manner, because they would know that

God was the _only good_ of all spirits; and that whether they were _in_

the body, or _out_ of the body, in _heaven_ or on _earth_, they must

have every degree of their greatness and happiness from God alone.

All human spirits therefore, the _more exalted_ they are, the more

they _know_ their divine original, the _nearer_ they come to heavenly

spirits, the more will they live to God in all their actions, making

their whole life a _state of devotion_.

Devotion therefore is the greatest sign of a great and noble _genius_;

it supposes a soul in its _highest state_ of knowledge; and none

but _little_ and _blinded_ minds, that are sunk into _ignorance_ and

_vanity_, are destitute of it.

8. If a human spirit should imagine some _mighty prince_ to be greater

than God, we should take it for a poor ignorant creature; all people

would acknowledge such an imagination to be the height of stupidity.

But if this same _human spirit_ should think it better to be devoted to

some mighty _prince_, than to be devoted to God, would not this still

be a greater proof of a poor, ignorant, and blinded nature?

Yet this is what all people do, who think any thing _better_, _greater_,

or _wiser_ than a devout life.

So that which way soever we consider this matter, it plainly appears,

that devotion is an instance of _great judgment_, of an _elevated

nature_; and the want of _devotion_ is a certain proof of the want of

_understanding_.

The greatest spirits of the Heathen world, such as _Pythagoras_,

_Socrates_, _Plato_, _Epictetus_, _Marcus Antoninus_, owed all their

greatness to the spirit of devotion.

They were full of God; their wisdom and deep contemplations tended

only to deliver men from the vanity of the world, the slavery of bodily

passions, that they might act as _spirits_ that came from God, and were

soon to return to him.

9. Let _libertines_ but grant that there is a God, and a providence,

and then they have granted enough to justify the wisdom, and support

the honour of devotion.

For if there is an infinitely wise and good Creator, in whom we live,

move, and have our being, whose providence governs all things in all

places, surely it must be the highest act of our _understanding_ to

conceive rightly of him; it must be the noblest instance of _judgment_,

the most exalted temper of our nature, to worship and adore this

universal providence, to conform to its laws, to study its wisdom, and

to live and act every where, as in the presence of this infinitely good

and wise Creator.

Now he that lives thus, lives in the spirit of devotion.

And what can shew such great parts, and so fine an understanding, as to

live in this temper?

For if God is _wisdom_, surely he must be the wisest man in the

world, who _most_ conforms to the wisdom of God, who _best_ obeys his

providence, who enters _farthest_ into his designs, and does all he

can, that God’s will may be done on earth, as it is done in heaven.

A devout man makes a true use of his reason; he sees through the

_vanity_ of the world, discovers the _corruption_ of his nature, and

the _blindness_ of his passions. He lives by a _law_ which is not

visible to _vulgar eyes_; he enters into the world of _spirits_; he

compares the greatest things, sets _eternity_ against time; and chuses

rather to be for ever great in the presence of God when he dies, than

to have the greatest share of worldly pleasures whilst he lives.

11. _Lastly, Courage_ and _bravery_ are words of a great sound, and

seem to signify an _heroic_ spirit; but yet _humility_, which seems to

be the _lowest, meanest_ part of devotion, is a more certain argument

of a _noble_ mind.

For humility contends with greater enemies, is more constantly engaged,

more violently assaulted, suffers more, and requires greater courage to

support itself, than any instances of worldly bravery.

A man that dares be poor and contemptible in the eyes of the world, to

approve himself to God; that resists and rejects all human glory; that

opposes the clamour of his passions, that meekly puts up all injuries,

and dares stay for his reward till the invisible hand of God gives

to every one their proper places, endures a much _greater trial_, and

exerts a _nobler fortitude_, than he that is bold and daring in the

fire of battle.

For the boldness of a soldier, if he is a stranger to the spirit of

devotion, is rather _weakness_ than fortitude; it is at best but _mad

passion_, and heated spirits, and has no more true valour in it than

the fury of a _tyger_.

Reason is our _universal law_, that obliges us in all places, and all

times; and no actions have any honour, but so far as they are instances

of our obedience to reason.

And it is as _base_ to be bold and daring against the principle of

reason and justice, as to be bold and daring in _lying_ and _perjury_.

Would we therefore exercise a _true fortitude_, we must do all in the

spirit of _devotion_, be valiant against the corruptions of the _world_,

and the lusts of the _flesh_, and the temptations of the _devil_:

for to be daring and courageous against these enemies, is the noblest

bravery that an human mind is capable of.

I have made this digression for the sake of those, who think great

devotion to be _bigotry_ and _poorness_ of _spirit_; that by these

considerations they may see, how _poor_ and _mean_ all other _tempers_

are, if compared to it: that they may see all worldly attainments,

whether of greatness, wisdom, or bravery, are but _empty sounds_; and

there is nothing _wise_, or _great_, or _noble_, in an _human spirit_,

but rightly to _know_, and heartily _worship_ and _adore_ the great God,

that is the _support_ and _life_ of all spirits, whether in _heaven_,

or on _earth_.

An extract from the Rev. Mr. LAW’s

LATER WORKS.

An extract from the Case of Reason, or Natural Religion, fairly

and fully stated. In answer to a book, entitled _Christianity

as Old as the Creation_.

_The Introduction, shewing the state of the Controversy._

THE infidelity which is now openly declared for, pretends to support

itself upon the _sufficiency_, _excellency_, and _absolute perfection_

of reason, or natural religion.

The author with whom I am engaged, makes no attempt to invalidate

the _historical evidence_ on which Christianity is founded; but by

arguments drawn from the nature of God, and natural religion, pretends

to prove that no religion can come from God, which teaches any thing

more than that, which is fully manifest to all mankind by the _mere

light_ of nature.

His chief principles may be reduced to these following propositions.

1. That human reason, or natural light, is the _only means_ of knowing

all that God requires of us.

2. That reason, or natural light, is so full, sufficient, plain,

and certain a rule in all religious duties, that no external divine

revelation can add any thing to it, or require us to believe or

practise any thing, that was not as fully known before. A revelation,

if ever made, can only declare those very _same_ things _externally_,

which were before equally declared by the _internal_ light of nature.

3. That this must be the case of natural and revealed religion, unless

God be an arbitrary being. For if God be not an arbitrary being, but

acts according to the reason and nature of things; then he can require

nothing of us by revelation, but what is already required by the nature

and reason of things. And therefore, as he expresses it, _reason and

revelation must exactly answer one another like two tallies_¹.

¹ Page 60.

4. That whatever is at any time admitted as matter of religion, that is

not manifest from the reason of the thing, and plainly required by the

light of nature, is gross superstition.

5. That it is inconsistent with the divine perfections, to suppose,

that God can by an external revelation give any religious knowledge, at

_any time_, to _any people_, which was not equally given at _all_ times,

and to _all_ people.

This is the state of the controversy. As to the railing accusations,

which this author pours out, at all adventures, upon the clergy, I

shall wholly pass them over; my intention being only to appeal to the

reason of the reader, and to add nothing to it, but the safe, unerring

light of divine revelation.

CHAPTER I.

_Enquiring, whether there be any thing in the |nature| and

|condition| of man, to |oblige| him to think, that he is not

to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from

God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from

the nature of things._

I BEGIN with enquiring what there is to _oblige_ a man to hold this

opinion, because if there is not some strong and plain proof arising

from the _nature_ and _condition_ of man, to _oblige_ him thus to abide

by the sole light of his own reason; it may be so far from being a duty,

which he owes to God, that it may be reckoned amongst his most criminal

presumptions. And the pleading for this authority of his own reason;

may have the guilt of pleading for his greatest vanity. And if, as

this writer observes, _spiritual pride be the worst sort of pride_,¹ a

confident reliance upon our own reason, as having a right to determine

all matters between God and man, if it should prove to be a _groundless

pretension_, bids fair to be reckoned the highest instance of the

_worst_ kind of the worst of sins.

¹ Page 150.

Every other instance of vanity, every degree of personal pride, and

self-esteem, may be a pardonable weakness in comparison of this. For

how small is that pride which only makes us prefer our own personal

beauty or merit to that of our fellow-creatures, when compared with a

self-confiding reason, which is too haughty to adore any thing in the

divine counsels, which it cannot fully comprehend; or to submit to any

directions from God, but such as its own wisdom could prescribe? Thus

much is certain, that there can be no _medium_ in this matter. The

claiming this authority to our own reason, must either be a very great

duty, or among the greatest of sins.

If it be a _sin_ to admit of any _secrets_ in divine providence, if it

be a _crime_ to ascribe wisdom and goodness to God in things we cannot

comprehend: if it be a _baseness_ and _meanness_ of spirit to believe

that God can teach us _better_ or _more_ than we can teach ourselves:

if it be a _shameful apostacy_ from the dignity of our nature, to

submit to any _mysterious providence_ over us, to comply with any other

methods of _homage_ and _adoration_, than such as we could of ourselves

contrive and justify; then it is certainly a great duty to assert and

maintain this authority of our own reason.

On the other hand; if the profoundest humility towards God, be the

highest instance of piety: if every thing within us and without us, if

every thing we know of God, every thing we know of ourselves preaches

up humility to us, as the foundation of every virtue, as the life

and soul of all holiness: if _sin_ had its beginning from _pride_,

and _hell_ be the effect of it, if _devils_ are what they are through

spiritual pride and self-conceit, then we have great reason to believe,

that the claiming this authority to our reason, in opposition to the

revealed wisdom of God, is not a frailty of _flesh_ and _blood_, but

that same spiritual pride which turned _angels_ into _apostate_ spirits.

Since therefore this appealing to our own reason, as the absolutely

_perfect rule_ of all that ought to pass between God and man, has an

_appearance_ of a pride of the _worst_ kind, and such as unites us

both in temper and conduct with the fallen spirits of darkness, it

highly concerns every pleader on that side, to consider what grounds

he proceeds upon, and to ask himself, what there is in the _state_ and

_condition_ of human nature, to oblige him to think, that nothing can

be _divine_ or _holy_, or _necessary_, in religion, but what _human_

reason dictates?

I hope the reader will think this a fair state of the case, and that

all the light we can have in this matter, must arise from a thorough

consideration of the _state_ and _condition_ of man in this world.

If without revelation he is free from mysteries as a _moral_ and

_religious_ agent, then he has some plea from his state and condition

to reject _revealed_ mysteries.

But if in a state of natural religion, he can’t acknowledge a divine

providence or worship God, without _as much_ implicit faith, and

submission of his reason, as any revealed mysteries require; then

his _state_ and _condition_ in the world, condemns his refusal of

any revelation sufficiently attested to come from God. This enquiry

therefore into the state and condition of man, being so plainly the

true point of the controversy, I hope to obtain the reader’s impartial

attention to it.

Had mankind continued in a state of _perfect innocence_, without ever

failing in their duty either to God or man, yet even in such a state,

they could never have known what God would or would not reveal to them,

but by some express revelation from him. And as God might intend to

raise them to some higher, and unknown state of perfection; so he might

raise them to it by the revelation of such things as their own reason,

though uncorrupt, yet could not have discovered.

But if man, in a state of _innocence_, could have no pretence to set

himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason the _final

judge_ of what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he

any pretence for so doing in his present state of _sin_, _ignorance_,

and _misery_. His _nature_ and _condition_ is so far from furnishing

him with reasons against revelation, against any _supernatural_ help

from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every

circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms of _mercy_

and deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according to

_schemes_ of his _own_ contrivance, not from his _own knowledge_ of

the _nature_, and _reason_, and _fitness_ of things, but from some

_incomprehensible depth_ of divine goodness.

For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own

weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of any _methods_ of _atoning_ for

our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are

not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make

war against God.

For to insist upon the _prerogative_ of our own nature, as qualifying

us to make our own peace with God, and to reject the _atonement_ which

he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable,

that our _own repentance_ should be sufficient without it, is the same

height of _pride_ and _impiety_, as to affirm, that we have no need of

any repentance at all.

For as mankind, if they had continued in a state of _innocence_, could

not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes

of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these

things unto them: so after they were _fallen_ into a state of guilt and

sin, they could never know what _misery_ it would expose them to, or

_when_, or _how_, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it,

and made as happy as if they had _never_ sinned; these are things that

nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.

So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint the _atonement_ for his own

sins, or to think himself able to tell what it _ought_ to be, is as

foolish and vain a presumption, as if man in _innocence_ should have

pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into a _cherub_.

The writers against revelation appeal to the _reason_ and _nature_ of

things, as _infallibly_ discovering every thing that a revelation from

God can teach us.

Thus our author; _If the relations between things, and the fitness

resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not

God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of

things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake

their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish

fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity_¹.

¹ Page 30.

It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions

founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that

persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the

reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of

parents to their children, and of men to men, is very apparent, from

the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties

which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge

the relation that is between God and us.

But then, this _whole argument_ proves directly the contrary to that

which this author intended to prove by it.

I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the

nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness

of actions resulting from thence, is the _sole rule_ of God’s actions.

And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that

a man cannot thus abide by the _sole light_ of his own reason, without

contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be

the _sole rule_ of God’s actions.

* For if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _nature_ of things

and persons, and this fitness be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions, it

is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be

_entirely_ inconceivable by us, so as not to be known _at all_, and in

no instances _fully_ known, or _perfectly_ comprehended.

* For if God is to act according to a _fitness founded_ in the _nature_

of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its

fitness founded in his own _incomprehensible_ nature, must he not

necessarily act by a rule _above_ all human comprehension? If he must

govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a _rule_ that is

just as _incomprehensible_ to us as his own nature.

* And we can be no farther _competent judges_ of the _fitness_ of the

conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and

can no more tell what is, or is not _infinitely wise_ in God, than we

can raise ourselves to a _state_ of infinite wisdom.

So that if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _particular

nature_ of things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must

arise from that which is _particular_ to his nature, then we have from

this argument, the _utmost certainty_ that the _rule_ or _reasons_ of

God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and

in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he

is not an _arbitrary being_, that acts by _mere will_, but is governed

in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.

How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner.

_If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove

from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being?_ For how

can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary

consequence of his not being arbitrary?

Supposing God not to be an _arbitrary being_, but to act constantly,

as the perfections of his own nature make it _fit_ and _reasonable_ for

him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehending

the reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.

* For instance; look at the _reason_ of things, and the _fitness_ of

actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state

and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men,

than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating

man of such a _form_ and _condition_, to go through _such_ a state

of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the

comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.

Shew me according to what _fitness_, founded in the _nature_ of things,

God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner,

bring you into such a world, and suffer and preserve _such a state_

of things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to

believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce

from the nature of things.

But whilst your own _form_, whilst _creation_ and _providence_ are

depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to

pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of

religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature

and reason of things.

_Revelation_, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to

see the _reasonableness_ and _fitness_ of it. And don’t you also say,

that God has made you for your _own sake_; ought you not therefore to

know the reasonableness and fitness of God’s forming you as you are?

Don’t you say, that providence is for the _sake_ of man? Is it not

therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there

should be no _mysteries_, or _secrets_, in providence, but that man

should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be

constantly fit and reasonable?

Don’t you say, that the _world_ is for the _sake_ of man; is it not

therefore fit and reasonable that man should see, that the _past_ and

_present_ state of the world has been such as the reason and fitness of

things required it should be?

* Now if the _imperfect_ state of human nature, the _calamities_ of

this life, the _diseases_ and mortality of human bodies, the _methods_

of God’s continual providence in governing human affairs, are things

that as much concern us, as any methods of revealed religion; and if

these are things that we cannot explain, according to any _fitness_ or

_unfitness_ founded in the _nature_ of things, but must believe a great

deal more of the infinite wisdom of God, than we can so explain; have

we any reason to think, that God cannot, or ought not to raise us out

of this unhappy state of things, help us to an higher order of life,

and exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of himself, by any means, but such

as our own poor reason can grope out of the nature and fitness of

things?

Now what is the reason, that all is thus mysterious and unmeasurable

by human reason, in these matters so nearly concerning human nature?

’Tis because God is not an _arbitrary being_, but does that which the

_incomprehensible perfections_ of his own nature, make it _fit_ and

_reasonable_ for him to do. Do but grant that nothing can be _fit_ for

God to do, but what is _according_ to his own _infinite perfections_:

let but this be the _rule_ of his actions, and then you have the

_fullest_ proof, that the fitness of his actions must be above our

comprehension, who can only judge of a _fitness_ according to our _own

perfections_; and then we must be surrounded with mystery for this very

reason, because God acts according to a _certain rule_, his own nature.

_Again_: What is the nature of a human soul, upon what _terms_, and

in what manner it is _united_ to the body, how far it is _different_

from it, how far it is _subject_ to it, what powers and faculties

it _derives_ from it; are things wherein the _wisdom_ and _goodness_

of God, and the _happiness_ of man are deeply concerned. Is it not

necessary that these things should have their foundation in the

_reason_ and _fitness_ of things? And yet what natural reason,

uninspired from above, can shew that this _state_ of soul and body is

founded therein?

* _Again_: The origin of _sin_ and _evil_, or how it entered into the

world consistently with the infinite wisdom of God, is a mystery of

_natural religion_, which reason cannot unfold. For can we shew from

the _reason_ and _nature_ of things, that it was _fit_ and _reasonable_,

for the providence of God to suffer sin to enter, and continue in the

world? Here therefore the man of natural religion must drop his method

of reasoning from the fitness of things, and that in an article of the

highest concern to the moral world, and be as mere a believer, as he

that believes the most incomprehensible mystery of revealed religion.

Now as there have been in the several ages of the world, some

_impatient_, _restless_ and _presuming_ spirits, who, because they

could not in these points explain the justice of God’s providence, have

taken refuge in horrid _atheism_, so they made just the same _sober

use_ of their reason, as our _modern unbelievers_, who because they

can’t comprehend the _fitness_ and _necessity_ of certain Christian

doctrines, resign themselves up to an hardened _infidelity_. For it

is just as reasonable to allow of no mysteries in _revelation_, as to

allow of no mysteries in _creation_ and _providence_.

And whenever this writer shall think it proper to attack _natural_

religion with as much freedom as he has _revealed_, he need not enter

upon any _new_ hypothesis, or _different_ way of reasoning. For the

same turn of thought, may soon find materials in the natural state

of man, for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion,

and the mysteries of providence, as is here brought against revealed

doctrines.

To proceed: If the _fitness of actions is founded in the nature and

relation of beings_, then nothing can be fit for God to do, but so far

as it is fit for the _Governor of all created beings_, whether on earth,

or in any other part of the universe; and he cannot act fitly towards

mankind, but by acting as is fit for the Governor of all beings.

* Now what is fit for the _Governor of all created_ nature to do in

this or that particular part of his creation, is as much above our

reason to _tell_, as it is above our power to _govern_ all beings. And

how mankind ought to be governed, with relation to the whole creation,

of which they are so small a part, is a matter equally above our

knowledge; because we know not how they are a part of the whole, or

what relation they bear to any other part, or how their state affects

the whole, or any other part, than we know what beings the whole

consists of.

Now there is nothing that we know with more certainty than that God is

governor of the _whole_, and that mankind are a _part_ of the whole;

and that the uniformity and harmony of divine providence, must arise

from his infinite wise government of the _whole_; and therefore we have

the utmost certainty, that we are _vastly incompetent_ judges of the

fitness or unfitness of any methods that God uses in the government of

so small a part of the universe, as mankind are.

_Again_: If the _fitness of actions is founded in the relations of

beings to one another_, then the fitness of the actions of God’s

providence over mankind, must be in many instances altogether

incomprehensible to us.

For the relation which God bears to mankind, as their _all-perfect

Creator_ and continual _Preserver_, is a relation that our reason

conceives as imperfectly, and knows as little of, as it does of any

of the divine attributes. When it compares it to that of a _father_

and his children, a _prince_ and his subjects, a _proprietor_ and his

property, it has explained it in the best manner it can, but still has

left it as much a _secret_, as we do the divine nature when we only say,

it is _infinitely_ superior to every thing that is _finite_.

By the natural light of our reason we may know with certainty, several

_effects_ of this relation, as that it puts us under the care and

protection of a wise, and just, and merciful providence, and demands

from us the highest instances of humility, adoration and thanksgiving.

But what it is in its own nature, what kind of state, it is to

exist in and by God, what it is to see by a _light_ that is his, to

act by a power from him, to live by a _life_ in him; are things as

incomprehensible to reason, _left to itself_, as what it is to be in

the _third heavens_, or to hear words that cannot be uttered.

But if this relation consists in these _inconceivable_ things, in a

communication of _life_, _light_ and _power_, if these are enjoyed in

God, and in ourselves, in a manner not to be explained by any thing

that we ever heard, or saw; then we must necessarily be poor judges of

what is fit for God to require of us, because of this _relation_. It

teaches us nothing but the superficialness of our own knowledge, and

the unfathomable depths of the divine perfections.

How little this writer has considered the nature of this _relation_

between God and man, may be seen by the following paragraphs. _The Holy

Ghost_, says he, _cannot deal with men as rational creatures, but by

proposing arguments to convince their understandings; and influence

their wills, in the same manner as if proposed by other agents_. As

absurd, as to say, God cannot _create_ us as rational beings, unless

he creates us in the same _manner_, as if we were created by other

agents. For to suppose that other agents can possibly act upon our

understanding, and will, in the _same manner_ that God does; is as

gross an absurdity, as to suppose that other agents can create us in

the same manner that God creates us.

And to _confine_ the manner of the Holy Ghost’s acting upon us, to the

manner of our acting upon one another by _arguments_ and _syllogisms_,

is as great a weakness, as to _confine_ the manner of God’s creating us,

to the manner of our making a _statue_ with _tools_ and _instruments_.

But he proceeds and says, _For to go beyond this, would be making

impressions on men, as a seal does on wax; to the confounding of their

reason, and their liberty in chusing; and the man would then be mearly

passive, and the action would be the action of another being acting

upon him, for which he could be no way accountable_¹.

¹ Page 199.

Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting

upon men, it must either only propose an argument, just as a man may

propose one, or it must act like a _seal upon wax_.

I only ask this writer, whether God communicates _life_, and _strength_,

and _understanding_, and _liberty of will_ to us, only as men may

communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so,

it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way.

But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God,

enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these

faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor

as _wax_ receives the _impression_ of the _seal_, but in a way as much

above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all

our _power_ of acting, by a _continual communication_ from him, and yet

as free agents, have all our _light_ from him, and yet are _accountable

intelligent_ beings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that

the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be

saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.

The short of the matter is this. Either this _writer_ must affirm, that

our _rational nature_, our _understanding faculties_, our _power_ of

action, our _liberty_ of will, must _necessarily_ subsist without the

_continual action_ of God upon them, or else he must grant, that God

can _act_ upon our _understandings_ and _wills_ without making us as

_merely passive_ as the wax under the seal.

This writer says, _Though the relation we stand in to God, is not

artificial, as most are amongst men――yet this does not hinder, but

that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and

Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects_. But

how are we to know this? _This_, says he, _the divine nature_, which

_contains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to

us_¹.

¹ Page 29.

If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor,

according to his own infinite _perfection and happiness_, therefore

his conduct over us may be _very mysterious_, he had drawn a _plain_

conclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern

us according to something that is not plain, according to his own

_incomprehensible nature_.

His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to

his own _infinite perfection and happiness_; but we _do not know_ what

his infinite perfections and happiness are:

Therefore we _plainly know_ how he is to govern us.

Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be

demonstrative, it is no wonder that all his principles of religion are

founded upon demonstration.

But if he knows no more of what arises from the _relation_ between God

and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well

content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.

It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his

creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly

require of us either in a state of _innocence_ or _sin_. For as the

fitness of actions between beings _related_, must result from their

respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature,

on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly

impossible for mere natural reason to say, what _kind_ of _homage_, or

_worship_, he may _fitly_ require of man in a state of _innocence_; or

what _different_ worship and homage he may, or must require of men, as

_sinners_.

And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, as _plainly

pointing this out_, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to the

_incomprehensibility_ of God as a plain proof of our comprehending what

God is.

As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their

foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are

the same in the state of _innocence_ or _sin_, and we know that we

truly act according to the divine will, when we act according to what

these relations require of us.

But the question is, What distinct kind of _homage_, or _service_, or

_worship_, God may require us to render to him, either in a state of

_innocence_ or _sin_, on account of that relation he bears to us as an

all-perfect Creator and Governor?

But this is a question that God alone can resolve.

Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon

in it. For as the _necessity_ of divine worship, so the _particular

manner_ of it, must have its reason in the divine nature.

_Sacrifice_, if considered only as an _human invention_, could not

be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as a _divine

institution_, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a

reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was

of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply

with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine

appointment altered the _nature_ and _fitness_ of things; but because

nothing has the _nature_ and _fitness_ of divine worship, but as it is

of divine appointment.

Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without

revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God,

and observed every duty both of moral and civil life, as an act of

obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any

particular _manner_ of divine worship himself, or to reject any that

was appointed by God, as _unnecessary_. It would have been ridiculous

to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship.

For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than

innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the

sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject a _revealed

manner_ of divine worship, because God had given them reason of their

own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?

And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have

any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state

of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for

bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God

from sinners.

For what the _relation_ betwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to

require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.

This is a _new state_, and the foundation of a _new relation_, and

nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has its _fitness

resulting_ from it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the

fore-mentioned _relative characters_ of God, as our _Governor_ and

_Preserver_, but what we derive from our idea of human _fathers_

and _governors_: which idea only helps us to comprehend these

_relations_, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend the

_omnipotence_ of God. For a father or governor, no more represents the

_state_ of God as our _Governor_ and _Preserver_, than our living in

our father’s _family_, represents the _manner_ of our living in God.

These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very

plain, as to the _reality_ of their existence; and highly mysterious

and inconceivable, as to the _manner_ of their existence.

That which is _plain_, in these relative characters of God, plainly

shews our obligations to every instance of _duty_, _homage_, _love_,

and _gratitude_.

And that which is _inconceivable_ in them, is a solid foundation of

that _profound humility_, _awful reverence_, _internal piety_ and

_tremendous sense_ of the divine Majesty, with which devout persons

think of God, and assist at the _offices_ of religion. Which excites in

them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation,

than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for all

_things_, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human

authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.

And if some people, by a _long_ and _strict_ attention to _reason_,

and the _fitness_ and _unfitness_ of things, have at last arrived

at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and

devotion, are mere _bigotry_, _superstition_, and _enthusiasm_; I

shall only now observe, that _youthful extravagance_, _passion_, and

_debauchery_, by their own _natural tendency_, without the assistance

of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And

though it is not reckoned any reflection upon _great wits_, when they

hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of that

_reason_ and _philosophy_, which teaches _old men_ to think the same of

religion, that _passion_ and _extravagance_ teach the young.

To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true

idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this

relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being

comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge

and criminals, a _creditor_ and his debtors, a _physician_ and his

patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and

subjects.

For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered,

give us any full idea, either of the _nature_ and _guilt_ of sin or how

God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to

them.

To ask, whether _sin_ hath solely the _nature_ of an offence, against

a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it

is like an _error_ in a _road_ or _path_, and so is entirely at an end,

when the right path is taken; whether its guilt hath the nature of a

debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether

it affects the soul, as a _wound_ or _disease_ affects the body, and so

ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions

are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is really _thinking_,

or his nature a real _substance_. For as his knowledge and nature

cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the

terms _thinking_ and _substance_, so the nature of sin is not _strictly

represented_ under any of these characters, but is capable of receiving

_some representation_ from every one of them.

When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that

we have infinitely more reason to dread it on _God’s account_, than to

dread any offence against our parents, or governors.

When it is compared to a _debt_, it is to signify, that our sins make

us accountable to God, not in the _same manner_, but with the same

certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it

has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.

When it is compared to a _wound_, or disease, it is not to teach us,

that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to

help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring

death to the body, so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.

Since therefore the _nature_ and _guilt_ of sin can only so far be

known, as to make it highly to be _dreaded_, but not so known as to be

_fully_ understood, by any thing we can compare to it:

Since the _relation_ which God bears to _sinners_, can only be so known,

as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in

every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to

teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows,

that if God is not an _arbitrary_ being, but acts according to a

_fitness resulting_ from this relation, he must, in this respect, act

by a _rule_ known only to himself, and such as we cannot _possibly_

state from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things.

For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from

their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, then _reason_ must be

here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in

stating the _nature_, the _guilt_, or proper _atonement_ of sin in men,

than of sin in _angels_.

For _reason_ can no more tell us what the _guilt_ of sin is, what

_hurt_ it does us, how far it _enters_ into, and _alters_ our

very nature, what _contrariety to_, and _separation_ from God, it

necessarily brings upon us, or what _supernatural_ means are, or are

not, necessary to abolish it; our _reason_ can no more tell this,

than our _senses_ can tell us, what is the _inward_, and what is the

_outward_ light of angels.

Ask reason what _effect_ sin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no

more, than if you had asked, what effect the _omnipresence_ of God has

upon the soul.

Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, the

_true nature_ of an atonement for sin, how far it is like _paying_ a

_debt_, or _healing_ a _wound_, or how far it is different from them?

And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is the _true

degree_ of power that _preserves_ us in existence, how far it is _like_

that which at first created us, and how far it is _different_ from it.

All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to

us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities,

and we cannot take upon us to be _philosophers_ in these matters,

but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up to _vision_ and

_imagination_.

And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal to

_hunger_ and _thirst_, and _sensual pleasure_, to tell us _how_ our

souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to our

_reason_ and _logic_, to demonstrate how sin is to be _atoned_, or the

soul _prepared_, and _purified_, for future happiness.

For God has no more given us our reason to _settle_ the nature of an

atonement for sin; or to find out what can, or cannot, take away its

guilt, than he has given us _senses_ and _appetites_ to state the

nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.

And he who rejects the _atonement_ for sins made by the Son of God,

as _needless_, because he cannot prove it to be _necessary_, is as

extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by his _only

Son_, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a

faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son,

as our _reason_ is to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God,

with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.

When therefore this writer says, _Can any thing be more evident, than

that if doing evil be the only cause of God’s displeasure, the ceasing

to do evil, must take away that displeasure?_¹

¹ Page 4.

* Just as if he had said, if conversing with a _leper_ has been the

only cause of a man’s getting a _leprosy_, must not departing from

him, be the removal of the _leprosy_? For if any one, guessing at the

_guilt_ of sin, and its _effects_ on the soul, should compare it to

a _leprosy_ in the body, he can no more say, that he has reached its

_real, internal_ evil, than he, that comparing the happiness of heaven

to a crown of glory, can be said to have described its real happiness.

This _writer_ has no occasion to appeal to the nature of things, if

he can be thus certain about things, whose nature is not only obscure,

but _impossible_ to be known. For it is as impossible for him to know

the _guilt_ and _effects_ of sin, as to know the shape of an angel.

It is as impossible to know by the mere light of reason, what God’s

_displeasure_ at sin is, what _separation_ from sinners it implies, or

how it _obliges_ God to deal with them; as to know what the internal

essence of God is. Our author therefore has here found the utmost

degree of evidence, where it was _impossible_ for him to have the

_smallest degree_ of knowledge.

If a man, having _murdered_ twenty of his fellow-creatures, should

afterward be sorry for it, and wish that he had a power to bring them

to life again, or to create others in their stead, would his ceasing to

kill, and wishing he had a power to create others in their stead, put

him just in the _same state_ with God, as if he had never murdered a

man in his life? But unless this can be said, it cannot be said that

repentance is sufficient to put a man in the _same state_, as if he

never had sinned.

The writer has two more objections against the atonement for sin, made

by Jesus Christ. _First_, as it is an _human sacrifice, which nature

itself abhors_: and which was looked upon as the great abomination of

idolatrous _Pagan_ worship.

The _cruelty_, _injustice_, and _impiety_, of shedding human blood in

the sacrifices of the _Pagans_ is fully granted; but _reason_ cannot

thence bring the smallest objections against the sacrifice of Christ.

For how can reason be more disregarded, than in such an argument as

this? The _Pagans_ were unjust, cruel, and impious, in offering human

blood to their false gods; therefore the true God cannot receive any

_human_ sacrifice, or allow any persons to die, as a punishment for sin.

For, if no human sacrifice can be fit for God to receive, because

human sacrifices, as parts of _Pagan_ worship, were unjust and impious;

then it would follow, that the _mortality_, to which all mankind are

appointed by God, must have the _same cruelty_ and _injustice_ in it.

Now that _death_ is a punishment for sin, and that all mankind are

by death offered as a _sacrifice_ for sin, is not only a doctrine of

revealed religion, but the plain dictate of reason. But if reason must

acknowledge the death of all mankind, as a sacrifice for sin, then it

can have no just objection against the sacrifice of Christ, _because_

it was _human_.

I need not take upon me to prove the _reasonableness_ of God’s

procedure in the _mortality_ of mankind; revelation is not under any

necessity of proving this; because it is no difficulty that arises from

revelation, but equally belongs to natural religion; and both of them

must acknowledge it to be reasonable; not because it can be proved to

be so from the nature of things, but is to be believed to be so, by

faith and piety.

But if natural religion, will not suffer us to think it _inconsistent_

with the justice and goodness of God, to appoint all mankind victims

to death on the account of sin, then _natural_ religion, can have

no objection against the sacrifice of Christ, as it is an _human

sacrifice_.

And all that _revelation_ adds to _natural_ religion, on the point of

_human_ sacrifice, is only this; the knowledge of _one_, that gives

_merit and effect_, to all the rest.

_Secondly_, It is objected, that the atonement made by Jesus Christ,

represents God as punishing the _innocent_ and acquitting the _guilty_;

or, as punishing the innocent _instead_ of the guilty.

But this proceeds all upon mistake: for the atonement made by Jesus

Christ, though it procures pardon for the guilty, yet it does not

acquit them, or excuse them from any punishment, or suffering for sin,

which _reason could impose upon them_. Natural religion calls men to

repentance for their sins: the atonement made by Jesus Christ does not

acquit them from it, or pardon them without it; but calls them to a

_severer_ repentance, than natural religion alone prescribes.

God therefore does not by this proceeding, shew his _dislike_ of the

_innocent_ and his _approbation_ of the _wicked_.

For how can God be thought to punish our blessed Saviour out of

_dislike_, if his sufferings are represented of such infinite merit

with him? Or how can he shew thereby his _approbation_ of the guilty,

whose repentance is not _acceptable_ to him, till recommended by the

infinite merits of Jesus Christ?

As to the fitness of our Lord’s sufferings, as God and man; and the

_nature_ and _degree_ of their worth; reason can no more enter into

this matter, or _prove_ or _disprove_ any thing about it, than it can

enter into the state of the whole creation, and shew, how it could, or

could not, be in the whole, better than it is.

For you may as well ask any of your _senses_, as ask your _reason_ this

principal question, _Whether any supernatural means be necessary for

the atonement of the sins of mankind?_ Or, supposing it necessary,

whether the _mediation_, _death_, and _intercession_ of Jesus Christ,

as God and man, be that true supernatural means?

For as the fitness or unfitness of any _supernatural_ means, for the

atonement of sin, must result from the _incomprehensible relation_

God bears to sinners, as it must have such _necessity_, and _dignity_,

as this relation _requires_, it necessarily follows, that if God acts

according to _this relation_, the _fitness_ of his actions cannot be

according to our comprehension.

Again: Supposing some _supernatural means_ to be necessary, for

destroying the guilt and power of sin; or that the _sufferings_, and

_intercession_, of the Son of God incarnate, is that true supernatural

means, it necessarily follows, that a revelation of such, or any other

_supernatural_ means, cannot possibly be made obvious to our reason and

senses, as the things of human life, or the transactions amongst men

are; but can only be so revealed, as to become just occasions of our

_faith_, _humility_, and _pious resignation_, to the divine wisdom and

goodness.

For, to say that such a thing is _supernatural_, is only saying, that

it is something, which, by the _necessary state_ of our own nature, we

are as incapable of knowing, as we are incapable of seeing _spirits_.

If therefore supernatural things are by the letter of scripture ever

revealed to us, they cannot be revealed to us as they are in their _own

nature_: for if they could, such things would not be _supernatural_.

If an _angel_ could appear to us, as it is in its own nature, then we

should be _naturally_ capable of seeing angels; but, because our nature

is not _capable_ of such a sight; therefore, when _angels_ appear

to men, they must appear, not as they are in themselves, but in some

_human_ or _corporeal_ form.

It is just thus, when any _divine_ matter is revealed by God; it can

no more possibly be revealed to us, as it is in its _own nature_,

than an _angel_ can appear to us, as it is in its own nature; but such

supernatural matter can only be revealed to us, by being represented to

us, by its likeness to something, that we already _naturally_ know.

Thus revelation teaches us this _supernatural_ matter; that Jesus

Christ is making _perpetual intercession for us in heaven_: for

Christ’s _real state_, or _manner_ of existence with God in heaven,

in regard to his church, cannot, as it is in its _own nature_, be

described to us; it is in this respect ineffable, and incomprehensible.

And therefore, this high and inconceivable manner of Christ’s existence

with God in heaven, in regard to his church, is revealed to us under an

idea, that gives us the truest representation of it, we are capable of.

But if any one should thence infer, that the Son of God must therefore

either be always upon his knees, or _prostrate_ in some humble form of

a supplicant, he would make a very weak inference.

Because this revealed idea of Christ, as a perpetual Intercessor in

heaven, is only a comparative representation of something, that cannot

be _directly_ and _plainly_ known as it is in its own nature; and only

teaches us, how to believe something, though imperfectly, yet _truly_

of an incomprehensible nature.

Again: When it is by the letter of scripture revealed to us, that the

blessed Jesus is the one _Mediator_ between God and man; that he is

the _Atonement_, the _Propitiation_, and _Satisfaction_ for our sins:

these expressions only teach us _as much_ outward knowledge of so great

a mystery, as human language can represent. But they do not teach us

the perfect nature of Christ’s state between God and sinners. For that

being a _supernatural_ matter, cannot by any outward words be revealed

to us as it is in its _own nature_, any more than the _essence_ of God

can be made _visible_ to our eyes of flesh.

But these expressions teach us thus much with certainty, that there is

in the _state_ of Christ between God and sinners, something infinitely

and inconceivably beneficial to us; and _truly answerable_ to all that

we mean by _mediation_, _atonement_, _propitiation_, and _satisfaction_.

And though the _real, internal manner_, of this mediation and atonement,

as it is in its own nature, is _incomprehensible_, yet this does not

lessen our knowledge of the truth and certainty of it, any more than

the _incomprehensibility_ of the divine nature, lessens our certainty

of its real existence.

And as our idea of God, though consisting of incomprehensible

perfections, helps us to a real and certain knowledge of the divine

nature; and though all mysterious, is yet the solid foundation of all

piety; so our idea of Jesus Christ, as our _Mediator_ and _Atonement_,

though it be incomprehensible as to its real nature, yet helps us to a

_certain_ knowledge of Christ, as our _Mediator_ and _Atonement_; and,

though full of mystery, is yet full of motives to the highest piety,

love, and gratitude unto God.

All objections therefore, raised from any difficulties about the nature

of _atonements_, _propitiations_, and _satisfactions_, as these words

are used in common language, are vain, and entirely groundless.

For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, that

_atonement_, or _satisfaction_, when attributed to Jesus Christ,

signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms in

_human laws_ or in _civil_ life; take away this supposition, and all

objections are entirely removed with it.

To return: I have granted this writer his great principle, _That the

relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence,

is the sole rule of God’s actions_: and I have granted it upon this

supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to

his _own nature_; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but

what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then

the _rule_ of his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And

consequently, _reason alone_, could not be a competent judge of God’s

proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and

therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and

made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it.

But though I have thus far, granted the _nature_ and _relations_

of things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that

plainly supposes, that his _own nature_ must be the rule of his actions;

yet since our _author_, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines

of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not what

_eternal, immutable_ reasons and relations of things, _independent_

of any being, and which are a _common rule and law of God and man_, I

entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion.

Thus, when this writer says, _If the relations between things, and the

fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions,

must he not be an arbitrary being?_ As he here means some _eternal,

immutable relations, independent_ of God; so, to suppose, that God

cannot be a _wise_ and _good_ being, unless such eternal, independent

relations, be the _sole rule_ of his actions, is as erroneous, as

to affirm, that God cannot be _omniscient_, unless _mathematical

demonstrations_ be his _sole manner_ of knowing all things. And it

is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledge _solely_ in mathematical

demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of his _infallible

knowledge_, as to make I know not what independent relations of things,

the _sole rule_ of his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is

not _arbitrary_, but a wise and good being.

And we have as strong reasons to believe God to be, in the highest

degree, _wise_ and _good_, without knowing on what, his wisdom and

goodness is _founded_; as we have to believe him to be _omniscient_,

and _eternal_, without knowing on _what_ his _omniscience_ is founded;

or to _what_, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to

hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to be _wise_ and _good_,

as to ask what obliges him to be _omniscient_, or _eternal_.

And as it would be absurd to ascribe the _existence_ of God to _any

cause_, or found it upon any _independent relations_ of things, so it

is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of

God to _any cause_, or found them upon any independent relations of

things.

Nor do we any more _lose_ the notion, or _lessen_ the certainty of the

divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say on _what_ they are

founded, than we _lose_ the notion of God, or render his existence

_uncertain_, because it cannot be founded on any thing.

And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to

have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed to _any

cause_ because every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every

thing can be created, so in our account of _wisdom_ and _goodness_,

there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom

and goodness, that never _began_ to be, and that is as different as

to its _manner_ of existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that

have a beginning, as the _existence_ of God is _different_ from the

existence of the creatures.

* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and

goodness that _never began_ to be, then it is as necessary to affirm,

that such wisdom and goodness can no more be _founded_ upon the

_relations_ of things, than the _unbeginning existence_ of God can be

_founded_ upon the existence of things. And to seek for any _reasons_

of a wisdom and goodness that was always in the _same infinite_ state,

is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or asking

_what_ it is that _contains_ infinity.

* When therefore this writer saith, _Infinite wisdom can have no

commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things_;¹

he might as justly have said, an _infinite Creator_ can have no

power of creating, but what is founded on the _unalterable nature_

of creatures.

¹ Page 247.

* For the _reason_ of things, is just as unalterable, as the _nature_

of creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing

else but their _manner_ of existence, or the _state_ of their nature,

certainly the relations of things must have the same _beginning_, and

the same _alterable_ or unalterable nature, as the things from whence

they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist in _such a

manner_, though it does not exist at all.

When therefore he says again, _That the will of God is always

determined by the nature and reason of things_;¹ It is the same as

if he had said, the _omnipotence_ of God is always determined by the

_nature_ of _causes_ and _effects_. For as all causes and effects are

what they are, and _owe_ their _nature_ to the omnipotence of God, so

the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the

wisdom and will of God.

¹ Page 65.

Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God,

destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than

the existence of things depending on the _power_ of God, destroys the

certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot

make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their

existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have

such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time,

though their relations depend upon his will.

So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God,

brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such

relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and

the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as

nature itself is continued; and when that either _ceases entirely_, or

is only _altered_, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations

cease, or are altered with it.

Our author says, _Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on

the eternal reason of things?_¹

¹ Page 425.

* I dare say it with the same assurance, as that his _existence_ is

not founded on the _eternal existence_ of things. And that it is the

same extravagance to say, that God’s laws are founded on the _eternal

reasons_ of things, as to say, that his _power_ is founded on the

_eternal capacities_ of things. For the _capacities_ of things have

just the same _solidity_ and _eternity_, as the relations of things

have, and are just such _independent realities_ as they are: and are

just the same _proper materials_ to found the omnipotence of God upon,

as the relations of things are, to found his infinite wisdom upon.

And as we can say, that the _omnipotence_ of God in preserving and

supporting the creation, will certainly act _suitably_ to itself, and

_consistent_ with that omnipotence which first made things be what

they are, and put nature into such a state as it is in; so we can say,

that the _infinite wisdom_ of God in giving laws to the world, will act

_suitably_ to itself, and _consistent_ with that wisdom which at first

made the nature and relations of the rational world be what they are.

But then as the _omnipotence_ of God, though it acts suitably to the

state of the creation, and the nature of causes and effects, which

it first ordained, yet cannot be said to be founded upon the nature

of causes and effects, because neither causes nor effects have _any

nature_, but what they _owe_ to omnipotence; so the infinite wisdom

of God, though in giving laws to the world, it acts _suitably_ to the

natures and relations of rational beings, yet cannot be said to be

_founded_ upon such relations, because such relations are the _effects_

of the divine wisdom, and owe their existence to it.

And the _reason_ or _relations_ of things shew God’s _antecedent_

wisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature of _causes_ and

_effects_ shew his _antecedent_ power, and are the effects of it.

And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes

and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from the _reason_ and

_nature_ of things.

Again; if God is _infinite_ wisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded

on the relations of things, unless things _finite_, and relations that

began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite,

and could not begin to be.

Therefore to ask, _what_ it is founded upon, when it can have no

foundation upon _any thing_, is asking, what an _independent_ being is

dependent upon, or _how_ that began, which could have no beginning?

And to ask the reason or foundation of _any one_ of the divine

attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all.

And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes,

is seeking for the cause of God’s existence.

And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to the _end_ of

_causes_, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause.

Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose

nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say,

something exists without ever _beginning_ to exist. For as nothing can

have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can

have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom

ever _began_ to be _infinite_, and we could know when that beginning

was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its

infinity was _founded_; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek

for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning.

This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on

the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that

God was not an _arbitrary being_.

* Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being,

that is, a being of the _highest freedom_ and _independency_, that does

every thing according to his _own will_ and _pleasure_, is as vain, as

to seek for reasons to prove, that _all things_ are not the effect of

his _will_. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from

him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can

do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and

arbitrary in as _high a manner_, as he is powerful?

This _writer_ says, _It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst

we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and

caprice._¹

¹ Page 31.

But if God’s _will_ is as _essentially_ opposite to _humour_ and

_caprice_, as his _omnipotence_ is to _weakness and inability_; then

it is as absurd to suppose, that God must act according to humour and

caprice, because he acts according to his own will, as to suppose that

he must act with inability, because he acts by his omnipotence.

And if the will of God, _as such_, is in the highest state of

perfection, then we have the _highest reason_ to love and adore God,

because he is arbitrary, and acts according to his _own all-perfect

will_. And if it be asked, what it is that makes the will of God

_all-perfect_, it may as well be asked, what it is that makes him

omnipotent, or makes him to exist. For, as we have not found out a God,

till we have found a being that has no _cause_; so we have not found

the _will_ of God, till we have found a _will_, that has no _mover_, or

_director_, or _cause_ of its perfection. For that _will_ which never

began to be, can no more be any thing, but what it is in itself, than

it can begin to be.

That which makes people imagine, that _will alone_ is not so adorable,

is because they consider it as a blind imperfect faculty that wants to

be directed. But what has such a will as this to do with the _will_ of

God?

For if the will of God is as _perfect_ a _will_, as his omniscience

is a _perfect knowledge_, then we are as sure, that the will of God

cannot want any direction, or _will_ any thing amiss, as we are, that

his omniscience cannot need any information, or fall into any mistake.

And if the _will_ of God wanted any direction or government, it is

impossible it should have it; for having no superior, it could only be

so governed, because it _willed_ it, and therefore must be always under

its own government.

All the perfection therefore that can be ascribed to God, must be

ascribed to his _will_, not as if it was the production of his will,

(for nothing in God is produced) but as eternally inherent in it.

And as God’s will has thus all the perfection of the divine nature, and

has no rule, or reason, or motive to any goodness, that comes from it,

but its own _nature_ and _state_ in God: so this great will is the only

law of all creatures, and they are all to obey and conform to it, for

this reason, because it is the will of God.

* Nothing has a _moral_ reason, or fitness to be done, but because it

is the will of God that it should be done.

* It may be asked, Is there then no _reason_ or _nature_ of things?

Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of

things, considered _independently_ of the divine will, have no more

_obligation_ in them, than a _divine worship_ considered independently

of, and without any regard to the _existence_ of God. For the _will_

of God is as absolutely necessary to found all _moral obligation_ upon,

as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious

worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the _will_

of God, is only like the fitness of _religious_ worship without the

_existence_ of God.

And it is as just to say, that he destroys the _reason_ of religion,

who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps

the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of

God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its

connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can

moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be

the will of God.

It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is in

_itself absolutely_ unfit to be done?

This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes

actions to be fit _in themselves_, than it makes _things_ to exist

_in, or of themselves_. No things, nor any actions have any _absolute_

fitness, of and in _themselves_.

A _gift_, a _blow_, the making a _wound_, or _shedding_ of _blood_,

considered in themselves, have no _absolute_ fitness, but are fit or

unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.

When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does

not make the thing fit in _itself_, which is just in the _same state_

considered in _itself_, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the

person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit

for him to do, by doing the will of God.

For instance, the _bare eating_ a fruit, considered in _itself_, is

neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food,

then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is

poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If

eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat

our own damnation.

But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered

in _itself fit_ or _unfit_: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from

such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.

Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which

according to his present circumstances, _without_ that command, he

ought not to do, God does not make that which is _absolutely_ unfit

in _itself_, fit to be done: but only adds _new circumstances_ to an

action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral in _itself_,

but because of its circumstances.

Again, it is objected, _If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad,

antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no

reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another._

It is answered, _first_, That all goodness, and all possible perfection,

is as _eternal_ as God, and as essential to him as his existence. And

to say, that they are either _antecedent_ or _consequent_, _dependent_

or _independent_ of his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore,

whether there is not something right and wrong, antecedent to the

will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his

existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something

good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there

be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any

other _source_ or _reason_ of the divine goodness, besides the divine

nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine

omnipotence.

The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and

to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither

_antecedent_, nor _consequent_ to his will.

_Secondly_, Nothing is more certain, than that all _moral obligations_

and _duties_ of creatures towards one another, _began_ with the

existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal

qualities and effects, _began_ with the existence of bodies.

As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has

any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter

so created and constituted by the _will_ of God; so no actions have any

_moral qualities_, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature

in which they are created by the will of God.

* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the same _origin_,

and the _same reason_, that natural qualities and effects have in the

corporeal world, _viz._ the sole will of God. And as in a different

state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and

effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be

different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in

their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because

they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as

their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its

existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right

and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.

The pretended _absolute independent fitnesses_, or _unfitnesses_

of actions therefore _in themselves_, are vain _abstractions_, and

philosophical _jargon_, serving no ends of morality, but only helping

people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God,

which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginary _absolute

fitnesses_ the _common law_ both of God and man, is still more

extravagant. For if the _circumstances_ of actions give them their

_moral nature_, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before

that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.

And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of

his _different state_, cannot require of his brother; surely that which

God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may

require of a son, as God is different from a father.

Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much

under authority; for law can no more be without authority, than without

a law-giver. And if God and we are under the _same law_, we must be

under the _same authority_.

* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures,

any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any ♦of us; so

neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under

any authority at all.

♦ word omitted in text “of”

And though God is not to be looked upon as an _arbitrary being_, in the

sense of this author, who will not distinguish arbitrary from _humour_

and _caprice_; yet in a true sense of the word, when applied to God, he

must be affirmed to be an arbitrary being, that acts only from himself,

from his _own will_, and according to his _own pleasure_.

And we have no more reason to be afraid to be left to a God without

a law, or to be left to his will and pleasure, than to be left under

the protection and care of a being, that is all love, and mercy, and

goodness. For as the existence of God, as such, necessarily implies the

existence of all perfection; so the will of God, as such, necessarily

implies the _willing_ every thing, that _all perfection_ can will.

And as the existence of God, because it contains all perfection, cannot

for that reason have any external cause; so the will of God, because it

is _all perfection_, cannot, for that reason, have any external _rule_

or _direction_. But his own will is wisdom, and his wisdom is his will.

His goodness is arbitrary, and his arbitrariness is goodness.

But this writer does not only thus bring God into this state of law

and obligation with us, but makes farther advances in the same kind

of errors.

_Hence_, says he, _we may contemplate the great dignity of our rational

nature, since our reason for |kind|, tho’ not for degree, is of the

|same nature| with |that of| God’s._¹

¹ Page 24.

Here you see _our reason_, that is, our _faculty_ of reasoning, (for

reason cannot be called _ours_ in any other respect,) has no other

difference from reason as it is in God, but that of degree. But what

greater absurdity can a man fall into, than to suppose, that a being

whose existence had a beginning but a few years ago, differs only in a

degree from that which could not possibly have a beginning; or that a

_dependent_ and _independent_ being, should not be different in _kind_,

but _only_ in degree?

For to say, that the faculties of a dependent and independent being,

may be of the same kind, is as flat a contradiction, as to say, the

same kind of thing may be dependent, and independent.

Reason belongs to God and man, just as _power_, _existence_, _life_,

and _happiness_, belong to God and man; and he that can, from happiness

being common to God and man, prove our happiness to be of the _same

kind_ and nature with God’s, may also prove reason in God and man to be

of the same kind.

This writer indeed says, _Our happiness is limited, |because| our

reason is so; |and that God has| unlimited happiness, |because| he

alone has unlimited reason._¹

¹ Page 24.

But if that which is _necessarily limited_, is different from that

which is _necessarily unlimited_, then we have proof enough from this

very argument, that a reason _necessarily_ limited cannot be of the

_same kind_ with that reason, which is _necessarily_ unlimited. Unless

it can be said, that limited and unlimited, finite and infinite,

beginning and unbeginning, have no contrariety in _kind_, but only

differ, as a _short_ line differs from a _long_ one.

* The truth of the matter is this; reason is in God and man, as

power is in God and man. And as the divine power has some degree of

likeness to human power, yet with an _infinite_ difference from it:

so that perfection which we call _reason_ in God, has some degree of

likeness to reason as it is in man, yet is _infinitely_ and beyond all

conception different from it.

* And as our enjoyment of power is so limited, so imperfect, so

superficial, as to be scarce sufficient to tell us, what power is, much

less what omnipotence is; so our share of reason is so small, and we

enjoy it in so imperfect a manner, that we can scarce think or talk

intelligibly of it, or so much as define our own faculties of reasoning.

CHAPTER II.

_Shewing from the |relation| between God and man, that human

reason cannot be a competent judge of the |fitness| and

|reasonableness| of God’s proceedings with mankind, either

as to the |time|, or |matter|, or |manner| of an external

revelation._

AS our author has laid it down for an undeniable rule of God’s actions,

that he must, if he be a wise and good being, act according to the

relation he stands in towards his creatures; I proceed upon this

principle to prove the incapacity of _human reason_, to judge _truly_

of God’s proceedings in regard to divine revelation.

For if the fitness of actions _results from the nature and relations_

of beings, then the _fitness_ of God’s actions, as he is an _omniscient

Creator_ and _Governor_, to whom every thing is _eternally foreknown_,

over beings endued with _our freedom of will_, must be to us

incomprehensible.

* We are not so much as capable of comprehending by our reason, the

_possibility_ of this relation, or how the fore-knowledge of God can

consist with the free agency of creatures. We know that God fore-knows

all things, with the same certainty as we know there is a God. And

if _self-consciousness_ is an infallible proof of our own existence,

it proves with the same certainty the freedom of our will. And hence

it is, that we have a full assurance of the consistency of God’s

fore-knowledge with freedom of will.

* Now this _incomprehensible_ relation between an _eternally

fore-knowing Creator and Governor_, and his free creatures, is the

_relation_ from whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us.

But if the _relation_ itself is incomprehensible, then those actions

that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible.

Nothing can be fit for God to do, either in _creation_ or _providence_,

but what has its fitness founded in his _fore-knowledge_ of every thing

that would follow, from _every kind_ of creation, and _every manner_ of

providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according to

_this fore-knowledge_ of _every thing_ that would follow from _every

kind_ of creation, and _every manner_ of providence; then we have the

utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as a _fore-knowing

Creator_, and _Governor_ of free agents, must be founded upon _reasons_

that we cannot possibly know any thing of.

* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified

to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which

the whole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is

qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which a

_fore-knowing Providence_ observes over free agents. For every reason

on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not only

_unknown_ to us, but by a necessity of nature _impossible_ to be known

by us.

For if the _fitness_ of God’s acting in this, or that manner, is

founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would _happen_, from

every _possible way_ of acting, then it is impossible for us to know

the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is

impossible for us to be omniscient.

Who can tell what _different kinds_ of rational creatures,

distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and

reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would

be the _effect_ of such different creations? Who can explain the

_fitness_ of that vast _variety_ there is amongst rational creatures

of the _same species_, or shew that all their different faculties ought

to be as they are? And yet the _fitness_ of this providence has its

_certain reason_ in the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit,

but because of it.

Who can tell what _degree_ of reason rational creatures ought to

enjoy, or what degrees of _new_ and _revealed_ knowledge it is fit and

reasonable for God to give, or not give them, because they seem, or

seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to

receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable

for God to create them of such a _kind_, and _degree_, as they are of;

so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their

natural knowledge, and make them as _differently accountable_ for

the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural

faculties.

And as the reason why God created them of _such_ a _kind_, and

with _such faculties_, was because of his own fore-knowledge of the

_effects_ of such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them any

_supernatural_ knowledge, both the doing it, the _time_, the _matter_,

and _manner_ of it, must have their fitness in his own _eternal

fore-knowledge_ of the effects of such a revelation.

The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation

depends, _why_ or _when_, of _what matter_, in _what manner_, and to

whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be

as unsearchable by us, as the reasons of _this_ or _that_ creation of

rational beings, at such a _time_, of such a _kind_, in such a _manner_,

in such a _state_.

This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions,

which this writer puts in this manner.

“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men

was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who

at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times

alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his

creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the

beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer

the doing it till the time of _Tiberius_; since the sooner this was

done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹

¹ Page 393.

And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being

universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children,

when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have

communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in

all languages, as in one?”¹

¹ Page 196.

Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and

fundamental principle.

“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things

resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹ as he

expressly affirms; then the _sole rule_ or reason of God’s revealing

any thing to any men, at any time, must have its _fitness resulting_

from the divine fore-knowledge of the effects of _such_ a revelation,

at _such_ a time, and to _such_ persons. If God does not act thus,

he does not act according to the relation betwixt a _fore-knowing

Creator_, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to a

_fitness resulting_ from this _relation_, and makes, or does not make

revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of

times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good,

can make a revelation at any time, and not make the _same_ at _all_

times, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can

reveal that at one time, because it is a _proper_ time for it, and not

reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.

¹ Page 28.

* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of the _fitness_

of times, and of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents, deferred

a certain revelation to the time of _Tiberius_, because he _fore-saw_

it would then be an act of the _greatest_ goodness, and have its

_best effects_ upon the world: to ask therefore, _what reason can be

assigned_, why so good a revelation was not _sooner_, or even from the

_beginning_ made to the world, is asking, why God should act, according

to his _own fore-knowledge_ of the _state_ and _actions_ of _free

agents_, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from

such a fore-knowledge?

These questions suppose, that if God shewed his _goodness_ to mankind

by a revelation at such time, he must be _wanting_ in goodness

before that time, because he did not make it _sooner_; whereas if his

deferring it till _such_ a time, was owing to his _fore-knowledge_ of

the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have

its _best effects_, then God is proved to be equally good before he

made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before its

_proper_ time: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had not

_deferred_ it till that time.

Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions

of _free agents_, as the cause of all that is particular in the _time_

and _manner_ of any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence,

cannot be said to be _begging the question_, but is resolving it

directly according to the _rule_, which this writer lays down for God

to act by: that “the relations between things and persons, _and_ the

fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”

But if this is the _sole rule_, then God in giving any revelation, must

act as the _relation_ betwixt a _fore-knowing_ Creator and his _free_

creatures requires; and his actions must have their _fitness resulting_

from his fore-knowledge of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents.

And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask why _this_ or _that_

revelation _only_ at _such_ a time, is to ask why God _only_ does that

which is _fit_ for him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation

at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it is _not

fit_ for him to do?

This writer asks, “How it is consistent with the notion of God’s being

universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children,

who had equal need of it?” But if they had _equal need_ of it, yet if

they were not _equally fit_ for it, but prepared only to have their

_guilt_ increased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then

God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information

from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.

_Judas_, _Pontius Pilate_, and the _Jews_ that called for our Saviour’s

crucifixion, had _equal need_ of a Saviour with those that believed in

him. _Chorazin_ and _Bethsaida_ wanted the light of the gospel as much

as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at

that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were,

God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the

light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.

So that this argument, founded on the _equal need_ of all, or former

ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation

made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good

effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for

such a _particular time_ and _state_ of things and persons.

He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to

all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in

any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does

things because they are _easy_, or forbears things because they are

_difficult_ to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought

to have revealed such things to _all_ nations or persons, because it

was as _easy_ to him, as to do it to _any one_ nation or person; unless

it be supposed, that the _easiness_ of a thing is a reason why God does

it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But

if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it

must be liable to the same charge.

But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they

are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has

afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this,

that his _manner_ of revealing every thing, might be worthy of his

own _fore-knowledge_ of the effects of it, and that every thing that

is particular in the _time_ or _manner_ of any revelation, might have

its _fitness resulting_ from the _relation_ betwixt a good God and his

creatures, whose _changing_ state, _different_ conduct, tempers and

actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.

Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the

effect of _justice_, or else of _mercy_ and _free goodness_; but in

either of these cases it ought to be _universal_; for justice must be

done to all. But if it is the effect of _mercy_ and _free goodness_,

this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good,

who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹

¹ Page 401.

It is answered, That there is neither _justice_ in God without mercy,

nor _mercy_ without justice; and to ascribe a _revelation_ to either

of them separately, in _contradistinction_ to the other, has no more

reason in it, than to ascribe the _creation_ separately either to the

_wisdom_ or _power_ of God, in contradistinction to the other.

_Secondly_, A divine revelation is not owing barely to the _justice_

or _free goodness_ of God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of

God, _governed_ and _directed_ by his eternal fore-knowledge of all the

effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.

* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place;

not because it is a _justice_ that he cannot refuse, not because it

is a matter of _favour_ or _free goodness_, and therefore may be given

in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the whole _duration_

of human things, the whole _race_ of mankind, the whole _order_ of

human changes and events, the whole _combination_ of all causes and

effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the

consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according

to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing

that is _particular_ in it, either as to _time_, _matter_, _manner_, or

_place_.

* All complaints therefore about that which is _particular_, or

_seemingly_ partial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very

unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings,

because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done,

and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but

according to his own infinite perfections.

* We will not allow a providence to be _right_, unless we can

comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not

possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as much _above_ our

comprehension, as our wisdom is _below_ that which is infinite.

For if the _relations_ of _things_, and _persons_, and the fitness

resulting from thence, be the _rule_ of God’s actions; then all the

revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting

from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to the _various states_,

_conditions_, _tempers_, and _actions_ of free agents, and the various

effects of every manner of revelation.

But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless

he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he

must act by a _rule_ that lies out of our sight, and his providence in

this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason,

because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it

ought to have.

CHAPTER III.

_Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the

reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation._

THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation

between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on

which a divine revelation is founded, both as to its _time_, _matter_,

and _manner_.

But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections

must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and

manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are

to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or

receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every

revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”

If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong

belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong

belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious

for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine

revelation, either as to its _matter_ or _manner_, as imperfectly as

he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for

believing _false revelations_, as for _idolatry_; and as full of guilt

for rejecting a _true revelation_, as for denying the only _true God_.

_Secondly_, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending the _reasons_,

on which the particular _matter_ or _manner_ of any divine revelation

is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons for

_receiving_ or not _receiving_ a revelation as divine, as to make our

conduct therein justly accountable to God.