CHAPTER IV

UNDER WHICH FLAG?

Upon his return Lord Milner found that the storm clouds had gathered

in the Transvaal. In a despatch of January 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain

had informed the Pretoria Executive that the proposed extension of the

dynamite contract in its new form (_i.e._ as, in effect, a "privileged

importation by one firm," although nominally "a State undertaking")

was held by the law officers of the Crown to be as much a violation of

the Convention as the original monopoly, which had been cancelled on

the representations of the Imperial Government in 1892. Mr. Reitz's

reply, which Lord Milner transmitted to the Colonial Office not long

after his arrival at Capetown, was a blunt assertion that, in the

opinion of his Government, the Imperial Government had no right to

interfere. But in the meantime the whole question of the position of

the British residents in the Transvaal had been raised directly by the

agitation which had arisen out of the shooting of Edgar at

Johannesburg on December 18th, 1898.[50] This event was followed by

the petition for protection, which Sir William Butler (who was

General-in-Command, and during Lord Milner's absence Acting High

Commissioner) refused to transmit to the Secretary of State (January

4th, 1899); by the arrest of Messrs. Webb and Dodd and the breaking up

of the Amphitheatre meeting (January 14th); by the attempt of the

Pretoria Executive to buy off the capitalists (February 27th-April

14th); by the presentation of the second petition to the Queen (March

24th); by the agitation on the Rand in favour of the reforms for which

it prayed; and lastly by the public meetings held in the Cape Colony

and Natal for, and against, the intervention of the Imperial

Government.[51]

[Footnote 50: "On the Sunday night before Christmas, a

British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar was shot dead in his

own house by a Boer policeman. Edgar, who was a man of

singularly fine physique, and both able and accustomed to

take care of himself, was returning home at about midnight,

when one of three men standing by, who, as it afterwards

transpired, was both ill and intoxicated, made an offensive

remark. Edgar resented it with a blow which dropped the other

insensible to the ground. The man's friends called for the

police, and Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house a few

yards off. There was no attempt at concealment or escape;

Edgar was an old resident and perfectly well known. Four

policemen came.... The fact, however, upon which all

witnesses agree is that, as the police burst open the door,

Constable Jones [there are scores of Boers unable to speak a

word of English who, nevertheless, own very characteristic

English, Scotch, and Irish names] fired at Edgar and dropped

him dead in the arms of his wife, who was standing in the

passage a foot or so behind him."--FITZPATRICK'S _The

Transvaal from Within_.]

[Footnote 51: For particulars of these events the reader is

referred to _The Transvaal from Within_.]

[Sidenote: The Uitlanders' petition.]

Within three months of his return Lord Milner cabled the masterly

statement in which he endorsed the petition of the Uitlanders[52] with

the memorable words: "The case for intervention is overwhelming."

Like the Graaf Reinet speech, this despatch of May 4th was written at

white heat, but the opinions which it expressed were in no less a

degree the mature and measured judgments of a mind fully informed upon

every detail germane to the issue. So much is this the fact that all

that is essential for the full comprehension of the second Reform

Movement at Johannesburg--the salient features of which have been

outlined above--is to be found within the limits of this brief and

notable State document:

[Footnote 52: The petition, with its 21,684 signatures,

reached Lord Milner through Sir W. (then Mr.) Greene, the

British Agent at Pretoria, on March 27th. It was forwarded by

the High Commissioner to England in the mail of March 29th.

The same ship, the _Carisbrook Castle_, carried Dr. Leyds,

who was returning to Europe after a visit to Pretoria. Sir W.

Greene had returned to South Africa in the same ship with

Lord Milner (February 14th), and had stayed at Government

Cottage (Newlands) with him for some days, discussing

Transvaal matters, before proceeding to Pretoria on February

19th.]

[Sidenote: The intervention despatch.]

"Having regard to the critical character of the South African

situation and the likelihood of an early reply by Her Majesty's

Government to the Petition, I am telegraphing remarks which under

ordinary circumstances I should have made by despatch. Events of

importance have followed so fast on each other since my return to

South Africa, and my time has been so occupied in dealing with

each incident severally, that I have had no time for reviewing

the whole position.

"The present crisis undoubtedly arises out of the Edgar incident.

But that incident merely precipitated a struggle which was

certain to come. It is possible to make too much of the killing

of Edgar. It was a shocking and, in my judgment, a criminal

blunder, such as would have caused a popular outcry anywhere. It

was made much worse by the light way in which it was first dealt

with by the Public Prosecutor and then by the judge at the

trial. By itself, however, it would not have justified, nor, in

fact, provoked the present storm. But it happened to touch a

particularly sore place. There is no grievance which rankles more

in the breasts of the Uitlander population than the conduct of

the police, who, while they have proved singularly incompetent to

deal with gross scandals like the illicit liquor trade, are harsh

and arbitrary in their treatment of individuals whom they happen

to dislike, as must have become evident to you from the recurrent

ill-treatment of coloured people. There are absolutely no grounds

for supposing that the excitement which the death of Edgar caused

was factitious. It has been laid to the door of the South African

League, but the officials of the League were forced into action

by Edgar's fellow-workmen. And, the consideration of grievances

once started by the police grievance, it was inevitable that the

smouldering but profound discontent of the population who

constantly find their affairs mismanaged, their protests

disregarded, and their attitude misunderstood, by a Government on

which they have absolutely no means of exercising any influence,

should once more break into flame.

"We have, therefore, simply to deal with a popular movement of a

similar kind to that of 1894 and 1895 before it was perverted and

ruined by a conspiracy of which the great body of the Uitlanders

were totally innocent. None of the grievances then complained of,

and which then excited universal sympathy, have been remedied,

and others have been added. The case is much stronger. It is

impossible to overlook the tremendous change for the worse, which

has been effected by the lowering of the status of the High Court

of Judicature and by the establishment of the principle embodied

in the new draft Grondwet that any resolution of the Volksraad

is equivalent to a law. The instability of the laws has always

been one of the most serious grievances. The new Constitution

provides for their permanent instability, the judges being bound

by their oath to accept every Volksraad resolution as equally

binding with a law passed in the regular form, and with the

provisions of the Constitution itself. The law prescribing this

oath is one of which the present Chief Justice said that no

self-respecting man could sit on the Bench while it was on the

Statute Book. Formerly the foreign population, however bitterly

they might resent the action of the Legislature and of the

Administration, had yet confidence in the High Court of

Judicature. It cannot be expected that they should feel the same

confidence to-day. Seeing no hope in any other quarter, a number

of Uitlanders who happen to be British subjects have addressed a

petition to Her Majesty the Queen. I have already expressed my

opinion of its substantial genuineness and the absolute _bona

fides_ of its promoters. But the petition is only one proof among

many of the profound discontent of the unenfranchised population,

who are a great majority of the white inhabitants of the State."

"The public meeting of the 14th January was indeed broken up by

workmen, many of them poor burghers, in the employment of the

Government and instigated by Government officials, and it is

impossible at present to hold another meeting of a great size.

Open-air meetings are prohibited by law, and by one means or

another all large public buildings have been rendered

unavailable. But smaller meetings are being held almost nightly

along the Rand, and are unanimous in their demand for

enfranchisement. The movement is steadily growing in force and

extent.

[Sidenote: The movement not artificial.]

"With regard to the attempt to represent that movement as

artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional

agitators, I regard it as a wilful perversion of the truth. The

defenceless people who are clamouring for a redress of grievances

are doing so at great personal risk. It is notorious that many

capitalists regard political agitation with disfavour because of

its effect on the markets. It is equally notorious that the

lowest class of Uitlanders, and especially the illicit liquor

dealers, have no sympathy whatever with the cause of reform.

Moreover, there are in all classes a considerable number who only

want to make money and clear out, and who, while possibly

sympathising with reform, feel no great interest in a matter

which may only concern them temporarily. But a very large and

constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds

of passage; they contemplate a long residence in the country, or

to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of

the reform movement as they are of the prosperity of the country.

They would make excellent citizens if they had the chance.

"A busy industrial community is not naturally prone to political

unrest. But they bear the chief burden of taxation; they

constantly feel in their business and daily lives the effects of

chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic

administration; they have many grievances, but they believe all

these could gradually be removed if they had only a fair share of

political power. This is the meaning of their vehement demand for

enfranchisement. Moreover, they are mostly British subjects,

accustomed to a free system and equal rights; they feel deeply

the personal indignity involved in a position of permanent

subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power

to their exertion. The political turmoil in the Transvaal

Republic will never end till the permanent Uitlander population

is admitted to a share in the government, and while that turmoil

lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate progress in Her

Majesty's South African dominions.

"The relations between the British Colonies and the two Republics

are intimate to a degree which one must live in South Africa in

order fully to realise. Socially, economically, ethnologically,

they are all one country. The two principal white races are

everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to

dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they

can live in harmony, and the country progress, is equality all

round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six

Governments; but not under two absolutely conflicting social and

political systems--perfect equality for Dutch and British in the

British Colonies side by side with the permanent subjection of

the British to the Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to

talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs.

"It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal

Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government.

No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace

of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great

Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment to the Uitlanders

is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The

majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect.

But the enormous number of British subjects, the endless series

of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances, which

are not less serious because they are not individually

sensational, makes protection by the ordinary diplomatic means

impossible. We are, as you know, for ever remonstrating about

this, that, and the other injury to British subjects. Only in

rare cases, and only when we are very emphatic, do we obtain any

redress. The sore between us and the Transvaal Republic is thus

inevitably kept up, while the result in the way of protection to

our subjects is lamentably small. For these reasons it has been,

as you know, my constant endeavour to reduce the number of our

complaints. I may sometimes have abstained when I ought to have

protested from my great dislike of ineffectual nagging. But I

feel that the attempt to remedy the hundred-and-one wrongs

springing from a hopeless system by taking up isolated cases, is

perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war, but will never lead to

real improvement."

[Sidenote: Enfranchisement the remedy.]

"The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these

injuries--the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic

protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander

representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a

paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of

protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our

subjects. The admission of the Uitlanders to a fair share of

political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic.

But it would, at the same time, remove most of our causes of

difference with it, and modify and, in the long run, entirely

remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great

Britain which at present dominates its internal and external

policy.

"The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted

answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But,

in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for

years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not

true that this is owing to the Raid. They were going from bad to

worse before the Raid. We were on the verge of war before the

Raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The

effect of the Raid has been to give the policy of leaving things

alone a new lease of life, and with the old consequences.

"The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently

in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted

grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for

redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of

Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government within

the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the

Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a

republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing

references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with

the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of

war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I

regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a

ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the

British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large

number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used

which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right,

even in this Colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth.

Thousands of men peacefully disposed, and, if left alone,

perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are

being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding

exasperation on the side of the British.

"I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous

propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her

Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South

Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice

would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair

share in the government of the country which owes everything to

their exertions. It could be made perfectly clear that our

action was not directed against the existence of the Republic. We

should only be demanding the re-establishment of rights which now

exist in the Orange Free State, and which existed in the

Transvaal itself at the time of, and long after, the withdrawal

of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish demand, as other

Uitlanders besides those of British birth would benefit by it. It

is asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves.

And it would certainly go to the root of the political unrest in

South Africa, and, though temporarily it might aggravate, it

would ultimately extinguish the race feud, which is the great

bane of the country."[53]

[Footnote 53: C. 9,345.]

It was Lord Milner's intention that the text of this despatch should

have been made public upon its receipt in England. It contained the

essential facts of the South African situation; and, what is more, it

exhibited with perfect frankness the connection between Dutch

ascendancy in the Cape Colony and Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal--a

matter which was very imperfectly understood. The circumstance that

these essential facts were before the British people, and, moreover,

the circumstance that President Krueger knew that they were before the

British people, would, he believed, greatly increase the effect of the

strong demand for reforms which the Imperial Government had determined

to address to the Pretoria Executive in response to the petition to

the Queen.

[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's intervention.]

Nor was he alone in this opinion. Mr. Hofmeyr knew that a despatch of

grave importance had gone home. He had gathered, no doubt, a fairly

accurate notion of its tenor from Mr. Schreiner, whom Lord Milner had

warned some time before of "the gravity of the situation."[54] It is

not going beyond the limits of probability to assume that the Master

of the Bond realised the effect which the publication of these plain

truths, backed by the authority of the High Commissioner, would

produce upon the mind of the English people, and that he thereupon

determined to take steps to prevent a turn of affairs which, as he

conceived, would be most unfavourable to the nationalist cause.

Surmises apart, it is certain, at least, that five days sufficed to

place Mr. Hofmeyr in a position to ask Lord Milner if he would

favourably consider an invitation to meet President Krueger in

conference at Bloemfontein; and that within three days more (May 12th)

a definite proposal to this effect had been made through the agency of

President Steyn and accepted by Mr. Chamberlain. Nor, is it any less

certain that, in view of the friendly discussion which was to take

place so soon, the Secretary of State decided to postpone the

publication of Lord Milner's despatch. This is the short history of

the Bloemfontein Conference. It was a counter-stroke dealt by one of

those "formidable personalities" of which Mr. Asquith spoke, and in

all respects worthy of Mr. Hofmeyr's statesmanship. Indeed, the

methods which he employed for paralysing the machinery of British

administration in South Africa were always subtle: infinitely more

subtle than those which Parnell adopted in the not very dissimilar

circumstances of the Home Rule campaign.

[Footnote 54: C. 9,345. See forward, p. 155.]

The decision to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch of

May 4th was a serious mistake, the injurious effect of which was felt

both at the Conference and afterwards. But before we observe the

incidents by which this central event was immediately preceded, it is

necessary to examine more fully the political environment in which

Lord Milner found himself established now that the April elections[55]

had given the Afrikander party an assured tenure of power, and, at the

same time, the moment had arrived for the Imperial Government to

fulfil the pledge given on February 4th, 1896, for the redress of the

"admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.

[Footnote 55: See p. 125.]

[Sidenote: The Bond and the ministry.]

The Schreiner Ministry was the agent of the Bond; it could not exist

for a day if the Bond withdrew its support. The Bond majority in the

Legislative Assembly had been returned by the Dutch inhabitants of the

Colony for the avowed purpose of preventing the intervention of the

Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. The Ministry and

its supporters had begun by ranging themselves definitely on the side

of the Transvaal. And, therefore, in all that was done by either

party from the Bloemfontein Conference to the Ultimatum, it followed,

_ex hypothesi_, that, in their opinion, the Transvaal was right, and

England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner, on behalf of

the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the proposals of

the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he even knew what

those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented themselves as

"mediators." They had as little intention of mediating between the

Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a barrister, heavily

feed and primed with his client's case, has of mediating between his

client and his client's opponent at the hearing of a case in court.

But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet--T. Nicholas

German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William

Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and

Richard Solomon--had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and

bear true allegiance to Her Majesty."

[Sidenote: The Schreiner ministry.]

The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of

so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a

parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High

Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise

of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the

Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, he was bound to administer

the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice tendered by

his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged to give him

was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High

Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his

ministers--the alternative to accepting this advice--would have been

an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they

had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to

the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter

that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be

difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape

ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was

done by the Liberal Opposition--again collectively or individually--in

England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet,

whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened--and

was intended to lessen--the force of an effort on the part of the

Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity

for war.

And here certain questions which will arise inevitably to the mind

that pursues the narrative of the next few months, must be

anticipated. What was the position of Mr. Schreiner? What was his real

standpoint, and what was his relationship to Lord Milner? How was it

that two Englishmen, Mr. Merriman and Sir (then Mr.) Richard Solomon,

came to be in this Afrikander Cabinet, and what were their respective

motives in thus associating themselves with the objects of the Bond?

[Sidenote: The prime minister.]

Mr. Philip Schreiner was the son of a German by birth, a missionary of

the London Missionary Society, who had married an Englishwoman, and

afterwards settled in the Orange Free State. He had himself married a

sister of Mr. F. W. Reitz, formerly President of the Free State, and

now State Secretary of the South African Republic. The Schreiner

family was remarkable for intellectual power. Of his sisters one is

the authoress of _The Story of an African Farm_, and a second, Mrs.

Lewis, like her brother Theophilus, was an active Imperialist and a

determined opponent of the Bond. Mr. Schreiner himself was educated at

the South African College at Capetown, and subsequently at Cambridge,

where he was placed first in the First Class of the Law Tripos, and

afterwards elected a Fellow of Downing. After a successful career at

the Cape Bar he was appointed Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes's

Ministry, a position which he held at the time of the Raid. He was

prevented by his strong disapproval of the part then played by Mr.

Rhodes from joining the Progressive party; and, having accepted the

position of Parliamentary leader of the Bond, he had become, as we

have seen, Prime Minister through the Bond victory in the Cape General

Election of 1898. It is characteristic alike of Mr. Schreiner and of

his political position that the only word of sympathy with the British

connection, uttered from first to last during this election by the

Bond candidates or their supporters, was the conventional reference to

the greatness of the British Empire which, as we have noticed,

occurred in his address to the electors of Malmesbury. With these

political and social ties, Mr. Schreiner was compelled to be a South

African first and a British subject second. His is precisely the kind

of case where true allegiance can be expected only when a federal

constitution has been created for the Empire.

"See," said Lord Milner, in his farewell speech at Johannesburg,

"how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone

solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of

South Africa; how it would unite its white races as nothing else

can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great

Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept

allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland.

But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of integrity,

without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal

devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South

Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for

the good of South Africa as a member of that greater whole."[56]

[Footnote 56: _The Johannesburg Star_, April 1st, 1905.]

With Schreiner, and such as he, loyalty to the Crown was for the

moment the product of intellectual judgment or considerations of

policy. All, or almost all, the instinctive feelings, born of

pleasant associations with persons and places, which enter so largely

into the sentiment of patriotism seem to have drawn him, as they drew

his sister, Mrs. Cronwright-Schreiner, into sympathy with the cause of

Afrikander nationalism. What his view was upon the particular issue

now agitating South Africa may be gathered from an answer which he

gave to a question put to him by Mr. Chamberlain in the course of the

inquiry into the Raid (1897):

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I suppose your view is that the Imperial

Government should adopt the same policy as the Cape Government,

and should refrain from even friendly representations as not

being calculated to advance the cause of the Uitlanders?

MR. SCHREINER: Yes, decidedly, so far as purely internal concerns

are concerned.[57]

[Footnote 57: Proceedings of the Select Committee on British

South Africa (Q. 4,385).]

In other words, Mr. Schreiner was a consistent and convinced opponent

of Imperial intervention. But there was a difference between his

motive and that of the Bond leaders. Schreiner desired to prevent

intervention, not because he did not recognise the justice of the

claims of the Uitlanders, but because he believed that the Imperial

Government was devoid of any right to intervene under the Conventions;

while, at the same time, his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander

nationalists made him blind to the existence of any moral right of

interference that England might possess, as the Power responsible for

the well-being of South Africa as a whole. And so, partly by force of

environment and partly by a narrow and erroneous interpretation of the

principles of international law,[58] the Boer and Hollander oligarchy

in the Transvaal, with all its moral obliquity and administrative

incompetence, had become, as it were, a thing sacrosanct in his eyes.

Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond leaders, on the other hand, desired to

prevent intervention because they were perfectly satisfied to see the

British Uitlanders in a position of political inferiority, and

perfectly content with the whole situation, the continuance of which,

as they knew, was directly calculated to bring about the supremacy of

the Dutch race in South Africa. Therefore Hofmeyr made no effort to

improve the state of affairs in the Transvaal until he saw the storm

bursting. And when, at a later stage, he set himself to work in

earnest to induce President Krueger to grant reforms, he did so to save

the cause of Afrikander nationalism and not to assist the British

Government in winning justice for the Uitlanders.

[Footnote 58: For the position of Great Britain from the

point of view of international law see some remarks in the

note on page 580 (Chapter XII.).]

[Sidenote: Sir Richard Solomon.]

Sir Richard Solomon, who was a nephew of Saul Solomon, the prominent

radical politician chiefly instrumental in carrying the vote for

Responsible Government through the Legislative Council of the Cape

Colony (1872), was the leader of the Bar at Kimberley. His presence,

at first sight, formed a wholly incongruous element in such a

ministry. On the native question, in his fiscal views, as a supporter

of the Redistribution Bill, and in his sympathy with the Uitlanders,

he was in direct conflict with the characteristic principles of the

Bond. His one link with the Afrikander party was his distrust of

Rhodes; and in view of his unquestioned loyalty to the British

connection, his decision to join the Schreiner Ministry is probably to

be attributed to his personal friendship for the Prime Minister. On

the other hand, his ability, detachment from local parties, and the

respect which he commanded, made him a valuable asset to Mr.

Schreiner.

[Sidenote: Messrs. Merriman and Sauer.]

Mr. Merriman, whose close political associate was Mr. Sauer, had twice

held office under Mr. Rhodes (1890-96); but his separation from

Rhodes, consequent upon the Raid, had thrown him into the arms of the

Bond. Some of the more striking incidents in Mr. Merriman's political

career have been already mentioned.[59] Fifteen years ago more

Imperialist than Rhodes, he was soon to show himself more Bondsman

than the Bond. Once the resolute, almost inspired, castigator of the

separatist aims of that organisation, he was now in close and

sympathetic association with the leaders of Afrikander nationalism in

the Republics and the Cape Colony. The denunciations of "capitalism"

and "capitalists" with which he now regaled his Afrikander allies, had

an ill savour in the mouth of the man who had tried to amalgamate the

Diamond Mines at Kimberley--failing where Rhodes and Beit afterwards

succeeded--and who, attracted by the magnet of gold discovery, for a

short time had acted as manager of the Langlaagte Estate and Mr. J. B.

Robinson's interests at Johannesburg. With political principles thus

unstable and a mind strangely sensitive to any emotional appeal, it is

not surprising that Mr. Merriman displayed the proverbial enthusiasm

of the convert in his new political creed. His original perception of

the imprudence and administrative incompetency of President Krueger's

_regime_ was rapidly obliterated by a growing partizanship, which in

turn gave place to an unreasoning sympathy with the Boer cause,

combined with a bitter antipathy against all who were concerned,

whether in a civil or military capacity, in giving effect to the

intervention of the Imperial Government on behalf of the British

industrial community in the Transvaal. Mr. J. W. Sauer was destined to

exhibit his political convictions in a manner so demonstrative that

his words and acts, as recorded in the sequel, will leave the reader

in no doubt as to the reality of his sympathy with the Boer and

Afrikander cause. For the moment, therefore, it is sufficient to

notice that, although he shared Mr. Merriman's present abhorrence of

"capitalism" and "capitalists," he was for many years of his life a

promoter and director of mining and other companies.

[Footnote 59: See pp. 61, 69, and 93.]

Of the two Bondsmen in the Cabinet, Mr. Herholdt was a member of the

Legislative Council, and a Dutch farmer of moderate views and good

repute; while Dr. Te Water was the friend and confidant of Mr.

Hofmeyr, and, as such, the intermediary between the Bond and the

Afrikander nationalists in the Free State and in the Transvaal.

The Schreiner Cabinet was the velvet glove which covered the mailed

hand of Mr. Hofmeyr. Dr. Te Water had been Colonial Secretary in the

Sprigg Ministry up to the crisis of May, 1898. He was now "minister

without portfolio" in the Schreiner Ministry. His presence was the

sign and instrument of the domination of the Bond; and the domination

of the Bond was as yet the permanent and controlling factor in the

administration of the Colony under Responsible Government. The fact

that only two out of six members of the Ministry were Bondsmen, is to

be referred to the circumstance that the actual business of

administration had been hitherto mainly in the hands of a small group

of British colonial politicians, who were prepared to bid against each

other for the all-important support of the Dutch vote. With the

majority of these men, to be in office was an object for the

attainment of which they were prepared to make a considerable

sacrifice in respect of their somewhat elastic political principles.

The denial of political rights to the British population in the

Transvaal, by threatening the maintenance of British supremacy in

South Africa, had now for the first time created a British party in

the Cape Colony--the Progressives--strong enough to act in

independence of the Bond. The existence of this British party, not

only free from the Bond, but determined (although it was in a

minority) to challenge the Bond predominance, was a new phenomenon in

Cape politics. In itself it constituted an appreciable improvement

upon the previously existing state of affairs; since the British

population was thus no longer hopelessly weakened by being divided

into two parties of almost equal strength, nor were its leaders any

longer obliged to subordinate their regard for British interests to

the primary necessity of obtaining office by Bond support.

[Sidenote: Policy of the ministry.]

Mr. Schreiner's Ministry, however, in spite of a difference of motives

on the part of its individual members, was unanimous in its desire to

prevent that intervention of the Imperial Government for which, in

Lord Milner's judgment, there was "overwhelming" necessity. The idea

of inducing President Krueger to grant such a "colourable measure of

reform"[60] as would satisfy the Imperial Government, or at least

deprive it of any justification for interference by force of arms,

was in contemplation some months before the Bloemfontein Conference

took place. On January 1st, 1899, Mr. Merriman wrote to President

Steyn with this object in view. "Is there no opportunity," he

said,[61] "of bringing about a _rapprochement_ between us, in which

the Free State might play the part of honest broker? We, _i.e._, the

Colony and Free State, have common material interests in our railway,

apart from our anxiety to see the common welfare of South Africa

increase from the removal of the one great cause of unrest and the

pretext for outside interference."

[Footnote 60: Mr. Merriman's expression. See his letter to

Mr. Fischer at p. 161.]

[Footnote 61: Cd. 369.]

And Lord Milner, very soon after his return from England, was sounded

by Mr. Schreiner as to the possibility of settling the franchise

question by means of a South African Conference. Early in March--when

Mr. Smuts was in Capetown, and the Pretoria Executive was engaged in

the abortive attempt to separate the leaders of the mining industry

from the rank and file of the Uitlander population by offering them

certain fiscal and industrial reforms, if only they would undertake to

discourage the agitation for political rights--the same subject was

brought before the High Commissioner by Mr. Merriman himself. In

pursuance of the real purpose of the Afrikander Ministry--_i.e._ to

obtain a fictitious concession from President Krueger, instead of the

"fair share in the government of the country" required by the

Imperial Government--it was proposed originally to exclude Lord Milner

altogether from the negotiations by arranging that the Transvaal

Government should bring forward proposals for reform at an inter-State

Conference consisting of representatives of the governments of the two

Republics and the self-governing British Colonies. But Lord Milner

was, happily, High Commissioner as well as Governor of the Cape. As

High Commissioner, he declared that at any such Conference the

Imperial Government must be separately represented. Neither the

Transvaal nor the Free State was willing to enter a Conference on

these terms, although they were acceptable to the Cape Government; and

the plan fell to the ground.

It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr intervened, in view of Lord Milner's

despatch of May 4th; and President Steyn, persuaded with dramatic

swiftness to accept the role of peace-maker, which his predecessor,

Sir John Brand, had played with such success in 1881, secured the

grudging consent of President Krueger to meet the High Commissioner at

Bloemfontein.

[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's _tour de force_.]

The incidents which led to the accomplishment of Hofmeyr's _tour de

force_ are singularly instructive. Lord Milner's despatch was

telegraphed from Capetown about midday on May 4th. It was soon

apparent that there was a leakage, legitimate or illegitimate, from

the Colonial Office. On Saturday, the 6th, Mr. Schreiner received

warning telegrams from trusted sources in London, including "Hofmeyr's

best friends"; and on this day he wrote a letter to President Steyn

containing a "proposition" of so confidential a character that it

could not be telegraphed in spite of the urgent need of haste.[62] On

Monday, the 8th, Mr. Schreiner received more warning telegrams, and

Dr. Te Water, in writing to President Steyn, expressed his hope that

the proposition, made by Schreiner in his letter of Saturday, might by

this time "have been accepted, or that something had been done which

would achieve the same purpose."[63] On the same day the Cape papers

published an alarming telegram reproducing from _The Daily

Chronicle_[64] a statement that the South African situation was very

serious, and that the British Government was prepared to "take some

risk of war." On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Milner was present at a dinner

given by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; and Mr. Hofmeyr, who

was among the guests, in the course of a long conversation with him

after dinner, broached the idea of his meeting President Krueger at

Bloemfontein. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Milner sent for Mr. Hofmeyr

and discussed the subject more at length; and, a little later, when he

had gone to the Governor's Office, Mr. Schreiner came in with a

telegram from President Steyn, in which the Cape Prime Minister was

requested to ascertain formally whether the High Commissioner would be

willing to accept an invitation to meet President Krueger. This

telegram Lord Milner forwarded to Mr. Chamberlain, adding that the

Cape Cabinet was "strongly" in favour of acceptance, and that

Schreiner himself had declared that the invitation was the result of

the "influence which he (Schreiner) had been using with the Transvaal

Government ever since I had warned him of the gravity of the

situation."[65] Mr. Chamberlain's reply (May 12th), authorised Lord

Milner to accept President Steyn's invitation, and in doing so, to

state that a despatch was already on its way which contained a similar

proposal made by the Imperial Government--

[Footnote 62: Letter of Te Water to Steyn. See forward, p.

162, where this letter is given.]

[Footnote 63: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 64: Then under the editorship of Mr. Massingham.]

[Footnote 65: C. 9,345.]

[Sidenote: The conference arranged.]

"in the hope that, in concert with the President, you may arrive

at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept

and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable

concession to their just demands and a settlement of the

difficulties which have threatened the good relations"

between the two Governments. This was the famous despatch of May 10th,

in which Mr. Chamberlain reviewed carefully and exhaustively the whole

situation as between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, and

formally accepted the Uitlanders' Petition to the Queen. It was not

published until June 14th, _i.e._, after the Bloemfontein Conference

had been held. It was then issued, together with Lord Milner's

despatch of May 4th, in a Blue-book containing the complete record of

all discussions of Transvaal affairs subsequent to Lord Milner's

appointment.

In the course of the next few days communications passed rapidly

between Lord Milner, Mr. Chamberlain, President Steyn, and President

Krueger, with the result that, on May 18th, President Steyn's

invitation was formally accepted, and on the following day it was

arranged that the Conference should begin on May 31st. Never was

intervention more effective, or less obtrusive. Mr. Hofmeyr's part in

the affair was confined apparently to an after-dinner conversation

with the High Commissioner. Nor was the directing hand of the Master

of the Bond revealed more fully until Lord Roberts's occupation of

Bloemfontein placed the British authorities in possession of part of

the communications which passed at this time, and during the four

succeeding months, between the Cape nationalists and their republican

confederates. And even in these documents Hofmeyr's name is rarely

found at the end of a letter or telegram. It is Schreiner or Te Water

who writes or telegraphs to Steyn or Fischer, adding sometimes, by way

of emphasis, "Hofmeyr says" this or that. In the meantime (May 22nd),

Lord Milner had telegraphed, for "an indication of the line" which Mr.

Chamberlain wished him to take at the Conference. He himself

suggested that the franchise question should be put in the foreground;

since it would be useless to discuss other matters in dispute until a

satisfactory settlement of this all-important question had been

achieved. Mr. Chamberlain replied (May 24th), agreeing with the line

indicated by Lord Milner:

"I think personally that you should lay all the stress," he

telegraphed, "on the question of the franchise in the first

instance. Other reforms are less pressing, and will come in time

if this can be arranged satisfactorily, and the form of oath

modified."

Mr. Chamberlain at the same time authorised Lord Milner to inform the

Uitlander petitioners that they might rely upon obtaining the general

sympathy of the Imperial Government in the prayers which they had

addressed to the Queen.

[Sidenote: Motives of Afrikander leaders.]

There was no doubt in Lord Milner's mind as to the real motives which

had prompted the Afrikander nationalist leaders to make this effort.

They recognised at length that he was in earnest, and that Mr.

Chamberlain was in earnest, and they desired, above all things, to

avoid a crisis which would force a conflict before their ultimate

plans had fully matured. Lord Milner knew that any delay which

involved the continuance of the present position--a position which was

one of moral superiority for the Dutch--would unite the whole of the

Dutch, with a section of the British population, against Great Britain

within a measurable period. He recognised that the franchise question

was the one issue which could be raised between the paramount Power

and the South African Republic in which the whole of the Cape Dutch

would not throw in their lot bodily with their republican kinsmen.

This very anxiety on the part of Mr. Hofmeyr to prevent the decisive

action of the Imperial Government was evidence of the truth of his

estimate. But as a response to the appeal of the Graaf Reinet speech,

this Afrikander mediation came too late. "Hands off" the Transvaal was

the first plank in the platform of the Schreiner Ministry; "reform"

was a second and subsidiary plank, adopted in place of the first only

when they had been driven to abandon it by Lord Milner's resolution

and statesmanship. But the purpose of the Ministry now, no less than

before, was to hinder, and not to help, the British Government in

obtaining justice for the Uitlanders. Moreover, the Transvaal

armaments were well advanced, and the Pretoria Executive was too

deeply committed to a policy of defiance to allow it to draw back

without humiliation. Nevertheless, Lord Milner felt bound to avail

himself of any prospect of peace that the Conference might afford.

When, however, Mr. Schreiner, in bringing President Steyn's telegram,

had said that he regarded the proposal as "a great step in advance on

the part of President Krueger," Lord Milner had replied that he could

"hardly take that view, as the invitation did not emanate from

President Krueger himself," and contained no indication of "the basis

or subject of discussion."

[Sidenote: Krueger's obduracy.]

The High Commissioner was right. The slight degree in which any appeal

adequate to the occasion was likely to prove acceptable to President

Krueger may be gathered from a passage in a letter of Sir Henry de

Villiers to President Steyn (May 21st), in which the Chief Justice of

the Cape refers to his recent experience in Pretoria when he was on

this very errand of "mediation":

"On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President, as

I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on

him; but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought,

would be amenable to argument: but I fear that either my advice

had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with

the President.

"I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad

with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.

"It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily

from the Government, instead of being gradually forced from them.

In the former case, they would rally the greater number of the

malcontents around them; in the latter case, no gratitude will be

felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides,

there can be no doubt that, as the alien population increases, as

it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their

discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be

conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made

by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.

"I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my

fellow-Commissioners that the President would adopt his

retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever

have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would

have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the

condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other

words, to recommence the war....

"I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly,

but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object

in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are,

of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's

position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience

will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can

reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used

your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will

also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace

successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make

his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the

arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide

over immediate difficulties."

And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief

Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in

allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:

"From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw,

three months ago, that if President Krueger did not voluntarily

yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the

whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krueger's friends

to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is

war with England; on the other side there are concessions which

will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, decide at once

how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years'

franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, make them your

friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority

of the Uitlanders with you when they become burghers. The answer

I got was: We have done too much already, and cannot do more. Yet

afterwards they did a great deal more. The same policy of doing

nothing except under pressure is still being pursued. The longer

the delay, the more they will have to yield."

[Sidenote: Afrikander advice.]

This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr.

Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir

Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed

to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a

convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate

of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience

has completely justified:

"I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost

influence to bear on President Krueger to concede some colourable

measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as

in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is

the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing

off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless

hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should

recruit his Republic with new blood--and the sands are running

out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The

fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is

done.... A moderate franchise reform and municipal privileges

would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a

maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against

the swamping of the old population."[66]

[Footnote 66: All these letters are in Cd. 369.]

But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative

of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see

that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on

indefinitely--that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord,

unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect

of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of

Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken,

contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both

the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the

nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with

which Dr. Te Water served them.

The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,[67] consists of three

letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the

Colonial Secretary's Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The

replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the

public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes

heartily" that Schreiner's "proposition" for the Conference has been

accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the advisability of

President Krueger's yielding on the ground, not of justice, but of

temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of the Crown

completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the Afrikander

nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private telegraphic

code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Saturday, when Schreiner

was obliged to write instead of telegraphing."

[Footnote 67: Cd. 369.]

"Circumstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our

friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the

head of the Government here, they have a better chance that

reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they

would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections

and our enemies were advisers.

[Sidenote: "Play to win time".]

"Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly

that things are extremely critical.

"Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such

as J. H.'s[68] best friends, received by him on Saturday and this

morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win

time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present

team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward

before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less

hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded

in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here."

[Footnote 68: Mr. Hofmeyr.]

In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share

President Steyn's view that "all the noise about war is bluff." Then

there follows a passage showing that Mr. Steyn had entertained

expectations of assistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that even Dr. Te

Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial allegiance:

"But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes,

"as to what you mean by saying that 'The Cape Ministry will be

able to do much more good.' In what respect do you think that we

can be of more use than before?"

Assuming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the

event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape

Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or

words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous

views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested

during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers,

from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes:

"When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz

and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and

duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of

the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible

assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a

responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of

internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all

the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown;

at least if they did not do so they would be liable to

dismissal."

Dr. Te Water then continues:

"I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not

already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible,

to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for

the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully

about this."

[Sidenote: Te Water and Steyn.]

The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a

curiously significant passage. There were some things discussed

between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know.

President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore,

reassures him:

"Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram

also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private:

naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend

Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be

afraid; I shall not give you away."

It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no

private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private

telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn's use.

"To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic

code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and

I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of

weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself _only_. It

is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and

the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am

afraid that things leak out there in one way or another."

And he then drives home the advice given before: "It is honestly now

the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the

rope."

One other letter must be given to complete this view of the

circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th,

1899--that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord

Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange

the conference with President Krueger. It is addressed to President

Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows:

"DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

"GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.

"_May 9th_, 1899.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,--

"I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the

ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the

Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could

consequently not get the desired information earlier.

"The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser

and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will

be able to supply you with any of either sort.

"On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest.

"The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet

officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come

in it through your proposed plan. The copies _re_ dynamite will

be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting,

"Your humble servant and friend,

"P. GROEBLER."[69]

[Footnote 69: The original of this letter is now in the

possession of Mr. E. B. Iwan Mueller, by whom it was published

in his work, _Lord Milner and South Africa_. The translation

is that of the Department of Military Intelligence.]

The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for time,"

because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal party to

power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of their

policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics were

"playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until

their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them

to defy the British Government.

[Sidenote: The Bloemfontein conference.]

It was in these circumstances that the High Commissioner met President

Krueger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st--June 5th). He was

accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary),

Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams

(Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),[70] with Mr.

Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner

had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner,

following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of

the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he

was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the

Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of

"sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on

the eve of the Conference.[71] Nor did Lord Milner avail himself of

President Steyn's willingness to take part in the proceedings; but, at

the High Commissioner's suggestion, Mr. Fischer (who was a member of

the Free State Executive) was invited to act as interpreter--a duty

which he discharged to the satisfaction of both parties. With

President Krueger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr.

A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive), Mr. J. C. Smuts

(the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of these, the High

Commissioner's Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at the meetings of

the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined to Lord Milner

and President Krueger.[72] As regards the business in hand, the

failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had deprived Lord Milner of

what would have proved a helpful influence. Mr. Hofmeyr's action had

procured an opportunity for "friendly discussion." But the

friendliness was to be all on the side of the Imperial Government. For

the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as we have seen, to secure

a fictitious concession on the part of President Krueger. Lord Milner's

aim was to obtain by friendly discussion a genuine and substantial

measure of reform; and the prospect of his success would have been

greatly increased if this despatch and Mr. Chamberlain's reply to it

had been before the public when the Conference took place. It was

written with the object of making the British people and President

Krueger alike aware how grave was the judgment which he had formed of

the existing situation. With England alive to the near danger which

threatened her supremacy in South Africa, and President Krueger brought

to understand that the man with whom he had to deal was one who held

these opinions, Lord Milner could have been "friendly" without the

risk of having his friendliness mistaken for a readiness to accept the

illusory concession which was all that the Afrikander mediation was

intended to secure.

[Footnote 70: 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one

year after the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he

(then A.D.C. to Lord Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up

the British flag over the Raadzaal at Pretoria.]

[Footnote 71: Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).]

[Footnote 72: Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at

8.30 a.m. on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein

punctually at 5 p.m. on Tuesday. Here he was met by President

Steyn and various officials of the Free State; and an address

of welcome was presented to him by the Mayor of Bloemfontein

upon his arrival at the private house which had been provided

for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven

o'clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the

High Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was

introduced by Mr. Steyn to President Krueger, Mr. Schalk

Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The first meeting of the Conference

took place in the afternoon at 2.30, in the new offices of

the Railway Department. In the evening a largely attended

reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Krueger

was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an

hour. The Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June

5th, and Lord Milner then paid a farewell visit to President

Steyn. The High Commissioner's special train left

Bloemfontein on the following morning at 10.30, and reached

Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of Wednesday, the 7th, where

he was received by a large crowd, including three of the Cape

Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of Parliament.

President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday

morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything

possible for the comfort and convenience of his state guest

during the week that he was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings

of the Conference, with the High Commissioner's report upon

them, are published in C. 9,404.]

[Sidenote: Lord Milner's attitude.]

As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great

embarrassment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the

charge of entering upon the discussion in an aggressive spirit,

calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a conciliatory

tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the abortive

protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully filled the

republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It has been

suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better result if he

had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had been willing

to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based upon an

entire misunderstanding of the method which the High Commissioner did,

in fact, adopt. The five years' franchise--the Bloemfontein

minimum--was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner said, in effect,

to President Krueger was this: "I have a whole sheaf of grievances

against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway rates,

interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious police

system, administrative corruption, municipal abuses, and the rest. I

will let all these go in exchange for one thing--a franchise reform

which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander

population some appreciable representation in the government of the

Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise

that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose

from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that

could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing

a permanent settlement of the Uitlander question, he had nothing

further to concede, and said so.

[Sidenote: President Krueger.]

No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and

antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented,

could have been found. At the evening reception given by President

Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly

buttoned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and

then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant's face,

half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth

which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Krueger,

_aetat._ 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Krueger's large and powerful frame

had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as

the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become

shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his

stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he

retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of

its former alertness. It needed all Mr. Smuts' mental resources--all

that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the

Temple--to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of

his State-Attorney's ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of

defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which

the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to

the Conference to make "one big straightforward effort to avert a

great disaster"; Krueger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end was as

Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of reform

seemed to President Krueger, in this mind, "worse than annexation"; and

on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is absolutely at an

end, and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it."

The Bloemfontein Conference made retreat for ever impossible. Lord

Milner himself was perfectly conscious that in holding President

Krueger to the franchise question he had made the conference the

pivotal occasion upon which turned the issue of peace or war. He knew,

when he closed the proceedings with a declaration that his meeting

with President Krueger had utterly failed to provide a solution of the

franchise question, that from this day forward there could be no

turning back for him or for the Imperial Government. But he knew, too,

that poor as was the prospect of obtaining the minimum reforms by any

subsequent negotiation, nothing could contribute more to the

attainment of this object than the blunt rejection of the makeshift

proposals put forward by President Krueger at Bloemfontein.

[Sidenote: After the conference.]

The result of the Conference, from this point of view, and its effect

upon the British population in South Africa, may be gathered from the

address presented to Lord Milner on his return to Capetown, and from

his reply to it. By the mouth of Mr. Alfred Ebden, a veteran colonist,

the British population of the Colony then (June 12th) expressed their

"admiration" of Lord Milner's "firm stand" on behalf of the

Uitlanders, offered him their "earnest support," and declared their

"entire confidence in his fairness and ability to bring these unhappy

differences to a satisfactory settlement." The essence of Lord

Milner's reply lies in the words, "some remedy has still to be found."

The nationality problem would be solved if the principle of equality

could be established all round. The Transvaal is "the one State where

inequality is the rule, which keeps the rest of South Africa in a

fever." It is inconsistent, he says, with the position of Great

Britain as paramount Power, and with the dignity of the white race,

that a great community of white men "should continue in that state of

subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the

Transvaal." And he concludes:

"I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her

Majesty's Government is one of aggression. I know better than any

man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has

been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will

continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference. Can any one

desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present

period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement

to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the future. Of

that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the

South African Republic will yet see its way to adopt a measure

of reform more liberal than that proposed at Bloemfontein. If

not, there may be other means of achieving the desired result. In

any case, it is a source of strength to those who are fighting

the battle of reform, and will, I believe, contribute more than

anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel that they have

behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the unanimous

sympathy of the British people throughout the world."[73]

[Footnote 73: C. 9,415.]

In the four months that followed the Bloemfontein Conference a burden

of toil and responsibility was laid upon Lord Milner which would have

crushed any lesser man into utter passivity or resignation. An

Afrikander Cabinet, with a nationalist element reporting its

confidential councils with the Governor to Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond

Master, and President Steyn, the secret ally of President Krueger,

would have been sufficient in itself to paralyse the faculties of any

ordinary administrator at such a crisis. But this was not the only

adverse influence with which circumstances brought Lord Milner into

collision. Incredible as it may seem, it is none the less the fact

that Sir William Butler, the General-in-Command of the British forces

in South Africa, and the military adviser of the High Commissioner,

was in close political sympathy with Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, and

in complete agreement with their views. For General Butler held that a

war to compel the Boer oligarchy to grant the elementary political

rights to the British in the Transvaal, which even Mr. Gladstone's

Cabinet intended to secure for them, would be the "greatest calamity

that ever occurred in South Africa." And more than this, that if the

Home Government did make war, it would be merely playing the game of

"the party of the Raid, the South African League."[74]

[Footnote 74: Evidence before War Commission. Cd. 1,791.]

[Sidenote: Milner and Butler.]

It is generally supposed that Lord Milner's disagreement with General

Butler had its origin in the conduct of the latter, when Acting High

Commissioner, in refusing the first Uitlander petition. This is quite

untrue. Lord Milner's view of the Uitlander grievances was, of course,

different from that of General Butler, who treated the appeal to the

Queen as an unnecessary and artificial agitation against the Transvaal

Government, and thereby placed the Acting British Agent, Mr. Edmund

Fraser, in a position of extreme difficulty; since Mr. Fraser was, of

course, desirous of carrying out his duties upon the general lines

followed by Sir William Greene in accordance with the instructions of

the Home Government. But the Transvaal question had never been

discussed between Lord Milner and General Butler; and at the time of

the Edgar incident Lord Milner was in England, and he had no means,

therefore, of forming an opinion as to the significance which attached

to this event, or the agitation to which it gave rise. On this

particular point there was no opportunity for a conflict of opinion.

Had Lord Milner been in South Africa he would, no doubt, have accepted

the first petition to the Queen; but he made no complaint of General

Butler's refusal to receive it. For the moment it was General Butler's

business, as Acting High Commissioner, and not Lord Milner's. From a

wider point of view, General Butler's action was injurious. It was one

of the many instances in which their English sympathisers have led the

Boers to destruction. But there was no friction, or argument, or

unfriendliness between him and the High Commissioner on this account.

This arose at a much later period; and arose, not on the general

question of policy, but on the question of the necessity of military

precautions in view of the imminence of war.

[Sidenote: Reinforcements requested.]

The friction between the High Commissioner and the General-in-Command

in South Africa was the most disastrous manifestation of a disregard

of the necessity for timely military preparations on the part of the

Imperial Government, which, when war broke out, jeopardised the

success of the British arms. For quite distinct reasons both General

Butler and the Imperial Government were opposed to any preparations

for war. The Salisbury Cabinet were reluctant to take any step that

might seem to indicate that they considered that the door to a

peaceful solution of the dispute was closed. In thus subordinating the

needs of the military situation to those of the political, they acted

in direct opposition to the maxim _si pacem vis, bellum para_. They

carried this policy to such a point that they disregarded the advice

of Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, and that of the Intelligence

Department,[75] with the result that when the war did break out the

available British forces in South Africa were found to be in a

position of grave disadvantage. The motive of General Butler's

opposition was entirely different. His view was that what made the

situation dangerous was not President Krueger's obduracy, but what he

called the "persistent effort" to "produce war" made by the British

inhabitants who desired Imperial intervention in the Transvaal. And

he, therefore, held that any reinforcements sent by the Home

Government would "add largely to the ferment which he (General Butler)

was endeavouring to reduce by every means."[76] The position in June

and July, from a military point of view, was as extraordinary as it

was harassing to Lord Milner. In England the civil authority, the

Cabinet, was refusing to make the preparations which its military

adviser declared to be necessary. In South Africa the civil authority,

the High Commissioner, was provided with a military adviser who cabled

to the Home Government political reasons for not sending the

reinforcements which the High Commissioner then urgently required. In

these circumstances it is obvious that nothing but the supreme efforts

of Lord Milner could have saved England from an overwhelming military

defeat, or from a moral catastrophe even more injurious to the

interests of the empire.

[Footnote 75: See p. 319 (note 2).]

[Footnote 76: Cd. 1,791.]

When Lord Milner saw, before the Bloemfontein Conference, that the

situation was becoming dangerous--and still more after the

Conference--he desired that preparations for war should be made by the

Imperial Government as a precautionary measure. Between December 1st,

1896, and December, 1898, the South African garrison had been raised

from 5,409 to 9,593 men.[77] It remained at a little under 10,000 up

to the end of August, 1899. Lord Milner had repeatedly impressed upon

the Home Government, from the middle of 1897 onwards, that 10,000 men

was the minimum force consistent with safety. In view of the increased

tension after Bloemfontein and of the enormous armament of the South

African Republic, he felt that this minimum had become inadequate, and

that it was desirable, and would strengthen the chance of a peaceful

submission of the Boers, to steadily but unostentatiously increase the

garrison. And what he desired especially was that the general on the

spot should do, locally and quietly, all that could be done to advance

these preparations. The measures which he urged were that plans should

be prepared for the defence of Kimberley and other towns on the

colonial borders, and that all supplies and material of war necessary

to put these plans into effect should be accumulated, and, as far as

possible, distributed.

[Footnote 77: War Commission, Cd. 1,791.]

[Sidenote: General Butler's objections.]

General Butler, as we have seen, was opposed to all preparations for

war; and it is not surprising, therefore, that everybody who offered

assistance, or advice on the military situation, was coldly received

by him. Mr. (now Sir) Aubrey Wools-Sampson, who, after the failure of

the Bloemfontein Conference, threw up lucrative civil employment in

Rhodesia in order to come to the Cape and place himself, as a

volunteer, at the service of the military authorities in the event of

war, was so completely discouraged that he went to Natal to form the

nucleus of the splendid fighting force afterwards known as the

Imperial Light Horse. When Colonel Nicholson, then head of the British

South Africa Police in Rhodesia, suggested that, in the same event, an

attack on the Transvaal, launched from the north, might prove valuable

as a means of diverting a portion of the Burgher forces from

employment against the Cape Colony and Natal, General Butler is said

to have looked upon his proposal as another Jameson Raid.[78] And

when, after the Bloemfontein Conference had been held, the Home

Government, in response to Lord Milner's repeated appeals, proposed to

send out the very inadequate reinforcements which formed its first

effort to strengthen the British military position in South Africa,

General Butler immediately represented to the War Office that these

additional troops were unnecessary, and protested against their being

despatched.

[Footnote 78: This was precisely the _role_ played by

Mafeking, only defensively, not offensively.]

General Butler's action at this crisis is so remarkable, and so

unprecedented, that the circumstances must be related with some

precision. In 1896, and again in 1897, General Goodenough had

submitted to the War Office schemes for the defence of the British

colonies, in which both the enormous extent of the frontiers to be

protected and the great numerical superiority of the burgher forces to

the then existing British garrison were fully exhibited. A memorandum

of the Department of Military Intelligence, dated September 21st,

1898, urged "that defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the

Cape and Natal"; that "the arrangements which would be made for the

despatch of reinforcements from England, and for the provision of

supplies and transport, be worked out fully in the War Office; and

that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what

action under these arrangements would be required of him on the

outbreak of war."[79] On December 21st, 1898, General Butler, upon

succeeding to the South African command, was requested to furnish, at

an early date, a fresh scheme of defence embodying his own proposals

for the distribution of the 9,500 British troops then in South Africa

in the event of war. At the same time the latest information as to

the military strength of the two Republics--showing, among other

things, a total of 40,000 burghers[80]--was forwarded to him, and his

attention was directed to the fact that the troops under his command

must be considered as a purely defensive force, whose _role_ would be

to repel invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from England.

In the absence of any reply to this communication General Butler was

again requested, on June 6th, 1899 (_i.e._ after the failure of the

Bloemfontein Conference), to report on the defence of the British

colonies. He then sent his scheme of defence, cabling the substance in

cipher, on June 9th, and sending the text by despatch on June 14th. On

June 21st he received a War Office telegram informing him that it had

been decided to "increase the efficiency of the existing force" in

South Africa. And to this communication was added the question: "Do

you desire to make any observations?"

[Footnote 79: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission).]

[Footnote 80: These were the figures of the D. M. I.

"Military Notes" of June, 1898; in the revised "Military

Notes" of June, 1899, the estimated total of the Boer force

was considerably greater--some 50,000 exclusive of colonial

rebels.]

[Sidenote: "Ringing the War Office bell".]

The sequel can be given in General Butler's words: "I looked on the

one side," he said, in giving evidence before the War Commission, "and

I saw what seemed to me a very serious political agitation going on

with a Party that I had not alluded to yet, whom I had always looked

upon as a Third Party; they were pressing on all they knew. The

Government did not seem to be aware of that, and this telegram

brought matters to such a point that I thought it gave me the

opportunity to speak. So I took these words 'any observations,' and

answered in a way which I thought would at least ring the War Office

bell."

The telegram with which General Butler "rang the War Office bell" was

this:

"You ask for my observations: present condition of opinion here

is highly excited, and doubtless the news _quoting_ preparations

referred to in your telegram, if it transpires, will add largely

to the ferment which I am endeavouring to reduce by every means.

Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms, in my

estimation, gravest elements in situation here. Believe war

between white races, coming as sequel to Jameson Raid, and

subsequent events of last three years, would be greatest calamity

that ever occurred in South Africa."

This telegram elicited the following reply from the Home Government:

"You cannot understand too clearly that, whatever your private

opinions, it is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy

by the High Commissioner, who is fully aware of our views, and

whom you will, of course, loyally support."

In the course of his evidence before the War Commission General Butler

gave some further explanation of the motives which had prompted his

reply to the telegram of June 21st. In response to the question, "It

was never in your contemplation that Mr. Krueger would declare war?"

he replied:

[Sidenote: General Butler's view.]

"My view was this, that as long as I held the neck of the bottle,

so to speak, there would be no war ... but to my mind the minute

there was the least indication of the Imperial Government coming

in, in front of, or behind, that party [_i.e._ "the party of the

Raid, the South African League"], there would be a serious state

of things. Until then there was, to my mind, no probability--no

possibility--of an invasion. That was the state of my mind at the

time ... [and] I wished to point it out before final decisions

were arrived at."

And in a note which he desired to be appended to his evidence before

the War Commission, General Butler wrote with reference to his failure

to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements, that in

his opinion "such a demand at such a time would be to force the hands

of the Government, play into the hands of the 'Third Party,' and

render [himself] liable to the accusation in the future that [he] had

by this premature action produced or hastened hostilities."[81]

[Footnote 81: All of these extracts will be found in Cd.

1,791.]

Here was an impasse from which obviously there was but one method of

extrication. Either the High Commissioner or his military adviser must

be recalled. That the Imperial Government did not recall General

Butler then and there cannot be attributed to any ignorance on their

part of Lord Milner's extreme anxiety for adequate military

preparations. It arose, no doubt, from the circumstance that General

Butler was known to be favourably inclined to the Boer cause, and

that, therefore, his removal at this juncture would have been

represented by the friends of the Boers in England, and by the

official leader of the Opposition, as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's

alleged determination to force a war upon the Transvaal. General

Butler was allowed, in these circumstances, to remain at the Cape

until the latter part of August, when fresh employment was found for

him, and Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker was appointed to the Cape

command. How General Butler was able to reconcile the opinions which

he had expressed to the War Office with the discharge of his duties as

military adviser to Lord Milner during these two critical months is a

matter which need not be discussed. The decision to retain him in the

South African command would seem, on the face of it, to have been a

grave administrative error. It is enough for us to record the

undoubted facts that Lord Milner was supremely dissatisfied with the

action of General Butler as his military adviser, and that whereas the

High Commissioner had requested the Home Government to provide him

with a new military adviser in June, General Butler did in fact remain

at the Cape until the latter part of August.

General Butler is reputed to be both an able man and a good soldier.

It is interesting, therefore, to know what was his view, and to

compare it with that of Lord Milner. In these opinions, which

dominated General Butler during the period in question (May to August,

1899), there was only one point in which he and Lord Milner found

themselves at one. This was the danger of the war; that is to say, the

seriousness of the military task which would await Great Britain in

the event of war with the Dutch in South Africa.

[Sidenote: What Lord Milner thought.]

As a great deal has been written on the subject of the military

unpreparedness of England, and it has, moreover, been frequently

stated in this connection that Sir William Butler was the only man to

form a just estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces,

it is very desirable to place on record what was really in Lord

Milner's mind at this time. He agreed with General Butler in his

estimate of the formidable character of the Boers; but he differed

from him in everything else. To Lord Milner's mind the situation

presented itself primarily from a political, and not from a military

point of view. He believed that England was bound to struggle at least

for political equality between the British and Dutch throughout South

Africa. He felt that, after our bad record in the past, it would be

absolutely fatal to begin to struggle for this equality unless we were

prepared to carry our efforts to a successful issue. He thought that

such a claim as this for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was one

that admitted of only two alternatives--it must never be made, or,

being made, it must never be abandoned. The whole weakness of our

position in South Africa was a moral weakness. The contempt which the

Dutch had learnt for England was writ large over the whole social and

political fabric of South Africa. Englishmen could not look the Dutch

in the face as equals. If, after all our previous humiliations and

failures; after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were going to commence

a struggle for equality--nothing more, and then not to get it, the

shame would be too grave for any great Power to support, or for those

who sympathised with us in South Africa to endure. We had raised the

British party in South Africa from the dust by the stand which we had

made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal. If we were going to

retreat from that position, the discredit of our action would compel

England to resign her claim to be paramount Power, and with the

resignation of that claim England's rights in South Africa would

inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at Simon's

Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was fundamental was

not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of retreat.

[Sidenote: Retreat impossible.]

Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if

the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line,

the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something

substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable,

that they would not yield, and that in this case a state of tension

would be created which must end in war. His position was, therefore,

definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing a policy

from which we cannot retreat--a policy that may lead to war--it is

wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared, unarmed, without

a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And so far from

thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the Imperial

Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would make war

more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely. But even

if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but "retreat" that

must be avoided at all costs.