THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING
[Sidenote: The gold industry re-started.]
With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate
submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks.
The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of
the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably
inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists,
and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the
most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River
Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great
industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not
only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles
within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange
River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms
before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story
of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly
records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold
industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission
to set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to
November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first
time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress
was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round
numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953,
and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and
sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May,
1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output
to 138,600 oz., of the value of L600,000, and 30,000 additional
British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in
view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the
expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces
in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the
Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that
its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate
attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that
during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were
being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was
ultimately reduced below the normal.
The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle
precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far
as his efforts could avail, it should not be unprepared for the
economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a despatch
of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr. Chamberlain the
importance of settling British colonists upon the land, and pressed
for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this question.
[Sidenote: Land settlement.]
"This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote,
"and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have
reached a point where little more progress can be made without a
decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British
colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale,
under Government control and with Government assistance, or to be
left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and
sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with
no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give
it.... The principal consideration is the necessity of avoiding a
sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of
the population between the country districts and the towns. If we
do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an
industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost
wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural
population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not
possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave
misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners
upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting
life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new
element we may be simply laying up the material for further
trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the attitude of the
rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy
with British ideas as ever.... To satisfy these demands, it is
clear that no small and makeshift scheme will suffice. Land
settlement must be undertaken on a large scale; otherwise,
however useful, it will be _politically_ unimportant.
"The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely
necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses
arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my
profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we
provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the
settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity
will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which
will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and
prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these
first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be
required if land settlement is to assume the proportions which I
contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this
line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty
in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do
fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize
every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to
our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want
to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game,
and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command
of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away
opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards.
"What I want to put plainly to His Majesty's Government are these
two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good
land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily,
if necessary? And, assuming this question to be answered in the
affirmative, (2) what amount shall we be able to dispose of for
this purpose in the immediate future?"[319]
[Footnote 319: Cd. 1,163.]
It had been arranged during Lord Milner's last visit to England that
the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic
reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be
provided by a loan secured upon their assets and revenues. The
purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were
the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new
lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the
compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and
in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home
Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus
raised, a sum of L3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum
L2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and L1,000,000 in the
Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not
issued until after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa in the
(South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner's proposal was
approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited
resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable
for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies.
Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme
importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa,
the preparation of the administrative machinery, the _materiel_ of
transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for the repatriation
of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing activity. At the same
time certain other administrative questions were brought by him to the
consideration of the Home Government during these months (January to
May, 1902), with the result that the ink was scarcely dry upon the
Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask for, and obtain,
decisions upon them.
[Sidenote: On the eve of peace.]
The telegrams which passed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office
on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following
the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of
Lord Milner's calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to keep
pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On
April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent.
tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining
industry. The rate is high--twice as high as the gold tax under the
Republic--and will yield an annual revenue of L500,000 or L600,000 on
a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes
that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed
while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope
that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to
show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the
decision on this matter of such general economic importance at once.
Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further information; and we find
Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I trust you will now agree to
the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am anxious to publish the
Proclamation in next Friday's _Gazette_." And to this Mr. Chamberlain
replies on June 4th, "I agree to the imposition of a 10 per cent. tax
on the profits of gold mines." On June 2nd, that is, two days after
the terms of surrender have been signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends
a "most urgent" telegram on the immediate financial position:
"The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the
new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year,
but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good.
We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African
Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing
provided for the various extraordinary items which have been
hitherto financed out of the L500,000 grant for relief and
re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for
this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the L500,000 is
nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement,
which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped,
especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority
to spend another L500,000 on these purposes. This is independent
of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of
the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you
immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in
acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the
immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the
fundamental questions of finance settled promptly, a breakdown
is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to feel that
services already started and working well were provided for at
least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new and
heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will require
all my attention in the immediate future."[320]
[Footnote 320: Cd. 1,163.]
Mr. Chamberlain's reply comes on June 18th:
"You may incur expenditure up to L500,000 more for relief and
re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan."
On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating
the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these
lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval."
The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally.
Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the
persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for
a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch
on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is
proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs,
on June 20th:
[Sidenote: "It is vital to make a start".]
"If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I
would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on
those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it
is vital to make a start."
There is land available, and there are men available--over-sea
colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of agriculture, who have fought
in the war, and have, therefore, a first claim to be considered. But
these desirable settlers cannot afford to wait in a country like South
Africa, where the cost of living is abnormally high, without a
definite prospect of employment.
"Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be
bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being
severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay."
This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of July 7th, in which
he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner's proposals, and leaves him
"full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is
not possible to criticise effectively" in London.
In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal
initiation of Crown Colony government:
"I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord
Milner says, "constituting the Government of the Transvaal, and
my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath."
And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at
once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the
Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a
non-official element:
[Sidenote: Colonists and the settlement.]
"I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would
be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to
the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present
improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new
colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of
public business."
To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief
telegram of July 7th.[321]
[Footnote 321: Cd. 1,163.]
Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the
spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous
wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of
the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of
Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the
tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after
the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new
colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever
previously attained."[322] The story of this "tremendous effort," with
its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved
for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part
which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the
republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South
Africa.
[Footnote 322: At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From _The
Star_ report.]
Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the
surrender of the Boer forces in the field, it is necessary to recall
the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of the new
colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and the
Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the preceding
year (1901). In these communications--the origin of which has been
mentioned previously[323]--the significance attached by loyalist
opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily left
undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general policy
of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape ministers,
while recognising that full representative self-government should be
conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the necessity of
maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until "such time as it
was certain that representative institutions could be established, due
regard being had to the paramount necessity of maintaining and
strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in question." And as,
in their opinion, "this consummation would be ultimately assured and
materially strengthened by a large influx of immigrants favourably
disposed to British rule," they expressed the hope that "no time would
be lost after the conclusion of the war in putting into effect a large
scheme of land settlement." More than this, with the object-lesson of
the actual breakdown of representative government in their own Colony
before their eyes, they added a recommendation that this British
immigration should not be confined to the new colonies, but that a
portion of the funds to be provided by the Imperial Government for
this purpose should be allocated to the Cape Colony.
[Footnote 323: See p. 489.]
[Sidenote: The language question.]
In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the
settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in
particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion
of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of
British government in the former Republics would afford. The
settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated
as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal
administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before
intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to
crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore,
insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the
predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support
of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the
"Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so
called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from
"the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No
one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth
of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education
sufficient to qualify him for the public services, or for a
professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second
language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less
difficult--probably more difficult--to him than to learn English, the
desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English
becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical
convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making
English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority
to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the
language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a
matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South
Africa.
"The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa
generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance
of the English language. The language question has done more,
probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke
racial animosity."
They, therefore, recommend that--
"English should be the official and predominant language in the
higher courts, and in the public service--combined with such
concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and
circumstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached
to all courts and to the principal public offices, and their
services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as
in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in
all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools
situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all
other primary schools. Dutch should be the medium of instruction
meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts, and it
should be taught in all schools where there is a reasonable
demand for it."[324]
[Footnote 324: Cd. 1,163.]
On the question of disarmament they wrote:
"In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is
necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new
colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then
the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be
contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance."
[Sidenote: The native question.]
On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies,
the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent.
"For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given
political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect
of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would
materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and
be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives
should be taught habits of steady industry.
"Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with
their language and customs.
"The assumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal
to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English
have suffered from its influence.
"A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely,
owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a
feeling that even the just rights of natives would be
disregarded. It is essential, in the interests of the natives
themselves, generally, that the Home Government should work in
accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great
influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will
secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local
feeling."[325]
[Footnote 325: Cd. 1,163.]
As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of
South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the
learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To
effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of
professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa,
and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil
service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of
service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They
also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of
the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this
claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully
annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial
Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on
the termination of the war.
As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of
any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of
British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a
cost. As the representative man of the British in South Africa, he
was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender contained no
concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer people
calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative union of
the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility laid
upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might be
conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be conceded,
was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. That the
Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more favourable
terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner, is apparent
from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively with the
former. In this object, however, they were entirely unsuccessful,
since the Home Government indicated from the first their desire that
Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for negotiation; and in
the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him with the assistance
of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the Transvaal
Administration.
[Sidenote: The peace negotiations.]
The actual circumstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations
originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen,
the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord
Kitchener was assured, the Netherlands Government communicated their
readiness to mediate between the British Government and the
Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State,
with a view to the termination of hostilities. To this offer the
British Government replied that, while they were sincerely desirous of
terminating the war, the only persons whom they could recognise as
competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the Boer forces
in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to forward a copy
of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments
to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this communication Mr. Schalk
Burger, as acting President of the South African Republic, informed
Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to treat for peace, but that
before doing so he wished to see President Steyn. He, therefore, asked
for a safe-conduct through the British lines and back to effect this
purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home Government authorised Lord
Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and Lord Milner agreed in
thinking it desirable." As the result of the consultation between
Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free State and Transvaal
leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was decided, on April
10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to receive
representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be
appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals."
The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President
Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey
met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The
proposals which the Boer representatives then put forward were wholly
inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed them to London
with the remark:
"I have assured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's
Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the
independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they
must expect a refusal."
[Sidenote: Independence refused.]
On the day following the British Government replied that they could
not
"entertain any proposals which were based upon the former
independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to
the British Crown."
Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up
the position that they were not competent to surrender the
independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning
thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked,
therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers.
This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had,
as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the
British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to
grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on
their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any
expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal
Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the
offer made by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve months
before.
"We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April
16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer
leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April.
"The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have
been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not
entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the
two South African States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume
that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of
independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces
still in the field.
"They now state that they are constitutionally incompetent to
discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence,
but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted
if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to
relinquish the demand for independence.
"This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of
proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest
moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the
loss of so much life and treasure.
"We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to
spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the
restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by
the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to
refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha
more than twelve months ago,[326] and to inform them that,
although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the
forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us
by the refusal of that offer would justify us in imposing far
more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the hope of a
permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general surrender
on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications in detail
as may be agreed upon mutually.
"You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them,
and to submit the result for our approval.
"Communicate this to the High Commissioner."[327]
[Footnote 326: For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms,
see above, p. 471, and forward; p. 568, note 2.]
[Footnote 327: Cd. 1,096.]
[Sidenote: Consulting the Burghers.]
Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives
put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham
Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,[328] might be
allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations,
and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation
and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both
these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener
was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the
burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two
days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in
the field--exclusive of those in the Cape Colony--to be elected, and
meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the
two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed,
every possible assistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to
the Boer leaders with the object of enabling them to carry out these
arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and passes for
their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the localities
chosen for the commando assemblies, the places and dates of which had
been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer representatives left
Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the British troops. In spite,
however, of the restrictions imposed upon the activity of the forces
under his command, Lord Kitchener was able to report, on June 1st,
that "good progress" had been made in the work of the campaign up to
the actual cessation of hostilities.[329]
[Footnote 328: This deputation was despatched in March, 1900,
to "win the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.]
[Footnote 329: Cd. 986.]
The sixty Boer representatives--two for each commando--thus assembled
at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat
for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis
Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and Smuts, and
President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other
civilians,[330] proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th,
they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward
the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation:
[Footnote 330: A full list of the names is to be found in the
Draft Terms of Surrender at p. 564.]
[Sidenote: The terms drafted.]
"(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards
foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under
British supervision. (3) We are prepared to surrender a part of
our territory."
What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's
telegram to the Secretary for War:
"Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for
negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid
down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion,
nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the
afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner
proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the
burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of
objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner
should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as
possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.[331] They
will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for
the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the
draft document."[332]
[Footnote 331: These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year
ago. See note 2, p. 568.]
[Footnote 332: Cd. 1,096.]
The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is
to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between
May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness
on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they
allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction
to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental
difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be
accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally
maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg
terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord
Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your
proposal into consideration."
[Footnote 333: Smuts.]
[Footnote 334: Hertzog.]
[Footnote 335: De Wet.]
[Footnote 336: Botha.]
[Sidenote: Payment of Boer war debts.]
On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in
consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the
Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State
High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the
negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur;
but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the
the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military
and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The
Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by
their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be
recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments
for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner,
on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very
unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets
of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time
when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for
expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war
against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly
indefensible. The British people, he said--
"would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of
hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the
people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much
smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during
the war."
As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and
receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing,
with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home
Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the
Middelburg terms.
This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the
clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately
became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a
compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite
sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course
of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make
a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government
followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant--L3,000,000--and in
rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be
devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by
them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be
submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to
be appointed to distribute the L3,000,000 grant.
The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in
the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the
Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful
general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and
anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and
arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping
military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army
or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted
statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South
Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and
interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are
being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is
exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the
actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once
accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of
surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to
an agreement, it will be the _English_ document which will be wired to
England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which
will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not necessary to
place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British
Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular
matter, he replies:
"As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain
promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to
which a reference may be made later should appear in it.
Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should
appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to
clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible
misunderstanding."
[Sidenote: Lord Milner's vigilance.]
And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You
must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid
before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible
misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that
the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly
considered," he says:
"Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am
convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this
document must contain everything about which there is anything in
the form of a pledge."
And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he
draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language
to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been "completely
annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement should be
signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document, or its
terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."
The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord
Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated,
unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer
commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months
of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of
their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion
and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new
agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the
whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home
Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer
"delegates."
"It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr.
Chamberlain,[337] "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of
this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at
Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those
occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by
His Majesty's Government."
[Footnote 337: Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and
De la Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.]
[Sidenote: Approval of Home Government.]
At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement
was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain
informed Lord Milner by telegram that the Cabinet approved of the
submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and with
the new clause dealing with the grant of L3,000,000, to the Assembly
at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be inflicted
upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed in
private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener and
Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had been
settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner and Mr.
Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The reason for
this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, while they
objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made part of
the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless quite
willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which it
was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of
Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the
statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their
respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on
May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His
Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of
further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to
the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The
Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day
for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of Surrender were
submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher representatives.
One other point had been raised and settled between Lord Milner and
the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August 7th, 1901,
certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of
confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that
in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly
dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could
not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government
concurred.
The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at
Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:
"_Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces
in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government._
"His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord
Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T.
Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and
Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange
Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis
Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the
Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their
respective burghers desirous to terminate the present
hostilities, agree on the following articles:
[Sidenote: The surrender agreement.]
"1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their
arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in
their possession or under their control, and desist from any
further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward
VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner
and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord
Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant
Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.
"2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal
or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present
outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring
their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King
Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as
transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence
ensured.
"3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be
deprived of their personal liberty or their property.
"4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any
of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in
connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this
clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of
war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the
Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial
immediately after the close of hostilities.
"5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the
children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when
necessary for the better and more effectual administration of
justice.
"6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their
protection, on taking out a licence according to law.
"7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River
Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil
government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative
institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.
"8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will
not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.
"9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the
war.
"10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the
local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each
district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the
presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of
assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and
supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide
themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed,
stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their
normal occupation.
"His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these
Commissions a sum of L3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will
allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African
Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the
late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a
Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government,
and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to
have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they
will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of
war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally
given.
"In addition to the above-named free grant of L3,000,000, His
Majesty's Government will be prepared to make advances on loan
for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and
afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent.
interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit
of this clause."[338]
[Footnote 338: Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign
the Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State
representatives. He was declared President, in the place of
Steyn, at Vereeniging on the 29th.]
[Sidenote: Punishment of rebels.]
To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of
the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer
commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of
Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.
"His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the
treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion
and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be
determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the
laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have
joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that
part of the British Empire to which they belong.
"His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government
that the following are their views as to the terms which should
be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the
field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th
April, 1901:
"With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon
surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the
resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes
place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the
punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have
been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the usages of
civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be entitled for
life[339] to be registered as voters or to vote at any
Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With
reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape
Colony and all other persons holding an official position under
the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of
commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for
high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such
special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the
punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the
court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of
death be inflicted.
"The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt
with according to the law of the Colony."[340]
[Footnote 339: This was reduced to a period of five years.]
[Footnote 340: Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg
terms, the terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less
favourable to the Boers in respect of permission to possess
arms, and the use of the Dutch language; but the monetary
assistance promised to the repatriated burghers was more
generous. The free grant was raised from one million to three
millions, and the advances on loan were offered for the first
two years free of interest, and subsequently at only three
per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon
the prolongation of the war made this increased assistance
necessary and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that
Lord Milner, alike in the Middelburg and Vereeniging
negotiations, although he was opposed to any payment of the
costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on the war,
was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government in
the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all
other matters that concerned their material prosperity.
One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms
is noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of
Commons by the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the
Colonies (Mr. Winston Churchill), that the use of the word
"natives" in clause viii. of the Terms of Surrender prevented
the introduction of any legislation affecting the _status_ of
Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new colonies prior to
the establishment of self-government. This assertion was
based upon the contention that the word "natives" is
understood by the Boers to indicate the "native of any
country other than those of the European inhabitants of South
Africa." The actual text of the corresponding clause in the
Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener's despatch of March 20th,
1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards the extension of
the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and Orange River
Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government
to give such franchise before representative government is
granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so
limited as to secure the just predominance of the white
races. The legal position of coloured persons will, however,
be similar to that which they hold in Cape Colony." Apart
from the fact that the Boers were debarred by Lord Milner's
specific statements either from going behind the English text
of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining
[the Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg
proposal," it is difficult to see how this Middelburg clause
could have raised any presumption in the minds of the Boer
commissioners that the English word "native" was intended to
include not only the Kafirs (of which word it is a loose
equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the Bantu
tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal
yellow-skinned natives of South Africa--the Bushmen and
Hottentots), but the "coloured people," or half-castes.
Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July
31st, 1906) with reference to Mr. Churchill's statement that
the question had not been raised, to the best of his belief,
by the Boer commissioners; and that in any case there was
nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to prevent the Crown
Colony administration of the new colonies from legislating in
respect of "coloured persons." [And _a fortiori_ in respect
of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the
treaty says 'natives' and does not say 'coloured people.' I
think that in the Dutch version the word 'naturellen' was
used. I venture to say that nobody familiar with the common
use of language in South Africa would hold either that
'natives' included coloured people, some of whom very much
more resemble whites than natives, or that 'naturellen'
included 'kleurlingen,' which is the universally accepted
Dutch word in South Africa for coloured people."]
[Sidenote: The last debates.]
[Sidenote: Accepting the inevitable.]
With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final
stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still
required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly
at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the
morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by
the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of
the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners
on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting
President of the South African Republic, then announced that the
meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses
should be taken--to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or
to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting,
and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in
questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various
Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding
between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the
Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the
delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually
proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on
the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so
much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in
the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria
convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of
accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually,
to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the
surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible
from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour
should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the
question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the
delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the
Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted
discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the
afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the
limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long
debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke
more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments
used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering
that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he
said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of
indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be
continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the
form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the
substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice
the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From
this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words
of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was
preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then
a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the
commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6
votes.
[Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the
commando representatives--as also those of the earlier
meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General
Christian de Wet in _The Three Years' War_.]
After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution
constituting a committee[342] to collect funds for the destitute Boers
was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the
decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to
sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.
[Footnote 342: Three of the members of this committee,
Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to
proceed to Europe for the purposes of this appeal.]
Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to
Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on
administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going
on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the
telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the
Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was
just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought
the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner
and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former
British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here,
at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10
o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement
was signed.[343]
[Footnote 343: The actual surrender of the arms in the
possession of the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out
with admirable promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement
had been signed Lord Kitchener was able, in a final despatch
from Capetown on June 23rd, to record his "high appreciation
of the unflagging energy and unfailing tact" with which
Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet had
facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed
to receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in
the Cape Colony less expeditious in surrendering to General
French. In all 21,226 burghers and colonial rebels, of whom
11,166 were in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River
Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down their arms. Lord
Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and 23rd),
addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the
Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic
utterances. His message to the former was:
"I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal
to acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South
Africa to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal. I will only say here
that no request of mine was ever refused by any of these
Governments, and that their consideration and generosity
were only equalled by the character and quality of the
troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that
country."
And of the troops, which under his command had successfully
accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he
wrote:
"The protracted struggle which has for so long caused
suffering to South Africa has at length terminated, and
I should fail to do justice to my own feelings if at
this moment I neglected to bear testimony to the
patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been displayed
by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and
Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing
but the qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops
could have overcome the difficulties of this campaign,
or have finally enabled the empire to reap the fruits of
all its sacrifices."]
[Sidenote: Admissions of the Boer leaders.]
The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at
Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the
hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer
sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people
abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war
in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of aggression
forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the enemies of
England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the enemy. Very different
is the account of the origin of the war, which Acting President
Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow countrymen in this day
of truth-telling.
"Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he
said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon.
We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we
under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon
our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the
possibility of defeat."
And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and
one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded
by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war;
I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this
"although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts,
State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general
of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as
members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the
war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, since in
the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies himself
would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.
[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.]
No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now
that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that
the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they
regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of
barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more
Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought
the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General
de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war,
said:
"I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That
is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I
think also we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the
men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the
women, and then they could take the women with them to the
English in the towns."
But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any
longer carrying this plan into effect.
"When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of
provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot
without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then
well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too
thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English
protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our
greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man
answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to
the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women
now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how
can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to
give up liberty for their sakes?"
And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:
"If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision
for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every
kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has
caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get
them into the townships, but later on this became impossible,
because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the
idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending
the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable,
because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and
the men still on commando were not so closely related to these
families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."
Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the
efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected
areas.
[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.]
"A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We
could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the
enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different
aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by
day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos."
And again--
"There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have
managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have
been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the
British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But
things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after
district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory.
In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its
forces upon us."
To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of
again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.
"Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season
of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed.
How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that
they can only go _op-een-stap_?"[344]
[Footnote 344: An onomatopoeic expression for the step of a
tired horse.]
Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct
evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers,
and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led
them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May
30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of
the English Government "may not be very advantageous to us, but
nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." And
Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the
document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to
stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is
because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a
tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it.
What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and
the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the
continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief
description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,[345] he
writes:
[Footnote 345: _The Three Years' War._]
"There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes
or No. It was an ultimatum--this proposal of England. What were
we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."
[Sidenote: Boer claim to independence.]
Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the
question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the
moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the
British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their
minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives
agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the
sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming
their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History may well ask,
On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical standard,[346] the
Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the administrative
autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged by the laws of
war,[347] they had been saved from the alternatives of physical
annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic generosity of
the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant population. From a
constitutional point of view, the presence of Article IV.[348] in the
London Convention was in itself sufficient to refute the claim of the
republic to be a "sovereign international state."
[Footnote 346: [The Transvaal Government]--"or rather the
President and his advisers--committed the fatal mistake of
trying to maintain a government which was at the same time
undemocratic and incompetent.... An exclusive government may
be pardoned if it is efficient; an inefficient government, if
it rests upon the people. But a government which is both
inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under
which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of
government which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They
ought, therefore, to have either extended their franchise or
reformed their administration" (Bryce, _Impressions of South
Africa_, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is not likely to have been
unduly severe. "The political sin of the Transvaal against
the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of detail--of
less or more--but was fundamental in its denial of elementary
political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed
minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the
taxes, denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the
money extorted" (Captain Mahan, _The Merits of the Transvaal
Dispute_, 1900 [included in _The Problem of Asia_]). To
these, perhaps, I may be permitted to add the following words
spoken by myself in 1894--more than a year before the
Raid--and published in 1895 (_South Africa: a Study,
etc._):--"The Boer has still to justify his possession of
these ample pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and
these stores of gold and of coal. If he can enlarge his mind,
if he can reform existing abuses, if he can expand an archaic
system of government and render it sufficiently elastic to
meet the requirements of an enlarged population and important
and increasing industries--well and good. If not, let the
Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with the
intelligence and the progress of South Africa. _Then_ the
Boer system will be condemned by a higher authority than the
Colonial Office or the opinion of England; and from the high
court of Nature--a court from which no appeal lies--the
inexorable decree will go forth: 'Cut it down; why cumbereth
it the ground?'"]
[Footnote 347: See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted
_supra_.]
[Footnote 348: "The South African Republic will conclude no
treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the
Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward
or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved
by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain Mahan writes: "In refusing
the Transvaal that independence in foreign relations which
would enable other states to hold it directly accountable,
Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that
foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for
reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate
control of foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose
not to permit interference in the Transvaal by a foreign
Power, was responsible for conditions of wrong to foreign
citizens within its borders. She had surrendered the right to
interfere, as suzerain, with internal affairs; but she had
not relieved herself, as by a grant of full independence and
sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility for
injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the
United States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in
the case of the Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by
the state sovereignty of Louisiana" (_Ibid._). And, says the
same writer, _a fortiori_ was Great Britain justified in
interfering on behalf of her own subjects.]
[Sidenote: Effect of surrender terms.]
Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by
the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question
whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating
at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which,
as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been
deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually
pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms
actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the
British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement of
the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, and by what
stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. The two
respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight
dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess
rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language
in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions
are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound
policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain
districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small
number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated
homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous
and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The
refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves
with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional
Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy
responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an
altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police.
At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in
such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under
the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient
remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system--a
system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition of arms by
the natives in South Africa--the number of rifles possessed by the
Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government;
while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege
of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to
British rule would form an additional safeguard.
In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of
course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of
English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South
Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have
resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of
the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have
retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these
circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination
of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the
material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was
the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new
administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free
trade in language"--that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond,
the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the
convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of
administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these
concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full
self-government would not be granted to either of the new colonies
until a British or loyalist majority was assured.
[Sidenote: Free initiative secured.]
But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their
immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete
freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for
the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative
reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task--at once more
congenial and more especially his own--was discharged is a matter that
must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of
the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the
review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.
INDEX
"Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State, The, his report
of De Wet's success in Cape Colony, 431, 432.
Administrative reconstruction, 397, 458, 489, 523 _et seq._
Africa. _See_ South Africa.
Afrikander Bond, The, 46;
programme of, 50 _et seq._;
its sphere of action, 55;
its power in Cape Colony, 55;
its origin, 56;
its purpose, 56 to 58, 106;
its first congress, 59;
its "programme of principles," 59;
its change of policy, 60;
members returned to it by the Cape Parliament, 60, 483;
meets at Bloemfontein, 63;
adopts the Hofmeyr programme, 64;
its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa, 65;
its first openly avowed aim, 66;
falls back on the policy of 1881, 69;
its influence in the Cape Legislature, 70, 93, 121, 122, 141;
its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, 94, 95;
the parliamentary chief and the real leader of, 97;
Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony, 84, 91, 92, 98;
the sum and substance of its policy, 106, 107, 119;
address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch, 108;
Lord Milner's reply, 109 to 113;
Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of, 116;
the funds of, 118;
its domination, 150;
nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krueger, 162, 169, 195, 274, 276;
demonstrations organised by, 215;
the completeness with which it had undermined British power, 223;
its view of the Salisbury Cabinet, 274;
its activity, 348;
its attitude at the end of January, 1900, 373;
annual congress at Somerset East, 374;
its policy after the occupation of the Republics, 429;
its attitude in February, 1901, 430;
the qualities of its leaders, 435;
its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the
Burgher Peace Committee, 474;
its identification with the Boer invaders, 475;
the character of the men it sent to Parliament, 483.
"Afrikanderdom," the doctrine of, 197.
Afrikander nationalists, The, 48 (note), 267;
the creed of, 48 _et seq._, 119;
their plan of a united S. Africa, 70;
Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support, 73;
strength of their forces, 74, 96, 104;
their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
uneasiness of, 113;
dominate S. Africa, 126;
their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
their direct appeal to the Queen, 294;
unmasked, 300;
their speech and action during the war, 343;
they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their
"peace overtures" on the British Government, 360, 361;
their "conciliation" meetings, 361, 382;
renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition, 369;
their objects, 382, 383;
their opposition to the Treason Bill, 395;
their references to Boer successes, 396;
they slander the British troops, 398;
their hatred of England, 429;
assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders, 478;
their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 495.
"Afrikander party" The, the friends of in England, 375, 379.
Agricultural Department, The, formation of in Orange River Colony, 525.
Agriculture, The development of in new colonies, 536.
"Albany" settlers, The, 15, 271.
Albert, 346.
_Albert Times, The_, 120.
Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws, The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for
the repeal of, 81;
repeal and amendment of, 82, 88, 94.
Aliwal North, 346, 411, 455.
Amershof, Mr. Justice, 103.
Amery, Mr., 291, 300.
Amphitheatre Meeting, The, 131.
Anti-British Press, The, 68, 166, 205 to 207, 225, 272, 349, 374, 380,
391, 403, 409, 477.
Ardagh, Sir John, 319 (note).
Arms, The surrender of, 573;
the possession of, 581.
Army Corps, The, the order to mobilise, 244, 317, 318;
arrival of, 305, 321, 331.
Arnold-Forster, H. O., 516.
Asquith, H. H., his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 92, 99;
his utterances, 416.
Attorney-General, The (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason,
480.
Baden-Powell, Colonel, afterwards General, 191 (note), 329 (note), 397,
530.
Balfour, A. J., 203 (note), 228, 302, 307.
_Balfourian Parliament, The_, 319 (note).
Balliol Scholars, 76 (note).
Bantu, The, 11, 12, 25.
Barberton, 452.
Barkly East, 346.
Barkly, Sir Henry, 275.
Bastards, The, 281.
Basuto incident, The, 496 (note).
Basutoland, 83;
British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298;
construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein, 532 (note).
Beaconsfield, Lord, 24.
Bechuanaland Expedition, The, 350 (note).
Bechuanaland, 83;
the administration of the European population of, 35;
the Transvaal's attempt to secure, 64, 74, 93;
the Dutch community in, 346.
Bechuanas, the employment of as indentured labourers, 117.
Beechranger Hottentots, The, 2, 4.
Belgrave, Lord (now Duke of Westminster), 167.
Berry, Dr. (now Sir) Wm., 124 (note).
Bethulie Bridge, 411, 455;
alleged movement of British troops to, 236.
Bezuidenhout, the Boer, 11.
Blignaut, J. N., letter from, 258.
Blockhouse system, The, area inclosed by, 458;
effect produced by, 456, 457;
efficiency of, 576;
extension of, 455;
its help to the railways, 533.
Bloemfontein, Meeting of the Afrikander Bond at, 63;
opening of the railway at, 67;
seizure of correspondence at, 156, 162, 206, 376;
the occupation of, 328, 363, 384;
visit of Lord Milner to, 397;
the effective occupation of the district round, 453;
discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and
Kitchener, 471;
civil administration in, 524;
construction of the railway to Basutoland, 532 (note).
Bloemfontein Conference, The, 268;
proposed, 140;
agreed to by President Krueger, 153;
negotiations leading up to, 151 to 165;
meeting of, 167, 168;
the discussion at a closing of, 168, 172;
the result of, 172;
the four months which followed, 174.
Bloemfontein Convention, The, 17, 87 (note);
Sir G. Grey's criticism of, 19.
_Bloemfontein Express, The_, 50, 54, 63, 67.
Blood, Sir Bindon, 425.
Bodley, J. E. C., statement by, 76 (note).
Boer Administration, The, depraved character of, 212.
Boer Army, The, 336, 337, 340 (note).
Boer aspirations, The, 302.
Boer children, Teaching of during the war, 519 to 523.
Boer Peace commissioners, The, their tortuous diplomacy, 526;
the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them, 563;
their departure from Pretoria, 569.
Boer deputation in Europe, The, 555.
Boer emigrants, The, 19.
Boer leaders, The, their decision to continue the struggle, 414, 417,
418, 424 _et seq._;
their disingenuousness, 557;
penalties to which they were liable, 564;
they treat for peace, 552, 555 _et seq._
Boer raiders, The, 438.
Boer revolt of 1880-81, The, 31.
Boer Republics, The (_see also_ Orange Free State and Transvaal),
creation of, 17, 19;
scheme for their union with the British colonies, 24.
Boer spies, 337.
Boer, vernacular, The, 547.
Boers, The, the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their
treatment, 9;
their dealings with the natives, 11;
the grant of self-government to, 29;
their resistance to British arms 48;
their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
their military forces, 181, 340 (note),
without uniform, 336;
personal dealings with, 194, 195;
their friends in England, 232, 414, 424, 573;
breaches of faith by, 399;
their losses up to November, 1901, 458;
final surrender of, 573 (note).
Bond, The. _See_ Afrikander Bond.
Bond Press, The, 209.
Booy the Hottentot, 11.
Borckenhagen the German, 49, 50, 66.
Botha, Louis, 564;
dispersal of his army, 322;
defeat of at Diamond Hill, 329;
defeat of at Dalmanutha, 329;
in Johannesburg, 337;
urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms, 414, 424;
his determination to fight on, 421;
circular issued by him, 425 (note);
his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla
war, 427;
failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener, 434;
stimulates his followers, 457;
treats for peace, 471, 552, 554;
meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the
discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging, 562;
advocates submission, 571, 577;
Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the
treaty of peace, 573 (note);
his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the
later stages of the war, 575;
his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system,
576;
his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape
Colony, 577.
"Botha" terms, The, 471, 554.
Bower, Sir Graham, 41.
Brand, President, 28, 275;
discourages the Afrikander Bond, 55;
the role played by him in 1881, 153.
Brebner J., 564.
Breed's Nek, 455.
British Administration, the failure of in S. Africa, 1, 22;
distrust of by the British in S. Africa, 37;
the Bond and, 65;
its impotency, 69;
efficiency of impaired by English party politics, 254.
British and Dutch factions, The, bitterness of, 244.
British Army, The, in Cape Colony and Natal, 189, 325;
disadvantage in which it was placed, 253;
its performance in S. Africa, 323;
the number of effectives available, 323;
its difficulties, 330 _et seq._;
the slander of, 398, 499.
British colonists, the settlement of on the land, 538.
British Government, representatives of at the Cape, 7;
its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa, 8.
British Navy, The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of,
95;
holds the seas, 311.
British party, A, the creation of, 150.
British policy in S. Africa, 9 _et seq._;
up to 1897, 69.
British population in Cape Colony, The, 107, 115, 127;
effect of the Redistribution Bill on, 125;
their approval of Lord Milner's policy, 216;
their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years'
franchise law, 222;
their support of Lord Milner, 270;
numbers which took part in the war, 324.
British settlers in the country, 61.
Britstown, 354.
_Brunt of The War, The_, 462 (note).
Bryce, James, The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of, 259,
314, 360, 415, 496;
misstatement by, 263;
the "settlement" advocated by him, 370;
his view of the Transvaal Government, 579 (note).
Buller, General Sir Redvers, 191;
defeat of, 306;
his responsibility for the early disasters, 318, 319;
his misconception of the state of affairs, 319, 320;
at Maritzburg, 321;
forces at his disposal, 321;
false report of surrender to the Boers, 380.
Bundy, Thomas Dashwood, 212 (note).
Bunu, the affair of, 89 (note).
Burger, Schalk, 89, 101, 159, 564;
denounced by Krueger, 100;
attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
his determination to fight on, 421;
his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war,
427;
his official notice of June 20th, 1901, 434;
his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps, 463 (note);
announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace,
552;
granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn,
552;
meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552;
appointed a peace commissioner, 556;
calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not, 570;
his account of the origin of the war, 574;
his reasons for treating for peace, 578.
Burgher Camps, deportation of Boer non-combatants to, 459;
high rate of mortality in, 460 to 463;
Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the
camps, 463 (note);
condition of, 503, 505, 513;
establishment of schools in, 519 to 523;
views of the Boers on, 575.
Burgher meetings, The, the minutes of, 560 _et seq._
Burgher Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423;
its efforts, 427, 429;
treatment of its agents, 427 to 429;
Bond leaders hold aloof from, 474.
Burghersdorp, The theological seminary of, 120.
Burns, John, 315, 496.
Burt, Thomas, 498 (note).
Butler, General Sir William, refuses to transmit a petition for
protection from the British residents in the Transvaal, 131, 176;
his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 174, 184;
his views of a war, 174, 175, 179;
his view of the Uitlander grievances, 175;
the friction between him and Lord Milner, 175, 176;
his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa, 177;
his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war,
180;
requested to furnish a scheme of defence, 180, 181;
his scheme, 181 to 183;
his evidence before the War Commission, 175 (note), 181 to 183;
his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate
reinforcements, 183, 319;
his withdrawal from the command at the Cape, 184, 247, 269, 289;
his only point of agreement with Lord Milner, 185;
his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, 185;
is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements, 190.