CHAPTER XIII.

THE MYSTERY OF FAITH--THE MYSTERY OF MIRACLE.

Faith in the power of prayer--and only where a power, an objective

power, is ascribed to it, is prayer still a religious truth--is

identical with faith in miraculous power; and faith in miracles is

identical with the essence of faith in general. Faith alone prays;

the prayer of faith is alone effectual. But faith is nothing else

than confidence in the reality of the subjective in opposition to

the limitations or laws of Nature and reason,--that is, of natural

reason. The specific object of faith, therefore, is miracle;

faith is the belief in miracle; faith and miracle are absolutely

inseparable. That which is objectively miracle or miraculous power

is subjectively faith; miracle is the outward aspect of faith, faith

the inward soul of miracle; faith is the miracle of mind, the miracle

of feeling, which merely becomes objective in external miracles. To

faith nothing is impossible, and miracle only gives actuality to

this omnipotence of faith: miracles are but a visible example of

what faith can effect. Unlimitedness, supernaturalness, exaltation of

feeling,--transcendence is therefore the essence of faith. Faith has

reference only to things which, in contradiction with the limits or

laws of Nature and reason, give objective reality to human feelings

and human desires. Faith unfetters the wishes of subjectivity from the

bonds of natural reason; it confers what Nature and reason deny; hence

it makes man happy, for it satisfies his most personal wishes. And

true faith is discomposed by no doubt. Doubt arises only where I go

out of myself, overstep the bounds of my personality, concede reality

and a right of suffrage to that which is distinct from myself;--where

I know myself to be a subjective, i.e., a limited being, and seek to

widen my limits by admitting things external to myself. But in faith

the very principle of doubt is annulled; for to faith the subjective

is in and by itself the objective--nay, the absolute. Faith is nothing

else than belief in the absolute reality of subjectivity.

"Faith is that courage in the heart which trusts for all good to

God. Such a faith, in which the heart places its reliance on God alone,

is enjoined by God in the first commandment, where he says, I am the

Lord thy God.... That is, I alone will be thy God; thou shalt seek

no other God; I will help thee out of all trouble. Thou shalt not

think that I am an enemy to thee, and will not help thee. When thou

thinkest so, thou makest me in thine heart into another God than I

am. Wherefore hold it for certain that I am willing to be merciful

to thee."--"As thou behavest thyself, so does God behave. If thou

thinkest that he is angry with thee, he is angry; if thou thinkest

that he is unmerciful and will cast thee into hell, he is so. As thou

believest of God, so is he to thee."--"If thou believest it, thou hast

it; but if thou believest not, thou hast none of it."--"Therefore,

as we believe so does it happen to us. If we regard him as our God,

he will not be our devil. But if we regard him not as our God, then

truly he is not our God, but must be a consuming fire."--"By unbelief

we make God a devil." [98] Thus, if I believe in a God, I have a God,

i.e., faith in God is the God of man. If God is such, whatever it

may be, as I believe him, what else is the nature of God than the

nature of faith? Is it possible for thee to believe in a God who

regards thee favourably, if thou dost not regard thyself favourably,

if thou despairest of man, if he is nothing to thee? What else then

is the being of God but the being of man, the absolute self-love

of man? If thou believest that God is for thee, thou believest

that nothing is or can be against thee, that nothing contradicts

thee. But if thou believest that nothing is or can be against thee,

thou believest--what?--nothing less than that thou art God. [99]

That God is another being is only illusion, only imagination. In

declaring that God is for thee, thou declarest that he is thy own

being. What then is faith but the infinite self-certainty of man, the

undoubting certainty that his own subjective being is the objective,

absolute being, the being of beings?

Faith does not limit itself by the idea of a world, a universe,

a necessity. For faith there is nothing but God, i.e., limitless

subjectivity. Where faith rises the world sinks, nay, has already

sunk into nothing. Faith in the real annihilation of the world--in an

immediately approaching, a mentally present annihilation of this world,

a world antagonistic to the wishes of the Christian, is therefore

a phenomenon belonging to the inmost essence of Christianity;

a faith which is not properly separable from the other elements

of Christian belief, and with the renunciation of which, true,

positive Christianity is renounced and denied. [100] The essence

of faith, as may be confirmed by an examination of its objects down

to the minutest speciality, is the idea that that which man wishes

actually is: he wishes to be immortal, therefore he is immortal;

he wishes for the existence of a being who can do everything which

is impossible to Nature and reason, therefore such a being exists;

he wishes for a world which corresponds to the desires of the heart,

a world of unlimited subjectivity, i.e., of unperturbed feeling,

of uninterrupted bliss, while nevertheless there exists a world

the opposite of that subjective one, and hence this world must pass

away,--as necessarily pass away as God, or absolute subjectivity,

must remain. Faith, love, hope, are the Christian Trinity. Hope has

relation to the fulfilment of the promises, the wishes which are not

yet fulfilled, but which are to be fulfilled; love has relation to

the Being who gives and fulfils these promises; faith to the promises,

the wishes, which are already fulfilled, which are historical facts.

Miracle is an essential object of Christianity, an essential article of

faith. But what is miracle? A supranaturalistic wish realised--nothing

more. The Apostle Paul illustrates the nature of Christian faith by

the example of Abraham. Abraham could not, in a natural way, ever hope

for posterity; Jehovah nevertheless promised it to him out of special

favour, and Abraham believed in spite of Nature. Hence this faith was

reckoned to him as righteousness, as merit; for it implies great force

of subjectivity to accept as certain something in contradiction with

experience, at least with rational, normal experience. But what was

the object of this divine promise? Posterity, the object of a human

wish. And in what did Abraham believe when he believed in Jehovah? In

a Being who can do everything, and can fulfil all wishes. "Is anything

too hard for the Lord?" [101]

But why do we go so far back as to Abraham? We have the most striking

examples much nearer to us. Miracle feeds the hungry, cures men born

blind, deaf, and lame, rescues from fatal diseases, and even raises

the dead at the prayer of relatives. Thus it satisfies human wishes,

and wishes which, though not always intrinsically like the wish for the

restoration of the dead, yet in so far as they appeal to miraculous

power, to miraculous aid, are transcendental, supranaturalistic. But

miracle is distinguished from that mode of satisfying human wishes

and needs which is in accordance with Nature and reason, in this

respect, that it satisfies the wishes of men in a way corresponding

to the nature of wishes--in the most desirable way. Wishes own

no restraint, no law, no time; they would be fulfilled without

delay on the instant. And behold! miracle is as rapid as a wish is

impatient. Miraculous power realises human wishes in a moment, at

one stroke, without any hindrance. That the sick should become well

is no miracle; but that they should become so immediately, at a mere

word of command,--that is the mystery of miracle. Thus it is not in

its product or object that miraculous agency is distinguished from

the agency of Nature and reason, but only in its mode and process;

for if miraculous power were to effect something absolutely new,

never before beheld, never conceived, or not even conceivable, it

would be practically proved to be an essentially different, and at

the same time objective, agency. But the agency which in essence,

in substance, is natural and accordant with the forms of the senses,

and which is supernatural, supersensual, only in the mode or process,

is the agency of the imagination. The power of miracle is therefore

nothing else than the power of the imagination.

Miraculous agency is agency directed to an end. The yearning after the

departed Lazarus, the desire of his relatives to possess him again,

was the motive of the miraculous resuscitation; the satisfaction of

this wish, the end. It is true that the miracle happened "for the

glory of God, that the Son of God might be glorified thereby;" but

the message sent to the Master by the sisters of Lazarus, "Behold,

he whom thou lovest is sick," and the tears which Jesus shed,

vindicate for the miracle a human origin and end. The meaning is:

to that power which can awaken the dead no human wish is impossible

to accomplish. [102] And the glory of the Son consists in this: that

he is acknowledged and reverenced as the being who is able to do what

man is unable but wishes to do. Activity towards an end is well known

to describe a circle: in the end it returns upon its beginning. But

miraculous agency is distinguished from the ordinary realisation

of an object in that it realises the end without means, that it

effects an immediate identity of the wish and its fulfilment; that

consequently it describes a circle, not in a curved, but in a straight

line, that is, the shortest line. A circle in a straight line is the

mathematical symbol of miracle. The attempt to construct a circle

with a straight line would not be more ridiculous than the attempt

to deduce miracle philosophically. To reason, miracle is absurd,

inconceivable; as inconceivable as wooden iron or a circle without

a periphery. Before it is discussed whether a miracle can happen,

let it be shown that miracle, i.e., the inconceivable, is conceivable.

What suggests to man the notion that miracle is conceivable is

that miracle is represented as an event perceptible by the senses,

and hence man cheats his reason by material images which screen the

contradiction. The miracle of the turning of water into wine, for

example, implies in fact nothing else than that water is wine,--nothing

else than that two absolutely contradictory predicates or subjects

are identical; for in the hand of the miracle-worker there is no

distinction between the two substances; the transformation is only

the visible appearance of this identity of two contradictories. But

the transformation conceals the contradiction, because the natural

conception of change is interposed. Here, however, is no gradual, no

natural, or, so to speak, organic change; but an absolute, immaterial

one; a pure creatio ex nihilo. In the mysterious and momentous act of

miraculous power, in the act which constitutes the miracle, water is

suddenly and imperceptibly wine: which is equivalent to saying that

iron is wood, or wooden iron.

The miraculous act--and miracle is only a transient act--is therefore

not an object of thought, for it nullifies the very principle of

thought; but it is just as little an object of sense, an object of

real or even possible experience. Water is indeed an object of sense,

and wine also; I first see water and then wine; but the miracle itself,

that which makes this water suddenly wine,--this, not being a natural

process, but a pure perfect without any antecedent imperfect, without

any modus, without way or means, is no object of real, or even of

possible experience. Miracle is a thing of the imagination; and on that

very account is it so agreeable: for the imagination is the faculty

which alone corresponds to personal feeling, because it sets aside

all limits, all laws which are painful to the feelings, and thus makes

objective to man the immediate, absolutely unlimited satisfaction of

his subjective wishes. [103] Accordance with subjective inclination

is the essential characteristic of miracle. It is true that miracle

produces also an awful, agitating impression, so far as it expresses a

power which nothing can resist,--the power of the imagination. But this

impression lies only in the transient miraculous act; the abiding,

essential impression is the agreeable one. At the moment in which

the beloved Lazarus is raised up, the surrounding relatives and

friends are awestruck at the extraordinary, almighty power which

transforms the dead into the living; but soon the relatives fall

into the arms of the risen one, and lead him with tears of joy to

his home, there to celebrate a festival of rejoicing. Miracle springs

out of feeling, and has its end in feeling. Even in the traditional

representation it does not deny its origin; the representation which

gratifies the feelings is alone the adequate one. Who can fail to

recognise in the narrative of the resurrection of Lazarus the tender,

pleasing, legendary tone? [104] Miracle is agreeable, because, as

has been said, it satisfies the wishes of man without labour, without

effort. Labour is unimpassioned, unbelieving, rationalistic; for man

here makes his existence dependent on activity directed to an end,

which activity again is itself determined solely by the idea of the

objective world. But feeling does not at all trouble itself about

the objective world; it does not go out of or beyond itself; it is

happy in itself. The element of culture, the Northern principle of

self-renunciation, is wanting to the emotional nature. The Apostles

and Evangelists were no scientifically cultivated men. Culture, in

general, is nothing else than the exaltation of the individual above

his subjectivity to objective universal ideas, to the contemplation

of the world. The Apostles were men of the people; the people live

only in themselves, in their feelings; therefore Christianity took

possession of the people. Vox populi vox Dei. Did Christianity conquer

a single philosopher, historian, or poet of the classical period? The

philosophers who went over to Christianity were feeble, contemptible

philosophers. All who had yet the classic spirit in them were hostile,

or at least indifferent to Christianity. The decline of culture was

identical with the victory of Christianity. The classic spirit, the

spirit of culture, limits itself by laws,--not indeed by arbitrary,

finite laws, but by inherently true and valid ones; it is determined

by the necessity, the truth of the nature of things; in a word, it is

the objective spirit. In place of this, there entered with Christianity

the principle of unlimited, extravagant, fanatical, supranaturalistic

subjectivity; a principle intrinsically opposed to that of science,

of culture. [105] With Christianity man lost the capability of

conceiving himself as a part of Nature, of the universe. As long as

true, unfeigned, unfalsified, uncompromising Christianity existed,

as long as Christianity was a living, practical truth, so long did

real miracles happen; and they necessarily happened, for faith in

dead, historical, past miracles is itself a dead faith, the first

step towards unbelief, or rather the first and therefore the timid,

uncandid, servile mode in which unbelief in miracle finds vent. But

where miracles happen, all definite forms melt in the golden haze

of imagination and feeling; there the world, reality, is no truth;

there the miracle-working, emotional, i.e., subjective being, is held

to be alone the objective, real being.

To the merely emotional man the imagination is immediately, without his

willing or knowing it, the highest, the dominant activity; and being

the highest, it is the activity of God, the creative activity. To

him feeling is an immediate truth and reality; he cannot abstract

himself from his feelings, he cannot get beyond them: and equally

real is his imagination. The imagination is not to him what it is

to us men of active understanding, who distinguish it as subjective

from objective cognition; it is immediately identical with himself,

with his feelings; and since it is identical with his being, it is

his essential, objective, necessary view of things. For us, indeed,

imagination is an arbitrary activity; but where man has not imbibed

the principle of culture, of theory, where he lives and moves only

in his feelings, the imagination is an immediate, involuntary activity.

The explanation of miracles by feeling and imagination is regarded

by many in the present day as superficial. But let any one transport

himself to the time when living, present miracles were believed in;

when the reality of things without us was as yet no sacred article of

faith; when men were so void of any theoretic interest in the world,

that they from day to day looked forward to its destruction; when

they lived only in the rapturous prospect and hope of heaven, that

is, in the imagination of it (for whatever heaven may be, for them,

so long as they were on earth, it existed only in the imagination);

when this imagination was not a fiction but a truth, nay, the eternal,

alone abiding truth, not an inert, idle source of consolation,

but a practical moral principle determining actions, a principle to

which men joyfully sacrificed real life, the real world with all its

glories;--let him transport himself to those times and he must himself

be very superficial to pronounce the psychological genesis of miracles

superficial. It is no valid objection that miracles have happened,

or are supposed to have happened, in the presence of whole assemblies:

no man was independent, all were filled with exalted supranaturalistic

ideas and feelings; all were animated by the same faith, the same

hope, the same hallucinations. And who does not know that there are

common or similar dreams, common or similar visions, especially among

impassioned individuals who are closely united and restricted to their

own circle? But be that as it may. If the explanation of miracles by

feeling and imagination is superficial, the charge of superficiality

falls not on the explainer, but on that which he explains, namely,

on miracle; for, seen in clear daylight, miracle presents absolutely

nothing else than the sorcery of the imagination, which satisfies

without contradiction all the wishes of the heart. [106]

The Essence of Christianity Translated from the second German edition · 第 13 / 22 章