CHAPTER III

A YEAR OF OBSERVATION

Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so

different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr.

Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the

man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in

South Africa--a position always difficult, but now more than ever

arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had

been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner--as he

then was--to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and

pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service. His

_metier_ was finance, and his accomplishment literature. Commencing

with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest)

for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to

Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the

Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable

assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,

in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent methods

of raising revenue--the death duties. The principle of the graduated

death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked out the

elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and enabled them

eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions, however

ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of

pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State. Yet it was

certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar

of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.[26] Whatever direct

knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the

impression created by his book _England in Egypt_. This was a work

which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English

statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative

system, working in a political society full of intrigue and

international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of

insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an

active association with so accomplished a master of financial and

administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment

for a colonial administrator.

[Footnote 26: Mr. Bodley, in his _Coronation of King Edward

VII._, remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected

during the mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at

that time (1902) "attained eminence in any branch of public

life." These three were Mr. H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore

(then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord Milner.]

[Sidenote: Sir Alfred Milner.]

But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their

view of the appointment from the opinions expressed by the many

prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The

leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of

the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir

Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March

28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained

admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life.

"He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount

high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most

grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers,"

pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all

affection." Mr. Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked

throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of

our time has been received with a larger measure both of the

approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The

office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and

responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only

"embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront

the new High Commissioner for South Africa:

"But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an

intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should

arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as

belongs to any man of our acquaintance."

Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had undertaken

his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies the reasoned

basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his earliest

political convictions was the belief that--

"there was no political object comparable in importance with that

of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the

United States]: the severance of another link in the great

Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill

any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed

to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to

render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide

State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had

ever ventured to aspire to. But in a cause in which one

absolutely believes, even failure--personal failure, I mean, for

the cause itself is not going to fail--would be preferable to an

easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere."

[Sidenote: Personal traits.]

This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the

paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and

already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of

all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was

closest to the life--"worthy of all praise and all affection." The

quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore

witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those

who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in

any public work. Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of the

Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in Cairo would

light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman who had once

been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue officials still

hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings. Such men had no

claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts of intellect;

but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his nature. "He was

so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining his name and

personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But the other

side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and inflexible

resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be brought

into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his South

African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to be

accepted as the characterising quality of the man. To some Milner

became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to

secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon

the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear

mental vision--never more clear than in South Africa--became clouded

by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be

further from the truth. If the man lived who could have turned the

Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English

ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who

had universally inspired all his former associates, whether equals or

subordinates, with admiration and affection. Whatever bitterness was

displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer and Afrikander

leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due to their

perception that he was then--as always--a source of strength and an

inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as their

rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated

Bismarck--because he was the strong man on the other side.

Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception

of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he

believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire,

irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship.

It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an

opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the

cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years

of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs

of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried

him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen

who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war,

when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him.

But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood

the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as

because they were by this time convinced of his complete mastery of

the political and economic problems of South Africa. It is to this

inability to understand the facts of the South African situation, as

he had learnt them, that we must attribute the comparative feebleness

shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the perverse attempt which

was made by the Liberal party, after the General Election of 1906, to

revoke the final arrangements of his administration. The interval that

separated Lord Milner's knowledge of South Africa from that of the

Liberal ministers was profound; but even the Unionist chiefs showed

but slight appreciation of the unassailable validity of the

administrative decisions with which they had identified themselves,

when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these decisions again, and

somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal of the nation.

[Sidenote: Arrival at Cape Town.]

Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual

moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and

the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point.

In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded

the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of

1896--the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the

freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the

London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the

appearance of a British squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the despatch

of reinforcements to the South African garrisons. The evident

determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to

repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of

amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during

the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more

conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in

this connection two other facts must be recorded. In August, 1896, Sir

Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir

William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was

assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a

trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the

Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported

on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than

reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had

been before the British public for the last year. It was otherwise

remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon

the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to

assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the

Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes.

[Sidenote: Milner's thoroughness.]

Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with

the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he

attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the

problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month of

anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was there

anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony, or in

the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from putting

his purpose into effect. Apart from the circumstance that the

reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration--a question

in which the political future of Mr. Rhodes was largely involved--was

a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required

by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of

"being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved,

therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country

districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch

population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and

Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible

to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial

Government. In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of

his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and

September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia

(November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898).

And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the

Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"--the former in order that he might

read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to

open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most helps a

man to know the character of his neighbour.

Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the

speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear

and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period

he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of

President Krueger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of

the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in

view of the disturbed state of South African politics. And as High

Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions

relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which

some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and

custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate

matters of personal fitness and official etiquette. But an account of

these questions--questions which he handled with equal insight and

decision--must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by

which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of

which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa

depended--the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in

the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its

allegiance to the British Crown.

[Sidenote: His friendliness to the Boers.]

The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the

Transvaal Government was one that was consistent alike with his

personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and

enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival

he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and

through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on

terms of intimacy with President Krueger, that he desired, as it were,

to open an entirely new account between the two governments. He, a new

High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to

retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic

hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the

discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect

friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired,

on his side, by the same friendly feelings. It was his hope,

therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic

controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser

matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krueger

and himself.

This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired

to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first

the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street

and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as

possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid

unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President

Krueger, was manifested in all he did at this time. In the course of

the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee by the

British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was asked to

decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of President

Krueger, should come first upon the list at the public banquet. He

replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President Krueger, as

the head of the State, must be fully accorded. On this occasion, of

all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most careful to

avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the South

African Republic or its chief magistrate."[27]

[Footnote 27: The incident is otherwise interesting as

affording the first sign of that confidence of the British

population in Lord Milner, which, steadily increasing as the

final and inevitable struggle approached, earned for him at

length the unfaltering support of British South Africa. After

the Rand celebrations were over, he was informed that his

advice had been put into effect with "very considerable

difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this: "The

new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look

to him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we

do this, let us obey him in a matter like this."]

[Sidenote: Milner and the Conventions.]

While to President Krueger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot

arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the

Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform

there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But

before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will

not, reform themselves. Therefore let us wait patiently, and make

things as easy as possible for President Krueger." More than this, he

had almost as little belief in the utility of the Conventions[28] as

Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers did, or did not,

call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small matter--an

etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was essential

was that men of British blood should not be kept under the heel of the

Dutch. Moreover, the grievances for which the observance of the London

Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a remedy, were

insignificant as compared with the more real grievances, such as the

attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury to

industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration,

and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical

observance of the Convention would remove. Nor did it escape Lord

Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of

the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of

grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the

subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial

Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions,

therefore, should be invoked as little as possible. For, if the Boers

denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of the text, the

Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma.

Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon

the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain

for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum

of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in

the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is

essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere

diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British

Government."

[Footnote 28: Apart from the question of the validity of the

preamble to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two

Conventions--the London Convention (1884), and the Swaziland

Convention (1894)--were in force between the South African

Republic and Great Britain. The relations of the Imperial

Government to the Free State were regulated by the

Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand

River Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's

time.]

[Sidenote: Transvaal affairs.]

Lord Milner's hope that President Krueger might meet him half-way,

although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of

foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour.

After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the

attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly

less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri"

Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's

Jubilee,[29] and at the same period the first and only step was taken

that offered a genuine promise of reform from within. The Industrial

Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive at the

request of President Krueger, surprised the Uitlander community by

conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that left

no ground for complaint. Its report, reviewing in detail the

conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded

a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints

put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr.

Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of

the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the

Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations

of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months

later President Krueger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or

of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there

remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government

being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner

consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the

Transvaal Government. And this although the Pretoria Executive soon

began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.[30]

[Footnote 29: These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey

Woolls-Sampson and Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to

sign the petition of appeal--an act of submission which

President Krueger required of the Johannesburg Reformers,

before he released them from Pretoria gaol. They did so on

the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself

responsible for their safety; since they and the other

Reformers, with the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their

arms on the faith of Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would

obtain reasonable reforms from President Krueger for the

Uitlanders.]

[Footnote 30: In the question of the Swaziland border, the

affair of Bunu, and the continued and increasing

ill-treatment of the Cape Boys, the Boer Government

manifested its old spirit of aggression and duplicity. All

these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and wearisome

negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled

firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly

discussion.]

If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krueger and the

Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of the

Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to notice,

the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee

celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which

he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch

in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion

in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses

or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial

Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued:

"The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar

interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware,

have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different

sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am

able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the

loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen.

People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as

well as the African natives, have vied with one another in

demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the

throne. When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of

feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration

of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement

which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the

feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much

stronger than has sometimes been believed. In my opinion, the

impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her Majesty's

Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South Africa,

and is likely to have a permanent value."[31]

[Footnote 31: This short despatch has been given practically

_in extenso_. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it

was communicated to the Press some three months after it had

been received.]

[Sidenote: First impressions of the Dutch.]

It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with

the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord

Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch

itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the

unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech,

and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the

result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support

the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal.

This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to

establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of

the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived

notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an

"open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his

first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded

it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch. But it must be

remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very

limited field of observation. At the time when this despatch was

written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in South

Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had been

confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula; that is

to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the Cape

Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely

identified, from a social point of view, with the official and

mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs.

What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was

prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone

of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the

Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June

23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had

happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change

in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr.

Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an

imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? _Nemo repente fuit

turpissimus._ Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was

right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from

ready appreciation to grave remonstrance.

The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an

element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which

posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in

South Africa to have been a just and necessary, or a needless and

aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the reader must

first be possessed of some more precise information of the political

situation in the Cape Colony at this time.

[Sidenote: The Sprigg ministry.]

At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in

motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the

new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape

Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May,

1898. The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg

upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid

(January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last

thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander

Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet--Mr.

Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and

Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct

representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington,

who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been

himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon

Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the

intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully

and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman. It

was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry

of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British interests was

too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more decided advocates

of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his more or less

friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions of the Dutch

extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry, offering in

itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by Mr. Hofmeyr

to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be adopted, had

secured for the Government the votes of the majority of the Dutch

members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the subserviency of

the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was afforded upon Lord

Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home Government determined to

reinforce the South African garrison, in order to strengthen its

demand upon the Transvaal Government for the repeal of the Aliens

Immigration Law. Although no direct opposition was offered by the

Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of barrack accommodation

in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for placing obstacles in the

way of its accomplishment. These difficulties were successfully

overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the reinforcements arrived

without giving rise to any political excitement.[32]

[Footnote 32: By August the South African garrison had been

raised to the very moderate strength of rather more than

8,000 troops.]

[Sidenote: Navy contribution bill.]

A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond

to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, in order that Sir

Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among the other

prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the Colonial

Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee celebrations in

England.[33] This was the beginning of a disagreement between the

Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in seriousness after

Sir Gordon's return from England, until it culminated in the

resignation of Dr. Te Water (May, 1898). The offer of an annual

contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was affirmed in

principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was understood in

England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the British

connection. In point of fact the measure received practically no

support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of Parliament,

on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's action in

the matter was employed as an effective argument to stimulate

disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr. Hofmeyr,

however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an organisation, to

commit itself to any overt opposition to the principle of a

contribution to the British Navy--an attitude which would have been

obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of loyalty--and with

characteristic irony the third reading of the Navy Contribution Bill

was eventually passed, a year later, without a division in the

Legislative Assembly by a Ministry[34] placed in office by Bond votes

for the declared purpose of opposing the policy of the Imperial

Government on the one question--the reform of the Transvaal

Administration--upon the issue of which depended the maintenance of

British supremacy in South Africa.

[Footnote 33: Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister

of the Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his

presence rendered any the less desirable by the fact that Sir

Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice, was also attending the

Jubilee in England.]

[Footnote 34: The Schreiner Ministry.]

[Sidenote: Rhodes's position.]

But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the

Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to

dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into

the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a

tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir

Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed

for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the

Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist

organisation, called the South African League, was established with

the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa.

Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention

of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of

devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But

upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the

Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much

warmth by the British population at Capetown in July, 1897, that he

had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same

position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was

afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr.

Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the

report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility

against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the

Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of

which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters

to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had

adopted Mr. Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as

their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new

combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman

and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898,

found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for

the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually

destructive aims. On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now

almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape

electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution"

into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its

recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with

Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader,

depending in no less a degree upon the Dutch population of the

Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that threatened

to deprive this population of its parliamentary preponderance. And in

a few months' time, as we shall see, the Schreiner-Bond coalition took

for its immediate aim the prevention of British interference in the

Transvaal; while the Progressive party came, no less openly, to avow

its determination to promote and support the action of the Imperial

Government in seeking to obtain redress for the Uitlander grievances.

The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well

known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at

Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too

authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance

which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources

of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience. For

the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or

party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and

ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and

circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our

question, which among these facts of personal observation and

experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape

Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of

the Graaf Reinet speech? The historian cannot claim, like the writer

of creative literature, to exhibit the working of the human mind. In

the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only what "has"

happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged and ennobled

by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen. But such

satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is at the

disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and running

over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of poetry, we

know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech the

development of the great South African drama reached its

"turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner

was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the

"embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred.

[Sidenote: No reform in the Transvaal.]

The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the

determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a

period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all

prospect of "reform from within." The treatment accorded to the report

of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established

the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints

of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance. The

Commission was created by President Krueger; it was in effect the

fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the

grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own

officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the

Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their

recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most

serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The

Report had raised great expectations. It was thought that, not all,

but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into

effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no

loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the

Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of

burgher predominance. If what President Krueger was waiting for was a

convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This

reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk

Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr. Krueger in

the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to

set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was

thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to

the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the

industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal

devotion to himself. Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on

the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the

recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as

subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report

had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from committee

to Volksraad, until very little of the original recommendations

remained, the Government took action. In addition to an immaterial

reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the Netherlands Railway

Company--a concession subsequently alleged to have been the price paid

by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further inquiry into its

affairs--it was announced that, with the object of lessening the cost

of living on the Rand, the import duties upon certain necessaries in

common use would be reduced, in accordance with the recommendations of

the Commissioners on this point; but that, since it was obviously

inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the Republic, the duties upon

certain other articles of the same class would be raised to an extent

more than counterbalancing the loss upon the reduction. _Parturiunt

montes; nascitur ridiculus mus._

[Sidenote: Krueger re-elected president.]

This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the

closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr.

Krueger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for

the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his

candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal,

had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors.

The figures--Krueger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert

(Commandant-General) 2,001--were additional evidence of the impotency

or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The first act

of President Krueger, on his return to power, was to dismiss Chief

Justice Kotze. Mr. Kotze's struggle for the independence of the law

courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with what

was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President Krueger

had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No. 1 of

1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the

right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their

opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that

extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the

entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were

adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged

through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers. The President

undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the

independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged

themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In

February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotze wrote to remind President Krueger

that his promise remained unfulfilled,[35] withdrawing at the same

time the conditional pledge not to exercise the "testing" right given

by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotze under Law No. 1,

compelled a second judge, Mr. Justice Amershof (who had supported the

Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to resign, and

appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who, as Chief

Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the Reformers

in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had declared that

"no honourable man could possibly accept the position of a judge so

long as Law No. 1 remained in force." The judicature was now rendered

subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were thus deprived of

their last constitutional safeguard against the injustice of the Boer

and Hollander oligarchy.

[Footnote 35: There appears to have been some question as to

whether the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to

introduce the proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or

in 1898. Chief Justice de Villiers held that the latter date

was contemplated by the President. But the point is

immaterial, since President Krueger denied in the Volksraad,

after the dismissal of Mr. Kotze, that he had ever given an

undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody

else.]

[Sidenote: His reactionary policy.]

This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President

Krueger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the

recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of

Chief Justice Kotze, that he was determined not merely to set himself

against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under

which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the

fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority;

he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in

possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in

increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war.

Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from his mission to Europe, he

had opened up communications with European Powers, that placed him in

a position to avail himself to the full of the possible embarrassment

of Great Britain through international rivalries or disagreements. In

South Africa he had carried through a treaty of offensive and

defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had received more than

one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander nationalism had been

kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony.

These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the

disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal

still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the

complaisance with which President Krueger's reactionary policy was

regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that

Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling

results. We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee

despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities

for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that

he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may

presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were

lost.

In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At

every little town and _dorp_--wherever, in fact, he went--he conversed

with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness;

and all the speeches that he made in reply to the addresses of

welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone. This was the time when

there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come

from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech

with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt--a feeling

which his audience must share--that now there was to be peace in South

Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner

were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to

this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was

accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. (now Sir Pieter)

Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit

as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of

Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all." The

expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp

reproof from _Ons Land_. From this and many other such incidents it

must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of

the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination.

[Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.]

[Sidenote: "Hands off" the Transvaal.]

And so it came about that in the months that President Krueger was busy

shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise

that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the

Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the

Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless. It made no

difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was always,

"_Our_ Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened both in

the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African) spring

and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord

Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial

Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape

Colony were against the British cause. The rank and file of the Dutch

population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly

friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control

of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than

anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord

Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, _Ons

Land_ presented the most authoritative and significant expression of

the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and

unrivalled experience. The editorial columns of _Ons Land_ rarely

contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence

of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more

subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the

attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than

of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented

and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it

than they were in that of any foreign country. And, in South African

matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders, was not

merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action for the

improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal, it took

a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum and

substance of Bond policy.

Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the

Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely

against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state

of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While

there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the

Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the

Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that

Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the

Colony. It was the utter despondency of the British population, and

the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he

have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a

constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there

was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its

stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest

of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete.

[Sidenote: Milner at Graaf Reinet.]

It was with this accumulated evidence in his mind that Lord Milner

travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf Reinet,

expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the ordinary sort

at the opening of the railway on the following day. The conventional

expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely veiled hypocrisy

and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at the time when

the whole weight of their influence was thrown against Great Britain

on the only South African question that really mattered, had become

nauseating even to his serene temper and generous disposition. He was

wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or unfriendly reply from the

Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable proposals of the Imperial

Government. Late at night there was brought to him, in the train, a

copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander

Bond, which was to be presented to him on the morrow. It contained, in

more than usually pointed language, a protest against "the charges of

disloyalty made against the Bond," and a request that the High

Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the expression of its

unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine how, in ominous

contrast to the superficial protestations of the text, something

exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address, something which

emphasised the inconsistency of these formal professions of attachment

to the throne with the very practical hostility of their authors to

British policy, struck the High Commissioner with peculiar force. The

Dutch, who, under British rule, enjoyed--one might almost say

abused--every privilege of citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite

prepared to see the British excluded, under Dutch rule, from these

same privileges in the Transvaal. More than that, they were determined

to employ all the agencies at their command to prevent any effective

interference with the Transvaal oligarchy. Lord Milner evidently felt

that the time had come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the

impressions which had been accumulating in his mind, he wrote down

then and there his answer, which was delivered on the following day.

"Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her

Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be

allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason

could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully

well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its

great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural

disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the

position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her

Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago. The progress in

material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress

are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means

always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely

free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging

the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of

law manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, and

secure in the discharge of their high functions from all external

interference. You have--at least as regards the white

races--perfect equality of citizenship. And these things have not

been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and

gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government,

justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy.

And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that

gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack

without your being asked to contribute one pound to that

protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of

course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not.

"And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have

to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may

put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or

less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to

shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the

population of the Colony--Dutch as well as English--are, I firmly

believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know they live

under a good constitution, and have no wish to change it, and

regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at

the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to consider; if

political controversy were confined to the internal affairs of

the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of hard

language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the

usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody

else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd--so obviously

absurd--that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges

would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.

[Sidenote: The loyalty of the Bond.]

"What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case,

what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the

fact that the political controversies of this country at present

unfortunately turn largely upon another question--I mean the

relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South African

Republic--and that, whenever there is any prospect of any

difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once

vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality,

espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that

they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the

politician--often the best of men, though singularly

injudicious--who, whenever any disputes arise with another

country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be

in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very

much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his

fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly

opposite assumption. And so I do not take it that in this case

people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy

with the Government of the Transvaal--which, seeing the close tie

of relationship which unites a great portion of the population

here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly

natural--to a point which gives some ground for the assertion

that they seem to care much more for the independence of the

Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to

which they themselves belong.

"For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in

espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open

rupture between that country and the British Government. They

loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they

think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government

that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great

number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that

is a way to prevent such a calamity.

"But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the

assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the

independence of the Transvaal--that independence which it has

itself given--and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order

to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact

opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it

is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes

of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they

are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the

Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the

semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that

country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only

on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly

reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of

the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain's

moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is

not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government

which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at

all. It is that unprogressiveness--I will not say the

retrogressiveness--of the Government of the Transvaal and its

deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it

devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every

impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers

which threaten it are internal.

[Sidenote: Milner's appeal to the Dutch.]

"Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that

this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all

that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation

that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or

that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that

quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be

instantly rejected because it was British. But the same does not

apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to

those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy

for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of

disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least cannot be

suspected across the border; and if all they desire--and I

believe it is what they desire--is to preserve the South African

Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the

British Colonies and Government, then let them use all their

influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the

Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its

Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing

it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even

more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its

administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa,

such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the

direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate

troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than

thirty years, is to be found."[36]

[Footnote 36: _Cape Times_, March 4th, 1898.]

Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No

such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High

Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now

eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action

and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect,

and grew uneasy.

The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. What is

the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, if you

refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one thing of

all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should feel--that the

Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and the tone and

temper of its administration, to those of the free communities of

South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free State."

The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was

the weight of inevitable truth.

A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to

urge President Krueger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he

says:

"You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at

Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in _The

Cape Times_. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled

hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble

ahead....

"Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the

future lies in the attitude of President Krueger and his vain hope

of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened

minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using

the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true

Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent

discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their

mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs

cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and it

will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all

of us.

"I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in

the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and

good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between

the South African Republic and a catastrophe."[37]

[Footnote 37: Cd. 369.]

[Sidenote: Sprigg and the Bond.]

Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the

British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased

by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had

been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the

essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been

vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had

done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to

do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was

unassailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the

different sections of the British population were manifesting a

tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this

movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge

the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time

past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population

of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by

any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary

representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the

Cape electoral system was brought before the Ministry. The

indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze, and the

growing evidence of President Krueger's determination to ride

rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed

to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of

the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the

common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of

British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid

British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The

Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing

to Mr. Hofmeyr; but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost

united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament,

resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was

approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.

Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.[38]

[Footnote 38: He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship

by Dr. Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a

Progressive, and at the same time Sir Thomas Upington, who

had resigned from ill-health, was succeeded by Mr. T.

Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.]

[Sidenote: Redistribution.]

Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the

parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He

had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his

Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to

throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes was

the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in doubt. On the

resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was at once turned

on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave notice of a vote of

"no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, and in the meantime

the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was met by the "previous

question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of the Provincial Council

of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in Parliament or in the

Press, to conceal the fact that, under the question of redistribution,

wider and more momentous issues were at stake. The counts in the

Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out in _Ons Land_, were (1)

its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the proposed gift of a

warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of sympathy with the

South African Republic. Against these crimes it had nothing to place,

except that it had permitted the employment of the captured Bechuanas,

as indentured labourers[39]--its sole merit, in the opinion of the

Bond journal. _The Cape Times_, on the other hand, declared with equal

frankness that the real point to be decided was, whether the interests

of President Krueger and the South African Republic, or those of the

Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, had the greater claim upon

the Government and Parliament of the Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when,

on June 13th, he introduced the "no confidence" motion, asked the

House to condemn the Ministry on the ground that it had not shown any

"sympathy" with, or made any "conciliatory approach" towards, the

"sister Republic." On Monday, June 20th, the second reading of the

Redistribution Bill was carried by a majority of seven, but two days

later, June 22nd, the Ministry found itself in a minority of five on

Mr. Schreiner's motion of "no confidence."[40] In these circumstances

Sir Gordon Sprigg determined not to resign, but to appeal to the

electorate--a course justified by constitutional usage--and Parliament

was dissolved.

[Footnote 39: These were prisoners taken in the suppression

of the revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.]

[Footnote 40: The little group of six, of which Sir James

Innes was the head--including Sir R. Solomon and four

others--voted _with_ the Ministry for the Redistribution

Bill, but _against_ it on the "no confidence" motion (with

the exception of Sir James himself). Also one moderate

Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the

Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.]

[Sidenote: The general election, 1898.]

The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no

little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were

supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and

other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by

President Krueger and his agents from the revenues of the

Transvaal.[41] Mr. Schreiner's election utterances were studiously

moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the

Malmesbury division, by whom he was returned to Parliament, contained

a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to which they

belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented the

sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The

objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive

form by _Ons Land_, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to

oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in

politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation

of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words,

to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the

diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general

preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The

under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch

population may be understood from the fact that the following frank

appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was

published in the columns of _Ons Land_:

[Footnote 41: Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a

candidate financed from Pretoria.]

"When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it

must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The

majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go

bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two

Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the

stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at

least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape

Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The two

Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the stranger

[_i.e._ British] are unable to continue the fight. One day the

question of who is to be master will have to be referred to the

arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend upon

the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our side

we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince matters.

This is the real point at issue; and in this light every

Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we

expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority

of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on

the sword when God's time comes."[42]

[Footnote 42: As translated in _South Africa_, October 15th,

1898.]

At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become

what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of

rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander

nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from

certain extracts from the _Studenten Blad_ of the Theological Seminary

of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by _The Albert

Times_. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by

November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students

had at that date joined the Boer forces:

[Sidenote: Anti-british sentiment.]

"Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors

of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as

their heart's blood--a people that followed our fathers to the

new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and

snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom?

Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the

land with God's aid and with their blood. But England is not

satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people,

and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our

religion! Must we surrender everything, and disown our fathers? I

cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me--the thought

of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand

of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an

unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say that the Bible teaches

us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be

here applied. Race hatred is something quite distinct from

personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as a private

individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, however,

I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, must

regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion--as a wolf

that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief

reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the

enemies of our religion."

At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were

over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned.

Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned

both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former

constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus

vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return

of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take

place until the 15th. As all three constituencies were expected to

elect Progressives--an expectation which was fulfilled--the result of

the general election was to give the Bond a bare majority of one, and

this in spite of the fact that a considerably larger total of votes

had been cast for the Progressive than for the Bond candidates.[43]

[Footnote 43: In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39

Progressive members were returned. A very careful and

reliable calculation showed that, of an aggregate of 82,304

votes polled, 44,403 were cast for Progressive, and 37,901

for Afrikander candidates. More than this, while no

Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than

137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective

majorities, of two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives,

therefore, were entitled, on their aggregate vote, to a

majority of six.]

[Sidenote: Milner's impartiality.]

These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is

significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner

discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the

Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had

polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a

minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry

should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until

the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in

the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce

one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the

Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution

of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The

partial appropriation made by Parliament before the dissolution was

exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be provided

without the authority of Parliament was the issue of Governor's

warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign warrants to

enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during the

unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last appropriation

and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of the

constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain supply

is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to issue

warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the

Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be

completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as

the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was,

no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair

prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to

put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have

failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A

loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with

or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run

the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and

of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might

otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But,

as Governor of the Colony, he refused to allow any considerations of

party interest, on this or on any subsequent occasion, to influence

his judgment. While he conceived it to be his duty to give advice and

criticism to public men of all shades of political opinion, he showed

himself inexorably opposed to the thought of straining his

constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the benefit of one

side or the other.[44] Accordingly provision for the expenses of

administration was made by Governor's warrants up to September 30th,

and on the day following the Vryburg election (September 16th), a

proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th was issued.

[Footnote 44: Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord

Milner for the purpose of laying his views before him. But,

it is said, the unwonted sternness of the Governor's

expression at once convinced him of the hopelessness of his

mission; and he withdrew without any attempt to argue his

case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal magnetism, the

incident is not without significance.]

[Sidenote: Schreiner, prime minister.]

On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no

confidence" by a majority of two.[45] On the 17th the House assembled

with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to

the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members

of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close

association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The

latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided

with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The

Progressives continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon Sprigg.

Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an "independent," since

he had found himself unable to work in association with a party in

which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. The new Ministry was not

strong enough to resist the continued demand of the Progressives for a

measure of electoral reform; but the Redistribution Bill, as now

passed, took the form of a compromise so disastrous to the British

population that the Bond majority was increased to eight by the new

elections held in April, 1899.[46]

[Footnote 45: Both sides were one short of their full

strength, but a Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was

chosen Speaker of the House.]

[Footnote 46: The second reading of the Navy Contribution

Bill, giving effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was

carried on December 2nd, 1898, without a division.]

Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief

that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the

Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in

October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony

pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the

affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and

more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have

seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the

northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal

the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been

despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with

authority and funds calculated to enable him to enlist the active

sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria

Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by

Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the

actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. Smuts, a younger and

even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was

appointed to the office of State Attorney.[47] With the exception of

Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the

control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists

dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in

these circumstances, the tone of the communications passing between

the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become

increasingly unsatisfactory.[48]

[Footnote 47: The State-Secretaryship was offered first to

Mr. Abraham Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was

declined (_Memoirs of Paul Krueger_, vol. ii., p. 297). The

Cape Afrikanders desired the appointment of Mr. Smuts.]

[Footnote 48: On May 7th, 1897, President Krueger had formally

requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at

issue between the two Governments under the Convention to be

submitted to the arbitration of the President of the Swiss

Republic. To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on

October 10th, that the relationship of Great Britain to the

South African Republic being that of a suzerain Power, it

would be impossible for the Imperial Government to permit the

intervention of a foreign Power. On April 16th, 1898, in a

despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly,

President Krueger claims that the South African Republic is an

independent State, and denies the existence of any

"suzerainty" on the part of Great Britain. In forwarding this

despatch Lord Milner made the apposite comment that the

propriety of employing the term suzerainty to express the

rights possessed by Great Britain is an "etymological

question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December 15th,

accepts President Krueger's declaration that he is willing to

abide by the articles of the Convention, reasserts the claim

of suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and

demands the immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch

of May 9th, 1899, Mr. Reitz asserts that the Republic is "a

sovereign international State"; and on June 13th Mr.

Chamberlain replies that he has no intention of continuing

the discussion.]

[Sidenote: Milner's visit to England.]

In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England.

Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th,

was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner's visit was due

in part to the necessity for medical treatment;[49] but, in any case,

it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to

Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South

African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the

19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February

14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was

engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody

else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs

was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss

of South Africa.

[Footnote 49: Owing to a slight affection of the eye.]

During nineteen months of close observation and earnest, patient

study, Lord Milner had grasped the situation in its completeness. What

he saw was the demoralising effect of the spectacle of the Dutch

ruling in the Cape Colony, and the British being tyrannised over in

the Transvaal. Looking at South Africa as a whole, there was the fact,

as indisputable as it was grotesque, that the British inhabitant was

in a position of distinct inferiority to the Dutch; and this although

the Cape and Natal were British colonies, while the Transvaal and the

Free State were states subject to the authority of Great Britain as

paramount Power. It was an impossible position. What Lord Milner urged

upon the Imperial Government was the plain necessity of putting an end

to an intolerable state of things which showed no capacity of righting

itself; of pressing for justice to the British population of the

Transvaal, with an absolute determination to obtain it. That such a

policy might result in war, he knew; though neither he nor any one

else realised, in the beginning of 1899, how near war actually was.

The reliance of the Transvaal oligarchy on the Orange Free State, now

bound to them by a formal alliance, and on the party of the Bond now

in power at the Cape, might tempt them to resist even the most

moderate demands. But Milner no doubt hoped that, if the British

Government grasped the nettle firmly, and, while treating the

Transvaal with all possible diplomatic courtesy, yet left no doubt

whatever of its inflexible resolution, war might still be avoided. And

in any case he felt that there was no option for the British

Government but to take up the case of the Transvaal British, if a

shred of respect for the power and name of Britain was to be preserved

in South Africa. To embark on such a policy involved two dangers: the

danger of war, and what in Milner's eyes was perhaps even greater,

the danger that, by advancing just claims and then, letting ourselves

be "bluffed" out of them, we might yet further lessen, and indeed

totally destroy, what hold we still possessed upon the affection of

the South African British or on the respect either of British or

Dutch. In the light of past experience the second danger may well have

seemed to him the greater of the two. But, with perils on both hands,

he still felt that there was nothing for it but to go forward, to make

one supreme effort to save a situation which was rapidly becoming a

hopeless one. To have remained quiescent, with the forces which were

gradually edging us out of the Sub-Continent growing on every side,

could only have ended in the overthrow, or at best, the euthanasia of

British dominion in South Africa.

[Sidenote: His verdict.]

It was in the course of this visit that Lord Milner realised the

magnitude of the task that lay before him. To save England in spite of

herself; to keep South Africa a part of the Empire in spite of

ignorance at home, in the teeth of an armed Republic and an Afrikander

ministry, required not merely an iron will and mastership in

statecraft, but a reasoned and unfaltering belief in the justice of

the British cause. "Certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my

might," he said long afterwards in his farewell speech at

Johannesburg, "because I was, from head to foot, one mass of glowing

conviction of the rightness of our cause."